ACCT116 – Master Class ScheduleSubject to (possibly major) revi.docx

ACCT116 – Master Class Schedule
Subject to (possibly major) revisionVersion 8/27/2014
Date
No.
Topic
Related
Readings
Homework Problems
DUE?
WEEK 1
T Sept 23
1
PART I: Introduction and cost terms
· What is management accounting?
Chapter 1
Read Syllabus
R Sept 25
2
· Parlez vous management accounting?

Chapter 2, p. 24-47
Chapter 3, p. 93-103
HW 1:
Exercises: 2-2, 2-3, 2-4
Problems: 2-18, 2-21
(due Oct 5)
WEEK 2
T Sept 30
3
PART II: Short-term decision making
· Cost-Volume-Profit
Chapter 5
HW 2:
Exercises: 5-4, 5-5, 5-8, 5-12
(due Oct 12)
Quiz 1 opens
R Oct 2
4
· Cost-Volume-Profit/ cost estimation
Chapter 2, p. 48-49/
Chapter 5
HW 3:
Exercises: 2-5, 2-8
(due Oct 19)
WEEK 3
T Oct 7
5

· CONVOCATION – NO CLASS
HW 4:
Exercises: 12-1, 12-3, 12-4, 12-5, 12-8, 12-9
(due Oct 19)
R Oct 9
6
· Short-term decision problems
Chapter 12
WEEK 4
T Oct 14
7
MIDTERM 1
R Oct 16
8
PART III: Cost allocation
· Job order costing
Chapter 3
HW 5:
Exercises: 3-1, 3-2, 3-10, 3-17
Problems: 3-22, 3-24
(due Oct 26)

WEEK 5
T Oct 21
9
· Job order costing
Chapter 3
R Oct 23
10
· Activity-based costing
Chapter 7
HW 6:
Exercises: 7-2, 7-3, 7-4, 7-8, 7-14, 7-15
(due Nov 2)
WEEK 6
T Oct 28
11
· Activity-based costing
Chapter 7
Quiz 2 opens
R Oct 30
12
· Service costing/ absorption costing
Chapter 6

WEEK 7
T Nov 4
13
PART IV: Budgeting and Planning
· Budgeting and planning
Chapter 8
HW 7:
Exercises: 8-1, 8-4
(due Nov 16)
R Nov 6
14
· Flexible budgets
Chapter 9
HW 8:
Exercises: 9-1, 9-8, 9-12, 9-13, 9-14
(due Nov 16)
WEEK 8
T Nov 11
15
· Flexible budgets and exam review
R Nov 13
16
MIDTERM 2

WEEK 9
T Nov 18
17
PART V: Control
· Variance analysis
Chapter 10
HW 9:
Exercises: 10-1, 10-2, 10-7, 10-8
(due Dec 7)
Quiz 3 opens
R Nov 20
18
· Control Through Decision Rights Allocation: Investment
Center and Residual Income measures
Chapter 11
HW 10:
Exercises: 11-1, 11-2, 11-8, 11-10
(due Dec 7)
Thanks-giving
T Nov 25
19
· Homework review

WEEK 10
T Dec 2
19
PART VI: Incentives
· Performance measurement and incentives
Chapter 11
R Dec 4
20
· Review
Finals week
Comprehensive final exam
Individual write up
9
1
C H A P T E R 1 0
Global Logistics and Risk
Management

309
Wal-Mart Changes Tactics
to Meet International
Tastes
São Bernardo, Brazil.Wal-Mart Stores Inc. is finding
out that what plays in Peoria isn’t necessarily a hit in
suburban São Paulo.
Tanks of live trout are out; sushi is in. American
footballs have been replaced by soccer balls. The fix-
ings for feijoada, a medley of beef and pork in black
bean stew, are now displayed on the deli counter.
American-style jeans priced at $19.99 have been
dropped in favor of $9.99 knock-offs.
But adapting to local tastes may have been the
easy part. Three years after embarking on a blitz to
bring “everyday low prices” to the emerging markets
of Brazil and Argentina, Wal-Mart is finding the
going tougher than expected.
Brutal competition, markets that don’t play to Wal-
Mart’s ability to achieve efficiency through economies
of scale, and some of its own mistakes have produced
red ink. Moreover, the company’s insistence on doing
things “the Wal-Mart way” has apparently alienated
some local suppliers and employees.
DEEP POCKETS
No one is counting Wal-Mart out, of course. With
sales of nearly $105 billion last year and profits of
$3.1 billion, the Bentonville, Arkansas, behemoth

has deep pockets. And it has revised its merchandis-
ing in Brazil and Argentina and made other changes.
Its four newest stores are smaller than the initial out-
lets in São Paulo and Buenos Aires and are in mid-
size cities where competition isn’t so fierce.
Bob L. Martin, Wal-Mart’s head of international
operations, is confident that the company will eventu-
ally become the dominant retailer in South America.
“There is low-hanging fruit all over the place,” he
says. “The market is ripe and wide open for us.” He
adds that Wal-Mart plans to add eight stores in both
Argentina and Brazil next year, doubling the number
now in each country.
A lot is riding on Wal-Mart’s global expansion
drive, which is targeting not only South America but
also China and Indonesia, two other markets full of
promise and pitfalls. With opportunities for growth
dwindling at home, the company is opening fewer
than 100 domestic stores a year, down from as many
as 150 in the early 1990s. The current rate of open-
ings can’t generate the profit gains that Wal-Mart
wants, and its main hopes lie overseas.
“If we’re good enough in international, we can
duplicate Wal-Mart,” chief executive David D. Glass
said in an interview in June. “We have very high
expectations.”
C A S E
Source: Jonathan Friedland and Louise Lee. The Wall Street
Journal,
Online Edition, October 8, 1997. Copyright 1997 by Dow Jones

&
Company, Inc. Reproduced with permission of Dow Jones &
Company,
Inc. in the format textbook via Copyright Clearance Center.
sim8239X_ch10_309-330.qxd 5/9/07 11:59 AM Page 309
Sunday. Hugo and Mariana Faojo help explain why.
Browsing in the shoe section, the young couple say
they see little difference between the goods at Wal-
Mart and those at nearby Carrefour. For groceries,
they prefer Supermercados Jumbo SA, a Chilean-
owned chain, where they say they find high-quality
products and fresh meats. Clothes and household
goods, Wal-Mart’s mainstays, are similar in quality
and price to those at Carrefour, says Mr. Faojo, a
government surveyor.
Not only did Carrefour arrive first—it now has a
total of about 60 stores in Argentina and Brazil—but
it is maneuvering with prices and promotions to keep
Wal-Mart off balance. When Thomas Gallegos, who
manages Wal-Mart’s new store here, prints up fliers
advertising bargains, the nearby Carrefour responds
in just a few hours by offering the same product for a
few cents less—and its fliers are handed out at the
entrance to the Wal-Mart parking lot. “Geez, the
competition is aggressive,” says Mr. Gallegos, who
previously ran a Wal-Mart in Harlingen, Texas.
Carrefour, which, like Wal-Mart in the United
States, drives hard bargains with its suppliers, can
afford to play low-ball because it has the critical
mass that Wal-Mart lacks here. And it holds down its

overhead by stocking a far-narrower selection of
merchandise; for example, the Carrefour in La Plata,
Argentina, stocks 22,000 items, while the Wal-Mart
next door carries 58,000.
Mr. Martin contends that Carrefour’s advantage is
ephemeral and that customers value Wal-Mart’s
broader choice. “It’s costing them something to fight
us,” he adds. Carrefour didn’t respond to requests for
an interview.
DISTRIBUTION PROBLEMS
Right now, however, Wal-Mart’s effort to stock such a
wide variety of merchandise is hurting it. Squeezing
out costs in the supply chain is crucial to its “every-
day low pricing” formula. In the United States, the
company runs like a well-oiled machine, maintaining
a highly sophisticated inventory-management system
and its own network of distribution centers.
But timely delivery of merchandise is a relative
concept in the bumper-to-bumper traffic of São
Paulo, where Wal-Mart depends on suppliers or con-
tract truckers to deliver most of its goods directly to
stores. Because it doesn’t own its distribution sys-
tem, it can’t control deliveries nearly as well as it
310 DESIGNING AND MANAGING THE SUPPLY CHAIN
A SMALL OPERATION SO FAR
So far, though, the six-year-old international operation
is relatively tiny; it accounted for only 4.8 percent of
Wal-Mart’s 1996 sales. Most of the company’s inter-
national revenue comes from Canada, where Wal-

