Me and My shadow

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Me and My Shadow
Author(s): Jane Tompkins
Source: New Literary History, Vol. 19, No. 1, Feminist Directions (Autumn, 1987), pp. 169-178
Published by: The Johns Hopkins University Press
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Me and MyShadow
Jane Tompkins
HERE ARE TWO voicesinsideme answering,answeringto,
Ellen's essay.One is thevoiceofa criticwho wantsto correct
a mistakein the essay's view of epistemology.The other is
the voice of a person who wantsto writeabout her feelings.(I have
wantedto do thisfora long timebuthave felttoo embarrassed.)This
personfeelsitis wrongtocriticizetheessayphilosophically,and even
beside the point,because a critiqueof thekindthecritichas in mind
only insulatesacademic discoursefurtherfromthe issues thatmake
feminismmatter.That make hermatter.The critic,meanwhile,be-
lieves such feelings,and the attitudesthat informthem, are soft-
minded,self-indulgent,and unprofessional.
These beingsexistseparatelybut notapart. One writesforprofes-
sionaljournals; theotherin diaries,lateat night.One uses wordslike
"context"and "intelligibility,"likestowinarguments,see hername in
print,and givegraduate studentshardheaded advice. The otherhas
hardlyeverbeen heard from.She had a shortstorypublishedonce in
a universityliterarymagazine, but her worksexist chieflyin note-
books and manila folderslabelled "Journal"and "Private."This per-
son talkson thetelephonea lotto her friends,has seen psychiatrists,
likescappuccino, worriesabout thestateof her soul. Her fatheris ill
rightnow,and she has a friendwho recentlycommittedsuicide.
The dichotomydrawnhere is false-and notfalse.I mean in reali-
tythere'sno split.It's thesame person who feelsand who discourses
about epistemology.The problem is thatyou can't talk about your
privatelifein the course of doing yourprofessionalwork.You have
to pretend thatepistemology,or whateveryou're writingabout, has
nothingto do withyourlife,thatit'smore exalted,more important,
because it(supposedly)transcendsthemerelypersonal.Well,I'm tired
of the conventionsthatkeep discussionsof epistemology,or James
Joyce,segregatedfrommeditationson whatis happeningoutside my
windowor insidemyheart.The public-privatedichotomy,whichisto
saythe public-privatehierarchy,is a foundingconditionof femaleop-
pression. I say to hell withit. The reason I feel embarrassedat my
own attemptsto speak personallyin a professionalcontextis thatI
have been conditionedto feelthatway.That's all thereis to it.

170 NEWLITERARYHISTORY
I thinkpeople are scaredtotalkabout themselves,thattheyhaven't
got the gutsto do it.I thinkreaderswantto knowabout each other.
Sometimes,when a writerintroducessome personalbitof storyinto
an essay,I can hardlycontainmypleasure. I love writerswho write
about theirown experience. I feelI'm being nourishedbythem,that
I'm being allowed to enter into a personal relationshipwiththem,
thatI can matchmyown experiencewiththeirs,feelcousin to them,
and say,yes,that'show itis.
Whenhecastshisleavesforthuponthewind[saidHawthorne],theauthor
addresses,notthemanywhowillflingasidehisvolume,ornevertakeitup,
butthefewwhowillunderstandhim..... Asiftheprintedbook,thrownat
largeon thewideworld,werecertaintofindoutthedividedsegmentofthe
writer'sownnature,andcompletehiscircleofexistencebybringinghiminto
communionwithit.... And so as thoughtsare frozenand utterance,be-
numbedunlessthespeakerstandinsometruerelationwithhisaudience-it
maybe pardonableto imaginethata friend,a kindand apprehensive,
thoughnottheclosestfriend,islisteningtoourtalk.
Hawthorne's sensitivityto the relationshipthatwritingimpliesis
rare in academic prose, even when the subjectwould seem to make
awareness of the reader inevitable.AlisonJaggar gave a lecturere-
centlythatcrystallizedthe problem I've been speakingabout. West-
ern epistemology,she argued, is shaped by the beliefthatemotion
should be excluded fromthe process of attainingknowledge. Be-
cause womeninour cultureare notsimplyencouragedbutrequiredto
be the bearers of emotion,whichmen are culturallyconditionedto
repress,an epistemologywhichexcludes emotionsfromthe process
of attainingknowledge radicallyundercuts women's epistemicau-
thority.The idea thattheconventionsdefininglegitimatesourcesof
knowledge overlapped with the conventionsdefiningappropriate
(male) gender behaviorseemed to me a blindinginsight.I saw thatI
had been Socialized frombirthto feeland act in waysthatautomati-
callyexcluded me fromparticipatingin theculture'smostvalued ac-
tivities.No wonder I feltso uncomfortablein the posturesacademic
prose forcedme to assume; itwas likewearingmen'sjeans.
Ellen Messer-Davidow'sessayparticipates-as Jaggar'slectureand
my pr6cis of it did-in the conventionsof Westernrationalism.It
adopts theimpersonal,technicalvocabularyoftheepistemicideology
itseeks to dislocate.The politicalproblemposed bymyneed to reply
to the essay is this:to adhere to theconventionsis to uphold a male
standardofrationalitythatmilitatesagainstwomenbeingrecognized

