362351

po':>, UN '(-iLk-noN C{GfMAN I)Et,rTl-r'-1 AND
~lDfV) '. Pr C~ l'l ,~ U7
UTENAVIDI
A thesis submitted in fulfilment ofthe requirements for the degree ofPh.D. in the University
ofLondon.
Birkbeck College, London August 1996

2
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Professor John Solomos and Dr. Sunil Khilnani jointly supervised my work for this thesis,
and I thank them for the invaluable advice and encouragement they offered during the
various stages ofthe study. John, an acknowledged authority on racism in Britain, author and
co-author of several books on this subject and contributor to many international journals,
guided me to think about various aspects of racism, including historical and contemporary
developments in Germany. Sunil, a political scientist with a special interest in Western
Europe and a prolific writer, encouraged me to think conceptually and to develop a better
understanding ofthe specificity of German developments through a comparison with related
issues in other countries, particularly France. Both stressed the need for the theoretical
contextualisation of my work and subjected it to necessary and constructive critique
throughout.
The responsibility for the analyses, opinions expressed and limitations of this study is, of
course, my own.

3
ABSTRACT
Post-reunification developments in German society, including the intensification of racism and
nationalism, and the question of German identity, have led to a wide-ranging international
debate. My thesis discusses some ofthe controversial issues and arguments raised, in an effort to
understand the specific forms ofcontemporary German racism.
The legal status and the political economy of asylum seekers are analysed, as are the debates
leading to the mid-1993 change in Germany's Basic Law. Until then, a unique right which
guaranteed asylum had existed. Its insertion into (West) Germany's provisional constitution in
1949 had been more ideologically than altruistically motivated. The change in legislation,
primarily aimed at appeasing the racists, had the immediate effect ofcurbing numbers.
Focusing on East-West migration, Germany's constitutional policy of accepting ethnic Germans
from Eastern Europe is scrutinised. Previously a tool in the Cold War armoury, this open-armed
approach was curtailed by an embryonic immigration law.
In the aftermath of the collapse of 'communism' and German reunification, the integration of
foreigners and ofeast- and ethnic Germans raised new questions about their respective rights. An
examination of the changing terms of debate about citizenship and identity in German society
reveals the different consequences for both citizens and non-citizens. Through briefly comparing
German with French citizenship, the peculiarity of the former, and the framework for assessing
the current 'dual nationality versus naturalisation' controversy, is established.
Political and theoretical interest in German identity has resurfaced. In determining the key
components of post-war identity, I found that anti-communism had stood out in serving as a
negative reference point; now it is increasingly being replaced by racism. The mixture of
biological and political factors in the new make-up of German collective identity appears to
leave no room for foreigners.
The critique ofthe contemporary German Left's approach to racism and identity is backed up by
events in the city state of Bremen, particularly around the 1991 local elections, which -
alongside fascist successes - revealed the Left's difficulty in sustaining a consistent anti-racism.
The conclusion indicates that the issues of asylum, immigration and ethnic Germans had
required serious answers before 1989. Reunification catapulted them to centre stage. The lack of
a coherent theory and strategy is reflected in the ad-hoc, contradictory nature ofpolicies dealing
with the various categories of migrants. The 'solutions' proposed within the context of the
German nation state are [mally contrasted with those currently discussed at the European leveL

CONTENTS
Acknowledgements
Abstract
Contents
List oftables
Glossary and Abbreviations
Note on translation
CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
PART I
German reunification and racism
Some responses
Terminology
The political economy ofmigration
The structure ofthe thesis
Methodology and sources
THE ASYLUM DEBATE IN GERMAN POLITICS
FROM 'OPEN ARMS' TO A GERMAN BASTION WITHIN
FORTRESS EUROPE
CHAPTER TWO
REFUGEES AND ASYLUM SEEKERS
Labour mobility
'Guests' and 'Gate-crashers'
Looking to the east
Refugees and 'illegality'
The number ofasylum seekers
Super-exploitation
The daily bread
Living with violence
CHAPTER THREE
2
3
4
7
8
9
10
10
14
18
22
30
35
41
43
46
48
51
53
57
61
64
GERMANY'S ASYLUM POLICY 69
Introduction 69
The context and creation ofthe Basic Law 70
The origins ofArticle 16 74
The administrative framework 79
The 'abuse' ofthe 'right to asylum' 81
'Maintaining or amending Article 16' - was this the question? 86
From Article 16 ... 88
... to Article 16 (a) 90
The consequences ofthe change 92
4

PART II
BLOOD VERSUS TERRITORY
- OR WHAT MAKES A GERMAN GERMAN?
CHAPTER FOUR
ETHNIC GERMANS
Ethnic Germans and the labour market
Obersiedler
Experience versus expectations
Aussiedler
Experience versus expectations
Studying ethnic Germans
CHAPTER FIVE
GERMAN CITIZENSHIP
CHAPTER SIX
Introduction
The blood connection
The historical background
After the Second World War
Becoming German without a blood link
Naturalisation and its limitations
The social boundaries ofethnic groups
From temporary migrant workers
to permanent settlers
Dual citizenship
IDENTITY IN GERMANY - IDENTITY CRISES?
Non-German identity
German identity
The post-war period, East and West
Post-war German identity
Identification with the economy
German provincialism
The memory ofthe Holocaust
Constitutional patriotism
Anti-communism and pro-Americanism
German identity since reunification
Class identification
The question ofsolidarity
97
98
98
101
107
113
117
122
122
124
126
l31
l34
l34
l37
l39
144
148
148
150
153
155
155
159
162
163
165
167
169
171
5

PARTll
THE GERMAN LEFT AND THE QUESTIONS
OFRACEANDETHmCITY
CHAPTER SEVEN
TACKLING GERMAN RACISM 175
The peculiar nature ofthe German Left 178
Five 'identity characteristics' re-examined 180
Identification with the economy 180
Provincialism 181
The memory ofthe Holocaust 183
Constitutional patriotism - or
Nothing goes without patriotism? 185
Anti-Americanism and pro-Sovietism 190
Ecology and racism 192
German anti-fascism 193
Dealing with the racist present 195
Proposed solutions 198
CHAPTER EIGHT
TREND-SETTER BREMEN: FROM OPEN CITY TO FORTRESS 204
The 1991 election 205
Fascist successes 209
Who is to 'blame'? 210
The 'refugee crisis' 218
'Too many foreigners'? 221
Freie Hansestadt Bremen - a Free and Open City? 224
Setting trends 225
From Open Refugee City ... 227
... towards Fortress Bremen 228
CHAPTER NINE
CONCLUSION 233
Germany in Europe - some perspectives 247
BIDLIOGRAPHY 253
Part A: Primary sources 253
Part B: Secondary sources 257
6

7
LIST OF TABLES
Table 1 Asylum applicants-by country oforigin (1980-1992) 53
Table 2 Asylum applicants-by selected nationality (1980-1992) 56
Table 3 Applications to enter the Federal Republic ofGermany: comparison
between ethnic Germans and asylum seekers (1986-1992) 57
Table 4 Violent acts with right-wing motives (1991-1992) 67
Table 5 The development ofthe right to asylum (1973-September 1986) 80
Table 6 Aussiedler by country oforigin 109
Table 7 Residence status offoreigners (1985-1988) 141
Table 8 Natura1isation (1985-1991) 142
Table 9 Analysis ofelection results, Bremen City, with differences to
the national results (per cent) (1949-1987) 207
Table 10 Bremen Burgerschaft election results (1983-1991) 208
Table 11 Bremen Burgerschaft election results: changes from 1987
to 1991, by City and Land (per cent) 209
Table 12 Asylum seekers in Germany and in the Land Bremen, 1991 219
Table 13 Processing asylum applications - Germany and Bremen
(1986-1990) 219
Table 14 Countries oforigin ofthe foreign population in the
Land Bremen, 1991 222
Table 15 Unemployment in the Land Bremen (1988-1991) 223

GLOSSARY
Basic Law Germany's provisional constitution of 1949
Bundesamt Federal Office
- ~ fUr die Anerkennung auslandischer Fllichtlinge:
~ for the Recognition ofForeign Refugees
- Statistisches ~: ~ ofStatistics
Bundesanstalt fUr Arbeit (BfA)
Bundesland
Bundestag
Bundesrat
Bundeswehr
Land (pI: Lander)
Landtag
Federal Labour Agency
see: Land
Lower House ofParliament (662 seats in 1990-94 Bundestag)
Upper House ofParliament
German Federal Armed Forces
One ofthe 16 federal states ofreunified Germany (11 ofthe
former Federal Republic ofGermany, 5 ofthe former German
Democratic Republic)
The parliament ofa Land
ABBREVIATIONS
8
bold type: parties represented in the 12th German Bundestag 1990 to 1994, the figures
indicating their respective number of seats (Statistisches Bundesamt, Statistisches Jahrbuch,
1991:103)
AL
B90/Grii
BDA
BDI
CDU
CSU
CDU/CSU
DDR
Alternative Liste (Berlin section ofDie Grilnen)
Biindnis 90/Griine (a radical/green alliance); 8
Bund Deutscher Arbeitgeber (Federation ofGerman Employers)
Bund der deutschen Industrie (Federation ofGerman Industry)
Christlich-Demokratische Union (Christian Democratic Union)
- exists in all Lander except Bavaria; 268
Christlich-Soziale Union (Christian Social Union) - the
Bavarian sister party ofthe CDU; 51
Christian Unions joint Bundestag fraction since 1976; 319
Deutsche Demokratische Republik (GDR)

