SlideShare a Scribd company logo
1 of 44
Download to read offline
CNIT 141


Cryptography for Computer Networks
1. Encryption
Updated on 8-25-2021
Topics
• The Basics


• Classical Ciphers


• How Ciphers Work


• Perfect Encryption: The One-Time Pad


• Encryption Security


• Asymmetric Encryption


• When Ciphers Do More Than Encryption


• How Things Can Go Wrong
The Basics
• P: Plaintext


• K: Key


• C: Ciphertext


• E: Encryption via cipher


• D: Decryption via cipher
Classical Ciphers
Caesar Cipher
Caesar Cipher in Python
Brute Force Attack
Vigenere Cipher
• Shift varies with a repeated keyword


• Combine several Caesar ciphers together
Breaking the Vigenere
Cipher
• Find repeating ciphertext to deduce key length


• Use frequency analysis
Frequency Analysis
• From Wikipedia
Modified Caesar Program
• Converts to
uppercase


• Preserves
spaces
Encrypt a Paragraph
Frequency Counter
How Ciphers Work
Two Components
• Permutation


• Transforms one letter to another letter


• In Caesar cipher, shift letter three places


• Mode of Operation


• Algorithm to handle messages of arbitrary
size


• In Caesar cipher, process each letter
independently
Permutation Security
• Permutation should be determined by
the key


• If key is secret, attacker can’t easily
decrypt


• Different keys should result in different
permutations


• Permutation should look random


• No pattern in ciphertext
Mode of Operation
• Caesar cipher encrypts letters one at a time


• Double letters remain doubled


• HELLO -> KHOOR


• Patterns in plaintext are preserved in ciphertext


• Insecure (now called “Electronic Code Book”
mode)


• More secure modes encrypt repeated text
differently each time
Perfect Encryption:


The One-Time Pad
XOR
• XOR combines two bits


• 0 ^ 0 = 0


• 0 ^ 1 = 1


• 1 ^ 0 = 1


• 1 ^ 1 = 0
Encrypting a Stream of
Bits
• Plain: ABC =
	
0100 0001 0100 0010 0100 0011
• Key:
	
0110 0110 0110 0101 1010 111
0

• Cipher:
	
0010 0111 0010 0111 1110 110
1

• Key must be random and never re-used


• Key must be longer than all the plaintexts you
want to send
Unbreakable
• If an attacker uses a brute-force attack


• Trying all possible keys


• They get all possible letter sequences


• No way to identify the correct decryption
Encryption Security
Attack Models
• Set requirements for cryptographers who
design ciphers


• So they know what attacks to prevent


• Give guidelines to users


• Whether a cipher is safe in their environment


• Provide clues for cryptanalysts who attempt to
break ciphers


• Is an attack doable in the model considered?
Attack Models
Kerckhoff’s Principle
• The key is secret


• The cipher is not secret
Black-Box Models
No knowledge of cipher operation


• Ciphertext-Only Attack (COA)


• Attacker sees only C


• Known-Plaintext Attack (KPA)


• Attacker knows P and C


• Chosen-Plaintext Attack (CPA)


• Attacker can perform encryption for any P


• Chosen-Ciphertext Attack (CCA)


• Attacker can perform encryption and decryption
Gray-Box Models
• Attacker has access to the implementation


• Can tamper with the system’s internals


• Side-channel attack


• Attacker measures something else about the
cipher’s operation


• Such as timing or power consumption


• Noninvasive — does not alter integrity of
system
Gray-Box Models
• Invasive attacks


• Modify system


• Examples


• Using acid to dissolve parts of a microchip


• Injecting faults with lasers
Security Goals
• Indistinguishability


• Ciphertext should be indistinguishable from
a random string


• Non-malleability


• Ciphertext cannot be altered and produce
meaningful plaintext
Security Notions
• IND-CPA


• Indistinguishability against a Chosen-
Plaintext Attack


• Also called semantic security


• Two identical plaintext strings must result in
different ciphertexts


• Accomplished by adding “random” bits each
time you encrypt
Asymmetric Encryption
• Uses two keys


• Also called Public-Key encryption


• Public key freely published to everyone


• Private key held secret


• Will be covered in later chapters—everything
in this chapter is about symmetric encryption
When Ciphers Do More
Than Encryption
Authenticated Encryption
• Returns an authentication
tag with the ciphertext


• Tag ensures integrity of the
message and also
authenticates the author


• Authenticated Encryption
with Associated Data
(AEAD)


• Another variant
Format-Preserving Encryption
• Normally encryption takes inputs as bits and
returns outputs as bits


• Could be written as hex, base64, etc.


• Format-Preserving Encryption returns
ciphertext in the same format as the plaintext


• Zip code -> Zip code


• IP address -> IP address
Fully Homomorphic
Encryption
• Allows modification of encrypted data without
decrypting it


• The first FHE scheme was created in 2009


• Very slow
Searchable Encryption
• Searches encrypted data without decrypting it


• Using an encrypted search string


• Protects privacy of search engine users
Tweakable Encryption
• Adds a “tweak” parameter to normal
encryption


• Such as a unique customer number


• Acts like an Initialization Vector in
CBC


• Main application is disk encryption
How Things Can Go
Wrong
Weak Cipher
• 2G phone networks used the A5/1 cipher


• Vulnerable to a time-memory trade-off attack


• Using large lookup tables to speed up an
attack
Wrong Model
• Padding Oracle attack


• If a user submitted data that decrypted to a
valid string, that was taken as authentication


