Engendering the New Enclosures Development,Involuntary Rese

Engendering the New Enclosures: Development,
Involuntary Resettlement and the Struggles for Social
Reproduction in Coastal Tanzania
Youjin Brigitte Chung
ABSTRACT
This article engages with the feminist concept of ‘social
reproduction’ to
arrive at a richer understanding of the gendered processes and
outcomes
of contemporary large-scale land acquisitions, or the ‘new
enclosures’. It
focuses on the case of a recent land deal for industrial
sugarcane production
in the Coast Region of Tanzania and the resultant process of
involuntary
resettlement. It critically analyses people’s struggles for land in
the face of
imminent displacement, and the gendered ways they experience
the erosion
of their pre-existing modes of social reproduction. It argues that
enclosure of
rural landscapes does more than immediately strip peasants and
pastoralists
of their means of production and turn them into wage labourers.
It gradually
uproots them from their socio-ecological knowledges, cultural
practices and
historical memories, which are rooted on the land and
articulated through

gender. The highly uncertain processes of enclosure and
displacement also
force rural women and men to renegotiate their livelihood
strategies and
intra-household gender relations.
INTRODUCTION
Tanzania is among the top African countries targeted by foreign
investors in
the contemporary global land rush (Anseeuw et al., 2012).
While obtaining
The research for this article was made possible through the
support of various institutions across
Cornell University, Ithaca: the Institute for the Social Sciences
(Contested Global Landscapes
Theme Project); the College of Agriculture and Life Sciences–
AWARE Initiative (Advanc-
ing Women in Agriculture through Research); the Einaudi
Center for International Studies;
the Department of Development Sociology; and the Graduate
School. I also acknowledge the
generous support of the Social Science Research Council,
through the Dissertation Proposal
Development Fellowship and the International Dissertation
Research Fellowship. I warmly
thank Wendy Wolford and Phil McMichael for their patience
and thoughtful feedback in re-
viewing multiple versions of this article. I am also grateful to
Marygold Walsh-Dilley, Ryan
Nehring, Chuck Geisler, Michael Watts and four anonymous
reviewers for Development and
Change, who provided constructive comments and
encouragement on an earlier version of this
article.

Development and Change 48(1): 98–120. DOI:
10.1111/dech.12288
C© 2017 International Institute of Social Studies.
Engendering the New Enclosures in Tanzania 99
precise data on transnational land transfers remains a challenge,
it is es-
timated that more than 30 deals amounting to one million
hectares have
been announced, negotiated or signed in Tanzania within the
last decade
(see Locher and Sulle, 2014). The new wave of enclosures in
Tanzania has
not only been accelerated by the convergence of the global
food, fuel, fi-
nance and climate crises (Borras et al., 2011; McMichael,
2012), but also
by the state’s committed push to transform agriculture into a
‘modernized,
commercial, highly productive and profitable’ sector (URT,
2013: 9). Since
the launch of the Kilimo Kwanza (Agriculture First) initiative in
2009, the
Tanzanian government has placed the private sector at the heart
of its agricul-
tural transformation agenda. As part of this strategy, it launched
the Southern
Agricultural Growth Corridor of Tanzania in 2010 to promote
public–private
partnerships (PPPs) as a model for agriculture-led growth and
development.
More recently, in 2013, the government announced its ‘Big

Results Now’
initiative, with the aim of establishing 25 large-scale
commercial farm deals
for paddy rice and sugarcane by 2015/16.1
This article examines, from a feminist perspective, a recent
large-scale
land deal for industrial sugarcane production in Bagamoyo
District, Coast
Region of Tanzania. The deal was negotiated between the
Tanzanian gov-
ernment and Agro EcoEnergy Tanzania Limited (hereinafter
referred to as
EcoEnergy), a subsidiary of the Swedish company EcoEnergy
Africa AB,
based on a benefit-sharing scheme, known as ‘land for equity’.2
According
to this arrangement, the Tanzanian government agreed to lease
20,373.56
hectares3 of public land to EcoEnergy for 99 years, in exchange
for a 25
per cent equity share in the investment (Agro EcoEnergy
Tanzania, 2012a).
Despite the fact that the land title was transferred to EcoEnergy
in May 2013,
the actual project implementation remains at a standstill at the
time of this ar-
ticle’s publication. In this text, I argue that the project has
stalled because the
government and the company have been unable to resolve the
issue of how to
compensate and remove the approximately 1,400 people who are
currently
subsisting on and staking their claims to the land. These
individuals, their
families and communities are not just awaiting physical

displacement from
their homes and dispossession from their means of production.
They are
experiencing gradual dislocation from their socio-ecological
knowledges,
cultural practices and historical memories, which are
inextricably tied to
the land, and which are often articulated through gender. By
considering
1. As of November 2016, however, not one farm deal has been
completed, including the one
discussed in this article.
2. ‘Land for equity’ models have been in place in South Africa
since the mid-1990s, but they
have largely failed to generate socially equitable outcomes for
smallholder farmers and
farmworkers (see Vhugen et al., 2014). Currently, there are no
policy, institutional and legal
frameworks governing ‘land for equity’ deals in Tanzania
(Interview with a Ministry of
Lands official, 21 October 2015).
3. This is the official figure as stated in the Certificate of Title
granted to EcoEnergy, a copy
of which was shared with the author by a Ministry of Lands
official (21 October 2015).
100 Youjin Brigitte Chung
involuntary resettlement as a technical issue, the Tanzanian
government and
EcoEnergy have inevitably underestimated the strength and the

gendered
nature of people’s attachment to the land.
To explain the dispossessions associated with contemporary
land deals,
many authors have turned to the Marxist concepts of ‘primitive
accumula-
tion’ and ‘accumulation by dispossession (ABD)’ (see Levien,
2012; Moyo
et al., 2012). These concepts are indeed useful for historicizing
the current
bout of transnational land deals as an expression of, and as
responses to,
the crisis of neoliberal capitalism, and for explaining how
displacement and
dispossession are inherent to capitalist development. However, I
argue that
they are insufficient for explaining the gendered processes and
outcomes
of contemporary land deals, let alone other means through
which capital
continues to encroach upon rural landscapes. This is because
primitive accu-
mulation and ABD are constrained by their androcentric and
capitalocentric
approaches to valuing land and labour, and hence fail to account
fully for the
complex gender dynamics and realities of social life on the land
for agrarian
households.
The overarching aim of this article is to embed gender, or to
correct
the ‘overwhelming gender-blindness’ (Daley, 2011: 14), in the
global ‘land
grab’ debate. I start by sketching in broad strokes what I am

calling a ‘fem-
inist ontology of land’. Central to this approach is the concept
of ‘social
reproduction’. This concept is more explicitly gendered,
nuanced and hu-
manistic than the notion of ‘reproduction’, which is laden with
the ideas
of primitive accumulation and ABD. Against the dominant
ontology that
abstracts land as a commodity and a factor of production, the
feminist ontol-
ogy conceptualizes land as a broader site and source of social
reproduction.
I argue that social reproduction allows us to see the multiple
uses and values
of land and labour that give significance to life for rural women
and men.
This highlights the role of gender as a key signifier of power
that mediates
peoples’ relationships to and experiences on the land.
Following this discussion, I present the case study of the
Bagamoyo
EcoEnergy (BEE) Sugar Project. I highlight the complexity of
multiple
and overlapping claims made over the acquired land, as well as
various
problems associated with how people and their properties were
counted by
government authorities for compensation purposes. I argue that
involuntary
resettlement, specifically the ways in which it is planned and
governed,
results in the fragmentation of pre-existing modes of social
reproduction;
it devalues the polyvalence of land and labour, and glosses over

the un-
equal gender relations of power that operate within Tanzanian
society. Yet,
the ways in which rural women and men experience and respond
to (the
imminence of) displacement are deeply gendered — they are
shaped and
constrained by the patriarchal ideologies that are entrenched
and reproduced
within households.
The empirical findings presented in this article are based on
fieldwork
conducted in August 2013, July and August 2014, and
September through
December 2015. I draw upon in-depth interviews with 54 people
from 47
households (24 women, 30 men), and three focus groups
involving 34 people
— all of whom are facing involuntary resettlement induced by
the BEE Sugar
Project. I also build on data collected from semi-structured and
unstructured
interviews with 52 key informants, including village leaders,
national and
district level government officials, EcoEnergy executive and
consultants,
donor agency staff, local researchers, activists and lawyers
working on issues
of land, gender and agricultural development.

