Slides presented in 2012 on the world economic crisis, its causes, effects, and consequences for strategy in the global South. Presented to the November 15-17 colloquium organised by the journal 'Amandla' and by the Alternative Information and Development Centre (AIDC)
Beyond the EU: DORA and NIS 2 Directive's Global Impact
The world crisis and the global South
1. Alan Freeman
Presented to the Amandla Colloquium on wage-led growth,
Johannesburg, 15-17 November 2012
With acknowledgements to
AIDC and Amandla
Radhika Desai
‘Key Trends in Globalisation’ website
2.
3. Share of World GDP
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
1970
1972
1974
1976
1978
1980
1982
1984
1986
1988
1990
1992
1994
1996
1998
2000
2002
2004
2006
2008
2010
0%
North America
Other Industrialised
Accession and Transition
Rest
13. Symptom not cause
Underlying cause is failure of investment
Irrational expansion of credit-money-capital
Resource-extractive, speculative modes of “growth”
Drive to extract solution from other nations
Under neoliberalism, centred on ‘global south’
Rising poverty, productive paralysis, parasitic classes
Extreme inequities
Extreme problems of governance
National responses fuelled by popular revolt
(Argentina, Venezuela, combined with ‘rational economic
nationalism’ (China, Russia)
Focused in the first instance on control of resources
To a greater or lesser degree addressing social problems
14.
15. Prolonged and intractable crisis of growth provoked by
long-term failure of investment
Increasingly irrational responses domestically
(austerity, refusal to contemplate state-led investment)
Increasingly predatory relations with global south
Increasingly undemocratic governance
Growth of militarism
BUT
ULTIMATELY UNDERMINING THE ECONOMIC
BASIS OF DOMINANCE
16. Leads to unsustainable inequity
Creates parasitic and predatory classes
Incompatible with democratic institutions (because
great majority do not benefit)
Extreme vulnerability to speculative shocks
Politically and economically unsustainable
17. Latin America clearest example
Retake control of resources
Kick out the IMF; development-oriented finance
Economic regionalism
South-South strategy
The problem of ‘reprimarisation’
Constant threat of military intervention and external
destabilisation
The most successful (Venezuela, Brazil) are those that
focus on raising living standards of the poor
18. State-led
Export of manufactures and services
Leapfrog technology – climb up the value chain
Domestic market substitution – insulate from falling
demand in export markets
‘South-South’ economic relations
Many contradictions but primary outcome is human-
led economic development
Manufacturing industries made competitive
Service industries lead employment growth
High wage growth despite great inequities
Rapid educational development
19. Use the state
Treat labour as the primary asset of the economy
Control your resources
Control financial flows
Create a capital goods industry
Move into high-value service production
Focus on building domestic and regional demand
20. Sell off your resources
‘Liberalise’ your financial institutions
Choke off domestic demand
Expect capital to invest in your country without being
made to
Follow a North-oriented economic strategy
Let a parasitic class take over your government
Listen to the IMF
21. Various factors played a role in the IMF’s failure to
identify risks and give clear warnings. Many of these
factors represent long-standing problems that had
been highlighted for over a decade.
These factors are grouped into the following broad
categories: analytical weaknesses, organizational
impediments, internal governance problems, and
political constraints.
22. Analytical weaknesses were at the core of some of the
IMF’s most evident shortcomings in
surveillance, particularly for the largest advanced
economies. These weaknesses were of two broad types:
groupthink and other cognitive biases,
and analytical approaches/knowledge gaps
23. The linking of macroeconomic and financial sector analysis
remained inadequate, even though a series of evaluations
since the Asian crisis had called for enhanced attention to
macro-financial linkages in the IMF’s surveillance
This reflected the lack of a suitable conceptual framework
for analyzing such linkages within the economics
profession at large, as well as the view common among
IMF economists that financial issues were not central.
IMF economists tended to hold in highest regard macro
models that proved inadequate for analyzing macrofinancial linkages.
24. incentives were not well aligned to foster the candid exchange of
ideas that is needed for good surveillance—many staff reported
concerns about the consequences of expressing views contrary
to those of supervisors, Management, and country authorities.
Staff reported that incentives were geared toward conforming
with prevailing IMF views. Several senior staff members felt
that expressing strong contrarian views could “ruin one’s career.”
Thus, views tended to “gravitate toward the middle” and “our
advice becomes procyclical.”
Staff saw that conforming assessments were not penalized, even
if proven faulty. A lack of accountability was frequently
highlighted as a serious obstacle to getting the incentives right.
Many area department economists felt that there were strong
disincentives to “speak truth to power,
Editor's Notes
End of the ‘hydraulic effect’ and a combined crisis of the whole industrialised worldThe ‘lost and found’ decadesThe return of ‘the rest’Reversed relation of Third and Second World