DFU
DGB
FDP
FRG
GDR
GRa
KPD
MdB
Nazi
NPD
NSDAP
PDS
SED
SPD
ABBREVIATIONS (continued)
Deutsche Friedensunion (German Peace Alliance)
Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund (German Trade Union Federation)
Freie Demokratische Partei (Free Democratic Party); junior
partner to CDU/CSU in government alliance since 1983; 79
Federal Republic ofGermany
German Democratic Republic
Die Grlinen (The Green Party)
Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands (Communist Party of
Germany)
Mitglied des Bundestags (Member of Parliament)
belonging/relating to the NSDAP; also used popularly in Germany to
describe anything fascist
Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands (National Democratic
Party ofGermany) [from 1964]
Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei (National Socialist
German Workers Party)
Partei des Demokratischen Sozialismus (party ofDemocratic
Socialism; successor party to the SED); 17
Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands (German Socialist Unity
Party) [GDR]
Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (Social Democratic
Party ofGermany); 239
NOTE ON TRANSLATION
All translations from German language sources are my own.
9

CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
German reunification! and racism
10
The momentous events that shook German society during the first few years after the
collapse ofthe Iron Curtain took many by surprise. The speed and intensity ofdevelopments
since 1989 overwhelmed almost everyone, politicians and policy-makers included. How
could one make sense ofthem?2
The dismantling of the Berlin Wall marked the end of an historical era,3
and the process of
reunification a new beginning. The demise of Soviet 'communism' - the fall of the GDR
being one of many consequences - affected the whole global set-up.4Yet the division of
Germany meant that it had a particularly strong impact there. After more than four decades
ofenforced separation, the nation was reunited. This process coincided with the deepening of
the economic crisis, and was accompanied by expressions of social discontent and
campaigns directed against certain foreigners.
The superiority ofthe Western socio-economic system appeared vindicated. On both sides of
the Wall, as its slabs came down, expectations grew. In the new five Lander, these included
democratic ideals ('freedom and democracy') and hopes for economic improvements. As
'unification came because the population ofthe GDR demanded it' (peter Pulzer, 1992:323),
East German's hopes were dashed rapidly, perhaps more cruelly than in the West where the
response was more muted. West Germans were disenchanted over the 'solidarity surcharge'
(a 7.S per cent levy on employees' income tax), imposed in mid-1991 to pay for eastern
I use the term 'reunification'(Wzedervereinigung) rather than 'unification', although Germany never before
existed in its post-1989 territorial shape.
2 'The forces operating in society work exactly like the forces ofnature - blindly, violently and destructively,
so long as we fail to understand them and take them into account. But once we have recognised them and
understand their action, their trend and their effects, it depends solely on ourselves to increasingly subject them to
our will and to attain our ends through them' (Frederick Engels, 1976:361).
3 The formal end ofthe Cold War period in Germany was sealed with the Two-pIus-Four Treaty between the
FRG and the GDR, and the four war-time Allies (the USA, France, Britain and the Soviet Union). The Treaty,
signed on 12 September 1990 in Moscow, came fully into force on 15 March 1991.
4 This study focuses on German domestic events. International consequences of the Soviet Union and the
Eastern Bloc's break-up since 1989-1990 are only touched upon where relevant.

11
reconstruction,5which contravened Chancellor Kohl's earlier 'no tax increases to pay for
reunification' promise. West Germans also thought that East Germans had 'no experience of
democracy since 1933', and that they had 'no conception ofthe rules ofthe modem economy
or of the spirit of enterprise' (Dominique Schnapper, 1994:137). The 'hard-working' West
Germans were supposed to bail them out. Soon, on both sides of the - now no longer
physical - wall, reunification blues set in.
The government and the country's conservative forces6
c1aimed German reunification as their
achievement ofa long-held political aim. It also was to bring economic benefits, and prevent
a further slide into the crisis that had gripped other countries. This was exposed as a
miscalculation: Germany could not escape the recession. In early 1994 - and for the first
time since the Second World War - official unemployment figures exceeded four
million.
7
Daily reports ofmass redundancies bore witness to employers' efforts to re-establish
profitability at the expense ofworkers' livelihoods.8
At the same time, racism and nationalism flared up. Not only did they motivate some to
destroy living human beings, but, it seemed, also the hopes for a peaceful common future.
Abroad, the initial euphoria9
about reunification soon gave way to fears. Was history
repeating itself?
Reunification made Germany's relationship to its past immediately relevant. This found
expression also in the formulation ofpolicy. How would the government deal with the post-
war provisional constitution, the Basic Law? How would it treat the former GDR citizens,
and both ethnic German and non-German 'foreigners' within the newall-German territory?
How would it handle neo-fascist organisations? Reunification handed Germany the
opportunity ofgetting to grips with its past and ofcharting out a new path for the future.
5 Outrage followed over revelations in early 1995 that around DM 65 billion of public money had
disappeared without trace in eastern Germany since reunification (Der Spiegel, 13 February 1995:50).
6 The German Left's attitude to the GDR will be looked at separately.
7 Trade unions regard this as an underestimate; according to the chemical workers' union gp magazin
(December 1993:14), in reality around six million were unemployed.
8 A significant break-through was the introduction of the four-day week, pioneered by the VW automobile
corporation.
9 Former French minister and president of the European Parliament Simone Veil exclaimed: 'The date of
German unification is a very great date, a historic date. La guerre estfinie.... In my view, it has ended on a vision
ofhope because it is based on agreement by two worlds that used to clash with each other....German reunification
gives us a feeling ofjoy' (1992:263). Within Germany, GUnter Grass was not the only prominent person who
feared the consequences ofreunification (1992).

12
The government's first, clumsy, attempt to deal with the past failed. Steffen Heitmann, hand-
picked for presidential nomination by Chancellor Helmut Kohl who wanted an East German
to succeed the popular, liberal-minded Richard von Weizsacker, soon had to withdraw his
candidacy. The uproar caused by his comments, widely condemned as racist and sexist, and
his controversial views about the fascist past, had refused to die down. This test of the
public's feelings about the Holocaust and foreigners showed its lack of preparedness to
accept a new president who openly popularised such ideas.l 0
Reunification also 'profoundly challenged the Federal Republic's conception of itself'
(Schnapper, op cit:136). The 'general crisis of national identity' (ibid:137) provided the
impetus for Germany's fascist forces to seize the initiative. They had gained electoral
successes and other forms of support from early 1989 onwards, which reflected similar
contemporary developments elsewhere (eg France, Austria, and Italy). After reunification,
their confidence grew. The key election in 1991 in Bremen is therefore examined in some
detail. In the April 1992 Landtag elections in the southern Land Baden-Wtirttemberg, the
Republikanerllparty received 20.5 per cent of working classl2
votes (Das Parlament, 10
April 1992)YMy analysis does not rest on their electoral fate. Instead, I try to determine
how they could find a fertile soil for a potential 'cultural hegemony' in the centre of German
society (Siegfried Jager, 1992:5). Who would best capture the prevailing Zeitgeist?
While many analysts concentrated on the individuals and groups carrying out violent acts,14
my research examines how the academic world as well as various political groups and
parties have sought to comprehend the new post-reunification situation. I was interested
especially in the Left's strategy with regard to (im-)migration, countering racist attacks and
10 In 1995, a string of '50th armiversaries' were coming up (eg the end ofthe Second World War; the liberation
of Germany's concentration camps by the Allies). Discretion, not insensitivity, was a quality expected in a new
post-holder.
11 Since the spectacular breakthrough ofthe Republikaner party in the Berlin election ofearly 1989, it emerged
that this fascist party received significant, and not only electoral, support among civil servants, including the
police. The Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution only began monitoring them from mid-
December 1992 (Ministry ofthe Interior, 1993:66).
12 I use the term 'working class' in line with Annie Phizacklea and Robert Miles' characterisation (1980:233),
encompassing productive and unproductive labour, those without control over investment or the physical means
ofproduction, those who do not control the labour-power ofothers and who either sell their labour-power for a
wage, or, ifnot directly involved in the wage-labour relation, are dependent upon that sale.
13 As their share of total votes cast was 10.9 per cent, this means that their (electoral) support among workers
was far higher than among the rest ofthe population.
14 'In Germany...attention to racist violence is almost entirely directed towards supposed perpetrators and hardly
any attention is paid to (potentially) victimised minority communities and the impact of this violence on their
everyday life' (Rob Witte, 1995:491; also see Helmut Willems, 1995).

13
the apparent strengthening of nationalism. I focus on the Left's response because it was the
Right which initially led the anti-immigrant campaign, claiming the SPD was the 'asylum-
seeker party' (cfDer Spiegel, 4 March 1996).
Conscious of the problems associated with over-generalisation, I perceived there to be a
'crisis of the Left,.15Reduced to a cliche since the 1970s, this expression now appeared to
have a new meaning. Previously describing the Left's inability to agree on aims and strategy,
now, after the Cold War, it signified, in my view, the lack of any forces able to oppose
conservatism and fascist tendencies with a credible alternative, both theoretical and
practical.16The Left, traditional and 'new', appeared to lack direction, and to be in a state of
confusion, retreat and paralysis. My study is therefore partly also an attempt at a critique of
the Left from an alternative theoretical point ofview.
The absence of a credible opposition strategy is one of the factors underlying the debates
about asylum, immigration policy, and national identity etc. Some possible reasons for the
lack of practical support and solidarity with Germany's Gastarbeiter and other migrants,
including forced ones, as they have come under attack, have been attributed to tendencies in
society away from 'solidarity' towards 'individualism' and into 'consumption',17a situation
described as an 'atmosphere ofde-solidarisation'.18
Two striking factors, then, appear to stand out in reunifying German society. In this period of
flux and uncertainty,19they are the dramatic increase in anti-foreigner - in particular anti-
refugee/asylum seeker - sentiments and associated violence on the one hand, and on the
other, the apparent unwillingness or inability of any significant section of German society,
particularly of what has traditionally been the Left, to counter-pose both theoretical and
practical alternatives.
15 The shake-up ofthe old political categories since the 1980s (eg progressive, innovative) means a change in
the criteria used to differentiate Left from Right; some question the whole concept of a LeftlRight division.
Reunification, potentially providing an impetus for the Left's rejuvenation, has so far not led to clarification or
redefinition ofaims. In Chapter seven, a working definition of 'the Left' is given.
16 As John Solomos and John Wrench argue, 'in the present political context it is impossible to ignore the
urgency of measures to tackle the growth ofracism, and the need to develop initiatives to promote an image of
Europe which challenges the narrowness ofthe visions articulated by racist movements and parties' (1993:8).
17 'There has been an enormous expansion of "civil society", related to the diversification of social worlds in
which men and women now operate. At present, most people only relate to these worlds through the medium of
consumption.....' (Stuart Hall, 1989:129).
18 'Klima der Entsolidarisienmg': 'the fear in the heart is greater than the anger in the gut'(Michael Bartsch,
Der Tagesspiege/, 30 April-l May 1995), which allegedly makes people tolerate a degree ofinjustice.

