AN EXAMINATION OF THREE OBJECTIONS TO DON MARQUIS S ARGUMENT AGAINST ABORTION CHOICE

AN EXAMINATION OF THREE OBJECTIONS TO
DON MARQUIS’S ARGUMENT AGAINST
ABORTION CHOICE
By
BENJAMIN E. JURY
Bachelor of Arts
Southwest Baptist University
Bolivar, MO
2012
Submitted to the Faculty of the
Graduate College of the
Oklahoma State University
in partial fulfillment of
the requirements for
the Degree of
MASTER OF ARTS
May, 2012

ii
AN EXAMINATION OF THREE OBJECTIONS TO
DON MARQUIS’S ARGUMENT AGAINST
ABORTION CHOICE
Thesis Approved:
Scott D. Gelfand
Thesis Adviser
Eric Reitan
Lorraine Y. Landry
Dr. Sheryl A. Tucker
Dean of the Graduate College

iii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Chapter Page
I. Don Marquis’s Argument...........................................................................................1
1.1 The Argument ...................................................................................................2
1.2 When Do We Begin to Have a FLO? ..............................................................6
1.3 Sufficient Condition..........................................................................................8
1.4 Why Marquis’s Argument is Appealing...........................................................8
II. The Embryo Rescue Case
Objection………………………………………………………………………... 14
2.1 Fetus Rescue Case...........................................................................................17
2.2 Kaczor’s Solution to FRC...............................................................................17
2.3 Beckwith’s Solution to FRC...........................................................................19
2.4 Liao’s Solutions to FRC..................................................................................20
2.5 Napier’s Solutions to FRC..............................................................................28
2.6 George and Tollefsen’s Solutions to FRC ......................................................33
2.7 Deckers’s Solution to FRC .............................................................................34
III. The Save the Mother’s Life Objection...................................................................37
3.1 Card’s Objection to Marquis...........................................................................39
3.2 Differences between Self-Defense and Abortion in Other-Defense...............42
3.3 Three Cases of Forced Choice Abortion.........................................................44
3.4 Thomson on Self-Defense...............................................................................45
3.5 McMahan on Self-Defense .............................................................................58

iv
Chapter Page
IV. The Killing Abortion Doctors Objection...............................................................73
4.1 The Objection ...............................................................................................73
4.2 Kaczor’s Solutions to KADO .........................................................................77
4.3 Tollefsen’s Solution to KADO .......................................................................84
4.4 Audi’s Solution to KADO ..............................................................................87
V. CONCLUSION......................................................................................................94
REFERENCES ............................................................................................................97

1
CHAPTER I
DON MARQUIS’S ARGUMENT
In this thesis I will look at three reductio ad absurdum arguments against Don
Marquis’s argument that abortion is immoral. In this chapter I will describe Marquis’s
argument and give reasons for its importance. Chapter 2 will consist of my description
and evaluation of the Embryo Rescue Case objection against Marquis’s argument.
Ultimately, I will argue that this objection is flawed. In Chapter 3 I will analyze a second
reductio ad absurdum objection against Marquis. I call this the Save the Mother’s Life
objection. I believe that this objection also is mistaken. Finally, in Chapter 4 I’ll address
a third reductio ad absurdum objection to Marquis’s argument. This objection to
Marquis’s view, I argue, is ultimately a successful reductio ad absurdum to his argument
that abortion is immoral.

2
I have chosen to focus on Marquis’s argument, because I believe it is one of the
best arguments in the pro-life literature. (Although I consider it the best, I will not argue
that here.)1
I shall consider reasons why Marquis’s argument is attractive later. First,
however, we need to understand his argument.
Before I begin I need to describe what I mean by the terms pro-choice and pro-
life. When I say that Marquis is pro-life I mean he generally believes, except in rare
situations, that abortion is immoral. By pro-choice here, I mean that someone generally
believes that abortion is permissible. Having stated what I mean by the two terms, we
can proceed with the discussion of Marquis’s argument.
1.1 The Argument
Marquis’s argument is an argument by inference to the best explanation. Arguments by
inference to the best explanation have two steps.2
The first step begins by deriving a
principle from uncontroversial cases of A which best explains our intuitions about those
uncontroversial cases. The second step involves applying the principle that is derived
from those uncontroversial cases of A to controversial cases of A. 3
1
I a ot alo e i asse ti g that Ma uis s a gu e t is the st o gest i the p o-life literature. For
example, important philosophers such as Peter Singer and Walter Sinnott-Armstrong have stipulated that
Ma uis s p o-life argument is the best. “i ge s uote a e fou d i the de ate et ee hi a d Do
Marquis here: Abortion and Infanticide: A Critique of Peter Singer's Views. Debate with Don Marquis.
Princeton University, March 29, 2006. The quote can be found 57 seconds into the debate. For Sinnott-
A st o g s o e t see his You Can't Lose What You Ain't Never Had: A Reply to Marquis on
A o tio . Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition. 96.1
(Oct 1999): 59.
2
Boonin, David and Graham Oddie. What’s Wro g? Applied Ethi ists a d Their Criti s. Oxford, Oxford
University Press, 2005. 17-19.
3
Ibid.

3
In his article, "Why Abortion is Immoral", Marquis argues that in order to
understand whether abortion is wrongful killing, we need to understand why killing us is
prima facie seriously wrong.4
Marquis asks what principle best explains our intuitions
that killing us is prima facie seriously wrong. He concludes that killing us is prima facie
seriously wrong because it harms us.5
Marquis then specifies in more detail why killing harms us. He asserts that,
killing harms us because it deprives us of all the goods we would have had, had we
lived.6
Killing us is prima facie seriously wrong because it deprives us of everything that
makes our lives worth living. These goods might include: our friendships, those things
that we love, etc... In other words, as Marquis asserts, killing us is wrong because it
deprives us of a future-like-ours or FLO. Furthermore, having a FLO is a sufficient
condition, rather than a necessary condition, for why killing us is prima facie seriously
wrong.7
It is important to be clear what Marquis means by a future-like-ours. The word
“like” is vague here. How much “like” our futures must other being’s futures be in order
to make killing her prima facie seriously wrong? To answer this question, Marquis
helpfully distinguishes between a narrow sense and a broader sense of a FLO.8
By the
latter sense, he means someone has a FLO, when her valuable experiences overlap in
some way with a human person’s.9
That is, if someone at least shares some experiences
with human persons, then that something has a FLO. For example, since human persons
4
Ma uis, Do . Wh A o tio Is I o al. .Journal of Philosophy. 86.4 (1989): 189-190.
5
Ibid.
6
Ibid.
7
Ibid., 192.
8
Ma uis, Do . "“t o g s O je tio s to the futu e of alue a ou t." Journal of Medical Ethics. 37.6
(2011): 385-386.
9
Ibid.

4
enjoy eating vegetables and rabbits do as well, it follows on the broader construal of a
FLO that rabbits have FLOs. If Marquis defines a FLO in this broad sense, then aborting
or killing rabbits is wrong, because they have a FLO. Marquis believes that this
interpretation is mistaken. He believes that if a theory of killing has the consequences
that killing rabbits or aborting rabbits is wrong, then that theory is mistaken.10
Therefore,
he rejects the broad sense of a FLO.
By the narrow sense of FLO, Marquis means that a being has a FLO if and only if
they have future goods that are characterized as the goods of persons.11
(I will refer to
these goods as “person goods”.) That is, it is likely that the being, who’s FLO is in
question, will have future experiences that persons will have such as doing philosophy,
forming friendships, loving someone, etc… This definition of a FLO avoids the absurd
consequence that rabbits have a FLO because they do not possess a future that is
associated with person goods. Hence, when Marquis mentions a FLO, he means it in the
narrow sense.12
Another important addendum to Marquis’s argument is Marquis does not know
for sure that we will enjoy goods in our futures, but it is likely that we will at least enjoy
some goods provided that we have adequate health care, food, shelter, etc...Thus,
according to Marquis, killing harms us because it deprives us of all the things we would
have had likely valued, had we not been killed. So with the above refinements to
Marquis’s FLO principle we can describe his principle of the wrongness of killing in the
following way: A sufficient condition why killing a being is prima facie seriously wrong
is because it deprives a being of “person goods”, that she would likely have had, had she
10
Ibid.
11
Ibid.
12
Ibid.

5
not been killed. So since we have our principle derived from the uncontroversial cases of
killing, the first step of arguments by inference to the best explanation is completed.
As mentioned earlier, the second step with arguments by inference to the best
explanation is to apply the principle that was derived from the uncontroversial cases of A,
to controversial cases of A. Marquis follows this second step by applying his FLO
principle of when killing is wrong to the controversial case of abortion. (That is, killing
fetuses.) He argues that a sufficient condition for what makes killing us prima facie
seriously wrong is depriving us of a FLO. Fetuses, Marquis believes, will likely grow up
and enjoy “person goods” just like we enjoy those goods; thus they also have a FLO.13
In
other words, Marquis thinks that fetuses have the property of a future-like-ours. Since
killing us is prima facie seriously wrong because killing deprives us of a FLO, then if
fetuses have a FLO, killing them is prima facie seriously wrong because killing them
deprives them of a FLO as well.14
Thus, abortion in typical cases is prima facie seriously
wrong.
Put in a more formal way Marquis’ argument looks like this:
Step 115
P1: Killing is prima facie seriously wrong in a range of uncontroversial cases such as
killing adults, killing children, killing the temporary comatose and killing infants.
P2: The best explanation for why killing is prima facie seriously wrong in these
uncontroversial cases is killing deprives these beings of a future-like-ours or a FLO.
(Call this the FLO principle.)
13
Ibid.
14
Ibid.
15
Boonin, David and Graham Oddie. What’s Wro g? Applied Ethi ists a d Their Criti s. Oxford, Oxford
University Press, 2005. 17-19.