ME AND MY SHADOW 171
as culturallylegitimatesourcesof knowledge.To breakwiththecon-
ventionsis to risknotbeing heard at all.
This is how I would replyto Ellen's essay ifI were to do it in the
professionallysanctionedway.
The essayprovidesfeministcriticswithan overarchingframework
forthinkingabout whattheydo, bothin relationto mainstreamcriti-
cism and in relation to feministwork in other fields. It allows the
reader to see women'sstudiesas a whole,furnishingusefulcategories
for organizinga confusingand miscellaneousarrayof materials.It
also provides excellent summaries of a wide varietyof books and
essaysthatreaders mightnototherwiseencounter.The enterpriseis
carriedout withoutpointedattackson othertheorists,withoutcreat-
ing a cumbersomenewvocabulary,withoutexhibitionisticdisplaysof
intellector esotericlearning.Its practicalaim-to definea fieldwith-
in whichdebate can take place-is fulfilledbyNewLiteraryHistory's
decisionto publishit,and to do so in a formatwhichincludesreplies.
(Very nice,Jane. You sound so reasonable and generous. But, as
anybodycan tell,thisisjust theobligatorypat on theback beforethe
stab in theentrails.)
The difficultywiththeessayfroma philosophical,as opposed to a
practical,pointof viewis thatthetheoryitoffersas a basis forfuture
workstemsfroma confusednotionof whatan epistemologyis. The
author says: "An epistemology... consists of assumptions that
knowersmake about theentitiesand processesin a domain of study,
the relationsthatobtain among them,and the proper methods for
investigatingthem."I wantto quarrel withthisdefinition.Epistemol-
ogy, strictlyspeaking, is a theoryabout the origins and nature of
knowledge.As such,itis a setof ideas explicitlyheld and consciously
elaborated,and thusbelongs to the practiceof a subcategoryof phi-
losophycalled epistemology.The factthatthereisa branchofphilos-
ophy givenover to the studyof whatknowledgeis and how itis ac-
quired is important, because it means that such theories are
generated not in relation to thisor that "domain of study"but in
relationto one another,thatis,withinthecontextof alreadyexisting
epistemologicaltheories.They are rarelybased upon a studyof the
practicesof investigatorswithina particularfield.
An epistemologydoes not consistof "assumptionsthat knowers
make" in a particularfield; itis a theoryabout how knowledgeis ac-
quired whichmakessense,chiefly,in relationto othersuch theories.
What Messer-Davidowoffersas the "epistemology"of traditionallit-
erarycriticsis not theirepistemology,if in facttheyhave one, but

