HLS-465_APLHA GROUP 1 PROJECT_CASSIE BRIGGS

Running head: HURRICANE KATRINA: THE STORM THAT INSPIRED CHANGE
Alpha Group1
Cassie Briggs
JackBrooks
Kristen Duke
JeffHanson

HURRICANE KATRINA: THE STORM THAT INSPIRED CHANGE
Hurricane Katrina: The storm that inspired change
Eastern Kentucky University
Modern Natural Disasters
HLS-465
Alpha Group 1
October 15, 2015

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HURRICANE KATRINA:THE STORM THAT INSPIRED CHANGE
Hurricane Katrina: The storm that inspired change
The primary goal of this paper will be to discuss the changes made in the aftermath of
Hurricane Katrina. The main purpose of this material is to identify issues that contributed to the
evacuation problems that incurred before and after the event. The other purpose will be to
identify issues contributing to evacuations, lack of preparedness, warnings, and notices. Some of
the questions asked in the following section include - what issues contributed to evacuation
problems, what are some of the problems surrounding disaster preparedness, and what might
improve disaster preparedness? How might warnings and notices be improved?
Evacuation and Preparedness
The events surrounding Hurricane Katrina raised numerous issues concerning Emergency
Management. This section will address significant changes that have a substantial impact on
evacuation methods. "Following the hurricane event, the Congressional Party implemented the
Post-Katrina Emergency Reform Act of 2006 (PKEMRA) to include issues that resulted from the
storm," (Fugate, 2011). One of the problems with surrounding evacuation efforts leading up to
Hurricane Katrina was the lack of evacuation routes leading out of the city, which included
Interstate 10, which moves from east to west across the state. Interstate 10 crosses the
Mississippi River, as does Highway 90. There was massive congestion on both transportation
route leading out of New Orleans, and the fast rising water compromised both routes in the
predominately low-lying areas. The rapidly rising water along with the limited evacuation routes
crippled thousands of people and created a situation where they had nowhere to go. The Post-
Katrina Emergency Reform Act is critical to evacuation efforts.
To address the transportation problems, the Louisiana Department of Transportation and
Development developed a contraflow map for emergency evacuation. The contraflow plan is

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now in effect, and it provides for the timely evacuation of citizens through the North, East, and
West directions out of the city while they attempt to seek shelter and security, along with higher
and in some cases drier ground in the event of the storms. An essential element in flood
preparation includes having Contingency Plans in line before a natural disaster occurs. The
experiences gained from the hurricane and the storm itself contributed to the changes made by
the State of Louisiana. The state of Louisiana now conducts annual preparedness exercises and
implements post-Katrina evacuation plans.
Another area that is frequently overlooked includes the evacuation and preparation efforts
required when caring for animals. People often fail to consider the furry little critters, such as
dogs, cats, and small animals. Unfortunately, they are unable to take care of themselves and are
reliant on us for their daily needs. Hurricane Katrina not only displaced many human beings, but
an estimated 250,000 dogs and cats became homeless or perished because of Hurricane Katrina
(Bershadker, 2015).
Many families fled Hurricane Katrina and did not have time or space to take their animals
along with them. The displacement of so many animals has caused some psychological effects
among families due to the emotional trauma of having to leave a pet behind. Despite the fact that
not every displaced pet perished in the hurricane, many pets were unable to reunite with loved
ones because they were either not microchipped or registered through the ASPCA. The heartache
that Katrina caused helped to inspire the formation of the Pets Evacuation and Transportation
Standards Act of 2006. The Act’s creation contributed to reducing the number of displaced
animals due to natural disasters (H.R. 3858, 109th). The most significant contributing factor of
this Act is that it helps to identify FEMA's authority in the provision of essential assistance to