6
P3: It is reasonable to believe that being deprived of a FLO is the best explanation for
why killing is wrong in these uncontroversial cases.
C: Therefore, it is reasonable to believe that the FLO principle is true.
Step 2
Now that we have the principle that best explains those uncontroversial cases of killing,
we can apply it to a controversial case of killing, i.e. abortion.
P4: If the FLO principle is true, then killing fetuses is prima facie seriously wrong.
P5: Abortion kills the fetus.
P6: The FLO principle is true.
C2: Thus, abortion is prima facie seriously wrong.
1.2 When Do We Begin to Have a FLO?
Now that the general argument can be viewed more clearly, let us examine some other
clarifications. One important issue in Marquis’s argument is when do we begin to have a
FLO? (This, as we will see, is important for my defense of Marquis in chapter 3.)
Marquis thinks that we are human organisms. We begin to exist and therefore begin to
have a FLO at three weeks after conception. Thus he believes we were never human
embryos. This is because embryos are not an earlier version of us.16
In an article concerning Peter Singer’s views on abortion, Marquis denies that
embryos are earlier versions of us because of the following reductio ad absurdum:
16
Ma uis, Do . A o tio ‘e isited. “tei o k, Bo ie eds. The Oxford Handbook of Bioethics. New
York: Oxford University Press, 2007. 399-400.

7
suppose we have two identical twins Fred and George.17
He asks us to assume that the
precursor of the twins, the fertilized egg, is the same individual as them. If this is true,
Marquis argues, than the fertilized egg is the same individual as both of them since
identity is transitive. (By transitivity of identity here, I mean if A is identical to C, and B
identical to C, then A is identical to B.) This is because if Fred (A) is the same individual
as the fertilized egg (C), and George (B) is identical to the fertilized egg (C), then Fred
(A) and George (B) are identical. But this is clearly false; Fred and George are different
people. Therefore, the lives of Fred and George did not begin at conception, he argues.18
Human organisms do not begin at conception for Marquis; hence I was never an embryo.
Therefore, embryos do not have FLOs.19
(Of course, Marquis believes that having a FLO
is a sufficient condition for having a right to life, so there might be other reasons why
killing embryos is wrong.)
Marquis further denies that we come to exist at conception because much of the
early embryo is placenta.20
Thus, he contends that prior to implantation there is not a
human organism; the organism emerges out of the placenta, rather than the organism
being the placenta.21
Finally, Marquis denies that human organisms begin at conception
because of the nature of human organisms. Human organisms, he believes, have many
parts that function differently, but contribute to the organism a whole.22
He asserts that
these parts do not differentiate from the placenta until three weeks after conception.
17
Ibid. Marquis actually borrows this case from Peter Singer.
18
He believes that George and Fred do not begin at conception because identity does not survive fission.
19
Ibid.
20
Ibid.
21
Ibid.
22
Ibid.

8
Therefore, Marquis believes embryos are not human organism and embryos do not have
FLOs until three weeks after conception.
1.3 Sufficient Condition
Although I have already mentioned this, it is important to understand why Marquis thinks
having a FLO is a sufficient condition for having a right to life. This is important
because if Marquis believes that having a FLO is a necessary condition for killing being
prima facie seriously wrong, then he is vulnerable to a counterexample. David Boonin
imagines a scenario in which someone suffers from permanent depression and will never
in their life come to value their future.23
If Marquis believes that having a FLO is a
necessary condition for killing being prima facie seriously wrong, then killing the
depressed man would not be wrong on his view. But this is counterintuitive; surely
killing the depressed man is prima facie seriously wrong. However, if Marquis thinks
having a FLO is a sufficient condition for killing being prima facie seriously wrong, then
there may be other reasons other than having a FLO for why killing the depressed man is
wrong. Thus, his view is not committed to the counterexample proposed by Boonin. So
I believe Marquis’s view should be understood as having a FLO is a sufficient condition
for making killing prima facie seriously wrong.
1.4 Why Marquis’s Argument is Appealing
23
Boonin, David. A Defense of Abortion. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003. 76.

9
Now that we have clarified Marquis’s argument, we can look at reasons why it is
attractive. First, although Marquis considers his argument a potentiality argument for the
immorality of abortion (as I will explain shortly), it does not suffer the negative effects
often associated with such arguments. Potentiality arguments for the immorality of
abortion generally argue that since fetuses have the potential of attaining a right to life,
they have an actual right to life.
The problem with these arguments is having a potential right does not entail an
actual right. For example, I may be the President of the United States one day, and thus
may have the rights that go along with such a job, but this does not entail that I currently
have the actual rights of the President of the United States.24
(A hypothetical objector
might respond that the counterexample is not analogous because the right to life is a
natural right, while the right to be the President is a conventional right. Although this is
true, this puts the burden on the advocate of the potentiality argument because he has to
provide us with a natural right that we have because of our potentiality, to show that the
right to life arises via potentiality.25
) Although Marquis’s argument is a potentiality
argument, he avoids this problem because he does not argue for the moral status of the
fetus via a potential property to an actual property. Instead, his account stipulates that the
very same property that makes killing you and me wrong is the same property that makes
killing fetuses wrong. That property consists of one of having a right to life in virtue of
one’s potentiality.26
Fetuses do not have this property potentially, they actually have this
property. Therefore, his argument does not rely on the invalid inference from a potential
24
Ibid., 45-49.
25
Ibid.
26
York: Oxford University Press, 2007. 400.

10
property to an actual property. So although Marquis considers his argument a potentiality
argument, it does not have the problems associated with those arguments.
It may be argued that Marquis’s argument is not a potentiality argument because
it does not rely on a potential property for the wrongness of killing us; instead it relies on
an actual property, although that property is potentiality. That is, being deprived of the
potential goods I would have had, had I lived, is what makes killing me wrong. Marquis
believes his argument is best understood as a potentiality argument because he says,
“Of course, you now have a future of value in virtue of now being an individual
having a certain potentiality. That potentiality is grounded upon your present
nature as a human being. Nevertheless, it is not that present potentiality itself that
is intrinsically valuable to you. Your actual or potential future is the source of the
value of your (future) life to you and therefore the basis for the wrongness of
killing you.”27
So in other words, Marquis believes his argument is a potentiality argument in a sense
because it still grounds the wrongness of killing us on being deprived of “potential”
goods. Thus even if having a FLO is an actual property rather than a potential property,
it is still similar enough to other potential arguments because those arguments rely on the
view that killing fetuses is wrong because it deprives them of a potential right to life. In
other words, the value of the fetus’s life lies in its future goods. Therefore, killing the
fetus deprives it of those futures goods. The only difference between Marquis’s
argument and other potentiality arguments is Marquis’s argument grounds the wrongness
of killing us in our potentiality, as well as fetuses, while other potentiality arguments do
27
Marquis, Do . “i ge o A o tio a d I fa ti ide: ‘epl to “i ge . “ hale , Jeff e A. eds. Peter
Singer Under Fire: The Moral Inconoclast Faces His Critics. Peru: Open Court, 2009. 147.

11
not ground the wrongness of killing us in our potentiality, instead they ground the fetus’s
right to life in terms of its potentiality. Hence, unlike Marquis’s argument they have a
problem. So since, Marquis’s argument shares the common feature of potentiality
arguments that makes killing the fetus wrong, he argues that it is best understood as a
potentiality argument.28
Another reason why Marquis's pro-life view is attractive is because it accounts for
moral intuitions on both sides of the debate. For example, many pro-lifers and pro-
choicers have intuitions that infanticide and killing the temporary comatose is wrong.29
However, many pro-choice views struggle with accounting for these intuitions. (For
example, accounts of personhood that contend that one must desire one’s life in order to
have a right to life, struggle with these intuitions because temporary comatose patients do
not actively have these desires, nor do infants.)30
But on Marquis's account infants will
enjoy person goods; therefore it is wrong to kill them. Similarly, the temporary comatose
will eventually wake up and enjoy person goods; hence it is also wrong to kill them
because they have a FLO.31
So Marquis’s argument fits nicely with these intuitions.
Marquis's argument also is able to account for pro-choice intuitions. For
example, many pro-choicers have intuitions that it is permissible to kill anencephalic
newborns and people who are in persistent vegetative states. They believe that these
beings are not harmed when their lives are ended because those beings forever lack the
28
I disagree with Marquis that his argument is a potentiality argument. This is because his argument
al ead stipulates that ou ha e a ight to life e ause ou ha e a a tual FLO. It does ot state that
because you have a potential right to life you have an actual right to life, unlike other potentiality
arguments.
29
York: Oxford University Press, 2007. 401.
30
Ibid., 395-415.
31
Ibid., 401.

12
ability to care about their lives. Marquis's argument can also accommodate these
intuitions. People who are in persistent vegetative states and anencephalic newborns will
never be able to enjoy person goods such as friendships, love, etc..., therefore, on
Marquis's position they will never have a FLO.32
Hence, Marquis’s view does not imply
it is wrong to kill these beings. (Although since having a FLO is a sufficient condition
for why killing is wrong for Marquis, killing these beings may still be wrong for other
reasons.)
Furthermore, Marquis's account avoids the speciesism objection to the standard
pro-life argument. The speciesism objection says that the species of a being is morally
relevant to that being’s moral status. By the standard pro-life argument I mean the
following argument: 1. All human beings have a serious right to life. 2. Human fetuses
are human beings. 3. Therefore, human fetuses have a serious right to life. The
speciesism objection is problematic to the standard pro-life argument because the
argument assumes in Premise 1 that the biological property “human being” is morally
relevant. This is problematic because biological properties are not morally relevant
because they are simply a description of types of beings. They are simply a description
of what is the case, not what ought to be the case. Furthermore, since a ought can’t be
derived from what simply is, the biological property “human being” is not morally
relevant. Hence, the standard pro-life argument is mistaken.
Another way to articulate this objection is to draw an analogy with what is wrong
with racism. Just as the wrongness of racism depends on the claim that biological
properties do not morally matter; so does the speciesism objection. (Race does not matter
morally because it is a description of what beings are, not what they are ought to be.) If
32
Ibid.

13
treating a biological category as if it matters morally is what is wrong with racism, then
treating a biological category as if it matters morally is what is wrong with speciesism.
Thus if racism is wrong, then so is speciesism. The standard pro-life argument treats
species as if it is morally relevant. Therefore, the standard pro-life argument is wrong.
Marquis’s argument does not face this speciesism objection because his
argument derives the wrongness of abortion from the wrongness of killing in general and
what makes killing wrong in general is a morally relevant property. Thus, Marquis’s
argument does not depend on the morally relevance of species at all. Moreover, Marquis
does not derive an is from an ought.
A final reason that Marquis’s FLO argument is plausible is that it is not
incompatible with active euthanasia, unlike other pro-life arguments. If someone is
suffering from a painful and incurable illness and wishes to die, then it is permissible for
them to be killed because their future is no longer valuable to them. So because the
person no longer has a FLO, they may choose to end their life. (Once again although
Marquis’s FLO argument does not imply that active euthanasia is wrong, it may be
wrong for other reasons for Marquis because having a FLO for him is a sufficient
condition for why killing is prima facie seriously wrong.)
So because his argument avoids the speciesism objection, captures intuitions on
both sides of the debate, and permits active euthanasia, his argument is one of the
strongest pro-life arguments. Although Marquis’s argument avoids some pitfalls of other
pro-life arguments, it may the case that there are other arguments that are problematic for
his account. I will now turn to look at three of these arguments.