14
Some responses
Several types of response to the new post-reunification situation can be distinguished. First,
spontaneous answers emerged which, despite their shortcomings, have often been more
immediately 'successful' than more 'considered', reluctant ones. They include expressions of
sympathy by individuals and groups for those affected by racism, most visible as the 'chains
oflight'?OLess publicised were occasional practical actions by groups ofAutonomen (quasi-
anarchists) and others, who supported asylum seekers against being transported to hostels in
'hostile' east German districts. The problem was not the response itself, but that it took place
in isolation from a longer-term strategy.
Other immediate reactions tended to focus on some ofthe perpetrators ofviolence, ie young
fascists who openly expressed anti-foreigner views; soon it was they who were portrayed as
the victims deserving 'our' sympathies. One approach was to take them off the streets (by
opening youth clubs, especially in east Germany, and by giving them work, even if token).
Another consisted of controlled exposures to 'foreign cultures'. A cultural organisation in
Hamburg, for example, took a group of skinheads to Turkey, to meet 'ordinary Turkish
people', hoping that this would reduce their racism and aggressiveness towards foreigners.
The limitations ofthe social psychology-type response became clear after their return.21
The second type of response consisted of demands for public policy changes, eg to allow
certain foreigners to possess dual citizenship, and to make naturalisation easier. Raised even
by prominent political figures, it was left to speculation how this solution would end the
spate ofracist and fascist attacks. The German government continues to resist such demands;
it responded to the racist violence by cutting asylum seeker numbers via a Basic Law
amendment, and banning four small fascist organisations by Spring 1995. This apparently
even-handed approach placed the victims and perpetrators ofracist attacks on the same level.
19 'No other country in Europe has so many, and such large, insurance companies per capita as Germany has'
(Dennis Bark and David Gress, 1993:786).
20 Under the slogan 'Munich says "no"', around a quarter ofits inhabitants silently demonstrated solidarity with
Germany's foreigners on 6 December 1992, by lining the streets holding candles. The four Lichterketten
originators (a film producer, journalist, advertising executive and disco-owner) explicitly excluded political
organisations from their appeal for support. This action was emulated in other cities around the country.
21 Interviewed on German television, the youths stated that they had enjoyed their unexpected holidays in
Turkey, but that in their opinion it was still best for Turkish people to return to live there.

15
The third kind of response, and for this study the most significant, was the intellectual and
academic one. Developments in Germany attracted comment and critique, both domestic and
internationaL Analysts tried to capture them from different angles, emphasising various
aspects. The most common, perhaps obvious, link was made between today's burning of
refugee hostels and the anti-Jewish pogroms of the Nazi period. Sometimes descriptions
were presented as analysis and superficial conclusions drawn; for example, Germans were
assumed to possess some innate, biological traits, which inevitably lead them to commit
indescribably inhuman deeds?2
Post-reunification processes in German society were rightly discussed within different
contemporary debates, disciplines and schools of thought, as they affected, among others,
citizenship, nationality and ethnicity, nationalism and racism. This enabled me to review
these issues from several angles, bringing together insights from examining historical,
political, economic, sociological and other factors; in other words, I followed a broadly inter-
disciplinary approach.23
Unavoidably, I have drawn upon pre-reunification analyses to
counterbalance and contextualise more recent ones.
ill the previous two decades, an expanding field of research on migration to Germany had
investigated one section of (West) Germany's post-Second World War migrants, the
Gastarbeiter (guest workers)?4The term, initially describing migrant workers recruited in the
1950s and 1960s mainly from the Mediterranean countries, today simply transliterates as
'Turks'?5The process ofrecruitment ofthe supposedly temporary Gastarbeiter under a state-
controlled work contracts system is now well-documented.
26
Equally well known is the fact
that, while many migrants returned to their respective countries after a given period ofselling
22 At a Chequers meeting on 24 March 1990, Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher reportedly described as some
of the 'less happy' German attributes - which were 'an abiding part of the German character': 'in alphabetical
order, angst, aggressiveness, assertiveness, bullying, egotism, inferiority complex, sentimentality' (Charles
Powell,1992:234).
23 I am aware of some recent the controversies associated with such an approach, especially that sparked offby
John Goldthorpe's article 'The uses of history in sociology' (1991) which attracted some critical replies, eg
Michael Mann's (1994:51).
24 Rather less attention has seemingly been devoted to the estimated 14 million refugees and displaced persons
who had settled in and helped rebuild post-war West Germany, and their descendants.
25 'Germans seem to perceive Turks as alien and threatening. Differences in language, culture and appearance
are much more marked, and anti-Turkish feeling has deep historical roots, connected with medieval struggles
between Christianity and Islam....' (Stephen Castles et aI, 1984:200). More recently, other factors have added to
or revived aspects of this picture: the rise of Islamic fundamentalism, and the often violent activities of
organisations like the Turkish Grey Wolves and the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK).
26 Critical reviews ofearlier studies, which tended towards a social-work approach to migrants, can be found in
Hartmut Griese (ed, 1984). The problematic of 'engagement' versus 'distanciation' in German post-1945
research about foreigners is thematicised in Annette Treibel's sociological study (1988).

16
their labour-power, significant mnnbers stayed. Joined by their families, Gastarbeiter
became an integral part of contemporary German society.27Having become permanent
settlers, their socio-economic status had been transformed, but not their political-legal status
as foreigners. They remain aliens among an apparently homogeneous German population.
Gaps in understanding the earlier migrant movements, their conditions of life and the
developments affecting their descendants in Germany persist. Even more obscure are the
facts regarding the latest arrivals, refugees and ethnic Germans28
from Eastern Europe: one
reason why I chose to examine them. Refugees in Germany, following government
estimates, numbered around 1.5 million at the end of 1992,29and the ethnic German
Aussiedler population almost double that. These two groups are distinct from each other in
many aspects, but they share common problems. Their interaction with each other, and
'indigenous' German society (which included other 'foreigners') and the state with them,
was of particular interest for me. The initial dearth of analyses of these groups, however,
posed a distinct obstacle.
One of the German state's first post-reunification preoccupations was the high profile
targeting of asylum seekers. It singled out this clearly defined group, unauthorised migrants,
and portrayed them as misusing German public funds and generous refugee provisions.
Coming at a time when the enormous problems of recession and east German restructuring
were becoming evident, the government parties unleashed a campaign against them which
contributed substantially to fuelling racism against foreigners in generaL The slogan
'AusHinder 'raus!' appeared spray-painted on many walls (and was less frequently scrubbed
out). Attention was thus diverted away from the issues the government, the opposition, and
German society as a whole would otherwise have had to confront in the reunification
process.
As the political establishment, with media support, turned towards the task ofexposing - and
virtually ending - the in-migration of those it denounced as 'scroungers' and 'economic
migrants', asylum seekers were presented explicitly as public enemies undermining the
27 Initially, 'guest workers' tended to be single but by 1993, 83 per cent ofthe foreign population were living in
families (Cornelia Schmalz-Jacobsen, 1994:53).
28 By ethnic Germans I mean (1) former citizens of the GDR, Ubersiedler, who resettled in the FRG before
reunification, and (2) Aussiedler, people claiming German ancestry and migrating from East European countries.
29 Ofthese, around 100,000 were recognised as 'genuine' asylum beneficiaries, 640,000 as 'de facto' refugees,
and around 610,00 were asylum seekers (ibid).

17
country'S internal stability. Key parliamentary debates I examined bear this out (cf Chapter
three). Consequently, and for many months, refugees topped the agenda of the population's
political concerns, according to some opinion polls. Racist explanations of social problems,
and solutions proposed to them (and carried out, such as reducing the welfare benefits of
asylum seekers to below Germans' subsistence level), became prominent, finding little
criticism or effective opposition.
As the main method proposed to cut refugee numbers was to change the relevant part ofthe
Basic Law, there is a need to analyse both the ideological role of (West) Germany's refugee
provision, and the reasons for targeting this section of united Germany's foreign population.
The legal and ideological distinction between 'foreigners' and 'Germans' needs to be noted
and explained.3o
By contrast, other groups of migrants in Germany attracted little or no overt state or public
attention. Highly skilled professionals, usually from advanced capitalist countries,31and
European Community (later European Union) nationals enjoy a privileged status among
foreigners. Neither did the immigration of 'ethnic Germans' from Eastern Europe and from
the disintegrating Soviet Union attract state or public fury,32at least until recently.
When 'ethnic Germans' did become a topic of public debate, the impetus often came from
'radical' if not 'left-wing' quarters. Even the opinion-making Der Spiegel reported on the
westward population movement (of ethnic Germans) from areas such as Tajikistan and
Kirghizia with headlines that expressed fears of being swamped by sheer numbers. Such
views gave the impression that the Left, in a direct reversal ofthe Right's preference, pursued
divisive policies, favouring 'black' ('third world') over German (white) immigration. Oskar
Lafontaine, the often controversial Saarland minister president, never sought to disguise his
preference for allowing into the country deserving 'third world' refugees rather than ethnic
Germans from Eastern Europe who, by implication, were undeserving. (After becoming SPD
30 'Until reunification, German policy towards immigrants consisted of maintaining a legal and political
distinction between nationals and foreigners' Schnapper argues (op cit:135); afterwards, 'West Germans have
suddenly become aware that foreign workers...had become more integrated into their society than their
"compatriots" from the east' (ibid:137).
31 Potential Japanese investors in eastern Germany's ravaged economy, though, were advised by their embassy
to make their presence there less conspicuous, otherwise they might be mistaken for Vietnamese (former
Gastarbeiter in the GDR) and attacked by racists.
32 Nevertheless, the preferential treatment accorded to Aus- and Ubersiedler led to a degree of Sozialneid
(social envy).