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individuals with pets and service animals. It also helps provide for their care, rescue, sheltering
and vital needs required to sustain life.
Warnings and Notices
In the moments before the hurricane and afterward, the National Weather Service and
various local, State and Federal agencies worked diligently to provide the community with
warnings and notices. The support they provided was top notch. Following Katrina, there was
exhaustive after action review of all warning and notification systems where recommendations
were made to improve upon the lessons learned from the hurricane. The analysis allowed for
more predictability and advanced notification of the population with the threat of Natural
Disasters. When examining the various issues and recommendations regarding warning and
reporting notices, it becomes apparent that they can be further broken down. Furthermore, it is
evident that they are attributable to critical issues involving communication and automation.
Many people are aware that communication within any situation is essential. During
Katrina, it was noted that communications activities between offices were dependent on cell
phones and HF amateur radio equipment. Satellite phones were not immediately available as a
communications alternative. Single points of failure in the commercial telecommunications
system upon which the National Weather Service (NWS) relies on operations must be
identifiable and mitigable to improve continuity of operations plans for NWS field offices.
(Jonson, 2006, pg. 2)
The NWS has since procured an alternative communications systems, such as Ham (HF)
amateur radio equipment, for its field offices that are compatible and coordinated with other
emergency management agencies. The Sea, Lake, and Overland Surges from Hurricanes
(SLOSH) Model is an integral system currently maintained by the National Weather Service.

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During Hurricane Katrina, there were issues identified with agencies having accurate real-time
data feeds from the National Weather Service.
The National Weather Service performs weather forecast modeling and uploads that data
to their server. The main issue that resulted was due to the lack of communication between the
National Weather Service and others agencies in communicating that an updated model was
available on their server and available for viewing. Another key element updated due to
Hurricane Katrina is the Automated Flood Warning Systems (AFWS). Information that used to
be available on the National Weather Service’s website was incorrect and inefficient. The errors
are now gone, all corrections made as recently as March 31, 2015, and it is currently available on
the National Weather Service Website.
Security
The primary goal of this section will be to identify the problems including complicated
security efforts and the levees system failure after Hurricane Katrina. This section's main
purpose is to identify issues that led to the evacuation problems that occurred before the event.
The other purpose will be to identify issues contributing to the lack of preparedness. Some of
the questions asked include - what issues surrounded security efforts and why did the levees
fail? What might prevent either things from happening again?
Soon after Hurricane Katrina had devastated the Louisiana Gulf Coast, safety in the
region became a major concern due to extenuating circumstances. Some of the issues included
evacuation problems, the lack of available food supply to meet the immediate needs of survivors,
lack of shelter, water supply, and clothing issues. The problems amplified the situation and
created dire circumstances for survivors who desperately took to looting businesses, homes, and
just about any facility deemed to have the necessary items needed for survival.

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Adding to the circumstances was the fact that many of the New Orleans’ police force
were affected personally by the hurricane, resulting in the strength being diminished in labor and
law enforcement capabilities to address the increasing issues of safety and security of those in
the affected areas. These activities significantly impeded, or temporarily halted, response and
recovery efforts while delaying restoration of core services of power, water, and
communications.
Department of Homeland Security officials noted that angry mobs interfered with the
delivery of critical items, like water, food, and fuel. The angry citizens resorted to theft and high
jacking, and conditions grew dangerously intolerable. In response to the threat, responding
agencies sent out numerous requests for assistance from law enforcement personnel but they
went unanswered. The reasoning behind this is that there was miscommunication that
contributed to confusion among both state and federal level agencies (DHS, 2005).
Numerous after action reports indicated that there were issues that needed to be addressed
to correct existing issues and improve security efforts. The Department of Justice (DOJ),
working in unison with the DHS, examined Federal responsibilities that included providing
support to both State and local law enforcement and criminal justice systems during
emergencies. Other responsibilities mandate that they help build operational plans, including
procedures and policies to promote sufficient Federal law enforcement response (Bush, 2005).
The DHS, together with the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), has revamped
the National Response Framework (NRF) in May 2013 to provide current information on the
responsibilities and roles undertaken by incident responder during recovery operations.
In response to the security issues demonstrated with Hurricane Katrina in 2005, new
Response Core Capabilities in the National Response Goal have identified On-scene Security