• Even if the string contained nonsense


• Server provided error messages for incorrect
padding


• Those errors can be used to find valid
ciphertext without knowing the key
CNIT 141: 1. Encryption

More Related Content

What's hot

Red Team Revenge - Attacking Microsoft ATA
Red Team Revenge - Attacking Microsoft ATARed Team Revenge - Attacking Microsoft ATA
Red Team Revenge - Attacking Microsoft ATANikhil Mittal
 
Evading Microsoft ATA for Active Directory Domination
Evading Microsoft ATA for Active Directory DominationEvading Microsoft ATA for Active Directory Domination
Evading Microsoft ATA for Active Directory DominationNikhil Mittal
 
PowerShell for Practical Purple Teaming
PowerShell for Practical Purple TeamingPowerShell for Practical Purple Teaming
PowerShell for Practical Purple TeamingNikhil Mittal
 
CNIT 121: 2 IR Management Handbook
CNIT 121: 2 IR Management HandbookCNIT 121: 2 IR Management Handbook
CNIT 121: 2 IR Management HandbookSam Bowne
 
CNIT 126 11. Malware Behavior
CNIT 126 11. Malware BehaviorCNIT 126 11. Malware Behavior
CNIT 126 11. Malware BehaviorSam Bowne
 
CNIT 126 2: Malware Analysis in Virtual Machines & 3: Basic Dynamic Analysis
CNIT 126 2: Malware Analysis in Virtual Machines & 3: Basic Dynamic AnalysisCNIT 126 2: Malware Analysis in Virtual Machines & 3: Basic Dynamic Analysis
CNIT 126 2: Malware Analysis in Virtual Machines & 3: Basic Dynamic AnalysisSam Bowne
 
Hunting for Privilege Escalation in Windows Environment
Hunting for Privilege Escalation in Windows EnvironmentHunting for Privilege Escalation in Windows Environment
Hunting for Privilege Escalation in Windows EnvironmentTeymur Kheirkhabarov
 
CISSP Prep: Ch 8. Security Operations
CISSP Prep: Ch 8. Security OperationsCISSP Prep: Ch 8. Security Operations
CISSP Prep: Ch 8. Security OperationsSam Bowne
 
Thick client pentesting_the-hackers_meetup_version1.0pptx
Thick client pentesting_the-hackers_meetup_version1.0pptxThick client pentesting_the-hackers_meetup_version1.0pptx
Thick client pentesting_the-hackers_meetup_version1.0pptxAnurag Srivastava
 
OWASP Secure Coding
OWASP Secure CodingOWASP Secure Coding
OWASP Secure Codingbilcorry
 
CNIT 127: 8: Windows overflows (Part 2)
CNIT 127: 8: Windows overflows (Part 2)CNIT 127: 8: Windows overflows (Part 2)
CNIT 127: 8: Windows overflows (Part 2)Sam Bowne
 
CISSP Chapter 7 - Security Operations
CISSP Chapter 7 - Security OperationsCISSP Chapter 7 - Security Operations
CISSP Chapter 7 - Security OperationsKarthikeyan Dhayalan
 
MITRE ATT&CKcon 2018: Playing Devil’s Advocate to Security Initiatives with A...
MITRE ATT&CKcon 2018: Playing Devil’s Advocate to Security Initiatives with A...MITRE ATT&CKcon 2018: Playing Devil’s Advocate to Security Initiatives with A...
MITRE ATT&CKcon 2018: Playing Devil’s Advocate to Security Initiatives with A...MITRE - ATT&CKcon
 
CRYPTOGRAPHY AND NETWORK SECURITY
CRYPTOGRAPHY AND NETWORK SECURITYCRYPTOGRAPHY AND NETWORK SECURITY
CRYPTOGRAPHY AND NETWORK SECURITYKathirvel Ayyaswamy
 
CNIT 129S: 12: Attacking Users: Cross-Site Scripting (Part 1 of 2)
CNIT 129S: 12: Attacking Users: Cross-Site Scripting (Part 1 of 2)CNIT 129S: 12: Attacking Users: Cross-Site Scripting (Part 1 of 2)
CNIT 129S: 12: Attacking Users: Cross-Site Scripting (Part 1 of 2)Sam Bowne
 
aclpwn - Active Directory ACL exploitation with BloodHound
aclpwn - Active Directory ACL exploitation with BloodHoundaclpwn - Active Directory ACL exploitation with BloodHound
aclpwn - Active Directory ACL exploitation with BloodHoundDirkjanMollema
 
Emily Stamm - Post-Quantum Cryptography
Emily Stamm - Post-Quantum CryptographyEmily Stamm - Post-Quantum Cryptography
Emily Stamm - Post-Quantum CryptographyCSNP
 
AES-GCM common pitfalls and how to work around them.pptx
AES-GCM common pitfalls and how to work around them.pptxAES-GCM common pitfalls and how to work around them.pptx
AES-GCM common pitfalls and how to work around them.pptxskantos
 
1. Mobile Application (In)security
1. Mobile Application (In)security1. Mobile Application (In)security
1. Mobile Application (In)securitySam Bowne
 

What's hot (20)

Red Team Revenge - Attacking Microsoft ATA
Red Team Revenge - Attacking Microsoft ATARed Team Revenge - Attacking Microsoft ATA
Red Team Revenge - Attacking Microsoft ATA
 