Mart purchased 120 stores from Woolworth Corp. in
1994, and from Mexico, where earlier this year it
bought a controlling stake in Cifra, SA, its partner,
and now has about 390 stores. Last year, the interna-
tional unit had an operating profit of $24 million, its
first, compared with a $16 million loss in 1995. Mr.
Martin says he expects further improvement this
year. Mr. Glass said he expects international growth
to account for a third of Wal-Mart’s annual increase
in sales and profits within three to five years.
The performance of Wal-Mart’s 16 South American
stores may well indicate the future outlook. In Canada
and Mexico, many customers were familiar with the
company from cross-border shopping trips, and by
acquiring local retailers, Wal-Mart quickly reached the
size necessary to hold down costs. In South America
and Asia, by contrast, Wal-Mart is building from
scratch in markets already dominated by savvy local
and foreign competitors such as Grupo Pão de Acucar
SA of Brazil and Carrefour SA of France.
LOSSES FORECAST
Wal-Mart doesn’t break out financial data on its South
American Operations. However, retail analysts, citing
the accounts of Wal-Mart’s Brazilian partner, Lojas
Americanas SA, expectWal-Mart to lose $20 million to
$30 million in Brazil this year, on top of an estimated
$48 million in losses since starting up in South
America in 1995. In Argentina, where the company
doesn’t have a partner, Wal-Mart executives concede
that it is losing money but say its performance meets
expectations. The company expects operations in both
countries to be profitable by early 1999.

“What counts is that we are finding great customer
acceptance,” Mr. Martin says. Wal-Mart says its super-
center in Osasco, Brazil, was the top-grossing store in
the entire company last year. And at a recent super-
center opening in the mid-size Brazilian city of
Ribeirão Prêto, shoppers practically beat down the
doors to scoop up bargain-priced microwave ovens
and television sets.
But such enthusiasm is hard to sustain. At an older
supercenter in Avellaneda, a suburb of Buenos Aires,
a few shoppers are in the store during peak hours one
CHAPTER 10: GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND RISK
MANAGEMENT 311
does in the United States, vendors say. Stores here
sometimes process 300 deliveries daily, compared
with seven a day at U.S. locations, and some ship-
ments have mysteriously disappeared somewhere
between the port and the store.
“The biggest issue Wal-Mart has is shipping prod-
uct on time and getting it on the shelf,” says Jim
Russel, a national account manager for Colgate-
Palmolive Co. in Bentonville. Wal-Mart recently built
a warehouse in Argentina and one in Brazil that it
says will eventually reduce its distribution problems.
But logistics aren’t the only issue. Some local sup-
pliers have difficulty meeting Wal-Mart’s specifica-
tions for easy-to-handle packaging and quality

control, forcing the retailer to rely so heavily on
imported goods that it could have problems if Brazil’s
economic stabilization policies falter. Eleven South
American suppliers have taken umbrage at Wal-Mart’s
aggressive pricing policies and for a time refused to
sell goods to the chain.
Wal-Mart also has sought to drive hard bargains
with divisions of its major suppliers back in the United
States. The pitch hasn’t been altogether successful.
Wal-Mart doesn’t get special deals just because it’s a
big U.S. customer, some large domestic suppliers say.
VARIOUS MISTAKES
Wal-Mart’s troubles in South America stem partly
from its own mistakes. Analysts say it failed to do its
homework before plunging in. In addition to the live
trout and American footballs, the company initially
imported items such as cordless tools, which few
South Americans use, and leaf blowers, which are
useless in a concrete jungle such as São Paulo.
And merchandise flubs weren’t the only mistakes.
In Brazil, Wal-Mart brought in stock-handling equip-
ment that didn’t work with standardized local pallets. It
also installed a computerized bookkeeping system that
failed to take into account Brazil’s wildly complicated
tax system. Vincente Trius, who heads Wal-Mart’s
Brazilian operations, says, however, that the company
hasn’t lost money as a result of tax miscalculations.
Wal-Mart has also been slow to adapt to Brazil’s
fast-changing credit culture. Not until last February
did the company start accepting postdated checks,
which have become the most common form of credit

since Brazil stabilized its currency in 1995. Pão de
Acucar, whose Extra hypermarkets compete with
Wal-Mart, has been taking postdated checks since
they first became popular and has installed a sophis-
ticated credit-checking system at its registers.Wal-
Mart is hurrying to do so, too.
The six South American Sam’s Club locations, the
members-only warehouse stores that sell merchandise
in bulk, got off to a slow start largely because shop-
pers weren’t used to paying a membership fee and
don’t have enough room at home to store bulk pur-
chases. In Argentina the clubs have faced another
barrier: Small-business customers are reluctant
to sign up for fear Wal-Mart could provide tax infor-
mation to the authorities on their purchases.
Wal-Mart won’t disclose Sam’s Club membership
data in South America. But it now offers shoppers
free one-day memberships tied to specific purchases.
Mr. Martin says that Wal-Mart is “disappointed” in the
club’s performance in Argentina but that it is improv-
ing in Brazil. The company says it plans more Sam’s
outlets in South America but hasn’t disclosed details.
PROBLEMS CALLED TEMPORARY
Wal-Mart’s Mr. Glass characterized the missteps
as temporary problems and inevitable in entering a
new market. “It’s a lengthy process to go to South
America, recruit good managers, bring them to Wal-
Mart, and train them and indoctrinate them and teach
them what you want to teach them,” he said in June.
“It’s slow going early on, and you spend a lot of
money. You pay a lot of tuition to learn what you

need to learn.”
Wal-Mart says that it is developing a strong group
of young executives and hasn’t suffered high turnover.
But Francisco de Narvaez, the owner of Argentine
supermarket chain Casa Tia SA, says some managers
have left because Wal-Mart “didn’t listen to their
senior-level local employees.” In the past six months,
Wal-Mart has hired two managers who had worked at
its Mexican operations to take over two São Paulo
locations.
Mr. Trius, a Spanish-born executive who earlier
turned around Dairy Farm Ltd.’s Spanish supermarket
chain, says he believes the criticisms of Wal-Mart’s
South American operations go too far. “If Joe Blow was
to open in Brazil with the same concept and within two
years had everything in place, people would say, ‘What
an incredible job,’” he says. “People expected us to
snap our fingers and be Wal-Mart in the United States
overnight. To me, the criticisms are more related to
expectations than to reality.”
By the end of this chapter, you should be able to answer the
following questions:
• Other than a need to expand, what other reasons would Wal-
Mart have for opening
stores globally?
• Why would it be beneficial for Wal-Mart to have suppliers in

different countries?
• Why would Wal-Mart want strong centralized control of its
stores? Why would
Wal-Mart want strong local control of stores?
• What pitfalls and opportunities other than those mentioned in
The Wall Street
Journal article would Wal-Mart face over the next few years?
• What are the sources of risks faced by the global supply chain
and how can the firm
mitigate the various risks?
10.1 INTRODUCTION
It is readily apparent that global operations and supply chains
are becoming increas-
ingly significant. Dornier et al. [59] collected the following
statistics, which help to
indicate the magnitude of this trend:
• About one-fifth of the output of U.S. firms is produced
overseas.
• One-quarter of U.S. imports are between foreign affiliates and
U.S. parent compa-
nies.
• Since the late 1980s, over half of U.S. companies increased
the number of countries
in which they operate.
In many ways, international supply chain management is the
same as domestic
supply chain management spread over a larger geographic area.