172 NEW LITERARY HISTORY
her descriptionofwhatshe assumes theirassumptionsare, a descrip-
tion which may or may not be correct.Moreover,ifliterarycritics
should indeed elaborate a theoryof how theygot theirbeliefs,that
theorywould have no privilegedpositionin relationto theiractual
assumptions.It would simplybe another theory.This distinction-
between actual assumptionsand an observer'sdescriptionof them
(even whenone isobservingone's own practice)-is crucialbecause it
pointsto an all-importantfactabout the relationof epistemologyto
what reallygetsdone in a given domain of study,namelythis: that
epistemology,a theoryabout how one gets one's knowledge,in no
waydeterminesthe particularknowledgethatone has.
This factis importantbecause Messer-Davidowassumes thatifwe
change our epistemology,our practiceas criticswillchange too. Spe-
cifically,she wantsus to give up the subject-objecttheory,in which
"knowledge is an abstractrepresentationof an objectiveexistence,"
fora theorywhichsaysthatwhatcountsas knowledgeisa functionof
situationand perspective.She believesthatitfollowsfromthislatter
theorythatknowledgewillbecome more equitable,more self-aware,
and more humane.
I disagree. Knowingthatmyknowledgeis perspectival,language-
based, culturallyconstructed,or what have you does not change in
theslightestthethingsI believetobe true.All thatitchangesis what
I thinkabout howwe getknowledge.The insightthatmyideas are all
products of the situationI occupy in the worldapplies to all of my
ideas equally (includingthe idea thatknowledgeis culturallybased)
-and to all of everybodyelse's ideas as well. So wheredoes thisget
us? Rightback to wherewe werebefore,mainly.I stillbelievewhatI
believe and, ifyoudifferwithme,thinkthatyouare wrong.If I want
to change your mind I stillhave to persuade you thatI am rightby
using evidence, reasons, chains of inference,citationsof authority,
analogies,illustrations,and so on. BelievingthatwhatI believecomes
frommybeing in a particularculturalframeworkdoesn'tchange my
relationto mybeliefs.I stillbelievethemjust as muchas ifI thought
theycame fromGod, or thelawsof nature,or myautonomous self.
Here endeth theepistle.
But whileI thinkEllen is wrongin thinkingthata change of epis-
temologycan mean a change in thekindsof thingswe think,I am in
sympathywiththeends she has in view.This sympathypromptsme
to say thatmyprofessionallycorrectreplyis not on target.Because
thetarget,thegoal, rather,is notto be fightingover thesequestions,
tryingto beat theotherperson down. (What the goal is,is harder to
say.) Intellectualdebate ifitwereintherightspiritwouldbe wonder-
ful.But I don't knowhow tobe in therightspirit,exactly,can'tmake

pointswithoutsoundingkindof superiorand smug.Mostof all,I
don'tknowhowtoenterthedebatewithoutleavingeverythingelse
behind-the birdsoutsidemywindow,mygriefoverJanice,justmy-
selfas a personsittinghereinstockingfeet,a littlebitchillybecause
thewindowsare open,and thinkingaboutgoingto thebathroom.
Butnotgoingyet.
I findthatwhenI trytowriteinmy"other"voice,I amimmediate-
lycriticalofit.Itwobbles,vacillatesbackandforth,isneitherthisnor
that.The voicein whichI writeaboutepistemologyis familiar,I
knowhowitoughtto sound.This voice,though,I hardlyknow.I
don'tevenknowifithasanythingtosay.ButifI neverwriteinit,it
neverwill.So I havetotry.(Thatiswhy,yousee,thisdoesn'tsound
toogood.Itisn'ta practicedperformance,ithasn'tgota surface.I'm
askingyoutobearwithmewhileI try,hopingthatthis,whatI write,
willexpresssomethingyouyourselfhavefeltorwillhelpyoufinda
partofyourselfthatyouwouldliketoexpress.)
The thingI wanttosayisthatI'vebeenhidinga partofmyselffor
a longtime.I'veknownitwastherebutI couldn'tlistenbecausethere
was no place forthispersonin literarycriticism.The criticismI
wouldliketowritewouldalwaystakeofffrompersonalexperience,
would alwaysbe in some waya chronicleof myhoursand days,
wouldspeakina voicewhichcantalkabouteverything,wouldreach
outtoa readerlikemeandtouchmewhereI wanttobetouched,like
SusanGriffin'svoicein"TheWayofAllIdeology."I wanttospeakin
whatUrsulaLeGuincalledthemothertongue.
ThisisLeGuinspeaking:
ThedialectofthefathertonguethatyouandI learnedbestincollege...
onlylectures
.... Manybelievethisdialect-theexpositoryandparticularly
scientificdiscourse-is thehighestformoflanguage,thetruelanguage,of
whichall otherusesofwordsare primitivevestiges.... And itis indeeda
High Language.... Newton's Principiawas writtenin it in Latin,
....
and
KantwroteGermaninit,and Marx,Darwin,Freud,Boas,Foucault,allthe
greatscientistsandsocialthinkerswroteit.Itisthelanguageofthoughtthat
seeksobjectivity.
... The essentialgestureofthefathertongueisnotreasoning,butdistanc-
ing-making a gap,a space,betweenthesubjector selfand theobjector
other.... Everywherenoweverybodyspeaks[this]languageinlaboratories
andgovernmentbuildingsandheadquartersandofficesofbusiness.... The
fathertongueisspokenfromabove.Itgoesoneway.No answerisexpected,
orheard.
... The mothertongue,spokenorwritten,expectsananswer.Itisconver-
sation,a wordtherootofwhichmeans"turningtogether."The mother

