Srlc brief
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1) The document discusses the Sense and Respond Logistics Capability (SRLC) concept which aims to improve military logistics through a more adaptive, networked approach. 2) It analyzes lessons from Operation Iraqi Freedom where logistics challenges included outrunning communications and losing visibility of supplies. 3) The SRLC concept proposes treating logistics materiel as a common pool across services rather than separate reservoirs, with all units able to provide and receive support as needed through a synchronized network.
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Srlc brief
- 1. Sense and Respond Logistics Capability (SRLC) Arthur K. Cebrowski, VADM Director, Force Transformation Following current doctrine is supposed Office of the SECDEF to make things work well. Ra pid Pr oto typ ing but Success generated by adhering to doctrine is Concept S&R not supposed to be “surprising.” n tio nta rime pe Ex
- 2. Logistics Problems Operation Iraqi Freedom Rate of Advance: Out ran logistic communications Reliable Communications: Logistics units lacked best communication capability Visibility of Supplies: Lost visibility of incoming and intra-theatre supplies In-theatre Transportation: Less than optimal use of theater transportation assets
- 3. Some Lessons Learned Trends suggest a lag in integrating logistics more fully into a broader network-centric force capability and operational approach could become increasingly dangerous. U.S. military deployments abroad Continuing Demand for Materiel Formidable Opponents Metrics/Reporting
- 4. …We must build forces that draw upon the revolutionary advances in the President George W. Bush technology of war that will allow us to U.S.keep the peace by redefining war on our Commander in Chief Naval Academy Commencement 2001 May 25, terms. I’m committed to building a future force that is defined less by size and more by mobility and swiftness, one that is easier to deploy and sustain, one that relies more heavily on stealth, precision weaponry and information technologies.
- 5. Congressionally Direction Section 934 of Public Law 106-398 stipulates that areas listed below be addressed SEC. 934. NETWORK CENTRIC WARFARE (NCW) 1. Findings. Congress makes the following findings: (a) Joint Vision 2020 set the goal for the DoD to pursue information superiority in order that joint forces may possess superior knowledge and attain decision superiority during operations across the spectrum of conflict. (b) One concept being pursued to attain information superiority is known as NCW. The concept of NCW links sensors, communications systems, and weapons systems in an interconnected grid that allows for a seamless information flow to warfighters, policy makers, and support personnel.
- 6. Rumsfeld Doctrine The core of the Rumsfeld doctrine is that the speed/availability of effects takes away options, thereby limiting/barring the enemy’s ability to adapt. Speed is comprised of more than just physical speed, however. Cognitive speed is a vital component; it takes the initiative from the defender and severely limits their ability to react
- 7. The “New American Way of War” Jointly coherent forces must operate without functional barriers similar to the way in which joint capability packages must exhibit seamless Gen Richard. B. Myers interoperability. Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Logistics, Operations, and Intelligence can no longer carry on as separate and distinct communities that share occasional interface points; their Log performance in the cognitive and information domains in particular must Ops Intel become more jointly coherent.
- 9. Network-Centric Warfare “The Emerging 21st Century Way of War” Posits: a shift away from attrition strategies in favor of effects- based operations joint coherence as opposed to coordination among different service components concurrent rather than sequential actions operational adaptability
- 10. Sense & Respond Concept Origin S&R business analog is an adaptive managerial framework originally developed by IBM Business literature and practice reflect application of network centric theory and principles
- 11. Ra pid Pro tot yp ing SRLC Contentions Concept S&R n tio nta im e pe r Ex Demand is ultimately unpredictable, so success depends on speed of pattern recognition and speed of response The best supply chain is one that is highly flexible rather than highly optimized Business units and subunits organize into modular capabilities that negotiate with one another over commitments Networks self-synchronize via a common environment and set of shared objectives; typically business financial and customer satisfaction measures Sophisticated IT support enables data sharing, “knowing earlier,” commitment tracking, and role reconfiguration
- 12. Network- Global Centric Information Warfare Grid SRLC Prominent Characteristics The materiel in and moving to an armed conflict forms a common pool from which any unit can draw support. (It is a joint pool, not separate service reservoirs.) All units within a functionally organized network are potential consumers and providers of supply to and from all other units in the network. (It is a common network, not a set of separate supply chains.) All units dynamically synchronize to satisfy demands within the network. (It is not strictly hierarchical.)
- 13. The SRLC recognizes that the effectiveness of a unit is a function not only of having enough ammunition, fuel, food, water, and everything else that maintains military capabilities, but also that combat effectiveness is a function of avoiding burdensome surpluses.
