Final Thesis

Shami 1
Teresa Shami
The Forgotten Prime Minister and the Partition of India:
The Untold Story of Post-war Britain
Introduction
Following the Second World War Great Britain found itself in an undesirable position in
the world. It was no longer the grand imperial power it once was; domestically Great Britain
was floundering and disenchantment crept into the minds of the British people. During the late
nineteenth century Benjamin Disraeli dubbed India as the jewel of the British Empire; it was the
key to maintaining British grandeur. India was not just a colony of the British; India belonged to
the British nation. “India had come into the mainstream of English politics and was heavily
implicated in the major undertakings of the British nation all over the world.”1
India was vital to Great Britain‟s global success because of the resources it brought home
and the economic stability it gave to the metropole. India‟s exports and the taxes inflicted on the
Indian population were vital to Britain‟s economic system. Britain created a financial network in
India for their commercial and strategic needs that ignored the Indian‟s economic needs.2
In
1947 following years of debates and compromises, the area known as India was divided between
the two largest political parties, the Indian National Congress and the All-India Muslim League,
and two new nations were introduced to the world, India and Pakistan. The impracticality of the
division of areas such as Bengal and Punjab, due to the inconvenience that it placed on the
population, displaced millions of people and led to the violence that would eventually claim
somewhere between two hundred thousand and one million lives. The loss of India ended the
idea of British grandeur and it hurt Great Britain in many ways; the most significant way was
1
Francis G. Hutchins, The Illusion of Permanence, British Imperialism in India (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1967), 137.
2
Sumit Sarkar, Modern India, 1885-1947 (New York: St. Martin‟s Press Inc., 1989), 27, 37.

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economically. Britain no longer had finances coming in from India, which meant they had lost a
key element of their economic system during a time when they faced economic ruin.
In many ways the history of Partition has become a history of great men. Historians
discuss at length the roles that men, such as Winston Churchill, Sir Archibald Percival Wavell,
Lord Louis “Dickie” Mountbatten, Jawaharlal Nehru, and Muhammad Ali Jinnah, played in the
path towards Indian independence. The “problem of India” hit its peak during the post-war
period; however, Partition is rarely mentioned within the historiography of post-war Britain.
Great Britain was trying to implement a welfare state while simultaneously dealing with the
growing demand for Indian independence. Thus these two histories must be discussed in the
same conversation. The key to doing this is Clement Attlee, Britain‟s prime minister from 1945
to 1951. Attlee has been removed from the history of Partition and Partition has been removed
from post-war historiography. Attlee is the connection between the growing decolonization of
the time and Britain‟s post-war welfare state.
Historiographies of Partition and Post-war Britain
There is a large historiography that has been done on the Partition of India as well as a
historiography on the Labour Party and Britain‟s post-war government. The events discussed in
these historiographies occurred simultaneously, yet they are not discussed together. It was not
until the 1960s that scholarly literature began to focus on the end of the British Empire in India.
In such a short period of time the amount of scholarship that has been completed on the subject is
plentiful; however, most of these works are written from the South Asian perspective that ignore
the story of Britain at this time. From the inception of the idea of Partition, the events that
occurred in 1947 have been glossed over by many British historians. Thus one must turn to

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works written from the South Asian perspective to gain an understanding of the events, works
that are critical of the role the British played. Three such works are Stanley Wolpert‟s Shameful
Flight: The Last Years of the British Empire in India, Lucy Chester‟s Borders and Conflict in
South Asia: The Radcliffe Boundary Commission and the Partition of Punjab, and Yasmin
Kahn‟s The Great Partition: The Making of India and Pakistan.
Wolpert argues that Partition would not have happened if the British would have
continued negotiations for ten more months. Wolpert traces the negotiations among the key
actors of Partition and finds that the haste in which Mountbatten acted caused the turmoil and
chaos that ensued; he fails to mention Attlee or his administration in this work. Chester and
Khan take a different approach to exploring Partition. In Borders and Conflict in South Asia,
Chester uses the Radcliffe Commission3
as the framework of her study in order to show how the
actual border that separated India and Pakistan caused the mass turmoil that ensued and how
Britain continually tried to persuade India to join the Commonwealth even as decolonization
spiraled into chaos. Khan‟s approach to studying Partition is closely related to Chester‟s. The
Great Partition is focused on the impact Partition had on everyday life and the people of India
that gives a great deal of attention to the horrors surrounding Partition. These three works are a
good representation of the extensive scholarship written on Partition and Indian independence
from a South-Asian perspective. They study Partition from the story on the ground; the
institutional story takes a backseat with their approach. It is rare for Partition to be studied from
the British perspective; the few works that have been written from the British point-of-view
overly romanticize the events by painting the involvement of the “great” British men as heroic
while portraying the Indian independence leaders as stubborn and belligerent.
3
The Radcliffe Commission was the border that divided India and created the new country, Pakistan.

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One of the few historians to study Partition from the British perspective is British
historian, R.J. Moore. In his works Endgames of Empire: Studies of Britain’s Indian Problem
and Escape from Empire: The Attlee Government and the Indian Problem Moore tries to connect
the historiography of Partition and post-war Labour government, but this is done from a naïve
British perspective. Endgames of Empire is an overly romantic study of Britain‟s role in 1947
India, especially the discussion of Mountbatten. Moore seeks to illustrate the successes and
failures of the British government‟s actions taken to solve the Indian problem. Moore illustrates
the idealism of Attlee‟s government and argues that the government‟s belief that India would
willingly join the Commonwealth as hopeful. Moore does not hold Attlee‟s government
accountable for the problems that occurred during the post-war era and he argues that Attlee
should be praised for “his boldness in adopting a fresh approach” to deal with India.4
Leaving Moore out of the conversation for the moment, most of the literature written
about the Labour Government, Attlee‟s time in office, and post war British society conveniently
ignores the Partition of India. Michael Blackwell‟s book Clinging to Grandeur: British Attitudes
and Foreign Policy in the Aftermath of the Second World War provides a look at post-war
Britain‟s political mentality. Great Britain had an overwhelming desire to regain its global
influence after World War II. Its goal was to become a great world power during peacetime.
Blackwell states that Britain still believed they were politically and socially superior and that
they were still the moral leader of the world, even though their position in the world was greatly
weaken following World War II. There was the belief that in the end Britain would always
prevail. Blackwell sensibly states that “by clinging to grandeur of the past, they [the British]
4
R.J. Moore, Escape from Empire: The Attlee Government and the Indian Problem (New York: Clarendon Press,
1983), 347.

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failed to adjust to the less glorious present and set Britain on a difficult road.”5
Blackwell does
discuss post-war British foreign policy, but one of the most important international events, the
Partition of India, is barely mentioned. The Partition of India played a huge role in Britain‟s loss
of grandeur; thus it needs to be discussed as such.
The following two works examine Attlee‟s administration and the welfare state in great
depth. In Ideas and Policies under Labour 1945-1951—Building a New Britain, Martin Francis
examines Attlee‟s post-war socialist agenda and demonstrates how Attlee‟s administration was
not nearly as radical as it has been previously argued. Francis discusses the influence that
ideologies such as Marxism, ethical socialism, and Fabianism had on Attlee‟s administration and
how twelve important men, such as Attlee, Stafford Cripps, and Ernest Bevin, were the key to
the ever-changing policy of the administration. Francis argues that Attlee‟s administration
became uncertain of the success of nationalization as they moved deeper into the post-war period
and proves that “democratic socialism remained a creative and vital force in the six years of the
Attlee government.”6
Francis fails at illustrating how India was vitally important to the Labour
Party‟s post-war agenda. The loss of India did not just help bring the end to British grandeur, but
it also brought an end to the profit that Great Britain made from its time in India. In the long run
this loss of wealth did not help further Labour‟s ideal democratic welfare state. Francis does not
mention this.
In her work Austerity in Britain: Rationing, Controls, and Consumptions 1939-1955, Ina
Zweiniger-Bargeilowska discusses the extension of rationing, controls, and austerity from war
time to peace time. Unlike Francis, Zweiniger-Bargeilowska does not spend much time
5
Michael Blackwell, Clinging to Grandeur: British Attitudes and Foreign Policy in the Aftermath of the Second
World War (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1993), 161.
6
Martin Francis, Ideas and Policies under Labour, 1945-1951—Building a New Britain (Manchester: Manchester
University Press, 1997), 231.