18
leader in late 1995, he set about 'uniting the Left', as he sensed an overall Left majority in
the country. He significantly helped change the political climate in early 1996 when he
shocked an election rally in February by targeting ethnic Germans as the cause for many
social ills, in a populist manner reminiscent ofthe Right's earlier attack on asylum seekers.)
On one level, the purpose of the hysteria around asylum seekers was to limit their numbers
by making their entry almost impossible.33
To 'harmonise' Germany's relatively accessible
asylum procedure down to the level pertaining in much of the rest of Western Europe, the
campaign culminated in legislation passed in mid-1993. A far-reaching amendment ended,
for all practical purposes, Germany's apparently unique34
right to asylum embodied in the
1949 Basic Law. The simultaneous taking shape of an embryonic and clandestine
immigration policy directed towards 'ethnic Germans' by-passed public attention. Now that
(forced) migrants have been 'dealt with' (by the government with opposition support), it
seems that the SPD scents electoral success by sounding equally 'tough' on ethnic Germans.
Terminology
Part of the intellectual and academic problem in tackling the post-reunification trends of
racism and fascism was that they appeared not to fit into any preconceived picture ofracism.
I soon realised that the concepts and terms used in the relevant discourses internationally,
specifically in a country like Britain, needed to be examined critically and their content
evaluated, to see if and how they might be applied to the - peculiar - German situation.
Hence, I briefly outline a number of operational definitions of terms which sometimes
possess a specific - even contradictory or controversial - German meaning or connotation.35
Of course, the terminological minefield has a definite material basis, and a purpose. The
label of foreigners, strangers and aliens, guest workers with restricted legal rights to
permanent abode and their descendants, sets them apart from the majority population.
Instead of being able to become immigrants with corresponding rights, their presence is
33 Recent reports about 'safe third countries' list examples of genuine refugees being subjected to 'unjustified
harassment' and 'inhumane treatment' such as by the creation of 'refugees in orbit', shuttled between different
EU countries, each refusing entry (amnesty international, 1994a,1994b; European Council on Refugees and
Exiles, 1995).
34 This 'uniqueness' is discussed in Chapter three.

19
insecure, and they are subject to discrimination. Non-Gennan youths in particular suffer the
consequences ofbeing foreigners in a legal but 'Inlander' in many other senses. Vice versa,
ethnic Gennan youths are legally and 'ethnically' Gennan but for all practical purposes they
are complete strangers. I call this peculiar contradiction one between 'indigenous aliens' and
'foreign non-aliens'.
Gennany's foreign population, at the end of 1993, was 6,878,117; at around 8.5 per cent of
the population of (81,187,000), this represents a post-war record (Schmalz-Jacobsen,
1994:54). An apparently straight-forward statistic immediately begs the question: who are
these foreigners? Are they long-tenn settlers, new migrants, first, second, or third generation
immigrants,36refugees or newly arrived East Europeans ofGennan descent?
The terminology about foreigners consists of legal/political constructs that are subject to
arbitrariness and manipulation. David Edye highlighted the significance of 'the political
concerns of governments...in segmenting the labour force by allowing different groups of
workers different social, industrial and political rights' (1987:7). The Foreigners' Law, also
referred to as the Aliens Act, gives a legal definition of 'foreigners/aliens'. But even the
Beauftragte der Bundesregierung..., while generally following this definition, found it
problematic. She tried to overcome it by talking about 'migrants', but acknowledges that this
tenn too is imprecise, as the descendants of migrant workers, born in Gennany, cannot be
regarded as migrants themselves (Schmalz-Jacobsen, 1993:13). (She fails to mention the
further complication of 'ethnic Gennans' - who are excluded from both definitions and
come under a separate department headed by their own commissioner.) 37
Turks, the largest group among Gennany's resident foreigners, have a special legal status
through the association agreement with Turkey. It lies somewhere between that ofcitizens of
other third states and those of the European Union. Nevertheless, Chapter two shows that
today by 'foreigners' are meant Turks and persons of non-European origin, and they
commonly experience super-exploitation, racial discrimination and racist and fascist attacks.
Ethnic Gennan immigrants, though legally equal with the indigenous Gennans, are socially
35 Cf also Thomas Faist's article 'How to define a foreigner? The symbolic politics of immigration in German
partisan discourse, 1978-1992' (1994).
36 There are no immigrants as such in Germany, and Germany is not - officially - a 'country ofimmigration'.
37 Hence, the 'foreigners' of the government statistics do not include 'ethnic German' immigrants who are
admitted on the basis ofproofofGerman ancestry.

20
'declared to be foreigners' - a term 'which for most Germans has the same meaning as
undesirables' (Lutz Hoffinarm, 1990:27).
A key task, then, was to analyse the socio-political construction of foreignness in Germany.
This particularly concerned Asylum seekers and Refugees, and Migrant workers. As
Robert Miles and Diana Kay argued, 'the social and legal status of refugee is socially
determined rather than inherent in a particular set of circumstances, and so perceived
political interests playa major role in attributing the status and in acting in accordance with
it' (1994:30). This statement is apt when one discusses the various political interests
involved in categorising refugees, and in the changing political prioritisation of certain
groups offoreigners.
The socio-political construction of 'foreigners' is epitomised by the approach towards
asylum seekers, even at the linguistic level. 'Asylant' (asylum seeker) describes someone
who has entered Germany and requested asylum. However, it has become synonymous and
is often used inter-changeably with the pejorative 'Schein-Asylant,38(fraudulent asylum
seeker). It is imprecise, as it lacks the distinction between 'Asylsuchender', (asylum seeker)
and 'Asylberechtigter'(an accepted - typically political- refugee, FlUchtling). Linguistically,
the first use ofAsylant was traced by Simona Wolke, a refugee lawyer, to Bundestag debates
in early 1978. The Wiesbaden Society for the German Language found that its negative
image partly derives from its word-ending ('-ant'), similar words, without exception, having
unpleasant connotations.39
According to the Society, it is 'a linguistic pogrom expression'
(Frankfurter Rundschau, 5 October 1991) whose effect is enhanced by opinion-makers
through compound nouns (eg 'Asylanten-Flut' - flood of asylum seekers; 'Asylanten-
ansturm' - threat ofbeing over-run by asylum seekers etc).
Except where analytically necessary to distinguish between asylum seekers (whose case is
still in process) and refugees (already recognised as political refugees), I followed the
practice of Amnesty International and the German authority handling asylum claims40which
use the term Flilchtling, refugee. Those not qualifying as a refugee under the German Basic
38 In the autumn of 1991, at the height of anti-foreigner violence, even the radical Der Spiegel used the term
'Schein-Asylanten' in a key article.
39 Simulant (malingerer), Querulant (querulous person), Spekulant (speculator), Intrigant (schemer) and
Sympathisant (sympathiser, usually ofa grouping without much popular support).
40 Bundesamtfor die Anerkennung von ausldndischen Fliichtlingen.

21
Law may be allowed to stay because other, international, regulations (eg the Geneva Refugee
Convention) apply, or they may be granted the - extremely insecure - status of tolerated
person (through a Duldung) for humanitarian reasons. Not all asylum seekers are, turn out,
or even claim to be refugees. Non-EU citizens wishing to migrate to Germany can often only
do so by making an asylum application inside the country some time after their arrival.
'There is thus a great variety ofpeople making use ofthe asylum procedure ranging from the
politically persecuted to those escaping from deprivation, ethnic disturbances, civil war,
sexual or religious harassment to "economic migrants" who would not normally apply for
"asylum". Even those ethnic Germans whose ethnicity is open to doubt can apply for
asylum' (Barbara Marshall, 1992b:253).
Economic refugees ('Wirtschaftsasylanten'), also called economic migrants (meaning
those from 'third world' rather than developed countries), face a broad social consensus of
rejection, and frequent vilification. They are typically counter-posed to 'real', ie political,
refugees, their 'bogus' nature being reinforced by the government-cited statistical 'fact' that
'less than five per cent' ofrefugees who arrive in Germany are 'genuine'.
Individually, few persons seeking refuge in Germany have experienced narrowly defined
political persecution, the necessary precondition for being accepted as a refugee. Most,
lacking this precondition, 'merely' wanted to escape poverty, tribal warfare, civil strife,
sexual or religious discrimination, lack of democracy and lawlessness, or death. As a
collectivity, however, these 'economic refugees' are victims ofthe same socio-economic and
political world order as 'proper' refugees.
Gastarbeiter (guest workers), Germany's migrant workers, were hired individually by the
German authorities on behalf of specific employers, mainly in the countries of Southern
Europe. They arrived between the mid-fifties and the 1973 Anwerbestopp (marking the end
of primary recruitment). Initially, their rights were as restricted as their living conditions
were. Contracted to work on a one-year rotation basis initially, these cheap labourers soon
proved indispensable to Germany's economic performance. While many stayed on after this
system of contract labour ended, large numbers returned to their native countries, hoping to
start a new and better life there with their painstakingly accumulated savings.