TOWARDS A FEMINIST ONTOLOGY
In order to engender our understandings of the new enclosures,
we cannot
simply ‘add women and stir’ (Harding, 1995). Engendering is
about taking
gender seriously as a relational and analytical category and an
ideological
process, which defines what it means to be women and men,
female and
male, and feminine and masculine in a given society (Scott,
1988). It is also
about being keenly aware of how gender intersects with class,
race, ethnicity,
marital status, sex, age and other identity categories to mediate
the relations
of power and inequality. As Joan Scott emphasizes, feminist
scholarship is
less about highlighting the important role and deeds of women
than exposing
the ‘silent and hidden operations of gender that are nonetheless
present and
defining forces in the organization of most societies’ (ibid.: 25).
Before
elaborating on the concept of ‘social reproduction’, which lies
at the heart of
the feminist ontology, I highlight several limits of primitive
accumulation
and ABD for engendering the new enclosures.
Limits of Primitive Accumulation and ABD
Primitive accumulation refers to the violent process through
which capital-
ism emerges from pre-capitalist agrarian social formations: the
enclosure of

the commons; the expulsion of peasants from their land; and
their forcible
transformation into wage labourers (Marx, 1867/1976).
Harvey’s (2003)
updated concept of ABD signifies the ongoing nature of
primitive accumu-
lation in the contemporary era; it is the central mechanism
through which
capitalism reproduces itself over time. Reproduction according
to orthodox
Marxism consists of: a) the daily maintenance of the workers’
labour power;
b) the continued extraction of surplus value through the
exploitation of the
proletariat by the bourgeoisie; and c) the biological
reproduction of human
beings or future labour power. As Marx (1867/1976: 711) puts
it, ‘every
social process of production is at the same time a process of
reproduction’.
This interconnected process, however, is distinctly class based
in orthodox
Marxist theory, and has significance insofar as it expands the
‘public’, or the
‘formal’, sphere of the commodified market economy.
However, as Marxist and socialist feminists have long argued,
privileging
the ‘public’ sphere and silencing the ‘private’ sphere of the
unwaged domes-
ticity has far-reaching consequences. It eclipses the fact that
capitalism has

thrived on the co-existence of waged and unwaged labour, and
especially the
exploitation of the latter. It also degrades women’s social status
to a mere
biological ‘machine for the production of new workers’
(Federici, 2004: 12),
and devalues women’s housework and care work, which are
unwaged but
still socially necessary for ensuring the well-being of all people,
regardless
of their position vis-à-vis the capitalist labour market (Picchio,
1992). Fur-
thermore, it naturalizes and trivializes patriarchy which
predates capitalism
by over five millennia, and conceals the fact that capitalism, as
we know it,
depends on patriarchy for its continuity (Connell, 1987).
In addition to their relation to labour, primitive accumulation
and ABD
are also limited by their androcentric and capitalocentric
approaches to land.
The questions of who has land, who gets land, what they do
with it, how and
why cannot be answered without an analysis of the interlocking
hierarchies
of class, gender, ethnicity, age, marital status and other forms
of inequalities.
However, because primitive accumulation and ABD tend to
assume that land
is a commodity, private property or physical resource to be
dominated by
people for ‘productive’ use, they pre-empt the exploration of
the polyvalence
of land (see Li, 2014; McMichael, 2014; Verma, 2014). By this
I mean the

multiple and overlapping ways in which land is accessed, used,
controlled
and valued by rural women and men, and how property,
inclusive of pri-
vate, public and communal, exists in a complex web of social
relationships
and institutions (see Berry, 1989; Ribot and Peluso, 2003). For
instance, as
Radcliffe (2013) demonstrates in the case of contemporary
Ecuador, indige-
nous women articulate their historical land claims not based on
their class
identities per se, but on their ethnicity and gender, while
rejecting a stark
division between collective and individual property rights. In
another his-
torical example, Federici (2004) highlights how medieval
women claimed
the commons as the centre of social life before the European
enclosures. She
argues that the commons provided not only the source of
material life, but
also a space for women to convene to exchange news, carry out
cultural ac-
tivities, and form their own viewpoints autonomously from men.
There is a
strong parallel between her idea of gendered commons and what
Rocheleau
and Edmunds (1997: 1355) refer to as ‘micro-frontiers’ in
contemporary
rural Africa, such as kitchen gardens, bush lands or scattered
patches of
uncultivated land. Women exert relatively greater control over
these niche
spaces, than they normally would over their family plots (which
are often

perceived to be ‘owned’ by their husbands or male elder kin).
At the same
time, poor women in particular rely heavily on these gendered
spaces to ac-
cess resources, such as fuelwood, wild foods and medicinal
plants, to meet
their personal, household and communal responsibilities (ibid.).
My main argument is that land enclosures do more than
immediately
strip peasants and pastoralists of their means of production and
turn them
into wage labourers. They gradually displace people from their
cultural
practices, socio-ecological knowledges and historical memories,
which are
deeply rooted on the land, and which are articulated in gendered
ways. These
combined processes of displacement, dispossession and
dislocation can be
rapid or they can be slow, they can be visible or they can be
invisible. As
Feldman and Geisler (2012: 974) argue, ‘in situ displacement’,
or a situa-
tion in which people are displaced in place through the loss of
entitlements,
social exclusion and alienation of rights and identities, can be
as trauma-
tizing as physical eviction itself. This type of displacement,
albeit unseen,
results in the accumulation of human insecurity and, ultimately,

the failure
of peoples’ capacity to ‘socially reproduce everyday lives and
livelihoods’
(ibid.). However, what does it mean to be socially reproducing?
And what
does impaired social reproduction look like?
Bringing the ‘Social’ Back in Reproduction
At the crux of the feminist ontology of land is the concept of
‘social re-
production’, which has been used widely by feminist scholars
across the
disciplines. Laslett and Brenner (1989: 382–3) refer to social
reproduction
as the ‘activities and attitudes, behaviours and emotions,
responsibilities and
relationships directly involved in the maintenance of life on a
daily basis,
and intergenerationally’. Katz (2001: 711) defines it as the
‘fleshy, messy
and the indeterminate stuff of everyday life’, and Picchio (1992:
98) sug-
gests that social reproduction is something that allows ‘people
to feel like
human beings in a system that treats them like commodities’. In
this article,
I consciously use the concept of social reproduction to
distinguish it from,
and to rescue the humanism that is lost in, the orthodox Marxist
notion of
‘reproduction’.
Social reproduction occurs at multiple levels (e.g. household,
market,
state) and can be associated with various social formations.

However, for
the purpose of this article, I focus on the level of the household
in agrarian
societies undergoing capitalist transformation. I define social
reproduction
as an assemblage of diverse labour processes — both paid and
unpaid, ma-
terial and symbolic, individual and communal — which are
necessary for
the sustenance and resilience of human life. What is unique
about agrarian
households is that their labour processes (i.e. the transformation
of their
labour power into labour) occur on, with and through the land.
For example,
rural Tanzanians use their land for more than just cultivating
crops. They
depend daily on forests and other tree resources (for gathering
fuelwood,
timber and medicinal plants); grasses (for thatching and
weaving); meadows
and pastures (for grazing livestock); and rivers, ponds and dams
(for fetch-
ing water, catching fish and collecting clay and sand for making
cooking
utensils). In other words, there is a strong unity between what
are often
separated as ‘productive’ and ‘reproductive’ activities, or
‘public’ and ‘pri-
vate’ spheres, in agrarian societies.

What is important to note here is that, more often than not, it is
women
and girls who perform the labour processes constitutive of rural
social repro-
duction. The repeated performance of gendered labour processes
on a daily
and intergenerational basis has the effect of reifying the
dominant identities
of women as mothers, housewives, caregivers and agricultural
labourers. In
Tanzania, such ideological construction of womanhood has
stemmed from
the historical legacy of slavery and servitude, as well as the
patriarchal
norms that are produced and reproduced most intimately within
households
(see Bryceson, 1995). Nevertheless, agrarian households are
hardly natural,
isomorphic or altruistic units. Rather, they are a ‘battleground
over patri-
archy’ (Friedmann, 1986: 192), in which daughters, sons, wives
and junior
kin do not automatically acquiesce in the authority of the male
‘head’ of
the household, but constantly bargain, negotiate, resist and/or
adapt to un-
equal relations of power (Carney and Watts, 1990; Guyer and
Peters, 1987;
Schroeder, 1999).
The definition of social reproduction provided above is
intentionally
broader than the approach taken by some contemporary feminist
politi-
cal economists, who pit the ‘unpaid care economy’ against the
‘commodity

economy’, and attempt to calculate its monetary value within
national in-
come statistics (see Folbre, 2006; Razavi, 2007). While such
distinctions
help politicize the ‘invisibility’ of gendered unpaid care work,
they still
operate within the public–private dualism that has characterized
both main-
stream and Marxist analyses of capitalism. My aim is to move
beyond these
rigid boundaries and to demonstrate that production and
reproduction are
in fact mutually constituted, and nested within a broader field
of social
reproduction.
To recapitulate, social reproduction is analytically important as
it lends
the following two key insights for engendering the new
enclosures. First,
it allows us to see the multiple uses and values of land and
labour, and
how combining the two ensures the sustenance and resilience of
life for
agrarian households. Second, it allows us to examine gender as
a key signifier
of power and a constitutive element in shaping people’s
relationships to
and experiences on the land. Hence, enclosures of rural
landscapes will
likely result in the fragmentation of the meanings of land and
labour, and
force rural women and men to renegotiate their livelihood
trajectories and
intra-household gender relations. These are not consequences
specific to

the new enclosures per se, but of agrarian capitalism more
broadly. For
example, Carney and Watts (1990) and Schroeder (1999) have
shown that
commercial agriculture and agroforestry schemes introduced in
the 1980s in
rural Gambia have resulted in the intensification of intra-
household conflicts
and the renegotiation of conjugal contracts, that is the terms on
which claims
on resources (e.g. land, labour, income) are made between
husbands and
wives. Such gendered experiences can be reformulated as
‘struggles for
social reproduction’; while clearly being material processes,
struggles over
land and labour are at the same time ‘struggles over socially-
constructed
meanings, definitions, and identities’ (Hart, 1991: 95). In the
remainder of
the article, I extend the theoretical discussion thus far to the
case of the BEE
Sugar Project.
A CASE STUDY: THE BEE SUGAR PROJECT
Acquiring ‘Land for Equity’
The BEE Sugar Project is a PPP between the Tanzanian
government and
Agro EcoEnergy Tanzania, which is a subsidiary of the Swedish

company
EcoEnergy Africa AB.4 The project site is located in Bagamoyo
District in
the Coast Region of Tanzania, approximately 80 km northwest
of Dar es
Salaam, about 8 km inland from the Indian Ocean, directly
south of Saadani
National Park, and situated within the Wami/Ruvu River Basin,
one of nine
river basins draining mainland Tanzania. This vast project,
requiring over
half a billion US dollars in total investment cost, is to be
financed primarily
by the African Development Bank (AfDB).5 While a
Memorandum of Un-
derstanding (MoU) was signed between EcoEnergy and the
(then) Ministry
of Planning, Economy and Empowerment in June 2006 to
produce ethanol
for export, its current rationale is to produce sugar, electricity
and ethanol for
the Tanzanian domestic market, thereby contributing to national
economic
development (AfDB, 2012).
In May 2013, EcoEnergy received a certificate of title to a large
portion
of an ‘abandoned’ state cattle ranch, known as Razaba (Ranchi
ya Zanzibar
Bagamoyo), which operated between the late 1970s and early
1990s. As
per the ‘land for equity’ arrangement, the Tanzanian
government granted
EcoEnergy the right to occupy 20,373.56 hectares of general
land (a category
of public land), free of encumbrance for 99 years, in exchange