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examining the ideological facets of Attlee‟s post-war administration. Instead she argues that the
rationing from the late 1940s to the early 1950s was critical to the relationship between the
British state and society by illustrating how the public did not readily accept the “austerity
policy;” how the state struggled to enforce the controls; and how these controls led to scams and
a more powerful black market. Zweiniger-Bargeilowska studies the Attlee administration, how
the controls were enforced, the nutrition and health policies as well as public opinion and gender
and class divisions to understand how these controls influenced the lives of the British people.
The economic loss of India helps to explain Britain‟s need for an austerity program in the post-
war period, but Zweiniger-Bargeilowska fails to mention this important point.
This brief discussion of the historiographies of Partition and the policies of post-war
Labour government illustrates how these two historiographies have barely been connected and
when they have, such as with the works of R.J. Moore, the history has been idealized and
romanticized. As previously stated the key to connecting these two historiographies critically is
through Clement Attlee. Attlee played a critical role in the Partition of India as well as in post-
war Britain; thus, not only do these events need to be discussed together, but Clement Attlee
must be visible in both of the histories. Why is it rare for these two parallel events to be
discussed together and why has Attlee and the Labour government been all but removed from the
historiography of Partition? I offer several answers to these perplexing questions.
Clement Attlee—the Key to Indian Independence?
To understand the necessity for the inclusion of Attlee into the historiography of Partition
his role in the Partition of India must be discussed. The offices Attlee held prior to becoming
prime minister allowed him to solve the problem of India. In 1927, Attlee was appointed to the

Shami 7
Simon Commission, or the Indian Statutory Commission, a royal commission created for the
purpose of exploring the possibility of granting self-rule to India. The commission‟s results were
reported in the Report of the Indian Statutory Commission published in 1930, in which the
commission proposed the creation of a representative government for India noting that the
tensions between the Muslims and the Hindus were steadily increasing.7
This report led to the
Government of India Act of 1935 which forged the “Federation of India,” thereby giving India a
limited degree of autonomy while the British still maintained power to suspend the newly created
government.8
On the surface it appears that the commission made great strides in giving India self-
government; however, in actuality it was a chance for certain MPs to travel to a far off corner of
the empire and to learn about a culture they knew little about. In a B.B.C interview from 1959,
Attlee stated that prior to this trip in 1927 his knowledge of India was limited to that of a school
boy‟s. He and the other MPs of the commission knew their efforts would not bring about change
or self-government. Attlee had also been the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs; in 1942 he
was responsible for maintaining good relations between Britain and its dominions.9
This
position helped him immensely in 1945 with the question of Indian independence.
Being a member of the Simon Commission as well as Secretary of State for Dominion
Affairs greatly benefited Attlee‟s tenure as Prime Minister, a position he was granted following
the Labour Party‟s landslide victory in the 1945 election.10
Following his party‟s victory, Attlee
7
H.M. Stationery Office, Indian Statutory Commission, Report, 1930.
8
India Office, Government of India Act, 1935.
9
The Commonwealth of Nations also known as the British Commonwealth or merely the Commonwealth is made
up independent nations (dominions) that were formerly part of the British Empire. These nations have are
autonomous, but they still hold allegiance to the British crown. Today there are around 54 countries in the
Commonwealth. Having dominion status means becoming part of the Commonwealth. Example of Commonwealth
dominions are Canada, Australia, and South Africa.
10
Peter Clarke, Hope and Glory- Britain 1900-200 (London: Penguin Books, 2004), 447. Clarke breaks down the
results of the 1945 election. The Labour Party had 48 percent of the votes while the Conservative Party had 39.6

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found himself with a myriad of problems in his hands when he took office; one of the largest was
the India problem; the majority of his time as Prime Minister, Attlee tried to formulate a peaceful
way for Britain to leave India because of the growing demand made by the Indians for
independence as well as the claim made by Britain‟s allies that the British Empire no longer fit
into the post-war world. The British government could not create a peaceful compromise that
pleased all parties involved. In Attlee‟s 1959 B.B.C. interview with Francis William, Williams
narrated that Attlee was more involved in creating the policy for India “than almost any other
issue throughout the course of his whole administration…he was actively engaged at every stage
of difficult and often dangerously critical negotiations on the future of India, and the major
decisions were his.”11
The first step Attlee took towards freeing India was sending a Cabinet Mission to India
on the recommendation of Viceroy Wavell, the Viceroy in India at the time. Much like the
Simon Commission of 1927, the Cabinet Mission traveled to India to discuss the transfer of
power from British rule to Indian rule. The main purpose of this mission was to have discussions
with the elected officials of India, to create a Constituent Assembly of India, and to set up a
committee to support the interests of the two main parties, the Indian National Congress and All-
India Muslim League. The Cabinet Mission tried to implement the ideas of the Cripps Offer of
1942.12
The mission members believed they formed a plan that pleased both parties; a plan that
sought to maintain the future unity of India by having a central government while grouping
together the Muslim provinces and giving these provinces a political safeguard from Hindu rule.
percent of the votes. The Liberal Party received 9 percent of the votes while “others” made up the last 2.4 percent.
Labour got 393 seats and the Conservatives got 210 seats in the House of Commons. Liberals got 12 seats while
“Others” got 25 MPs.
11
Williams, A Prime Minister Remembers, 202.
12
In 1942 Stafford Cripps went to India to secure their support and cooperation during the Second World War. A
very general and simple description of the Cripps Offer is that Cripps offered the Indians dominion status following
the war with the possibility of future total independence.

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Both parties agreed on having a unified India, but the Indian National Congress was against the
idea of the Muslim provinces. Jinnah, the leader of the All-India Muslim League, refused any
changes to the plan that did not create a group of Muslim provinces. This refusal led Attlee to
make a broadcast encouraging the Indians to accept a compromise. “I would ask all Indians…to
join in a settlement which majority and minority communities will accept as just and fair and in
which both States and Provinces can find their place.”13
Lord Wavell did not want Attlee to
make this statement because he was convinced Attlee had taken the option of Partition off of the
table. Attlee did not heed Wavell‟s advice refusing to change his statement; in his mind,
Partition was not an option at that point in time, and he would only approve Partition as a final
solution, after every available option had failed.
Unfortunately, Jinnah and the Muslim League refused to change their minds and called
for the division of India and the creation of a Muslim state, to be named Pakistan. Attlee
received a letter from Tara Singh, an influential Indian, urging him to put the Cripps Offer into
play quickly and informing Attlee of the growing tensions between the numerous religious and
political groups. The tensions were no longer just between the Congress and the League.
Minority groups, such as the Sikhs, entered into the fight. This letter warned that if the British
government waited too long there was a “danger for a lot of bloodshed;” the tensions among the
Hindus, the Muslims, and the numerous minority groups, especially the Sikhs threatened to
erupt.14
In a few short months the situation in India quickly worsened and the compromising
among the groups had all but ended. Jinnah sent Attlee a letter informing him that the Cabinet
13
“Lord Pethick-Lawrence to Field Marshal Viscount Wavell,” Constitutional Relations between Britain and India:
The Transfer of Power 1942-7, ed. Nicholas Mansergh, vol. 6 (London: 1983), 271.
14
“Master Tara Singh to Mr. Attlee,” Constitutional Relations between Britain and India: The Transfer of Power
1942-7, ed. Nicholas Mansergh, vol. 6 (London: 1983), 424-425.