Evading Microsoft ATA for Active Directory Domination
Evading Microsoft ATA for Active Directory DominationEvading Microsoft ATA for Active Directory Domination
Evading Microsoft ATA for Active Directory Domination
 
PowerShell for Practical Purple Teaming
PowerShell for Practical Purple TeamingPowerShell for Practical Purple Teaming
PowerShell for Practical Purple Teaming
 
CNIT 121: 2 IR Management Handbook
CNIT 121: 2 IR Management HandbookCNIT 121: 2 IR Management Handbook
CNIT 121: 2 IR Management Handbook
 
CNIT 126 11. Malware Behavior
CNIT 126 11. Malware BehaviorCNIT 126 11. Malware Behavior
CNIT 126 11. Malware Behavior
 
CNIT 126 2: Malware Analysis in Virtual Machines & 3: Basic Dynamic Analysis
CNIT 126 2: Malware Analysis in Virtual Machines & 3: Basic Dynamic AnalysisCNIT 126 2: Malware Analysis in Virtual Machines & 3: Basic Dynamic Analysis
CNIT 126 2: Malware Analysis in Virtual Machines & 3: Basic Dynamic Analysis
 
Hunting for Privilege Escalation in Windows Environment
Hunting for Privilege Escalation in Windows EnvironmentHunting for Privilege Escalation in Windows Environment
Hunting for Privilege Escalation in Windows Environment
 
CISSP Prep: Ch 8. Security Operations
CISSP Prep: Ch 8. Security OperationsCISSP Prep: Ch 8. Security Operations
CISSP Prep: Ch 8. Security Operations
 
Thick client pentesting_the-hackers_meetup_version1.0pptx
Thick client pentesting_the-hackers_meetup_version1.0pptxThick client pentesting_the-hackers_meetup_version1.0pptx
Thick client pentesting_the-hackers_meetup_version1.0pptx
 
OWASP Secure Coding
OWASP Secure CodingOWASP Secure Coding
OWASP Secure Coding
 
CNIT 127: 8: Windows overflows (Part 2)
CNIT 127: 8: Windows overflows (Part 2)CNIT 127: 8: Windows overflows (Part 2)
CNIT 127: 8: Windows overflows (Part 2)
 
CISSP Chapter 7 - Security Operations
CISSP Chapter 7 - Security OperationsCISSP Chapter 7 - Security Operations
CISSP Chapter 7 - Security Operations
 
IPsec
IPsecIPsec
IPsec
 
MITRE ATT&CKcon 2018: Playing Devil’s Advocate to Security Initiatives with A...
MITRE ATT&CKcon 2018: Playing Devil’s Advocate to Security Initiatives with A...MITRE ATT&CKcon 2018: Playing Devil’s Advocate to Security Initiatives with A...
MITRE ATT&CKcon 2018: Playing Devil’s Advocate to Security Initiatives with A...
 
CRYPTOGRAPHY AND NETWORK SECURITY
CRYPTOGRAPHY AND NETWORK SECURITYCRYPTOGRAPHY AND NETWORK SECURITY
CRYPTOGRAPHY AND NETWORK SECURITY
 
CNIT 129S: 12: Attacking Users: Cross-Site Scripting (Part 1 of 2)
CNIT 129S: 12: Attacking Users: Cross-Site Scripting (Part 1 of 2)CNIT 129S: 12: Attacking Users: Cross-Site Scripting (Part 1 of 2)
CNIT 129S: 12: Attacking Users: Cross-Site Scripting (Part 1 of 2)
 
aclpwn - Active Directory ACL exploitation with BloodHound
aclpwn - Active Directory ACL exploitation with BloodHoundaclpwn - Active Directory ACL exploitation with BloodHound
aclpwn - Active Directory ACL exploitation with BloodHound
 
Emily Stamm - Post-Quantum Cryptography
Emily Stamm - Post-Quantum CryptographyEmily Stamm - Post-Quantum Cryptography
Emily Stamm - Post-Quantum Cryptography
 
AES-GCM common pitfalls and how to work around them.pptx
AES-GCM common pitfalls and how to work around them.pptxAES-GCM common pitfalls and how to work around them.pptx
AES-GCM common pitfalls and how to work around them.pptx
 
1. Mobile Application (In)security
1. Mobile Application (In)security1. Mobile Application (In)security
1. Mobile Application (In)security
 

Similar to CNIT 141: 1. Encryption

CNIT 141: 1. Encryption
CNIT 141: 1. EncryptionCNIT 141: 1. Encryption
CNIT 141: 1. EncryptionSam Bowne
 
CNIT 141: 1. Encryption
CNIT 141: 1. EncryptionCNIT 141: 1. Encryption
CNIT 141: 1. EncryptionSam Bowne
 
CNIT 141: 1. Encryption
CNIT 141: 1. EncryptionCNIT 141: 1. Encryption
CNIT 141: 1. EncryptionSam Bowne
 
CISSP Prep: Ch 4. Security Engineering (Part 2)
CISSP Prep: Ch 4. Security Engineering (Part 2)CISSP Prep: Ch 4. Security Engineering (Part 2)
CISSP Prep: Ch 4. Security Engineering (Part 2)Sam Bowne
 
CNIT 125 Ch 4. Security Engineering (Part 2)
CNIT 125 Ch 4. Security Engineering (Part 2)CNIT 125 Ch 4. Security Engineering (Part 2)
CNIT 125 Ch 4. Security Engineering (Part 2)Sam Bowne
 