22
A significant differentiation, often overlooked, exists between those 'guest workers' whose
sending countries were or were not full member states of the European Community (now
European Union). Under ECIEU rules, the former enjoy the right of free movement and a
growing range of other rights; most ofthose who stayed have blended into German society.
Today, therefore, Gastarbeiter refers mostly, and often in a derogatory manner, to Turkish
people; they are the most visible group ofauthorised labour migrants.
The political economy ofmigration
One major challenge for my study was the concept of racism itself. Applied to foreigners
who were discriminated against because of their perceived phenotypical differences from
'Germans', racism could be demonstrated to affect many - though not always all - refugees
and particularly Turkish Gastarbeiter. But could it adequately describe certain policies and
practices directed towards 'one's own people': ethnic Germans?
Whilst institutionalised and popular racism could be demonstrated to exist for defined ethnic
minority, non-German population groups, it was harder to disentangle discriminatory state
policies against sections of the German population itself. Such policies, embodied even in
the Union Treaty between the FRG and the GDR leadership during the latter's final days of
power, were reinforcing existing and creating new divisions in society. They demarcated the
indigenous (West) German population not only from former GDR citizens, but also from
East European 'ethnic Germans', despite the principle ofequality ofall Germans anchored in
the Basic Law.
This dichotomy could not be explained easily within the theoretical framework of racism I
was familiar with (primarily that ofBritish society). It led me to think in a broader, historical
way about the political economy of migration and about German nationalism. The way the
latter was being re-articulated - receiving a boost through reunification - provided the key to
understanding both the more 'traditional', often latent, racism and new forms ofexclusionary
policies directed against sections ofGerman society.
The 'race' relations explanatory framework appeared to have little relevance in Germany.
Instead, the German experience seemed unique. Few Germans would disagree that 'race' had

23
been an issue in Nazi times, but for many, including academics, 'race' and therefore 'racism'
was not an issue today: politicians and sociologists often prefer the term Auslanderfoindlich-
keit, 'hostility to foreigners' (which reduces it to an attitude problem, or irrational prejudice)
despite pertinent critiques of this notion (eg Annita Kalpaka and Nora Rathzel, 1991;
Czarina Wilpert, 1993).
How then could one discuss contemporary social relations in Germany without 'race' as an
analytical concept? Could one work within the racism framework, or was it inappropriate?
Could its limitations be transcended in the German context? The challenge was to explore an
additional dimension of the problematic of contemporary international migration. Initially it
meant finding alternatives to seeing the problem in terms of 'black' and 'white', literally.
The racism expressed towards Gastarbeiter and many refugees (particularly from 'third
world' countries) was reminiscent of the way black immigrants in Britain had been or are
treated. Both were signified, because of skin pigmentation or other physical characteristics
(black hair, moustache etc), as 'foreign'. Hence, one could accommodate them theoretically
in the racism perspective derived from, for example, the British experience. One difference
with Britain and France, though, was that the people at the receiving end of German racism
were not former colonial subjects or their descendants, who might have claims (such as some
rights of settlement or citizenship) on Germany derived from a colonial history. But similar
to Britain's post-1947 immigrant workers, Gastarbeiter had been enticed by the state to
come; others came as forced migrants, refugees. (Many recent refugees had their roots in
Turkey [or rather, in Turkey's Kurdistan] - the same country, incidentally, which had
provided the majority ofGermany's Gastarbeiter in the past.)
But 'ethnic German' migrants and many refugees from war-tom Yugoslavia, Romania or
Kurdistan appeared not to fit into this framework. Individuals labelled as 'black' vigorously
rejected being pigeonholed thus. In the German context, which bore no direct relation to a
(post-)colonial situation, it seemed that 'black' as a political let alone a somatic label was
untenable.41
'Ethnic Germans' were neither 'black' nor contract labourers, nor came from a
colonial background or fled from direct persecution. Rather, their increased migration
41 Castles et al argued that 'ethnocentric attitudes are deeply rooted in Western European culture, even in
cOlUltries that were not major colonial powers...'. Although Germany 'managed to secure only three African
colonies', this legacy created 'attitudes towards non-European people every bit as racist as those in more
successful colonial powers' (1984: 195-196).

24
resulted from the demise of the Soviet Union whose countries now granted its citizens the
right to leave - and through the provisions of the German constitution that embodies an
ethnic definition ofGermanness.
Stephen Castles and Godula Kosack (1973), in a different context, recognised this problem
in their research on immigrant workers and class structure in Western Europe. They observed
that at most a quarter ofthe eight million immigrants in Western Europe at the time could be
considered to be racially distinct from the indigenous population. Hence:
The problems experienced by all immigrants to Europe and their impact upon society
are very similar to those ofcoloured immigrants in Britain. Ifthat is the case, race and
racialism cannot be regarded as the determinants of immigrants' social position.
Instead ... the basic determinant is the function which immigrants have in the socio-
economic structure. Through this function, immigrants have an important effect not
only on economic and social developments, but also on the political situation, and
hence on class structure, class consciousness, and class conflict (1973:2).
Reducing the problem to the socio-economic function of immigrants in my VIew
undervalued the ideological dimension, and the existence of 'racism', for want of a better
term. For me, the problem lay in the fact that neither asylum seekers nor ethnic Germans
were immigrants in the traditional sense (one being forced migrants, one becoming German
citizens virtually automatically upon their arrival). I saw my challenge encapsulated in
Robert Miles' statement that:
If we are to take seriously the idea that there are historically specific racisms, it is
necessary to undertake a wide-ranging but historically specific analysis of different
conjunctures. In carrying out that analysis, we should take account of the historical
affinity between processes in the interior of, and exterior to, Europe. This is because
we need a theoretical basis independent of colonialism to explain non-colonial
racisms... (1993b:89, emphasis added).
Hence the 'political economy ofmigration' (ibid: 127) could encompass both politically and
economically determined migration to Germany, and possibly provide clues as to the
treatment of contemporary migrants. Miles, like Castles and Kosack (despite the above
proviso), pioneered this approach; their works, both earlier and current, stand out as leading
landmarks, and have influenced the thinking of new layers of social scientists and others
seeking to understand (and to develop resistance to) racism.

25
A political economy of migration for Germany, then, has to encompass more than the
Gastarbeiter problematic, although this would inevitably form the foundation of it. It must
be capable of dealing with matters such as the gulf between east and west in reunified
Germany, the East-West migration ofethnic Germans, and the influx of refugees. It can, as I
show, provide the framework for analysing contemporary German racism.
The material basis of the new upsurge in racism (I share some writers' reservations about
calling it a 'new racism') must be sought in the contradictions inherent in German
reunification itself: Germany was at once weakened and strengthened. Weakened, because of
the sudden, virtually unpredictable occurrence of reunification, and the huge costs involved,
including those of establishing state structures in the eastern Lander. Strengthened, because
reunification carried with it the expectation of future prosperity. As a sovereign nation state,
now the largest in population terms in Europe, together with its established economic
predominance, Germany strengthened already existing exclusionary practices, using racism
as a tool. Within this contradiction lay the key for unlocking some aspects ofthe upsurge in
nationalism, racism and fascism, and for the unequal treatment ofwhat, in Cold War terms,
had been the 'brothers and sisters' "over there". By approaching the intra-German 'racism'
in this way, one could explain the discriminatory policies and practices by the state and
labour movement bodies towards Germany's 16 million new citizens.
One pitfall I wanted to avoid was economism, the idea of reducing the problem of, and
consequently the solution to, racism and fascism to the immediate wage-labour/capital
relationship, in an unmediated way. It seemed important, while examining the underlying
economic factors, to emphasise the connecting links between the economic circumstances
and the political and ideological roles of anti-foreigner arguments and actions. Failure to do
so could lead to seeking the social base - and 'natural' constituency - ofracism arbitrarily in
a particular section ofsociety.
I saw the problem of economism exemplified by the east German Friedrich Schorlemmer,
the 1993 winner of the Peace Prize of the German Book Trade. Speaking about the racist
upsurge following reunification, he argued that 'the human cultural achievement' of
'protecting foreigners and minorities' might only be safeguarded by redirecting (racist)
aggression into 'human labour', ie 'directing our destructive forces into constructive efforts.

26
Labour, as a common, meaningful, if demanding activity helps us to become more human'
(,Den Frieden riskieren'[Risking peace], Siiddeutsche Zeitung, 11 October 1993).
Could labour provide the solution to racism and fascism? Ifso, fighting for the right to work
- for all population groups - must be a crucial demand for stemming the tide of racism and
fascism. Schorlemmer's statement begs some questions, though. Why is there racism in
countries and regions with vastly different rates ofunemployment? Could it be eliminated by
full employment? The ideological dimension was missing entirely from his analysis.
To improve my understanding of how ideological considerations impacted on the debate, I
scrutinised and employed four main concepts: citizenship, nationality, ethnicity and
identity. Their application within the specific contemporary German context required
them to be grasped both individually and as a whole. To provide me with the background
to and an appreciation of the contemporary significance of these concepts, I examined a
number of significant contributions to the unfolding debate.
The arguments of Etienne Balibar (eg 1988) played a key role in the 'new citizenship'
debate since the late eighties. My own discussion of German citizenship in Chapter five
may at first appear one-sidedly legalistic. I emphasised the relevance of Aristotle's insight
that each political regime builds the distribution of powers into a specific defmition of
citizenship,42'in juridically (or quasi-juridically) delimiting a certain type of "human
being" and a certain model of rights and duties, this definition crystallises the constitutive
social relations of a society at the level of the individual' (ibid:723). In this sense,
citizenship marks a 'temporary equilibrium', 'a relation of forces and interests' (ibid:724),
and expresses a value-judgement in relevant state policies.
I could then discuss significant sections of German society lacking formal equality and the
contradictions this gives rise to,43not least in addressing non-Germans as 'our foreign
fellow citizens' (unsere auslandischen Mitbiirger); lack of citizenship even carries a threat
42 Aristotle's 'equal citizens' were, of course, a select group indeed, their equality made possible through the
naked exploitation ofthe rest ofsociety: non-citizens and slaves.
43 'The German polity at once demands that immigrants assimilate culturally and, at the same time, denies
them the opportunity for cultural assimilation and political participation through an ethnic understanding of
membership' (Thomas Faist, 1994:53).