14
CHAPTER II
THE EMBRYO RESCUE CASE OBJECTION
The first reductio ad absurdum argument that I will examine is called the
“Embryo Rescue Case” argument. Following S. Matthew Liao33
I will refer to the
Embryo Rescue Case as ERC for the sake of brevity. Here, I will argue that the ERC
argument is unsuccessful or mistaken. To press the objection, proponents of the ERC
argument, such as Dean Stretton and Michael Sandel, provide something in kind to the
following scenario:
Suppose you are in an IVF clinic and there is a fire. Because of the fire you can
only save either “n” embryos (where n is greater than or equal to one) or one five
year old child.
In regard to the scenario above, S. Matthew Lao says, “if embryos are right holders like
you and me, it seems that one should either be permitted to save the embryo if n=1, or be
required to save the embryos if n > 1.”34
33
Lao, “. Matthe . The E o ‘es ue Case. Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics. 27.2 (2006): 142.
34
Ibid.

15
However, most of us share the moral intuition that we ought to save the child, regardless
of how many embryos are present. 35
Therefore, argue Sandel and Stretton, because we
ought to choose the child over any number of embryos36
, it follows that the embryos do
not have a right to life (or a FLO in Marquis’s case).37
Hence, they add, if the embryos
do not have a right to life, then it is permissible to kill them for purposes of abortion or
research.
ERC is a problem for Marquis. If we assume his FLO argument is correct, then
embryos have the same property that makes killing you or me prima facie wrong, namely
a FLO. Since embryos have a FLO, Marquis’s view seems to entail we can save the
embryo in the ERC. Furthermore, Marquis’s view seems to entail that we ought to
choose the embryos when they outnumber the child in the ERC. If Marquis’s position
entails these claims, then his position is counterintuitive, imply the advocates of the ERC
objection. The ERC argument can also be stated more formally as seen in Stephen
Napier’s article38
:
35
Dean Stretton and Michael Sandel also make this argument in Dean Stretton. C iti al Noti e of—
Defending Life: A Moral and Legal Case against Abortio Choi e F a is J. Be k ith. Journal of
Medical Ethics. 34 (November 2008): 795 and in Mi hael “a del, The Ethi al Implications of Human
Clo i g. Perspectives in Biology and Medicine. 48.2 (2005): 245. The original use of the Embryo Rescue
Case can be found in George Annas s, A French Homunculus in a Tennessee Cou t. Hastings Center
Report. 19.6 (1989): 20–22.
36
In this thesis I am assuming that in situations in which we have to save one person or five persons, we
ought to pick the larger amount of persons. This assumption has been challenged by John M. Taurek in
his i po ta t pape “hould the Nu e s Cou t. Philosophy & Public Affairs. 6.4 (Summer 1977): 293-
316.
37
Dean Stretton. C iti al Noti e of—Defending Life: A Moral and Legal Case against Abortion Choice by
F a is J. Be k ith. Journal of Medical Ethics. 34 (November 2008): 795 and in Mi hael “a del, The
Ethical I pli atio s of Hu a Clo i g. Perspectives in Biology and Medicine. 48: 2 (2005): 245
38
Napier, Stephen. "Vulnerable Embryos: A Critical Analysis of Twinning, Rescue, and Natural-Loss
A gu e ts. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly. 84.4 (2010): 798. In his formal presentation of
the E‘C a gu e t Napie does ot use o al status i stead he uses o al o th . Although ea lie i
his article he indicates that the t o te s ea the sa e thi g. The ph ase o al status see s to e
to be the normal term used throughout the literature on abortion and embryo research, so to avoid
o fusio I ill use the te o al status .

16
(P1) Our intuitions tell us to save the child instead of the embryo (all else being
equal).
(P2) If our intuitions tell us to save the child instead of the embryo, then the
embryo lacks the same moral worth as the child.
(C1) The embryo lacks the same moral worth as the child.
Although we have a conclusion the argument is not complete yet.
(P3) If an entity E (the embryo in this case) does not have equal moral worth as
another entity A (the child), then it is permissible to kill E for research purposes.
(C2) It is permissible to kill the embryo for research purposes.
To evaluate this argument, I will first argue that the version above is not a
problem for Marquis. Then, I will argue that a modified version of the argument is a
difficulty for his FLO argument. In order to refute the modified version of the ERC
objection to Marquis’s argument, I will survey the various attempts to solve the original
ERC objection. I will argue that only one of the proposed refutations to the original ERC
objection succeeds in dealing with the modified ERC objection.
One reply available to Marquis is to deny that embryos have FLOs, and therefore,
we are able to save the five year child in ERC no matter how many embryos are present.
As we saw in chapter one, Marquis believes human beings do not begin to exist until
three weeks after conception, hence embryos do not have a FLO. Since embryos do not
have a FLO and the five year old child does, it follows that we should save the five year
old. Hence, the embryo rescue case is not a reductio ad absurdum to his argument.

17
2.1 Fetus Rescue Case
Although initially plausible, I do not think Marquis’s implied responses succeed in
defending his argument entirely from ERC like cases. Suppose we modify ERC to the
point in which Marquis believes that human organisms have a FLO. Imagine, through no
fault of your own, you are taken hostage by an insane man who enjoys putting people in
horrible moral situations. The man takes you to a room where all you can see is five
three week old fetuses in one room and a five year old child in another room. The fetuses
are alive by being connected to their mothers, in such a way, that you cannot see their
mothers. Furthermore, you are told that whatever harms the fetuses will not harm their
mothers. The insane man informs you that there is poisonous gas in both rooms, and if
left unchecked, will eventually kill both the fetuses and the child. In front of you, he tells
you, are two buttons. One will stop the gas from killing the fetuses. The other will stop
the gas from killing the child. He will let you save either the fetuses or the child, but not
both. He points a gun at your head and tells you to choose. Call this modified case Fetus
Rescue Case or FRC. Once again, my moral intuitions (and I think those of others) are
that you are obligated to save the child. Thus, it does not matter that Marquis could
mitigate ERC with his earlier response, since he still has a problem with FRC.
2.2 Kaczor’s Solution to FRC
One response that Marquis might use to FRC is from Christopher Kaczor in his book The
Ethics of Abortion: Women’s Rights, Human Life, and the Question of Justice. Kaczor’s
response is to the original ERC, but it has implications for FRC as well. His response is
as follows: Even if we choose to save the child in ERC, it does not follow that the

18
embryos have no right to life. What follows, for Kaczor, is we have moral justification to
treat human beings who are right holders in different ways. He gives an example in
which we are forced to choose between saving the President of the United States and four
other national Presidents and Prime Ministers or 10 other unknown individuals.39
According to Kaczor, to choose the Presidents and Prime Ministers is not a denial of the
rights to life of the unknown people, but instead it is an affirmation that the deaths of the
world leaders will affect a lot more people, than the killing of the ten individuals.
Similarly, contends Kaczor, we can save the five year old child over the embryos, since
the child has relationships, future plans, and responsibilities, unlike the five embryos. He
stipulates that this does not show that the embryos lack a right to life.
Although Kaczor only mentions embryos, his argument also applies to FRC.
Here, Kaczor might argue that even if the child ought to be saved, it does not follow that
the fetuses do not have FLOs. For it is likely, on Kaczor’s view, that the five year old
child has relationships, future plans, et cetera that will be thwarted if he dies, and thus his
death will harm more people than will the death of the fetuses. Consequently, in light of
this, I believe Kaczor, would say we ought to save the five year old in FRC as well.
One problem, with using Kaczor’s view to refute FRC, is it leads to absurd
consequences. To see this suppose you had to choose between saving a rich man and
poor man who is a hermit, but you could not save both.40
On Kaczor’s view you are
required to save the rich man, since he has more interests, responsibilities, dependents, et
cetera, just like the five year old child does in FRC. So by not saving the rich man, you
39
Kaczor, Christopher. The Ethics of A ortio : Wo e ’s Rights, Hu a Life, a d the Questio of Justi e.
New York: Routledge, 2011. 139. Robert P George and Christopher Tollefsen also make a similar
objection in their Embryo: A Defense of Human Life. New York: Doubleday, 2008. 138-143.
40
I owe this point to Scott Gelfand.

19
will be causing more harm to more people. But this seems counterintuitive that you
ought to save the rich man. Hence, if I am right, then there is a counterexample to
Kaczor’s argument and his defense against the FRC fails. (Of course, a utilitarian would
disagree with this, but Marquis is not a utilitarian, therefore he would be against Kaczor’s
solution.)
2.3 Beckwith’s Solution to FRC
Another possible rebuttal to FRC comes from Francis Beckwith.41
Beckwith only argues
against ERC, but his arguments also apply to FRC. According to Beckwith, our
intuitions are distorted in ERC because the embryos do not look like adult human beings.
Thus, because our intuitions are distorted we can actually save the embryo over the child
or if there are more embryos we ought to save them over the child. I believe Beckwith
would say something similar about FRC because the fetuses at three weeks do not look
like adult human beings. Thus, for him, the only reason we choose to save the child over
the fetuses is because our intuitions are distorted. Contrary to Beckwith, Dean Stretton
argues that our intuitions are not distorted in ERC.42
He argues: suppose the child in
ERC (and for us FRC) is actually a member of an alien species that look a lot like turnips,
but they have rationality. He believes, even if the child looked like a turnip, we still
ought to save the child over the embryos (or in our case the fetuses).43
Therefore, I
believe that Beckwith is mistaken.
41
Beckwith, Francis. Defending Life: A Moral and Legal Case against Abortion Choice. New York:
Cambridge, 2007: 169-170.
42
“t etto , Dea . C iti al Noti e of—Defending Life: A Moral and Legal Case against Abortion Choice by
F a is J. Be k ith. Journal of Medical Ethics. 34 (November 2008): 795.
43
Ibid.