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Mission delegates as well as the viceroy were not handling negotiations in a manner that would
honor the British government.
According to Jinnah, the actions of the Cabinet Mission ruined “the confidence of
Muslim India and shattered their hopes for an honourable and peaceful settlement.” The British
were playing into the hands of the Congress who, Jinnah believed, threatened “non-cooperation
and civil disobedience, if they were not satisfied.” Jinnah ended his letter to the Prime Minister
with a threat that if the Muslims were not heard violence would soon ensue between the parties.
“We shall have no other course open to us…its consequences, I need not say, will be most
disastrous and a peaceful settlement will then become impossible.”15
Attlee told Jinnah that his
fears about the Congress were unfounded and exaggerated, but that he hoped Jinnah would use
his influence to help the Viceroy to maintain peace. 16
Attlee received complaints and demands from a number of Indian groups, not just the
Muslim League and Congress. Attlee received a letter from Dr. Ambedkar written on behalf of
the Scheduled Castes, one of the many minority groups of India.17
Ambedkar requested that the
Scheduled Castes have two representatives in the government. He also pointed out that Attlee
said in a previous statement that “H.M.G. [His Majesty‟s Government] will see that satisfactory
safeguards which will enable them to live free from the fear of the Majority.” Ambedkar
demanded that the safeguards be “provided for the Scheduled Castes before it agrees to sign the
Treaty for cessation of sovereignty.” Since such statement was made by Attlee, Ambedkar felt
as if the British government was obligated to accept the demands he made in his letter to Attlee.
15
“Lord Pethick-Lawrence to Field Marshal Viscount Wavell,” Constitutional Relations between Britain and India:
16
“Mr. Attlee to Mr. Jinnah,” Constitutional Relations between Britain and India: The Transfer of Power 1942-7,
ed. Nicholas Mansergh, vol. 8 (London: 1983), 107.
17
Scheduled Castes made up approximately 20 percent of Indian population at this time. The British referred to
them as “the depressed classes.”

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Attlee responded firmly to this letter by saying that he never made a comment specifically about
the Scheduled Castes. The actual statement mentioned minority groups as a whole, not specific
minority groups. He also told Ambedkar that there was little hope that the Scheduled Castes
would get two representatives due to the fact that they made up such a small portion of the
population. Neither Jinnah nor Ambedkar appreciated Attlee‟s response letters. Jinnah used his
influence to create further complications and Ambedkar refused to accept Attlee‟s answers. 18
In December of 1946, the British government held the India Conference in London to
help bring about a quick compromise. During this conference Attlee met with Jawaharlal Nehru,
an influential Indian independence leader and future Prime Minister of India, who stated his
party‟s desire for a united India under Hindu rule. While the Prime Minister met with Nehru,
Lord Pethick-Lawrence, the Secretary of State of India, met with Jinnah who was disgruntled
and bitter. According to Pethick-Lawrence, Jinnah seemed “like a man who knew that he was
going to be killed and therefore insisted on committing suicide in order to avoid it.”19
In these
two simultaneous meetings Nehru and Jinnah blamed the other‟s party on the violence and riots
among the Indian population that transpired at this time. This conference showed Attlee and the
British government that the Muslim League had quit working with the Congress and were solely
focused on the creation of Pakistan within the Commonwealth. By the end of 1946 Attlee knew
that a peaceful end to British rule in India was nearly impossible. In February of 1947, Lord
Wavell‟s term as Viceroy of India ended leaving Attlee with the unfortunate task of deciding to
renew Wavell‟s contract or to assign a new man to the post. Replacing Wavell would not please
the opposition, but Attlee felt as if Wavell had done all that he could do as Viceroy. It was time
18
“Dr. Ambedkar to Mr. Attlee,” Constitutional Relations between Britain and India: The Transfer of Power 1942-
7, ed. Nicholas Mansergh, vol. 8 (London: 1983), 221-223.
19
“India Conference in London (46) 1,” Constitutional Relations between Britain and India: The Transfer of Power
1942-7, ed. Nicholas Mansergh, vol. 9 (London: 1983), 252-255.

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to let someone else try to bring about a peaceful end to British rule in India; he ignored the
criticisms of the right and appointed Lord Louis “Dickie” Mountbatten as the new Viceroy of
India.
This appointment was one of the most criticized decisions of Attlee‟s time as prime
minister. Mountbatten was an admiral in the Royal Navy and prior to his appointment as viceroy,
he was best known for his work during the Second World War. The only previous experience he
had with the region was as the commander posted in South-Asia during the war, during which
time he recaptured Burma for Britain. He had never worked with India outside of a militaristic
sense, which meant he was not well versed in the political atmosphere of the area and was not
privy to the tensions among the population. Attlee knew the appointment of Mountbatten to
viceroy was ideal because Mountbatten was an energetic man willing to do what had to be done.
“Mountbatten was an extremely lively, exciting personality. He had an extraordinary faculty for
getting on with all kinds of people.” Attlee explained to Williams that he thought he would have
trouble convincing King George to allow him to appoint Mountbatten, a member of the royal
family, to the position of viceroy, but surprisingly the King “approved of the idea right away.” It
was Mountbatten that needed convincing because according to Attlee, “Dickie‟s greatest hope
was that he would one day succeed to the position of First Sea Lord.”20
As Attlee changed the personnel in India he finally admitted to himself and the King that
the chance of failure for finding a peaceful solution to the India problem was “six to four.” He
accepted that there was no longer a chance for a United India; it was time to take the only step
possible, Partition. The time to take things slowly had ended. “I was quite sure this was one of
20
Williams, A Prime Minister Remembers, 210. Mountbatten‟s father had the naval rank of First Sea Lord, a
respected position. The Mountbatten family was German. Their actual name was Battenberg. Mountbatten‟s father
was disgracefully removed from this position at the onset of the First World War due to the anti-German sentiment
that swept across Britain. Mountbatten was also a member of the royal family through marriage. His sister,
Princess Alice of Battenberg, was the mother of Prince Philip, Queen Elizabeth II‟s husband.

Shami 13
the instances where the dictate „Go slow‟ could not be applied and we must go ahead and fix the
date early.”21
This belief led to the now infamous time limit that Attlee placed on Britain‟s
withdrawal from India. An article from The Manchester Guardian stated that “Britain will
withdraw from India by June 1948. If the main Indian parties cannot agree on a common
Constitution, power will still be transferred into Indian hands on that date.” The article
continued to say that this decision could not be taken lightly. “It will cause profound regret and
anxiety to many friends of India.”22
Attlee saw that Mountbatten had great abilities, but he was not blind to the fact that
Mountbatten told everybody something different in order to please each party. He would tell
Attlee one thing, the King another, and Nehru and Jinnah yet another. An example of the
confusion that Mountbatten created was when he told Attlee, the King, and the India and Burma
Committee that Nehru had accepted his plan for self-government; however, a few days later
Nehru made a statement chastising the British government and the plan. “H.M.G seems to
function in an ivory tower of their own, isolated from realities in India…the things that emerge
from London are so peculiar.”23
It was clear to Attlee that the government did not have the same
understanding of the plan that Nehru had and he held Mountbatten accountable for the confusion;
he was not blinded by his respect for Mountbatten. Even without this confusion, though,
Partition was, according to Attlee, “inevitable”: “As Indian leaders have finally failed to agree on
a plan for a united India, Partition becomes the inevitable alternative, and we will, for our part,
give to the Indians all our help and advice in carrying out this most difficult operation.”24
On 4
21
Williams, 210.
22
“A Date for India,” The Manchester Guardian, 21 February 1947.
23
“Draft Telegram from Mr. Attlee to Rear-Admiral Viscount Mountbatten of Burma,” Constitutional Relations
between Britain and India: The Transfer of Power 1942-7, ed. Nicholas Mansergh, vol. 10 (London: 1983), 806.
24
“Text of Broadcast by Mr. Attlee on 3 June 1947 at 9 P.M.,” Constitutional Relations between Britain and India:

