13. Banks,Ā contād
ā¢ MonitoringĀ costĀ forĀ bankruptĀ entrepreneurĀ
withĀ Ā ļ§ ļ¼ ļ§
Ģ BankruptcyĀ costĀ parameter
ļļ1 ļ« R k ļļ§A
ā¢ BankĀ zeroĀ profitĀ condition
fraction of entrepreneurs with ļ§ļ¾ļ§
Ģ quantity paid by each entrepreneur with ļ§ļ¾ļ§
Ģ
ļ£
ļ1 ā Fļļ§ ļļ
Ģ ZB
quantity recovered by bank from each bankrupt entrepreneur
ļ§
Ģ
ļ« ļ1 ā ļļ ļ ļ§dFļļ§ļļ1 ļ« R k ļA
0
amount owed to households by bank
ļ½ ļ1 ļ« RļB
21. Result
ā¢ Leverage,Ā L,Ā andĀ entrepreneurialĀ rateĀ ofĀ
interest,Ā Ā Z,Ā notĀ aĀ functionĀ ofĀ netĀ worth,Ā N.
ā¢ QuantityĀ ofĀ loansĀ proportionalĀ toĀ netĀ worth:
L ļ½ A ļ½ Nļ«B ļ½ 1ļ« B
N N N
B ļ½ ļL ā 1ļN
ā¢ ToĀ computeĀ L,Ā Z/(1+R),Ā mustĀ makeĀ
assumptionsĀ aboutĀ F andĀ parameters.
1 ļ« R k , ļ, F
1ļ«R
22. TheĀ Distribution,Ā F
Log normal density function, Eļ· = 1, ļ³ = 0.82155
0.9
0.8
0.7
0.6
density
0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 5 5.5
ļ·
28. Standard Model āMarginal Efficiency of
Investmentā
Firms
consumption ļ f,t
Investment goods
ļ 0 Yjt
1 1
Yt ļ½ ļ f,t
dj , 1 ā¤ ļ f,t ļ¼ ļ,
Yjt ļ½ ļ t Kļ ļz t l jt ļ 1āļ
jt
other ļ« ļ¢ oil aļu t ļKt ļ« G t ļ« Ct ļ« ļIļ,t ā¤ Yt .
t
Ģ t
Supply labor Rent capital
Households
Backyard capital accumulation: Ģ Ģ
Ktļ«1 ļ½ ļ1 ā ļļKt ļ« Gļļ i,t , I t , I tā1 ļ
Rk u tļ«1 r k ļ« ļ1 ā ļļP k ā²,tļ«1
u c,t ļ½ E t ļļ c,t u c,tļ«1 ļ tļ«1
tļ«1 Rk
tļ«1 ļ½ tļ«1
P k ā²,t
29. Standard Model
Firms
L
K
Labor
market C I
Market for
Physical
Capital
household
30. Financing
ā¢ In the standard model, already have borrowing by firms for
working capital.
ā will now have banks intermediate this borrowing between
households and firms.
ā¢ In standard model, āputting capital to workā is completely
straightforward and is done by households. They just rent
capital into a homogeneous capital market.
ā¢ Now: āputting capital to workā involves a special kind of
creativity that only some households ā entrepreneurs ā have.
ā Entrepreneurs finance the acquisition of capital in part by
themselves, and in part by borrowing from regular āhouseholdsā.
ā Conflict of interest, because there is asymmetric information
about the payoff from capital.
ā Standard sharing contract between entrepreneur and household
not feasible.
31. Financial Frictions with Physical K
Firms
L
K
Labor
market C I
Capital
Producers Entrepreneurs
Entrepreneurs
sell their K
to capital producers
household
32. Financial Frictions with Physical K
Firms
Labor
market
Capital Kā
Producers Entrepreneurs
Loans
household banks
33. Accounts for nearly 50% of GDP
Banks, Households, Entrepreneurs
ļ§~Fļļ§, ļ” t ļ, Eļ§ ļ½ 1
entrepreneur
entrepreneur
entrepreneur
Households
Bank
entrepreneur
entrepreneur
Standard debt contract
34. ā¢ Net worth of an entrepreneur who goes to
the bank to receive a loan in period t:
value of capital after production earnings from capital after utilization costs
nt ļ½ Ģ
P k ā²,t ļ1 ā ļļļ§Kt ļ« Ģ
r k ļ§Kt
t āB tā1 Z tā1
ļt
An entrepreneur who bought capital in t-1 experienced an idiosyncratic shock, ļ§.
This log-normal shock has mean unity across all entrepreneurs, ļ§ ~ Fļļ§, ļ” t ļ .
An entrepreneurās shock can only be observed by lender by paying a monitoring
cost.
Under standard debt contract, entrepreneur either pays the interest rate on the debt,
or (if ļ§ is too low) declares bankruptcy, in which case he/she is monitored and
loses everything to the bank.