for 25 per
4. Agro EcoEnergy Tanzania is owned 93.5 per cent by
EcoEnergy Africa AB; 5 per cent by
the Tanzanian Petroleum Development Company, a state-owned
parastatal; and 1.5 per cent
by Community Finance Corporation, a private Tanzanian
company, for which no public
information is obtainable. EcoEnergy Africa AB is owned by
EcoDevelopment in Europe
AB, which is a minority owner of Svensk Etanolkemi AB
(SEKAB), one of the largest
producers of ethanol derivatives in Europe (SEKAB, n.d.). Until
2009, Agro EcoEnergy
Tanzania operated under the name of SEKAB Bioenergy
Tanzania. See Havnevik et al.
(2011) for the evolution of SEKAB’s operations in Tanzania
since 2005.
5. The Swedish International Development Agency (Sida) had
guaranteed a bridge loan worth
SEK 120 million (US$ 14 million) to EcoEnergy in February
2014, but withdrew its support
at the end of April 2015 (Interview with Sida official, 26
October 2015). The planned out-
grower scheme associated with the BEE Sugar Project is to be
funded by the AfDB and the
International Fund for Agricultural Development.
cent equity ownership in the investment.6 Specifically, it was
agreed that
the Tanzanian government would receive a 10 per cent non-

dilutable equity
share at the time of financial close with the AfDB, and an
additional 15
per cent after 18 years of project operation (Agro EcoEnergy
Tanzania,
2012a).7 Despite the official transfer of the land title in 2013,
years of
inactivity on the ground since the signing of the MoU have
meant that the
land has become an epicentre of illicit property transactions and
burgeoning
informal settlements. In November 2011, the District
Commissioner’s Office
resorted to erecting a notice board at the entrance of the project
site that read:
‘Warning! Do not agree to buy land/farm in this area. This area,
which used
to be Razaba . . . is public land, and the government is in the
final stages
of transferring the land to the investor, EcoEnergy. Do not be
deceived’. In
early 2014, additional notice boards were erected to show the
boundaries of
the project area, and site-closure workers and militia police
were deployed
to close off the area.
As of this article’s publication, however, there is little project
implemen-
tation on the ground. No bulk infrastructure or on-farm
development is under
way, such as the construction of haulage roads, bridges, power
lines, wa-
ter storage, processing plant and the installation of irrigation
systems. The
project’s partners attribute this impasse to the bureaucratic and

political ob-
stacles associated with fulfilling the loan conditions set out by
the AfDB.
Some of the major conditions include: a) the resolution of
various land dis-
putes within the project site; b) the enactment of regulatory
reforms to protect
the domestic sugar industry; and c) the provision of various tax
incentives for
EcoEnergy.8 I will examine the first issue in the following
section, although
not in an exhaustive manner due to reasons of space.9 While the
other two
conditions also merit detailed analysis, such analysis falls
beyond the scope
of this article. What the text aims to do instead is to show that
there is a more
fundamental and theoretical reason for the delay. I argue that
the project
is at a standstill because the Tanzanian government and
EcoEnergy have
not been able to resolve the issue of how to compensate and
remove the
people who are currently occupying and deriving their
livelihoods from the
land.
6. All land in Tanzania is ‘public land vested in the President as
trustee on behalf of all
citizens’ (URT, 1997: 9). Public land is divided into village
land reserved land and general
land (URT, 1999a: section 4).
7. The government’s equity shares are non-dilutable, meaning
that its ownership percentage
will not be reduced even if/when other shareholders make

additional capital investment in
the project.
8. Interview with two Ministry of Agriculture officials, 8
October 2015 and 16 October 2015;
Interview with an EcoEnergy executive, 30 October 2015.
9. For instance, this article unfortunately omits the boundary
dispute between EcoEnergy,
Saadani National Park and the surrounding villages.
Competing Land Claims
There are five major settlements whose residents are facing
involuntary
resettlement induced by the BEE Sugar Project: Bozi, Gama,
Makaani,
Kaloleni Biga and Gobole. In addition to these farming
communities, there
are other populations, such as pastoralists, charcoal producers,
seasonal
fishermen and food traders, who have set up semi-permanent
residence
throughout the project site over the past two decades. The exact
population
size of the project area is difficult to determine due to the large
numbers of
transient groups of people and the lack of census data at sub-
village levels.
Triangulating from available sources, about 1,400 people were
estimated to
be living and working on the land as of 2014.10 The local

populations are
ethnically diverse, representing a wide range of tribes, such as
Zaramo, Doe,
Kwere and Zigua — the original peoples of the Swahili coast —
as well as
Nyamwezi, Gogo, Sukuma, Nyakyusa, Luguru, Hehe, Bondei,
Dengereko,
Kaguru, Fipa, Ha, Nyiramba, Barabaig, among others. It must
be noted
that the Coast Region has historically been characterized by
high levels of
migration from the interior; Bagamoyo was once the centre and
terminus for
the East African ivory and slave trade in the early 19th century.
In terms of livelihoods, farming communities within the BEE
project site
intercrop cereals, tubers and legumes, such as maize, paddy
rice, cassava,
potatoes, cowpea and pigeon pea. Many households also grow
perennial
fruit trees and cash crops, such as banana, mango, coconut,
papaya, cashew,
watermelon and sesame. These crops provide important sources
of income
for meeting basic needs, such as foodstuffs, household goods,
school fees
and health services, as well as for meeting emergent needs.
Back gardens
are considered to be autonomous spaces for women, where they
grow veg-
etables, such as tomatoes, okra, onions, green peppers, African
eggplant,
amaranth, pumpkin/pumpkin leaves and sweet potato leaves.
Women use
these vegetables and other ingredients to prepare side dishes

(mboga) to
serve with staple grains or to sell at local markets. Few
households cultivate
sugarcane; for those who do, it is mostly done on a small scale
for domestic
consumption or for occasional sales.
While systems of land tenure vary according to ethnicity,
lineage, religion,
as well as land policies at the village level, gender inequality in
land inheri-
tance remains a common obstacle for women in rural
Bagamoyo. A woman’s
right to land is often determined by her marital status—even in
those few
coastal societies that have historically been matrilineal and
matrilocal. When
a woman marries a man, or when she is ‘wedded to’ (kuolewa in
Kiswahili)
a man, she usually receives usufructuary rights to her husband’s
land. Un-
married daughters, divorcees and widows are further
disadvantaged from
10. Agro EcoEnergy Tanzania (2012b) and interview with a
district land valuer, 31 July 2014.
Fieldwork conducted in 2015, however, showed that the actual
number may be close to
3,000.
inheritance, according to both customary practices and Islamic
law (Ezer,

2006; Tsikata, 2003). For nomadic pastoralists, the concept of
individual
ownership of land is irrelevant, as pasture, grazing land and
water dams are
communal property. For the Barabaig, an ethnic minority in
Tanzania, but
the dominant pastoralist group within the BEE project site, the
experience of
enclosures and evictions is not new. They had already been
displaced from
their homelands, the Hanang Plains of Northern Tanzania, in the
1970s due
to a large-scale wheat mechanization project (see Tenga and
Kakoti, 1993).
Since then, they have been migrating eastwards in search of
grazing land for
their large herds of livestock.
As stated, the land acquired by EcoEnergy was a former cattle
ranch, Raz-
aba, established during the state socialist era. When it closed
permanently in
1994, its former workers and their families were permitted to
live on the land
until the farm would be repurposed for other activities.11 The
workers settled
in an area now known as Bozi, situated at the southern end of
the BEE project
site. All government officials whom I interviewed at both
district and minis-
terial levels referred to Bozi people as ‘invaders’
(wanaovamia/wavamizi),
squatting on government land. Most, if not all, of Bozi residents
are aware
of the fact that they are living and working on land that is not
legally theirs,

and recognize the precarious nature of their land rights.
However, they stake
their claims to the land not by the virtue of statutory ownership
of land, but
by the years of labour they have expended, customarily, to
clear, occupy and
use the land to socially reproduce their lives and livelihoods. As
an elderly
man, who formerly worked as a Razaba watchman, recollects:
‘The former
workers of the ranch started a life here in Bozi. It was a fertile
place. I cleared
three acres to grow maize, paddy rice, cassava, mango, orange
and cashew
with my wife. But now we are forbidden from growing
permanent crops.
We were told that if we plant them, it’s like we are wasting our
energy’.12
I will later return to this issue of land use restrictions when I
discuss the
process of compensation valuation.
Stretching across the northeastern part of the BEE project site,
immediately
past the two remnant dams from the Razaba era, there are two
settlements
known as Gama and Makaani. While Gama is officially
recognized as an
area within the sub-village of Kitame, which lies northeast of
the project
site, Makaani is not registered as a legitimate settlement in any
of the public
documents I have surveyed. While the official position of the
government
is that the people of Makaani are invaders just like the people of