Shami 14
June 1947 the British government officially announced that India would soon be divided into two
nations, and by 15 August 1947, after more than one hundred years, India was no longer under
British rule.
India may have been independent as of August 1947; however, the debate about India
and Pakistan joining the Commonwealth had only started. Attlee‟s plan the entire time was to
give India self-government as well as the option to choose to join the Commonwealth. Attlee‟s
past as the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs aided him when he tried to convince Nehru to
have India join the Commonwealth. He explained to Nehru the British Commonwealth had
“evolved not by design or by the application of theories of the interrelation of states, but from the
application of democratic principles of self-government and from the practical needs of the age.”
Attlee used the “Partition” of Ireland to illustrate how joining the Commonwealth could be
surprisingly successful. “The course of Irish history resulted in the establishment within the
Commonwealth of a republic which is, however, linked to the other states by the Crown. It is, as
so many things British are, illogical, but it works.”25
Attlee did not necessarily see Britain‟s
withdrawal from India as a success, but he also did not see it as a failure. In his interview with
Williams, almost twelve years after the Partition of India, Attlee said that he did not regret his
actions in India. The British government was blamed for the chaos that ensued following
Partition, but Attlee refused to accept this blame.
[The massacres] were not just the result of handing over, or of any feebleness by the
Government. They had been brewing for a long time. They start with one lot killing the
other in Bengal. They did the same in Bihar and on up to the U.P. and so on eventually
up to the Punjab, where there were a very sticky lot of people…whether we could have
stopped it then if we‟d still been in control I don‟t know—it‟s very doubtful. But there it
was. I can only say that the death toll would have been far higher if we hadn‟t come
out—if we‟d tried to hold India.26
25
Attlee to Nehru, 11 March 1947, PRO, PREM 8:820.; For more information on the “partition of Ireland” please
refer to The Course of Irish History edited by T.W. Moody and F.X. Martin.
26

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Attlee was involved in every aspect of granting India independence. He worked personally with
Indian leaders as well as with the Viceroy. He did not automatically go into the situation with
Partition on the mind; Partition would only occur after everything else failed and he was one of
the first to admit when it was the only way for Britain to leave India. Williams stated in his
conversation with Attlee that “there are few who would deny that Attlee‟s decision on India
proved to be one of the great acts of his career.”27
If Attlee was seen by his contemporaries as
vital to the status of India, why has he been overlooked by historians of Partition and removed
from the historiography?
What Happened to the “Great” in Great Britain?
While Attlee and Great Britain dealt with the problem of India abroad there were a slew
of domestic issues that required immediate attention. India was not of great importance in the
eyes of the British population. Attlee is remembered for the Labour Party‟s revolutionary
domestic agenda not the other achievements and failures of his administration. When the Labour
Party won the 1945 election, unlike previous prime ministers, Attlee inherited a disenchanted
and broken nation; following the Second World War, Great Britain found itself in a major
financial hole because even though it may have been on the winning side of the war, its citizens
were greatly disillusioned and its influence throughout the world was all but lost causing Attlee‟s
domestic agenda to take center stage.
In 1945, Attlee and the Labour Party ran on a platform based on creating employment
opportunities as well as a welfare state, with the campaign slogan. “Let us face the future.”28
Attlee was faced with the task of not only bringing back Great Britain economically and socially,
27
Williams, 202.
28
Peter Clarke, Hope and Glory: Britain 1900-2000 (London: Penguin Books, 1997), 216.

Shami 16
but he was also responsible for the reconstruction of one of the most important cities in the
world, London. The main objective of the Labour Party under Attlee was “the creation of a
society based on social justice…[and] this could only be attained by bringing under public
ownership and control the main factors in the economic system.”29
According to Attlee, he and
his government were ready and willing to take on the “difficult situation of the country” that
came about from the “great life-and-death struggle from which [Britain] had emerged
victorious.”30
After the experience the nation had endured during World War II there was a shift
in the mental climate among the people. Attlee‟s administration had the difficult task of
convincing the nation that the successful rationing they had done during the war needed to
continue during peace time. Attlee and his government knew that there was a bright future for
the welfare state and that it would ultimately lead to “a peaceful revolution.” Attlee declared that
he had every intention to push Britain towards a new horizon; however, once his term as prime
minister got underway the reality of Britain‟s poor domestic situation set in. He still believed in
Socialism, but he “declared that the course of events in the next few years might well decide the
future of civilisation for decades or perhaps for centuries.”31
Attlee had the future of, what he
believed to be a world super power in his hands, but Great Britain was far from being super
globally because of the rise of stronger international powers such as the United States and the
Soviet Union and because of the economic struggle Britain faced. This meant that problems at
home took precedent over problems abroad, such as India.
The affects of the Second World War were found in every aspect of life; industries
struggled as employment cuts and budget cuts were made. The atmosphere of post-war Britain
was that of Britain during the war in many ways. This was illustrated by a photograph published
29
C.R. Attlee, As it Happened (London: William Heinemann LTD, 1954), 163.
30
Attlee, 163.
31
“Mr. Attlee‟s Two Roles, The Manchester Guardian, 4 October 1950.

Shami 17
in The Manchester Guardian on March 16, 1946. The photograph depicted Kensington Gardens
in London; a young soldier built a barbed wire fence around the exterior of the gardens while the
headline read “A Prison Camp in Kensington Gardens.” German prisoners of war were held in
this make shift prison.32
The war may have been over, but its affects were felt daily and were
very visible. Britain faced numerous economic difficulties during this time as well as
disillusionment on the part of the citizens. Train services were cancelled in Manchester with
over twenty-seven trains cut from the schedule.33
There was little chance the cotton industry
would make a profit and working hours were cut for many individuals while others lost their jobs
entirely. 34
The loss of employees extended the hours and work weeks for others.35
Rationing of
all sorts, from coal to bread, was necessary for British survival at this time. In a letter to the
Editor of The Manchester Guardian, a citizen expressed his distress about the rationing of coal.
“All that one can read into current speeches and writings is that we must reduce our consumption
of coal; in short, we must live uncomfortably cold. We have been led up the garden path by
promises of greater comfort and ease.”36
The country believed in the welfare state the Labour
Party had promised; however, following the election, the British people felt as if they were not
given what they were promised. Unfortunately from the perspective of the citizens the outlook
for the future was bleak.
The nation found itself continuing to ration even after they had won the war due to the
shortages of resources. These shortages and rations began to take their toll on the nation,
especially the rationing of tea, which caused one of the greatest uproars. In 1947, the tea ration
32
“A Prison Camp in Kensington Gardens,” The Manchester Guardian, 16 March 1946.
33
“Manchester Using More Power: Home Economies Needed,” The Manchester Guardian, 19 February 1947
34
“Cotton commission—No Chance of Making a Profit,” The Manchester Guardian, 19 February 1947
35
“Staggering Hours and Nights Work,” The Manchester Guardian, 21 February 1947; “Sunday Working After
All,” The Manchester Guardian, 21 February 1947.
36
“Use of Oil—(Letter to the Editor),” The Manchester Guardian, 21 February 1947.

Shami 18
was reduced from three ounces for one person per week to two ounces.37
With the rationing that
the British citizens dealt with, what occurred abroad, like in India, did not matter to them, even if
the loss of the wealth gained from India affected them directly. With the struggles that the
people faced the government decided to give domestically driven surveys to examine the success
of the government‟s post-war policies and to gain an understanding of how the people felt about
the policies. The British people had high expectations for Labour‟s post-war domestic agenda;
Attlee‟s administration failed to meet these expectations in a number of ways. In January 1946,
the Departmental Committee of the House Office gave a survey asking people about the affects
of shop closure hours. The survey “enquire[d] into the provisions of the Shop Acts relating to
closure hours” and reported if any changes needed to be made. With these new acts working
shoppers needed extended hours or special time off in order to get their necessary shopping
done.38
The idea of frivolous spending seemed to be something of the past; a number of surveys
given demonstrated this and the citizens‟ growing disillusionment with the Government and
society. The following four surveys have been vital to post-war historiography because they
illustrate the sentiment of opportunity lost. A survey given in October 1946 collected information
on the “use of and future demand for carpets in working class households.” The Carpet Working
Party of the Board of Trade asked “957 working class housewives from England, Scotland, and
Wales” about their use and requirements for room and stair carpets. 39
The Board concluded that
a little less than half of the housewives surveyed were willing to pay up to seven pounds for a
room-carpet and those with stairs would pay up to three pounds for stair carpets.40
In 1946 even
37
“Tea Ration Cut,” The Manchester Guardian, 15 July 1947.
38
Home Office of Shop Closing Hours, Departmental Committee, The Social Survey—Shopping Hours, 1946, v.
39
Board of Trade, Carpet Working Party, Social Survey—Carpets, 1946.
40
Board of Trade, Carpet Working Party, Social Survey—Carpets, 1946, i.