20
2.4 Liao’s Solutions to FRC
A better defense against FRC is provided by Liao.44
In his paper, Liao attempts to show
that ERC does not, by itself, support the claim that embryos do not have a right to life.
He argues that if our intuitions are correct in the first ERC, then they should be the same
in most cases when one has to choose either the embryo or the child.45
Liao asks us to
consider a variation of the Embryo Rescue Case which goes as follows:
Another IVF clinic is on fire. Inside there is an embryo and a five old
child. Unlike the other ERC case the child is unconscious and dying as a
result of smoke inhalation. The child only has a few days to live. Also
different in this case is that the embryo is you and your spouse’s last
chance at pregnancy. You have been desperately trying to have a child for
years and the doctor says this time you are very likely to succeed. 46
I will refer to the above case as Embryo Rescue Case 2 or ERC2. According to Liao, his
intuitions are different in this case then in ERC. He contends that you may be permitted
to save the embryo rather than the child.47
The problem, as Liao points out, with ERC2 is that the case is loaded with factors
that may distort our moral intuitions.48
For example, one potential distortion, he argues,
is we are permitted to save the embryo because the child is about to die. Liao believes
that the assumption that underlies this idea is false.49
The hidden assumption, he asserts,
44
Liao, “ Matthe . The E o ‘es ue Case. Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics. 27.2: 141-147.
45
Ibid.
46
Ibid.
47
Ibid.
48
Ibid.
49
Ibid.

21
is that we can save non-right holders when a right holder is about to die. He thinks that
this distortion can be ruled out by another case. Liao considers another variant on the
embryo case which he calls the Picasso Rescue Case or PRC50
:
There is another fire at the IVF clinic. But this time all the embryos are dead.
However, there is a five year old child, who is unconscious, and about to die in a
couple of days because of smoke inhalation. Also in the clinic is a Picasso
painting, made specifically for you by Picasso, which you love. The painting
means so much to you that if you lose it, you will suffer serious distress for many
years to come. You can save the dying child or your painting, but not both.
Which should you save?
Liao believes his and other intuitions indicate that you should clearly save the
child in PRC.51
Based on the case, Liao argues that the principle that we can save non-
right holders when a right holder is about to die is false; so our intuitions are not distorted
in ERC2.52
Another reason that ERC2 might distort our intuitions is that the embryo is
yours and it is your last chance to have a child. Liao believes this will not account for the
distortion either, since the Picasso painting is your painting.53
On the basis of the Picasso
case, Liao indicates that if ERC established that embryos are not right holders, there
should not be cases so similar, such as ERC2, in which we have intuitions that justify us
in saving the embryo.54
However, he thinks there are such cases; hence ERC does not
establish by itself that embryos are not right holders.
50
Ibid.
51
Ibid.
52
Ibid.
53
Ibid.
54
Ibid.

22
What Liao says concerning PRC and ERC2, applies to FRC as well. Imagine a
modification on the original FRC, call it FRC2. Conditions are basically the same as
FRC, but in FRC2 the man tells you that the unconscious five year old child that you can
save will be dead in a couple of days from a previous illness. Also there is only one fetus
to save, but it is you and your wife’s last possible attempt to have a child and it is hooked
up to another woman. As in ERC2, I contend that you can save your fetus in FRC2.
As Liao maintains in ERC2, our intuitions might be distorted in FRC2. Not only
is the fetus mine and my wife’s, but the child is also dying. These beliefs are supported
by the following underlining assumptions: First, it is permissible to save a non-right
holder over a right-holder if the non right-holder is yours. Secondly, you can save a non-
right holder over a right-holder if the right-holder is dying. To show that these intuitions
are not distorting our intuitions in FRC2 we can imagine a similar case to Liao’s Picasso
Rescue Case. Imagine that an insane man forces you to choose between saving your
beloved Picasso painting or a stranger’s dying child. (Call this case IPRC or Insane
Picasso Rescue Case.) Surely, it would be wrong for you to save the painting. Thus the
second assumption seems to be false because even though the child is dying you still
cannot save the painting. It might be the case that which distorts our intuitions in FRC2
is that the child is yours, but IPRC rules this out because the painting is yours. So as in
ERC2, we can rule out the alleged distortions in FRC2 by comparing it with a variant on
Liao’s PRC.
One response against Liao’s implied argument against FRC2 is what is distorting
your intuitions is you are morally excused in choosing the fetus, because it is your fetus
that you love. You love the fetus because it is your future child and last chance to have a

23
child. The reason you are excused is illustrated in another fire rescue case. In this case
you have the choice between saving your parents or three strangers, and once again you
cannot save both. According to Scott Gelfand,55
some agents might not be able to choose
anything but to save their parents because they love them.56
Loving them, for Gelfand,
creates such an overwhelming emotional toll that you cannot help but save them. Thus,
loving them creates an excusing condition. Although your action might be unjustified,
you are still excused because in this situation you could not help but save your parents.
Accordingly, you may be excused in FRC2 as well, because you love the fetus. And you
cannot help but save it. So what is distorting your intuitions is confusion between the
ideas of excuse and justification because of our deep love for the fetus.
To this Liao might respond, that he can eliminate this distortion of our intuitions
by going back to FRC2 and IPRC. That is, if the woman who chooses the painting
because of her love for it is not excused, than choosing the fetus because you cannot help
but love it is not an explanation for the alleged distortion of our intuitions in FRC2.
However, it seems that the woman in the painting case is excused for the choosing the
painting because she loves the painting, just like the parent loves the fetus. Thus the
distortion in our intuitions is not ruled out by the painting case; hence our intuitions are
distorted in FRC2.
Another way that Liao might respond is the woman who is in love with the
painting is not excused for her action, unlike the parent’s love for his fetus, because
loving a painting (no matter how famous) is not a worthy object of love. So even if
55
Co e satio ith “ ott Gelfa d. I Gelfa d s e a ple he is i agi i g a plausi le fo of
compatibilism.
56
Also it might be the case that you justified instead of excused in saving your parents because you love
them. If this is true, then the argument in this section does not work.

24
loving the painting creates such a strong emotional toll on the woman, it does not follow
that she is excused for choosing her painting because she should not have loved the
painting in the first place or not love the painting more than a human. Thus if the
excusing condition is ruled out in the painting case, then it is not clear that the parent’s
love is distorting our intuitions in FRC2. Against Liao, I believe that a painting is not
necessarily wrong to love. Imagine in IPRC that the woman’s painting was done by her
husband, who happens to be Picasso and it is the only thing she has left of his. Would it
be so wrong, for the woman to love the painting? I do not think it would be so wrong
because the painting is such a cherished memory from the woman’s husband. Hence, it
seems that the woman would be excused in saving the painting because of her love for it.
I believe there is a better way to respond to Gelfand. To do this, consider the
following case called FRC3. In FRC3 everything is the same as in FRC2, except the
fetus is not yours. Like in FRC2 the insane man tells you that the five year old only has a
few days to live. Which should you choose? Most people would, I expect, argue that
their intuitions are not as strong as in FRC. I think you can choose the fetus. It is clear
in FRC3 that there is no excusing condition. So if you choose the fetus, it seems you are
justified in choosing the fetus. Thus, I believe Gelfand’s objection is mistaken.
A better way to object to Liao’s implied argument is to argue that it is
permissible to save a non-right holder if a right holder is about to die. For example,
suppose the child in PRC has been in great pain because of his past disease and now,
unconscious, he will soon die of smoke inhalation. It seems permissible to me, that the
man in PRC can the save the painting over the child. If I am right then this is a
counterexample to Liao’s view that we cannot permissibly save a non-right holder over a

25
right holder. Therefore, contrary to Liao, our intuitions are distorted in ERC2 and by
implication FRC2 by the factor of the dying child.
It maybe objected that it is not clear that the child is a right holder in the case just
mentioned and this is why it seems permissible to save the painting over the child. But I
believe this is mistaken, because if the child is not a right holder, then it seems that we
would not have a duty to refrain from killing him. If A has a right to life, then others
have a prima facie duty to not deny A that right. Thus if the dying child has a right to
life, then others have a prima facie obligation to not kill him. To see this consider a case
where in order to save the fetuses you have to kill the dying child who is in pain. Would
it be wrong to kill the dying child? My intuition and I think others intuitions are that it
would be wrong to kill him even if he is dying; hence, it seems that he has a right to life.
Therefore, our intuitions are not distorted in the counterexample to Liao’s case.
A further possible solution proposed by Liao to ERC, which I will argue has
implications for FRC, involves what Jeff McMahan has called time relative interests or
TRIs.57
According to McMahan, a time relative interest is the degree to which we are
psychologically related to our past and future selves.58
The degree, for McMahan, is
affected by the amount of mental life that is sustained over time and the amount of
internal coherence between earlier memories and later memories.59
McMahan believes
that the stronger one’s time-relative interest’s the stronger one is connected to one’s past
and future, thus, the stronger one is invested in one’s future. For example, an adult will
have stronger time-relative interests than an infant, since an infant has weak interest in
57
Liao, “ Matthe . The E o ‘es ue Case. Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics. 27.2: 141-147.
58
Ibid.
59
DeGrazia, David. "The Harm of Death, Time- Relati e I te ests, a d A o tio . Philosophical Forum. 38:1
(2007): 65-66.

26
his or her future. To solve the ERC objection Liao argues that if person A has stronger
time-relative interests then person B, then we should save person A, since A has stronger
time-relative interests. This is important to the embryo rescue case; because even if we
have stronger intuitions to save the embryos or the infant, it does not follow that the
embryos or infants are not right holders because it may be the case that they have lesser
time-relative interests. In order to support this Liao gives the Alzheimer’s Case60
.
A hospital is burning, and there is a person in the middle stage of an Alzheimer’s
disease and there is a normal adult. You can only save one of them.
According to Liao, all things being equal, you should save the healthy adult, even though
both the Alzheimer’s patient and normal adult have an equal right to life.61
The time-
relative interest account provides an explanation for why this is so, contends Liao, since
the Alzheimer’s patient has weaker time-relative interests.
Liao worries that the time-relative interest account implies that the Alzheimer’s
patient is not a right holder.62
He ultimately argues that even though the Alzheimer’s
patient has weaker time-relative interests, it does not follow that the patient lacks a right
to life. Liao gives another scenario called Alzheimer’s Case 2 to demonstrate this63
:
A hospital is burning, and there is your spouse who is in the middle stage of an
Alzheimer’s disease and there is a normal stranger. You can only save one of
them.
In Alzheimer’s Case 2, asserts Liao, you are permitted to save your spouse even though
your spouse has weaker time relative interests. Furthermore, he stipulates, that even
60
Liao, “ Matthe . The E o ‘es ue Case. Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 27.2: 141-147.
61
Ibid.
62
Ibid.
63
Ibid.

