100 documents on_the_origin_of_the_war-selected_from_official_german_white_book-1939-251pgs-pol

100 DOCUMENTS ON THE ORIGIN OF THE WAR

100
DOCUMENTS
ON
THE ORIGIN
OF
THE WAR
SELECTED
FROM THE OFFICIAL GERMAN
WHITE BOOK
PRESENTED
BY THE GERMAN INFORMATION SERVICE
PUBLISHED BY DEUTSCI-IER VERLAG BERLIN

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
Introduction by Herr von Ribbentrop, Reich Minister for Foreign
Affairs 9
Foreword 13
First Chapter
Development of German-Polish Relations and Ger-
many's Efforts to maintain Peace in Europe . Docu-
ments No.i-ii : 15-40
No.
i Extract from a Memorandum circulated by Mr. Lloyd George,
British Prime Minister, 25 March x919 16
z Extract from the Observations of the German Peace Delegation
on the Peace Conditions, 29 May 1919 17
3 Extract from the Observations of the German Peace Delegation
on the. Peace Conditions, 29 May 1919 17
4 Memo by the Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs concerning a
conversation of the Fuehrer with the Polish Minister, 2 May 193 3 21
5 The Reich Minister for Foreign-Affairs to the German Minister
in Warsaw, 24 November 1933 23
6 The German Minister in Warsaw to the German Foreign Office,
z8 November 1933 25
7 Declaration made by the German and Polish Governments,
26 January 1934 27
8 Conversation of the Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs with
M. Beck, Polish Minister for Foreign Affairs, 2o January 1937 30
9 The German Ambassador in Warsaw to the German Foreign
Office,I June 1937 31
,o The German Consul-General in Danzig to the' German Foreign
Office, x5 November 1937 36
ii The German Ambassador in Warsaw to the German Foreign
Office, 2 September 1938 37

No. Page
Second Chapter
British War Policy after the Munich Agreement.
Germany's Effort to obtain a peaceful Solution for the
Problems of Danzig and the Corridor . Documents
No.12-55 41-120
12 Joint Declaration made by the Fuehrer and Mr . Chamberlain,
British Prime Minister, Munich, 30 September 1938 41
13 Extract from a Speech by Mr . Chamberlain, British Prime
Minister, in the House of Commons, 3 October 1938 42
14 Extract from a Speech, by Mr. Winston Churchill, broadcast in
the United States of America, 16 October 1938 44
15 Conversation of the Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs with the
Polish Ambassador at Berchtesgaden, 24 October 1938 46
Polish Ambassador, 19 November 19 3 8 50
17 Conversation of the Fuehrer with M. Beck, Polish Minister for
Foreign Affairs, in the presence of the Reich Minister for Foreign
Affairs, the German Ambassador in Warsaw, and the Polish
Ambassador in Berlin, Berchtesgaden, 5 January 1939 53
M. Beck, Polish Minister for Foreign Affairs, Munich, 6 January
1939 57
M. Beck, Polish Minister for Foreign Affairs, Warsaw, 26 Ja-
nuary 1939 6o
2o Speech by Mr. R. S. Hudson, Secretary, Department of Overseas
Trade, in the House of Commons, 3o November 1938 (Extract) 61
21 The German Ambassador in Paris to the German Foreign office,
1o December 1938 63
22 The German Ambassador in London to the German Foreign
Office,5 January 1939 64
23 Speech by Mr. Chamberlain, British Prime Minister, in
Birmingham, 28 January 1939 (Extract) 66
24 The German Charge d'Affaires in Ankara to the German Foreign
Office, 17 January 1939 67
25 The German Minister in Teheran to the German Foreign
Office, 4 March 1939 68
2

No.

Page
z6 Statement made by Mr. Chamberlain, British Prime Minister, in
the House of Commons, 6 February 1939 71
27 The German Ambassador in Paris to the German Foreign Office,
z8 February 1939 7z
z8 Speech by Mr. Chamberlain, British Prime Minister, in
Birmingham, 17 March 1939 (Extract) 73
29 Extract from a Speech by Lord Halifax, British Secretary of State
for Foreign Affairs, in the House of Lords, zo March 1939 75
3o The German Charge d'Affaires in London to the German
Foreign Office, 20 March 1939 76
31 The German Charge d'Affaires in London to the German
Foreign Office, zz March 1939 77
3 z The German Charged'Affaires in London to the German Foreign
Office, z9 March 1939 77
Polish Ambassador, 21 March 1939 81
37 Memo by the Director of the Political Department in the German
Foreign Office, 25 March 1939 87
Polish Ambassador, z6 March 1939 87
Polish Ambassador, 27 March 1939 89
4o The German Foreign Office to the German Ambassador .in
Warsaw, 27 March 1939 91
Office, z8 March 1939 92
43 The German Consul-General at Thorn to the German Foreign
3

4
No.

page
44 The German Consul-General in Posen to the German Foreign
_Office, 31 March 1939 96
45 Memo by the State Secretary at the German Foreign Office,
6 April 1939 97
46 Statement made by Mr. Chamberlain, British Prime Minister, in
the House of Commons, 31 March 1939 100
47 Speech by Mr. Chamberlain, British Prime . Minister, in the House
of Commons, 3 April 1939 (Extract) 101
48 Extract from a Speech by Sir John Simon, British Chancellor of
the Exchequer, in the House of Commons, 3 April 1939 102
49 Speech by the Fuehrer to the Reichstag, 28 April 1939 104
5o The German Ambassador in Warsaw to the German Foreign
Office, 23 May 1939 113
51 The German Consul-General in New York to the German
Foreign Office, 25 May 1939 115
Office, 29 June 1939 117
Office, 10 July 1939 118
Office,-15 July 1939 119
5 5 The German Ambassador in Paris to the German Foreign Office,
28 July 1939 120
Third Chapter
Poland as the Instrument of Britain's Will to War .
Documents No . 56-100 123-250
56 Petition by the Representatives of the German Minority to the
President of the Polish Republic, 12 May 1939 124
57 The German Consul at Lodz to the German Foreign Office,
15 May 1939 127
Office, 19 June 1939 130
59 The German Consul at Lemberg to the German Foreign Office,
15 July 1939 132

No

PAV
6o The German Consul at Lemberg to the German Foreign Office,
9 August 1939 132
61 Memo by an official in the Political Department of the German
Foreign Office, 16 August 1939 134
62 The German Consul-General at Kattowitz to the German Foreign
Office, i6 •August 1939 134
65 The German Consul-General at Thorn to the German Foreign
Office, 28 August 1939 143
Office.I August 1939 145
67 The Diplomatic Representative of the Polish Republic in Danzig
to the President of the Senate of the Free City of Danzig, 4 August
1939 149
68 The Diplomatic Representative of the Polish Republic in Danzig
to the President of the Senate of the Free City of Danzig, 4 August
1939 (2nd Note) 150
69 The President of the Senate of the Free City of Danzig to the
Diplomatic Representative of the Polish Republic in Danzig,
7 August 1939 151
70 Memo by an official in-the Political Department of the German
Foreign Office, 24 August 1939 15 2
71 The German Consul-General in Danzig to the German Foreign
Office, 31 August 1939 153
72 Communication from the State Secretary at the German Foreign
Office to the Polish Charge d'Affaires, 9 August 1939 154
73 Communication from the Under-Secretary of State at the Polish
Ministry for Foreign Affairs to the German Cbargl d'Affaires in
Warsaw, io August 1939 155
74 The High Command of the German Armed Forces to
the German Foreign Office, 3 November 1939 156
15. August 1939 159
la 100 documents, engi .
5

No.

Page
15 August 1939 162
77 Mr. Chamberlain, British Prime Minister, to the Fuehrer,
22 August 1939 165
78 Conversation of the Fuehrer with the British Ambassador,
Berchtesgaden, 23 August 1939 168
79 The Fuehrer to Mr. Chamberlain, British Prime Minister,
23 August 1939 173
8o Statement made by the Fuehrer to the British Ambassador,
25 August 1939, at 1.30 p. m 178
81 British-Polish Agreement of Mutual Assistance, 25 August 1939 181
82 M. Daladier, the French Premier, to the Fuehrer, 26 August 1939 18 5
83 The Fuehrer to M. Daladier, the French Premier, 27 August
1939 187
84 Memorandum from the British Government handed to the
Fuehrer by the British Ambassador, 28 August 1939, 10.30 p. M. 192
85 The Fuehrer's Reply to the British Government handed to the
British Ambassador, 29 August 1939, 6.45 p. m 196
86 The German Charge d'Affaires in Warsaw to the German Foreign
Office, 3o August 1 939, 5.30 p. m 200
British Ambassador, 3o August 1939, at midnight 201
88 Official German Communication, 31 August 1939, 9 p. m 211
89 Announcement by the Polish Broadcasting Station at Warsaw,
31 August 1939, 11 p. m 214
9o List of officially reported serious frontier incidents on the
German-Polish frontier between z5 and 31 August 1939, com-
piled by an official in the Political Department of the German
Foreign Office, i September 1939 215
91 Speech by the Fuehrer to the Reichstag, i September 1939 P25
9z Conversation of the Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs with the
British Ambassador, i September 1939, 9 P. m 735

No.