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and Protection as one of the 14 Core Capabilities and Critical Tasks once an emergency is
declared. The objective of this Core Capability is to ensure a safe and secure environment
through the efforts of law enforcement and other security operations. Security efforts help to
protect people and communities. Response personnel, both traditional and atypical, engage in
lifesaving and life-sustaining operations.
The Critical Tasks establish a safe and secure environment in an affected area. They also
work to provide and maintain the on-scene security of populations directly impacted throughout
a geographically dispersed area. Additionally, they help to reduce or eliminate risk through
remedial efforts further reducing vulnerability to people, environment, and property (FEMA,
2013b, p. 23).
Once an emergency is declared, and federal assistance goes into place, regional leaders
will implement standard operating procedures to determine agencies that are necessary, the
location to provide services, and the services that are in demand. The NRF identifies Emergency
Support Functions (ESF), and ESF Coordinators, who are involved with Public Safety and
Security. FEMA noted that the ESF Coordinators are the lead federal agency of the Key
Response Core Capability of On-scene Security and Protection (FEMA, 2013b, p. 34).
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Actions (USACE) regarding the Levee System
The USACE designs and constructs the levees and floodwalls in the City of New Orleans
and surrounding areas. Hurricane Katrina created a significant storm surge, with waves nearly
28 feet high, when it moved into the city. The storm caused damages and failures to the
protective structures that left approximately 80% of the city underwater, up to 15 feet in some
places.

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In the months following Hurricane Katrina, the USACE began work to redesign and
replace the broken system with improvements made to withstand another 100-year event similar
or greater in nature to Hurricane Katrina. As such, U.S. Congress authorized and funded the
USACE to construct "The Greater New Orleans Hurricane & Storm Damage Risk Reduction
System (HSDRRS)," (USACE, 2015). The entire system consists of 350 miles of levees
including floodwalls in interior and perimeter systems, which also include improvements on
gated structures and pump stations throughout the area (USACE, 2015). In all, USACE has
strengthened the levees, floodwalls, gated structures, and pump stations that form the 133-mile
Greater New Orleans perimeter system, as well as improvements on approximately 70 miles of
interior risk reduction structures (USACE, 2015).
The HSDRRS includes the world’s largest surge barrier. The Inner Harbor Navigation
Canal Surge Barrier is 1.8 miles long and 26 feet high (USACE, 2015). The wall’s design will
help to protect sections of the Orleans and St. Bernard parishes. The pump station at the Gulf
Intracoastal Waterway-West Closure Complex is the largest in the world (USACE, 2015).
These activities have provided significant upgrades to the protection of Southeast
Louisiana in the forms of improved and state of the art levee systems and floodwalls. Though
most projects are complete, the USACE is continuously monitoring all associated systems and
always seeking ways to improve upon what has been accomplished to ensure the safety of the
public in this region susceptible to hurricane and flooding weather events.

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Changes to Coastal Building Codes
The purpose is to address some of the changes that occurred in the aftermath of
Hurricane Katrina. This section will carefully examine some of the changes made to existing
coastal building codes following the hurricane event. Some of the questions that this section will
explore include – what are building codes, why did local government officials make changes to
existing coastal building codes, and what were some of the changes? The goal will be to identify
changes in coastal building codes. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)
defines building codes as regulations formulated to oversee the design, construction, alteration,
and maintenance of structures to help safeguard the building occupants’ health, welfare, and
safety (FEMA, n.d.a, para. 2).
The devastation created by Hurricane Katrina was surreal. Government officials knew
that after the storm had passed, some homeowners would want to return to the area and rebuild
what they had lost. However, they also knew that many homes destroyed in the flood were not
up to code and that building codes in the area were never initially enforced. The message was
clear. If government officials did not make critical efforts to change existing building codes and
enforce them, they could potentially face a repeat of the hurricane disaster on a much larger scale
in the future. The storm that hit the area less than one month after Hurricane Katrina struck was
a clear indicator that they could not ignore the need for change. Hurricane Rita hit New Orleans,
Louisiana, on September 24, 2005. The hurricane was a category three at the time and produced
considerable damage. Following the 2005 hurricane season, government officials decided
enough was enough and took action to correct the lack of communal resiliency.
The federal government put added pressure on state governments to make critical
changes to existing law and to develop new laws that would lead to better construction practices