- 14. Adaptive vs Flexible SRLC is adaptive rather than flexible, an important nuance that connotes a greater capacity to adjust to a broader range of environmental factors, including timing and radical changes in context.
- 15. Contractors Support during Iraqi Freedom Size: More than military personnel engaged in supply activities Responsiveness: Surprised at degree of effectiveness and efficiency “Bridging” capacity: Functioned as “Trusted Agent” across services
- 16. Synchronizing S&R and the Force-Centric Logistics Enterprise Overall Objective: Develop a coherent, convergent DoD Logistics Transformation Strategy that reconciles and builds on S&RL, FLE, and PBL initiatives Near-term: Identify linkages and specific leverage points in programs and initiatives Apply S&RL concepts and co-evolution strategies and processes, end-to-end and at all levels (strategic, operational, tactical—these blur in the S&R concept) to evaluate current and design future initiatives Present a concept for joint prototyping and experimentation to explore these interactions directly
- 17. Web Sites 1. DoD Office of Transformation. http://www.oft.osd.mil 2. Network Centric Warfare, DoD report to Congress. http://www.defenselink.mil/nii/NCW/ 3. Network-Centric Warfare: Its Origin and Future. Adm Cebrowski, Director, DoD Office of Transformation. http://www.usni.org/Proceedings/Articles98/PROcebrowski.htm 4. e-Book; Network Centric Warfare: Developing and Leveraging Information Superiority. http://www.dodccrp.org/NCW/ncw.html 5. Network Centric Warfare: An Overview of Emerging Theory, John J. Garstka, Joint Staff. http://www.mors.org/publications/phalanx/dec00/feature.htm 6. Network-centric warfare: Not there yet, Dan Caterinicchia, Federal Computer Work. http://www.fcw.com/fcw/articles/2003/0609/cov-netcentric-06-09-03.asp 7. An Interview With The Director, Admiral Arthur K. Cebrowski, Director of Force Transformation, Office of the Secretary of Defense. http://e-reservist.net/SPRAG/TransformationInterview-Admiral%20Arthur%20K_%20Cebrowski.htm
- 18. Summary Operation Iraqi Freedom showed us that we were sporadically applying some of the tenets of Sense and Respond Logistics, but there is more to do.
Editor's Notes
- Rate of Advance: The rate of advance toward Baghdad, particularly in the first 2 days, exceeded planning expectations and, in a number of instances, outran the communications system that had been designated for logistics support. The fast pace of operations led many combat units to try to expedite processing and delivery of their supply needs by sending requisitions through whatever means was available, often imbedding them in e-mail traffic or situational reports instead of logistics information systems. Lack of Reliable Communications: The lack of reliable communications, especially among combat service support forces, added to the difficulty. The only consistently reliable form of communication was satellite (SATCOM) radios, but these were distributed mostly with combat units, not logistics units. The other form of communicating that received praise was the instant messaging function on the Blue Force Tracker (BFT) system. Although unsecured, this allowed continuous, on-the-move communications. Again, this equipment was not made available to logistics forces, although it has since been recommended as an action item in service lessons-learned documentation. Supply Visibility: “Invisibility” of roughly 30% of what was coming into the theater, and perhaps more regarding intratheater transport, posed a number of problems. Most of these were related to how the logistics and combat personnel compensated for the gaps in in-transit visibility. The basic compensation was the traditional one: as those supplies that could not be tracked during transit arrived, discover what they are and then figure out what to do with them. In-theatre Transportation: T he gaps in in-transit visibility for materiel moving from the points of debarkation out to the combat units complicated the optimal use of theater transportation assets. To compensate for this and to ensure receiving units did not face shortages, the bias of logistics personnel was to push more than enough forward to the combat units. That further complicated optimal use of in-theater transportation and the supply chain sometimes delivered too much of the wrong materiel at the wrong time.