CompTIASecPLUS-Part6 - UnlimitedEdited.pptx
CompTIASecPLUS-Part6 -  UnlimitedEdited.pptxCompTIASecPLUS-Part6 -  UnlimitedEdited.pptx
CompTIASecPLUS-Part6 - UnlimitedEdited.pptxmohedkhadar60
 
Applied cryptanalysis - stream ciphers
Applied cryptanalysis - stream ciphersApplied cryptanalysis - stream ciphers
Applied cryptanalysis - stream ciphersVlad Garbuz
 
«Applied cryptanalysis stream ciphers» by Vladimir Garbuz
«Applied cryptanalysis stream ciphers» by Vladimir Garbuz «Applied cryptanalysis stream ciphers» by Vladimir Garbuz
«Applied cryptanalysis stream ciphers» by Vladimir Garbuz 0xdec0de
 
Information and network security 10 classical encryption techniques
Information and network security 10 classical encryption techniquesInformation and network security 10 classical encryption techniques
Information and network security 10 classical encryption techniquesVaibhav Khanna
 
Cryptography & Steganography
Cryptography & SteganographyCryptography & Steganography
Cryptography & SteganographyAnimesh Shaw
 
Hybrid Cryptography with examples in Ruby and Go
Hybrid Cryptography with examples in Ruby and GoHybrid Cryptography with examples in Ruby and Go
Hybrid Cryptography with examples in Ruby and GoEleanor McHugh
 
Symmetric ciphermodel
Symmetric ciphermodelSymmetric ciphermodel
Symmetric ciphermodelpriyapavi96
 

Similar to CNIT 141: 1. Encryption (20)

CNIT 141: 1. Encryption
CNIT 141: 1. EncryptionCNIT 141: 1. Encryption
CNIT 141: 1. Encryption
 
CNIT 141: 1. Encryption
CNIT 141: 1. EncryptionCNIT 141: 1. Encryption
CNIT 141: 1. Encryption
 
CNIT 141: 1. Encryption
CNIT 141: 1. EncryptionCNIT 141: 1. Encryption
CNIT 141: 1. Encryption
 
CISSP Prep: Ch 4. Security Engineering (Part 2)
CISSP Prep: Ch 4. Security Engineering (Part 2)CISSP Prep: Ch 4. Security Engineering (Part 2)
CISSP Prep: Ch 4. Security Engineering (Part 2)
 
CNIT 125 Ch 4. Security Engineering (Part 2)
CNIT 125 Ch 4. Security Engineering (Part 2)CNIT 125 Ch 4. Security Engineering (Part 2)
CNIT 125 Ch 4. Security Engineering (Part 2)
 
Cryptography
CryptographyCryptography
Cryptography
 
CompTIASecPLUS-Part6 - UnlimitedEdited.pptx
CompTIASecPLUS-Part6 -  UnlimitedEdited.pptxCompTIASecPLUS-Part6 -  UnlimitedEdited.pptx
CompTIASecPLUS-Part6 - UnlimitedEdited.pptx
 
Cryptography
CryptographyCryptography
Cryptography
 
Slidecast - Workshop
Slidecast - WorkshopSlidecast - Workshop
Slidecast - Workshop
 
Basic cryptography
Basic cryptographyBasic cryptography
Basic cryptography
 
CISSP - Chapter 3 - Cryptography
CISSP - Chapter 3 - CryptographyCISSP - Chapter 3 - Cryptography
CISSP - Chapter 3 - Cryptography
 
Block Ciphers Modes of Operation
Block Ciphers Modes of OperationBlock Ciphers Modes of Operation
Block Ciphers Modes of Operation
 
Applied cryptanalysis - stream ciphers
Applied cryptanalysis - stream ciphersApplied cryptanalysis - stream ciphers
Applied cryptanalysis - stream ciphers
 
«Applied cryptanalysis stream ciphers» by Vladimir Garbuz
«Applied cryptanalysis stream ciphers» by Vladimir Garbuz «Applied cryptanalysis stream ciphers» by Vladimir Garbuz
«Applied cryptanalysis stream ciphers» by Vladimir Garbuz
 
Information and network security 10 classical encryption techniques
Information and network security 10 classical encryption techniquesInformation and network security 10 classical encryption techniques
Information and network security 10 classical encryption techniques
 
Cryptography
CryptographyCryptography
Cryptography
 
Cryptography
CryptographyCryptography
Cryptography
 
Cryptography & Steganography
Cryptography & SteganographyCryptography & Steganography
Cryptography & Steganography
 
Hybrid Cryptography with examples in Ruby and Go
Hybrid Cryptography with examples in Ruby and GoHybrid Cryptography with examples in Ruby and Go
Hybrid Cryptography with examples in Ruby and Go
 
Symmetric ciphermodel
Symmetric ciphermodelSymmetric ciphermodel
Symmetric ciphermodel
 

More from Sam Bowne

3: DNS vulnerabilities
3: DNS vulnerabilities 3: DNS vulnerabilities
3: DNS vulnerabilities Sam Bowne
 
8. Software Development Security
8. Software Development Security8. Software Development Security
8. Software Development SecuritySam Bowne
 
4 Mapping the Application
4 Mapping the Application4 Mapping the Application
4 Mapping the ApplicationSam Bowne
 
3. Attacking iOS Applications (Part 2)
 3. Attacking iOS Applications (Part 2) 3. Attacking iOS Applications (Part 2)
3. Attacking iOS Applications (Part 2)Sam Bowne
 