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and safer communities. The Louisiana state government responded by requiring all local
governments to review their existing regulations or ordinances and improve them to as needed.
According to the New Orleans’ Code of Ordinances, “In response to the flooding in New
Orleans and elsewhere, state legislature ordered all local governments units to adopt regulations
for the physical development of parishes and municipalities and the exercise of police power,”
(IFRC, 2010, p.1). The goal was to reduce the flood threat throughout the coastal areas by
improving mitigation efforts through better materials, enforcing stricter ordinances, and
addressing elevation issues.
Local authorities responded to the senatorial order by implementing new building codes
and enacting stringent laws that regulate elevation height for different types of construction.
Additionally, they required the use of building permits and emphasized the need for all buildings
to be flood-proof. On March 11, 2010, the City of New Orleans enacted the Code of
Ordinances. The document provides information on the new policies implemented to improve
community resilience through new ordinances designed to regulate new construction and
improve existing infrastructure. Local government also ordered that anyone who fails to comply
with the new mandates would face hefty fines.
The eleven-page document lists building codes, guidelines, definitions, including
information on issuing fines to those who ignore city ordinances. The report provides
information on building codes including building regulations, flood hazard reduction,
information on planning public areas such as parks, streets, sidewalks, waterways, utilities, and
more. In addition to ordering residents to comply with city building ordinances, State law
ordered all parishes and municipalities to comply with the Federal Flood Insurance Act of 1968,
designed to minimize flood loss.

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In New Orleans, the residential building code changes included the addition of minimum
elevation requirements, first-floor elevation requirements, new construction ordinances, utility
flood protection, and so on. The first change addressed the importance of acquiring building
permits when undergoing new construction or modifying existing infrastructure. Section 78-44,
Code 1956, § 32-8 requires the use of building permits to ensure that people conform to the
provisions implemented by the City of New Orleans.
The minimum elevation of a building is one of the primary concerns noted in the
ordinance document. According to Section 78-81 of the 2010 City Ordinance document, the first
floors of all new residential construction and any improvements must be elevated to the 100-year
base flood level (BFE)…,” (IFRC, 2010, p. 6). [(Code 1956, § 32-20; M.C.S., Ord. No. 23242, §
1, 9-18-08]. The ordinance also states that professional engineers and architects who work on
flood mitigation projects for new construction that is non-residential and improvements made to
non-residential construction be certified to do so. They must also maintain their certifications.
The Section 78-80 (Code 1956, § 32-19) mandate focuses on the first-floor sections of newly
constructed buildings. The ordinance notes that all new construction of first floors should be
constructed above or directly along the flood point as predetermined for a 100-year-storm threat.
Moreover, building permits issued for new construction or renovations include the elevation of
main sea level of the lowest floor.
New building codes mandate that new construction or improvements made to buildings
implement mitigation strategies such as anchoring down buildings to prevent flotation,
movement, or collapse. All materials used in new development or renovations must be up to
code and be resistant to flood damage. People are encouraged to adhere to new construction
practices that limit potential flood damage. One of the issues that the new building codes focus

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on includes the movement of water through buildings and emphasizes that is to be considered
when constructing or improving infrastructure. More precisely, it speaks of hydrostatic forces
placed on exterior walls because of flooding and the ability of floodwater to safely enter and exit
infrastructure (IFRC, 2010, p. 8).
The City of New Orleans has a website called, www.nola.gov. Visitors to the site can
view the city’s Plan for the 21st Century (2010), Mater Plan, which consists of proposed
framework designed to improve the core systems that help to shape all aspects of the social,
physical, economic, and natural environments (NOLA, 2010, para. 1). In Chapter 12 of the
Master Plan, it specifies that current zoning laws and building codes should be adapted to allow
for the use porous paving materials, on-site storm water management systems, rain gardens, and
cisterns (NOLA, 2010, p. 16). The plan also notes that building codes should encourage
rehabilitation of older structures to help bring them up to code.
Section 78-135 prohibits the construction of new manufactured homes within high-hazard
coastal areas (IFRC, 2010, p. 9). The only exception is the existence of manufactured homes in
pre-existing communities. New construction in coastal zones must be located inland, away from
the potential reach of high-tide waters. Additionally, the primary floor of a building must be at
or above the potential flood level. The buildings must contain flotation protection, such as pile
or column foundations. The lowest floors must also be free of obstruction or include a wall that
will separate freely when under the pressure of wind or water, without risking the structural
integrity of the building (IFRC, 2010, p. 10). The design of the walls must incorporate safe
loading, be able to carry 10 to 20 pounds per square foot, and can consist of lattice, or other
materials (IFRC, 2010, p. 10).