- U.S. Military Deployments Abroad : The distances across which the United States may have to conduct military operations will increase. We are pulling away from the forward garrisons and their supporting infrastructures that we maintained in the last half of the last century. Both the numbers of personnel and the percentage of the total force stationed abroad have been declining, and will probably continue to do so for the foreseeable future. The general trend is away from forward garrisoned forces and toward maneuvering from strategic distances, basing hubs, or from the U.S. homeland. That makes the traditional way in which the US has logistically supported its forces abroad more challenging. The greater the distances involved in the traditional supply chain, the longer it takes to provide what is needed, where it is needed, and when it is needed. A Continuing Demand for Materiel: The expenditure rates of materiel per aircraft, ship, tank, or individual have not declined, and in most cases have increased. As little as 20 years ago it took tens of aircraft each with tens of bombs to destroy a fixed target. Today, a single aircraft can destroy ten fixed targets with a single sortie. Similar productivity gains have occurred across the force. The result has been shorter conflicts and less overall expenditures of men and materiel to achieve success. But as long as conflict lasts, aircraft burn pretty much the same amount of fuel per flight mile as they did 20 years ago, tanks use as much (or more) fuel and ammunition per mile as they did before, and ships use as much fuel, food, energy, and ammunition per day as they have for decades. The per capita logistics requirements, per day, week, or month are essentially the same as or more than they were in the past. Overall, then, the demand for materiel and the logistics that get it to where it is needed remain essentially a function of the number of aircraft, ships, tanks, and personnel committed to a conflict and the length of time they fight. The “spear-tips” have become deadlier, but it still takes about the same amount of materiel to use them. The U.S. B-1s, B-2s, and B-52s used in Afghanistan and Iraq were devastatingly effective, largely because much of the ordnance they delivered was precision guided; yet the distances over which they operated and their persistence over the battlefield cost a lot in terms of the fuel they and the tankers that provided it to them required. History suggests that the U.S. per capita logistics demand, expressed in the weight of the support and its transportation, for an operation like Iraqi Freedom is three times what it was in WW II and nearly 15 times what it was in WWar I. Formidable Opponents: The conflicts that have generated these expectations have been fought against opponents that, in retrospect, turned out to be less adept, effective, and powerful than prudent planning assumed. The success U.S. military forces had against those of Iraq and Serbia was a function not only of the skill and potency of the U.S. forces, but also of the relative weaknesses of those we fought. Other opponents may be less weak, more knowledgeable of U.S. capabilities and vulnerabilities, and more successful in exploiting them. Success in their ability to do so, even in a conflict in which the United States prevails—but at a high cost in casualties and conflict length—could shatter the growing expectations that armed conflict involving U.S. forces can be pristine and relatively risk and cost limited. Metrics/Reporting: “ The whole concept of readiness reporting shifted away from trying to indicate where the problems were to a kind of yes-no determination. If it could still move, shoot, and communicate, it was ready. So, the kind of information that could have given us a better sense of the repair parts and other things that were needed, just dropped off the scope.”
- Network Centric Warfare (sec. 934): The House bill contained a provision (sec. 907) that would require the Secretary of Defense to submit a report to the congressional defense committees outlining the efforts of the Department to define and integrate network centric warfare concepts into its vision for future military operations. The Senate amendment contained a similar provision (sec. 906) that would require the Secretary of Defense to submit three reports: (1) a report on the implementation of NCW principles; (2) a study on the use of joint experimentation for developing NCW concepts; and (3) a report on science and technology programs to support NCW concepts. The House recedes with an amendment that would establish a requirement for the Secretary of Defense to submit two reports: (1) a report on implementation of NCW principles; and (2) a study on the use of joint experimentation for developing NCW concepts. The amendment would further clarify specific elements of the information to be included in the reports. Focused logistics will effectively link all logistics functions and units through advanced information systems that integrate real-time total asset visibility with a common operational picture. These systems will incorporate enhanced decision-support tools that will improve analysis, planning, and anticipation of warfighter requirements. They will also provide a more seamless connection to the commercial sector to take advantage of applicable advanced business practices and commercial economies.
- This ability to disguise operational patterns also has implications for security. Speed potentially reduces U.S. and civilian casualties as well as infrastructure damage. This doctrine provides the base justification for force structure transformation and requires that those lean and lethal forces be supported by responsive logistics systems that can seamlessly sense and respond to operational needs.