Page
93 Communication handed to the German Foreign Office by' the
Italian Ambassador on the morning of 2 September 1939 238
94 Information from the Havas News Agency, 2 September 1939 238
95 Extract from a Statement made by Lord Halifax, British Secretary
of State for Foreign Affairs, in the House of Lords on the after-
noon of 2 September 1939 239
96 Note handed to the German Foreign Office by the British
Ambassador, 3 September 1939, 9 a. m 240
97 Memorandum from the Reich Government, handed to the British
Ambassador by the Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs, 3 Sep-
tember 1939, 11 .30 a. m 241
98 Note handed to the Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs by the
French Ambassador, 3 September 1939, 12.20 p. m 245
French Ambassador, 3 September 1939, 12.20 p. m 247
loo The State Secretary at the German Foreign Office to the German
Diplomatic Representatives, 3 September 1939 249
1a'

Under the leadership of Adolf Hitler, the German people
has learnt to look not backward into the past, but
forward into the future. But the war which has been enforced
upon us, and which we are waging for the sake of Germany's
future weal, renders it absolutely necessary that we should
constantly bear in mind what led to the outbreak of the
present conflict and wherein lay its ultimate causes . These
facts have long been obvious to those who cared to see them
and have often enough been publicly established by competent
German authorities and especially by the Fuehrer in his speeches.
Since, however, our enemies are untiring in their efforts to
conceal the truth by means of lying propaganda and to mis-
lead the world at large, not only as regards the causes of the
war but also concerning their aims, it seems essential to
furnish once again by authentic official documents the irrefu-
table proof that Britain, and Britain alone, was responsible
for the war which she deliberately brought about in order
to annihilate Germany.
Immediately after the outbreak of hostilities, the German
Foreign Office published, in the form of a White Paper, those
documents which shed a light upon the last phase of the
German-Polish crisis . The Foreign Office now publishes a
more comprehensive collection of documents relating not only
to the period immediately preceding the outbreak of hostilities,
but to the most important political events which gave rise to
the conflict with Poland in the first place, and subsequently,
-to the conflict with Britain and France.

The zoo documents here published are so eloquent in them-
selves that comment is superfluous . These matter-of-fact
diplomatic papers give a plain and unadorned picture of the
political developments of the past few years, a picture which
cannot fail to arouse, even in those closely connected with
these developments, a feeling of overwhelming tragedy . They
prove how, since the conclusion of the Great War, the Poles
systematically attempted to exterminate the German minority
in Poland and to ruin Danzig; they prove how the Fuehrer
endeavoured by broad-minded and infinitely patient statesman-
ship to establish German-Polish relations on a permanent foot-
ing to the interests of both parties; they prove how, on the
contrary, the people in power in Poland in their short-sighted-
ness frustrated the possibilities of a final settlement again and
again offered to them by Germany. Above all, the documents
clearly show how, immediately after the Munich Conference,
Britain's desire for war became more and more obvious and
how the British Government finally utilized the infatuation
of the Polish Government, which Britain herself had brought
about on purpose, in order to start their long-planned war -
with Germany. To reveal the full extent of Britain's political
hypocrisy and criminal machinations it would, indeed, be ne-
cessary to recount the events of the entire post-war period,
throughout which Britain opposed every successive attempt
on the part of Germany to free herself from the fetters im-
posed on her by the dictated Treaty of Versailles and again
and again spoilt every opportunity for the revision of this
dictated treaty by means of negotiation. A study of the short
period which has elapsed since the autumn of 1938, viewed in
the light of the documents published in this White Book will,
however, suffice to prove that Britain was, from the outset,
determined to thwart the Fuehrer in his purpose by force .
He had already by his supreme statesmanship succeeded in
doing away with several of the worst crimes committed at
Versailles, and that without bloodshed and without impinging
I0

upon the interests of Great Britain . In the same way, the
Fuehrer would have obtained a peaceful solution of the Ger-
man-Polish problem, hid not Britain made unscrupulous use
of Poland as a pawn in her schemes for war and by her
criminal policy plunged Europe into war .
This truth, historically established for all time, is further
borne out by the fact that Britain replied to the final and
generous peace offer made once again by the Fuehrer in his
speech in the Reichstag on 6 October by an arrogant and
insulting challenge to Germany. In unshakeable consciousness
of the righteousness of their cause and with the unswerving
conviction of their ultimate victory, the people of Germany
took up the challenge and will not lay down their arms until
they have achieved their aim . This aim is :-The military
annihilation of their adversaries and the securement of the
German nation's rightful living space against the threat of
aggression for all time .
Berlin, 3 December 1939.
von Ribbentrop
Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs .

Foreword
The following documents have been, published with the
object of giving a clear picture of the events which led up
to the outbreak, of the present war. They relate not only to
the weeks immediately preceding the outbreak of hostilities
but allow the reader to form an unbiassed opinion with regard
to the more remote causes of the war.
The White Book published by the German Foreign Office
(1939, No. 2) entitled "Documents on the Origin of the War"
contains no less than 482 documents . It was necessary, in
order to give a really comprehensive survey not only of the
development of German-Polish relations, but also of Britain's
war policy and the German-Polish crisis of * 1939, to publish
an unbroken series of official documents . A great number of
the documents contained in the above-mentioned publication
need not, however, be referred to by those who merely wish
to gain a general impression of the most important political
events. The present edition is, therefore, a selection of those
sections of the official White Book dealing with the origin of
the war, which most clearly show the main trend of political
developments. This handy edition of . the German documents
on the origin of the wiLr affords every reader an opportunity
of speedily familiarizing himself with the most important facts
which led to the outbreak of the present conflict. The contents
of those documents which do not appear in this edition are
.summarized in the connecting text, which thus gives a clear
and accurate picture of the course of events .
z3

In the first chapter, the documents show the development
of German-Polish relations from the Versailles Conference to
the time preceding the Munich Agreement. The second chapter
deals with the development of British war policy, namely, the
encirclement of Germany and the incitement of Poland and
also the endeavour of the Reich Government to reach a
peaceful settlement of the problems of Danzig and the Polish
Corridor. The third chapter shows how Poland became the
instrument of Britain's will. to war. The effects of the British
guarantee can be observed in the campaign to exterminate the
German minority in Poland . This is followed by the last phase
of the German-Polish crisis, in which British policy led to the
outbreak of hostilities.
(The figures in brackets indicate the number of the document in
the official German White Book .)

FIRST CHAPTER
Development
of German-Polish Relations
A. The Versailles Conference and the Polish Problem
Since the day at Versailles when Poland was reconstituted
an independent state, German-Polish relations have been under
a cloud. In the first instance, Poland declared herself Ger-
many's hereditary enemy according to an alleged thousand-
year-old tradition. She thus established not only her territorial
claims with regard to Germany, but even justified her own
right o f existence and recommended herself to the victorious
Powers as a potential and reliable ally who could be called
upon at any time to assist in holding Germany in check .
Secondly, this function on the part o f Poland was confirmed
by the Western Powers, and by inclusion in the French system
of collective security she became the eastern link in the encircle-
ment o f Germany, destined since their failure to secure Russia
to assume that country's role and carry on the tradition that
Germany's attention should be divided between two fronts .
Thirdly, German-Polish relations were embittered from the
outset by the transfer to Polish rule of a large body of Ger-
mans who were forthwith subjected to strict Polonization .
Fourthly, the cession o f German territory in the east was one
of the greatest injustices of the Peace Treaty . Not only, the
German nation but competent statesmen among the Allies
regarded these cessions as so intolerable that everyone agreed
that this was a matter for immediate - reparation, i f it were
not to be the cause of another European war .
In a memorandum addressed to the Versailles Conference on
25 March igig, Mr. Lloyd George drew attention to this
I5

potential cause of future conflict, as did also the German
Peace Delegation .
No. i (z)
Extract from a Memorandum circulated by Mr ., Lloyd George,
British Prime Minister, 25 March i9r9
"Some considerations for the Peace Conference before they
finally draft their terms"
. . . . The maintenance of peace will then depend upon there
being no causes of exasperation constantly stirring up. the spirit
of patriotism, of justice or of fair play. To achieve redress
our terms may be severe, they may be stern and even ruthless,
but at the same time they can be so just that the country on
which they are imposed will feel in its heart that it has no
right to complain. But injustice, arrogance, displayed in the
hour of triumph will never be forgotten or forgiven .
For these reasons I am, therefore, strongly averse to trans-
ferring more Germans from German rule to the rule of some
other nation than can possibly be helped. I cannot conceive
any greater cause of future war than that the German people,
who have certainly proved themselves one of the most vigorous
and powerful races in the world, should be surrounded by a
number of small states, many of them consisting of people
who have never previously set up a stable government for
themselves, but each of them containing large masses of Ger-
mans clamouring for reunion with their native, land. The
proposal of the Polish Commission that we should place
z,ioo,ooo Germans under the control of a people which is of
a different religion and which has never proved its capacity
for stable self-government throughout its history must, in my
judgment, lead sooner or later to a new war in the East of
Europe . . . .
x6

No. a (2)
Extract from the Observations o f the German Peace Delegation
on the Peace Conditions, 29 May 1919*
(Translation)
By the settlement of the territorial questions in the east as
provided for in Articles 27 and 28, portions of the Prussian
provinces of East and West Prussia, Pomerania, Posen and
Silesia more or less considerable in area, which are not inhabited
by an undeniably Polish population, are allocated to the Polish
State. Without considering the ethnographical aspect of the
case, numerous German cities and large areas of purely German
territory are being handed over to Poland merely in order that
Poland should possess suitable military frontiers against Ger-
many or important railway junctions . Districts which at various
times during centuries have been separated from Poland or
over which Poland never ruled, are now being indiscriminately
allotted to her . The acceptance of the suggested settlement
would therefore signify a violation of large and undeniably
German districts. Such a settlement would, moreover, be con-
trary to the Wilsonian principle that in settling national
questions care must be exercised to avoid "introducing new or
perpetuating old elements of discord and antagonism that
would be likely in time to break the peace of Europe and
consequently of the world
Annex to the Note addressed by the President of the German
Peace Delegation at Versailles to the President of the Versailles
Conference on 29 May 1919.
No. 3 (I3)
Extract from the Observations o f the German Peace Delegation
on the Peace Conditions, 29 May 1919*
(Translation)
. . The surrender of the purely German Hanseatic town
of Danzig and of its equally purely German surroundings as
2 100 documents, engl .
7