Shami 19
though there was disillusionment, just as the survey illustrated, there was still a hopeful outlook
for the future.
The argument that practices, such as movie going, increase during times of economic
struggle is reinforced by the survey “Cinema and the Public,” a survey that looked at the movie
going habits and expenditures of the British public.41
This survey was given twice, once in
March 1946 and again in October 1946. Participants in this survey were asked how often they
went to the cinema. The conclusion of this survey was that there was a “substantial audience
amongst all economic groups.”42
The majority had cinema trips planned no matter the film being
shown because it was not about the film; it was about the experience. 85,400, 000 pounds were
spent on cinema tickets in 1948. According to the survey the public spent over one hundred
million pounds annually on the cinema experience.43
With the shortages and rations that the
British citizens dealt with, they found an outlet from their economic disenchantment with trips to
the cinema. The British people were so worried about their own personal lives that they could
not bring themselves to worry about foreign affairs.
The desire for small things such as crockery was more important to them than
international issues. Another survey done in the same vein as the carpet survey was a survey
report done on the “stock and demand of household crockery” that sought to find out the demand
for certain products.44
There was a growing desire for crockery following the end of the Second
World War; however, by the time of this survey in 1947 the products available did not meet the
demand. Only twenty-two percent of shoppers who tried to buy crockery were successful in
1947. From the point-of-view of the consumers there was a greater shortage of products post-
41
Social Survey—The Cinema and the Public, 1946.
42
Social Survey—The Cinema and the Public, 1946, 2.
43
The numbers that were found in the cinema survey are representative of Great Britain not just England. Great
Britain at this time included England, Scotland, and Wales.
44
Board of Trade, Statistics and Consumer Needs Division, The Social Survey—Domestic Crockery Survey, 1947.

Shami 20
war than during the war. This desire for crockery may appear to be a trivial one, but this survey
illustrated the hole Britain was in; they could barely afford to produce simple things, such as
dishes, for its citizens.
The British Tourist and Holidays Board was very interested in finding out about
“people‟s holiday arrangements in 1947 and their plans for 1948.”45
The results of this survey
were compiled in March 1948; then the Board compared the results from this survey to the
results from a similar survey that was given in 1946. The most interesting fact about this survey
was the answers that were given when asked what their future plans were. In 1946 most people
said yes when asked if they were planning on going on a trip the next summer. In 1948 not
nearly as many people said yes. Many more people answered with “I do not know” in 1948;
“uncertainty increased.”46
Only fifty-six percent of the subjects in 1948 said they had intentions
to travel the next year compared to the seventy-five percent in 1946. This demonstrated that
people were more hopeful about the future in 1946 and enjoyed planning ahead. By 1948
disillusionment had firmly found its way into the mind of the British people. It was also clear
that by 1948 the Labour government was unable to meet the expectations that winning the 1945
election had placed upon them.
The “Survey of Knowledge and Opinion about the Economic Situation” was a very
important survey that explored the public‟s knowledge of the governmental agenda as well as
how well they understood the economic crisis they faced. When asked about the crisis, the
subjects said they considered food, housing, and high prices as the biggest problems
nationwide.47
The majority of the people surveyed found things more difficult than the previous
year and felt that their “purchasing power” was limited because of high prices and lack of
45
British Tourist and Holidays Board, Report on the Demand for Holidays in 1947 and 1948, 1948.
46
Report on the Demand for Holidays, 1948, 4.
47
Ibid, 2.

Shami 21
money; it was not because of shortages.48
All of the previous surveys are very important to the
historiography of post-war Britain because they illustrate the affects that Britain‟s austerity had
on the country‟s citizens; they also demonstrate how what occurred at home needed urgent
attention from the prime minister, especially when compared to what was happening throughout
the empire. India was secondary.
The Labour Party was elected because the British people believed they were the key to a
prosperous future; they wanted to be led into the future by the Labour Party. One of the biggest
problems was that there was a growing sense of fear among the people because it appeared that
the future would be worse than the past. There was a great deal of fear mongering among
Conservative MPs, who spoke of starvation and how England was on the brink of death. Lord
Addison, the Leader of the House of Lords, spoke against this claim. At this time individuals
were given 1,600 calories a day from the “domestic rationing.” Addison, a medical doctor, tried
to convince the people that they would not starve. “We would all wish to have a more plentiful
and varied diet, but the requirements of the people as a whole were being adequately met and
there was no room for alarm and despondency.” He felt as if the false comments caused
“mischievous effects” and were “doing the country harm.”49
Fear and anger took over the minds of the people. Attlee urged them to have faith. He
made a call to the nation to “co-operate in the drive for prosperity and to avoid quarrels in
industry.” Attlee felt that Britain‟s greatest asset was the adaptability of its people. His socialist
agenda, his drive for nationalization, and the fact that Britain was in many ways worse off during
the post-war era than they were during the war overshadowed Attlee‟s work with India. Attlee
may have been involved in every step of the Partition of India and he may have made some
48
Ibid, 4.
49
“England Not Dying of Starvation,” The Manchester Guardian, 23 March 1947.

Shami 22
difficult and now infamous decisions, but that has been forgotten because at home there were
countless domestic issues that directly affected the British people. It was thought that giving
self-government to India did not mean much in the grand scheme of British society, even though
it did.
There is a New Bully on the Global Playground
Attlee‟s domestic agenda and the problems he faced at home were not the only aspects of
his administration that moved his role in India outside of the historiography of Partition and
removed India, in general, from post-war historiography; other international issues and the
emergence of the United States as the sole great world power played a key role as well. “More
important” foreign problems found their way on to Attlee‟s desk, the least of which included the
growing threat of the Soviet Union as well as the conflict in Korea. Attlee‟s government also
found themselves burdened with the mounting crisis in Palestine. Following World War II,
Britain was unable to handle the confusion that occurred in Palestine. Attlee was faced with the
ramifications of the White Paper of 1939.50
His administration was faced with the desire of a
great numbers of Jews seeking refuge in Palestine. Should the British government continue to
follow the example of Chamberlain‟s White Paper, should they formulate a new plan, or should
they admit defeat and hand over the problem to the United Nations? Ernest Bevin, the foreign
secretary, explained to the House of Commons that “it would have been a painful policy for
Britain; with the leadership she had shown in the world, to have gone to the United Nations
50
The White Paper of 1939 was a policy that the British government enforced under Neville Chamberlain. Instead
of Partitioning Palestine this White Paper would create an independent Palestine that would be governed by both
Palestinian Arabs and Jews. The representation for the Arabs and the Jews would be determined by the number of
each population. This policy also limited Jewish immigration to Palestine to 75,000 for the period between 1940
and 1944.

Shami 23
without attempting to solve the problems herself.”51
Thus Attlee and his ministers were set on
solving the problems of Palestine, without outside assistance because Britain needed to prove to
the world that they were still a world leader.
By not passing off the problem over to the United Nations straight away Britain was
responsible for the “tranquility of the Middle East;” Britain did not just have its own interests
that needed to be kept in mind while dealing with Palestine. An editorial piece for The Times
argued that since the United Nations, the British dominions as well as the Middle East had
invested interests in the dispute that Britain needed to do everything in its power to honor its
obligation to Palestine; however, it seemed to be a near impossible task seeing as both sides, the
Arabs and the Jews, were claiming the entire state of Palestine as their own.52
A conference was
held in Paris to try and find a peaceful resolution in Palestine. According to Attlee though “when
proposals that could work emerged they were shot down by American Zionists…no voices but
theirs counted.”53
Britain did not have a voice at the meeting making it clear that they could no
longer help Palestine. The United Nations took over the problem of Palestine and by 15 May
1948 Britain no longer had an obligation to Palestine.
Attlee argued that one of the biggest struggles facing Britain during this ordeal was the
intervention of the Americans. Attlee tried to get the Americans to see the situation from the
British perspective, but it proved to be extremely difficult. “The Americans thought we should
introduce a hundred thousand Jews into Palestine right away without the slightest consideration
for the effect on the Arabs. They had no obligation there. We did.” Attlee continued by stating
that “[the Americans] were full of suspicions because they assumed we could just order people
about. But you can‟t do that. The American oil interests didn‟t make things any easier either.
51
“Why the Palestine Plan was Rejected,” The Manchester Guardian, 19 February 1947.
52
“Palestine,” The Times, 15 August 1945.
53