12 Elliptic Curves
12 Elliptic Curves12 Elliptic Curves
12 Elliptic CurvesSam Bowne
 
11. Diffie-Hellman
11. Diffie-Hellman11. Diffie-Hellman
11. Diffie-HellmanSam Bowne
 
2a Analyzing iOS Apps Part 1
2a Analyzing iOS Apps Part 12a Analyzing iOS Apps Part 1
2a Analyzing iOS Apps Part 1Sam Bowne
 
9 Writing Secure Android Applications
9 Writing Secure Android Applications9 Writing Secure Android Applications
9 Writing Secure Android ApplicationsSam Bowne
 
12 Investigating Windows Systems (Part 2 of 3)
12 Investigating Windows Systems (Part 2 of 3)12 Investigating Windows Systems (Part 2 of 3)
12 Investigating Windows Systems (Part 2 of 3)Sam Bowne
 
12 Investigating Windows Systems (Part 1 of 3
12 Investigating Windows Systems (Part 1 of 312 Investigating Windows Systems (Part 1 of 3
12 Investigating Windows Systems (Part 1 of 3Sam Bowne
 
9. Hard Problems
9. Hard Problems9. Hard Problems
9. Hard ProblemsSam Bowne
 
8 Android Implementation Issues (Part 1)
8 Android Implementation Issues (Part 1)8 Android Implementation Issues (Part 1)
8 Android Implementation Issues (Part 1)Sam Bowne
 
11 Analysis Methodology
11 Analysis Methodology11 Analysis Methodology
11 Analysis MethodologySam Bowne
 
8. Authenticated Encryption
8. Authenticated Encryption8. Authenticated Encryption
8. Authenticated EncryptionSam Bowne
 
7. Attacking Android Applications (Part 2)
7. Attacking Android Applications (Part 2)7. Attacking Android Applications (Part 2)
7. Attacking Android Applications (Part 2)Sam Bowne
 
7. Attacking Android Applications (Part 1)
7. Attacking Android Applications (Part 1)7. Attacking Android Applications (Part 1)
7. Attacking Android Applications (Part 1)Sam Bowne
 
5. Stream Ciphers
5. Stream Ciphers5. Stream Ciphers
5. Stream CiphersSam Bowne
 
6 Scope & 7 Live Data Collection
6 Scope & 7 Live Data Collection6 Scope & 7 Live Data Collection
6 Scope & 7 Live Data CollectionSam Bowne
 

More from Sam Bowne (20)

Cyberwar
CyberwarCyberwar
Cyberwar
 
3: DNS vulnerabilities
3: DNS vulnerabilities 3: DNS vulnerabilities
3: DNS vulnerabilities
 
8. Software Development Security
8. Software Development Security8. Software Development Security
8. Software Development Security
 
4 Mapping the Application
4 Mapping the Application4 Mapping the Application
4 Mapping the Application
 
3. Attacking iOS Applications (Part 2)
 3. Attacking iOS Applications (Part 2) 3. Attacking iOS Applications (Part 2)
3. Attacking iOS Applications (Part 2)
 
12 Elliptic Curves
12 Elliptic Curves12 Elliptic Curves
12 Elliptic Curves
 
11. Diffie-Hellman
11. Diffie-Hellman11. Diffie-Hellman
11. Diffie-Hellman
 
2a Analyzing iOS Apps Part 1
2a Analyzing iOS Apps Part 12a Analyzing iOS Apps Part 1
2a Analyzing iOS Apps Part 1
 
9 Writing Secure Android Applications
9 Writing Secure Android Applications9 Writing Secure Android Applications
9 Writing Secure Android Applications
 
12 Investigating Windows Systems (Part 2 of 3)
12 Investigating Windows Systems (Part 2 of 3)12 Investigating Windows Systems (Part 2 of 3)
12 Investigating Windows Systems (Part 2 of 3)
 
10 RSA
10 RSA10 RSA
10 RSA
 
12 Investigating Windows Systems (Part 1 of 3
12 Investigating Windows Systems (Part 1 of 312 Investigating Windows Systems (Part 1 of 3
12 Investigating Windows Systems (Part 1 of 3
 
9. Hard Problems
9. Hard Problems9. Hard Problems
9. Hard Problems
 
8 Android Implementation Issues (Part 1)
8 Android Implementation Issues (Part 1)8 Android Implementation Issues (Part 1)
8 Android Implementation Issues (Part 1)
 
11 Analysis Methodology
11 Analysis Methodology11 Analysis Methodology
11 Analysis Methodology
 
8. Authenticated Encryption
8. Authenticated Encryption8. Authenticated Encryption
8. Authenticated Encryption
 
7. Attacking Android Applications (Part 2)
7. Attacking Android Applications (Part 2)7. Attacking Android Applications (Part 2)
7. Attacking Android Applications (Part 2)
 
7. Attacking Android Applications (Part 1)
7. Attacking Android Applications (Part 1)7. Attacking Android Applications (Part 1)
7. Attacking Android Applications (Part 1)
 
5. Stream Ciphers
5. Stream Ciphers5. Stream Ciphers
5. Stream Ciphers
 
6 Scope & 7 Live Data Collection
6 Scope & 7 Live Data Collection6 Scope & 7 Live Data Collection
6 Scope & 7 Live Data Collection
 

Recently uploaded

Google Gemini An AI Revolution in Education.pptx
Google Gemini An AI Revolution in Education.pptxGoogle Gemini An AI Revolution in Education.pptx
Google Gemini An AI Revolution in Education.pptxDr. Sarita Anand
 