demanded in Articles ioo to io8 is a particularly glaring con-
travention of all the assurances given in President Wilson's
declarations . The census taken in Danzig on i December 1910
showed that Danzig had a negligible Polish-speaking minority
of 3 .5 per cent., the Danzig Niederung district one of i per
cent., the Marienburg district one of 3 per cent ., even the
Danzig Hohe district one of only i i per cent . The Poles
themselves do not seriously contest the fact that Danzig has
always been German in character. An attempt to convert
Danzig into a free, city, to hand over its transport system and
the external representation of its rights to the Polish State
would call forth violent opposition and a permanent state of
war in Eastern Europe. The economic measures moreover are
so arranged that every possible obstacle is placed in the way
of traffic between Danzig and Germany-obviously with the
intention of the ultimate Polonization of this purely German
territory by means of economic pressure. The German Govern-
ment are therefore forced to reject the intended violation of
Danzig's nationality and to demand that Danzig and the sur-
rounding territory be left to the German Reich . - - -
* Annex to the Note addressed by the President of the German
Peace Delegation at Versailles to the President o f the Versailles
Conference, dated 29 May z9z9.
Even M. Clemenceau, President of the Supreme Council, in
his well-known letter to M . Paderewski dated 24 June 1919,
pointed out to the Poles the obligations implied by the handing
over o f large groups o f minorities and made the signing and
observance o f a Treaty for the Protection o f Minorities the
condition on which Poland was to receive the German terri-
tories. This at the same time constituted a solemn obligation on
the part o f the Allied Powers to secure the observance by
Poland of this charter concerning the German and other
minorities in Poland. The wording of the Treaty leaves no

room for doubt as to what responsibilities Poland agreed to
assume with regard to the non-Polish inhabitants o f the new
State, who represented over 40 per cent. of the total population .
The history o f German-Polish relations from 1919 onwards is,
however, as the documents here published show, a story of
continual infringement of this treaty by the Poles and at the
same time a story of the silent complicity of the League of
Nations and the guarantor Powers . As far back as 2o No-
vember 1920, the German Government were forced to cast
aside their reserve and send a comprehensive complaint to the
Polish Government. It was stated therein that "Germans were
treated as outlaws in Poland." This complaint was as un-
successful as the numerous complaints and representations
made by representatives of the German minority in Poland .
itself.
The Polish Government made it clear that they considered
themselves in no wise bound by the obligations for the pro-
tection o f the minorities which they had so solemnly under-
taken. On 1o April 1923, for instance, General Sikorski, who
was then Premier, speaking in public, announced the Govern-
ment's programme as "the liquidation o f German estates and
the de-Germanization of the western `voivodeships"' and pro-
ceeded to indulge in cutting remarks directed against Danzig.
By the middle of 1923 the expulsion of the Germans had
already assumed extraordinary proportions . Polish measures
against German land-owners, which, for example, the Perma-
nent Court of International justice, in its advisory opinion
given on 1o September 1923, designated as "not in conformity
with the international obligations o f the Polish Government,"
still further increased the compulsion to emigrate . In Septem-
ber 1931 it was admitted in Polish quarters that some million
Germans had already been ousted from Poland. Neither the
guarantor Powers nor the League o f Nations, to which not
only the German, but also the Ukrainian minority had mean-
2*
z9

jytne made repeated appeals for protection against the conti-
nued infringement o f the provisions. of the Minorities Treaty
by Poland, fulfilled their obligations .
The Polonizing policy was likewise immediately directed
against the Free City of Danzig. The German Peace Dele-
gation's protest against the severance of Danzig from the
Reich, although based on President Wilson's declarations, had
proved in vain . From the outset Poland regarded thee new
status in Danzig merely as a preparatory condition for making
the city definitely Polish . Poland set up twenty-four author-
ities in Danzig, each of which she regarded as a Polish
nucleus capable of development . A report by the High Com-
mand of the German Army at the conclusion of the war
with Poland shows that the more important of these author-
ities had been developed into military bases . The Free City
of Danzig was constantly forced to appeal to the League
Commissioner, as also to the Council of the League of
Nations against action on the part of Poland . By the abuse
of privileges granted her at Versailles with regard to Danzig
and principally by the exercise of economic pressure, Poland .
endeavoured from the outset to force Danzig to subjugate
its interests to her own, nor did she hesitate to violate the
sovereign rights of the Free City of Danzig in cases where
such pressure seemed unavailing. Whilst Poland endeavoured
by every means in her power to usurp for herself a better
footing in Danzig, she succeeded in most seriously damaging
the trade of the port of Danzig by the construction of a
rival Polish harbour at Gdynia which was granted unilateral
privileges.
Germany's adversaries in the Great War who had been
responsible for the establishment o f the Polish State soon
realized that the continual violations of the law perpetrated
by Poland against, the German minority within her frontiers
and against Danzig, constituted a serious threat to the peace
of Europe . This feeling was expressed in numerous statements
20

G
made by leading British politicians, in debates in the House
of Commons and in various publications. Mr. Winston Chur-
chill, for example, speaking in the House of Commons in
November 1932 advocated "the removal of the just grievances
of the vanquished" and emphasized in particular the "Danzig
Corridor." "Otherwise" be averred, "we might find ourselves
pledged in honour and in law to enter a war against our will,
and against our better judgment, . in order to preserve those
very injustices and grievances which sunder Europe to-day ."
But nothing was done to alter matters while yet there was
time, and by the time that the National-Socialist Government
came into power in Germany, conditions had become more
and more critical.
B. Germany's Efforts to come to an Understanding
with Poland 7-933 to 1939
Immediately after coming into power, the Fuehrer, in order
to ensure peace with neighbouring states and thus to secure
the peace of Europe, resolved to place Germany's relations
with Poland upon an entirely new footing and with this
end in view, to come to an understanding with Poland. His
efforts to reach an understanding began in May 1933 and
continued until the end of August 1939. A few documents
selected from the abundant material extant bear witness to
Germany's efforts to reach an understanding.
No. 4 (26)
Memo by the Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs concerning
a conversation of the Fuehrer with the Polish Minister
(Translation)
Berlin, 2 May 11933
This morning the Reich Chancellor in my presence received
the Polish Minister who on behalf of his Government pointed
out that since the National-Socialist Party had come into
21

power in Germany a growing uneasiness had manifested itself
in Poland which had at times almost amounted to panic .
The Minister emphasized Poland's interest in a free outlet to
the sea which no Polish Government could ever again
renounce. For this reason Poland was compelled to maintain
her title to Danzig, and he had been instructed to obtain an
assurance from the Chancellor that Germany had no inten-
tions of altering the present status in Danzig .
The Chancellor replied to M. Wysocki by stating that, in
the first place, he was forced to deny that Poland had any
particular claim to Danzig . If uneasiness prevailed in Poland,
he could only say that there was definitely greater reason
for such uneasiness in Germany where there was a continual
sense of being threatened on account of events in Upper
Silesia, the concentration of troops on the frontier and the
occupation of the Westerplatte in Danzig . Owing to the
short-sightedness of statesmen, malevolence and lack of insight,
the frontier between Germany and Poland had been fixed in
such a way that as long as this demarcation held good, a
peaceful coexistence of the two peoples was practically in-
conceivable. He respected every nationality and regarded
Poland as an actuality which he was fully prepared to
acknowledge. But at the same time he demanded that Poland
for her part should treat Germany as an actuality. If, at
the time when the Treaty of Versailles was signed, people
had not been wholly unable to think clearly, Poland herself
ought never to have consented to the establishment of a
corridor through German territory, for it was obvious that
such a corridor would inevitably give rise to a continual
state of tension between Germany and Poland . It would
have been much wiser to have chosen the outlet to the sea,
to which the Minister had referred as an inalienable right
on Poland's part, on the other side of East Prussia . Had that
been done, friendly relations would long have existed between
Germany and Poland and there would also have been a

possibility of an economic understanding. He, the Chancellor,
only hoped that the political questions still pending between
Germany and Poland would one day be investigated and
dealt with dispassionately by the statesmen of both countries .
He was convinced that a way out of the present intolerable
situation could then be found. Germany wanted peace. He
was far from intending to expropriate Polish territory by
force. He reserved the right, however, to vindicate the rights
to which he was entitled by virtue of treaty at any time and
as he thought fit . . .
Frhr. von Neurath
No. 5 (33)
The Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs to the
German Minister in Warsaw
Telegram
(Translation)
Berlin, 24 November 1933
The Reich Chancellor agrees to the draft of a German-
Polish declaration as already handed over to you in person
here*. The Chancellor further agrees that you should hand
this draft in audience to Marshal Pilsudski on behalf of the
Reich Chancellor . Please make immediate formal application
for this audience and press for a speedy fixing of the date .
Please observe the following lines in what you say at the
audience: The Chancellor sincerely thanks the Marshal for his
greetings which he reciprocates . He has welcomed with satis-
faction the attitude adopted by the Marshal, with whose
views he is in complete accord as is clear from the press
communique** agreed upon. The Chancellor thinks it advisable
not to let matters rest after the publication of this com-
munique, but to find a way in which the ideas and aims of
23
I

both Governments could be more clearly specified and have
greater political weight. He had therefore instructed you to
hand the Marshal a draft of a declaration such as might be
made by both Governments with the object of achieving the
aim desired . To explain the wording adopted in this draft
you should point out that the Chancellor thinks it advisable
not to use traditional outworn phrases and formulas which
are already somewhat trite, but to choose instead a form
which would make the political decision of the two Govern-
ments absolutely clear and would make a deeper impression
on the public than the usual form of pact which is less
esteemed nowadays than formerly. You should, however,
emphasize in this connection that the form chosen in the
draft in no way affects the binding nature of the terms to
be agreed upon, as can be seen from the fact that provision
is made at the end for ratification.
For your information I should like to point out that the
wording of the declaration as suggested by us in no way
implies the recognition of Germany's existing eastern frontiers,
but states on the contrary that by the medium of this decla-
ration a basis shall be created for the solution of all problems,
i. e. also territorial problems.

