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Hurricane Harvey 2017: Texas state agencies response
- 1. HURRICANE HARVEY 2017: THE TEXAS STATE AGENCIES RESPONSE Week 8 Assignment
- 2. CONTENT • Introduction • Historical overview • Description of the Emergency, including Theoretical Considerations • Assessment of the Emergency • Proposed Intervention and Rationale • Actual Outcome of the Emergency • Strengths & Weaknesses • Additional Recommendations • References (separate Word document) 2
- 3. INTRODUCTION • Hurricane Harvey • 2nd costliest storm in U.S. history at $125B • Hurricane Katrina caused $161B in damages • Principally due to flooding in the Houston metropolitan area • First major hurricane to make landfall in the U.S. in 13 years • Hurricane Wilma (2005) • 105 fatalities • National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration • Number of annual storms impacting the U.S. remains steady 3(TCEQ, 2018; NOAA, 2018; CDC, 2018; USNHC, 2018)
- 4. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW I • Hurricane Harvey • Category 4 storm with 130 mph winds made landfall on August 25, 2017 at 10 PM near Rockport, Texas • Stalled over southeastern Texas for a week • Result: • An estimated 27 trillion gallons of rainwater fell on Texas • The highest storm surge was 12.5 feet northeast of Corpus Christi, Texas • The highest total rainfall in U.S. history was 60.58 inches near Nederland, Texas 4(TCEQ, 2018; NOAA, 2018; CDC, 2018; USNHC, 2018)
- 5. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW II 5 (NOAA, 2018)
- 6. DESCRIPTION OF THE EMERGENCY I • Governor’s Disaster Declaration encompassed 58 out of a total of 254 counties • Activated every Texas National Guard unit to facilitate rescue and relief operations • 12,000 Soldiers total 6 (PAO, 2017; NOAA, 2018) • Record amount of rainfall led to widespread flooding Houston was devastated • Lack of fresh water, food, medicine, healthcare, electricity, fuel, running water for sewage systems and personal use
- 7. DESCRIPTION OF THE EMERGENCY II • 61 public water systems serving 222,821 people & 40 waste water treatment facilities serving 168,816 people were destroyed or rendered non-operational • Hurricane Harvey created 15.9 million cubic yards of storm debris in TX • Theoretical considerations: • Community resilience theory: • A process linking a set of adaptive capacities to a positive trajectory of functioning and adaptation after a disturbance. • Impacted by culture, social culture, human spirit, adaptability, economic development, social capital, communication, competence, robustness, redundancy, and rapidity • Compounded by a sense of vulnerability and disappointment • It is the responsibility of the national government to protect and assist its citizens 7 (TCEQ, 2018; PAO, 2017; NOAA, 2018; Norris et al, 2007)
- 8. DESCRIPTION OF THE EMERGENCY III • Planned Behavior and Disaster Preparedness Theory: • Disaster preparedness are preparations and adjustments such as storing food and water, preparing a household emergency plan, preparing an emergency kit, and other activities that reduce risk or injury and damage • Actions that ensure resources necessary to carry out an effective response are available before a disaster, or obtained promptly when needed 8 (TCEQ, 2018; PAO, 2017; NOAA, 2018; Norris et al, 2007) • Factors affecting preparedness include: • Critical awareness; risk perception; preparedness perception; self-efficacy; collective efficacy; locus of control; fatalism; anxiety; previous disaster experience; societal norms; sense of community; community participation and empowerment; optimistic and normalization biases; social trust; perceived responsibility; responsibility towards others; coping style and available resources
- 9. ASSESSMENT OF THE EMERGENCY I • A confluence of wind and rains resulted in Hurricane Harvey becoming a rare 1,000 year storm • The carnage was well beyond that of the local, State and in many instances, the Federal government to deal with. • A large number of non-governmental organization responded: • The American Red Cross; Salvation Army; United Methodist Committee on Relief; Gulf Coast Synod Disaster Relief; United States Equestrian Federation; Humane Society of the United States; Knights of Columbus; Catholic Charities USA; AmeriCares; Operation BBQ relief; Amateur Radio Emergency Service. • Business aviation played a part in the rescue efforts, providing support during the storm as well as relief flights bringing in suppliers in the immediate aftermath. • As superstorms hit the U.S. and government-relief agencies struggle, organized private citizens can provide lifesaving assistance • Heroic efforts by the Louisiana Cajun Navy, Texas Navy and the Florida Cracker Navy 9(Tate, 2017; McAdie et al, 2009; TECQ, 2018)
- 10. ASSESSMENT OF THE EMERGENCY II • Thousands of people were stranded • Needed food, water, medicine, medical care • Nursing homes for the elderly and Special Needs Centers were especially vulnerable and hard hit • Flooded facilities; stranded in waist deep water • Loss of medical staff and support personnel • Needed transportation to shelters 10 (Morrow-Jones et al, 1991; CEC, 2018)