Bozi,
some of its residents insist otherwise. Both claims have some
merit, but
are clearly contradictory. When I first visited the project area in
August
2013 and returned in July 2014 and November 2015, I was
astonished by
the proliferation of people, houses and businesses (e.g. kiosks,
fruit stands,
butcher shops, hair salons), none of which had existed before.
Some of the
11. Interview with former Razaba farm manager, 24 November
2015.
12. Interview, 28 July 2014.
‘new’ Makaani residents I interviewed had decided to settle in
this area
despite being aware of the planned BEE project, due to the
hardship of eking
out a living in urban areas. While some are ardently claiming
the land as theirs
through legal action, others are more passive, with a greater
willingness to
migrate elsewhere if and when the project becomes operational.
To elaborate on the former, three male elders from Makaani,
allegedly
representing 537 others from the area, filed a court case against
the
government and EcoEnergy in August 2012 to claim their
historical rights

to the land. Two of the plaintiffs, whom I interviewed,
vehemently asserted
that: a) Makaani people are not invaders or trespassers of
government land;
b) Gama and Makaani are considered one community, ‘Gama-
Makaani’,
because many Gama residents have shifted to Makaani over the
years due to
recurrent floods; and c) the formal border of Razaba never
exceeded beyond
the two dams that marked the southern boundary of ‘Gama-
Makaani’.13
According to the former Razaba manager, Wami River was
officially the
northern boundary of the ranch. Yet, since the ranch failed to
utilize fully
the northern portion of the land, farmers were allowed to carry
on living
there as usual.14
The villagers are divided. While the Makaani elders have some
supporters
within their community, outside Makaani — even in Gama — it
is rumoured
that the elders are fabricating historical evidence to support
their lawsuit.
Some people believe that the majority of the 537 people who
backed the
court case are in fact urban elites who illegally bought land in
the project area
from the Makaani elders. As for EcoEnergy, the company
believes that the
Makaani elders were financially supported by domestic sugar
importers, who
stand to lose from the development of the national sugar

industry.15 Whatever
the truth may be, the Tanzanian High Court ruled in mid-
November 2015 that
the Razaba land, which was transferred to EcoEnergy, was
inarguably gen-
eral land, and that ‘Gama-Makaani’ residents did not have any
claims to it.
Finally, at the northern border of the project site along the south
bank
of the Wami River, there are two sub-villages: Kaloleni Biga
and Gobole.
Both are part of Matipwili village, whose land area — as
conceived by the
villagers — overlaps with and stretches further north of the
BEE project site.
According to the village chairman, the southern border of
Matipwili well
extended into the current Gama area during the ujamaa era.16
Whilst most of
the village activities (e.g. politics, schools, social services) take
place north
of the river, the southern sub-villages are considered to be the
historical
breadbasket of the village, due to the high fertility of the
floodplain soil.
Just like the elders of Makaani, Matipwili elders argue that
Razaba never
utilized the land past the two dams. As one male elder who
lived through
13. Interviews, 11 August 2014 and 28 November 2015.
14. Interview, 24 November 2015.
15. Interview with an EcoEnergy executive, 30 October 2015.
16. Interview, 15 August 2014.

the opening and the closure of the ranch laments: ‘It is not true
that the
government only gave Razaba land to EcoEnergy. They also
decided to give
away our [village] land without telling us!’.17 The grievance of
Matipwili
villagers further intensified in 2014, when the District Land
Office issued a
new village map, which had reassigned village boundaries and
essentially
erased Kaloleni Biga and Gobole from existence.
An official at the Ministry of Lands, with whom I spoke about
this matter,
stated: ‘The government has fixed the problem of overlapping
land claims.
The land was granted to EcoEnergy, so the village borders
needed to be
redrawn. You know all land in Tanzania is public land, so there
is nothing
wrong with the government doing its job’.18 This statement
reflects not only
the dominant ontology of viewing land as an arena of state
activity and a
factor of production, but also the ease and authority with which
the state
can wield cartographic power over its citizens. More
poignantly, however, it
epitomizes one of the key paradoxes of Tanzanian land laws.
While so-called
unoccupied and unused village land is automatically considered
general land

(URT, 1999a), the reverse does not hold true. That is, if general
land has been
left unattended by the state, villagers have no rights over it,
even if they have
made substantial investments on the land — both material and
symbolic —
for their social reproduction over multiple generations. One
official, whom
I interviewed in the Prime Minister’s Office, highlighted this
dilemma:
Land is politics. In Tanzania, there is hardly any square metre
of land that does not have a
claim over it. Only 10 per cent of all land in Tanzania has been
surveyed, mapped and titled.
You may have heard the common statistics that 2 per cent of
land in Tanzania is general
land, 28 per cent is reserved land and 70 per cent is village
land. But this is data from 20 to
30 years ago! These are the statistics used in our 1995 Land
Policy! Because we have not
surveyed and updated these data, you will easily find that within
a village, there is general
land and/or even reserved land! . . . We do not have updated
information about what general
land is today compared to what it was decades ago. This is
especially the case for those state
farms and ranches like Razaba that closed in the 1990s. And
because general land forever
remains general land, villagers who have customarily occupied
and used the empty land for
years have no legal rights over it.19
The local people I interviewed were aware that all land in the
country was
ultimately owned by the state, and that the President had the

prerogative
power to expropriate the land on which they lived for
investments of ‘pub-
lic interest’ (URT, 1999b: Part III, section 4). Yet, they resisted
the purely
statist and productivist notion of land by embodying a much
larger vision of
land as their site and source of social reproduction. As I will
further demon-
strate below, this disjuncture between different meanings of
land becomes
particularly salient during the interstitial stage of imminent
involuntary re-
settlement.
18. Interview, 20 August 2014.
19. Interview, 29 October 2015.
Unsettling Involuntary Resettlement
As a condition attached to loans from international financial
institutions
(IFIs), BEE Sugar Project is required to comply with what is
known as
‘international best practice’ on involuntary resettlement, in
addition to com-
plying with Tanzanian national laws. However, because the land
was granted
‘free of encumbrance’ to EcoEnergy according to the ‘land for
equity’ ar-
rangement, it was agreed that the Tanzanian government would

bear the
resettlement costs in accordance with its national laws. It was
also agreed
that where additional compensation funds are required to meet
the interna-
tional standards, EcoEnergy would provide the top-ups (Agro
EcoEnergy
Tanzania, 2012b).
The international guidelines here refer to the World Bank
Operational
Policies/Bank Procedures 4.12 (2001), the International Finance
Corpora-
tion (IFC) Performance Standard 5 (IFC, 2012a, 2012b) and the
AfDB
Involuntary Resettlement Policy (2003). These so-called ‘social
safeguards
policies’ are intended to help planners of development projects
to: a) avoid or
minimize involuntary resettlement wherever possible; b) when
unavoidable,
conceive and execute resettlement as ‘sustainable development
programs’
(World Bank, 2001: 1); and c) consult with and assist displaced
persons
to improve, or at least to restore, their livelihoods and living
standards. In
Tanzania, there are no direct laws or policies on involuntary
resettlement,
apart from legal requirements for ensuring compensation for
compulsory
land acquisitions, as stipulated in the National Constitution, the
Land Ac-
quisition Act of 1967, the National Land Policy of 1995, the
Land Act and
the Village Land Act of 1999 and their respective Regulations

of 2001 and
2002.
There are some major discrepancies between what is required by
Tanzanian law versus what is recommended as international best
practice.
First, while the latter recommends that compensation be
provided for all
populations requiring resettlement regardless of whether or not
they have
legal rights to the land they are occupying, the former stipulates
otherwise.
Hence, because it is international best practice to provide
resettlement assis-
tance to even those considered ‘invaders’ (i.e. people of Bozi
and Makaani),
the Tanzanian state has reluctantly agreed to provide what the
former Bag-
amoyo District Commissioner called ‘compensation of
compassion’ (The
Citizen, 2014). Second, while Tanzanian law requires a one-off
payment of
compensation (usually cash, unless the government decides
otherwise), it is
considered international best practice to provide people with the
option to
choose between cash and in-kind compensation.
Notwithstanding the dif-
ferences, I argue that there are two shared assumptions, both of
which have
far-reaching consequences for rural social reproduction.
First, involuntary resettlement is assumed to be a problem best
solved
through the knowledge of technical ‘experts’. Tanzanian law
stipulates that

the assessment of all compensation for displacement induced by
compulsory
land acquisitions ‘shall be prepared by qualified valuer . . . and
verified
by the Chief Valuer of the Government or his [sic]
representative’ (URT,
2001: sections 11–12). The IFIs similarly recommend that the
project pro-
ponents use ‘a panel of independent, reputed resettlement
experts . . . [to]
help capture international best practice’ (World Bank, 2004:
325). The IFIs
further conceptualize involuntary resettlement as a technical
‘project within
a project’ (Cernea, 2008) such that the solution to the problem
created by
development (i.e. forced displacement) is more development!
Consider the
following quote from the World Bank (2004: xvii):
‘Implementing resettle-
ment as a development program not only helps the people who
are adversely
affected but also promotes easier, less-troubled implementation
of develop-
ment projects’. In order for this logic to make sense, however,
development
must be cast as a transparent, ethical and power-neutral object,
or what
Ferguson (1990) calls an ‘anti-politics machine’. When
depoliticized as
such, displacement and dispossession become problems to be

fixed by tech-
nical ‘experts’, and no longer intrinsic and abiding features of
capitalism.
Second, both the Tanzanian law and international guidelines
assume that
the costs of displacement and dispossession can be measured
and compen-
sated for in cash or in kind. Tanzanian law states that
replacement land for
displaced populations should be of ‘comparable quality, extent
and produc-
tive potential to the land lost’ (URT, 2001: section 25). The
IFIs similarly
recommend that it should be of ‘equal productive value’ (Agro
EcoEnergy
Tanzania, 2012b: 39). For crops, it is considered international
best practice
to value them according to their ‘earning capacity’ (ibid.:147);
the Tan-
zanian Ministry of Lands, in cooperation with the Ministry of
Agriculture,
also publishes an annual ‘Crop Compensation Schedule’ that
lists the market
value for each crop that is considered compensable.20
In the context of the BEE Sugar Project, only cash crops, such
as per-
manent fruit trees (e.g. mango, cashew, coconut), were
considered worthy
of compensation, since it was assumed that subsistence food
crops had no
exchange value and that they would be harvested, consumed or
stored before
relocation. It was further assumed that there would be ‘a
seamless transi-