Neurath
* The reference is to a preliminary draft o f the Declaration o f
26 January r934, published under No .7 (37).
** The text of the communique is as follows:-
"This morning the Reich Chancellor received the Polish Minister
who called on him for the first time . The discussion concerning
German-Polish relations revealed the complete agreement of both
Governments to tackle questions affecting both countries by means
of direct negotiations and to renounce any resort to force in their
mutual relations."
24
0

No. 6 (34)
The German Minister in Warsaw .to the German Foreign Office
Telegram
(Translation)
Warsaw, 28 November 1933
Audience with Marshal Piludski took place this afternoon .
The conversation, at which M. Beck, Foreign Minister, was
present and which lasted about an hour and a quarter, was
of a definitely friendly • character and indeed the extra-
ordinary speed with which, considering the usual custom
here, the date of the audience was fixed, can be regarded as
a special mark of attention.
The Marshal who, in conversation, is inclined to deviate
from the subject under discussion and indulge in personal
reminiscences, mostly of a military nature, gives the im-
pression of a man intellectually alert but prematurely old and
almost infirm in body. Characteristic of his fundamental
attitude towards the questions under discussion were his
repeated expressions of friendly appreciation of the per-
sonality of the Reich Chancellor whose genuine desire for
peace he frequently emphasized in the course of the con-
versation.
I began by conveying- the Chancellor's greetings which
Pilsudski received with evident satisfaction. After having
explained, according to your instructions, the form of the
"declaration" chosen by us, I read it aloud in German at
the Marshal's request and supplemented this by explanations
in French, with which language he is better acquainted .
Pilsudski signified his agreement_ with the fundamental ideas
of the German proposal . Using his own characteristically
drastic mode of expression, he approved in particular of the
choice of a new form for the declaration in which the
absence of paragraphs, which he evidently detests, especially
25

appealed to him. He was careful however to infer that
traditional formulas and paragraphs sometimes had their uses .
He declared that he was naturally not in a position to express
an opinion with regard to details in the draft, but that he
wished already at this juncture to mention a particular point
about which he was doubtful, namely the reference to the
Locarno Treaty of Arbitration which was regarded with
disfavour in Poland. Concerning future procedure the Mar-
shal explained at some length what different persons should
be asked to examine and give their opinion on the draft
and pointed out repeatedly that this would occupy a con-
siderable time . In the further course of the conversation,
Marshal Pilsudski emphasized that he also wished to put
German-Polish relations on a friendly and neighbourly basis,
but stressed with a bluntness which I have as yet hardly
observed among Polish politicians, that the hostility of the
Polish people to the Germans, which dates back to time
immemorial, would give rise to grave difficulties in carrying
out this policy. Consequently, this policy must not be based
on sentiment but solely upon common-sense considerations .
I contradicted his assertion that the position in Germany
was similar and emphasized with particular reference to recent
incidents the necessity for the initiation of a systematic policy
of rapprochement, such as had already been instituted with
success by Germany, e . g. with regard to the press. Pilsudski
replied to my remarks by expressing his infinite contempt for
the press, with which he wished to have nothing to do, but
he admitted that something could be gained by influencing
political organizations .
In conclusion I mentioned the Chancellor's desire to achieve
normal relations in economic matters also. Pilsudski replied
that formerly only one Minister in the Polish Cabinet had
opposed the customs war, whereas to-day it would be difficult
to find a single Minister who was in favour of continuing
this wretched war. Poland, having weathered the economic
z6

crisis despite the fact that she had no reserves, was however
obliged to seek a settlement which was economically justifiable .
Moltke
Germany's efforts, which found a ready supporter in the
person o f that great Polish statesman, Marshal Pilsudski, who
was also- desirous o f coming to an understanding with his
western neighbour, appeared to meet with success. On
26 January 1934, a mutual Declaration was made which
seemed destined to place the relations of the two States and
the two peoples on a new footing .
No.7 (37)
Declaration made by the German and the Polish Governments,
26 January 1934
(Translation)
The German Government and the Polish Government
consider that the time has come to introduce a new phase in
the political relations between Germany and Poland by direct
understanding between State and State . They have, therefore,
decided in the present declaration to lay down the principles
for the future development of these relations.
The two Governments base their action on the fact that
the maintenance and safeguarding of a lasting peace between
their countries is an essential prerequisite for the general peace
of Europe . They have therefore decided to base their mutual
relations on the principles laid down in the Pact of Paris
of 27 August 1928 and propose to define more exactly the
application of these principles in so far as the relations
between Germany and Poland are concerned.
Each of the two Governments, therefore, establish that the
international obligations already respectively undertaken by
them towards a third party do not hinder the peaceful
development of their mutual relations, do no conflict with
the present Declaration and are not affected by this Declara-

tion. They establish, moreover, that this Declaration does not
extend to those questions which under International Law
are to be regarded exclusively as the internal concern of one
of the two States.
Both Governments announce their intention to settle
directly all questions of whatever sort which concern their
mutual relations. Should any disputes arise between them
and agreement thereon not be reached by direct negotiations,
they will in each particular case, on the basis of mutual
agreement, seek a solution by other peaceful means, without
prejudice to the possibility of applying, if necessary, those
methods of procedure which in the event of such cases arising
are provided for in other agreements in force between them .
In no circumstances, however, will they resort to force in
order to reach a decision in such disputes.
The guarantee of peace created by these principles will
facilitate the great task of both Governments of finding
solutions for problems of a political, economic or cultural
nature based on equitable and fair adjustment of the inte-
rests of both parties.
Both Governments are convinced that the relations between
their countries will in this way develop fruitfully, and will
lead to their becoming good neighbours, a result which will
contribute not only to the well-being of their own countries,
but also to that of the other peoples of Europe .
The present Declaration shall be ratified, and the instru-
ments of ratification shall be exchanged in Warsaw as soon
as possible. The Declaration is valid for a period of ten
years, reckoned from the day of the exchange of the instru-
ments of ratification. If the declaration is not denounced
by one of the two Governments six months before the
expiration of this period it will continue in force, but can
then be denounced by either Government at any time on
notice of six months being given.
28

Done in two original documents in the German and Polish ,
languages respectively.
Berlin, 26 January 1934 .
For the German Government :
C. Freiherr von Neurath
For the Polish Government :
J6zef Lipski
This solemn Declaration expressed the intention of both
Governments to solve all questions affecting their relations
by means of bilateral diplomatic negotiations, without resort-
ing to force and without the intervention of a third party .
It was hoped that on the basis of such good-neighbourly
relations, a solution could be found "for problems of a poli-
tical, economic or cultural nature". This agreement related,
therefore, to the settlement of problems but was not intended
to perpetuate the existing status quo between Germany and
Poland.
Expectations that this agreement would place the' relations
between the two states and the two peoples on a new and
productive footing were doomed to early disappointment .
The hope that the German-Polish Declaration would lead
to an improvement in the treatment of the German minority
in Poland and would consitute a rule for the attitude o f the
Polish authorities towards the German minority was soon
shattered. Assuming that Germany and the German Press
would remain silent in accordance with the spirit o f the
friendly agreement, the Polish Government under cover o f
this very agreement began a campaign with the object of
ridding themselves of the German minority by underhand
methods, the only obstacle in their path being the merely
formal supervision in connection with the Treaty for the
Protection of Minorities. On 13 September 1934, Poland, there-
fore, notified the League o f Nations Assembly that she would

cease to co-operate with the League in the execution of the
Treaty for the Protection of Minorities . In reply to German
reservations with regard to this step, the Polish Minister for
Foreign Affairs expressly declared that the rights o f the mino-
rities would, in future, be protected as hitherto by the Polish
constitution.
This statement was, however, not in accordance with facts .
The campaign to exterminate the German minority was con-
tinued by means o f Agrarian Reform, dismissal 'of workers,
limitation of cultural activities, boycotting measures and acts
of terror. The German-Polish press truce was not observed.
German representatives in Poland were forced to report that
the friendly agreement had brought with it no improvement
but that, on the contrary, the situation was becoming steadily
worse.
No. 8 (73)
Conversation of the Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs with
M. Beck, Polish Minister for Foreign Affairs
Memo
(Translation)
Berlin, 2o January 1937
M. Beck, the Polish Minister for Foreign Affairs, visited
me this morning, whilst passing through Berlin on his way to
Geneva, and we took occasion to discuss, amongst other things,
the attitude of the Polish Press .
I drew M. Beck's attention to the fact that even a large
part of the Polish Press which is inspired by the Government
has been, during the last few months, writing in a way very
unfriendly towards Germany. I stated that we had imposed
upon the German Press the duty of remaining very reserved
in regard to this unfriendly tone, but that I would request
him to use his influence with a view to causing this section
of the Polish Press to change its tone . This matter evidently
30

caused M. Beck embarrassment and he endeavoured to excuse
the matters objected to on the ground of internal political
difficulties in Poland . Frhr. von Neurath
In the spring of 1937, Germany, in view of the impending
expiration of the Geneva Convention relating to Upper Silesia
(which ensured the population on either side o f the frontier
certain facilities for a transition period o f fifteen years), made
an effort to secure a bilateral minorities agreement with
Poland. Poland, however, twice rejected such a suggestion,
being o f the opinion that it would constitute a limitation o f
her sovereign rights. In view o f this, Germany was prepared
to be satisfied with an identic declaration made simultaneously
by each Government in place of a formal agreement . In this
connection, the German Ambassador in Warsaw submitted the
following report to the German Foreign Office: -
Nr. 9 (88)
The German Ambassador in Warsaw to the German Foreign
Office
Report
(Translation)
Warsaw, i June 1937
I visited M . Beck to-day and made the demarche which you
instructed me to make and handed to him the attached Memo-
randum which I also thoroughly explained verbally. M. Beck
listened very attentively but showed during my remarks signs
neither of agreement nor disagreement . When I in conclusion
pointed out that my instructions from Herr von Neurath had
been ordered by the Fuehrer and Chancellor, M . Beck showed
signs of being obviously impressed and repeated that desires of
the Fuehrer were always certain to receive particularly serious
consideration in Warsaw, and he would, of course, immediately
submit to the Premier or to the Cabinet the matter which
31

I had brought to his notice, and would therefore wait in order
to make known in the near future the attitude of the Polish
Government.
For the rest M. Beck confined himself to a few short obser-
vations in which he first of all stated that as a matter of fact
our considerate behaviour on the occasion of the action taken
by the Polish Government at Geneva in the autumn of 1934,
had given rise at the time to great satisfaction in Warsaw .
M. Beck then added a few words of defence in regard to my
statements concerning the actual situation of the German
minority in Poland but did not go into details and stated that
in the event of arbitrary action on the part of subordinate
authorities, the Premier would certainly be prepared to inter-
vene in his characteristically energetic manner . M. Beck tried
to explain the difficulties connected with the whole German-
Polish minorities problem as being a result of the difference in
the internal structure of the two States, for in his opinion the
whole minorities problem was extraordinarily complicated .
M. Beck did not repeat his previous arguments against our
proposal but on the other hand did not utter a single word
about the fundamental points of view, which I had according
to my instructions put before him.