- The Physical Domain is the place where the situation the military seeks to influence exists. It is the domain where strike, protect, and maneuver take place across the environments of ground, sea, air, and space. It is the domain where physical platforms and the communications networks that connect them reside. Comparatively, the elements of this domain are the easiest to measure, and consequently, combat power has traditionally been measured primarily in this domain. In analysis and models, the physical domain is characterized as reality, or ground truth. Important metrics for measuring combat power in this domain include lethality and survivability. The Information Domain is where information is created, manipulated, and shared. It is the domain that facilitates the communication of information among warfighters. It is the domain where the command and control of modern military forces is communicated, where commander’s intent is conveyed. The information that exists in the information domain may or may not truly reflect ground truth. Example, a sensor observes the real world and produces an output (data) which exists in the information domain. With the exception of direct sensory observation, all of our information about the world comes through and is affected by our interaction with the information domain. And it is through the information domain that we communicate with others. Consequently, it is increasingly the information domain that must be protected and defended to enable a force to generate combat power in the face of offensive actions taken by an adversary. And, in the all-important battle for Information Superiority, the information domain is ground zero. The Cognitive Domain is in the minds of the participants. This is the place where perceptions, awareness, understanding, beliefs, and values reside and where, as a result of sensemaking, decisions are made. This is the domain where many battles and wars are actually won and lost. This is the domain of intangibles: leadership, morale, unit cohesion, level of training and experience, situational awareness, and public opinion. This is the domain where an understanding of a commander’s intent, doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures reside. Much has been written about this domain, and key attributes of this domain have remained relatively constant since Sun Tzu wrote The Art of War . The attributes of this domain are extremely difficult to measure, and each sub-domain (each individual mind) is unique. Note that all of the contents of the cognitive domain pass through a filter or lens we have labeled human perception. This filter consists of the individual’s worldview, the body of personal knowledge the person brings to the situation, their experience, training, values, and individual capabilities (intelligence, personal style, perceptual capabilities, etc.). Since these human perceptual lenses are unique to each individual, we know that individual cognition (understandings, etc.) is also unique. There is one reality, or physical domain. This is converted into selected data, information, and knowledge by the systems in the information domain. By training and shared experience we try to make the cognitive activities of military decision makers similar, but they nevertheless remain unique to each individual, with differences being more significant among individuals from different Services, generations, and countries than they are among individuals from the same unit or Service.
- Network-centric warfare challenges many of the precepts of industrial warfare. Conceptually, it leans away from attrition and notions of “overwhelming force,” and toward arguments favoring discriminating applications of force against the nodes of an opposing military, the destruction of which will have the greatest systemic erosion of the coherence, efficiency, and effectiveness of that military. Designed to facilitate operating within the decision-reaction cycle of an opponent, network-centric warfare hypothesizes that doing so will attack an opponent in the cognitive realm of conflict, in effect undermining an opponent’s confidence, discipline, and will. If there is a dominant distinguishing attribute of network-centric warfare, it is speed.
- In short, Sense and Respond Logistics is a system interwoven with network-centric operations and based upon highly adaptive, self-synchronizing, dynamically reconfigurable demand and support networks that anticipate and stimulate actions to enhance capability or mitigate support shortfalls.
- Through the execution of simple rule sets, units directly engaged with the enemy are given priority of support and directly supplied by adjacent non-engaged or reserve forces in the event that shortages of consumables or mission-critical gear are incurred. Alternatively, if readiness levels of an engaged unit fall below predetermined levels through attrition or unexpectedly high expenditure rates, other units are diverted to the engagement so that the achievement of operational objectives is not compromised.
- Too much ammunition, fuel, food, or water can erode effectiveness because with too much, the speed of the unit slows, its agility declines, and its ability to maintain a high battle tempo shortens because the greater weight and mass of the materiel require it to expend more energy to achieve the same results in a given period of time. This is not a new insight. Industrial age logistics have long recognized the relationship between military effectiveness and having the right amount of materiel support at the right time and location. But what is different is how the SRLC applies this understanding.
- In other words, linearity and sequenced actions are much less characteristic of SRLC. It is more serendipitous and synergistic; less rooted in preplanning, more in planning on the fly. It is this way because this is more compatible with and supportive of network-centric operations. It is more compatible because the kind of information and communications systems that make network-centric warfare feasible are an integral part of an SRLC and because, like network-centric warfare, it relies heavily on a less hierarchical command-and-control system that pushes authority downward and allows self-synchronization. It is more supportive of network-centric warfare because it reduces the overall mass of the force, allows greater systemic adaptability, greater speed, and greater agility of the force as whole—precisely the elements that generate the military effectiveness network-centric warfare promises.
- Size: We have not yet compiled accurate figures on the numbers of private contractors that were engaged in logistics support of Operation Iraqi Freedom, but preliminary data indicate the total was close to or higher than the number of uniformed military personnel engaged in supply activities. Responsiveness: There was (mild) surprise at the effectiveness and efficiency of the contractor support, which several of the respondents believed reflected the military experience many of the civilian contractors had. “ Bridging” Capacity: In effect, our contractors were able to greatly supplement the formal liaison relationships we had with the other military services. And when the services had trouble maintaining communications connectivity with units on our flanks, they (the contractors) could often fill the communications gap. But the real value was a form of “trusted agent”. The contractors could talk across the military services without regard to protocol, bias, or suspicion. That turned out to sometimes be the fastest, most effective means of coordination. And that was important in our efforts to fill in the supply gaps that occurred in the course of the operation.”