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The Institute for Business and Home Safety (IBHS) evaluated the building codes that had
been in effect prior to Katrina, including codes that were enacted in the Gulf States after the
storm hit. "The ICC helped develop the International Building Code and International
Residential Code models in 2006," (IBHS, n.d., para. 4). According to the IBHS, thirteen states
that have statewide building codes in place, have not compromised the IBHS or the IRC (IBHS,
n.d., para. 8).
An article published by FEMA mentioned that families and communities in Louisiana
have received roughly 19.6 billion dollars in FEMA assistance following Hurricanes Katrina and
Rita (FEMA, 2013a, para. 1). The money has gone toward flood mitigation efforts for
residential homes and community resiliency efforts. Furthermore, coastal restoration is another
important process that had been underway. Surrounding wetlands help to provide protection
from storm surge. Wetland restoration helps return wetlands to their natural state. Coastal beach
restoration is also underway to provide additional protection from future storms.
Hurricane Katrina's impact was so severe that it inspired change to prevent a repeat of the
disaster event. Some citizens of New Orleans experienced complete loss due to being uninsured
when the storm hit. However, one issue resulted when some were able to return but found that
the new building codes not only made the cost of building more expensive but also raised their
insurance cost expense as well. Nonetheless, the City of New Orleans is slowly rebuilding, and
the new building codes are helping to ensure resiliency against future disaster events.
Changes to the Communication Infrastructure
The focus will be on the issues surround the communication infrastructure. The purpose
of this section is to examine some of the improvements implemented to strengthen
communications infrastructure in the months to years following Hurricane Katrina. Some of the

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questions surrounding the material include – was there interference with communication systems
during the hurricane; how can the systems be improved, and what changes have occurred to
ensure communication systems will not be disrupted in the future? The goal will be to identify
changes or improvements made to existing communication systems.
According to authors Craig E. Colten, Robert W. Kates, and Shirley B. Laska, officials
had not realized how fragile the communication systems were until the storm hit the area
(Colten, Kates, & Laska, 2008, p. 39). Once they lost power, communication systems went
down, and emergency response efforts were disrupted (Colten, Kates, & Laska, 2008, p. 39).
The situation worsened as floodwater inundated the region, keeping emergency responders, Red
Cross workers, and other organizations from entering New Orleans. The planners never even
considered that the result would be citizen desperation, looting, limited food supply, lack of
water, and high death toll (Colten, Kates, & Laska, 2008, p. 39).
One issue was the loss of communication services, which proved to be a major blow to
emergency response efforts. The loss of communications emphasized the need for
communication systems resiliency. Chapter 14 of the NOLA Master Plan highlights the
objectives of New Orleans’ Hazard Mitigation Unit, including the Office of Homeland Security
and Emergency Preparedness (NOLA, 2010, p. 13). One of the primary objectives is to make
sure that local officials communicate potential hazards and risks to area residents in coordination
with FEMA, Army Corps of Engineers, Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and others
(NOLA, 2010, p. 13).
Technological communication systems should be improved to ensure their resiliency
during emergencies. One of the primary issues facing society is that it is utterly dependent on
modern technology for various communication and information sharing purposes. However,

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these systems are highly susceptible to power failure, service disruption, internet failure, cell-
phone disruption, and so on. Moreover, the ability to communicate through numerous channels
is critical when dispersing information to the public. The inability to send out information
through radio, television, internet and telephone communications weakens an emergency
responder’s ability to get valuable information out to the public. It can prevent people from
being able to call for help or prevent responders from saving lives. One of the things that New
Orleans’ city officials are currently working on is the development of a comprehensive
Geographic Information System (GIS) that will help in the planning, preparation, and recovery
of disaster events (NOLA, 2010, p. 14).
According to Craig Fugate, the Administrator of FEMA, the introduction of the Pre-
Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006 (PKEMRA) led to communication
improvements (Fugate, 2011, p. 2). PKEMRA helped to reorganize FEMA, improved
emergency response efforts, and it contributed to preparedness efforts (Fugate, 2011, p. 2).
Additionally, in 2008 FEMA established the Disaster Emergency Communications Division, or
DECD (Fugate, 2011, p. 7). The DECD assists emergency managers by providing them with
communication systems support. The DECD operates the Mobile Emergency Response Support
(MERS) unit including Mobile Communications Office Vehicle (MCOV) Assets (Fugate, 2011,
p. 7). When emergency managers are not able to rely on the continuation of critical services [i.e.
electricity, phone service] within their area, the DECD assists them in carrying out their
emergency operations. They help all governments including federal, state, local, and tribal. The
MERS and MCOV units provide emergency personnel with access to power generation
capabilities, mobile communication service, telecommunication systems, life support, and more,
enabling them to continue operations during all-hazard events (Fugate, 2011, p. 7).