von Moltke
In the Memorandum to which reference is made in the
report, the Reich Government expressed their disappointment
at Poland's rejection o f the German proposals . I f the Polish
Government declined f o»nal procedure and treaties in their
accepted form, esteeming such of little value from the point
o f view o f the minorities themselves, and preferred to come
to a friendly understanding with regard to any individual
problems which might arise, the German Government were,
to a certain extent, entirely in agreement with this point of
view, but pointed out that it was difficult to dispense with a
general fundamental agreement with regard to the treatment
o f such a vital problem. They, therefore, suggested an identic
3z

public declaration to be made by the two Governments regard-
ing the protection o f the German and the Polish minorities
respectively, domiciled within their territories. The Memo-
randum goes on to say: -
Extract from the Memorandum o f the Reich with regard to
the German-Polish Minorities problem, 1 June 1937
5. In addition to the previously indicated points of view
which arise out of questions of principle, and even more
urgently than these, the development of the actual situation
of the German minority in Poland demands that an under-
standing be arrived at between the two Governments on the
whole minorities problem. It is in this actual situation of the
German minority that the German Government regret to see
an incontrovertible argument against the Polish theory that
the minority would fare best if the local authorities were left
free to deal with it at their own unrestricted discretion . As a
matter of fact, our observations for a long time and parti-
cularly during the last year h ;ve left no doubt that a system-
atic attempt is being made with the support of state depart-
ments and of private organizations encouraged by the authori-
ties to shatter the economic foundations of the German mino-
rity in Poland and to cause all those who admit to being Ger-
mans to change their attitude in this respect .
6. It is not intended at this stage to enter into a discussion
of details. However, in order that the German complaint may
not appear to be vague or not substantiated we would draw
attention to the following points :-
(a) the disproportionate subjection of German estates to the
process of expropriation in accordance with Agrarian
Reform, as carried out particularly last year ;
(b) the intensified Polonization of German estates, which
have been for generations in the possession of Germans,
3 100 documents, engl.
33

by application of the law of repurchase and priority
purchase;
(c) the interpretation of the legislation applying to the
frontier zone*, which is in fact also being particularly
directed against the Germans ;
(d) the fact that for some time past persons belonging to
the German minority have only in exceptional cases
received permission from the authorities to open shops,
businesses, and trading and industrial undertakings, and
that doctors, chemists, and lawyers of German birth are
being caused the greatest difficulties by the authorities
in the establishment of a practice ;
(e) the likewise obvious fact that German employees and
workmen are dismissed owing to pressure from Polish
organizations, and find no employment as long as they
still belong to German organizations or send their children
to German schools ;
(f ) the sad plight of those young people who have passed
through schools which have been licensed by the Polish
State, but afterwards in preparing themselves for a pro-
fession have been caused such great difficulties that a
disproportionately high percentage of young people of
German birth have not yet been able to enter any pro-
fession;
(g) the boycott of all German businesses in the severed terri-
tories, which has even been publicly proclaimed recently .
* In accordance with the Frontier Zones Order of 23 December
1927 and the orders issued for the purpose o f its execution, limi-
tations were introduced in regard to residence and the acquisition
of landed property within a certain zone. To this zone belonged
the whole of Pommerellen, also the whole of the Corridor district,
almost the whole of the province of Posen, and the whole of Upper
Silesia. In spite of these representations by Germany the Frontier
Zone Order was made more rigorous on I July 1937.
34

In consideration of the various personal and family connect-
ions of the frontier population it is natural that it has become
known in Germany that those belonging to the German
minority are forfeiting their means of existence in a continually
increasing degree. As public feeling is mounting, the Govern-
ment of the Reich are called upon to take reprisals and to
limit the scope of existence for those belonging to the Polish
minority in Germany who hitherto have been following out
and carrying on their occupation without let or hindrance.
The Government of the Reich naturally desire not to have
to proceed to reprisals against Poland but cannot, on the other
hand, close their eyes to the fact that the increasing pressure
tQ which the Germans in Poland are being continuously sub-
jected is causing pain and disapproval within the Reich, and
that the popularity of a generous policy of coming to an under-
standing with Poland is suffering severely as a result of these
measures on the part of subordinate Polish authorities.
7. The Government of the Reich, therefore, urgently request
that the minorities question may be examined again in con-
sideration of and in connection with the foregoing points of
view. They hope that the Polish Government will, however,
still decide to enter into discussions in some form or another
of a fundamental settlement, and that they will, moreover,
adopt measures as soon as possible in order to curb the chauvi-
nism prevailing in the western provinces of Poland; for this
chauvinism involves the serious danger of the co-operation
between the German and Polish Governments, which had had
such a favourable beginning, being hampered in its further
fruitful development .
On f November 19,37, an Identic Declaration was actually
made by both Governments. In view of Poland's refusal to
agree to a treaty involving definite obligations for both par-
ties, this Declaration was, in practice, deprived o f a large
measure o f its effectiveness.
3'
35

The coercive measures adopted by the Poles against the
German minority were accompanied by continued anti-Ger-
man acts of provocation. That the final aim of Polish policy
as regards Danzig was to incorporate the Free City into the
Polish State was made obvious at a Polish national demon-
stration concerning which the German Consul-General in Danzig
sent the following report to the German Foreign Office :-
No. 10 (192)
The German Consul-General in Danzig to the German
Foreign Office
Report
(Translation)
Danzig, 1 f, November 1937
-On the occasion of the anniversary of the Polish Declara-
tion of Independence on 11 November celebrations took place
last Sunday in villages inhibited by Polish minorities in the
Free State of Danzig. Numerous Danzig residents of Polish
extraction took part in the festivities .
During one of the celebrations in the village of- Gross-
Trampken some remarkable statements were made in a speech
by M. Chodacki, Poland's Diplomatic Representative in
Danzig. He said amongst other things : "I remember the time
very well when I joined up in the Great War hoping for
Poland's resurrection. The Poles here in Danzig should like-
wise hope and wait for the time when, in the near future,
they will be living on Polish soil ."

von Luckwald
During 1938, German - Polish relations deteriorated still
further, a fact which was due to a great extent to the pro-
vocative attitude o f the Polish Press . In this connection the
German Ambassador in Warsaw reported as follows : -
36

No. 11 (117)
The German Ambassador in Warsaw to the German
Foreign Office
Report
(Translation)
Warsaw, 2 September 193 8
The attitude of the Polish Press and of other organs of
publicity in Poland, towards Germany has latterly become
unmistakably worse . This attitude was never satisfactory,
and continually failed to come up to the expectations which
had been frequently associated by Germans with the political
Agreement and the Press Pact of 1934. It is true that news-
papers inspired by the Polish Ministry for Foreign Affairs
and other organs of political opinion were mostly correct in
their behaviour and in many questions, particularly foreign
political ones, often displayed an attitude which must be
appreciated, but not even did the so-called `camp of national
unity', that is to say the party organization of the Govern-
ment which had been created for the purpose of winning the
"masses" for the prevailing system, fail to make use of anti-
German catchwords in its competition with the other po-
litical groups, and in order to gain more popularity .
The Polish Government are maintaining considerable re-
serve in the face of these incidents; at all events there are
no signs of any kind of energetic counter-action being taken.
It may be true that the possibility for the Polish authorities
of exercising influence upon the Press is limited, but such
an extremely passive attitude can indeed only be explained
by the fact that the Government are afraid of employing
such means of force as they actually possess, for the pro-
tection of the unpopular German interests, showing far
greater energy in representing their own interests . It would
37

seem hardly credible that it should be impossible to prevent
the repeated provocative demonstrations in the towns in the
western districts, staged by the West Marches Society, which
is in close contact with the Government .
It cannot escape the notice of the Polish Government that
this passive attitude is gradually creating an atmosphere which
is becoming continually more incompatible with the German-
Polish policy of coming to an agreement . Certainly one has
never, here in Poland, noticed a very cordial tone in regard
to Germany, and when there were critical moments, the
Poles always attached importance to not allowing their con-
nections with Germany to appear to be too intimate . That,
however, the song of hate, the "Rota", can be sung in front
of a German Consulate-General without anything being done
to prevent it, is indeed an incident of a kind which has not
been experienced since 1934- It is obvious that the Beck
policy is at the present time still less popular than pre-
viously, and the Foreign Minister himself is forced to main-
tain great reserve. In the well-known case of the German
secondary school at Bromberg, where the gentleman agree-
ment with M . Beck had quite clearly been wrecked by the
local administrative authorities, we have a clear indication
of the tension which exists within the country . As a matter
of fact, the members of the Polish Government themselves
do not seem to hold a common view in regard to this very
question of the German policy of M . Beck. At all events,
it can in all probability be assumed that neither the Minister
for War nor Marshal Smigly-Rydz are cordially co-operating
in M. Beck's policy. In this connection it is also interesting
to note that even an old pioneer of the policy of coming to
an understanding with Germany, like Mackiewicz, editor-
in-chief of the Wilna Slowo, recently attacked M. Beck's
policy in an article which was almost sensational, reproaching
M. Beck that he, by his policy of friendship with Germany,
3 8

was neglecting the relations with England and France
without having obtained corresponding advantages from the
co-operation with Germany .
Yesterday I again brought to the serious notice of M . Beck
the unfavourable development in Polish public opinion and
the recent particularly anti-German demonstrations ; I had
a few days ago touched upon the same subject when talking
with the acting Vice-minister, M . Arciszewski. M. Beck did
not deny that the situation was unsatisfactory, and said he
had, immediately after his return from leave, on his own
initiative drawn the attention of the Premier to these things,
and that the latter had shown full appreciation . When I
observed that we were not able to understand why an end
was not put at least to the repeated demonstrations of the
West Marches Society, M. Beck replied that it was not
advisable to proceed merely with prohibitions, but sometimes
better to open a safety-valve. The Government had, therefore,
restricted themselves to reducing to a very limited degree the
intentions of the demonstrators, which went very much
further. In addition, M. Beck attempted to show that the
attacks upon Germany were really not of such great signi-
ficance and assured me that the Government were in no wise
allowing themselves to be influenced - by the nervousness of
public opinion but were keeping to the old line of policy.
Although M. Beck was very definite in this statement, one
cannot disguise from oneself the fact that there is an
unfriendly feeling already prevailing against us here, which
might of course hamper the Polish Government when coming
to resolutions on decisive questions.
von Moltke
The growing, anti-German agitation reached its first climax
at the end o f February 1939 when, without obvious reason,
fierce anti-German demonstrations, which the police scarcely
39

attempted to check, took place in front o f the German
Embassy in Warsaw and of German Consulates in the pro-
vinces. Frenzied crowds sang anti-German songs, cheered
for "Polish Danzig", abused the "German dogs" and broke
windows. The Polish Government, it is true, officially
expressed their regret, but this did not serve to conceal the
alarming nature of these signs of growing Polish aggressiveness .