Shami 24
They were playing their own hands most of the time.”54
Attlee worked on Indian independence
simultaneously as he worked on the growing struggle in Palestine. Palestine‟s story is readily
remembered in post-war history, however, because of the involvement of the United States.
The United States is vital to post-war British historiography because the U.S. did not just
intervene in international issues like Palestine, but they were also involved in the majority of
Attlee‟s administration. America became Great Britain‟s “big brother” to the chagrin of most
British citizens including the prime minister. Following the Second World War, Great Britain
was the farthest thing from a super power. When international politics were involved Attlee and
his government needed the United States to agree with their plan; this also included decisions
made about the British Empire. Once Attlee placed an absolute date for Britain‟s exit from India
the United States began to push even harder for it. Lord Halifax, the British ambassador in
Washington, sent Attlee a letter that explained what occurred during a meeting discussing
Britain‟s removal from India. The United States pushed for approval from Attlee and King
George VI on a United States public statement about India. Halifax‟s letter stated that, “it
would, of course, be most valuable to us [Britain] to have the United States Government on
record as supporting us over India.”55
Attlee did not approve of the United States making a
statement because if they did it would “look like a pat on the back to us from a rich uncle who
sees us turning over a new leaf. I doubt it doing us any good in India with Congress while it
would irritate the Moslems.”56
By denying the United States his support, Attlee reinforced the
fact that he was prime minister in the minds of Americas, at least for the time being.
Attlee may not have always waited for the approval of the United States before acting,
but American involvement in British affairs made Attlee and his administration appear weak.
54
Williams, 181, 176.
55
1st
Earl of Halifax Telegram No. 1870 to Clement Attlee, 24 March 1946, PRO, PREM 8:244.
56
Prime Minister‟s Personal Minute to 1st
Earl of Halifax, 25 March 1946, PRO, PREM 8:244.

Shami 25
There was a belief within the British government that the colder America felt towards the Soviet
Union the warmer it acted towards Britain. This was visible in a lecture given by Dr. Lemin, a
Soviet intellectual, on the future of the British Empire. He argued against the belief that the
Soviet Union was a threat to the empire by arguing that the real threat to the British Empire was
the United States. “All the screaming, especially by the Americans, about the Soviet threats to
the Empire is merely an excuse for the Americans to penetrate into the Empire and establish
themselves in various key points.”57
From letters sent to The Manchester Guardian as well as
articles written in The Guardian and The Times it appeared that the British citizens agreed with
this sentiment.
They saw the United States as more of a threat to the British way of life than the Soviet
Union because the United States did not only intervene with foreign issue but domestic issues as
well. When the Labour Party came to power Bevin had to reassure the United States that they
were on the same page. He told the Foreign Service of the United States that even though “some
Americans were scared by the advent of a Labour Government: this was unnecessary. We have
much of the same objective as the Americans, to find employment for our people.”58
The United
States was unable to understand why there were such hardships in Britain at the time. They
argued that it was the socialist reforms of Attlee that were hurting the nation. It was not until
1947 that they started to recognize that not everything was a result of the political ideology of the
government. During this time Britain was dealing with a devastating winter; the snow was more
than they could handle and it hurt many industries. “Many American periodicals have published
57
Alexander Werth,“Something to be Said for the British Empire,” The Manchester Guardian, 23 May 1947.
58
The Foreign Service of the United States of America, 22 August 1945, PRO, FO 371:44578.

Shami 26
articles sympathising with Britain‟s present predicament.” They were no longer blaming
everything on the “social programme.”59
It was during this time that The New York Times praised Attlee‟s government and the
steps that had been made in India. “We are witnessing an evolution of a really peaceful
revolution, one which neither William Pitt nor the youthful Churchill could have foreseen. We
are seeing the broadening down of freedom, and growing sense of a bill of rights unlimited by
race, colour or culture.” The article continued, “the new Britain is more appealing to the
American mind than the old. We can understand it better. In its hour of darkness it breathes
courage and liberations.”60
Attlee and the British people felt resentment towards America. The
United States‟ treatment of the empire as well as their inferior treatment of the British in general
created a resentment of the United States among the British government and citizens. They felt
that the United States involvement infringed upon the British way of life. America saw
themselves as morally superior to the British; they used the British Empire to illustrate their
superiority.
There was an editorial published in The Manchester Guardian that very clearly reiterated
the resentment the British had towards the Americans. “It is very hard to persuade Americans,
even intelligent and historically minded Americans, that the imperialism of the eighteenth
century is dead, much less to persuade them that Britain is now as little „imperialist‟ in the bad
sense as is the United States.” The editor continued by pointing out some less than positive
aspects of the United States experience with “imperialism” and how America could definitely
not take a moral stance on British politics because of “manifest destiny” and “dollar
59
“Change of View in U.S.,” The Manchester Guardian, 24 February 1947.
60
“The Changing Empire,” The Manchester Guardian, 24 February 1947.

Shami 27
diplomacy.”61
The British press spoke against American involvement in British affairs and
Attlee tried to hold his ground, but in the end the United States played a huge role in post-war
British affairs. Attlee did not just have to please the Labour Party and the British people; he
“unofficially” had to gain the approval of the Americans. The fact that the Americans had such
an active role made Attlee appear to be secondary in the discussion of India as well as the history
of post-war Britain. Thus the American government became an advocate for the victims of the
British Empire leaving Attlee to appear useless in the minds of many. This created the notion
that Attlee was not strong enough to make any critical decisions about foreign policy, especially
not with a problem as confusing and serious as that of India and this false notion extended into
the historiography. The United States involvement in post-war Britain was so large that it
became a vital part of post-war historiography pushing aside the Partition of India.
The “Sheep in Sheep’s Clothing”62
versus the Great War Hero
A final reason for the removal of Attlee from the historiography of Partition was because
of the great amount of noise the charismatic Leader of the Opposition, war hero Winston
Churchill, made about every facet of Attlee‟s administration both domestically and
internationally. When the Labour Party won the 1945 election Churchill was shocked; he could
not understand how the Conservative Party could have lost the election after he proved victorious
in the war, especially since the Conservatives barked that Churchill was irreplaceable, but in the
end the British people did not agree with this sentiment. “We really need not fear that the
replacement of Mr. Churchill as Prime Minister would bring any disasters in its train. The
61
“Free India,” The Manchester Guardian, 16 March 1947.
62
“Mr. Attlee and Mr. Churchill in Angry Scene—bitter exchanges on Hyderabad,” The Manchester Guardian, 31
July 1948.

Shami 28
argument about the indispensible man had never been a good one; there is no such man.”63
Churchill openly critiqued most actions of Attlee and his government, particularly his domestic
agenda. “The Prime Minister and his colleagues should have concentrated on their immediate
task and left the fulfillment of party ambitions at least until we and the rest of the world stood on
firmer and safer ground.”
According to Churchill, there was no reason for the shortages or rations that plagued
Britain; it could have all been avoided with a bit of “reasonable foresight.” The British people
were “less fed than the populations of Holland, Belgium, and Denmark, countries which have
just emerged from long years of brutal Nazi rule…the Government cannot save the country and
carry on the class welfare and Socialist programme and nationalisation at the same time.”64
This
led Churchill to urge the “nation to whine.” Attlee spoke out against Churchill‟s attempt to rally
the British people and his exploitation of the nation‟s problems: “It is very different from the
Churchill of the war, who exhorted the people to bear bravely the inevitable hardships…and now
apparently is exhorting them to whine and to blame…he knows perfectly well that these things
are not due to the action of the Labour Government.”65
Attlee continued to argue that Churchill
did not believe the British people had governmental knowledge and that Churchill was blinded
by his Conservative desire for British grandeur.
Churchill was the greatest advocate for the continuance of the British Empire and for the
renewal Britain‟s former glory; thus it was not surprising that he caused a number of problems
for Attlee with India. Churchill refused to give Attlee support on India, especially in the case of
personnel change. He called for an endless number of, what appeared to be useless, debates
about India. Churchill forced Attlee and the Labour Party into debates that made no difference
63
“Mr. Churchill is Not Indispensable,” The Manchester Guardian, 15 June 1945.
64
“Mr. Churchill Joins in Attack,” The Manchester Guardian, 13 March 1947.
65
Ibid.