174 NEW LITERARY HISTORY
tongueislanguagenotas merecommunication,butas relation,relationship.
Itconnects..... Itspowerisnotindividingbutinbinding.... Weallknowit
byheart.JohnhaveyougotyourumbrellaI thinkit'sgoingtorain.Canyou
comeplaywithme?IfI toldyouonceI toldyoua hundredtimes.... O what
am I going to do? ... Pass the soy sauce please. Oh, shit.... You look like
whatthecatdraggedin....
Much of whatI'm sayingelaboratesor circlesaround thesequotes
fromLeGuin. I findthathavingreleased myselffromthedutyto say
thingsI'm not interestedin, in a language I resist,I feelfreeto en-
tertainother people's voices. Quoting them becomes a pleasure of
appreciation rather than the obligatorygiving of credit, because
when I writein a voice thatis notstrugglingto be heard throughthe
screen of a forcedlanguage, I no longerfeelthatitis not I who am
speaking,and so thereis more room forwhatothershave said.
One sentencein Ellen's essaystuckout forme thefirsttimeI read
itand thesecond and thethird."In timewe can build a synchronous
account of our subjectmattersas we glissade among themand turn
upon ourselves."Whatattractedme to thissentencewas theglissade.
Fluidity,flexibility,versatility,mobility.Moving fromone thingto
anotherwithoutembarrassment.It is a tenetof feministrhetoricthat
the personal is political,but who in the academy acts on thiswhere
language is concerned?We all speak the fathertongue,whichis im-
personal,whiledecryingthefathers'ideas. All ofwhatI have written
so faris in a kindofwatereddown expositoryprose. Not muchimag-
ery. No descriptionof concrete things.Only thatone word, "glis-
sade." "Like black swallowsswoopingand gliding/in a flurryof en-
tangled loops and curves
...
." Two lines of a poem I memorizedin
high school are whatthewordglissadecalled to mind.Turning upon
ourselves. Turning, weaving,bending, unbending,movingin loops
and curves.
I don't believe we can ever turnupon ourselvesin thesense Ellen
intends.You can'tgetbehind thethingthatcaststheshadow. Youcast
theshadow. As soon as you turn,theshadow fallsinanotherplace. Is
stillyourshadow. You have notgotten"behind"yourself.That iswhy
self-consciousnessis not the way to make ourselves betterthan we
are.
Justme and myshadow,walkin'down the avenue.
It is a beautifulday here in NorthCarolina. The firstday thatis
both cool and sunny all summer. After a terrible summer, first
drought,then heat wave, thentorrentialrain,treesdown, flooding.
Now, finally, beautiful weather. A tree outside my window just
brushed by red, withone fullyred leaf. (This is what I wantyou to

see.) A person sittingin stockingfeet looking out her window-a
floor to ceiling rectanglefilledwithgreen, withone red leaf. The
season poised, sunnyand chill,ready to rush down the inclineinto
autumn. But perfect,and still.Not goingyet.
My response to this essay is not a response to something Ellen
Messer-Davidowhas written;itis a responseto somethingwithinmy-
self.As I reread theopening pages ofEllen'sessayI feelmyselfbeing
squeezed intoa straitjacket;I wriggle,I willnotgo in. As I read the
list"subject matters,methods of reasoning,and epistemology,"the
words will not go down. They belong to a debate whose susurrus
hardlyreaches myears.
The liberationEllen promisesfromthe fettersof a subject-object
epistemologyis one I experienced some timeago. Mine didn't take
the form she outlines, but it was close enough. I discovered, or
thoughtI discovered,thatthepoststructuralistwayofunderstanding
language and knowledgeenabled me to saywhatI wantedabout the
world.It enabled me todo thisbecause itpointedout thattheworldI
knewwas a constructofwaysofthinkingabout it,and as such,had no
privilegedclaimon thetruth.Truth in factwould alwaysbejust such
a construction,and so one could offeranother,competingdescrip-
tionand so help to change theworldthatwas.
The catch was thatanythingI mightsay or imaginewas itselfthe
product of an already existingdiscourse. Not something "I" had
made up but a way of constructingthingsI had absorbed fromthe
intellectualsurround. Poststructuralism'spropositionabout the con-
structednatureof thingsheld good, but thatdidn't mean the world
could be changed by an act of will.For, as we are lookingat thisor
that phenomenon and re-seeing it, rethinkingit, the rest of the
world, thatpart of it fromwhichwe do the seeing,is stillthere,in
place, real, irrefragableas a whole,and makingvisiblewhatwe see,
thoughchanged byit,too.
This littlelecturepretendsto somethingI no longerwantto claim.
The pretenseis in the tone and levelof the language, not in whatit
saysabout poststructuralism.The claimbeing made bythelanguage
is analogous to what Barthes calls the "realityeffect"of historical
writing,whose real messageis notthatthisor thathappened but that
realityexists.So the claim of thislanguage I've been using (and am
usingrightnow) liesin itsimplicitdeificationofthespeaker.Let's call
itthe"authorityeffect."I cannotdescribethepretenseexcept to talk
about whatitignores:the human frailtyof thespeaker,his body,his
emotions,his history;the momentof intercoursewiththe reader-
acknowledgmentof the other person's presence, her feelings,her
needs. This "authoritative"language speaks as thoughtheotherper-