SECOND CHAPTER
British War Policy after the Munich Agreement-
Germany's Effort to secure an amicable Settlement
'of the Problems of Danzig and the Polish Corridor
A. Pro-war agitation in Britain - Germany's
proposals to Poland .
No. 'a (n7)
Joint Declaration made by the Fuehrer an
• d Mr. Chamberlain,
British Prime Minister, Munich, 30 September 1938
•

(Translation)
We, the German Fuehrer and Chancellor and the British
Prime Minister, have had a further meeting to-day and are
agreed in recognizing that the question of Anglo-German
relations is of the first importance for the two countries and
for Europe.
We regard the agreement signed last night and the Anglo-
German Naval Agreement as symbolic of the desire of . our
two peoples never to go to war with one another again.
We are resolved that the method of consultation shall be
the method adopted to deal with any other questions . that
may concern our two countries, and we are determined to
continue our efforts to remove possible sources of difference
and thus to contribute to assure the peace of Europe .
Adolf. Hitler

Neville Chamberlain
After many years of unreciprocated effort on the part of
Germany to secure the friendship of Britain, the Anglo-
German Munich Declaration, the text of which is given above,
4I

seemed to indicate that the relations between the two coun-
tries had taken that turn for the better which, as is well
known, had from the outset formed part o f the National-
Socialist foreign political programme . The Munich Agreement
had offectually done away with the Czech crisis . The Fuehrer
considered it now possible to stabilize relations with Britain
on a permanent basis and thus to secure for his own people
and for all other European nations a long period o f peace .
How great was then the general disappointment when, only
three days after the Munich Declaration, Mr . Chamberlain,
the British Prime Minister, informed the House o f Commons
that Britain would proceed to rearm at all costs . This speech,
of which an extract is given below, was accompanied by
violent attacks on Germany by members of the Opposition .
No. 13 (218)
Extract from Speech by Mr . Chamberlain, British Prime
Minister, in the House o f Commons, 3 October 1938
. . . . I believe there are many who will feel with me
that such a declaration, signed by the German Chancellor
and myself, is something more than a pious expression of
opinion. In our relations with other countries everything
depends upon there being sincerity and good will on both
sides. I believe that there is sincerity and good will on both
sides in this declaration . That is why to me its significance
goes far beyond its actual words . If there is one lesson which
we should learn from the events of these last weeks it is this,
that lasting peace is not to be obtained by sitting still and
waiting for it to come . It requires active, positive efforts to
achieve it. No doubt I shall have plenty of critics who will
say that I am guilty of facile optimism, and that I should
disbelieve every word that is uttered by rulers of other great
States in Europe. I am too much of a realist to believe that
42

we are going to achieve our paradise in a day. We have
only laid the foundations of peace. The superstructure is not
even begun .
For a long period now we have been engaged in this
country in a great programme of rearmament, which is daily
increasing in pace and volume. Let no one think that because
we have signed this agreement between these four Powers at
Munich we can afford to relax our efforts in regard to
that programme at this moment . Disarmament on the part
of this country can never be unilateral again . We have tried
that once, and we very nearly brought ourselves to disaster.
If disarmament is to come it must come by steps, and it must
come by agreement and the active co-operation of other
countries. Until we know that we have obtained that
co-operation and until we have agreed upon the actual . steps
to be taken, we here must remain on guard "
Once again the attitude not only of the British Prime
Minister himself, but primarily of the Opposition, which was
contrary to the letter and the spirit of the Munich Agree-
ment, forced the Fuehrer in a speech delivered at Saarbriicken
on 9 October 1938, to point out that Mr. Duff Cooper,
Mr. Eden or Mr . Winston Churchill might come into power
in Britain in Mr. Chamberlain's stead and that in that case
a world war would probably ensue, since this was the
publicly avowed aim of these men. On the very next day,
Mr. Hore Belisha, British Secretary of State for War, replied
in a speech in which he announced further rearmament
measures to be adopted by Britain. During the months which
followed, these measures, which were concerned with offen-
sive weapons and aims, including the building up of an expe-
ditionary force for a continental war, were carried out at
an increasing rate . At the same time, Britain urged France
as her ally to increase her armaments, especially with regard
to her air arm. That the. warning uttered by the Fuehrer
43

in Saarbriicken was only too justified was proved a few
days after when Mr . Winston Churchill, in a broadcast
message to the United States, made it clear in his customary
war-mongering tone, that the British political circles referred
to above did not intend to adhere to the Munich Agreement .
No. 14 (223)
Extract from a Speech by Mr. Winston Churchill, broadcast
in the United States of America, r6 October r938
We must arm. If, through an earnest desire for
peace, we have placed ourselves at a disadvantage, we must
make up for it by redoubled exertions, and, if necessary, by
1
fortitude in suffering. We shall no doubt arm.
Britain, casting away the habits of centuries, will decree
national service upon her citizens . The British people will
stand erect and will face whatever may be coming. But arms-
instrumentalities,-as President Wilson called them-are
not sufficient by themselves . We must add to them the
power of ideas .
People say we ought not to allow ourselves to be drawn
into a theoretical antagonism between Nazidom and demo-
cracy, but the antagonism is here now.
It is this very conflict of spiritual and moral ideas which
gives the free countries a great part of their strength .
. . . . The light of civilized progress with its tolerances and
co-operations, with its dignities and joys, has often in the past
been blotted out.
But I hold the belief that we have now at last "got far
enough ahead of barbarism to control it and to avert it,
if only we realize what is afoot and make up our minds
in time. We shall do it in the end . But how much harder our
toil, the longer the delay!

. Is this a call to war? I declare it to be the sole guarantee
of peace. The swift and resolute gathering of forces to con-
front not only military but moral aggression ; the resolute and .
sober acceptance of their duty by the English-speaking peoples
and by all the -nations, great and small, who wish to walk
-with them; their faithful and zealous comradeship would
almost between night and morning-clear the path of progress
and banish from all our lives the fear which already darkens
the sunlight to hundreds of millions of -men
During the weeks immediately following the conclusion o f
the Munich Agreement, the catchword "Poland" continually
appeared in the British Press. On the other hand, Poland had,
with Germany's assistance, just acquired the Olsa territory
and aspired to the establishment o f a common frontier with
Hungary. The time, therefore, seemed propitious for a final
settlement, satisfying the honour of both parties, o f the main
German-Polish problems, namely those of Danzig and the
Corridor. That both problems had to be solved is obvious
from what has been said in the first chapter with regard to
the constantly recurring tension in German-Polish relations
and also the plight of the German minority in Poland which ;
despite the existing German-Polish agreement, was steadily
becoming worse. Germany sought, however, to reach a sett-
lement, not in defiance of, but in co-operation with Poland on
the basis of the 1934 agreement . The German demands were
so moderate as to constitute the very minimum of what she
could claim. This is proved by the conversation between the
Reich Minister . for Foreign Affairs and the Polish Ambassador,
given below, at which the German proposals were formulated
for the first time. They were never altered in substance .
45

No. i 5 (197)
Conversation o f the Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs with
the Polish Ambassador at Berchtesgaden, 24 October 1938
(Translation)
Memo by Herr Hewel, Councillor o f Legation
At the beginning of the conversation the Reich Minister for
Foreign Affairs described the situation to the Polish Am-
bassador.
M. Lipski then explained the reason of his visit :-Poland
was interested in the stabilization of the Danube Basin . The
Carpatho-Ukraine, with its disorder, with a population eighty
per cent of which was illiterate, was a storm centre from
which issued every imaginable kind of political current, a
downright centre of Communism . It had 650,000 inhabitants
in all, of whom about 250,000 were Hungarians and Jews,
and 400,000 Ruthenians. Poland had already exchanged
numerous acrimonious Notes with Prague about this centre
of unrest. M. Beck had told him he wanted something sensible
to emerge from this crisis . Poland's wish was that this territory
should be linked to Hungary .
For the rest a common Polish-Hungarian frontier was of
great value to bar off the east . The rumours that a block was
being formed against Germany were nonsense; they had been
completely refuted by the attitude of Poland to Soviet Russia
during the crisis. Polish policy had aimed at inducing the
Hungarian Government to be moderate in the Slovakian
question and to take the offensive in the matter of the
Carpatho-Ukraine. He, Lipski, hoped that a solution in the
sense mentioned would not run counter to German interests .
The Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs explained to the
Ambassador that these ideas were somewhat new to him, and
that he would think them over in detail . He could understand
46