However, as we
will discuss in the remainder of this chapter, international
supply chain networks
can provide a wealth of additional opportunities if they are
managed effectively. At
the same time, there are many additional potential problems and
pitfalls to be
aware of.
International supply chains can run the gamut from a primarily
domestic business
with some international suppliers to a truly integrated global
supply chain. Some of the
advantages and disadvantages that we will discuss apply equally
to all of the systems in
the following list, while others apply only to the most complex
integrated systems.
International distribution systems. In this type of system,
manufacturing still
occurs domestically, but distribution and typically some
marketing take place over-
seas.
International suppliers. In this system, raw materials and
components are fur-
nished by foreign suppliers, but final assembly is performed
domestically. In some
cases, the final product is then shipped to foreign markets.
Offshore manufacturing. In this type of system, the product is
typically sourced
and manufactured in a single foreign location, and then shipped
back to domestic
warehouses for sale and distribution.
Fully integrated global supply chain. Here products are
supplied, manufactured,
and distributed from various facilities located throughout the

world. In a truly
global supply chain, it may appear that the supply chain was
designed without
regard to national boundaries. Of course, this is far from the
truth! As we shall see,
the true value of a global supply chain is realized by taking
advantage of these
national boundaries.
Clearly, a supply chain can fit more than one of these
categories. Throughout the
following discussion, consider how each of the issues discussed
applies differently to
firms, depending on their position in this global supply chain
spectrum.
In any event, many firms cannot help but become involved in
global supply chain
issues. Dornier et al. [59] identified the following forces that
collectively drive the
trend toward globalization:
• Global market forces.
• Technological forces.
• Global cost forces.
• Political and economic forces.
10.1.1 Global Market Forces
Global market forces involve the pressures created by foreign
competitors, as well as the
opportunities created by foreign customers. Even if companies
don’t do business over-

seas, the presence of foreign competitors in home markets can
affect their business sig-
nificantly. To defend domestic markets successfully, companies
may find it necessary to
move into foreign markets. Sometimes the threat of a presence
is sufficient, as in the dry
breakfast cereal business, dominated by Kellogg Co. in the
United States and Nestlé in
Europe. Apparently, failed attempts in the past to penetrate each
other’s home markets,
combined with the threat of retaliation, are enough to maintain
the status quo.
In addition, much of the demand growth available to companies
is in foreign and
emerging markets. Recently, companies have made great
sacrifices (particularly in
terms of proprietary technology) and taken on considerable
business risk to become
involved in ventures in mainland China. Indeed, the United
States is accounting for
less and less of the total consumption of goods in the world.
One cause of this increasing demand for products throughout
the world is the
global proliferation of information. Television introduces
products to Europeans.
Japanese vacation abroad. Businesses send overnight mail
between continents. The
Internet provides instant international exposure, as well as the
ability to purchase
goods in one country that will be delivered in another without
leaving home or office.
MANAGEMENT 313

E X A M P L E 1 0 - 1
In Brazil thousands of people move from preindustrial villages
to rapidly growing cities. Once there,
their first goal is to install television sets, even as they continue
to “make sacrificial offerings of fruit
and fresh-killed chickens to Macumban spirits by the
candlelight” [124].
As Kenichi Ohmae, head of management consulting firm
McKinsey’s Japanese
office, points out, people have “all become global citizens, and
so must the companies
that want to sell us things” [154]. Products are universally
desired, and many compa-
nies are willing to sell them globally. This is clearly a self-
amplifying trend for an
industry, because, as companies become global, their
competitors also must become
global in order to compete. Thus, many companies are becoming
global citizens with
universal products and the opportunity to hire talented
employees worldwide.
Along similar lines, particular markets often serve to drive
technological advances
in some areas. By participating in these competitive markets,
companies are forced to
develop and enhance leading-edge technologies and products.
These products can
then be used to increase or maintain market position in other
areas or regions where
the markets are not as competitive. To be a leader in software,
for example, you have

to compete in the U.S. market. Similarly, the German machine
tools market and the
Japanese consumer electronics market are hotly contested.
10.1.2 Technological Forces
Technological forces are related to the products themselves.
Various subcomponents
and technologies are available in different regions and locations
around the world, and
many successful firms need to have the ability to use these
resources quickly and
effectively. To achieve this, it may be necessary for firms to
locate research, design,
and production facilities close to these regions. This is often
particularly useful if sup-
pliers are involved in the design process, as discussed in
Chapter 11. The same logic
applies to collaborations and interfirm development projects. To
gain access to mar-
kets or technology, companies in different regions frequently
collaborate, resulting in
the location of joint facilities close to one of the partners.
Along similar lines, global location of research-and-
development facilities is
becoming more common, primarily for two reasons. First, as
product cycles become
shorter and time more important, companies have discovered
how useful it is to locate
research facilities close to manufacturing facilities. This helps
transfer technology
from research facilities to manufacturing facilities, and speeds

up the resolution of
problems that inevitably arise during this transfer. In addition,
specific technical
expertise may be available in certain areas or regions. For
example, a few years ago,
Microsoft opened a research lab in Cambridge, England, to take
advantage of the
expertise available in Europe.
10.1.3 Global Cost Forces
Cost forces often dictate global location decisions. In the past,
the low cost of
unskilled labor was a decisive factor in determining factory
location. Recently, studies
have found that in many cases, the costs of cheaper unskilled
labor were more than
offset by the increase in other costs associated with operating
facilities in remote loca-
tions. In some cases, of course, cheaper labor is sufficient
justification for overseas
manufacturing. More recently, however, other global cost forces
have become more
significant. For example, cheaper skilled labor is drawing an
increasing number of
companies overseas. Many of the analyses and programs that
U.S. consulting firms
undertook to address the Year 2000 problem (in which computer
programs might fail
when the year changed from 1999 to 2000) were done in India,
where programming
skills are much cheaper.
We have discussed how a supplier and the manufacturer supply
chain must often be
tightly integrated to deliver certain products effectively. Often
this can be accom-

plished most cost-effectively if the various participants are
located close together. This
may necessitate establishing integrated supply chains in
different markets. Finally, the
capital costs of building a new facility often dominate labor
costs. Many governments
are willing to provide tax breaks or cost-sharing arrangements
to lower the cost of the
new facility. In addition, supplier price breaks and cost-sharing
joint ventures may
dictate these types of decisions.
10.1.4 Political and Economic Forces
Political and economic forces may greatly affect the drive
toward globalization. In
Section 10.2.1, we will discuss exchange rate fluctuation and
the operational
approaches to dealing with this issue. There are also several
other political and eco-
nomic factors. For example, regional trade agreements may
drive companies to
expand into one of the countries in the regional group. It may be
to a company’s
MANAGEMENT 315
advantage to obtain raw materials from or to manufacture within
European, Pacific
Rim, or North American trading blocs. In some cases,

production processes may even
be redesigned to avoid tariffs; for example, almost-finished
goods may be shipped into
a trading bloc to avoid tariffs on “finished goods.”
Similarly, various trade protection mechanisms can affect
international supply
chain decisions. Tariffs and quotas affect what can be imported,
and may lead a com-
pany to decide to manufacture within the market country or
region. More subtle regu-
lations, including local content requirements, affect supply
chains. To address local
content requirements, for example, TI and Intel, both U.S.
firms, make microproces-
sors in Europe, and various Japanese automakers produce cars
in Europe. Even volun-
tary export restrictions can affect the supply chain: Japanese
manufacturers began to
manufacture more expensive cars after agreeing voluntarily to
limit exports to the
United States. Recall that this is why brands such as Infiniti and
Lexus came into exis-
tence. Government procurement policies can affect the ability of
international compa-
nies to be successful in various markets. In the United States,
for example, the
Department of Defense gives as much as a 50 percent advantage
to U.S. companies in
the bidding on contracts.
10.2 RISK MANAGEMENT
We have looked at the various forces that drive companies to
develop global supply
chains. Of course, many of the advantages of sourcing,