- 11. PROPOSED INTERVENTION AND RATIONALE • Lives were threatened! • Hurricane Harvey dropped fifty inches of rain and flooded 28,000 square miles around Houston in three days • Prior to the arrival of Hurricane Harvey • Mayor of Houston did not encourage evacuations • Exasperated a deadly situation • 56,000 9-1-1 Calls in Houston alone • Houston is the nation’s fourth-largest city with 6.6M residents • World’s 23rd largest economy 11 (NOAA, 2018; USNHC, 2018)
- 12. OUTCOME OF THE EMERGENCY I • Hurricane Harvey was the 2nd most destructive hurricane in U.S. history • It affected an estimated 13 million people • 738,000 people registered for assistance with State of Texas and/or FEMA • 37,000 people transported to shelters in Texas • 50 Texas counties out of 254 flooded • Hurricane Harvey damaged 203,000 homes • 12,700 were destroyed • 225,000 people were displaced • 1 million cars were destroyed 12 (NOAA, 2018; USNHC, 2018)
- 13. OUTCOME OF THE EMERGENCY II • Hurricanes Harvey slowed U.S. GDP 1% • Texas: • GDP of $1.5T • Accounts for 8% of U.S. economic output • Ranked No. 4 in 2017 America's Top States for Business • 20 Texas oil refineries were closed or partially shut down • U.S. energy production was reduced 21% • One quarter reduction of total U.S. refining capacity • Temporarily increased Texas unemployment rate by the thousands 13 (TCEQ, 2018)
- 14. OUTCOME OF THE EMERGENCY III • Texas Health and Human Services mobilized to help Texans • Crisis counseling • Mental Health counseling • Disaster benefits and assistance • Disaster Distress Hotline • Texas Workforce Commission • Disaster Unemployment Assistance • Texas Department of Housing and Community Affairs • Federal assistance • DisasterAssistance.gov • Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) • U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) • U.S. Department of Agriculture • Singapore, Israel, and Mexico provided disaster assistance 14 (TCEQ, 2018)
- 15. ADDITIONAL RECOMMENDATIONS I 15 (TCEQ, 2018; NOAA, 2018) • Conduct periodic and realistic, scenario based exercises/training at the local, State and Federal levels • Invite non-government agencies and nonprofit organizations to participate at least in the planning phase • Continue the practice of conducting an after action review (AAR) at the local, State and Federal levels • Publish, share and incorporate from the information contained in the AAR; revise tactics, techniques, policies and procedures; update training courses/topics as necessary • An absence of first responders spawned the vigilante future of disaster relief – Cajun Navy • Ad hoc group of boat owners from Louisiana drove to Texas • The people of Louisiana first began to call themselves the Cajun Navy during Hurricane Katrina relief efforts • Ferried supplies in and transported people to safety • Augmented operations by National Guardsmen and first responders • Strong-willed, brave citizens working to help others during an emergency • In some situations, organized citizens can act more effectively than government organizations
- 16. ADDITIONAL RECOMMENDATIONS II 16 (CDC, 2018) • All aspects of society were forced to analyze how they performed and what could be improved in a future disaster scenario • Hospital and emergency healthcare analysis • Identified 9 deficiencies that affected hospitals' ability to respond • Communities had 50 hours to prepare for Hurricane Harvey • There were not enough emergency shelters open and ready • Shelters were not equipped to care for residents with medical needs • Despite federal law requiring general population shelters to be equipped to meet the needs of people with special medical conditions, people were turned away from shelters • There was a general lack of medical preparedness at shelters • Resulted in reliance on hospitals as impromptu shelters and evacuation sites • Storm victims turned to hospital emergency departments and the barrage of people taxed hospitals' resources • Analysis of previous natural disasters shows that Harvey’s survivors will need attention and care far into the future. • Recommendations for public education about health effects and precautions • Improved surveillance programs to detect diseases or complications that usually increase after a disaster • Monitoring communities for mental health problems • Pregnant women require long term monitoring
- 17. STRENGTHS & WEAKNESSES I • Disaster Response Strike Team were well integrated • Training helped staff easily fill Incident Command System billets • Staff from regions, offices and agencies worked well together • Training provided system and procedural familiarity • Natural Disaster Operational Workgroup participation ensured integration with State and Federal agencies • EPA provided liaison added acquisition of federal support and assets • Pre-disaster communications systems worked well 17 (TCEQ, 2018) • Disaster documentation • Need to develop a working group to update cost tracking documentation process • Staff needs more training on completing forms • Response Manager • Need to create a work group to address Response Manager issues • Water, wastewater and debris management procedures and software need to be updated • Need to work with local government to identify Temporary Debris Management Sites • Public Information Requests • Staff overwhelmed • Lack of Public Information Officers