Salient Features of India constitution especially power and functions
Salient Features of India constitution especially power and functionsSalient Features of India constitution especially power and functions
Salient Features of India constitution especially power and functionsKarakKing
 
Wellbeing inclusion and digital dystopias.pptx
Wellbeing inclusion and digital dystopias.pptxWellbeing inclusion and digital dystopias.pptx
Wellbeing inclusion and digital dystopias.pptxJisc
 
Interdisciplinary_Insights_Data_Collection_Methods.pptx
Interdisciplinary_Insights_Data_Collection_Methods.pptxInterdisciplinary_Insights_Data_Collection_Methods.pptx
Interdisciplinary_Insights_Data_Collection_Methods.pptxPooja Bhuva
 
Basic Civil Engineering first year Notes- Chapter 4 Building.pptx
Basic Civil Engineering first year Notes- Chapter 4 Building.pptxBasic Civil Engineering first year Notes- Chapter 4 Building.pptx
Basic Civil Engineering first year Notes- Chapter 4 Building.pptxDenish Jangid
 
On_Translating_a_Tamil_Poem_by_A_K_Ramanujan.pptx
On_Translating_a_Tamil_Poem_by_A_K_Ramanujan.pptxOn_Translating_a_Tamil_Poem_by_A_K_Ramanujan.pptx
On_Translating_a_Tamil_Poem_by_A_K_Ramanujan.pptxPooja Bhuva
 
NO1 Top Black Magic Specialist In Lahore Black magic In Pakistan Kala Ilam Ex...
NO1 Top Black Magic Specialist In Lahore Black magic In Pakistan Kala Ilam Ex...NO1 Top Black Magic Specialist In Lahore Black magic In Pakistan Kala Ilam Ex...
NO1 Top Black Magic Specialist In Lahore Black magic In Pakistan Kala Ilam Ex...Amil baba
 
Sensory_Experience_and_Emotional_Resonance_in_Gabriel_Okaras_The_Piano_and_Th...
Sensory_Experience_and_Emotional_Resonance_in_Gabriel_Okaras_The_Piano_and_Th...Sensory_Experience_and_Emotional_Resonance_in_Gabriel_Okaras_The_Piano_and_Th...
Sensory_Experience_and_Emotional_Resonance_in_Gabriel_Okaras_The_Piano_and_Th...Pooja Bhuva
 
Sociology 101 Demonstration of Learning Exhibit
Sociology 101 Demonstration of Learning ExhibitSociology 101 Demonstration of Learning Exhibit
Sociology 101 Demonstration of Learning Exhibitjbellavia9
 
Accessible Digital Futures project (20/03/2024)
Accessible Digital Futures project (20/03/2024)Accessible Digital Futures project (20/03/2024)
Accessible Digital Futures project (20/03/2024)Jisc
 
Plant propagation: Sexual and Asexual propapagation.pptx
Plant propagation: Sexual and Asexual propapagation.pptxPlant propagation: Sexual and Asexual propapagation.pptx
Plant propagation: Sexual and Asexual propapagation.pptxUmeshTimilsina1
 
Holdier Curriculum Vitae (April 2024).pdf
Holdier Curriculum Vitae (April 2024).pdfHoldier Curriculum Vitae (April 2024).pdf
Holdier Curriculum Vitae (April 2024).pdfagholdier
 
Unit 3 Emotional Intelligence and Spiritual Intelligence.pdf
Unit 3 Emotional Intelligence and Spiritual Intelligence.pdfUnit 3 Emotional Intelligence and Spiritual Intelligence.pdf
Unit 3 Emotional Intelligence and Spiritual Intelligence.pdfDr Vijay Vishwakarma
 
REMIFENTANIL: An Ultra short acting opioid.pptx
REMIFENTANIL: An Ultra short acting opioid.pptxREMIFENTANIL: An Ultra short acting opioid.pptx
REMIFENTANIL: An Ultra short acting opioid.pptxDr. Ravikiran H M Gowda
 
FSB Advising Checklist - Orientation 2024
FSB Advising Checklist - Orientation 2024FSB Advising Checklist - Orientation 2024
FSB Advising Checklist - Orientation 2024Elizabeth Walsh
 
Towards a code of practice for AI in AT.pptx
Towards a code of practice for AI in AT.pptxTowards a code of practice for AI in AT.pptx
Towards a code of practice for AI in AT.pptxJisc
 
Exploring_the_Narrative_Style_of_Amitav_Ghoshs_Gun_Island.pptx
Exploring_the_Narrative_Style_of_Amitav_Ghoshs_Gun_Island.pptxExploring_the_Narrative_Style_of_Amitav_Ghoshs_Gun_Island.pptx
Exploring_the_Narrative_Style_of_Amitav_Ghoshs_Gun_Island.pptxPooja Bhuva
 
ICT role in 21st century education and it's challenges.
ICT role in 21st century education and it's challenges.ICT role in 21st century education and it's challenges.
ICT role in 21st century education and it's challenges.MaryamAhmad92
 
ICT Role in 21st Century Education & its Challenges.pptx
ICT Role in 21st Century Education & its Challenges.pptxICT Role in 21st Century Education & its Challenges.pptx
ICT Role in 21st Century Education & its Challenges.pptxAreebaZafar22
 