Poland's wishes, but he also saw certain difficulties to which
we should have to pay consideration.
The Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs then came to the great
general problem which had led him to ask M . Lipski to come
to Berchtesgaden and which he would like to broach quite
confidentially, as between M . Lipski, M. Beck and himself.
He asked the Ambassador to report what was discussed to
M. Beck by word of mouth ; otherwise there would be great
danger of things leaking out, especially to the press . To this
the Ambassador agreed. The Reich Minister for Foreign
Affairs in introducing the subject used the opportunity to in-
vite M. Beck, asking if he could not pay him a visit sometime
in the course of the following month. Germany, he said, would
always welcome her Polish friends . The Ambassador expressed
his gratification and undertook to inform M. Beck.
The Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs then went on to say
that he thought it was time to make a clean sweep of all
existing possibilities of friction between Germany and Poland.
This would crown the work inaugurated by Marshal Pilsudski
and the Fuehrer. As a comparison he instanced our relations
with Italy, in which the- Fuehrer for the sake of a general
settlement and with deep insight had renounced all claims to
South Tyrol. Such an agreement was worth attempting with
Poland and would be useful for Poland ; and it accorded with
the Fuehrer's policy, which was directed towards the attain-
ment of clear relations with all neighbours . In the case of
France too it was not impossible that agreements going beyond
the Fuehrer's declaration concerning the frontier would be
reached some day. In Poland's case the first thing was to
discuss Danzig, as a partial solution in a general adjustment
of the relations between the two-nations . Danzig was German
-it always had been German, and it would always remain
German. He, the Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs, was think-
ing of a solution that would, broadly speaking, be as fol-
lows :-
47

i. The Free State of Danzig to return to the German
Reich.
2. An extra-territorial motor-road belonging to Germany
to be built across the Corridor, and likewise an extra-
territorial railway with several tracks .
3 . Poland likewise to obtain in the territory of Danzig
an extra-territorial road or motor-road, a railway,
and a free port.
4. Poland to obtain a guarantee for the sale of her goods
in Danzig territory .
S. The two nations to recognize their common frontiers
(guarantee), or their respective territories .
6. The German-Polish Treaty to be prolonged by ten to
twenty-five years.
7. The two countries to add to their treaty a stipulation
providing for consultation.
The Polish Ambassador took note of this suggestion. Al-
though naturally he had first to speak to M . Beck, he would
like to say already that it was mistaken to regard Danzig as
a product of Versailles, like the Saar Territory, for instance .
One must follow the growth of Danzig historically and geo-
graphically to get a correct angle to the problem .
The Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs replied that he did
not desire an immediate answer. The Ambassador was to
think it all over and to speak to M . Beck as soon as possible .
After all there must be a certain give and take in these con-
siderations. For reasons of home politics a final recognition
of the Corridor was not easy for the Fuehrer, either . One
must think in terms of centuries in this case-Danzig -after all
was German and would always remain so .
M. Lipski promised to go into all this very thoroughly with
M. Beck. He intended to go to Warsaw about Thursday and
could be back at the beginning of the following week . What
concerned him most was an exchange of ideas about the Hun-
48

garian question. M. Beck had instructed him to say that Poland
was ready to participate, if Hungary's wish for arbitration
by the three countries, Germany, Italy, and Poland, were
accepted by the first two countries .
In reply the Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs pointed to
the risks which would be+incurred by an arbitration award.
In a second short conversation the Reich Minister for For-
eign Affairs mentioned the Carpatho-Ukraine . The Ambassa-
dor emphasized that Poland had no interest in extending her
frontiers there. Poland's sole wish was to receive a joint frontier
with Hungary.
The Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs promised to think
over the whole group of problems again, and in this con-
nection expressed the opinion that if a general settlement could
be reached between Germany and Poland, a happy solution
could certainly also be found for this problem.
The tone of the conversation was very friendly throughout.
Hewel
Some three weeks after this discussion M. Lipski, the Polish
Ambassador, paid -a visit to Herr von Ribbentrop, the Reich
Minister for Foreign Affairs, and submitted a reply which
partly deferred and partly evaded the German proposals, the
alleged reason being internal political difficulties.
It is of the utmost significance that neither at this discussion
nor at a conversation which took place between M . Beck and
the German Ambassador in Warsaw on 14 December, nor yet
on the occasion o f M. Beck', memorable talk with the Fuehrer
on S January 1939, did Poland betray by the slightest sign
that she felt herself threatened in any way.
On the contrary, the three documents which follow show
clearly that, as late as 26 January 1939, when the Reich
Minister for Foreign Affairs again had a talk with M . Beck
in Warsaw, Poland received the -moderate and positive German
proposals without protest and promised to weigh them care-
4 100 documents, engl.
49
11

fully. The five discussions which took place between 24 Octo-
ber 1938 and 26 January 1939, between the Fuehrer or the
Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs and Herr von Moltke, the
German Ambassador, on the one side and M . Beck and Lipski,
on the other, make it plain that, although Poland was ob-
viously endeavouring to prolong the negotiations with Ger-
many, there was, up to that point, a definite prospect that a
peaceful settlement satisfying the claims o f both parties might
still be reached . This was particularly evident at the talk
between the Fuehrer and M. Beck, the Polish Foreign Minister,
on 5 January 1939, when the Fuehrer described the broad,
amicable basis on which he conceived the future development
o f German-Polish relations and the solution o f the problem
of Danzig and the Polish Corridor. It was a solution by which
Poland stood to gain and which did away with the possibility
o f conflict in the future .
No. i6 (198)
Conversation o f the Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs
with the Polish Ambassador,
19 November 1938
Memo
(Translation)
At i p. m. to-day I received M . Lipski, the Polish Am-
bassador.
M. Lipski explained to me that, he had informed the Polish
Minister for Foreign Affairs, M . Beck, about the substance of
our discussion of 24 October at Berchtesgaden, and that he
was now in a position to tell me what M. Beck thought about
these matters . M. Lipski then read portions of his instructions
aloud from a slip of paper.
i. The Polish Minister for Foreign Affairs was of opinion
that German-Polish relations had in general stood the test .
50

Polish Agreement had been constructed on a durable founda-
tion. M. Beck considered that Poland's straightforward policy
had been of use to Germany when the latter acquired posses-
sion of the Sudeten German Territory, and had contributed
materially to the attainment of a solution of this question in
accordance with German views . During these critical days
the Polish Government had turned a deaf ear to all lures
coming from a certain quarter .
I answered M . Lipski that in my opinion too the German-
Polish Agreement had shown itself capable of withstanding
considerable strain. The Fuehrer's action against Czecho-
Slovakia had enabled Poland to gain possession of the Olsa
territory, and to satisfy a number of other wishes with regard
to frontiers. For the rest I agreed with him that the Polish
attitude had made things easier for Germany .
2. M. Lipski then made a lengthy speech to prove the im-
portance and value which Danzig as a Free City had for
Poland.
For reasons of home politics too it was difficult for the
Polish Minister for Foreign Affairs to assent to the incorpora-
tion of Danzig in the Reich. M. Beck had been revolving the
question in his mind how all points of friction about Danzig
which might possibly arise between Germany and Poland could
be done away with once and for all . His idea was that the
League of Nations' Danzig Statute might be replaced by a
German-Polish treaty dealing with all Danzig questions . This
treaty might be based on the recognition of Danzig as a
purely German town with all rights resulting from this . On
the other hand Poland and the Polish minority should like-
wise have all economic rights assured to them. In this arrange-
ment the character of Danzig as a Free State and the customs
union with Poland would be preserved .
I answered M . Lipski that I regretted M. Beck's attitude.
The suggestion for a permanent solution of the German-Polish
4*

problem by which Danzig fell to Germany might increase
M. Beck's burden in home politics, but on the other hand it
was obvious that it would also be no easy matter for the
Fuehrer to tell the German people that he was guaranteeing
the Polish Corridor. The purpose underlying my suggestion
was to establish German Polish relations on a foundation as
lasting as solid rock, and to do away with all possible points
of friction. It had not been my intention to have a diplomatic
chat. As he, M. Lipski, could perceive from the Fuehrer's
speeches, the latter had always taken a long view in dealing
with the German-Polish question . In his presence, at a recent
meeting of international press representatives, I had made it
clear that good German-Polish relations were fundamental to
German policy.
The Ambassador, M . Lipski, thanked me for these remarks,
and then returned to the proposal for a bilateral treaty about
Danzig. I explained to him that I could not, give a final
decision on this, but to me the proposal did not seem easy of
accomplishment.
3 . I then asked M . Lipski what M. Beck thought about the
question of an extra-territorial motor-road and of a likewise
extra-territorial double-track railway through the Polish
Corridor.
M. Lipski answered that he was not in a position to go into
the matter or make any official pronouncement . Purely for
his own person he could say that such a wish on the part of
Germany might conceivably not fall on barren ground in
Poland, and that perhaps opportunities might occur for find-
ing a solution in this direction .
4. I then spoke to M. Lipski about the Polish postage stamps
just issued, which were intended for Danzig use and which
represented Danzig as if it were a Polish town . Here again
he could understand that this hurt the feelings of the German
population of Danzig.

M. Lipski declared that he was not well informed about the
matter, but he would make enquiries .
In conclusion I told M. Lipski it would repay trouble to
give serious consideration to German proposals dealing with
the whole complex of German-Polish relations . It was desired
here to create something lasting and to bring about a really
stable condition of things . Naturally that could not be done
in a day. If M. Beck would think over our proposals-quietly,
he might perhaps see his way to adopting a positive attitude .
von Ribbentrop
No. 17 (200)
Conversation of the Fuehrer with M . Beck;
Polish Minister for Foreign Affairs, in the presence of-the
Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs, the German Ambassador
in Warsaw, and the Polish Ambassador in Berlin,
Berchtesgaden, 3 January 1939
Memo by Dr. Schmidt, Minister Plenipotentiary
(Translation)
In his introductory words M. Beck stressed the fact that in the
September crisis German-Polish relations had stood the test
without a sign of strain. It might be that during the last few
months the high standard exhibited by the relatio&s last Sep-
tember had shown some falling off, but in the opinion of the
Polish Government both parties should exert themselves to
remove the causes of certain difficulties which had arisen in
the immediate past. M. Beck instanced the Danzig question
as one of the difficulties, whereby he emphasized the fact that
in this case it was not only the German and the Polish Govern-
ments that where concerned ; there were also third parties,
among others the League of Nations. What would be the
proper course, for instance, if the League of Nations were to
withdraw from its role in Danzig? This was not the only
instance in which existing misunderstandings had to be remov-
53

ed. Amongst others there was the guaranteeing of the Czecho-
Slovakian frontier, the question whether it ought to be taken
in hand immediately or, if at all, what point of time was
contemplated for this . Poland was especially interested in the
Carpatho-Ukrainian question. He would remind them of
Marshal Pilsudski's words about the "Balkanizing of Central
Europe". In the agitators who were now pursuing their activi-
ties in the Carpatho-Ukrainian region Poland recognized old
enemies in a new guise . She feared that the Carpatho-Ukraine
might one day grow into such a centre of disquietude for
Poland that the Polish Government might see themselves
called upon to intervene. This might result in further com-
plications. That above all had been the compelling reason
for Poland's efforts to attain a joint frontier with Hungary .
The Fuehrer replied that a settlement of all existing diffi-
culties could only be obtained by recalling the general course
of German-Polish relations . On the German side he could say
emphatically that Germany's relations to Poland were embodied
in the non-aggression pact of 1934 ; since then there had not
been the slightest change in them . In the question of the Car-
patho-Ukraine particularly-here he was thinking of the mo-
tives attributed to Germany in the international press-he was
in a position to state that Poland had absolutely no cause for
fear. Germany had no interests on the other side of the Car-
pathians, and was indifferent about what interested countries
did there. The attitude adopted by Germany in regard to the
Ukrainian question on the occasion of the Vienna arbitration
award was an attitude which had perhaps led to certain mis-
understandings with Poland, but it was easily to be explained
by the historical development of the question . This arbitra-
tion award had been put into execution on the basis of the
Hungarian demands after both parties had been heard. What
had really and finally determined his (the Fuehrer's) attitude
in the Ukrainian question was his wish that in no case should
matters be permitted to come to an international conflict.
54