27
of deportation.44
As equality is indivisible, even the fonnally equal east and 'ethnic'
Gennans could not be regarded as full citizens at this historical juncture - a claim that I
will substantiate. That exclusion from citizenship is not incidental but intrinsic to (and not
only to Gennan) modem international capitalism, is illustrated par excellence by
Gennany's Gastarbeiter old and new. Imported to alleviate labour shortages and to afford
the employers greater flexibility in the labour-force, they could be exploited with far less
restrictions than their indigenous counterparts. Capital was not obliged to give them
anything but their wages and the barest of social benefits in return. Through exclusion
from citizenship, the various agencies of the state tried to safeguard capital against any
broader claims ofthese migrant workers in the future.
To get to grips with Nationality and nationalism, I analysed some of the assumptions
underlying the arguments between so-called particularists and universalists, particularly
those of David Miller (1988),45and Robert Goodin (1988) and Hennan van Gunsteren
(1988). This preliminary work contributed to sharpening my conclusions about the
development of a new Gennan national identity, and about the contemporary fonn of the
intellectual defence ofnationalism and patriotism. I found that citizenship and nationality
are tenns which are often used interchangeably. Stephen Castles, for example, wrote
'What is the significance ofnationality? Possessing citizenship ofthe country ofresidence
does not mean that young people of migrant origin enjoy equal political, economic or
social rights....' (1984:161). Despite overlapping meanings, nationality deserves separate
treatment, particularly as it is a factor in identity: 'modem Gennans worry about problems
of national identity - rightly, since the concept of Gennany has an obviously peculiar
history' (Harold James, 1989:1). Its significance has been heightened by Gennany
regaining its sovereignty46since reunification, whereby the question of Gennan nationality
was thrust up for re-discussion. The debate about nation, national identity and patriotism
became salonfahig, respectable, again - and was no longer confmed to the circles of the
fringe extreme Right.
44 The Federal Constitutional Court confinned the legality of deporting a person despite being married to a
Gennan partner, a ruling which 'should be made known explicitly to the two partners before a marriage takes
place... so that each one understands the risks which a marriage to a foreigner brings with it' (Franlifurter
Rundschau, 3 October 1979).
45 He argued that 'national boundaries may be ethically significant. The duties we owe to our compatriots may
be more extensive than the duties we owe to strangers, simply because they are compatriots' (1988:647). For a
critique ofthe Gennanic myth passed on in children's books, see Wolfgang Emmerich (1971).
46 'The united Gennany shall have accordingly full sovereignty over its internal and external affairs' (The Two-
Plus-Four Settlement of12 September 1990, article 7; see Harold James and Marla Stone, eds, 1992:113).

28
Ethnicity, apparently less controversial than 'race', is open to just as many misuses, and
increasingly substitutes for it in German publications (including neo-fascist ones).
Frequently, 'ethnic cultures' and cultural characteristics are presented as nature-given and
therefore unchangeable. Jager agrees that this cultural racism 'performs a similar function
as (genetic racism): to legitimise the shutting out of others and to explain fears' (1992:25).
lochen Blaschke (1985), examining ethnicity and the concepts ofpeople (Volk), nation and
internal colonialism, added a 'German dimension' to international theoretical develop-
ments in this field.
In Germany the main ethnic line, backed up by the whole legal edifice, is drawn between the
majority Germans47and non-German minority ethnic groups. Through the biological self-
definition of the former, other ethnic groups are automatically unequal (with two
exceptions).48My focus was on the presence of modem, post-war ethnic minorities which
resulted from mass international migration. I was able to show that, with the exceptions
mentioned, 'ethnic minorities' are synonymous with 'foreigners'. Like 'black people' in
Britain, as Les Back and lohn Solomos found, I consider that all three categories ofmigrants
(Gastarbeiter, refugees and ethnic Germans) were given 'racialised identities...constructed in
specific fields ofdiscourses' (1993:197 :ful). How these were constructed was illuminated by
Wolf-Dietrich Bukow who saw them as a result of 'a labelling, or more precisely: an
ethnicisation process' (1990:423, emphasis added);491 highlight the aim and function of
this dialectical process in the relevant chapters. Finally, ethnicisation can become a vehicle
of 'nationalistic focusing' of society (Georg Elwert, 1989:459). Uli Bielefeld made a
similar observation in studying second-generation Gastarbeiter5
0(Turkish and Yugoslav)
youths: he noted an 'acquired ethnic solidarity (erlernte ethnische Solidaritat), amongst
them (1988:186), noting that ethnicisation provides them with the possibility of distancing
themselves from certain expectations placed in them, while indicating their acceptance of
the ascribed status as aliens (ibid: 193). Ethnicisation, then, means drawing social
boundaries around 'ethnic groups', and possibly the development ofcounter-identities.
47 In this instance, I use the term to mean German citizens according to the ius sanguinis principle.
48 The officially recognised ethnic groups are Danes (in Schleswig-Holstein) and Sorbes (eastern Germany).
Incidentally, both are 'white' and population left-overs within German borders after specific historical events.
49 Particularly in the case of migrant workers' children born in Germany, in this 'ethnic labelling process'
certain aspects which initially seemed unimportant were 'step by step transformed into constituting relevant
characteristics' (ibid).
50 They, and particularly their relationship to (un-)employment, was examined by Czarina Wilpert (1988a).

29
The complex phenomenon of Identity expresses a sense of demarcation from as well as
solidarity with others. My interest in identity is limited to changing public identities,
national and ethnic, and possible counter-identities, in the particular socio-historical, post-
reunification setting. A plethora of writings on German identity existed well before
reunification, and I have drawn on some of the German-language ones51
for a critical
comparison with usually more hastily written - sometimes less substantial - ones since.
Dennis Bark and David Gress noted that, already in the 1980s, 'new issues joined old ones
to influence political culture, ofwhich the search for national identity and the effect ofthe
declining birth rate on national prosperity were especially important. Unification
intensified both these debates and moved them to centre stage in the 1990s' (1993:780-81,
emphasis added).
The concepts of citizenship, nationality, ethnicity and identity, having been moved to
centre stage by reunification, informed my quest to understand the peculiar contemporary
mix making up German racism. The difficulty of distinguishing between them is
expressed by David Miller's question: 'Can we separate nationality from ethnicity without
collapsing the former into mere adherence to a set of political institutions? Nationality
must be something more than de facto citizenship. It must amount to a common identity
that grounds citizenship' (1988:656-57; added emphasis). Magnified by the German
peculiarity, these concepts, here based on blood links, are closely inter-linked indeed. I
argue that the virtual collapse ofthese social constructs into each other had given Germany
a remarkable and powerful means ofcreating stability, a stability shaken by reunification.
My study had to leave out a number ofissues, given the scope ofthe project; the following
are some ofthe conscious limits and omissions.
I concentrated primarily on West (pre-reunification) and western Germany (post-reunifi-
cation), as it was the FRG which incorporated, in terms laid down in the Unity Treaty, the
former state of the GDR: its structures - economic, political, judicial, educational etc -
were superimposed onto the five new Lander. I do, however, refer to a few specific
processes and features ofthe GDR where relevant.
51 An arbitrary selection is Helmut Berschin, Rainer Roth (both 1979), He1ge Pross (1982), Werner Weidenfe1d
(ed, 1983) and Rudolfvon Thadden (1989).

30
My examination of institutional and everyday racism is selective; it largely excludes the
migrant workers ofthe fifties, sixties and seventies, the Gastarbeiter, as the history oftheir
migration and experiences in the early years of settlement are now reasonably well
documented. Some of their descendants are now themselves able to contribute to an
understanding oftheir problems, having reached prominent positions at different levels of
society. To a limited degree, they have 'found a voice'.
I omitted to discuss contemporary anti-Semitism, not because I assumed it was non-
existent, but because it is not the dominant form of racism in today's Germany. Fascists,
though, periodically attack Jewish institutions and sometimes also members ofthe 40,000
Jews living in Germany today.52
Finally, my presentation lacks a substantial elaboration of the causes of refugee move-
ments, though I briefly discuss some ofthe solutions proposed.
The structure of the thesis
The three areas I brought into a relationship with each other in this study (refugees and
asylum; citizenship, ethnicity and identity; the Left and anti-racism) are all large issues,
and discussing them inevitably means some shortcomings. I hope I compensated for these
by making novel points about their links and their contemporary significance. My choice
of authors is similarly open to challenge, as it does perhaps leave out some important
contributors to the various debates. Within the broad debates reflected in the three Parts, I
have drawn on wide-ranging arguments and insights. The presentation aims to reflect the
themes and their inter-connections.
Part I deals with the contemporary situation of refugees in Germany, and the peculiarity of
Germany's asylum law. Chapter two examines the material situation ofasylum seekers and
refugees - the modem, 'uninvited' Gastarbeiter, the 'lowest of the low,53- from the late
eighties until after reunification. I examine their role in the labour market and in broader
society (including education and housing), and the racial discrimination they face. I
52 For ClUTent research on Jewish people in Gennany, see Werner Bergmann and Rainer Erb (eds, 1990).