manufacturing, and selling
globally are immediately obvious. The world is converging in
many instances toward
standardized products.
This implies that more and more, vast markets have opened up
for products—far
greater than anything managers in the past could have imagined.
By taking advantage
of this trend, companies can realize vast economies of scale in
terms of production,
management, distribution, marketing, and so forth [124].
Indeed, as we discussed in the previous section, costs can be
lowered with a larger
number of options for sourcing raw material, labor, and
outsourcing opportunities and
a greater number of potential manufacturing sites. At the same
time, the increase in
potential markets allows for an increase in sales and profits.
These advantages are due
to the increase in the size and scope of the supply chain—they
are independent of the
specific characteristics of the global supply chain.
Unfortunately, all these advantages and opportunities associated
with global
supply chains come with significant increase in the level of
risks faced by today’s
global companies. Indeed, outsourcing and offshoring imply
that the supply chain
is geographically more diverse and hence more exposed to
various risks. Similarly,
recent trends toward cost reduction, lean manufacturing, and
just-in-time imply
that in a progressive supply chain, low inventory levels are

maintained. However,
in the event of an unforeseen disaster, adherence to this type of
strategy could
result in a shutdown of production lines because of lack of raw
material or parts
inventory.
Thus, in this section, we examine the various risks inherent in
global supply chains
and techniques to mitigate these risks.
10.2.1 Many Sources of Risks
Global supply chains are exposed to similar risks to those faced
by domestic supply
chains, as well as other risks that are more global in nature.
Figure 10-1 provides a
1The figure is inspired by [32].
FIGURE 10-1 Risk sources and their characteristics.
nonexhaustive list of the various types of risks faced by global
companies.1 Natural
disasters, geopolitical risks, epidemics, or terrorist attacks can
shut down production
lines because of lack of parts inventory. Indeed, this actually
happened to some auto
manufacturers in the wake of the September 11, 2001, terrorist
attack.

Unfortunately, it is very difficult to prepare for mega-disasters
such as hurri-
canes Katrina (2005) or Andrew (1992) because there is little
experience to draw
on [52]. Similarly, a SARS epidemic like the one in 2003 could
shut down the flow
of components and products from the Far East to the rest of the
world but again is
difficult to prepare for because of lack of data. Following
former Secretary of
Defense Donald Rumsfeld, we refer to these types of risks as
the unknown-
unknown since these are risks associated with scenarios where
one cannot identify
likelihood of occurrence.
At the other spectrum in Figure 10-1, we find sources of risks
such as supplier per-
formance, forecast accuracy, and operational problems. These
are risks that can be
quantified and hence we refer to those as the known-unknown.
For example, using his-
torical data the firm can characterize forecast error, mean time
between machine fail-
ure, and supplier lead-time performance.
Of course, due to their nature, the unknown-unknown are
difficult to control while
the known-unknown are more controllable. Between the two
extremes are various
types of risks that can be controlled to a certain extent. For
example, risk associated
with volatile fuel price can be managed through long-term
contracts while fluctuat-
ing exchange rates can be managed through a variety of hedging
strategies as we dis-

cuss below.
Indeed, currency fluctuations pose a significant risk in today’s
global operations.
They change the relative value of production and the relative
profit of selling a prod-
uct in a particular country. Relative costs change so that
manufacturing, storing, dis-
tributing, or selling in a particular region at a particular price
can change from being
extremely profitable to a total loss. The same is true
domestically. In many cases, cer-
tain regions within the same country may be less expensive for
storage or manufactur-
ing than others. However, the cost differences between domestic
regions are not
typically as dramatic as those across countries and, more
importantly, they don’t
change as frequently.
Unknown-Unknown
Known-Unknown
Uncontrollable
Controllable
It should be stressed that although managers typically think of
exchange rates as
affecting the dollar value of assets and liabilities denominated
in foreign currencies,

it is the operating exposure described in the previous paragraphs
that can have the
most dramatic effect on annual operating profit. This operating
exposure reflects the
fact that, in the short run, changes in currency exchange rates
do not necessarily
reflect changes in relative inflation rates between countries.
Thus, over the short
term, regional operations can become relatively more or less
expensive in terms of
dollars. Note that this operating exposure is not only a function
of a firm’s global
supply chain, but also its competition’s global supply chain. If a
competitor’s relative
costs decrease more, a firm can be underpriced in the market
[123].
Indeed, Dornier et al. [59] identified several factors that affect
the impact of operat-
ing exposure on a firm. Customer reactions influence how a
firm adjusts prices in var-
ious markets in response to changes in operating expenses. As
discussed above,
competitor reactions also influence how a firm can react to
changes in the relative cost
of doing business. Competitors can react to price increases by
raising their own prices
to increase profitability or gain market share. As we discuss in
the next section,
supplier reactions—the ability of suppliers to respond with
flexibility to varying
demands—is a strong factor in the effectiveness of certain
strategies that help firms
address the risk of operating exposure. Finally, government
reactions play a large role
on the global stage. Governments can intervene to stabilize

currencies or even directly
support endangered firms by providing subsidies or tariffs. In
addition, other political
instabilities also can affect multinational companies. Tax
situations can change
rapidly because political factors dictate different treatment of
corporations, particu-
larly foreign corporations, in various regions.
Likewise, foreign companies can enter domestic markets. These
companies may
even use domestic profits to subsidize low-priced goods in
foreign markets. This
could even affect companies that have decided not to compete
on the global stage.
So what are the methods that the global firm can use to mitigate
many of the risks
described in this subsection? In the next two subsections, we
consider strategies for
dealing with both the unknown-unknown, and the classes of risk
further towards the
known-unknown end of the risk spectrum.
10.2.2 Managing the Unknown-Unknown
Are there strategies that the firm can use to deal with the
unknown-unknown?
Unfortunately, these are the sources of risks that may create a
mega-disaster that not
only can wipe out years of profit but also can force a company
to exit a certain region
or a specific market.
We discuss in this section the following methods for managing
supply chain risks
and in particular strategies for managing the unknown-unknown.

• Invest in redundancy.
• Increase velocity in sensing and responding.
• Create an adaptive supply chain community.
As we will illustrate below, an effective use of these methods
allows the supply
chain to recover from a misfortune, thus creating the so-called
resilient supply chain.
Each of these methods focuses on a different supply chain
dimension. Redundancy is
built at the design stage; sensing and responding require
accurate information in a
timely fashion; finally, an adaptive supply chain is a supply
chain in which all its
elements share similar culture, work toward the same
objectives, and benefit from
financial gains.
MANAGEMENT 317
Redundancy A key challenge in risk management is to design
the supply chain so that
it can effectively respond to unforeseen events, the unknown-
unknown, without signifi-
cantly increasing costs. This can be done through careful
analysis of supply chain cost
trade-offs so that the appropriate level of redundancy is built
into the supply chain.