- 18. STRENGTHS & WEAKNESSES II • Staff from regions, offices and agencies worked well together (continued) • Assistance from Military Civil Support Teams and Texas State Guard Engineering Unit was helpful • Embedding Texas Optimization Program staff and engineers into the Texas Commission on Environmental Quality Assistance Teams worked very well • Information Resource Department personnel provided staff and support for the duration of the response, thereby ensured all computer systems were fully operational • Executive management participation in all conference calls/meetings helpful 18 (TCEQ, 2018) • Public Information Requests (continued) • Public Information Officers need to be assigned to each regional office and subordinate branch • Establish a clearing house to manage Public Information Requests • Public Information Officers need to participate in Unified Command to provide accurate and consistent responses • Discretion and Waiver guidance to regional centers • Specific guidance needed at regional offices • Conduct daily situation reports to work through issues and provide consistency
- 19. STRENGTHS & WEAKNESSES III • Posting Hurricane Harvey information online • Utilizing public website was very helpful • ShareNet Office webpages provided useful information for staff • State support to regional offices • Immediate authorization to implement Regional Hurricane Plans expedited response • Office of Compliance and Enforcement media support was helpful • Support from other regions ensured continuity of operations 19 (TCEQ, 2018) • Staffing • Need additional staff trained on National Incident Command System to backfill Texas Commission on Environmental Quality Command Staff and Safety Officer billets • Establish a centralized Disaster Response Strike Team office that can quickly backfill Command Staff positions • Provide additional training for Safety Officers through Texas Division of Emergency Management • Develop an email system for disaster related questions from the affected communities
- 20. STRENGTHS & WEAKNESSES IV • Past Lessons Learned • National Disaster Operational Workgroup is a lesson learned from 2009 Hurricane Ike • Texas Commission on Environmental Quality developed 16 Disaster Response Strike Teams, one per region to support local and State response efforts • Each Disaster Response Strike Team has: • 130 staff members • Staff is trained in National Incident Command System • Teams are comprised of various disciplines 20 (TCEQ, 2018)
Editor's Notes
- Hurricane Harvey started as a tropical wave off the African coast on Sunday, August 13th and tracked westward across the Atlantic and on August 17th become a tropical storm which moved into the Caribbean Sea where Harvey become disorganized. Harvey was then downgraded to a tropical wave which entered the Gulf of Mexico on the 22nd. On the morning of the 23rd, Harvey was upgraded again to tropical depression as the Bay of Campeche and the Western Gulf of Mexico had very warm waters. Over the next 48 hours Harvey would undergo a period of rapid intensification from a tropical depression to a category 4 hurricane. Harvey made landfall along the Texas coast near Port Aransas around 10:00 p.m. on August 25th as a cat 4 and brought devastating impacts. As Harvey moved inland, it’s forward motion slowed to near 5mph after landfall and then meandered just north of Victoria, TX by the 26th. Rain bands on the eastern side of the circulation of Harvey moved into southeast Texas on the morning of the 25th and continued through much of the night and into the 26th. A strong rainband developed over Fort Bend and Brazoria Counties during the evening hours of the 26th and spread into Harris County and slowed while training from south to north. This resulted in a rapid development of flash flooding between 10:00 p.m. and 1:00 a.m. as tremendous rainfall rates occurred across much of Harris County. The morning of the 27th saw additional rain bands continued to develop and produced additional excessive rainfall amounts. As the center of Harvey slowly moved east-southeast and back offshore heavy rainfall continued to spread through much of the 29th and the 30th exacerbating the ongoing widespread and devastating flooding. All of this rainfall caused catastrophic drainage issues and made rivers rise greatly. Only around 10 percent of the river forecast points in southeast Texas remained below flood stage due to the event, and approximately 46 percent of the river forecast points reached new record levels. Harvey maintained tropical storm intensity the entire time while inland over the Texas coastal bend and southeast Texas. After moving offshore, Harvey made a third landfall just west of Cameron, Louisiana on the morning of the 30th and brought more heavy rainfall to the Northern Gulf States.