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"The National Incident Systems, (NIMS), is a product of HSPD-5," (DHS, 2008, p. 3).
NIMS guides all department levels. Governmental status does not dictate who receives help.
NIMS helps agencies who need it and assists in managing all types of hazard events. NIMS is
essential to communications because it provides the necessary requirements that are needed
when creating a communications system, stresses the importance of shared systems, and provides
emergency managers with information that can help improve communication efforts significantly
(DHS, 2008, p. 5).
Restoration of Public Education
The section on restoration of public education will examine the changes incurred by the
hurricane. The purpose of this section is to gain more insight into the effects of Hurricane
Katrina on the public education system. The goal will be to identify what took place before and
after Katrina in regards to the school system. Additionally, the section will examine how the
storm brought changes to the school system that has been failing children for years. One
question that this section will examine is what changes helped restore public education facilities
and systems after hurricane Katrina?
The condition of many of the buildings was questionable prior to the storm. Some
buildings were close to one hundred years old or older. The age of the buildings was a major
contributing issue that had to be addressed in the aftermath of the Katrina. The structural
integrity of the majority of the school buildings had already been compromised due to old age
and were unable to withstand the type of flooding that Katrina caused. The storm ultimately
destroyed everything and most schools were amongst the damaged facilities that needed to be
tore down and potentially rebuilt.

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Some of the steps taken to get the school board on track started involved bringing in
contractors to remove tear down the damaged facilities, remove the debris, and prepare that
properties for the reconstruction process. The flood had inundated some of the buildings with as
much as five feet of water or more. Mold posed a serious health threat that had to be addressed.
To address this threat, mold testing was required for all the facilities that were to continue to
serve as schools for the community. The process of mold testing was critical, as it had to be
done before people could be let back into the facilities.
Another issue faced by the New Orleans School District were the school buses that were
partly submerged under floodwater. The warehouse that stores the buses was also flooded out.
The warehouse needed repairs, as did the buses that were sitting in water for quite some time.
Once the district started to get back on track, they had another issue to deal with. They had to
find people to drive the school buses. Finally yet importantly, the school needed to know how
many students would be returning, so they could get an idea of how many teachers they would
need. If those students and teachers did decide to come back, they were going to need a place to
live because most houses were destroyed. Food and school supplies were donated from other
states and organizations.
One idea that the city came up with included sending the kids to school somewhere else,
because despite the circumstances of New Orleans the kids still needed to attend school even if
they had to go out of state. The second idea was that public schools could be turned over to
charter schools. The difference in a charter school is the parents choose the school, the school is
held accountable for everything, freedom from certain routine procedures, and the school can
receive additional federal funding.

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Considering that 400,000 people were displaced, the assumption is the school systems
would probably be the last concern for the city. In order to get schools up and running the first
thing you need is a facility with running water, lights, sewage system, and supplies to name a
few. The children in the school system also need teachers and transportation. An outsider would
also assume that the only good thing about Katrina is that it did destroy 110 schools out of 142,
most of which either needed to be tore down or were not performing and meeting the no child
left behind requirements.
One point of view might be that families with young children, who resided in New
Orleans at the time of hurricane Katrina, had to evacuate, but would not have come back for
many reasons. First, the city was unsafe due to floodwater and dead bodies that filled the streets.
The flooding destroyed many homes, neighborhoods, and schools. Many families lost
everything and items that did not wash away were ruined. An experience like that could
traumatize a youngster. Moreover, it took three days for food and supplies to make it into the
city, not to mention the school systems were terrible to begin with, why not start from scratch in
another city with a better school system.
One consequence of not being prepared for the size of Katrina was that at all levels of
government, the heads of local and state governments did not know what the actual plans were in
case of a natural disaster of this magnitude. When you are not prepared you put, many lives at
risk. 1,833 died and that is not an accurate account, as loved ones are still missing. The after
action reports pointed lack of communication and preparation as the lack of coordination, and the
reason for such confusion.
After the storm, some did come back to New Orleans and those who enrolled in school
are doing better academically. New Orleans is the model for charter schools in urban