tion for the next planting season on the replacement land’ (Agro
EcoEnergy
Tanzania, 2012b: 147).
However, decades of research on development-induced
displacement and
resettlement tell us that there is hardly ever a ‘seamless’
transition after
forced migration (Colson, 1971; Scutter, 2005). This is because
people often
are compensated with smaller plots of land with poorer quality
soil compared
to the ones they have been dispossessed from, and because it
takes time for
people to experiment with and get accustomed to farming on
new land. More
importantly, it is because people lose access to common
resources, which
are indispensable, particularly for women, for ensuring food
security and
20. Interview with a district land valuer, 31 July 2014.
overall well-being of their families and communities — that is,
for ensuring
the continuity of social reproduction.
Indeed, my in-depth interviews with people living in the BEE
project
site revealed a wide variety of common property resources,
particularly
indigenous tree species, on which they depend for social

reproduction (see
Table 1). In addition to their materiality as sources of food,
fuel, fibre,
medicine and building material, some of these resources carry
symbolic and
gendered meanings. For instance, mkole, a tree that bears small
edible fruits
and has pliant branches, symbolizes female fertility and
matriliny for the
Zaramo — one of the original peoples of the Swahili coast (see
Swantz,
1995). In Zaramo mythology, female elephants are believed to
hide in the
mkole woods during menstruation and gestation, by enclosing
the area with
the branches tied together. This timing coincides with the
season when the
mkole fruits reach maturity and change colours from white to
green to red
to black. This symbolism of mkole is still present in the
initiation rites of
pubertal girls to womanhood.
These indigenous resources are not commodities with an
exchange value,
and hence, are not compensable under Tanzanian law. Yet, they
embody
immeasurable cultural values and knowledges that are passed on
intergener-
ationally as an intrinsic part of rural social reproduction. While
the IFC states
that the loss of common property resources ‘has been identified
as one of the
primary impoverishment risks associated with involuntary
resettlement and
requires careful mitigation’ (2012a: 7), how and in what ways

they should
be protected and restored is ultimately up to the subjective
consideration of
government and third-party resettlement ‘experts’. According to
Lassailly-
Jacob (1996), the reason why most involuntary resettlement
operations have
failed in Africa is precisely because the so-called resettlement
‘experts’ and
local populations have different visions about what land is and
how it is
valued. Whilst the former are fixated on ‘productivity and
profitability’, the
latter are more concerned about ‘a wide range of social, cultural
and reli-
gious elements, as well as the productive factor’ (ibid.: 196).
The problem
is not so much that there are differences in perspectives, but
that certain
visions become valorized while others are devalued and
delegitimized. As
one widow from Gobole poignantly remarks:
You know, there is a difference between the way you see things
and the way I see things.
Poor people like me — we have not been educated, but it
doesn’t mean that we don’t know
what is valuable to us on our land. Yet, to those educated
people, some things we have on
our land do not seem to have value. Mangos, cashews and
bananas — we plant them nearby;
they are easily seen on our farms and in markets in town. But
there are trees in the bush and
in the wild, which outsiders cannot see, but we know where they
are and still depend on them
for our lives . . . We have been ignored. Our culture has been

erased.21
Ta
bl
e
1
.
In
d
ig
en
o
u
s
T
re
e
S
p
ec
ie
s
F

o
u
n
d
in
th
e
B
E
E
P
ro
je
ct
S
it
e
L
oc
al
N
am
e
B
ot

an
ic
al
N
am
e
U
se
s
K
ik
u
la
g
em
b
e
/
M
k
u
la
je
m

b
e
D
ic
h
ro
st
a
ch
ys
ci
n
er
ea
F
u
el
w
o
o
d
,
ch
ar
co

al
,
m
ed
ic
in
e
(d
y
se
n
te
ry
,
to
o
th
ac
h
e,
el
ep
h
an
ti

as
is
,
g
o
n
o
rr
h
o
ea
,
sn
ak
eb
it
e)
,
fi
b
re
,
b
u
il
d

in
g
m
at
er
ia
l
M
ch
aa
k
a
/
M
ch
al
ak
a
S
p
ir
o
st
a
ch

ys
a
fr
ic
a
n
a
F
u
el
w
o
o
d
,
b
u
il
d
in
g
m
at
er
ia
l

M
ch
ej
i
/
M
ch
ej
u
M
a
n
il
ka
ra
su
lc
a
ta
E
d
ib
le
fr
u

it
,
m
ed
ic
in
e
(s
n
ak
eb
it
e,
m
ea
sl
es
),
b
u
il
d
in
g
m

at
er
ia
l
M
k
o
k
o
D
io
sp
yr
o
s
m
es
p
il
if
o
rm
is
F
u

el
w
o
o
d
,
ch
ar
co
al
,
b
u
il
d
in
g
m
at
er
ia
l,
m
ed
ic
in

e
(s
to
m
ac
h
ac
h
e)
M
k
o
le
G
re
w
ia
b
ic
o
lo
r
E
d
ib

le
fr
u
it
,
m
ed
ic
in
e
(a
n
ae
m
ia
,
sn
ak
eb
it
e,
d
ia
rr

h
o
ea
,
g
o
n
o
rr
h
o
ea
,
sy
p
h
il
is
,
in
fe
rt
il
it
y
fo
r

w
o
m
en
),
b
u
il
d
in
g
m
at
er
ia
l,
fu
el
w
o
o
d
M
k
u
n

ju
/
M
k
u
y
u
F
ic
u
s
sy
co
m
o
ru
s
F
u
el
w
o
o
d
,
fo

d
d
er
,
b
u
il
d
in
g
m
at
er
ia
l,
ed
ib
le
fr
u
it
,
m
ed
ic

in
e
(d
ia
rr
h
o
ea
,
so
re
th
ro
at
,
ch
es
t
p
ai
n
)
M
k
w

am
b
a
F
lu
eg
g
ea
vi
ro
sa
F
u
el
w
o
o
d
,
ed
ib
le
fr
u
it
,

m
ed
ic
in
e
(m
al
ar
ia
,
st
o
m
ac
h
ac
h
e,
sy
p
h
il
is
,
g

o
n
o
rr
h
o
ea
)
M
k
w
in
g
w
in
a
S
o
ri
n
d
ei
a
m
a
d
ag

a
sc
a
ri
en
si
s
E
d
ib
le
fr
u
it
,
m
ed
ic
in
e
(m
al
ar
ia

,
tu
b
er
cu
lo
si
s,
m
en
st
ru
al
p
ro
b
le
m
s)
M
le
g
ea
/

M
u
n
g
u
n
g
u
K
ig
el
ia
a
fr
ic
a
n
a
E
d
ib
le
fr
u
it
s,
m

ed
ic
in
e
(r
h
eu
m
at
is
m
,
m
al
ar
ia
,
in
fe
rt
il
it
y
,

d
y
se
n
te
ry
,
ep
il
ep
sy
)
M
u
an
g
aa
/
M
w
an
g
aa
Te
rm

in
a
li
a
sp
in
o
sa
F
u
el
w
o
o
d
,
m
ed
ic
in
e
(r
es
p
ir
at

o
ry
il
ln
es
se
s)
,
b
u
il
d
in
g
m
at
er
ia
l
M
za
m
b
ar
au

S
yz
yg
iu
m
g
u
in
ee
n
se
E
d
ib
le
fr
u
it
,
m
ed
ic
in
e
(s
to

m
ac
h
ac
h
e,
d
y
se
n
te
ry
),
fo
d
d
er
,
fu
el
w
o
o
d
,

b
u
il
d
in
g
m
at
er
ia
l
M
zi
g
u
n
g
a
A
ca
ci
a
za
n
zi
b

a
ri
ca
F
u
el
w
o
o
d
,
m
ed
ic
in
e
(a
b
d
o
m
in
al
p
ai
n

s
an
d
d
is
o
rd
er
s)
S
o
u
rc
e:
A
u
th
o
r’
s
fi
el
d
w
o

rk
;
H
in
es
an
d
E
ck
m
an
(1
9
9
3
);
R
u
ff
o
et
al
.
(2
0
0

2
)
Compensation Valuation
In 2011, EcoEnergy hired an independent consultancy firm to
draft the Reset-
tlement Action Plan (RAP) in compliance with the international
best practice.
In preparation for the RAP, a census, also known as the People
and Property
Count (PPC), was conducted from October to November 2011 to
deter-
mine the total number of people that are eligible for
compensation, and to
value their land-based assets.22 Because the Tanzanian
government assumed
responsibility for providing resettlement costs, the PPC was
conducted pri-
marily by government land valuers and surveyors, with the
employees of
the consultancy firm participating as observers (Agro
EcoEnergy Tanzania,
2012b). Eligibility for compensation was based on the ‘cut-off’
date, the
first day of the PPC, after which no new residents would be
allowed and
no additional permanent improvements on the land would be
compensated
(ibid.: 65). That is, if people decided to plant new mango trees,
or build new
houses after the cut-off date, they would not be provided with

additional
compensation beyond what had already been valued.
According to Tanzanian land laws and regulations, each person
eligible
for compensation shall be given an official document, called
‘Land Form
69a’. This form specifies that the recipient has the right to have
his or her
assets valued, and to claim compensation in accordance with the
national
land laws. There is another document, called ‘Valuation Form
1’, which is
used to record key information, such as the date and location of
the census,
a sketch map and measurement of houses and other built
structures, and
the types, numbers and maturity rates of different crops. While
government
authorities are recommended to share copies of these forms
upon completion
of the valuation process, not all households I interviewed
possessed them.
Even if they had the forms, they were unclear of what purpose
they served.
In early 2014, another PPC was conducted to take account of the
households
that were not included in the first survey. This second PPC,
however, was also
fraught with inconsistencies. For example, government
authorities counted
and gave forms to the people who were deemed ineligible for
compensation,
such as those who opportunistically moved into the project site
after the
‘cut-off’ date, while bypassing the eligible ones.