- The Texas National Guard members will assist in the ongoing search and rescue effort for any Texans in immediate danger, and will be heavily involved in the extensive recovery effort in the aftermath of the storm Texas National Guard is working closely with FEMA and federal troops to respond urgently to the growing needs of Texans who have fallen victim to Hurricane Harvey, and the activation of the entire Guard will assist in the efforts already underway.
- Communities have the potential to function effectively and adapt successfully in the aftermath of disasters. Drawing upon literatures in several disciplines, we present a theory of resilience that encompasses contemporary understandings of stress, adaptation, wellness, and resource dynamics. Community resilience is a process linking a network of adaptive capacities (resources with dynamic attributes) to adaptation after a disturbance or adversity. Community adaptation is manifest in population wellness, defined as high and non-disparate levels of mental and behavioral health, functioning, and quality of life. Community resilience emerges from four primary sets of adaptive capacities--Economic Development, Social Capital, Information and Communication, and Community Competence--that together provide a strategy for disaster readiness. To build collective resilience, communities must reduce risk and resource inequities, engage local people in mitigation, create organizational linkages, boost and protect social supports, and plan for not having a plan, which requires flexibility, decision-making skills, and trusted sources of information that function in the face of unknowns.
- Disaster preparedness is defined as actions that ensure resources necessary to carry out an effective response are available before a disaster. Disaster preparedness requires a thorough understanding of the factors that influence performance or nonperformance of disaster preparedness behaviors (DPB). The major aim of this research was to further our understanding of DPB based on the theory of planned behavior (TPB). Consistent with the theory, intentions to do DPB could the person predicted from attitudes, subjective norms, and perceived behavioral control with respect to DPB; and actually doing DPB was strongly related to intentions and perceptions of control assessed in the prepared people. Theoretical and practical implications of these findings are discussed. An effective intervention will not only have to encourage people of the desirability of DPB, but also to provide them with the skills and means to do it. The more strongly they can be made to feel that they have control over DPB, the more likely they are to carry out their intentions. That is, heightened perceived control tends to strengthen people’s motivation to do DPB.
- Agencies respond to Hurricane Harvey The Coast Guard deployed 2,060 personnel, 50 aircraft, 75 boats and 29 cutters, rescuing 11,022 people and 1,384 pets. FEMA assigned 28 Urban Search and Rescue (USAR) teams from across the nation to deploy to Texas to assist state and local agencies with the lifesaving mission. The teams rescued 6,453 people and 237 animals, using boats and high-water trucks. Search and rescue efforts involved USAR, National Parks Service, U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, Customs and Border Patrol and the Department of Defense. FEMA supplied 3 million meals, 3 million liters of water, 9,900 blankets, 8,840 cots and 10,300 hygiene kits to the state for distribution to survivors. FEMA quickly provided $186 million in Public Assistance funding to reimburse local and state agencies for the cost of emergency protective measures and debris removal. FEMA deployed teams of specialists to neighborhoods and disaster recovery centers to help Texans with registration and questions about disaster assistance. FEMA coordinated National Business Emergency Operations Center calls among 150 private sector partners working on disaster response, worked with social media companies to share disaster information and assisted cell service companies in providing charging stations for disaster survivors. The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) deployed more than 1,110 personnel with medical equipment and supplies. Personnel provided medical care to 5,359 patients and conducted 60 shelter assessments. The department helped move Port Arthur residents who had been living in floodwater-contaminated houses and apartments to temporary housing at the Bob Bowers Civic Center. U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) scientists deployed to the coast to help the National Weather Service(NWS) forecast storm surge and beach erosion, then worked through Harvey’s landfall to keep the NWS informed of real-time flooding. After the floodwaters receded, USGS scientists collected more than 1,500 high-water marks to help develop future flood maps. The Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) contacted all 61 public housing authorities in the disaster area to assess damage and to identify unoccupied units that could be made available to HUD-assisted and other survivors. Those authorities manage 91 public housing developments that serve 200,000 families. HUD did the same assessment with its 454 FHA-insured apartment complexes, comprising 50,000 units, of which 20,000 have direct HUD rental assistance. HUD also canvassed the four-state area surrounding the disaster for available public housing and multifamily housing units. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE), deploying 390 personnel, worked with local and state agencies and the Coast Guard to clear navigation channels, allowing critical ports to resume operations. Engineers performed generator inspections and installations to provide temporary emergency power at critical locations and provided technical assistance for debris, temporary housing and commodities missions. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), working with the Texas Commission on Environmental Quality, completed 625 drinking water assessments and 441 waste water assessments. The agency conducted assessments of 43 Superfund sites and recovered 517 containers of unidentified, potentially hazardous material. The Department of Energy (DOE) supported the Texas Division of Emergency Management and utility companies in efforts to restore power to more than 300,000 customers. Utility companies responded in a coordinated effort, activating their mutual support networks and assigning more than 10,000 workers from at least 21 states to the response and recovery effort, including crews, line workers and support personnel. DOE worked with the EPA to issue waivers that allowed more fuel to go into the supply pipeline. Secretary Perry authorized release of 5.3 million barrels of crude oil from the Strategic Petroleum Reserve as a resource if needed. The Department of Defense (DoD) supported more than 30 mission assignments from FEMA that included search and rescue, strategic airlift, transportation, evacuation, installations support, patient movement and logistics. As part of the search and rescue mission, U.S. Northern Command rescued nearly 3,000 people. The U.S. Small Business Administration (SBA), working with the Texas Gulf Coast Small Business Development Center, opened five business recovery centers to provide a wide range of services to businesses impacted by the disaster. SBA extended the deferment for first payment from the standard five months to 11 months from the date the borrower signs the loan closing documents. SBA provided an automatic 12-month deferment of principal and interest payments for SBA-serviced business and disaster loans that were in regular servicing status on Aug. 25 in the counties designated as federal disaster areas. The Civil Air Patrol conducted 270 flights with 32 aircraft to assist with emergency response. The Department of Agriculture (USDA) activated the Disaster Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program to provide food benefits to households that wouldn’t normally qualify, if they meet disaster income limits and have disaster-related expenses. Schools in hurricane-stricken areas were allowed to provide meals through the National School Lunch Program to all students free of charge through Sept. 30. Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service deployed 25 tons of pet food to affected areas and used helicopters to identify stranded livestock, assisting the Texas National Guard in dropping 210,000 pounds of hay to 10,000 head of livestock. The General Services Administration (GSA) leased facilities to provide work sites for several thousand federal employees deployed to Texas, including a joint state/federal field office, area field offices and call centers. The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services temporarily modified the Medicare, Medicaid and Children’s Health Insurance Program to provide immediate relief to Texas disaster survivors. The Department of Transportation provided technical assistance, training and on-site damage assessments for state and local partners to begin returning transportation infrastructure to pre-storm conditions. The Federal Highway Administration activated or deployed 36 employees in the response effort. Staff provided assistance for emergency repairs under the Emergency Relief Program with an initial $25 million in quick-release funds. All major airports returned to normal operations by Sept. 6. Ports in Corpus Christi, Houston, Beaumont and Port Arthur were open with restrictions. Metropolitan Transit Authority of Harris County returned to limited service. As of Sept. 20, 191 damage inspection reports documented emergency repairs completed and permanent repairs to be completed. The American Red Cross provided $45 million to more than 100,000 disaster survivors to help them with immediate needs. The Red Cross deployed more than 3,000 staff and volunteers, 171 emergency response vehicles, served 965,000 meals and 1 million snacks and operated shelters throughout the impacted counties. More than 300 voluntary organizations, including National and Texas Voluntary Organizations Active in Disasters and locally based groups, are working to support Harvey survivors. Volunteers are working to remove muck from homes, support shelters, feed people, distribute supplies, provide emotional and spiritual care, clean up debris, repair and rebuild housing and provide crisis support. The Salvation Army deployed 4,457 volunteers who have served 40,714 hours providing feeding, shelter, emotional and spiritual care, donations and social services. AmeriCorps Disaster Response Teams have deployed 109 volunteers mucking and gutting houses, chain-sawing trees and tarping roofs. Voluntary organizations have assisted 17,000 households with cleanup.