E X A M P L E 1 0 - 2
In 2001, a U.S.-based consumer packaged goods (CPG)
company had a global supply chain with
about 40 manufacturing facilities all over the world. Demand
for its products, household goods, was
spread over many countries. The company grew organically and
through acquisition. Management
realized that it was time to rationalize its network and close
nonproductive manufacturing facilitates.
Initial analysis indicated that the firm can reduce cost by about
$40M a year by shutting down 17 of
its existing manufacturing facilities, and leaving 23 plants
operating, while still satisfying market
demand all over the world.
Unfortunately, this new lean supply chain design suffered from
two important weaknesses. First,
the new design left no plant in North America or Europe, thus
creating long and variable supply
lead times. Such lead times require a significant increase in
inventory levels. More importantly, the
remaining manufacturing facilities in Asia and Latin America
were fully utilized and, hence, any dis-
ruption of supply from these countries, due to epidemics or
geopolitical problems, would make it
impossible to satisfy many market areas. So how can one design
the supply chain taking into
account epidemics or geopolitical problems that are difficult to
quantify?
The approach the firm took was to analyze the cost trade-offs.
These trade-offs are illustrated
in Figure 10-2 where the x-coordinate represents the number of
plants that remain open and the

y-coordinate, the various cost components, including variable
production cost, fixed cost, trans-
portation, duties, and inventory costs. The top line is the total
cost, that is, the sum of various cost
components. As you can see, closing 17 plants and leaving 23
open will minimize supply chain
costs. However, observe that the total cost function is quite flat
around the optimal strategy.
Indeed, increasing the number of open plants from 23 to 30
facilities will increase total cost by less
than $2.5M while at the same time increasing redundancy
significantly. Thus, even though we can-
not quantify the risks associated with epidemics or geopolitical
problems, we can prepare the sup-
ply chain for supply disruption by investing in redundancy
without significantly increasing supply
chain costs.
FIGURE 10-2 Cost trade-offs in supply chain design.
38 36 30 25 23
Total plants
20 10 9 8
T
ot
al
c
os
t
7 more plants is near optimal
optimal solution

Total Variable conversion Fixed cost Transportation Duty
Inventory
E X A M P L E 1 0 - 4
In 1997, Aisin Seiki was the sole supplier of 98 percent of the
brake fluid proportioning valves
(P-valves) used by Toyota Japan. P-valves are inexpensive
(about $7 each) but important in the
assembly of any car. If supply is interrupted, the Toyota
production line will have to shut down.
On Saturday, February 1, 1997, a fire stopped Aisin’s main
factory in the industrial area of
Kariya, where other Toyota providers are located. Initial
evaluation of the damage estimated that
it would take two weeks to restart the production again, and six
months for complete recovery,
see [175].
The situation was critical. Toyota was facing a season of great
demand, and plants were operat-
ing at full capacity, producing close to 15,500 vehicles per day.
Conforming to the just-in-time (JIT)
principle of the Toyota Production System, only two to three
days of inventory were available in
Sensing and Responding The following case illustrates how
speed in sensing and
responding can help the firm overcome unexpected supply
problems. Indeed, it also
illustrates how failure to sense, and therefore respond to,

changes in the supply chain
can force a company to exit a specific market.
MANAGEMENT 319
E X A M P L E 1 0 - 3
In 2001, the Philips semiconductor factory in Albuquerque, New
Mexico, provided several types
of radio frequency chips used in mobile telephones. Major
customers included OEMs such as
Ericsson and Nokia. On Friday, March 17, 2000, at 8 p.m.,
Mother Nature, in the form of lightning,
struck the Philips semiconductor plant. Fire, smoke, and water
used during the fire exhaustion
destroyed almost all the silicon stock in the factory. As a result,
the plant was shut down for
months.
Three days after the fire, Nokia detected delays in incoming
orders from the Albuquerque plant.
In the initial contacts, Philips reported they expected the plant
to be shut for only one week. Fearing
the worst, Nokia decided to send engineers to New Mexico to
evaluate the damage. When the
engineers did not get access to the plant, Nokia raised red flags
and increased the frequency of
monitoring incoming orders from the plant from weekly to
daily. On March 31, two weeks after the
fire, Philips confirmed to Nokia that months of orders will be
disrupted.
Nokia’s response to the news was decisive. The company
changed product design so they could
use chips from other suppliers. These suppliers committed a

five-day lead time. Unfortunately, this
was not enough; one of the five components provided by Philips
was impossible to source from other
suppliers. So Nokia convinced Philips to provide this
component from two Philips factories in China
and the Netherlands.
Ericsson’s experience was quite different. It took the news to
reach upper management about
four weeks, even though Philips informed Ericsson of the fire
three days after the incident. More
importantly, only five weeks after the fire, Ericsson realized the
severity of the situation. By that
time, the alternative supply of chips was already taken by
Nokia. The impact on Ericsson was dev-
astating. $400M in potential sales was lost; part of the loss was
covered by insurance. This,
together with other problems such as component shortages, the
wrong product mix, and marketing
problems, caused a $1.68B loss to Ericsson Cell Phone Division
in 2000 and forced the company
to exit the cell phone market [40].
Source: Adapted with permission from F. Cela Diaz, “An
Integrative Framework for Architecting Supply Chains.”
MS thesis, Massachusetts Institute of technology, 2005.
Adaptability This is, no doubt, the most difficult risk
management method to
implement effectively. It requires all supply chain elements to
share the same culture,
work towards the same objectives and benefit from financial
gains. Indeed, it creates
a community of supply chain partners that morph and reorganize
to better react to
sudden crisis. The next example illustrates the impact of the

adaptive supply chain in
a powerful way.
stock at Toyota, giving a margin of only a few days before the
plants would have to come to a com-
plete stop.
Immediately after the accident, Toyota initiated a recovery
effort with the help of their suppliers
to restructure the entire supply chain of P-valves. Blueprints of
the valves were distributed among
all Toyota’s suppliers, and engineers from Aisin and Toyota
were relocated to suppliers’ facilities and
other surrounding companies, such as Brother—a manufacturer
of printers and sewing machines.
Existing machinery was adapted to build the valves according to
Aisin and Toyota’s specifications,
and new machinery was acquired in the spot market. As
observed in [151], “Within days, firms with
little experience with P-valves were manufacturing and
delivering parts to Aisin, where they were
assembled and inspected before shipment to Toyota.” All in all,
about 200 of Toyota’s suppliers were
collaborating in the effort to minimize the impact of Aisin’s fire
and recover the Toyota production
line as soon as possible [151].
Figure 10-3 depicts the evolution of production and inventories
during the crisis. Factories came
to a complete stop for barely three days, and full production

was restored in less than one week.
The accident initially cost 7.8 billion yen ($65 million) to Aisin
and 160 billion yen (or $1.3 billion) to
Toyota; see [151]. However, it is estimated that the damage was
reduced to 30 billion yen ($250 mil-
lion) with extra shifts and overtime [175]. In addition, Toyota
issued a $100 million token of appreci-
ation to their providers as a gift for their collaboration.
Source: Adapted with permission from F. Cela Diaz, “An
Integrative Framework for Architecting Supply Chains.” MS
thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2005. Much of
his analysis is based on data in [175], [151], and [13].
FIGURE 10-3 Vehicle production and P-valve inventory levels.
E X A M P L E 1 0 - 4 C o n t i n u e d
◆
◆
◆
◆
Accident
Production rate
increased to
compensate for loss
Aisin producing
10% of the valves

3,000 valves
First 1,000 valves
arrive
First
prototypes
arrive
5,000 valves
45000
40000
35000
30000
25000
20000
15000
10000
5000
0
1/
30
1/
31

2/
1
2/
2
2/
3
2/
4
2/
5
2/
6
2/
7
2/
8
2/
9
2/
10
2/
11
2/
12

2/
13
2/
14
2/
15
2/
16
2/
17
2/
18
All factories stop
2/20 factories open
4/20 factories open
20/20 factories open
Day
◆ ◆ ◆
◆
◆
◆

◆
◆
◆
◆
◆
◆
◆
P-valves left in inventory (units)◆Vechicles produced (units)
The example thus illustrates how Toyota’s suppliers self-
organized to address a
sudden disruption in the supply of a key component. However,
it raises three impor-
tant questions. Does a single-sourcing strategy make sense for
such a key component?
Even if a single-sourcing strategy is appropriate, should not
Toyota carry large
amounts of inventory for such a low-cost but key component?
And finally, what are
the underlying mechanisms that exist in Toyota’s supply chain
and help the firm
quickly recover from the sudden supply disruption?