27
though your spouse has weaker time relative interests, you are still permitted to save your
spouse because she is your spouse. He believes this would not be the case, if your spouse
had no right to life. Liao argues this by using the Picasso Rescue Case. He thinks that
the case shows that we cannot save non-right holders, even if our preferences to save the
other object are strong. Therefore, only if the Alzheimer’s woman lacked a right to life,
would it be wrong to save her, despite her low time relative interests, argues Liao. So,
for Liao, even if a being has lower time relative interests it does not follow that the being
lacks a right to life.64
If Liao’s reasoning in Alzheimer’s Case 2 is right, then the time relative interest
case can show why we are justified in saving the child over the embryos. Since the
embryos do not have the brain power that allows them to stand in psychological relation
to their future and past selves, argues Liao, unlike the child who does stand in relation to
itself, we are justified in saving the child in ERC. But just because we would save the
child does not mean that the embryos lack rights to life or by implication a FLO, just as
the Alzheimer’s patient does not lack a right to life, even though her time-relative
interests are low.
As I said earlier, I believe Liao could equally apply TRIs to FRC. He could argue
that the five year old ought to be saved over the fetuses because the five year old has
greater time relative interests. Moreover, he could argue that using TRIA does not
commit him to the view that fetuses do not have FLOs for the same reasons that using
TRIA does not commit him to the view that embryos are not right holders. So I believe
Liao’s use of TRIA does apply to FRC.
64
Ibid.

28
But if Liao uses the time-relative interest account, does this help Marquis in FRC?
Can Marquis even use it? I think Marquis cannot. For Marquis, killing is fundamentally
wrong because the victim is deprived of all the goods the victim would have had, if she
had lived. On the other hand, for the time-relative interest account or TRIA the
fundamental explanation for the wrongness of killing is it frustrates the interests one has
to one’s future and past. TRIA seems to lead to the conclusion that killing an adult
human being is more wrong, then killing a fetus because fetuses are less psychologically
connected to their past and futures. Contrary to TRIA, Marquis maintains that killing an
adult human is as wrong as killing a fetus. Thus, I believe the two accounts are
fundamentally at odds with each other.
Even if Marquis can use the time-relative interest account, does he really want to?
I contend the answer is no. One problem with TRIA is that it has unacceptable
implications concerning saving persons. For example, suppose we have a choice to save
a one year old or a twenty five year old. We cannot save both. Most of us would say that
we can save either. However, TRIA does not support this view since the one year olds
psychological unity is not nearly as strong as the twenty five year olds psychological
unity.
2.5 Napier’s Solutions to FRC
Another possible solution to FRC is by Steven Napier.65
In his paper, Napier only argues
against ERC, but I believe they have similar implications for FRC as well. Based on how
65
Argu e ts. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly. 84:4 (2010): 798.

29
he construes the argument for ERC, I have formulated below how I believe he would
construe FRC:
(P1) Our intuitions tell us to save the child instead of the fetus (all else being
equal).
(P2) If our intuitions tell us to save the child instead of the fetus, then the fetus
lacks the same moral worth as the child.
(C1) The fetus lacks the same moral worth as the child.
Although C1 has been drawn the argument is not done yet.
(P3) If an entity E (the fetus in this case) does not have equal moral worth as
another entity A (the child), then it is permissible to kill E, since E is violating a
woman’s bodily autonomy.
(C2) It is permissible to kill the fetus, since it is violating a woman’s bodily
autonomy.
In his article on ERC, Napier challenges P2 of ERC with a counterexample and
by implication P2 in FRC. He implies that what underlies P2 in FRC is the assumption,
if our intuitions tell us to save X over Y, than Y does not have the same moral status as
X. He thinks that this assumption is obviously false in ERC, and there is no reason to
think that he would not believe it is false when applied to FRC as well. Napier,
challenges the hidden assumption in ERC, and by implication in FRC, by imagining that
the fetus in the rescue scenario was you and your spouse’s.66
Suppose, he implies, you
either had the choice between saving your fetus or a stranger’s fetus in FRC. Napier
implies, you would be allowed to save your fetus, but under P2 your fetus would have
greater moral status than the stranger’s fetus because you choose it. Napier, I think,
66
Ibid., 798-799.

30
would believe that this is counterintuitive because even though I choose my fetus, this
does not mean that it has more moral status then the other fetus simply because I choose
to save it.67
Napier uses a similar counterexample in response to ERC. When describing why
the results of the counterexample are bizarre for ERC, he argues that because the parent
favored her embryo this shows that it has more moral status. This is odd, he contends,
because we discover moral status, rather than impute it. Moral status is a property of the
embryo, not of our desires, he stipulates. Thus, I believe, Napier would argue P2 in FRC
has the same problem. So in other words, based on what he says about ERC, I believe he
would challenge FRC by arguing who I do not save does not entail that the individual
lacks moral status.
There is a difficulty with Napier’s counterexample because his case is not
analogous to FRC. In Napier’s counterexample the parent’s preferences distort our
intuitions in determining whether their fetus or the stranger’s fetus ought to be saved. If
the parents in Napier’s counterexample case are replaced with a stranger, then it seems
that we have no intuition either way that the stranger should save. Hence, neither fetus
would have greater moral status, than the other. However, in FRC the stranger has no
preference for either the child or the fetuses, but we still have the intuition that he ought
to save the child; thus in FRC our intuitions are not distorted by the parent’s preferences
because the stranger has no attachment to either the child or the fetuses. Therefore,
Napier’s case distorts our intuitions and is not analogous to FRC.68
67
Ibid.
68
It might be objected here that if our intuitions are not distorted in FRC2 by the parents in that case,
then why should they be distorted by the parents i Napie s ou te e a ple? Afte all, the e a ples a e

31
Furthermore, Napier challenge of P4 in ERC69
has consequences for P4 in FRC.
His argument implies that the best explanation for our intuition in FRC is that we have an
obligation to prevent unjust suffering to others. Napier implies that unlike the child the
fetuses feel no pain and do not suffer. (Even on conservative estimates fetuses do not
feel pain until the seventh week of pregnancy.) Since the child’s suffering is greater, we
have a duty to save the child, Napier, I think, would argue. This argument is clearly
mistaken for we can adjust FRC to where the child feels no pain in the fire, as well as the
fetuses. Even in this case most, if not all people, feel that we should save the child over
the fetuses.
Napier also objects to P4 in ERC by another way and by implication, P4 in FRC
as well. He argues that P4 is mistaken because it “basically tells us that if Y does not
have moral status equal to that of X, then it is permissible to kill Y.”70
Napier contends
that just because something does not have equal moral status does not mean we can kill
the thing that has lesser moral status.71
In other words, he wants to argue that the
embryos might have enough moral worth to make it wrong to kill them. For example,
one might argue: suppose there is another fire in an embryo clinic and I can only save
either my five year old child or a chimp. I can surely save my child, but this does not
mean I can kill the chimp. Thus, just because the chimp is not chosen does not mean that
it lacks a right to life, for Napier.
e si ila . I thi k that i F‘C a e i tuitio s a e disto ted the pa e t s hoi e, ut the a e u h
more distorted by the fact that a right holder is about to die in FRC2.
69
A gu e ts. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly. 84.4 (2010): 799-803. Robert P George and
Christopher Tollefsen also make this objection in their Embryo: A Defense of Human Life. New York:
Doubleday, 2008. 138-143.
70
Ibid., Robert P George and Christopher Tollefsen also make this objection in their Embryo: A Defense of
Human Life. New York: Doubleday, 2008. 138-143.
71
Ibid.

32
Contra Napier I think we can adjust the FRC scenario to fit his criticism. Suppose
the insane man in FRC pointed a gun at your head and told you that, in order to save
either the child or the fetuses, you had to press a button that released a poisonous gas that
would either kill the fetuses or the child. Although you would be excused, given the gun
pointed to your head, it would not follow that you are justified in killing the child. Most
people, I think, would contend that you ought to kill the fetuses to save the child, rather
than vice versa. The reason is that the fetuses lack moral status or have less status.
There may be a worry here that although most people have the intuitions that we
do not have to save the fetuses in FRC, not many people will have the intuition that we
can kill the fetuses to save the child in the modified FRC. I believe their intuitions are
distorted because they picture the fetuses looking like miniature versions of adult human
beings. But I think many will have the intuition that you can kill the fetuses to save the
child when they picture the size and appearances at the point where Marquis believe that
human organisms come to exist. The fetuses at three weeks are as big as an apple seed
and they do not look like human beings.72
That is, they do not have definitive arms, legs,
eyes, ears, or a nose.73
They also have a tail. So in light of this description is does not
seem to be too difficult to believe that many people would have the intuition that you can
kill the fetuses to save the child.
72
Vorvick , Linda J. "3.5 Week Fetus." Medline Plus: Trusted Health Information for You. N.p., 09/12/2011.
Web. 31 Mar 2012. http://www.nlm.nih.gov/medlineplus/ency/imagepages/9578.htm
73
"Fetal development - 4 weeks pregnant ." Baby Center. N.p., n.d. Web. 31 Mar 2012.
http://www.babycenter.com.au/pregnancy/fetaldevelopment/04weeks/