General Principles of Intellectual Property: Concepts of Intellectual Proper...
General Principles of Intellectual Property: Concepts of Intellectual  Proper...General Principles of Intellectual Property: Concepts of Intellectual  Proper...
General Principles of Intellectual Property: Concepts of Intellectual Proper...Poonam Aher Patil
 

Recently uploaded (20)

Google Gemini An AI Revolution in Education.pptx
Google Gemini An AI Revolution in Education.pptxGoogle Gemini An AI Revolution in Education.pptx
Google Gemini An AI Revolution in Education.pptx
 
Salient Features of India constitution especially power and functions
Salient Features of India constitution especially power and functionsSalient Features of India constitution especially power and functions
Salient Features of India constitution especially power and functions
 
Wellbeing inclusion and digital dystopias.pptx
Wellbeing inclusion and digital dystopias.pptxWellbeing inclusion and digital dystopias.pptx
Wellbeing inclusion and digital dystopias.pptx
 
Interdisciplinary_Insights_Data_Collection_Methods.pptx
Interdisciplinary_Insights_Data_Collection_Methods.pptxInterdisciplinary_Insights_Data_Collection_Methods.pptx
Interdisciplinary_Insights_Data_Collection_Methods.pptx
 
Basic Civil Engineering first year Notes- Chapter 4 Building.pptx
Basic Civil Engineering first year Notes- Chapter 4 Building.pptxBasic Civil Engineering first year Notes- Chapter 4 Building.pptx
Basic Civil Engineering first year Notes- Chapter 4 Building.pptx
 
On_Translating_a_Tamil_Poem_by_A_K_Ramanujan.pptx
On_Translating_a_Tamil_Poem_by_A_K_Ramanujan.pptxOn_Translating_a_Tamil_Poem_by_A_K_Ramanujan.pptx
On_Translating_a_Tamil_Poem_by_A_K_Ramanujan.pptx
 
NO1 Top Black Magic Specialist In Lahore Black magic In Pakistan Kala Ilam Ex...
NO1 Top Black Magic Specialist In Lahore Black magic In Pakistan Kala Ilam Ex...NO1 Top Black Magic Specialist In Lahore Black magic In Pakistan Kala Ilam Ex...
NO1 Top Black Magic Specialist In Lahore Black magic In Pakistan Kala Ilam Ex...
 
Sensory_Experience_and_Emotional_Resonance_in_Gabriel_Okaras_The_Piano_and_Th...
Sensory_Experience_and_Emotional_Resonance_in_Gabriel_Okaras_The_Piano_and_Th...Sensory_Experience_and_Emotional_Resonance_in_Gabriel_Okaras_The_Piano_and_Th...
Sensory_Experience_and_Emotional_Resonance_in_Gabriel_Okaras_The_Piano_and_Th...
 
Sociology 101 Demonstration of Learning Exhibit
Sociology 101 Demonstration of Learning ExhibitSociology 101 Demonstration of Learning Exhibit
Sociology 101 Demonstration of Learning Exhibit
 
Accessible Digital Futures project (20/03/2024)
Accessible Digital Futures project (20/03/2024)Accessible Digital Futures project (20/03/2024)
Accessible Digital Futures project (20/03/2024)
 
Plant propagation: Sexual and Asexual propapagation.pptx
Plant propagation: Sexual and Asexual propapagation.pptxPlant propagation: Sexual and Asexual propapagation.pptx
Plant propagation: Sexual and Asexual propapagation.pptx
 
Holdier Curriculum Vitae (April 2024).pdf
Holdier Curriculum Vitae (April 2024).pdfHoldier Curriculum Vitae (April 2024).pdf
Holdier Curriculum Vitae (April 2024).pdf
 
Unit 3 Emotional Intelligence and Spiritual Intelligence.pdf
Unit 3 Emotional Intelligence and Spiritual Intelligence.pdfUnit 3 Emotional Intelligence and Spiritual Intelligence.pdf
Unit 3 Emotional Intelligence and Spiritual Intelligence.pdf
 
REMIFENTANIL: An Ultra short acting opioid.pptx
REMIFENTANIL: An Ultra short acting opioid.pptxREMIFENTANIL: An Ultra short acting opioid.pptx
REMIFENTANIL: An Ultra short acting opioid.pptx
 
FSB Advising Checklist - Orientation 2024
FSB Advising Checklist - Orientation 2024FSB Advising Checklist - Orientation 2024
FSB Advising Checklist - Orientation 2024
 
Towards a code of practice for AI in AT.pptx
Towards a code of practice for AI in AT.pptxTowards a code of practice for AI in AT.pptx
Towards a code of practice for AI in AT.pptx
 
Exploring_the_Narrative_Style_of_Amitav_Ghoshs_Gun_Island.pptx
Exploring_the_Narrative_Style_of_Amitav_Ghoshs_Gun_Island.pptxExploring_the_Narrative_Style_of_Amitav_Ghoshs_Gun_Island.pptx
Exploring_the_Narrative_Style_of_Amitav_Ghoshs_Gun_Island.pptx
 
ICT role in 21st century education and it's challenges.
ICT role in 21st century education and it's challenges.ICT role in 21st century education and it's challenges.
ICT role in 21st century education and it's challenges.
 
ICT Role in 21st Century Education & its Challenges.pptx
ICT Role in 21st Century Education & its Challenges.pptxICT Role in 21st Century Education & its Challenges.pptx
ICT Role in 21st Century Education & its Challenges.pptx
 
General Principles of Intellectual Property: Concepts of Intellectual Proper...
General Principles of Intellectual Property: Concepts of Intellectual  Proper...General Principles of Intellectual Property: Concepts of Intellectual  Proper...
General Principles of Intellectual Property: Concepts of Intellectual Proper...
 