According to Kiyoshi Kinoshita, Toyota’s general manager of
production control,
single sourcing and holding almost no inventory was a
calculated risk [175]. Toyota’s
single sourcing allows Aisin to achieve economies of scale in P-
valve production, and
offer high quality at very low costs to Toyota [151].
The third question is discussed in detail in [151]. They observe
that key to under-
standing the ability of the supply chain to adapt to the new
environment is the just-in-
time (JIT) philosophy followed by Toyota and its suppliers
almost religiously. Indeed,
the essence of JIT is to control the amount of work-in-process
(WIP) inventory at a
relatively low level. Such a low level of WIP inventory
promotes high quality and a
quick identification of problems in the production line. Indeed,
in JIT, every worker
has the authority to stop the line in order to correct any
problem. This also implies that
JIT with low inventory levels fosters problem-solving capability
[151].
These are the qualities that were essential to the quick
adaptability of Toyota’s sup-
ply chain. Once Toyota identified the Aisin fire as a problem, it
stopped not only its
production line, but the entire supply chain. This stop of the
line forced supply chain
partners to deal with the challenge [151].
10.2.3 Managing Global Risks
We now turn our attention to the other risks faced by global
supply chains, including

those risks that can be, to a certain extent, quantified and
controlled (that is, the inter-
mediate risks identified in Figure 10-1). Bruce Kogut [111]
identified three ways a
global supply chain can be employed to address global risks:
speculative, hedge, and
flexible strategies.
Speculative Strategies Using speculative strategies, a company
bets on a single sce-
nario, with often spectacular results if the scenario is realized,
and dismal ones if it is
not. For example, in the late 1970s and early 1980s, Japanese
automakers bet that if
they did all of their manufacturing in Japan, rising labor costs
would be more than off-
set by exchange rate benefits, rising productivity, and increased
levels of investment
and productivity. For a while these bets paid off, but then rising
labor costs and unfa-
vorable exchange rates began to hurt manufacturers, and it
became necessary to build
plants overseas. Of course, if it had remained favorable to do all
the manufacturing in
Japan, the Japanese manufacturers would have “won the bet”
because building new
facilities is time-consuming and expensive.
Hedge Strategies Using hedge strategies, a company designs the
supply chain in
such a way that any losses in part of the supply chain will be
offset by gains in another
part. For example, Volkswagen operates plants in the United
States, Brazil, Mexico,
and Germany, all of which are important markets for
Volkswagen products.

Depending on macroeconomic conditions, certain plants may be
more profitable at
various times than others. Hedge strategies, by design, are
simultaneously successful
in some locations and unsuccessful in others.
Flexible Strategies When properly employed, flexible strategies
enable a company
to take advantage of different scenarios. Typically, flexible
supply chains are designed
with multiple suppliers and excess manufacturing capacity in
different countries. In
addition, factories are designed to be flexible, so that products
can be moved at mini-
mal cost from region to region as economic conditions demand.
MANAGEMENT 321
When considering the implementation of a flexible strategy,
managers have to
answer several questions:
1. Is there enough variability in the system to justify the use of
flexible strategies?
Clearly, the more variability in international conditions, the
more a company can
benefit from utilizing flexible strategies.
2. Do the benefits of spreading production over various
facilities justify the costs, which
may include loss of economies of scale in terms of

manufacturing and supply?
3. Does the company have the appropriate coordination and
management mecha-
nisms in place to take rapid advantage of flexible strategies?
If the supply chain is appropriately designed, several
approaches can be utilized to
implement flexible strategies effectively:
Production shifting. Flexible factories and excess capacity and
suppliers can be
used to shift production from region to region to take advantage
of current circum-
stances. As exchange rates, labor cost, and so on, change,
manufacturing can be
relocated.
Information sharing. Having an increased presence in many
regions and markets
often will increase the availability of information, which can be
used to anticipate
market changes and find new opportunities.
Global coordination. Having multiple facilities worldwide
provides a firm with a
certain amount of market leverage that it might otherwise lack.
If a foreign com-
petitor attacks one of your main markets, you can attack back.
Of course, various
international laws and political pressures place limits on this
type of retaliation.
Political leverage. The opportunity to move operations rapidly
gives firms a mea-
sure of political leverage in overseas operations. For example, if
governments are
lax in enforcing contracts or international law, or present
expensive tax alterna-

tives, firms can move their operations. In many cases, the
implicit threat of move-
ment is sufficient to prevent local politicians from taking
unfavorable actions.
E X A M P L E 1 0 - 5
When Michelin began to target North American markets
aggressively, Goodyear was able to drop
its tire prices in Europe. This forced Michelin to slow its
overseas investment program.
10.2.4 Requirements for Global Strategy Implementation
Any company, even a huge global company, is not immediately
ready for integrated
global supply chain management on this scale. Michael
McGrath and Richard Hoole
[137] discuss important developments that are necessary to set
the stage for this kind
of massive global integration. These developments are outlined
below for each of the
five basic functions of firms: product development, purchasing,
production, demand
management, and order fulfillment.
1. Product development. It is important to design products that
can be modified eas-
ily for major markets, and which can be manufactured in
various facilities. As we
discuss in the next section, this is not always possible, but it is
certainly helpful in
those cases where it is achievable. While it is dangerous to
design a product to be
the “average” of what several markets require, it may be

possible to design a base
product or products that can be more easily adapted to several
different markets. An
international design team may be helpful in this regard.
2. Purchasing. A company will find it useful to have
management teams responsible
for the purchase of important materials from many vendors
around the world. In
this way, it is much easier to ensure that the quality and
delivery options from vari-
ous suppliers are compatible, and that a qualified team is
present to compare the
pricing of various suppliers. Also, these teams can work to
guarantee that sufficient
suppliers in different regions are at hand to ensure the
flexibility necessary to take
full advantage of the global supply chain.
3. Production. As we discussed above, excess capacity and
plants in several regions are
essential if firms are to take full advantage of the global supply
chain by shifting pro-
duction as conditions warrant. To utilize this kind of strategy,
however, effective com-
munications systems must be in place so that this global supply
chain can be managed
effectively. Centralized management is thus essential to this
system, which implies that
centralized information must be available. Indeed, knowledge of
the current status of
factories, supplies, and inventory is essential when making the

types of decisions
described above. In addition, since factories are typically
supplying each other in a
complex supply chain, it is important that interfactory
communication is solid and that
centralized management makes each factory aware of the system
status.
4. Demand management. Often demand management, which
involves setting mar-
keting and sales plans based on projected demand and available
product, is carried
out on a regional basis. For the supply chain to be managed in
an integrated way,
demand management clearly has to have at least some
centralized component. On
the other hand, much of this sensitive, market-based
information is best supplied by
analysts located in each region. Thus, once again
communication is a critical com-
ponent of the success of global supply chain management.
5. Order fulfillment. To successfully implement a truly flexible
supply chain man-
agement system, a centralized system must be in place so that
regional customers
can receive deliveries from the global supply chain with the
same efficiency as they
do from local or regionally based supply chains. All the
flexibility in the world is of
little use if it makes the system so cumbersome and unpleasant
that customers turn
elsewhere. We discuss the kinds of advanced information
systems that this central-
ized order fulfillment requires in Chapter 14.

Only when a company is sufficiently prepared to implement
flexible strategies can
it take advantage of all that the global supply chain has to offer.
10.3 ISSUES IN INTERNATIONAL SUPPLY CHAIN
MANAGEMENT
In this section, we discuss other important issues of
international supply chains that
were not appropriate for the previous sections.
10.3.1 International versus Regional Products
The preceding discussion suggests that the ideal company builds
“universal products”
that can be sold in many markets. In many cases, however, this
is not that simple.
Ohmae [154] pointed out that there are several categories of
products, each of which
has different “international requirements.”
Region-specific products. Some products have to be designed
and manufactured
specifically for certain regions. For example, automobile
designs are often region
specific. The 1998 Honda Accord has two basic body styles: a
smaller body style
tailored to European and Japanese tastes and a larger body style
catering to
American tastes. Of course, even if regional designs are
different, effective supply
MANAGEMENT 323

chain management can take advantage of common components
or subassemblies
within the different designs. We discuss this issue in detail in
Chapter 11.
True global products. These products are truly global, in the
sense that no modifi-
cation is necessary for global sales. For example, Coca-Cola is
essentially the same
throughout the world, as are Levi’s jeans and McDonald’s
burgers. Similarly, lux-
ury brands such as Coach and Gucci are essentially the same
worldwide. It should
be noted, however, that some of these brands and products, such
as Coke and
McDonald’s, depend on very specific regional manufacturing
and bottling facilities
and distribution networks, while others are essentially
distributed and sold in the
same way throughout the world [124].
The difference between region-specific products and global
products does not
imply that one is inherently better than the other. However, it is
important to consider
carefully which of the two product types is more appropriate for
a particular situation
because employing strategies for regional products that are
designed for global prod-
ucts, or vice versa, can lead to disastrous results.
10.3.2 Local Autonomy versus Central Control