33
2.6 George and Tollefsen’s Solutions to FRC
Robert P. George and Christopher Tollefsen in their book Embryo: A Defense of Human
Life argue against ERC in several pages.74
Although their rebuttals apply to ERC, their
responses apply equally to FRC as well. Their first point is that ERC is problematic
when we consider other types of cases in which we have to save people.75
For example,
they argue that if there is a fire at a hospital and you have the choice between saving four
pregnant women or six men, they think that many people would choose to save the
pregnant woman, since they would reasonably judge that they were saving eight persons
rather than six.76
But when George and Tollefsen’s rebuttal is applied to FRC, I think they are
mistaken. Our intuitions here are not that we reasonably believe that we are saving
persons, but that we had better be safer rather than sorry and thus save the group that
likely has the most persons. However, this is different than the original FRC case, in
which we know how many individuals are involved and at what developmental stage they
are, unlike the George and Tollefsen’s case. So this case is not helpful in criticizing the
original FRC case. Furthermore, both sides of the abortion debate are likely to have
intuitions that differ in George and Tollefsen’s case. Therefore, their case is unlikely to
convince pro-choicers. Pro-lifers will likely favor the pregnant women, but the pro-
choicers will likely say that we can favor either. So unlike Thomson’s famous violinist
the intuition behind George and Tollefsen’s thought experiment is not widely shared
outside of the pro-life movement and thus is not effective in refuting FRC.
74
George, Robert P and Tollefsen, Christopher. Embryo: A Defense of Human Life. New York: Doubleday,
2008. 138-143.
75
Ibid.,
76
Ibid.,

34
George and Tollefsen argue finally that ERC is mistaken because of another case
in which we have the choice between saving three comatose patients or a five year old
girl. GT argue that even though many people would save the five year old girl, it does
not follow that we can kill the comatose patients and harvest their vital organs in order to
save the girl. They argue that this case is analogous to ERC.77
I believe George and
Tollefsen would argue that their argument has implications for FRC as well. Just because
you ought to save the child, does not mean you can kill the fetuses.
Although this objection makes sense in the cases of the comatose, it does not
work in the case of FRC. This is because we can modify FRC to show that you can kill
the fetuses to save child, hence it does follow that because you ought to save the child
that you can kill the fetuses. As I mentioned before with Napier, suppose you are forced
by the insane man to either gas the fetuses to save the child or gas the child to save the
fetuses. I believe most people would believe that it is permissible to gas and kill the
fetuses to save the child. Hence, it does follow that because you ought to save the child
that you can kill the fetuses.
2.7 Deckers’s Solution
Jan Deckers offers another solution that I think is successful in refuting ERC which also
refutes FRC.78
He argues that we need to take into account how we are affected
differently by a child than by an embryo. (Although this is similar to Beckwith, it is not
quite the same, since Beckwith’s view concerns the appearance of the embryo, rather
than what is like to be an embryo. It may be argued that we can only empathize with
77
Ibid.,
78
De ke s, Ja . Are those who subscribe to the view that early embryos are persons irrational and
i o siste t? A epl to B o k. Journal of Medical Ethics. 33.2 (February 2007): 102-106.

35
people who look like us, but it seems that we can empathize with Stretton’s rational
turnips, therefore this view seems to be mistaken.)
Once, Deckers believes, we understand this difference, we can realize that we are
justified in saving child over the embryos. However, he adds, this does not entail that the
embryos lack a right to life. What Deckers is referring to here is the idea that we do not
know what it is like to be an embryo. He argues we have no memories of being one and
thus we do not share a lot of experiences in common with them, but we do remember
being a child. Although we may not have any memories being other children or adults,
our own experiences are close enough to them to empathize with them, contends
Deckers.79
Hence, according to Deckers, we are more affected by their potential death.
Thus, we are justified in saving the child because we empathize more easily with the
child/adult than the embryos, Deckers believes. So what justifies us in saving the child in
ERC, for Deckers, is not the difference in moral status, but the difference in our empathy.
(However, empathy might ultimately ground moral status for Deckers.)
I believe Deckers would say something similar to FRC as well. What justifies our
saving the child is we emphasize with the loss the child over the fetuses. None of us
remember being a fetus, but we do know what it is like to be a child. Therefore, we will
likely empathize more with the child because of what the child might lose if he is not
saved.
One objection to Deckers’s view is that there seems to be another empathy based
explanation for why we can save the child over the fetuses. However, this competing
explanation entails that the fetuses lack the right to life. If this explanation is true, then
Marquis’s view that killing fetuses is wrong for the same reasons that killing adults is
79
Ibid.

36
wrong is mistaken, because fetuses lack the right to life. This competing explanation
goes as follows: What explains our intuitions in FRC is that the fetuses lack moral status.
This is because we empathize with the child and do not emphasize with the fetuses. The
reason that we can save the child over the fetuses is that we can empathize more with the
child, than with the fetuses.
We empathize more with the child because we share more experiences with the
child such as consciousness, the ability to love, and so on, than with the fetuses.
Therefore, because we empathize more with the child, this indicates that the fetuses lack
moral status. If empathy is a sign of moral status, then this provides a competing
explanation to Deckers’s solution to FRC. Thus unless the competing explanation is
mistaken, then Marquis’ argument has a difficulty with FRC.
One problem with the idea that empathy indicates who has moral status is it leads
to conclusions that are difficult to believe. For example, it seems that the temporary
comatose do not currently have the ability to love, feel pain, or have any experience that
we emphasize with. Therefore, according to the above view the temporary comatose lack
moral status. But most people would agree that they have the save moral status as you or
I. So it seems that the competing moral explanation is false because it has this result.
Hence, because the competing explanation is false, Marquis’s pro-life argument is sound
because Deckers’s view is correct.

37
CHAPTER III
THE SAVE THE MOTHER’S LIFE OBJECTION
The second reductio ad absurdum that I will look it is based on a particular
response by Robert F. Card in his paper “Two Puzzles for Marquis’s Conservative View
on Abortion”. 80
Card argues that Marquis’s FLO argument entails a reductio ad
absurdum, because it follows from Marquis’s view that in cases of abortion where the
doctor must choose between saving the woman or the fetus, the doctor must choose the
fetus.81
This view seems very counterintuitive to most people because we have the
intuition that the woman may be saved when she cannot be consulted. And as I shall
elaborate on later, Marquis’s FLO argument appears to fall victim to this problem
because his view does not have the resources for the doctor to choose the mother because
both beings have an equal FLO. I will refer to this objection as “The Save the Mother’s
Life Objection” to Marquis’s argument.
80
Ca d, ‘o e t. T o Puzzles fo Ma uis s Co se atio Vie o A o tio . Bioethics. 20.5 (September
2006): 264-77.
81
Ibid., 266-68.

38
To defend Marquis here, I will explore Card’s criticism of Marquis. Then, I will
argue that Card’s criticism is not a problem for Marquis because in the relevant cases the
fetus is an innocent threat. (By innocent threat I mean someone who is not responsible
for their choices, but poses a threat to someone else anyway.) I will argue that since the
fetus is an innocent threat, this allows for the invocation of self-defense/other-defense
justifications that would render permissible what would otherwise be prima facie
impermissible killing.
Although there is no uniform agreement of the conditions under which self-
defense/other-defense can justify killing, I will look at two popular and plausible
accounts of self-defense, which are on the extremes of the spectrum of self-defense as far
as the importance of the fault of the attacker is concerned. I will argue that on either of
these accounts it is permissible, given Marquis’s views about the wrong-making property
of killing and its applicability to the fetus, to save the life of the mother over the fetus.
First, at one end of the spectrum, I will look at Judith Jarvis Thomson’s view of self-
defense.82
At the other end of the spectrum is Jeff McMahan’s account of self-defense.83
For purposes of this chapter I want to argue that Marquis’s argument is plausible
whichever of the above accounts of self-defense he might choose. If I am right that the
above accounts are some of the most plausible accounts of self-defense and that they are
representational of the spectrum of responsibility of the attacker in the self-defense
literature, I think that if Marquis’s argument is compatible with either account of self-
defense, then his account is likely plausible enough to avoid Card’s objection.
(Although I look at these accounts of self-defense, I do not find either of them ultimately
82
Tho so , Judith Ja is. “elf Defe se. Philosophy and Public Affairs. (1991): 283-310.
83
McMahan, Jeff. The Ethics of Killing: Problems at the Margins of Life. New York: Oxford, 2002. 398-
421.

39
right. I will grant one, then the other, for the sake argument, to see if Marquis’s view can
allow the right to the mother to have an abortion.) On each account I will show given
that the fetus is threatening the mother’s life, that the doctor can save the mother’s life in
other-defense. Thusly, I will vindicate Marquis’s argument against Card, since it follows
that the fetus is an innocent attacker and, therefore, the doctor can favor the woman over
the fetus.
3.1 Card’s Objection to Marquis
Card begins his criticism of Marquis by considering the case of abortion when the life of
the mother is threatened by the pregnancy. 84
Most people, Card argues, have the
intuition that it is permissible for the woman to have an abortion in order to save her life
and so does Marquis.85
This leads us to the question: can Marquis’s view satisfy their
intuition? Marquis gives hints that it can. He says, “Presumably abortion could be
justified in some circumstances, only if the loss consequent on failing to abort would be
at least as great.”86
Apparently, Marquis thinks that abortion is permissible in some
scenarios to save the mother’s life.
In order to see the possible strategies for justifying abortion when the mother’s
life is at stake, we need to look at how Marquis compares FLOs. How Marquis compares
futures is important because for him the fetus has the same moral status as an adult
human being. Thus in cases such as when the mother’s and the fetus’s life are at stake,
both beings have a FLO if they are not deprived of it. But if both beings have FLOs to
84
2006): 267-68.
85
Marquis, Don. An Argument That Abortion is Wrong. Contemporary Moral Problems. J. White, ed.,
Belmont: Wadsworth, 2000. 164.
86
Ma uis, Do . Wh A o tio Is I o al. Journal of Philosophy 86 (April 1989): 183.

40
lose, then how do we decide who to save when we have to choose between saving the
mother or the fetus?
Marquis does not offer any specific way to compare FLOs. Card gives two
possible ways to measure competing futures that Marquis might use; he distinguishes
between an objective standard and a subjective standard.87
The former, contends Card,
means we should seek a utilitarian standard to determine the overall amount of pleasure
versus pain the persons would have from their experiences had they not been killed.88
Then, he argues, we would measure the competing futures to see which one has the larger
amount of goods. The latter approach concerns the perspective of the victim, argues
Card. For Card, this means the victim’s future is determined by the amount of value he
or she finds in it.89
The objective approach leads to counterintuitive implications according to Card.
Suppose, he states, a twenty year old unconscious mother has a pregnancy that threatens
her life.90
Card asks us to imagine a case when the best evidence shows that the fetus
will be able to survive if the pregnancy reaches the third trimester, but if it does, the
mother will die. Card argues that if Marquis adopts the objective standard we should
save the fetus, since it will likely have a more valuable future than the mother. (The
reason to save the fetus here, I think, is not that we actually know that the fetus will have
greater goods than the mother. Rather, the reason is that our best predictions about the
duration of each life will likely favor the fetus, given that she is born in a society with
decent heath care. So, all else being equal, healthy fetuses generally have longer life
87
2006): 266.
88
Ibid., 266-268.
89
Ibid.
90
Ibid., 267-68.