son weren'tthere.Or perhaps more accurately,it doesn't bother to
imaginewho,as Hawthornesaid, is listeningto our talk.
How can we speak personallyto one anotherand yetnot be self-
centered?How can we be partofthegreatworldand yetremainloyal
to ourselves?
It seems to me thatI am tryingtowriteout of myexperiencewith-
out acknowledgingany discontinuitybetween this and the subject
matterof theprofessionI workin. And at thesame timeI findthatI
no longer want to writeabout thatsubject matter,as it appears in
Ellen's essay. I am, on the one hand, demanding a connectionbe-
tween literarytheoryand myown life,and asserting,on the other,
thatthereis no connection.
But here is a connection.I learned whatepistemologyI knowfrom
myhusband. I thinkof itas more his game than mine. It's a game I
enjoy playingbut whichI no longer need or wantto play. I wantto
declare myindependence of it,of him.(Partofwhatis goingon here
has to do witha need I have to make sure I'm notbeingabsorbed in
someone else's personality.)What I am breakingaway fromis both
myconformityto theconventionsofa male professionalpracticeand
my intellectualdependence on my husband. How can I talk about
such thingsin public?How can I not.
I metEllen Messer-Davidowone summerat theSchool ofCriticism
and Theory whereshe was theundoubted leader of thewomenwho
were there. She organized them,led them. (I mightas well say us,
since,although I was on thefacultyas a visitinglecturer,she led me,
too.) At the end of the summerwe put on a symposium,a kind of
teach-inon feministcriticismand theory,of whichnone was being
offeredthatsummer.I thoughtitreallyworked.Some people, eager
to advertisetheirintellectualsuperiority,murmureddisappointment
at the "level"of discussion(code for,mymindis finerand more rig-
orous than yours).One person who spoke out at the closingsession
said he feltbulldozed: a more honestand usefulresponse.The point
is thatEllen's leadership affectedthe experience of everyoneat the
School thatsummer.Whatshe offeredwas notan intellectualperfor-
mance calculated to draw attentionto thequalityof her mind,but a
sustained effortof practicalcourage thatchanged the situationwe
werein. I thinkthatthekindofthingEllen did should be includedin
our conceptof criticism:analysisthatis notan end in itselfbut pres-
sure broughtto bear on a situation.
Now it'stimeto talkabout somethingthat'scentralto everything
I've been sayingso far,although it doesn't show,as we used to say
about theslipswe used to wear. If I had to beton it I would saythat