- News and social media reports from coastal Texas have shown many striking images of Hurricane Harvey flood victims, but few were as arresting as a photo of older women in a Dickinson nursing home, sitting in waist-high water in their wheelchairs. Although the women were moved to safety, the picture highlighted how vulnerable older adults can be during and after major disasters. My work focuses on answering pressing questions about the health of older adults after events such as Hurricane Harvey. While age alone does not make people more vulnerable to disasters, many health issues that are common with aging do, including frailness, memory impairment, limited mobility and chronic illness. Sixty percent of Hurricane Katrina deaths were age 65 and older, and more older adults died after Hurricane Katrina and in the year after than any other age group.
- Mayor Sylvester Turner and Gov. Greg Abbott disagreed over evacuation of the Houston region, with the governor urging residents to “strongly consider” leaving and the mayor telling people stay in their homes and ride out the storm. Turner's command of this crisis was criticized in the early stages because he refused to order 2.3 million Houstonians to evacuate. He has been steadfast in working to get the nation's fourth-largest city back on its feet In Houston, crews are still gutting and repairing tens of thousands of homes, businesses, schools and government buildings. At the mayor’s request, Houston’s landfills are open 24 hours a day to help clear more than eight million cubic yards of debris.
- It is estimated that Hurricane Harvey had total costs of $125 billion—second only to Hurricane Katrina in the period of record, which had an approximate cost of $161 billion. In terms of insured U.S. coastal properties vulnerable to hurricanes, New York ranks number one with $2.92 trillion, followed by Florida ($2.86 trillion), Texas ($1.17 trillion), Massachusetts ($849 billion), and New Jersey ($713 billion). The cumulative cost of the 16 separate billion-dollar weather events in the U.S. in 2017 was $306.2 billion, breaking the previous cost record of $214.8 billion (2005).
- Prices compiled by AAA showed that the average cost of a gallon of regular unleaded gas was $2.40 per gallon on Wednesday, up from $2.34 a week earlier. That's because shutdowns have slowed the flow of gas from the epicenter of Texas' oil refinery industry, which processes nearly one-third of America's crude oil. Earlier on Wednesday, the Motiva Port Arthur refinery, the largest in the US, began shutting down as flood waters rose. Refiners are demanding less crude oil, prices are falling. West Texas Intermediate crude, the US benchmark, is down 4% this week. "You've got a little less Eagle Ford production, and a little bit less Gulf of Mexico production, but it's nowhere near the demand that's been taken offline from the refiners," said Rob Thummel, a portfolio manager at Tortoise Capital, which manages $15 billion in energy assets. Thummel said the sheer demand for gasoline would have the refineries back up and running as soon as they can. Goldman Sachs estimated that it could take "several months" for demand to return to pre-hurricane levels.
- The Texas Workforce Commission began taking unemployment insurance claims the day Hurricane Harvey made landfall. FEMA activated Disaster Unemployment Assistance (DUA) for Texans whose employment was lost because of the disaster. The program is administered by the State of Texas. As of Sept. 19, the commission processed 136,576 unemployment insurance claims, of which 17,714 were under the DUA program. DUA call centers are operating seven days a week.
- As traffic pointed the way out of Houston before Hurricane Harvey, a line of trucks towing small, flat-bottomed boats made their way into the city. The Cajun Navy would save hundreds of lives from flooded out neighborhoods, and instead of rejecting their help, the government embraced it, entrusting much of the evacuation to this rag-tag band of individuals, preferring them over the Red Cross, and in some cases, the National Guard. In an age when the governmental bodies charged with our safekeeping are failing during times of both crisis and calm, stretched ever more thinly between natural disasters of increasing magnitude and frequency, amateur outfits like the Cajun Navy seem not just useful but like a patriotic solution to our society’s crumbling infrastructure. The idea of strong-willed, brave citizens working collectively to help each other during an emergency is an appealing one—but it is also a scenario whose utility has its limits, as well as its dangers.
- A Texas Hospital Association analysis of the storm, which killed 90 people and closed 20 hospitals, showed what worked and didn’t. A new report released by the Texas Hospital Association is shining a spotlight on the barriers and inefficiencies that plagued Texas hospitals as they struggled to stay open, let alone effective, while Hurricane Harvey ravaged the area. It is also drawing a roadmap for the improvements that need to be made and issues hospital leadership must address if they are to face the next storm with an improved level of preparation. Initial response from 92 hospitals showed the estimated disaster-related costs for reporting hospitals totaled $460 million, which included $380 million for capital, operating, emergency work and other costs; $40 million for increased uncompensated care costs; and $40 million in other increased costs. Hospitals also reported impact to revenue and cash flow thanks to billing and claims filing interruptions, business office closures and reduced hours, insurance and patient payment delays, decreased patient volume and canceled services.
