This document discusses Network Centric Warfare (NCW) and its implications for command and control. It makes the following key points: 1. NCW provides opportunities to improve command and control and execution through increased connectivity, knowledge, and responsiveness between decision-makers and entities. 2. Adopting NCW principles means the ability to enlarge the engagement envelope, increase effectiveness, and reduce costs through greater awareness and information sharing. 3. Developing new mission capability packages that fully leverage NCW will require changes to concepts of operations, command approaches, organizations, information systems, and training and education of personnel.

1. C4ISR & Tactical Data Link Systems
Network Centric Warfare (NCW) II

2. NCW II: Command and Control and Execution
The very essence of command and control
(C2) lies in the ability of a commander, at
any level, to make the most out of the
situation.
education training
experience
situation assets
supplies

3. NCW provides opportunities
to improve C2 & execution.
(in the context of missions)
NCW II: Command and Control and Execution

4. • Knowledgeable C2 decision
& elements
• Knowledgeable actor
entities
• Actor & decision are
connected
• Responsive sensor
• The footprint of all entities
will be much smaller
NCW II: Command and Control and Execution

5. NCW II: Command and Control and Execution
Knowledgeable C2 decision & elements
Clear information = betterdecision, accuratecapabilities.
Allows us to give more attention to
shaping the battlespace and less to
reacting to sudden or unexpected
changes.
Thus, less energy will be spent on
planning.

6. NCW II: Command and Control and Execution
Actor & Decision are Connected
Knowledgeable actor entities will alter the approach of C2
from a process that embeds plans and decisions,
to a process of conveying.
The mechanics of C2 will be significantly
reduced as the need to embed information
in commands is reduced, contributing to
increased command agility.

7. NCW II: Command and Control and Execution
Responsive Sensor
Better connectivity among actor and decision entities will result in
an increased ability to reactand effectively respond
to changes in the situation.
This agility will be greatly enhanced
by having more responsive sensor
entities.

8. NCW II: Command and Control and Execution

9. NCW II: Command and Control and Execution
Speed of command is a basic measure of C2.
• The time it takes to recognize and understand the situation
• Identify and assess options
• Select an appropriate course of action
• Translate it into actionable orders
Low levels of awareness slow
down the planning process,
as commanders delay decisions
until key elements of information
are updated.

10. NCW II: Command and Control and Execution
Rehearsal & Engagement (Enhanced Awareness) can also
increase combat effectiveness.
By sophisticated simulator
a warfighter can
improve the plan,
develop enhanced
awareness,
as a result, increase
the probability of a
successful outcome.

11. NCW II: Command and Control and Execution
Execution to maximize the
rehearsal.
It is an opportunity to:
• increase battlespace
awareness and
knowledge,
• to develop new
approaches to command
and control,
• to more dynamically plan
and rehearse missions.

12. CEC increases combat power by changing the
relationships between battlespace and
battletime.
The CEC component forces currently consist of:
• surface combatants (e.g., AEGIS Cruisers),
• early warning aircraft (e.g., E-2 Hawkeye).
Concepts will emerge enabling other elements,
such as:
• fighter aircraft,
• ground-based missiles (e.g., Patriot Missiles
or Hawk Missiles).
NCW II: Command and Control and Execution
Examples:

13. NCW II: Command and Control and Execution
By adopting NCW, means:
the ability to enlarge the engagement envelope,
reduce risk profiles,
increase effectiveness (operating tempo and responsiveness),
improve maneuverability,
achieve higher kill probabilities,
reduce costs*.

14. a
NCW II: The Entry Fee

15. NCW II: The Entry Fee
Since future warfare will rely heavily on increased connectivity
among sensors, command nodes, and weapons, network security will
be high priority.
Integrated capabilities for information protection will provide the
network-centric force with assured highspeed access to the
information required to dominate across all levels of conflict.
With the advent of information warfare techniques, it is no longer
necessary for our adversaries to have direct physical access to our
infostructure in order to attack us.

16. NCW II: The Entry Fee
Commercial information technology is driving the convergence of
technologies for voice and data services.
This technology will enable data traffic to be provided with the
reliability and quality of service associated with dial tone, as well as
new and exciting capabilities that we have not yet imagined.
The technologies that emerge from the commercial sector, when
augmented with specialized information technologies developed by
the DoD, such as highend encryption, low-probability of intercept
and detection communications, and specialized intelligent agents,
will provide the brick and mortar for our “Global Information Grid.”