31
highlight the consequences ofthe complete absence of anti-discrimination legislation, and
tackle some questions rarely touched upon in the 'asylum debate' (regarding the actual life
experience of refugees). I argue that refugee numbers and their impact on society were
effectively dramatised by both government and official opposition, making them look
responsible for the economic, political and social problems (ranging from the lack of
housing, to the spread of Aids) of post-reunification society. Meeting little opposition, the
public sentiments thus stirred up boosted the far Right. Finally, I discuss the consequences
of the campaign which made asylum seekers the top item of political debate, from the
'asylum summit' (October 1991),54through the 'asylum compromise' between the main
parliamentary parties (December 1992), culminating in the Basic Law amendment (1993).
Chapter three shows that, although an 'asylum debate' now exists in many countries, in
Germany it had a different quality. In the absence of an immigration policy, the issue of
asylum has been synonymous with immigration. I trace the asylum debate in German
politics to the inception of the Basic Law in 1949. By outlining the arguments and
motivations aired during that debate, the nature of Germany's apparently uniquely liberal
asylum clause becomes clearer. Its 'open arms' image, cherished during the Cold War as a
sign of the West's superiority in terms of freedom and democracy, and distinguishing it
from the 'communist' East, meant to signal the West's generosity towards dissident
refugees from countries suffering under the yoke of the Soviet Union (the very definition
of 'refugee' meant someone escaping from 'communism,).55
The 1993 amendment to the asylum clause was one of the elements building a fortified
bastion within 'Fortress Europe', its restrictions, such as the 'third country' clause,
featuring heavily in the European Union's harmonisation drive over refugee provisions. It
made access to Germany almost impossible, undermining the very rationale for an asylum
law. Germany's geographical position meant that, arguably, only the luckiest and
wealthiest of refugees, rather than those most in need of asylum, could enter. Through
inter-governmental treaties with surrounding countries, the government traded some
concessions for their efforts in stopping refugees arriving in Germany. Supporters of
stricter asylum regulations saw in the subsequent sharp drop in numbers retrospective
53 Borrowing the title of investigative journalist Giinter WallrafI's illuminating and controversial publication
(1988), which reports his experience as 'Ali', an unauthorised worker in Germany.
54 CfFrankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 11 October 1991.

32
'proof' that until then, mostly 'fake'I'bogus' asylum seekers had come; these were now
being deterred. Finally, I offer an explanation for the change in and timing of Germany's
asylum policy.
The treatment of asylum seekers at all levels (political, social, legal, economic etc) served
to emphasise the gulf between 'them' and 'us', between foreigners and Germans. This
fundamental distinction had existed, often in an extreme form, throughout the existence of
unified Germany since 1871. To illuminate its consequences, Part II covers German
ethnicity (Chapter four), citizenship (Chapter five) and identity (Chapter six). It surveys
the peculiarity of determining what makes a German German through blood links.
Analysing German identity, I isolated five post-war aspects, then examining which of
these survived or were replaced after reunification. This highlighted certain continuities
with the pre-1945 era, particularly as many decisions about who is a German today are
based on criteria used during fascism (cf Dieter Oberndorfer, 1992; Nora Riithzel, 1992).
Post-reunification, I contrast two particular groups of Germans with those in western
Germany, namely the former citizens ofthe GDR, and the 'ethnic Germans' from Eastern
Europe. The latter were, in a sense, 'queuing to become German' with second-class status.
At this stage, the link emerges between the issues of asylum and German ethnicity; it lies
in the conflict situation created by the competition of a number of groups in society.
Competition was multi-dimensional: between the various layers of the hierarchy of new
sources of labour, between those with less rights, formal and/or practical (asylum seekers,
east Germans and Aussiedler), between each other, and with 'West' Germans for access to
a shrinking labour market, including other resources. That this competition has taken a
racist form, I argue, is in no small measure due to the abandonment, in practice, of some
basic principles ofclass solidarity by the labour movement.
Chapter four, dealing with the experiences of east and 'ethnic' Germans in the FRG both
before and during reunification, emphasises their role in the labour market. Also in the
private sphere, many ex-GDR citizens had found it difficult to make adjustments from
their accustomed practices. Aussiedler experienced both a 'culture shock' and increasingly
55 The fact that some communist, socialist and trade union activists from other areas ofthe world, such as Latin
America in the 1970s, were accepted, increased the asylum clause's appearance ofneutrality.

33
also rejection and hostility from the indigenous Germans - quite contrary to what they had
expected. Some ofthe difficulties in studying 'ethnic Germans' are pointed out.
Chapter five examines the concept of German citizenship, and the principles of ius soli
and ius sanguinis. Aided by Walter Schleser's legal exposition of citizenship in twentieth
century Germany (1980), I traced the progression of the 1913 citizenship law through the
various political regimes since its inception. Lutz Hoffinann (1990, 1991) elaborated on
the way and the reasons why German citizens derive their identity from the ethnically
derived Volk. I have drawn on Maurice Roche's exploration (1992) of the notion of social
citizenship, which emphasises the 'welfare' of citizens in a broad sense, including work,
education, health and quality of life (ibid:3). Rogers Brubaker's comparison (1992)
between French and German citizenship principles and their historical development
significantly enhanced my understanding of the peculiar nature of German citizenship. As
Germany controlled access to citizenship through ethnicity, I could now evaluate the
consequences of the lack of citizenship rights for Germany's long-established foreign
communities, and the automatic citizenship status for east Germans and ethnic German
immigrants. Citizenship is the formal signal and the means of their respective exclusion
from/inclusion in German society. I show, however, that the latter's seemingly inalienable
right was beginning to be fenced in. Finally, the options of - and obstacles to - becoming
German without the blood link, through naturalisation and dual citizenship, are examined.
The issues raised in Chapter five led me to consider, in Chapter six, some components of
post-Second World War German identity. I look at how a particular Feindbild,56a negative
point of reference, was created, mainly around the prevalent anti-communism. After the
two Germanies united on 3 October 1990, and given the speed of reunification, the new
Germany was unfamiliar both to the old and even more so to its new population. What had
happened to the previous German identity - or were there two distinct German identities?
Was there any benefit in harking after a national identity? I show how, since reunification,
racism began to replace 'anti-communism' as the defining element in German identity.
56 The Feindbild notion is not new. Comparing 'the nation' in France and Germany in the nineteenth century,
Eric Hobsbawm argued that as the ' "German people" before 1871 had no political definition or unity...' , 'and its
relation to the new Empire...was vague, symbolic or ideological, identification had to be more complex .... Hence
the multiplicity ofreference, ranging from mythology and folklore ... through the shorthand cartoon stereotypes
to definition of the nation in terms of its enemies. Like many other liberated ''people'', "Germany" was more
easily defined by what it was against than in any other way' (1994:82).

34
Lastly, I considered some factors that could potentially arrest the further development in a
racist direction, and positively be channelled into alternative identities.
Controversial in nature as they are, the issues examined so far and possible solutions are
often hotly debated in Left and Liberal circles (though not exclusively there). There is, for
example, much controversy over the degree and nature of inclusion and exclusion of
'foreigners'. It is of course a debate of a complex and far-reaching nature that extends
beyond German boundaries. In Part III, I turn to the debate as it exists in Germany, starting
with a discussion ofthe role played by German intellectuals, particularly on what remains
of the Left, with regard to racism and fascism. Here, the contributors to the journal Das
Argument, in particular Wolfgang Fritz Haug and Nora Rathzel, and its special issues on
these themes, provided valuable insights into current German thinking.
In Chapter seven, I re-examine the elements ofpost-war German identity, now in the light
of the Left's relationship to them, with an added critical note on the relationship between
ecological arguments and racism. I probe left-wing thinking since the mid-eighties,
particularly around the Historikerstreit, the dispute about how to evaluate Germany's
fascist past. I then assess to what degree the collapse of 'communism', which has thrown
the West German Left in particular into confusion, has led to a rethinking on the questions
of racism, fascism and nationalism. Had the Left grasped the possibilities offered by the
end ofGermany's division?57
I examine some arguments by sections of the Left, particularly those around patriotism,
and the need for a new anti-racism and anti-fascism. Castles et al had stated that in
Germany, 'where racism is laid down by law and administered by the police and the civil
service, the anti-racist struggle is bound to confront the state' (1984:222-223). Did the
anti-racist struggle see the state as a problem, and if so, how? Racism, prevalent in pre-
reunification society and now catapulted to the fore, was an issue that tested the Left's
views on German identity, on the Basic Law - and its own relationship to the state, one
57 'The liberation of the peoples of Eastern Europe and the GDR also means liberation for leftists in this
country. Relieved ofthe pressure of the reality of a fraudulent socialism, they can heave a sigh of relief The
end of the having their minds made up for them, of false authorities and fronts, the demystification of
concepts, what an opportunity!' (Friedrich Christian Delius, 1990:75).