Centralized control can be important in taking advantage of
some of the strategies we
have discussed, but in many cases it makes sense to allow local
autonomy in the supply
chain. Sometimes, after independent regional operations have
proven to be successful,
headquarters can’t resist the temptation to tamper with the
system, and performance
suffers.
In addition, it is important to temper expectations for regional
business depending
on the characteristics of the region involved. For example,
companies typically experi-
ence, in the short term, relatively low returns in Japan, medium
returns in Germany,
and higher returns in the United States. Indeed, those companies
that are successful in
Japan had often settled initially for low returns [154].
However, managers may be tempted to follow local
conventional wisdom, and thus
miss some of the opportunities derived from the knowledge
acquired in the operation
of a global supply chain.
E X A M P L E 1 0 - 6
Nissan designates “lead-country” status to each of its car
models. For example, the Maxima and
Pathfinder are designed for American tastes, often by American
design studios. Similar designs are
developed primarily for Japanese and European markets. Once
regional product managers ensure
that vehicles meet lead-country requirements, other regional
product managers suggest slight

changes that might promote local sales. But the focus is on
developing cars for regions. Otherwise,
Nissan fears “the trap of pleasing no one well by pleasing
everyone half way.” There is no effective way
to average size, color, and other aesthetic and substantive
differences in cars across regions without
ending up with a model that no customers in that region
particularly like. Of course, if models can be
modified slightly to increase sales in other regions, it helps, but
that isn’t the primary focus [154].
E X A M P L E 1 0 - 7
When it first introduced the decongestant Contac 600 to
Japanese markets, SmithKline
Corporation was advised to use the traditional approach,
involving more than 1,000 distributors
with which the firm would have little contact. Rather than
accept this advice, SmithKline used 35
wholesalers, with whom it remained in close contact.
SmithKline had used this approach success-
fully elsewhere. Despite the naysayers, the introduction was
highly successful [124].
10.3.3 Miscellaneous Dangers
To be sure, there are many potential dangers that firms must
face as they expand their
supply chains globally. Exchange rate fluctuations, discussed
earlier as an opportu-
nity, can just as easily be a risk if not properly managed. It may
be harder to adminis-
ter offshore facilities, especially in less-developed countries.

Similarly, the promise of
cheap labor may mask the threat of reduced productivity [132].
Expensive training
may be required, but even then productivity may not reach
domestic levels.
Often local collaboration occurs in the global supply chain. In
this case, collabora-
tors can ultimately become competitors.
MANAGEMENT 325
E X A M P L E 1 0 - 9
Royal Dutch Shell and its Japanese partners, Mitsui and
Mitsubishi, have been investing for over a
decade in the development of oil fields in Russia’s far east. The
oil exploration project has run into
environmental problems and cost far exceeded the original
projection. Surprisingly, now that devel-
opment is almost over, oil prices are at an all-time high, and
huge revenue is expected, the partners
sold a majority stake in the project to Gazprom, Russia’s state-
owned gas company. The assumption
in the West is that Russia flexed its muscles and forced the
three partners to transfer ownership,
threatening dire consequences for any environmental problems
[15].
Similar dangers exist with foreign governments. To deal with
China and gain access
to that country’s huge markets, many companies are handing
over critical manufactur-
ing and engineering expertise to the Chinese government or to
Chinese partners. It is

only a matter of time until these Chinese companies, or other
companies selected by
the government, begin to compete under favorable terms with
their original partners.
The only question is whether the overseas firms that gave away
their technology will
still be able to compete successfully in the Chinese market, or if
they will lose this
opportunity even as Chinese companies begin to compete on the
world stage.
Indeed, this serves to highlight only one of the dangers that
foreign governments
pose to the international supply chain. Although world markets
are becoming more
open all the time, the world is far from becoming a giant free
trade zone. At any time,
the threat of protectionism might appear, and if the global
supply chain is not set up
with some kind of counter to this threat, companies will not be
able to do much about
it. Sometimes the threat comes not from the foreign
government, but from the domes-
tic government, dealing with the concerns of smaller local
firms.
E X A M P L E 1 0 - 8
• Hitachi, which used to manufacture under license from
Motorola, now makes its own micropro-
cessors.
• Toshiba, which manufactured copiers for 3M, is now a major
supplier of copiers under the Toshiba
brand name.

• Sunrise Plywood and Furniture, of Taiwan, was for many
years a partner of Mission Furniture in
California. Now it is one of Mission’s major competitors [132].
E X A M P L E 1 0 - 1 0
In 1986, Taiwan had a $15.7 billion trade surplus with the
United States, heightening domestic pres-
sure on the U.S. government to impose trade restrictions on
Taiwanese products. This occurred despite
the fact that the vast majority of Taiwanese imports were parts
to supply American companies such as
GE, IBM, Hewlett-Packard, and Mattel, which had moved
manufacturing offshore to take advantage of
lower costs. In response, Taiwan was forced to increase the
value of its currency relative to the U.S.
dollar, thus effectively removing much of the cost advantage of
manufacturing to Taiwan [132].
10.4 REGIONAL DIFFERENCES IN LOGISTICS
In the previous sections, we discussed the general advantages,
disadvantages, and
strategies for utilizing global supply chains effectively. Of
course, it is important to be
aware of the cultural, infrastructural, and economic differences
between regions when
decisions are made about particular foreign links in the global
supply chain. Wood
et al. [209] identified several categories of differences that

managers must consider
when designing international supply chains. In particular, major
differences can be
highlighted between the so-called triad, or First World, nations,
Japan, the United
States, and the nations of western Europe; emerging nations
such as Thailand, Taiwan,
China, Brazil, Argentina, and the countries of eastern Europe;
and the Third World
nations. These differences are summarized in Table 10-1 and
analyzed below.
10.4.1 Cultural Differences
Cultural differences can critically affect the way international
subsidiaries interpret
the goals and pronouncements of management. Wood et al.
[209] highlighted beliefs
and values, customs, and language, all of which play a big role
in global business and
can strongly affect negotiation and communication.
Language consists not only of words but also of expressions,
gestures, and context.
Many times, the words appear to be translated correctly, but the
meaning is not. We’ve
all heard stories of American businesspeople using the wrong
gestures in Asia, leading
to disastrous consequences. It is important to utilize appropriate
resources to make
sure that communication is effective.
Beliefs, or specific values about something, can differ widely
from culture to cul-
ture. The belief that effective communication is important, for
instance, can vary from
culture to culture. Similarly, values, or more general

conceptions, can vary. For exam-
ple, American manufacturers value “efficiency” in ways that
some other cultures do
not [209]. Also, some cultures may value time more than others,
so that late delivery
may be viewed in some places as a serious problem, while in
others it is not particu-
larly important.
Customs, of course, vary greatly from country to country. In
many cases, it is impor-
tant for the businessperson to adhere to local customs to avoid
offending anyone. For
example, the practice of gift giving varies greatly from country
to country.
10.4.2 Infrastructure
In First World countries, the manufacturing and logistics
infrastructure is highly
developed. Highway systems, ports, communication and
information systems, and
TA B L E 1 0 - 1
MAJOR DIFFERENCES BETWEEN DIFFERENT REGIONS
First World Emerging Third World
Infrastructure Highly developed Under development Insufficient
to support
advanced logistics
Supplier operating
standards High Variable Typically not considered
Information system Support system