CNIT 141: 1. Encryption

  • 1. CNIT 141 Cryptography for Computer Networks 1. Encryption Updated on 8-25-2021
  • 2. Topics • The Basics • Classical Ciphers • How Ciphers Work • Perfect Encryption: The One-Time Pad • Encryption Security • Asymmetric Encryption • When Ciphers Do More Than Encryption • How Things Can Go Wrong
  • 3. The Basics • P: Plaintext • K: Key • C: Ciphertext • E: Encryption via cipher • D: Decryption via cipher
  • 8. Vigenere Cipher • Shift varies with a repeated keyword • Combine several Caesar ciphers together
  • 9. Breaking the Vigenere Cipher • Find repeating ciphertext to deduce key length • Use frequency analysis
  • 11. Modified Caesar Program • Converts to uppercase • Preserves spaces
  • 14.
  • 16. Two Components • Permutation • Transforms one letter to another letter • In Caesar cipher, shift letter three places • Mode of Operation • Algorithm to handle messages of arbitrary size • In Caesar cipher, process each letter independently
  • 17. Permutation Security • Permutation should be determined by the key • If key is secret, attacker can’t easily decrypt • Different keys should result in different permutations • Permutation should look random • No pattern in ciphertext
  • 18. Mode of Operation • Caesar cipher encrypts letters one at a time • Double letters remain doubled • HELLO -> KHOOR • Patterns in plaintext are preserved in ciphertext • Insecure (now called “Electronic Code Book” mode) • More secure modes encrypt repeated text differently each time
  • 20. XOR • XOR combines two bits • 0 ^ 0 = 0 • 0 ^ 1 = 1 • 1 ^ 0 = 1 • 1 ^ 1 = 0
  • 21. Encrypting a Stream of Bits • Plain: ABC = 0100 0001 0100 0010 0100 0011 • Key: 0110 0110 0110 0101 1010 111 0 • Cipher: 0010 0111 0010 0111 1110 110 1 • Key must be random and never re-used • Key must be longer than all the plaintexts you want to send
  • 22. Unbreakable • If an attacker uses a brute-force attack • Trying all possible keys • They get all possible letter sequences • No way to identify the correct decryption
  • 23.
  • 25. Attack Models • Set requirements for cryptographers who design ciphers • So they know what attacks to prevent • Give guidelines to users • Whether a cipher is safe in their environment • Provide clues for cryptanalysts who attempt to break ciphers • Is an attack doable in the model considered?
  • 27. Kerckhoff’s Principle • The key is secret • The cipher is not secret
  • 28. Black-Box Models No knowledge of cipher operation • Ciphertext-Only Attack (COA) • Attacker sees only C • Known-Plaintext Attack (KPA) • Attacker knows P and C • Chosen-Plaintext Attack (CPA) • Attacker can perform encryption for any P • Chosen-Ciphertext Attack (CCA) • Attacker can perform encryption and decryption
  • 29. Gray-Box Models • Attacker has access to the implementation • Can tamper with the system’s internals • Side-channel attack • Attacker measures something else about the cipher’s operation • Such as timing or power consumption • Noninvasive — does not alter integrity of system
  • 30. Gray-Box Models • Invasive attacks • Modify system • Examples • Using acid to dissolve parts of a microchip • Injecting faults with lasers
  • 31. Security Goals • Indistinguishability • Ciphertext should be indistinguishable from a random string • Non-malleability • Ciphertext cannot be altered and produce meaningful plaintext
  • 32. Security Notions • IND-CPA • Indistinguishability against a Chosen- Plaintext Attack • Also called semantic security • Two identical plaintext strings must result in different ciphertexts • Accomplished by adding “random” bits each time you encrypt
  • 33. Asymmetric Encryption • Uses two keys • Also called Public-Key encryption • Public key freely published to everyone • Private key held secret • Will be covered in later chapters—everything in this chapter is about symmetric encryption
  • 34. When Ciphers Do More Than Encryption
  • 35. Authenticated Encryption • Returns an authentication tag with the ciphertext • Tag ensures integrity of the message and also authenticates the author • Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data (AEAD) • Another variant
  • 36. Format-Preserving Encryption • Normally encryption takes inputs as bits and returns outputs as bits • Could be written as hex, base64, etc. • Format-Preserving Encryption returns ciphertext in the same format as the plaintext • Zip code -> Zip code • IP address -> IP address
  • 37. Fully Homomorphic Encryption • Allows modification of encrypted data without decrypting it • The first FHE scheme was created in 2009 • Very slow
  • 38. Searchable Encryption • Searches encrypted data without decrypting it • Using an encrypted search string • Protects privacy of search engine users
  • 39.
  • 40. Tweakable Encryption • Adds a “tweak” parameter to normal encryption • Such as a unique customer number • Acts like an Initialization Vector in CBC • Main application is disk encryption
  • 41. How Things Can Go Wrong
  • 42. Weak Cipher • 2G phone networks used the A5/1 cipher • Vulnerable to a time-memory trade-off attack • Using large lookup tables to speed up an attack
  • 43. Wrong Model • Padding Oracle attack • If a user submitted data that decrypted to a valid string, that was taken as authentication • Even if the string contained nonsense • Server provided error messages for incorrect padding • Those errors can be used to find valid ciphertext without knowing the key