Shami 29
and did not help move the discussions on India in a positive direction. In many ways the debates
created more problems in deciding how to handle the problem of India. On 12 December 1946,
Churchill sprung a “surprise debate” about India on Attlee and the House of Commons. “The
danger is that his words may increase communal antagonism and Indian suspicions of British
intentions.” The Conservative MPs were also skeptical about a positive outcome of this debate.
They worried that “an expression of extreme opinion by Mr. Churchill may damage still further
the reputation of Conservatism with Indian opinion.”66
During the debate Churchill disagreed
with everything the Labour MPs said. In a description of the debate in The Manchester
Guardian, the article painted an unflattering picture of Churchill. “You can count on Mr.
Churchill to overdo it. The Labour benches had ceased to be angry. Now they were only
amused. For all its drama this was really an irrelevant interlude.”67
A couple of months following the “surprise debate” Churchill caused an uproar over the
appointment of Mountbatten and the setting of a time limit for withdrawal. Churchill had
appointed Wavell to the post of Viceroy; in February 1947 the contract of that appointment
ended and Attlee decided not to renew it, which angered Churchill who called it the “dismissal”
of Lord Wavell. He attempted to bully Attlee into divulging every detail of the decision for the
“resignation” of Lord Wavell, but Attlee refused. In amazement to the House of Commons
Attlee took a strong stand against Churchill, for the first of what would become many times.
Attlee argued that “he was not under obligation to say anything more on the point and appealed
to precedents set by Mr. Churchill himself during the war when he dismissed soldiers and
civilians without explanation.”68
This episode created chaos in the meeting with the
66
“Surprise Debate on India,” The Manchester Guardian, 12 December 1946.
67
“Mr. Churchill Raises Labour Storm,” The Manchester Guardian, 13 December 1946.
68
“Lord Mountbatten succeeds Lord Wavell as Viceroy—Mr. Churchill Raises a Storm,” The Manchester
Guardian, 21 February 1947.

Shami 30
Conservatives yelling for an answer while the Labour members shouting for order. Churchill
refused to accept the time limit that Attlee had put into place saying that it harmed the “prospect
of Indian unity” and that he stood by the Cripps Mission Declaration of 1942.69
This statement
by Churchill was ironic because when Stafford Cripps put forth his offer to the Indians Churchill
was furious and called for its retraction; however, it would have created chaos seeing as all
parties involved agreed upon it.
Churchill continually took a negative approach to India and how Attlee handled it. “We
lack the physical and moral strength to wind up our affairs in India in a responsible, humane, and
honourable fashion.” He dubbed the mission in India “Operation Scuttle” and “The Road to
Ruin.”70
Churchill even wanted to turn the India problem over to the United Nations which was
surprising because he was not worried about how this would make Great Britain look on the
world stage. It can be argued that he wanted to pass India off to the United Nations in order to
show how weak of a leader Attlee was and how poor of a job the Labour Party was doing, but
unfortunately for Churchill, Attlee did not let his ranting go unchallenged. Attlee contended that
Churchill never believed in self government. “I quite realise my own experience is out of date. I
hesitate to be dogmatic or prophetic as to what may happen in India. I differ in this from Mr.
Churchill. His practical experience in India was some fifty year ago. He formed some very
strong opinions then—I might also say prejudices—and they have remained with him ever
since.”71
Once the government finally agreed upon the future of India, Churchill continued to
argue against everything, including what appeared to be minor details. Attlee agreed with his
ministers that the bill that would give India freedom would be entitled the “Indian Independence
69
“Mr. Churchill Opposes India Time Limit,” The Times, 7 March 1947.
70
“Mr. Churchill Takes Gloomy View on India,” The Manchester Guardian, 7 March 1947.
71
“Premier Replies: Tilt at Mr. Churchill,” The Manchester Guardian, 7 March 1947.

Shami 31
Bill.” When Churchill heard this he sent Attlee a strongly worded letter informing him that he
disapproved of this name and that the only reason he and his party supported Mountbatten‟s
proposals was that he believed the bill and everything surrounding it would mention dominion
status. Churchill continued by saying that he would not support the bill if it was called the
“Indian Independence Bill.” He then went on to give his ideas for new titles such as, “The
Indian Dominions Bill” or “The Indian Self-Government Bill.”72
Needless to say Attlee was not
pleased with Churchill and his feelings were shown in his response letter where he explained the
feeling of the prime ministers of the commonwealth on the matter. “Dominion Prime Ministers
constantly stress the point that they are independent states within the British Commonwealth.
They bear allegiance to the King.” Attlee then explained to Churchill what dominion status
meant: “The insistence on independence does not touch the point of allegiance, but emphasizes
the complete freedom of every member of the Commonwealth from control by any other
member. I think this is a most valuable counter to the demand for independence outside the
Commonwealth as it shows that this demand can be satisfied within it. This is, in fact, the
meaning of Dominion Status.” 73
Churchill continually attacked India and spoke out against Attlee‟s carving up of the
empire. He stated that the loss of India was “the clattering down of the British Empire and all its
glories.”74
This did not just anger Attlee. Churchill had gone too far in the minds of the Indians.
They saw the comments that Churchill made “mischievous and venomous” and they refused to
stand by and accept the prejudices of Churchill. Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel, deputy Prime
Minister of India, said that if “His Majesty‟s Government…wish India to maintain friendly
relations with Britain they must see that India is in no way subjected to malicious and venomous
72
Winston Churchill Letter to Clement Attlee, 1 July 1947, PRO, PREM 8/562.
73
Clement Attlee Letter to Winston Churchill, 4 July 1947, PRO, PREM 8/562.
74

Shami 32
attacks…owing to years of deep-seated prejudices and owing to ignorance it may be difficult for
some [to give friendship and goodwill], but if future disasters are to be avoided it has got to be
done.”75
A few weeks after Vallabhbhai Patel made this statement, Churchill and Attlee had
their grandest debate about the blockade of Hyderabad76
and the result of this debate was “a
piece of personal drama unparalleled in Parliament.”77
Churchill argued that the British
government had an obligation to not allow the Indian government to take Hyderabad with force
because Hyderabad was meek and could not defend itself. Attlee was “an Attlee not before seen
in the House of Commons.” He was in control and spoke with “cold fury;” for the first time
there was an “unrelenting anger” in Attlee and he “treated the Leader of the Opposition with
something near contempt.” He argued that he would make the best decision about Hyderabad,
something that Churchill could not do because unlike Attlee who “listened to all the facts on
India,” Churchill “chose such facts as suited his prejudices.” As expected Churchill was
“flushed with anger,” but for the first time Attlee did not back down, prior to this occurrence
Attlee held his tongue because he was not interested in proving anything to the Leader of the
Opposition. Attlee stated in an interview that “a monologue is not a decision.”78
Churchill could
make all the grand speeches he wanted, but in the end decisions were not made with those
speeches. Attlee continued to chastise Churchill by stating that he did not have Churchill‟s
75
“Indian Criticism of Mr. Churchill—Attacks „Must Stop‟,” The Manchester Guardian, 30 June 1948
76
Hyderabad was an area of India where the Nizam was sovereign. The Nizam of Hyderbad was never a part of
British India, but it was a princely state under British rule. Following the removal of the British from the region, the
Nizam wanted to either remain independent or to join Pakistan because of their Muslim background. Neither one of
the options was strategically advantageous to India. To stop future rebellions by the Nizam India placed an
economic blockade on the state of Hyderabad. In September 1948, India used military force on Hyderabad causing
the Nizam to become a part of India.
77
July 1948.
78