availability Generally available not available Not available
Human Available with
resources Available some searching Often difficult to find
advanced manufacturing techniques allow the development of
advanced supply
chains. Regional differences do exist, primarily for
geographical, political, or histori-
cal reasons. For example, road widths, bridge heights, and
communications protocols
may differ from region to region, but, in general, techniques
have been developed to
overcome these differences.
Regardless of the infrastructure, geography also affects supply
chain decisions,
even within First World countries. In the United States, for
example, where large dis-
tances often exist between major cities, more inventory might
be held than in coun-
tries such as Belgium, where the distance between cities is
small.
Similarly, relative economic conditions have affected the mix of
logistics and
supply chain components in many First World countries. For
example, countries
with relatively cheap land and cheap labor, such as France, have
built many large,
“low-tech” warehouses, while the Scandinavian countries have
developed ware-

house automation because labor in those countries is so
expensive [66].
In the emerging nations, the supply chain infrastructure is
usually not fully in
place. Most domestic companies in emerging nations see
logistics as a necessary
expense and not a strategic advantage, so they limit investments
in logistics infrastruc-
ture. In many cases, gross national income in an emerging
nation may not yet be suffi-
cient to fully implement an advanced logistics infrastructure. In
addition, the focus of
infrastructure development may have been on exports instead of
building a system
appropriate for imports and exports. This is true in China [209].
Nonetheless, these
nations are “emerging” because they have begun to address
these issues. For example,
many countries have national transportation policies in place,
and are beginning or
continuing to implement them.
In the Third World, the infrastructure is generally insufficient
to support advanced
logistics operations. Roads are often in poor shape.
Warehousing facilities are fre-
quently unavailable. Distribution systems may be nonexistent.
In general, specific
supply chain decisions have to be considered carefully, because
many of the things
taken for granted in the triad or emerging nations may not exist
here.
10.4.3 Performance Expectation and Evaluation
Although regional differences remain among First World

nations, operating standards
are generally uniform and high. For example, overnight carriers
are expected to make
deliveries overnight. Contracts are legally binding documents.
Environmental regula-
tions and constraints typically are present, and companies are
expected to obey them.
However, the approaches to developing and enforcing
relationships do differ from
region to region. For example, European and American
companies use formal partner-
ship contracts more frequently than Japanese firms, which tend
to favor informal part-
nership agreements built over time [33].
In emerging nations, operating standards typically vary greatly.
Some firms may
have—and meet—high expectations, and place great value on
contracts and agree-
ments. Others, however, might not be so scrupulous. Research
and negotiation are
essential to successful deal making in the emerging nations. In
addition, the govern-
ment typically plays a large role in business, so foreign partners
and corporations
often must be ready to respond to the government’s changing
whims.
In the Third World, traditional performance measures have no
meaning. Shortages
are common and customer service measures that are used in the
West (e.g., stock
availability, speed of service, and service consistency) are
irrelevant; given this situa-
tion, a firm has little control of the timing and availability of
inventory [209].

MANAGEMENT 327
10.4.4 Information System Availability
Within the triad nations, computer technology has increased at
more or less the same
rate across different nations. In most cases, POS data,
automation tools, personal
computers, and other information system tools are just as
available in Spain as in
California.
Of course, there may be incompatibilities in various systems.
For example,
European EDI standards may vary from country to country and
industry to industry.
In addition, legal standards relating to data protection and
document authentication
vary from country to country. Nevertheless, efforts are
underway to overcome these
hurdles, and technology exists to overcome the technical
incompatibilities [143].
Support systems in the emerging nations may not be in place to
implement efficient
information systems. Communications networks may be
incomplete and not reliable
enough to support the traffic. Technical support expertise may
not be available to uti-
lize and maintain the equipment. However, governments in
these nations typically

have plans or programs in place to address these issues.
Advanced information technology is simply not available in
Third World countries.
Systems such as EDI and bar coding cannot be supported in this
type of environment.
Even the value of a personal computer is limited because of
inefficient communications
systems. In addition, data on the economy and population
typically are unavailable.
10.4.5 Human Resources
Within most First World countries, technically and managerially
competent workers
are available. As Wood et al. [209] pointed out, “Cultural
differences aside, a logistics
manager from Japan would be functionally at home in a
counterpart’s position in
America.” Unskilled labor, however, is relatively expensive in
these regions.
While it may be true that skilled managerial and technical
personnel are frequently
not available in emerging nations, sometimes this is not the
case. It might take some
searching, but employees with the appropriate skills often can
be found. In particular,
the eastern European countries have generally well-educated
populations [87]. In
addition, the wages of skilled workers in emerging nations are
generally competitive
on the world market. On the other hand, many Chinese
managers used to be selected
for political reasons, rather than technical or managerial
expertise, so experience in
this case may not be an appropriate indicator of ability [87].

Although it may be possible to find employees that are
appropriate to the available
technology level, it is often difficult to find trained logistics
professionals and man-
agers familiar with modern management techniques in Third
World countries. Thus,
training becomes especially important in this type of
environment.
SUMMARY
In this chapter, we examined issues specific to global supply
chain management. First,
we discussed various types of international supply chains,
covering the spectrum from
primarily domestic supply chains with some international
product distribution all the
way to fully integrated global supply chains. We then examined
the various forces
compelling companies to develop international supply chains.
Both advantages and
risks are inherent in global supply chains. These risks run the
gamut from unknown-
unknown risks to known-unknown risks. We discussed a variety
of approaches to
dealing with unknown-unknown risks, and a set of strategies for
addressing many of
the other risks. In particular, we focused on the advantages of
having a truly flexible
global supply chain to address the inherent risks in operating a
global company.

However, even with a flexible supply chain, the strategies and
approaches used to
address these risks will work only if the appropriate
infrastructure is in place.
We next surveyed some of the many issues in global supply
chain management,
including the concepts of international and regional products,
and the issue of central-
ized versus decentralized control in an international context. We
concluded with a dis-
cussion of regional logistics differences that influence the
design of effective supply
chains in different parts of the world.
DISCUSSION QUESTIONS
1. Discuss situations in which each of these supply chains might
be the appropriate
choice for a firm:
a. International distribution systems.
b. International suppliers.
c. Offshore manufacturing.
d. Fully integrated global supply chain.
2. Discuss a recent example of an unknown-unknown risk that
proved damaging to a
supply chain. Explain specifically how each of the following
strategies might have
mitigated this risk:
a. Invest in redundancy.
b. Increase velocity in sensing and responding.
c. Create an adaptive supply chain community.

3. You are the CEO of a small electronics manufacturing firm
that is about to develop
a global strategy. Would you prefer a speculative strategy, a
hedge strategy, or a
flexible strategy? Would your answer to this question change if
you were the CEO
of a large electronics firm?
4. Discuss some examples of regional products and of true
global products. What is
it about the products that makes them better suited to being
regional or global
products?
5. You are the manager of a regional bakery. Contrast the issues
you would face if
your firm is located in each of the following countries:
a. Belgium
b. Russia
c. Singapore
d. Canada
e. Argentina
f. Nigeria
6. Answer these questions about the case at the beginning of
this chapter:
a. Other than a need to expand, what other reasons would Wal-
Mart have for open-
ing stores globally?
b. Why would it be beneficial for Wal-Mart to have suppliers in
different countries?
c. Why would Wal-Mart want strong centralized control of its
stores? Why would

Wal-Mart want strong local control of stores?
d. What pitfalls and opportunities, other than those mentioned
in this case, will
Wal-Mart face over the next few years?
MANAGEMENT 329

ACCT116 – Master Class ScheduleSubject to (possibly major) revi.docx

Recommended

Recommended

More Related Content

Similar to ACCT116 – Master Class ScheduleSubject to (possibly major) revi.docx

Similar to ACCT116 – Master Class ScheduleSubject to (possibly major) revi.docx (12)

More from annetnash8266

More from annetnash8266 (20)

Recently uploaded

Recently uploaded (20)

ACCT116 – Master Class ScheduleSubject to (possibly major) revi.docx