41
spans than twenty year old mothers.) If this is the case, then the intuition that a third
party has the right to save the woman’s life over the fetus’s is contrary to Marquis’s view,
maintains Card. Thus, Marquis will have to adopt, what Card calls, the extreme
conservative view on abortion.91
That is, the view that the abortion doctor is obligated to
save the fetus’s life. Card finds this implication to be deeply implausible.
Instead of the objective standard, Marquis might be able to use the subjective
standard to mitigate the problem of the extreme conservative view, argues Card. One
way, he contends, to address the subjective standard would be to ask each person
involved in the dilemma to state how much they value their future. However, fetuses
cannot talk so this is not helpful, argues Card.92
Card mentions toward the end of his
paper, what I believe is a more promising method, which does not depend on either
subjective or objective viewpoints. Like Card, I will refer to this interpretation as the
threshold interpretation of Marquis’s FLO argument. 93
The idea here is as long the fetus
is say, at least three weeks old; he has an equal FLO as anyone else that is over three
weeks of age. This is similar to a height limit when someone is trying to ride a roller
coaster. If they are above the height limit or threshold, they have an equal right to ride
the roller coaster as anyone else. Similarly with FLOs, as long as someone has a
plausible prospect of enjoying some person goods in their future, they have an equal FLO
as an adult. However, if we take this approach, then Marquis’s view is contrary to our
intuitions. Our intuitions are that third parties who in a position to save either the fetus or
the mother and unable to communicate with either, the doctor may in a non arbitrary way
91
Ibid., 268.
92
Ibid. Moreover, this position is dangerous to Ma uis s FLO a gu e t e ause fetuses la k the
psychological capacities necessary to communicate that they value their futures. Therefore, on the
subjective standard fetuses might not actually have FLOs at all, since they cannot value them.
93
Ibid.

42
save the mother over the fetus. However, Marquis’s theory is not able to explain this
intuition on the threshold interpretation of FLO, for in his theory the third party must be
morally indifferent to whom he should save. This is because each human being involved
has an equal FLO.
To reconcile Marquis’s account with our intuitions in above case, not only do we
need to adopt the threshold account, but also we need to look at threat to mother cases in
the context of the ethics of self-defense and other-defense. Can Marquis argue that
because the fetus threatens the mother’s life, the fetus forfeits its right to life? If so, then
abortion to save the mother’s life would be justified, even in cases where neither party
can be consulted. If this is true, then Marquis can avoid the counterintuitive extreme
conservation view on abortion. As I said earlier, I will look at two accounts of self-
defense, apply them to other-defense and argue that abortion to save the mother’s life in
Marquis’s view is justified with both.
3.2 Differences Between Self-Defense and Abortion in Other-Defense
Before we move on to describing Thomson’s view of self-defense, we need to look at
how the paradigm case of self-defense differs from abortion in other-defense. As Nancy
Davis points out, there are several differences between the two.94
(By the paradigm case
of self-defense, I mean the case in which an innocent victim A is attacked for no good
reason by a responsible aggressor B and A is only able to stop B by killing.) First,
unlike the paradigm case of self-defense, abortion in other-defense is usually
94
Da is, Na . A o tio a d “elf-Defe se. Philosophy and Public Affairs. 13 (Summer 1984): 185-187.

43
premeditated.95
The woman usually knows that the fetus is killing her and has time to
react and therefore, order the abortion. Additionally, cases of abortion are usually
performed by doctors; while paradigm cases of self-defense involve just the attacker and
the victim. Hence, the cases of abortion involve other-defense.96
Furthermore, many
pregnancies, stipulates Davis, happen because of voluntary sexual intercourse in which
contraception was not used or was ineffective. So many abortions happen because the
pregnant woman was partially responsible creating the situation. This is unlike the
paradigm case of self-defense when the victim is not responsible for her aggressor
threatening her life. According to Davis, when a victim finds herself in a life threatening
situation, but is somewhat responsible for the situation because of her own negligence,
then the ability to kill in self-defense is not as clear.97
In order to see if the above differences cause problems for justifying abortion to
save the mother’s life, using the justificatory mechanisms available for killing in self-
defense, we need to look at accounts of self-defense. I will consider two representative
accounts, starting with Thomson’s. Before we look at Thomson’s view we need to be
clear about what cases of pregnancy involve a forced choice for Marquis. (By the term
“forced choice” here I mean a situation in which A has to kill B or B has to kill A in
order for someone to survive.) To do this we need to look more closely at cases of
pregnancy that involve a forced choice. There are three cases.98
95
Ibid.
96
Ibid.
97
Ibid.
98
Kaczor, Christopher. The Ethi s of A ortio : Wo e ’s Rights, Hu a Life, a d the Questio of Justi e.
New York: Routledge, 2011. 185-189.

44
3.3 Three Cases of Forced Choice Abortion
The first case is ectopic pregnancy, which is the most common. 99
In ectopic pregnancies
the fetus implants in the mother somewhere besides the uterus.100
Usually the fetus
implants in the mother’s fallopian tube. This can cause severe internal bleeding and
result in a loss of life to the mother, if the fetus is not removed quickly. However, if the
fetus is removed quickly it will die because the fetus has not become viable yet. Cases of
ectopic pregnancy were the mother’s life is at stake are not a problem for Marquis.
Under Marquis’s view this fetus does not have a FLO because the fetus will not live long
enough to become viable because the fallopian tube lacks the resources to bring the fetus
to viability. Thus the fetus will not grow into a healthy newborn, since it will die.
Hence, in these cases the fetus does not have a FLO and doctor is obligated to save the
mother’s life in cases of abortion involving a forced choice.
The second kinds of cases are called craniotomy cases or cephalopelvic
disproportion cases.101
In these cases the fetus’ head is so big that it cannot pass through
the birth canal. According to Christopher Kaczor the options are either the doctor can
crush the skull of the baby in order to save the mother’s life or the doctor can do
nothing.102
If the doctor does nothing, four outcomes are possible: the mother and child
could live, just the mother lives, only the child lives, or neither lives.103
Although these
use to be the options concerning craniotomy cases, they are not necessary anymore
because of the advancements in using caesarean sections. C-sections are safer than
99
Ibid., 187-188.
100
Ibid.
101
Ibid., 189.
102
Ibid.
103
Ibid.

45
craniotomies for everyone involved and will save both the fetus and the mother. 104
Hence, craniotomy cases do not create a forced choice situation.
The final and most difficult kinds of cases potentially involving a forced choice
between the mother and child are called hysterectomy cases105
, in these cases, the woman
has uterine cancer and to save her life, her uterus must be removed. If the uterus is
removed the fetus will die, since it will not be viable yet. But if the doctor waits until the
fetus is viable, then the mother might die of cancer.106
These cases are the most difficult
for Marquis because the doctor actually faces a real forced choice, unlike craniotomy and
ectopic pregnancy cases.
3.4 Thomson on Self-Defense
As we have seen the only common cases that actually pose a problem for Marquis are
hysterectomy cases. Having seen this we can look in detail at Thomson’s account of self-
defense. In her essay “Self Defense”, Thomson attempts to justify the view that we can
kill innocent threats such as fetuses. To justify self-defense against innocent threats
Thomson looks at paradigm cases of self-defense and attempts to understand why we
have the moral intuition that we can kill in those cases.107
(Once again, the paradigm
case of self-defense involves a villainous aggressor who is fully responsible for trying to
kill his victim for no good reason.) What explains our intuition in the paradigm case of
self-defense, for Thomson, is when someone tries to kill you for no good reason, then
104
Olds, S., London, M.L., & Ladewig, P.W. Maternal Newborn Nursing: Care of the Woman with
Cephalopelvic Disproportion. 775.
105
Kaczor, Christopher. The Ethics of Abortion: Wo e ’s Rights, Hu a Life, a d the Questio of Justi e.
New York: Routledge, 2011: 187-188.
106
Ibid., 185-189.
107

46
“they will otherwise violate your rights that they not kill you, and therefore lack rights
that you not kill them.”108
Thompson argues that the above principle applies to innocent threats as well.
Hence, there is no moral difference between cases of villainous aggressors and cases of
innocent threats. Thomson responds that one possible difference between these cases is
villainous aggressors forfeit their right to life, making them liable to defensive killing,
since they are at fault for their choice to attack. Innocent threats however, are not at fault
for the threat they pose, since they did not choose to attack the victim. Therefore, they
are not liable to defensive killing. Thomson argues that the attacker’s fault does not
make a difference whether or not he or she may be killed in self-defense.109
To make this point she first argues that intention does not make a difference to
whether or not the attacker may be killed in self-defense. To support her argument she
gives two examples. The first draws on her critique of the doctrine of double effect or
DDE. Thomson understands DDE as follows: we may do something bad in order to
bring about something good if two conditions apply. (1) The good outcome is in
proportion to the bad. (2) We do not intend the bad outcome as a means to the good
outcome.110
DDE has been used to support a difference in our intuitions between two
cases Strategic Bomber and Terror Bomber. In Strategic Bomber, one country A has
unjustly invaded country B. One of B’s pilots has been asked to bomb one of A’s
munitions factories to win the war against A. However, if B’s pilot bombs the factory he
will kill children at a nearby children’s hospital. Is the bomber’s action permissible?
Most people think the bomber’s action is permissible.
108
Ibid., 302.
109
Ibid., 293-295.
110
Ibid., 292.