Regardless of these irregularities, there was one consistency:
the forms
only included the names of male heads of the households
(unless the house-
holds were female-headed), because it was assumed that
husbands and fa-
thers were the de facto owners of the land, and that they were
the ones that
would collect compensation payments on behalf of their
families. When
wives were interviewed separately from their husbands, they
noted that it
was ‘not unusual’ (kama kawaida in Kiswahili) for the PPC
teams to have
22. In most cases, only unexhausted improvements were valued,
such as permanent dwellings
and perennial crops; people’s land itself was not valued, since it
was assumed that everyone
was squatting on government land.
interacted mainly with men. They noted this was because their
husbands,
and men in general, were the ‘clever ones’ (wajanja) with more
‘authority
and ability’ (nguvu na uwezo) than/over women. Even though
they saw this
as common practice, they cautiously admitted, upon further
probing, that
they were apprehensive about what was happening. They knew
that their

husbands would ultimately be the ones collecting and
controlling the cash
compensation, and they feared that it would be misappropriated.
Nearly all
women interviewed speculated that their husbands would use
the money
and/or run away with it to pay bridewealth for younger and
more beauti-
ful women, while leaving them and their children destitute. In
particular,
women of the Barabaig tribe (for whom polygyny is actively
encouraged)
noted that some men have already taken on more wives or
mistresses, using
the prospect of cash compensation as credit. They talked about
the emotional
stress they felt when forced to accept new wives into the
household, and the
fact that they cannot but keep quiet about their grievances for
the fear of
being beaten by their husbands.
Some women believed that perhaps their husbands were
strategically
trying to increase their household size with the hopes of getting
a bigger
house as part of in-kind compensation. However, husbands were
not the
only ones who tried to take advantage of the prospective
compensation and
the vulnerable social position of women. For instance, some
widows were
threatened by their deceased husbands’ male relatives to take
cash rather
than in-kind compensation. They claimed that the land (and the
cash that

would eventually flow from it) belonged to the husband’s
family according
to their interpretation of customary and Islamic law. All in all,
what were
considered strategic moves by men were experienced as torment
for women.
Overall, the uncertainty surrounding involuntary resettlement
and com-
pensation has been a major stranglehold on the continuity of
social repro-
duction for many households. Living in limbo — waiting for
something,
anything, to happen — has been psychologically and
emotionally debilitat-
ing for people whose lives and livelihoods are dependent on the
land. Many
women and men referred to how they were tired of being treated
like chil-
dren (watoto), herd animals (wanyama), or imbeciles
(wapumbavu), who
were unable to take control of their lives. Consider the
following quotes,
which suggest the extent to which peoples’ ability to socially
reproduce
themselves has been impaired — even when, on the face of it,
nothing
seems to be happening with the project on the ground:
I would like to grow and sell permanent crops. The school in
Razaba closed. Now my
children and grandchildren are not going to school. I have to
send my children away so they
can receive education. But where will I get the money [without
income from permanent
crops]? Who will take care of my children? Who will help me?

We are troubled . . . We are
just living here without knowing what will come next.23
23. Interview with an elderly widow, Bozi, 28 July 2014.
We are being tricked. It is a mind game. We are told that
compensation will be paid in three
months. Then they come back just shy of the third month to tell
us that we will have to wait
another three months. If they tell us that compensation will be
delayed for a year, they know
that farmers will riot . . . Many people are giving up hope in
farming. I mean, which farmer
in his/her right mind would want to make an effort to plough
and sow cassava, which takes
anywhere from six months to a year to grow, when they are
being promised that they will be
resettled in three months’ time?24
CONCLUSION
The case of the BEE Sugar Project demonstrates how similar
large-scale
commercial farm deals or agricultural PPPs may take shape in
Tanzania
in the future. Given that such endeavours require the enclosure
of large
tracts of land, which are often occupied and used by
agriculturalists, pas-
toralists and other rural populations, the extent of forced
displacements are
bound to become more ubiquitous. Yet, the absence of national

policies
and guidelines on involuntary resettlement and the irregularities
(including
gender-bias) associated with its current practice, as
demonstrated by this
article, pose significant challenges to the continuity and
resilience of rural
social reproduction. Social reproduction, as a concept and as a
lived experi-
ence, highlights the significance of the multiple uses, values
and meanings
of land and labour for agrarian households. At the same time, it
highlights
the constitutive role of gender in shaping and defining peoples’
relationships
to and experiences on the land.
Through an examination of the BEE Sugar Project, this article
shows how
the new enclosures are bound up with and complicated by
competing land
claims, which are gendered in important ways. Specifically, the
text argues
that the process of involuntary resettlement, induced by the new
enclosures,
results in the fragmentati on of pre-existing modes of social
reproduction.
In Bagamoyo, this was made possible through the technical
‘expertise’ of
government authorities, who conducted the PPCs not only
according to
their subjective evaluations, but also based on capitalocentric
and androcen-
tric approaches to valuing land. At stake are the displacement of
cultural
practices, socio-ecological knowledges and historical memories,

which are
deeply rooted on the land, and which are often articulated
through gender.
Lastly, this article demonstrates how the uncertain nature of
imminent
displacement, as well as (false) expectations surrounding
compensation pay-
ments, are compelling rural women and men to renegotiate their
livelihood
strategies and intra-household gender relations. Those who live
within the
BEE project site across different communities find it extremely
difficult
to make long-term investments on the land, in the face of
various land
use restrictions and the lack of clear information about the
resettlement
24. Interview with a male farmer, Bozi, 28 July 2014.
process. However, the ways in which individual women and men
expe-
rience and respond to living in limbo are simultaneously
informed yet
constrained by patriarchal ideologies that operate most
intimately within
households. This calls for further studies that examine in depth
how differ-
ent groups of rural women and men make sense of and resist,
the agonizing
predicament of ‘not knowing’, particularly during the liminal

period between
land acquisition and project implementation — or between
development and
dispossession.
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Youjin Brigitte Chung ([email protected]) is a PhD candidate in
Devel-
opment Sociology at Cornell University, Ithaca, NY, USA. Her
dissertation
examines the contested gender and social dynamics of a large-
scale land
deal for agro-industrial development in Bagamoyo District,
Coast Region,
Tanzania.
Sheet1Factor LoadingsSystematic Factor DrawsIdiosyncratic
Factor Draw# of FactorsAsset Return XiUi (Xi transformed to
Uniform space)Horizon (years)PDDefault?Total
DefaultsPD1PD2PD3PD4PD5Relative
Importance3560%25%10%3%2%Rating12345Asset
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0.0974749634-
0.35317548060.87884723770.3178038470.466036459368%1.58
%038BB0.520.310.030.070.050.03976060480.4811818256-
0.0974749634-0.35317548060.8788472377-
0.18462749540.043667156452%6.52%039BBB0.440.150.190.01
0.030.03976060480.4811818256-0.0974749634-
0.35317548060.87884723770.57469469740.592759090372%1.5
8%040BB0.520.050.190.110.040.03976060480.4811818256-
0.0974749634-
0.35317548060.87884723771.07799222770.91402841282%6.52
%041BB0.730.210.200.020.070.03976060480.4811818256-
0.0974749634-0.35317548060.8788472377-
0.24703397320.011481223850%6.52%042BB0.510.240.260.140
.020.03976060480.4811818256-0.0974749634-
0.35317548060.87884723771.11726011440.940842052183%6.5
2%043B0.550.090.290.120.140.03976060480.4811818256-
0.0974749634-
0.35317548060.87884723771.49927798251.250726971689%16.

93%044B0.240.070.050.120.050.03976060480.4811818256-
0.0974749634-0.35317548060.8788472377-0.8249035519-
0.750174196923%16.93%045BB0.470.430.010.140.090.039760
60480.4811818256-0.0974749634-0.35317548060.8788472377-
0.4386369568-
0.071143920447%6.52%046BBB0.490.430.230.090.120.039760
60480.4811818256-0.0974749634-0.35317548060.8788472377-
1.1217741741-
0.514479549330%1.58%047B0.190.140.250.120.080.039760604
80.4811818256-0.0974749634-0.35317548060.8788472377-
0.0852495348-
0.001136414250%16.93%048B0.160.100.180.070.130.03976060
480.4811818256-0.0974749634-0.35317548060.8788472377-
0.3401027802-
0.200393548242%16.93%049B0.620.260.280.110.110.03976060
480.4811818256-0.0974749634-
0.35317548060.87884723770.87943463760.765001685678%16.
93%050BB0.200.000.050.140.120.03976060480.4811818256-
0.0974749634-0.35317548060.8788472377-0.7322781121-
0.644388941626%6.52%051BB0.720.380.030.030.050.0397606
0480.4811818256-0.0974749634-0.35317548060.8788472377-
1.9097224049-
0.863340800319%6.52%052BB0.160.340.290.010.030.0397606
0480.4811818256-0.0974749634-0.35317548060.8788472377-
0.2242575334-
0.034363772149%6.52%053A0.680.330.160.050.110.039760604
80.4811818256-0.0974749634-0.35317548060.8788472377-
0.9115316409-
0.326875567637%0.47%054BB0.770.470.160.070.080.0397606
0480.4811818256-0.0974749634-0.35317548060.8788472377-
1.0911037191-
0.133731617345%6.52%055AA0.720.090.200.070.030.0397606
0480.4811818256-0.0974749634-
0.35317548060.87884723771.13784108280.802117181879%0.3
1%056BBB0.150.040.060.010.080.03976060480.4811818256-
0.0974749634-0.35317548060.8788472377-1.0327246851-