17. NCW II: Implications for MCPs (Mission Cap. Package)
The concept of a mission capability package (MCP) is a useful way of
describing and discussing a way of doing business.
An MCP consists of a concept of operations, command approach,
organization, systems, and people with a prescribed level of,
expertise.
Implicit in an MCP is the nature, distribution, and utilization of
information

18. NCW II: Implications for MCPs (Mission Cap. Package)

19. NCW II: Implications for MCPs (Mission Cap. Package)
Concept of Operations/ConOps
NCW-based ConOps should be focused on identifying and employing
these entities in a manner that dominates the adversaries by
determining the best time, places (targets), and methods (hard or
soft) to intervene to achieve the desired end.

20. NCW II: Implications for MCPs (Mission Cap. Package)
Command Approach
NCW-based ConOps should be focused on identifying and employing
these entities in a manner that dominates the adversaries
Ironically, at first glance, it seems when communications over any
distances were very slow and limited, and local commanders acted
almost autonomously.
The major difference, of course, is that now an autonomous unit is
really not truly autonomous because its behavior is heavily
influenced by its view of the COP, and its perception of the
commander’s intent.

21. NCW II: Implications for MCPs (Mission Cap. Package)
Infostructure Systems
Will provide key capabilities (bandwidth, processing power, stored
information, decision aids, and agents) and need to be better
designed to support battlespace entities as they interact much more
closely than ever before.
The increased use of decision aids and battlespace agents will make
it more important for the systems to be thoroughly tested before
deployment.
Just like organizations, their job is to enable and facilitate, not to get
in the way.

22. NCW II: Implications for MCPs (Mission Cap. Package)
People
People are central to any MCP, for it is the people that turn concepts
into realities. To create and maintain culture.
In order to work, the force needs to be educated and trained to
develop NCW attitudes and expertise, and needs to be written to
support this process.

23. NCW II: Implications for MCPs (Mission Cap. Package)
Coevolution of MCP
The melding of a ConOps, C2, organization, doctrine, weapons and
infrastructure, systems, and personnel into a coherent MCP, is
essentially an interdisciplinary learning process that is one part
discovery, one part testing, and one part practice.
It could be said that teamwork is the copilot of NCW—from the
conceptualization of new MCPs,
to their refinement and demonstration,
to the acquisition of needed components and the development of
needed personnel,
to their perfection through experience and practice.

24. • The development of new and
innovative NCW concepts and
strategies to meet mission
challenges;
• the ability to transform these
embryonic concepts and
strategies into real
operational capability,
unconstrained by current
institutional considerations.
NCW II: Making NCW a Reality
What is needed:
1. One designed to incubate
innovative ideas;
2. One designed to introduce
change;
3. One designed to insert tech.

25. First, the rate of technological advance, and the ability to turn out
new products, has increased dramatically.
Second, the advances in technology that are relevant for the military
are, to a very large extent, no longer driven by known operational
requirements.
Third, the military is now being driven by a technology cycle that is
quickening and has less and less time to react to take advantage of
the new capabilities they represent before these, in turn, are
overtaken by new capabilities.
Fourth, the new capabilities are equally available to potential
adversaries.
NCW II: Making NCW a Reality

26. Consider a situation in which new technology can be made
instantlyavailable to operational users.
How much of the technology’s potential will be realized?
NCW II: Making NCW a Reality
Examples:

27. What is needed:
• facilitates an understanding of emerging capabilities;
• preserve innovative concepts;
• expedites the testing and refinement;
• focuses efforts on the development.
NCW II: Making NCW a Reality

28. The key to any analysis (both its face validity and its utility) is the set
of measures used to represent the performance and effectiveness
of the alternatives being considered.
We are relatively good at measuring the performance of sensors and
actors,
but less adept at measuring command and control.
NCW II: Assessing the Potential of NCW

29. 1. Who, in the battlespace, is best equipped to make each firing
decision?
2. Is the concept of operation, doctrine, organization, and training
supportive of this?
3. How many decisions are expected to be needed, in what time
frame, and to what extent is this feasible?
4. What information is most important to support time-critical
decision making?
5. What is the impact of distributed teams sharing access to
information and acting without prior sync?
NCW II: Assessing the Potential of NCW

30. NCW II: Assessing the Potential of NCW

31. In other words, we want more out of our analyses than
“B was better than A.”
We want to understand why,
so we can apply the lessons learned to develop the best NCW-based
MCPs.
NCW II: Assessing the Potential of NCW

32. The most significant challenges to be faced:
1. Security in the Information Age
2. Coalition Environments
3. Jointness
4. Process of Coevolution
5. Investment Strategy
6. Education and Training
7. Bringing it All Together
NCW II: The Journey Ahead

33. The End.
Thank you!