- The Disaster Response Strike Team (DRST) members integrated well, it did not matter what region or discipline they were from. • Continued training helped DRST staff fill required Incident Command System (ICS) rolls as needed. • Continued training on Response Manager ensured that most DRST staff were familiar with the program. Staff from numerous regions, offices and agencies worked together to accomplish the final goal. • Continued participation in the NDOW ensures that TCEQ works well with both state and federal response partners. • Pre-disaster internal communications were good and ensured everyone was up to date on the current situation. • The EPA provided a staff member designated to assisting the TCEQ in obtaining federal assets and support. • Assistance from the Military Civil Support Teams and the Texas State Guard Engineering Unit was very helpful. Disaster Documentation: • Emails for timekeeping were confusing. • The timekeeping process is confusing and time consuming. • The daily 0900 cost tracking deadline is hard to comply with. • Staff need more training on properly completing the ICS 214b. • Develop or assign a workgroup to revise/update the TCEQ cost tracking documentation procedures. • Training on the completion of 214s is included in the NDOW Response Manager trainings. The training has been revised by the United States Coast Guard. Response Manager: • Several procedural and software issues have been identified, mostly related to the water and wastewater module. • A workgroup to address Response Manager issues has been created. The workgroup will work to revise/update the system’s Operating Procedures and fix issues within the software. The first workgroup meeting was held 2/6/18. • Continue with Response Manager trainings. Include all TCEQ offices in the trainings. Debris Management Procedures: • The debris management procedures for review/approval of TDMS locations needs to be updated. • Develop a workgroup to revise/update the TCEQ Debris Management Plan, including guidance for conducting approval reviews for TDMS locations and periodic inspections. • Work with local government officials to pre-identify TDMS locations prior to actual disasters.
- • Having a water/wastewater and waste/debris liaison increased efficiency. • Having the TCEQ Assistance Teams staffed with Texas Optimization Program (TOP) staff and engineers, who worked directly with the water system staff at their facilities to expedite the reestablishment of service to their customers was extremely helpful. Staff worked 24 hour shifts to provide advanced technical assistance to get plants back online as quickly as possible. • The ability of IRD to provide staff and support for the duration of the response ensured all computer systems Handling of Public Information Requests (PIRs): • Staff were overwhelmed by PIRs. • Lack of TCEQ Public Information Officer (PIO) in the branches hampered consistency in responses. • Requests for the same information from multiple people caused a drain on resources. • A TCEQ PIO at each branch would help streamline responses to PIRs. • Participation of TCEQ PIOs in the Unified Command would ensure accurate responses to PIRs and ensure consistency in responses by the various response partners operating in the Unified Command. • A clearing house for PIRs would help streamline the PIR response process. • PIOs in the field could help document response operations which could then be used to inform the public of TCEQ positive actions. Discretion and Waiver Guidance: • Additional guidance to regional staff on discretion and waiver issues would be helpful. • Conduct daily calls for staff fielding questions regarding waivers, to help work through issues and provide consistency application of the guidance.
- Posting Harvey information resources online was very helpful. • Providing disaster related information on the public website allowed staff to refer the public, regulated entities, local government officials and media, to a specific location for information. • The ShareNet Office webpages contained useful information for staff responding to Harvey. Develop additional trained staff to backfill TCEQ Command Staff positions. • Develop additional trained staff to backfill TCEQ Safety Officers. An email box dedicated to questions from the regulated community would have been helpful. • Setup a dedicated email box for disaster related questions from the regulated community. Staffing: • Develop a Central Office DRST that can back fill Command Staff positions, as needed. • Provide more training for Safety Officers through the NDOW or TDEM.
- The support provided to the impacted Regional Offices was very helpful. • Immediate authorization to implement Regional Hurricane Plans expedited the response process. • OCE support with media inquiries helped to relieve some of the duties from the regions. • Support from other regions, i.e. transferring affected region’s phone lines, responding to affected region’s complaints and other routine business, helped insure continuity of operations.