0.930600713218%1.58%057BBB0.180.210.150.150.070.039760
60480.4811818256-0.0974749634-0.35317548060.8788472377-
1.0925437284-
0.915969511318%1.58%058B0.060.190.090.020.110.039760604
80.4811818256-0.0974749634-
0.35317548060.87884723771.65219114321.775142283296%16.
93%059BB0.300.010.300.130.050.03976060480.4811818256-
0.0974749634-0.35317548060.8788472377-2.2247076048-
2.00385037772%6.52%160BB0.590.400.180.110.060.03976060
480.4811818256-0.0974749634-
0.35317548060.87884723770.89105458430.801582012179%6.5
2%061BBB0.590.430.010.040.090.03976060480.4811818256-
0.0974749634-
0.35317548060.87884723771.4924809071.309567637590%1.58
%062BB0.460.010.010.030.130.03976060480.4811818256-
0.0974749634-0.35317548060.8788472377-
0.0621382930.068223991653%6.52%063BB0.010.020.060.070.
040.03976060480.4811818256-0.0974749634-
0.35317548060.87884723770.2824470160.294636513762%6.52
%064B0.370.350.000.130.020.03976060480.4811818256-
0.0974749634-0.35317548060.8788472377-
0.07546614080.086517195753%16.93%065BBB0.120.450.250.0
50.110.03976060480.4811818256-0.0974749634-
0.35317548060.87884723770.54258688310.73278138777%1.58
%066BB0.110.290.200.020.100.03976060480.4811818256-
0.0974749634-
0.35317548060.87884723771.15430168991.274187436390%6.5
2%067BB0.560.430.080.140.060.03976060480.4811818256-
0.0974749634-
0.35317548060.87884723770.32087510850.446736898567%6.5
2%068BB0.630.140.040.110.040.03976060480.4811818256-
0.0974749634-
0.35317548060.87884723772.43330092181.919451917997%6.5
2%069BBB0.030.080.080.120.120.03976060480.4811818256-
0.0974749634-
0.35317548060.87884723770.30337558670.386362459865%1.5

8%070BB0.020.190.130.140.070.03976060480.4811818256-
0.0974749634-0.35317548060.8788472377-1.2996100159-
1.158913850712%6.52%071BB0.630.280.220.170.110.0397606
0480.4811818256-0.0974749634-0.35317548060.8788472377-
0.9531143743-
0.452752185733%6.52%072BBB0.060.410.110.080.010.039760
60480.4811818256-0.0974749634-
0.35317548060.87884723771.06499235591.126313364787%1.5
8%073BB0.670.310.220.170.140.03976060480.4811818256-
0.0974749634-0.35317548060.8788472377-0.5343449323-
0.105599574746%6.52%074BBB0.150.080.090.140.080.039760
60480.4811818256-0.0974749634-0.35317548060.8788472377-
2.3223899556-
2.19051708451%1.58%175B0.720.090.060.020.080.0397606048
0.4811818256-0.0974749634-
0.35317548060.87884723770.84751774140.706590380276%16.
93%076BB0.510.280.070.020.140.03976060480.4811818256-
0.0974749634-0.35317548060.8788472377-0.6798664067-
0.279623656539%6.52%077BB0.360.010.090.020.060.0397606
0480.4811818256-0.0974749634-0.35317548060.8788472377-
1.1778080539-
1.033307302115%6.52%078A0.480.460.210.150.110.039760604
80.4811818256-0.0974749634-0.35317548060.8788472377-
0.5848184811-
0.14106083344%0.47%079B0.720.200.000.100.120.0397606048
0.4811818256-0.0974749634-
0.35317548060.87884723770.63601012070.604613478473%16.
93%080BB0.180.330.120.140.100.03976060480.4811818256-
0.0974749634-
0.35317548060.87884723770.47043171960.622396994373%6.5
2%081BB0.620.040.120.040.140.03976060480.4811818256-
0.0974749634-
0.35317548060.87884723770.21807151250.306122506762%6.5
2%082BBB0.740.130.260.010.130.03976060480.4811818256-
0.0974749634-
0.35317548060.87884723770.47401543550.454128728268%1.5

8%083BBB0.540.010.190.090.140.03976060480.4811818256-
0.0974749634-
0.35317548060.87884723770.20676228250.260802376160%1.5
8%084BB0.200.250.210.070.120.03976060480.4811818256-
0.0974749634-0.35317548060.8788472377-
0.000319190.183166465757%6.52%085BB0.020.100.000.110.1
30.03976060480.4811818256-0.0974749634-
0.35317548060.87884723770.42738189330.540854130671%6.5
2%086BBB0.480.260.160.070.130.03976060480.4811818256-
0.0974749634-0.35317548060.8788472377-2.0256583528-
1.42317033188%1.58%087BB0.690.190.030.120.070.03976060
480.4811818256-0.0974749634-
0.35317548060.87884723770.18741900190.261137955460%6.5
2%088B0.600.360.180.020.080.03976060480.4811818256-
0.0974749634-0.35317548060.8788472377-0.7167870073-
0.244025760140%16.93%089B0.440.130.070.170.060.03976060
480.4811818256-0.0974749634-
0.35317548060.87884723770.57159482740.567681716471%16.
93%090BB0.010.070.090.010.030.03976060480.4811818256-
0.0974749634-0.35317548060.8788472377-1.1947116897-
1.140496046613%6.52%091BBB0.690.290.210.010.040.039760
60480.4811818256-0.0974749634-
0.35317548060.87884723770.42753329010.450335920867%1.5
8%092B0.170.340.290.060.080.03976060480.4811818256-
0.0974749634-
0.35317548060.87884723771.00358613321.07355511286%16.9
3%093BB0.400.400.110.020.070.03976060480.4811818256-
0.0974749634-0.35317548060.8788472377-1.8889050219-
1.287354335110%6.52%094B0.010.070.070.090.020.039760604
80.4811818256-0.0974749634-
0.35317548060.87884723771.60095683791.60156848895%16.9
3%095BB0.120.290.170.090.130.03976060480.4811818256-
0.0974749634-0.35317548060.8788472377-1.6773697062-
1.33765769389%6.52%096A0.100.470.230.010.040.0397606048
0.4811818256-0.0974749634-0.35317548060.8788472377-
0.409909931-

0.107521086746%0.47%097B0.120.310.060.170.090.039760604
80.4811818256-0.0974749634-0.35317548060.8788472377-
0.13826567320.036332667451%16.93%098B0.170.140.210.040.
010.03976060480.4811818256-0.0974749634-
0.35317548060.8788472377-1.5853657141-
1.46834490257%16.93%199BB0.400.380.120.140.070.0397606
0480.4811818256-0.0974749634-0.35317548060.8788472377-
0.0008788330.197821569458%6.52%0100BBB0.520.210.310.01
0.130.03976060480.4811818256-0.0974749634-
0.35317548060.8788472377-0.3434610941-
0.056875591948%1.58%0101BBB0.570.100.130.140.010.03976
060480.4811818256-0.0974749634-
0.35317548060.8788472377-1.4780594297-
1.143042795413%1.58%0102B0.570.130.100.090.090.03976060
480.4811818256-0.0974749634-0.35317548060.8788472377-
0.769276654-
0.486669531331%16.93%0103BB0.380.050.010.110.010.03976
060480.4811818256-0.0974749634-
0.35317548060.87884723770.32605834040.308252353262%6.5
2%0104BBB0.150.470.120.130.080.03976060480.4811818256-
0.0974749634-0.35317548060.8788472377-2.6300739204-
1.97938745892%1.58%0105BBB0.140.120.290.060.100.039760
60480.4811818256-0.0974749634-
0.35317548060.87884723770.97418742491.011028961784%1.5
8%0106B0.300.080.300.010.090.03976060480.4811818256-
0.0974749634-
0.35317548060.87884723771.0057540620.993901950884%16.9
3%0107BB0.700.490.120.050.000.03976060480.4811818256-
0.0974749634-
0.35317548060.87884723770.25272943290.361278260564%6.5
2%0108B0.770.330.240.040.100.03976060480.4811818256-
0.0974749634-
0.35317548060.87884723771.84502867881.123129360687%16.
93%0109BB0.160.420.050.010.040.03976060480.4811818256-
0.0974749634-0.35317548060.8788472377-2.0927704087-
1.62217469925%6.52%1110B0.320.470.120.000.100.039760604

80.4811818256-0.0974749634-
0.35317548060.87884723770.6883290090.873022315181%16.9
3%0111B0.430.010.160.050.130.03976060480.4811818256-
0.0974749634-
0.35317548060.87884723771.22871650931.175225393288%16.
93%0112B0.020.330.030.130.010.03976060480.4811818256-
0.0974749634-
0.35317548060.87884723770.85863548850.924072738282%16.
93%0113BBB0.440.460.120.020.030.03976060480.4811818256-
0.0974749634-
0.35317548060.87884723771.66654583881.515374977294%1.5
8%0114BB0.080.470.010.030.120.03976060480.4811818256-
0.0974749634-0.35317548060.8788472377-1.0763376283-
0.619978712227%6.52%0115AA0.300.400.190.020.010.039760
60480.4811818256-0.0974749634-
0.35317548060.87884723770.87496888440.929485659482%0.3
1%0116BB0.740.180.160.070.060.03976060480.4811818256-
0.0974749634-0.35317548060.8788472377-0.52030377-
0.194281875742%6.52%0117BB0.220.180.020.130.120.039760
60480.4811818256-0.0974749634-0.35317548060.8788472377-
1.2742759375-
1.05088307415%6.52%0118BB0.550.040.160.030.130.0397606
0480.4811818256-0.0974749634-
0.35317548060.87884723771.4676020331.321379207391%6.52
%0119BBB0.630.130.120.070.060.03976060480.4811818256-
0.0974749634-
0.35317548060.87884723771.01875234810.867182576981%1.5
8%0120B0.050.210.280.050.040.03976060480.4811818256-
0.0974749634-0.35317548060.8788472377-0.8641918283-
0.715241504124%16.93%0121B0.560.220.130.110.110.0397606
0480.4811818256-0.0974749634-
0.35317548060.87884723770.3781050470.464803747468%16.9
3%0122B0.280.370.130.170.020.03976060480.4811818256-
0.0974749634-
0.35317548060.87884723770.90994451150.912325424382%16.
93%0123BBB0.180.100.210.150.110.03976060480.4811818256-