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communities and the rate of graduation and test scores have increased because the city and state
took the proper steps to rebuild the school system after the storm.
Local, State, Federal coordination
The purpose of this project is to explain the lack of communication between local/state
government and the federal government. The goal is to identify the improvements made to
improve communications between the federal, state, and local government. The question in this
section will address, how well did the local state and federal government plan and coordinate
resources?
Local and state governments were not able to communicate with each other and they
were not able to come up with a plan of action. State and local government flat out did not have
the resources to attend to such a large natural disaster. Lack of communication on the local level
made it harder for FEMA to do its job, as it was barely able to do simple rescue procedures
because there was no plan of action in place on the local level. It took four days for FEMA to
show up, leading everyone to the assumption that the communication was lacking. Maybe
FEMA was waiting for the local and state government to handle things on their own, but they
were too overwhelmed.
One point of view is that Hurricane Katrina was pure chaos and anybody from the inside
or outside of the New Orleans area would likely agree. Many stayed behind, some for financial
reasons and some did not want to leave their homes. There are people who returned to the area
expecting their neighborhoods to return to the way things were prior to the storm. Another point
of view might be that they were delusional or just unwilling to accept reality. The local and city
government was not able to deal with the storm, or the aftermath without assistance from FEMA
and all outside organizations.

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When it was time to deploy people, and have supplies sent, officials had to obtain
permission to do so through forms. The forms had to be signed by certain individuals and that
was a very time consuming process. The forms also had to be approved before further steps
could be taken. Agencies on every level went ahead and did what needed to be done without
documentation and it made the communication of who was providing what, even more
confusing. While it was a great idea to go ahead and be proactive, it just made the situation
worse, people were unaccounted for, and those who needed help were not receiving assistance.
New Orleans lost a lot of students, teachers, and staff to the storm, but it was the best
thing that has happened to New Orleans school system. It took about a year to get schools back
up and running, had they not sent the kids off to other states for education they would have been
a year or more behind.
Need for change
One interpretation might be that the federal, state, and local response to Hurricane
Katrina was severely compromised by the lack of planning for a disaster of that scale. The
challenges the flooding presented only compounded pre-existing issues and made things worse.
The issues may have not completely been avoidable, but some of the issues that resulted such as
communication failure, transportation issues, lack of supplies, pet issues, and more may be
avoided through improved laws and planning efforts. Residential buildings and non-residential
buildings both experienced issues due to flooding and a lack of enforced building codes. One
might assume if codes had been initially implemented, perhaps the community may have fared
better in the event. A negative point of view is that if efforts are not made to implement change,
then the situation may be worse next time around. The implications that can result by not
making changes to the existing mandates, improving emergency response efforts, improving

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warnings/notices, evacuation methods, improving levees, among other things could contribute to
worse flooding and higher death toll. The New Orleans area was fortunate, because the French
Quarter escaped unscathed. Perhaps they will not be so luck next time. A positive point of view
is that if changes are implemented to improve existing infrastructure, resource coordination,
public education restoration, new flood proof construction, strengthened communication efforts,
improved security, and communal resiliency, then perhaps the City of New Orleans will
withstand any flood threat. Mitigation efforts make a community more resilient to
vulnerabilities. Improvements reduce risk.
Conclusion
Hurricane Katrina caused a lot of devastation and dislocated a lot of families, leaving
some people with nothing. The response to the storm was riddled with problems and those
problems led to change. The challenges to be overcome were immense, but nonetheless the
citizens of New Orleans pushed forward to get things done and rebuild their beloved community.
One benefit that the residents have is that many families have called New Orleans home for
hundreds of years. That kind of communal commitment and dedication is rare. Nevertheless, it
is the one thing that sets New Orleans apart from the rest of the United States.
In closing, as the citizens of New Orleans continue course and make improvements to
their community, they will be more resilient in the end. They can protect the beautiful French
Quarter and preserve their heritage. There is no doubt about it. The citizens of New Orleans
already had heart, but now they have change.

23
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