Shami 33
preconceived notion that “everything the Hindus do is wrong.” 79
Attlee‟s last word on the
matter was that he knew Churchill‟s beliefs did not represent those of the party. This silenced
Churchill and the entire room.
Attlee‟s forceful reaction surprised everyone. He was a man that had once been called “a
sheep in sheep‟s clothing.”80
Unlike his aristocratic predecessor Attlee was not a “blue blood.”
He was well educated, but not aristocratic. Attlee was the son of a solicitor who was not
groomed for political greatness; he did not have a captivating personality like Churchill, he was a
very private man, and the public did not know him. “No Prime Minister has been so little known
to the public as Mr. Attlee. Most people are at a loss to size him up…no one remembers a saying
of Mr. Attlee.”81
This hurt his place in history because it was hard to remember Attlee not just
when discussing India, but when discussing post-war Britain. With a Leader of the Opposition,
like Churchill it was hard for Attlee to take center stage. Churchill is a common part of the
historiography of India‟s path towards independence. He is shown as a hindrance to the
progression towards self-government, but the man that was fighting against him has been
removed which is not surprising. How could Attlee be remembered when the “great” Winston
Churchill was speaking so loudly against him and his administration? Churchill eclipsed Attlee
in almost every realm, especially when it came to deciding the future of India.
During Attlee‟s interview with Francis Williams, Williams asked Attlee about the
workings of his administration. Attlee explained that it was important to hear everyone‟s
opinion, but in the end it had to be the prime minister that made the final decision. “You don‟t
take a vote. No. Never. You might take it on something like if you meet at 6:30 or 7:30, I
79
July 1948.
80
Ibid.
81
“A Biography of Mr. Attlee—The Man of Reason,” The Manchester Guardian, 21 June 1948.

Shami 34
suppose, but not on anything major.” He continued on and said that even being prime minister,
though did not allow him to over speak. “You shouldn‟t talk too much yourself however good
you are at it.”82
Attlee‟s explanation of the workings of his administration put the legacy of his
administration into perspective. The “sheep in sheep clothing” image that Attlee had, removed
him from many aspects of post-war British history, not just the Partition of India.
Conclusion
Attlee was a pivotal character in the Partition of India as well as post-war Britain. He
was front and center making difficult decisions, which makes him key to bringing these two
parallel histories together. He argued against Partition until it was the only option remaining and
he made radical governmental changes with the appointment of Mountbatten all the while
domestically trying to implement Labour‟s ideal welfare state. Even though he worked tirelessly
towards the withdrawal of Britain from India he has been removed from the historiography of
Partition and Partition has been removed for post-war historiography. There are a few factors
that have led to these exclusions. Attlee‟s domestic agenda was recognized more than his
foreign policy. Great Britain found itself at a critical moment in history. It had lost its place on
the world stage and it was quickly moving towards economic ruin. What occurred in the
metropole overshadowed Attlee‟s work with India; even though India directly affected what
happened at home. There was such chaos at home that some have assumed it was impossible
that Attlee played a critical role in anything outside of fixing the domestic climate of Britain.
Domestic issues were not the only thing that challenged Attlee‟s importance in the
conversation about India. Other problems within the empire created difficulties as well, such as
the problem of Palestine. Attlee‟s work with Palestine was remembered because it was “more
82

Shami 35
important” on a global scale. This crisis was of great importance to the United States which
allowed the United States to find its way into the middle of most of Britain‟s post-war dealings.
American involvement in all things British made Attlee appear as if he was at the mercy of the
Americans. This paternal image of America being Britain‟s “rich uncle” made the actions of
Attlee involving India nothing, but actions that were forced upon him by the United States. The
final reason for Attlee‟s exclusion from the list of men that “solved the India problem” was
because of his captivating opponent, Winston Churchill. Churchill fought loudly against Attlee
on the future of India. He wanted India to stay under British rule and was very upset that
Attlee‟s government killed the empire that he had worked so hard to maintain. Even though
Attlee stood up to Churchill and created one of the biggest scenes to occur in a parliamentary
meeting he could not stand next to Churchill. Churchill‟s spotlight was always brighter.
The Partition of India and the domestic history of post-war Britain need to be examined
together. India played a major role in Britain at home even if its influence was not readily
visible. India provided Britain with great wealth throughout the history of the British Empire,
but it was also a great drain on Britain economically. Maintaining an empire, especially such a
large colony like India, was expensive; following the Second World War, Britain needed the
resources and income as well as the prestige that India gave them, but Britain could not afford
this at the time. India was a major post-war problem for Britain and it needs to be discussed as
such. Attlee is the key to doing this because his administration links India and post-war Britain
together. The Partition of India and the economic domestic issues Britain faced following the
war happened simultaneously and they cannot be separated. Clement Attlee and the events that
occurred during his time as prime minister have been forgotten in many ways, but they need to
be remembered so that a complete history of post-war Britain, including India, can be told.

Shami 36
Bibliography
Books and Newspapers:
Attlee, C. R. As it Happened. London: William Heinemann Ltd., 1954.
Blackwell, Michael. Clinging to Grandeur: British Attitudes and Foreign Policy in the
Aftermath of the Second World War. Westport: Greenwood Press, 1993.
Chester, Lucy. Border and Conflict in South Asia: The Radcliffe Boundary Commission and the
Partition of Punjab. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2009.
Clarke, Peter. Hope and Glory—Britain 1900-2000. London: Penguin Books, 2004.
Francis, Martin. Ideas and Policies under Labour, 1945-1951—Building a New Britain.
Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1997.
Hutchins, Francis G. The Illusions of Permanence, British Imperialism in India. Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1967.
Khan, Yasmin. The Great Partition: The Making of India and Pakistan. New Haven: Yale
University Press, 2007.
The Manchester Guardian. Manchester, United Kingdom, 1945-1948, 1950.
Mansergh, Nicholas, ed. Constitutional Relations between Britain and India: the Transfer of
Power 1952-7—Volume 6. London: H.M.S.O., 1983.
---. Constitutional Relations between Britain and India: the Transfer of Power 1952-7—Volume
8. London: H.M.S.O., 1983.
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11. London: H.M.S.O., 1983.
Moore, R.J. Endgames of Empire: Studies of Britain’s Indian Problem. Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1988.
---. Escape from Empire: The Attlee Government and the India Problem. New York: Clarendon
Press, 1983.

Shami 37
Sarkar, Sumit. Modern India, 1885-1947. New York: St. Martin‟s Press Inc., 1989.
Secretary of State for the Home Department to Partliament. Report of the Indian Statutory
Commission. London: H.M. S.O., 1930.
The Times. London, United Kingdom, 1945, 1947.
Williams, Francis. A Prime Minister Remembers. London: William Heinemann Ltd., 1961.
Wolpert, Stanley. Shameful Flight: The Last Years of the British Empire in India. Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2006.
Zweiniger-Bargeilowska, Ina. Austerity in Britain: Rationing, Controls, and Consumption 1939-
1955. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000.
Archival Sources:
United Kingdom. Public Record Office (PRO). 1945. Foreign Office 371, no. 44578. The
Foreign Service of the United States of America, 22 August.
---. 1946. Prime Minister‟s Office 8, no. 244. Prime Minister‟s Personal Minute to 1st
Earl of
Halifax, 25 March.
---. 1946. Prime Minister‟s Office 8, no. 244. 1st
Earl of Halifax Telegram No. 1870 to Clement
Attlee, 26 March.
---. 1946. Cabinet 124, no.639. The Social Survey—Carpets.
---. 1946. Cabinet 124, no.639. The Social Survey—The Cinema and the Public.
---. 1946. Cabinet 124, no.639. The Social Survey—Shopping Hours.
---. 1947. Prime Minister‟s Office 8, no. 820. Attlee to Nehru, 11 March.
---. 1947. Prime Minister‟s Office 8, no. 562. Winston Churchill Letter to Clement Attlee, 1
July.
---. 1947. Prime Minister‟s Office 8, no. 562. Clement Attlee Letter to Winston Churchill, 4
July.
---. 1947. Cabinet 124, no. 639. The Social Survey—Domestic Crockery.
---. 1948. Cabinet 124, no. 639. Report on the Demand for Holidays in 1947 and 1948.

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