47
Strategic Bomber is contrasted with Terror Bomber. In Terror Bomber the pilot
in B is asked to intentionally bomb A’s children’s hospital in order to terrorize the
population of A to get them to surrender to B. It seems wrong for the pilot to
intentionally do this. Friends of DDE claim that the difference between the cases is
explained by the doctrine because in Strategic Bomber the pilot does not intend the
deaths of the children as a means to winning the war, instead he foresees their deaths.
However, in Terror Bomber the pilot intends the bad outcome as a means to winning the
war, therefore his action is wrong.
Thomson argues that it is very odd thing to think that what determines whether
the bomber may drop the bomb are his intentions. She says, “Can anyone really think
that the pilot should decide whether he may drop the bombs by looking inward for the
intention with which he would be dropping them if he dropped them?”111
Thus
Thomson’s thinks that intentions are irrelevant to whether the bomber may drop the
bombs.
Thomson’s gives another example to demonstrate what she calls the “Irrelevance
of Intention to Permissibility Thesis” (that is, intentions do not matter to the
permissibility of actions)112
: Suppose Alfred wishes to kill his wife, who is dying a slow
painful death, whose death he wishes to quicken. Thinking that it is poison, Alfred buys
her the stuff which is really the cure. Is it permissible to give this poison to her, even
though Alfred thinks it is the cure? Yes according to Thomson, since Alfred’s bad
intentions do not matter to his action. According to Thomson, this is because Alfred
should be able to give the poison to his wife, regardless what his intentions are because
111
Ibid., 293-294.
112
Ibid., 294.

48
the “poison” will save her life. Thus Thomson’s believes it is counterintuitive for Alfred
to refuse to give his wife the poison because he has a bad intention.
Furthermore, Thomson believes that a more general thesis explains the truth of
The Irrelevance of Intention to Permissibility Thesis.113
She calls this the “The
Irrelevance of Fault to Permissibility Thesis.”114
The point of this thesis is, “it is
irrelevant to the question whether X may do alpha whether X would be at fault in doing
it.”115
We can understand why she believes this by returning to her Alfred example. In
the example, Alfred has a bad intention to poison his wife. Since he chose to have this
bad intention, he is at fault for it. In other words, he could have chosen an intention that
did not lead to him killing his wife, but he did not, so he is at fault for choosing that
intention. But surely, it is permissible for Alfred to give his wife the poison, even though
he is at fault for it, because that will save her life. So for Thomson the “Irrelevance of
Fault to Permissibility Thesis” explains the truth of the “Irrelevance of Intention to
Permissibility Thesis”. Hence, since fault is irrelevant in the Alfred example, thereby so
is intention. Thus, she thinks there is no difference between killing the innocent threat
and the villainess aggressor because the only difference is the fault of the aggressor. But
according to Thomson fault does not matter here because of the above examples.
On Thomson’s account of self-defense, abortion in other-defense is not a
problem. Thomson can say that the difference between the fetus and the woman is clear.
The fetus, by threatening the woman’s life, forfeits its right to life and therefore, killing it
is permissible. The doctor must save the woman because the fetus is threatening her life
and thus loses its right to life. The woman is not threatening the fetus so she does not
113
Ibid., 295.
114
Ibid.
115
Ibid.

49
forfeit her right to life. Thus under Thompson’s view the doctor may save the woman
because her life is threatened. Under Thomson’s view, if the doctor were to try to save
the fetus, the doctor’s act would be tantamount to a third party helping the threat in the
innocent threat case. Although this is not perhaps immoral, the doctor is certainly not
required to help the fetus (innocent threat).
However, this still leaves open several problems. First, as I mentioned earlier,
many women become pregnant through cases of voluntary sexual intercourse in which
contraception either was not used or was not effective. Thus unlike paradigm cases of
forced choice because the woman in the pregnancy case is partially responsible for the
forced choice. This is problematic because it may be the case that the woman is
responsible for the forced choice because her negligence contributed to it. Hence, the
argument concludes, the doctor is not permitted to save the woman by killing the fetus,
since the woman is responsible for the forced choice.
That the woman must suffer the consequences because of her voluntary choice
seems difficult to believe, in the abortion case. To see this consider the following
analogous case: Suppose Jane walks down a street where she knows that in the past
murders have been committed by men, drug induced to kill by a mad scientist. Although
Jane realizes there is some risk to walking down the street, taking the street makes it
easier for her to get to her job. As Jane is walking down the street, one of the drugged
induced men tries to kill her. Paul, who knows that Jane is aware of these drug induced
men killing on the street, realizes that the only way to save Jane is to kill the drugged
induced man. Paul ends up killing the man, thus saving Jane. Was Paul’s action
permissible? Yes it was. This is because it is difficult to believe that the woman must

50
give up her life because she negligently chose to walk down that particular street. The
consequences of the woman losing her right to life seem way to strong, given that all she
did was walk down a street. Similarly, in the abortion case it is very difficult to believe
that the woman must forfeit her right to life because she used faulty contraception. Thus
if I am right that these cases are analogous, it does not follow that if the woman is
responsible for the forced choice, that she forfeits her right to life. Hence, Thomson’s
account is compatible with the woman being responsible for the forced choice, yet it
allows the doctor to choose to save the woman over the fetus.116
Another potential problem with Marquis using Thomson's account to refute Card
is: there is another morally relevant difference between abortion in other- defense of
the mother and paradigm cases of self-defense. As I mentioned earlier, Davis stipulates
that abortion in other-defense of the mother usually involves premeditated killing, unlike
the paradigm case of self-defense.117
In the paradigm case of self-defense, the victim's
response to her attacker is usually spontaneous and if she has any time to deliberate, this
is done under duress. However, in the abortion case the woman is usually aware of the
situation; hence she has time to deliberate about what she wants to do. The difference of
premeditated killing also applies in cases in which the pregnant woman is unconscious,
since the doctor or the woman's friends/family will have time to choose for her the best
course of action to take.
What makes premeditated killing, perhaps worse, is that the woman or doctor is
intending the fetus’s death as a means, rather than foreseeing that the death will occur as
116
Although it may be permissible for Paul to do nothing instead of helping Jane because the drug
induced man is an innocent threat.
117
Da is, Na . A o tio a d “elf-Defe se. Philosophy and Public Affairs. 13 (Summer 1984): 185-187.

51
in paradigm cases of killing in self-defense.118
This is because it is difficult to believe
that the woman or doctor merely foresees the death of the fetus, since the doctor or
woman has time to consider his or her options and clearly decide which option is the best.
And if it is decided that the fetus will be killed, the clear intention will be to kill the fetus.
Hence, intending by premeditation the death of a person is what makes the difference
between premeditated killing in the abortion case and killing in paradigm cases of self-
defense.
Although many cases of abortion to save the mother’s life involve premeditated
killing, this is not a problem for Marquis if he adopts Thomson’s account. This is
because for Thomson’s account of self-defense or other-defense intention plays no role
whether the attacker’s or victim’s/third parties. Thomson’s case of Alfred proves this
point. Whether or not Alfred has the right intention, he may give his wife the poison,
since it will save her. Thus for Thomson intentions are not morally relevant to the
morality of self/other-defense.
Finally, another potential problem comes from the differences between self-
defense and other-defense. Unlike the paradigm cases of self-defense, abortions are
generally preformed by doctors. In her article, Thomson argues that other-defense by a
third party is not a problem for her view.119
The only plausible difference, she notes,
between other-defense and self-defense is we have agent relative permissions in the later,
unlike the former. Thomson, helpfully, puts the idea in the following way: “X (and only
X) is permitted to kill Y when Y will otherwise kill X, since it is X (and only X) whom Y
118
Ibid.
119

52
will otherwise kill”.120
In other words, X can only kill Y because X is the only one who
Y is threatening. Y is not threatening bystander Z, hence Z cannot intervene to save X
from Y.121
Thomson finds this idea suspect because it leads to counterintuitive consequences.
Suppose my loved one was about to be killed and I can only save her by killing her
attacker.122
Surely, I am justified in killing my loved one’s attacker. To this point,
Thomson mentions a rebuttal to the above argument, that it might be the case that agent
relative permissions extend to those I love as well as to me.123
This is because those I
love are a huge part of me. They are an extremely important part of what makes my life
worth living. Thomson rejects this idea because it is difficult to believe that whether or
not a person can be defended in a situation by a third party depends on if he is loved.124
I
share her belief that this is counterintuitive. Given that agent relative permissions seems
to be the only potentially morally relevant difference between other-defense and self-
defense, it appears that Thomson’s account can justify the abortion by the doctor to save
the mother’s life.
Now that we have seen the implications of Thomson’s account for cases of
abortion involving threats to the mother’s life, we can look at a possible problem if
Marquis decides to use Thomson’s account. First, it may prove too much. For instance,
some have argued that there are other circumstances of self-defense that justify killing.125
Many people have the intuitions that killing in self-defense is justified in cases of rape or
120
Ibid.
121
Ibid.
122
Ibid.
123
Ibid.
124
Ibid.
125
E glish, Ja e. A o tio a d the Co ept of a Pe so . Canadian Journal of Philosophy 5 (October
1975): 238-239.

53
cases such as a severe beating. By analogy with those cases, abortion may also be more
broadly justified, since pregnancy can involve serious harms to the woman.
Jane English argued that when a fetus poses a major threat to the pregnant
woman’s well being, life prospects, or health, then killing the fetus is justified.126
She
gives the example of a highly trained surgeon who is kidnapped by a hypnotized attacker:
The attacker claims not to want to hurt the surgeon, but instead he wants to bring him
back to a mad scientist who will put a permanent block on his knowledge of medicine,
ending his career in medicine. This would also have serious effects on the surgeon’s
family, personal relationships and happiness. According to English, the only way to
avoid this outcome is to shoot the innocent attacker. English claims you are justified in
doing so.127
Initially, the situation is analogous to unwanted pregnancies, especially with
teenagers. The unwanted effects of pregnancy appear as drastic as in the case of the
hypnotized attacker.
However, I believe there is a difference between the case of abortion and the case
of the hypnotized attacker. For one thing, the woman does not have to live with the
consequences forever like the surgeon. She can give up the child to adoption, thus
removing the potential future harms to her. Perhaps the proponent in favor of English’s
argument might argue that we can modify the surgeon case. Suppose the surgeon will
lose his ability to practice medicine for only nine months, but this will ruin his career, and
thus cause serious harms to his family, personal relationships, and happiness. The
example is analogous to a woman who cannot take off work for maternity leave. If she
does, then she will lose her job and this will cause significant harm to her family,
126
Ibid.
127
Ibid.

AN EXAMINATION OF THREE OBJECTIONS TO DON MARQUIS S ARGUMENT AGAINST ABORTION CHOICE

AN EXAMINATION OF THREE OBJECTIONS TO DON MARQUIS S ARGUMENT AGAINST ABORTION CHOICE

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AN EXAMINATION OF THREE OBJECTIONS TO DON MARQUIS S ARGUMENT AGAINST ABORTION CHOICE