0.0974749634-0.35317548060.8788472377-0.7435590978-
0.615968522727%1.58%0124BB0.400.050.020.120.100.039760
60480.4811818256-0.0974749634-0.35317548060.8788472377-
1.8342330439-
1.56762502746%6.52%1125B0.470.420.210.020.130.039760604
80.4811818256-0.0974749634-0.35317548060.8788472377-
0.16521444020.180841662457%16.93%0126B0.070.490.230.12
0.020.03976060480.4811818256-0.0974749634-
0.35317548060.87884723770.49099286240.595503120872%16.
93%0127BB0.260.420.020.050.050.0397606048 0.4811818256-
0.0974749634-
0.35317548060.87884723770.52094464760.688038265875%6.5
2%0128BBB0.580.260.190.070.020.03976060480.4811818256-
0.0974749634-0.35317548060.8788472377-
0.01433539770.110560327654%1.58%0129BB0.140.250.060.13
0.060.03976060480.4811818256-0.0974749634-
0.35317548060.8788472377-1.1206551143-
0.933893392618%6.52%0130BBB0.490.060.300.170.120.03976
060480.4811818256-0.0974749634-
0.35317548060.8788472377-0.8090658224-
0.579206025428%1.58%0131BBB0.590.060.150.030.080.03976
060480.4811818256-0.0974749634-
0.35317548060.87884723770.78517638840.717213996876%1.5
8%0132BB0.630.480.120.130.000.03976060480.4811818256-
0.0974749634-
0.35317548060.87884723770.70027800530.606014895573%6.5
2%0133BB0.470.130.090.120.080.03976060480.4811818256-
0.0974749634-
0.35317548060.87884723771.89165606891.721936949296%6.5
2%0134BBB0.580.310.170.020.100.03976060480.4811818256-
0.0974749634-
0.35317548060.87884723771.47110389891.301745893390%1.5
8%0135BB0.090.090.130.160.080.03976060480.4811818256-
0.0974749634-0.35317548060.8788472377-1.5935206102-
1.48594691357%6.52%0136B0.610.070.160.150.050.039760604
80.4811818256-0.0974749634-0.35317548060.8788472377-

0.8408660227-
0.599788250327%16.93%0137BB0.610.420.060.170.060.03976
060480.4811818256-0.0974749634-
0.35317548060.8788472377-0.5984529814-
0.167929374143%6.52%0138BBB0.710.420.250.050.100.03976
060480.4811818256-0.0974749634-
0.35317548060.8788472377-
0.51577750370.021615819251%1.58%0139BB0.370.260.100.08
0.130.03976060480.4811818256-0.0974749634-
0.35317548060.8788472377-1.2068039875-
0.83289420%6.52%0140BB0.530.460.030.160.100.0397606048
0.4811818256-0.0974749634-
0.35317548060.87884723770.13537011870.366517002664%6.5
2%0141BB0.550.350.040.040.050.03976060480.4811818256-
0.0974749634-0.35317548060.8788472377-1.1403908104-
0.647155624126%6.52%0142BBB0.190.160.070.040.100.03976
060480.4811818256-0.0974749634-
0.35317548060.8788472377-1.2867430849-
1.081109123214%1.58%0143BBB0.640.340.060.110.040.03976
060480.4811818256-0.0974749634-
0.35317548060.8788472377-1.3850612675-
0.763461638322%1.58%0144BB0.410.050.200.110.060.039760
60480.4811818256-0.0974749634-0.35317548060.8788472377-
0.236725237-
0.173068225843%6.52%0145BBB0.330.450.130.140.100.03976
060480.4811818256-0.0974749634-
0.35317548060.8788472377-1.756279839-
1.158334021112%1.58%0146BB0.090.370.190.030.030.039760
60480.4811818256-0.0974749634-0.35317548060.8788472377-
1.0143710422-
0.74027283923%6.52%0147BBB0.210.180.280.110.100.039760
60480.4811818256-0.0974749634-
0.35317548060.87884723772.3452026212.245491807699%1.58
%0148BB0.540.440.170.020.120.03976060480.4811818256-
0.0974749634-
0.35317548060.87884723771.43111308011.294715386290%6.5

2%0149BB0.430.130.050.140.020.03976060480.4811818256-
0.0974749634-
0.35317548060.87884723770.7935300370.739643162877%6.52
%0150BBB0.230.240.040.100.060.03976060480.4811818256-
0.0974749634-0.35317548060.8788472377-1.2131533355-
0.997153376816%1.58%0
PD TableHorizon --
>Rating12345AAA00.00030.00130.00240.0035AA0.00020.0006
0.00120.00210.0031A0.00050.00140.00230.00350.0047BBB0.0
0160.00450.00780.01170.0158BB0.00610.01920.03480.05050.0
652B0.03330.07710.11550.14580.1693CCC/C0.27080.36640.41
410.4410.4619
CODING ASSIGNMENT
• Example
• Portfolio of 200 assets
• 5 year horizon
• Asset default probability of 2.3% (BBB level)
• Generate default distribution using different levels of
correlations and a
one factor Gaussian copula default time model
• ASSIGNMENT
• Implement a more generic version of the above example where
information on N assets
can be read from an Excel File
• Horizon for the analysis should be a user input
• Asset default probabilities could come from the same Input
Excel file

• Generate and plot a default distribution using correlation
information from the Input Excel
file (i.e using factor loadings for each asset) and the option to
select up to 5 factors (user
input).
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Rural Fruit Workers in the North 127
it provides for women. Rachel and Ximena were important
actors in
making it acceptable for women to work seasonally in the grape
economy. In the neighbourhood where they had grown up it was
accepted that women would go out to work and so once they
arrived
in Tome Alto, they wanted to continue working. Although
originally
they went to find work without first asking their partners'
permission,
it soon became apparent that they could earn substantial
amounts of

money during a traditionally quiet period in the village and at
the
same time continue with their domestic responsibilities. In part
it is
the specific nature of seasonal work that has allowed women to
move
into the labour market and stay there. For example, the
temporary
nature of the work in export agriculture is seen as an advantage
in
that women perceive it as allowing them to combine their
traditional
role in the home with paid work, and the disruption of their
domestic
responsibilities is only for part of the year. This 'benefit' is
reinforced
by the wages they can hope to earn as a supplement to their
male
partner's income. The roles of campesina and temporera are
therefore
juggled by these women on a seasonal basis, although for them
their
traditional role is the primary one.
Alicia lives in the neighbouring settlement of Chanaral Alto, a
village unlike Tome Alto, in that it has been the site of
significant
expansion of the grape economy. Alicia and her husband sold
their
own land in the early 1970s when tomato production became
unprofitable. Her husband found work on the irrigation system
while
she stayed at home and raised their five children. Alicia first
began
to work in the grapes in 1983 and always chooses a farm where
there

are a lot of local people rather than migrant workers. She views
the
work in a very positive light for two main reasons. The first is
the
added financial security the extra wage provides - for example,
with
her money from the grapes she has been able to buy a washing
machine, a radio and clothes. The second is the break in the
domes-
tic routine that her work gives her. Although the work is
extremely
arduous, with long working days, Alicia looks forward each
year to
her seasonal work:
He [her husband] gives me permission to work because he
knows
that I relax. I get better because I have all sorts of ailments, I
should
be worse through working, but instead I feel a lot better. So he
leaves me in peace to get on with it. I don't see the children as
much
as I would like, but you know for my health I work. I feel better
when I go to work. (Alicia)
128 Women and Agribusiness
Alicia and her husband now run a bottle shop from the front
room
of their house, and Alicia has equal responsibility for the
ownership
and running of the business. In effect she is able to combine
multiple
roles as housewife, mother, self-employed shop owner and

temporera
in the grape economy. For her the work in the grape packing
plants
offers a chance to relax and let other family members take over
the
responsibility for the house. In this respect her husband has
been rela-
tively accommodating by helping to take care of the children
when
they were younger and helping with the household chores. In
fact,
Alicia feels that her husband is quite enlightened and moreover
has
learned something of the burden of the domestic routine: 'He
realises
that the role of mother is not easy, every day the same routine,
but I'm
lucky because he thanks me for the work I do.'
For Marta, who is 23 and lives with her parents in Chanaral
Alto,
her work in the grape economy has been economically vital and
has
become more so now that she has a small son. Her parents were
originally from Carcamo, a remote and impoverished village,
which
still lacks many basic amenities. Her father arrived to work on
the
tomatoes in Chanaral Alto in 1968 and her mother followed
soon
after because there was no doctor in Carcamo to care for their
chil-
dren. Marta went to school in Chanaral Alto until year 8 and
then fol-
lowed the normal pattern by boarding in Ovalle. She completed
a

diploma in nutrition but has never had the opportunity to use
her
skills in her work. She first began to work on the grapes with a
group
of girlfriends during the summer school holidays when she was
16. She
has always worked for the largest plant in Chanaral Alto. She
used to
enjoy her work in the packing plants, but recently has been less
enam-
oured of the hard, repetitive and pressurised working
conditions:
I like my job, more or less, but lately I have not been enjoying
it as
much. I realise that the work in the grapes is the only
possibility to
earn a little bit more. You're on your feet all day long. Yes, on
your
feet because if you sit down you slow yourself down. And you
can
find that you are very, very tired, but you have to put the
tiredness
aside because if you stop, well it's fewer boxes, and fewer
boxes
means less money that you can earn, because out of 1,000 pesos,
100 is a lot to lose. (Marta)
In 1990 she became pregnant by a seasonal worker from the
south.
She is uncertain whether he even knows about his son - he
certainly
does not contribute to his upbringing. This increased the
pressure on
her to find employment and during the winter of 1993 she
travelled

Engendering the New Enclosures Development,Involuntary Rese

Engendering the New Enclosures Development,Involuntary Rese

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