EllenMesser-Davidowwasmotivatedthatsummer,and probablyin
theessaynotunderdiscussionnow,byanger(forgiveme,Ellen,ifI
am wrong),angerat her,and our,exclusionfromwhatwasbeing
studiedat theSchool,angerat our exclusionfromthediscourseof
Westernman.I interpretherbehaviorthiswaybecauseangeriswhat
fuelsmyengagementwithfeministissues,an absolutefurythathas
neverevenbeen tapped,relativelyspeaking.It'stimeto talkabout
thisnow,becauseit'sso central,at leastforme: I hatemenforthe
waytheytreatwomen,andpretendingthatwomenaren'tthereisone
ofthewaysI hatemost.
Whatenragesmeisthewaywomenareusedas extensionsofmen,
mirrorsof men,devicesforshowingmenoff,devicesforhelping
mengetwhattheywant.Theyareneverthereintheirownright,or
rarely.
SometimesI thinktheworldcontainsno women.
Whyam I so angry?
Myangeris partlytheresultof havingbeen an onlychildwho
cavedin toauthorityveryearlyon. As a resultI've builtup a huge
storehouseofhatredandresentmentagainstpeopleinauthorityover
me(mostlymale).Hatredand resentmentandattraction.
Whyshould poor men be made theobjectof thisold pent-up
anger?(Old angeristhebestanger,themeanest,thetruest,themost
intense.Old angerispurebecauseit'sbeendislocatedfromitssource
forso long,has had thechanceto ferment,to feedon itselfforso
manyyears,so thatitis nothingbutanger.Allcause,all relationto
theoutsideworld,longsincesloughedoff,witheredaway.The rageI
feelinsideme nowis thedistillationofforty-sixyears.It has had a
longtimetosimmer,toharden,tobecomeadamantine,a blackslab
thatglowsinthedark.)
Areallfeministsfueledbysuchrage?Is themoltenlavaofmillen-
nia of hatredboilingbelowthesurfaceofeveryessay,everybook,
everysyllabus,everynewsletter,everylittlemagazine?I imaginethat
I canopen thefrontofmystomachlikea door,reachin,and pluck
frommemorytherootedsorrow,pullitout,rootand branch.But
where,orrather,who,wouldI be then?I amattachedtothisrage.It
is a sourceofidentityforme.It isa motivator,an explainer,a justi-
fier,a no-need-to-say-moregreeteratthedoor.IfI weretoeradicate
thisangersomehow,whatwouldI do?Volunteerworkalldaylong?
A therapistoncesuggestedtomethatI blamedon sexisma lotof
stuffthatreallyhadtodo withmyownchildhood.Herviewwasbasi-
callytheonearticulatedinAliceMiller'sTheDramaoftheGiftedChild,
in which the good child has been made to develop a false self by
parentswho cathectthechildnarcissistically.Mytherapistmeantthat

ifI workedout some ofmyproblems-as she understoodthem,on a
psychologicallevel-my feministrage would subside.
Maybe itwould butthatwouldn'ttouchtheissueoffemaleoppres-
sion. Here is whatMillersaysabout this:"Politicalactioncan be fed
by the unconscious anger of children who have been ... misused,
imprisoned,exploited,cramped,and drilled.... If,however,disillu-
sionmentand the resultantmourningcan be lived through... then
social and politicaldisengagementdo not usuallyfollow,but the pa-
tient'sactionsare freedfromthecompulsiontorepeat."Accordingto
Miller'stheory,thecriticalvoiceinsideme,thevoice I noticedbutting
in, belittling,doubting,being wise,is "the contemptuousintroject."
The introjectionof authoritieswho manipulatedme, withoutneces-
sarilymeaning to. I thinkthatifyou can come to termswithyour
"contemptuous introjects,"learn to forgiveand understand them,
youranger willgo away.
But ifyou'renotangry,can you stillact?Willyou stillcare enough
to writethe letters,make the phone calls,attendthe meetings?You
need to find another center withinyourselffromwhich to act. A
center of outgoing, outflowing, giving feelings. Love instead of
anger. I'm embarrassed to say words like these because I've been
taughttheyare mushyand sentimentaland smackof cheap popular
psychology.I've been taughtto look down on people who read M.
Scott Peck and Leo Buscaglia and Harold Kushner,because they're
people who haven'tverymucheducation,and because they'remostly
women. Or if not women, then people who take responsibilityfor
learning how to deal withtheirfeelings,who take responsibilityfor
marriagesthatare going bad, for childrenwho are in trouble,for
friendswho need help, forthemselves.The disdain forpopular psy-
chologyand forwordslike loveand givingis partof the police action
that academic intellectualswage ceaselesslyagainst feeling,against
women,againstwhatis personal.The ridiculingof the "touchy-feely,"
of the "Mickey Mouse," of the sentimental(often associated with
teaching thattakes students'concerns into account),belongs to the
traditionAlisonJaggarrightlycharacterizedas foundingknowledge
in the denial of emotion. It's looking down on women,withwhom
feelingsare associated, and on the activitieswithwhichwomen are
identified:mother,nurse,teacher,social worker,volunteer.
So fora whileI can't talkabout epistemology.I can'tdeal withthe
philosophicalbasis of feministliterarycriticisms.I can't strapmyself
psychicallyinto an apparatus that will produce the rightgestures
when I begin to move. I have to deal withthe trashingof emotion,
and withmyanger againstit.
This one timeI've takenoffthestraitjacket,and itfeelsso good.
DUKE UNIVERSITY

Me and My shadow

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