With respect to the details of German-Polish relations, he
wished once more to repeat that there had been no change
in the German attitude towards Poland since 1934. To attain
a final adjustment of the still unsettled questions between the
two countries, one should not confine oneself to the rather
negative agreement of 1934, but should seek to 'formulate a
treaty which would cover these single problems and dispose
of them. On the German side _ there was not only the Memel
question, which would be settled in a manner consonant with
German views (there were signs that the Lithuanians were
willing to co-operate in finding a sensible solution), there was
also the problem of Danzig and the Corridor, a problem that
directly affected German-Polish relations . The fact that Ger-
many felt so keenly on this matter made it extremely difficult
to find a solution. In his opinion it was necessary here to get
out of the old grooves and seek a solution on completely novel
lines. In the case of Danzig, for instance, one could imagine
an arrangement, by which this city, in conformity with the
will of its inhabitants, should be reincorporated in the German
body politic, whereby, as a matter of course, Polish interests,
particularly in the economic sphere, must be safeguarded in
every respect. That indeed was in the interests of Danzig,
for economically Danzig could not exist without a hinterland,
consequently what he, the Fuehrer, had in mind was a for-
mula by which Danzig would return to Germany politically,
but economically would remain with Poland .
Danzig was German, would always remain German, and
sooner or later would return to Germany.
With respect to the Corridor, which, as already mentioned,
presented a grave psychological difficulty for Germany, the
Fuehrer pointed out that for the Reich the connection with
East Prussia was as vital a matter as for Poland the connect-
ion with the sea. Here too it might be possible by the use of
quite novel methods to find a solution that would pay due
regard to the interests of both .
55

If means could be found to bring about a final settlement
of all individual questions on such a basis of common sense,
whereby as a matter of course each partner would obtain his
rights, the time would have arrived when in the relations of
Germany to Poland the rather negative declaration of 1934
might be supplemented by a treaty of a more positive charac-
ter, like the agreements with France, in which Germany
would guarantee Poland her frontiers clearly and in so many
words. Poland would then have the great advantage of get-
ting her frontiers with Germany, including the Corridor, assured
by treaty. The Fuehrer, in saying this, stressed once more the
psychological difficulty of the Corridor problem and the fact
that only he was in a position to propose such a solution with
success. For him (the Fuehrer) it was not quite a simple
matter to guarantee the Corridor in this way, and he would
certainly be considerably criticized for it, especially by the
bourgeoisie. But as a practical politician he nevertheless be-
lieved that such a solution would be best. When once Germany
had given her guarantee, one would hear as little about the
Polish Corridor as one did now of South Tyrol or Alsace-
Lorraine.
The Polish Minister for Foreign Affairs thanked the Fuehrer
for his exposition of the German standpoint, and declared
that Poland for her part would also abide by the attitude she
had maintained towards Germany till then.
Poland would continue the line of independent policy she
had pursued in former years, when an attempt was made to
link Poland more closely with Russia through the medium of
an Eastern Pact. Poland, it was true, was not so nervously
desirous as France to have her security buttressed up, and she
placed no trust in so-called "security systems" . Their final
burial after the September crisis indeed marked a turning-
point in history. But Poland could thoroughly appreciate the
German point of view as expressed once more in the declara-

Lion just made by the Fuehrer. For her part she would hold
fast to the old line of policy towards Germany.
As to German-Polish relations he took cognizance of the
wishes uttered by. the Fuehrer. Nevertheless the Danzig
question appeared to him extraordinarily difficult. In this
connection one had especially to take public opinion in Poland
into account. By this he did not mean the attitude of "the
coffee-house opposition" . During his seven years' period of
office he had never paid the least attention to coffee-house
opinion, and he was still in office . But he had to pay regard
to the real opinion of the nation, and there he saw difficulties
in the way of a solution of the Danzig question . But he in-
tended, nevertheless, to think the matter over quietly .
Colonel Beck did not enter into the other German-Polish
questions broached by the Fuehrer, but concluded his remarks
with a renewed confirmation of his statement that in her
general attitude Poland would now as before remain true to
the line followed since '934 •

Schmidt
No. '8 (201)
Conversation between the Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs
and M. Beck, Polish Minister for Foreign Affairs,
Munich, 6 January 1939
Memo
(Translation)
Berlin, 9 January 1939
At the beginning of a conversation lasting about an hour
and a half M. Beck immediately reverted to the Danzig
problem. He said that Poland, too, was endeavouring to con-
tinue neighbourly relations with Germany, and to improve
them. The only problem which might shortly produce disturb-
ing effects in this connection was the Danzig question. Two
57

possibilities might, he said, arise requiring us to define our
attitude with regard to the problem :-
i. That the League of Nations would cease to interest itself
in the Danzig question and would recall the High Com-
missioner, in which case Germany and Poland would have to
settle the question between themselves.
2. That the Poles would be compelled to take up the matter
owing to new developments in Danzig.
He added that the problem was, in fact, a very difficult
one and that he had cudgelled his brains for a solution,
without, however, any result so far.
Finally, M. Beck pointed out once more that Danzig was,
in the mind of the entire Polish people, the acid test of Ger-
man-Polish relations and that it would be very difficult to
alter this fact in any way .
In reply I explained to M . Beck that :-
i . As the Fuehrer had already said there was, on the Ger-
man side, an unqualified desire for a final, comprehensive and
generous consolidation of our mutual relations .
z. In this connection two problems seemed important :-
(a) Direct German-Polish relations . In this connection I
should suggest the following solution :-
Re-union of Danzig with Germany . In return for this
the guarantee of all Polish economic interests in this
territory, in the most generous manner. Connection
between Germany and her province of East Prussia by
means of an extra-territorial motor-road and railway.
In compensation thereof, Germany to guarantee the Cor-
ridor and all Poland's present possessions,-i. e., the
ultimate and permanent recognition of their common
frontiers.
(b) The Czecho-Carpatho-Ukrainian question .
58

In this connection I repeated that ethnographical
frontiers had been fixed at Munich . Should the prin-
ciple of political frontiers be brought up by any side,
Germany would not, of course, remain disinterested .
Although German political interests did not, in them-
selves, extend beyond the Carpathians, Germany con-
sidered it impossible, over and above this, to declare her
disinterestedness in any alteration of frontiers in regard
to Czecho-Slovakia and the Carpatho-Ukraine, because
such events might easily involve her in a conflict . The
decision arrived at by the arbiters in Vienna must be
observed, and it was our fundamental conception that,
in the event of other wishes cropping up in this con-
nection, such wishes must be brought into accord with
German interests .
At the close of the conversation I complained to M . Beck
about the treatment of our German minorities, mainly those
in the Olsa territory, and took occasion to object most emphatic-
ally to M. Grazynski's continued anti-German intrigues .
M. Beck assured me that this question had already received
serious attention and that he, for his part, would do his
utmost to bring about a more satisfactory state of affairs.
I then thanked M . Beck for his invitation to come to
Warsaw, which I accepted on principle. A date has not yet
been fixed. It was agreed that M. Beck and I should once
more consider in detail the whole complex of an eventual
treaty between Poland and ourselves. M. Lipski and Hem
.Moltke were to carry on negotiations during the next few
weeks, and my visit was to take place, at all events, this
winter.
von Ribbentrop
59

No. 19 (202)
Conversation between the Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs
and M. Beck, Polish Minister for Foreign Affairs,
Warsaw, 26 January 1939
Memo
(Translation)
Berlin, i February 1939
1. In my conversation with M . Beck, which was a con-
tinuation of our conversation at Munich on 6 January, I re-
verted to the former proposal concerning the re-union of
Danzig with the Reich in return for a guarantee of Poland's
economic interests there, the building of an extra-territorial
motor-road and railway connection between Germany and
her province of East Prussia, to be compensated on the Ger-
man side by a guarantee of the German-Polish frontier . In
this connection I stated again that it was the wish of the
Fuehrer to achieve a comf$ete conciliation in respect of Ger-
man-Polish relations by means of corresponding treaties . It
was important that M . Beck should realize that the German
wishes were extraordinarily moderate, since, even to-day, the
allocation of exceedingly valuable sections of severed German
territory to Poland, in accordance with the Treaty of Ver-
sailles, is regarded by every German as a great injustice, made
possible at the time only by Germany's extreme impotence .
Ninety-nine out of a hundred Englishmen or Frenchmen would,
if asked, say at once that the return of Danzig and of the
Corridor, at least, was a natural demand on the part of Ger-
many.
M. Beck seemed impressed by what I had said, but again
pointed out that inner-political opposition was to be expected ;
he would, nevertheless, carefully consider our suggestion .
I have come to an agreement with M . Beck that, should the
League of Nations withdraw from Danzig before a com-
prehensive treaty applying also to Danzig has been reached

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