35. Five Adjustments to Standard DSGE
Model for CSV Financial Frictions
ā¢ Drop: household intertemporal equation for capital.
ā¢ Add: characterization of the loan contracts that can be
offered in equilibrium (zero profit condition for banks).
ā¢ Add: efficiency condition associated with
entrepreneurial choice of contract.
ā¢ Add: Law of motion for entrepreneurial net worth
(source of accelerator and Fisher debt-deflation
effects).
ā¢ Introduce: bankruptcy costs in the resource constraint.
36. Risk Shock and News
ā¢ Assume Ģ
iid, univariate innovation to ļ” t
Ģ Ģ ļ£
ļ” t ļ½ ļ 1 ļ” tā1 ļ« ut
ā¢ Agents have advance information about
pieces of u t
u t ļ½ ļ 0 ļ« ļ 1 ļ«. . . ļ«ļ 8
t tā1 tā8
2
ļ itāi ~iid, Eļļ itāi ļ ļ½ ļ” 2
i
ļ itāi ~piece of u t observed at time t ā i
37. Economic Impact of Risk Shock
lognormal distribution:
20 percent jump in standard deviation
1
0.9
ļ³ Larger number of
ļ³ *1.2
0.8
entrepreneurs in left
0.7 tail problem for bank
density
0.6
Banks must raise
0.5 interest rate on entrepreneur
0.4
Entrepreneur borrows less
0.3
Entrepreneur buys less capital,
0.2
investment drops, economy tanks
0.1
0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4
idiosyncratic shock
38. Monetary Policy
ā¢ Nominal rate of interest function of:
ā Anticipated level of inflation and change.
ā Slowly moving inflation target.
ā Deviation of output growth from ss path.
ā Monetary policy shock.
39. Estimation
ā¢ Use standard macro data: consumption,
investment, employment, inflation, GDP,
price of investment goods, wages, Federal
Funds Rate.
ā¢ Also some financial variables: BAA-AAA
corporate bond spreads, value of DOW,
credit to nonfinancial business.
ā¢ Data: 1985Q1-2008Q4
40. Key Result
ā¢ Risk shocks:
ā important source of fluctuations.
ā¢ Out-of-Sample evidence suggests the
model deserves to be taken seriously.
42. Role of the Risk Shock in Macro and Financial Variables
43. Variance Decomposition In
Business Cycle Frequencies
Risk shock, ļ” t
Output
49
Credit
63
Slope of Term Structure
33
Risk spread
98
Real Value of Stock Market
76
44. Why Risk Shock is so Important
ā¢ A. Our econometric estimator āthinksā
risk spread ~ risk shock.
ā¢ B. In the data: the risk spread is strongly
negatively correlated with output.
ā¢ C. In the model: bad risk shock generates
a response that resembles a recession.
ā¢ A+B+C suggests risk shock important.
45.
46. What Shock Does the Risk
Shock Displace, and why?
ā¢ The risk shock crowds out some of the
role of the marginal efficiency of
investment shock.
47.
48. Why does Risk Crowd out
Marginal Efficiency of
Investment?
Supply shifter:
Price of capital marginal efficiency
of investment, ļ i,t
Demand shifters:
risk shock, ļ” t ;
wealth shock, ļ t
Quantity of capital
49. ā¢ Marginal efficiency of investment shock
can account well for the surge in
investment and output in the 1990s, as
long as the stock market is not included in
the analysis.
ā¢ When the stock market is included, then
explanatory power shifts to financial
market shocks.
50. CKM Challenge
ā¢ CKM argue that risk shocks (actually, any
intertemporal shock) cannot be important in
business cycles.
ā¢ Idea: a shock that hurts the intertemporal
margin will induce substitution away from
investment and to other margins, such as
consumption and leisure.
ā¢ CKM argument probably right in RBC model.
ā¢ Not valid in New Keynesian models.
51. Failure of Comovement Between C & I
in RBC Models With Risk Shocks
ā¢ In RBC model, jump in risk discourages
investment.
ā¢ Reduction in demand leads to reduction of price of
current goods relative to future goods, i.e., real
interest rate.
ā¢ Real interest rate decline induces surge in
demand, partially offsetting drop in investment.
ā¢ This Mechanism does not necessarily work in NK
model because real rate not fully market
determined there.
52.
53. āOut of Sample Evidenceā
ā¢ Out of sample forecasting performance
good.
ā¢ Predictions for aggregate bankruptcy rate
good.
ā¢ Correlates well with Bloom evidence on
cross-sectional uncertainty.
54. Conclusion
ā¢ Much of the dynamics of past data can be
explained as reflecting a risk shock.
ā¢ In this analysis, shock is treated as
exogenous.
ā¢ Interesting to investigate mechanisms that
make that āshockā endogenous.