35
regarded as problematic from the early days of the organised workers' movement in
Germany.58
The Left's dilemma is illustrated in Chapter eight with a case study of Bremen. In this
traditional left-wing stronghold, the consequences of the lack of a consistent Left
opposition found practical expression. Here, the Bremen Left had established an anti-racist
niche and been in the forefront ofdevising anti-racist initiatives such as the 'Open City for
Refugees' campaign. Here too, the fascists made spectacular electoral gains the early
1990s, following the SPD mayor's significant departure from earlier refugee polices, to the
point of breaking the Basic Law. Jiirgen Dinse's study (1992) into the backgrounds and
motivations of the Bremen electorate provides useful material. Finally, I suggest reasons
for the Left's failed anti-racist experiment and indicate possible consequences.
In the concluding Chapter nine, the various [mdings and insights gained during this study
are drawn together, and the links between the issues I had examined re-emphasised. Here, I
briefly contextualise German developments within contemporary social trends in Europe,
and indicate relevant analyses.
Methodology and sources
My choice of categories as tools with which to interpret contemporary German society are
not novel. My contribution to understanding post-reunification developments lies in
subjecting these categories, and their underlying assumptions, to critical analysis. I explored
various juxtapositions and pointed to their inter-connections, thus obtaining new insights
from their dynamic interplay, which further an understanding of some of the current social
trends, tendencies and processes, particularly those relating to racism and identity. I expect
my (perhaps controversial) conclusions to lead to constructive critique and a further
development ofthe arguments, and to inform comparative research ofthese issues.
58 Frederick Engels noted 'in Gennany particularly....a superstitious reverence for the state and everything
connected with it, which takes root the more readily since people are accustomed from childhood to imagine that
the affairs and interests common to the whole society could not be looked after otherwise than as they have been
looked after in the past, that is, through the state and its lucrative positioned officials' (Karl Marx, 1974b:18,
emphasis added).

36
Living, working and carrying out research for my Ph.D. in Germany during the initial post-
reunification years, I was faced with the problem of objectivity in my observations. Being
caught up in the wave of racism and xenophobia, as the majority ofthe population appeared
to be, it was a question of swimming against the stream, oftaking sides. I was acutely aware
of being neither a direct participant nor a detached observer of post-reunification
developments. My role was not that ofa reporter or recorder ofevents, nor ofan activist, but
of trying to place the new developments in a historical and theoretical context. Thus
confronted with some of the ethical and political issues faced in carrying out research on
racism, I benefited from Les Back and John Solomos' article 'Doing research, writing
politics' which examines 'the relationship of research on racism to political strategies'. It
raised 'an issue that has been largely neglected within the mainstream of sociological and
political studies on racism' (1993:178). Specifically, the authors warned of the pitfalls in
adopting 'speaking positions' (ibid: 179), ie becoming advocates for particular victims of
racism. A researcher would find it necessary 'to take on strategic academic identities'
(ibid: 194), which translated to my situation I understood to mean that there was no need to
deny a keen interest in, even involvement with, the subject of research, but to formulate the
issues and insights at a level which reflected a theoretical struggle.
My research is principally based on a critical examination of two types of sources, which is
reflected in the bibliography's division between Primary and Secondary material. With some
sources, particularly those which presented significant new factual material as well as
theoretical analysis, it was a question ofjudgement which section they should be assigned to.
As the study concerns contemporary, rapidly developing issues, media reports were of great
significance. International, national, regional and local newspapers supplied me with
information (but also analysis and opinions), so as to be able to highlight certain local or
regional events or issues. A regular review ofthese sources, which included the weekly Das
Parlament (reporting, for example, speeches in the Bundestag and Bundesrat), together with
a range ofTV programmes (reports, documentaries, live discussions with politicians, racists,
youths, victims, church representatives, interviews with ethnic minority spokespersons etc)
provided much raw material and examples. These, and most other publications from which I
drew mainly factual material, information and authoritative statements (eg party election
programmes), statistical analyses and legal information, are listed in Part A: Primary sources.

37
This section also contains some major special reports, special issues of regular publications
and specialist research publications which were relevant to the topic under discussion.
Part B presents a much larger number of Secondary sources, the study ofwhich was equally
imperative. They include writings expressing most shades of political opinion, but I was
primarily interested in those expressing Liberal and Left views. The books and articles
concerned different levels of discourse, ranging from political to social-psychological, from
polemics to sound academic research. Their key characteristic was their emphasis on analysis
and development of theoretical conclusions, however tentative these might be. As events
were chasing each other, the weekly Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte in particular contained
many relevant, up-to-date commentaries by a range of authors. Frequently, international
media reports and analyses provided interesting and novel angles on what was happening in
Germany.
The material mentioned so far complemented the social scientific literature which is also
listed in this section. The most significant part of these were writings by social scientists
engaged in the fields ofsociology, political science, history and economics, and I found those
of an interdisciplinary nature most illuminating. These contributions supplied me with
essential raw material for a critical review of the current state of knowledge and debates
about German phenomena. Again, my study of domestic publications was supplemented by
contributions made internationally, as the issues highlighted by reunification attracted a
response from a wide spectrum of opinion (eg the collection of essays in Harold James and
Marla Stone, eds, 1992) which provided me with a variety of questions, and internationally
expressed fears, moods and expectations. I found that the sometimes more critical and frank
writings from authors outside Germany about developments which they saw as peculiarly
German could usefully be contrasted with those emanating inside the country.
My interest in refugees had been aroused from personal experience as well as by the social
significance they were given, in Germany and in Europe, and by international events which
created refugees on a scale not experienced for decades. For Part I, I studied a wide range of
often complex legal and constitutional material, both international and German, to establish
the respective frameworks for understanding the rights of today's refugees, and Germany's
asylum policy. One set of documents examined were parliamentary papers and legal
treatises, and where possible, relevant commentaries. This was especially important

38
regarding the Basic Law, national and international refugee legislation and human rights
agreements.
As my work progressed, with racism becoming a dominant feature ofearly post-reunification
German society, the body of literature developed alongside it grew. It ranged from
publications by various government departments, particularly those associated with the
ministry of the interior, to often well researched church publications, and radical and multi-
cultural ones. There was an abundance oftelevision programmes (documentaries, interviews
and discussion forums). But some of the minutiae of everyday expressions of racism,
emanating from public authorities as well as from 'ordinary people', and offoreigner's fears
in this period of racist violence, could only be gleaned from personal discussions, or from a
few published accounts ofindividual life experiences ofmigrant women and refugees. From
informal discussions, I also learned of some refugees' plans to escape from Germany if the
situation became desperate, to seek asylum in other countries. Because ofthe sensitive nature
ofthis information I only referred to such attempts publicised in the media.
For Part n, I entered even more uncharted territory, that of trying to understand the
specifically German feature of accepting a particular type of East-West migrants, the ethnic
Germans. At the outset, there was little material accessible. The contradiction involved in
their status posed a novel challenge for scientific investigation. It required an analysis ofthe
constitutional definition of Germanness and its historically changing nature. Apart from
referring to the Basic Law itself, I studied reports by the Commission set up to review
proposed constitutional changes. In a similar way as mentioned for asylum seekers, there was
also, if less, media coverage of ethnic Germans, but more specialist commentaries were
found in journal articles. The Info-Dienst Deutsche Aussiedler, published by the Aussiedler
Commissioner in Bonn, often reprinted statistics, analyses and first-hand information which
were otherwise inaccessible. Undocumented discussions with a few Aussiedler, particularly
in southern Germany, and with indigenous Germans who came in contact with them, gave
me insights into some ofthe fears and assumptions which did not reach publicity.
To understand the relationship between East Germans, ethnic Germans, foreigners and
refugees, and indigenous Germans within the labour market, I drew on some official trade
union publications. Concerning reunification negotiations at the industrial relations level, I
referred to joint trade union/employer documents. Insights into grass-roots trade union

39
attitudes were gleaned during a number of undocumented and infonnal discussions I had
with several active and passive trade unionists and non-union members - whether anti-racist
or openly nationalistic.
For both Parts I and IT, to contrast the experiences of asylum seekers and ethnic Gennans
with each other and with indigenous Gennan society, I gathered statistical material consisting
of various federal and Land, and in Part III also city, data for the areas of immigration,
migration, naturalisation, and specific economic and social indicators. Another important
source were some analyses ofnational and regional election results, the most detailed being
Jfugen Dinse's of the 1991 Bremen election, and of others carried out by specialist bodies,
such as the Mannheim Forschungsgruppe Wahlen. Helpful empirical data also came from
relevant publications by some of Gennany's six main economic research institutes, for
example the Rheinisch-Westfalisches Institut.
With regard to citizenship, I studied Schleser's book (1980) as it contained authoritative
reprints of historical documents detailing the rules and regulations, from which I tried to
distil the significance of their changes. Regarding Gennan identity, I evaluated a far wider
range of sources, including individual research (eg by Celia Applegate, 1990; Harold James,
1989), and research by empirical social science survey programmes, eg the Datenreport,
which for the first time made available infonnation about the new Lander, and which tried to
address, amongst other factors, the question ofsocial class.
The justification for focusing on the Gennan Left in the final Part is given above; suffice it to
state here that the sources are wide-ranging and obviously written from definite points of
view and with political objectives. The summary conclusions are supplemented and tested in
the case study of Bremen, which involved some research into the interesting past of this
Land and its history as a door to international migration. I managed to obtain election
programmes from all parties but the DVU. The Zentralstelle fur die Integration von
Zugewanderten (centre for the integration of migrants) in Bremen kindly sent me detailed
infonnation about foreigners in Bremen. An examination of the conclusions of Dinse's
statistical analysis allowed me to substantiate my critical remarks about the Left.
The themes dealt with in this study were - and still are - controversial, and the subject of
intense political and academic debates, if not struggles. (For this reason, it was perhaps

40
unavoidable that, on occasions, political and ideological polemics have permeated some of
the quotations and statements, though I have attempted to reduce these to a minimum.) Some
ofthe occasional ferocity ofthese disputes can be explained by the absence ofa fundamental
agreement which is almost accepted as 'given' in some other European countries, even with
regard to the terms employed. One example is the denial ofthe existence of- and therefore
applicability of the term - 'racism' in contemporary Germany; indeed, it is 'only with the
advent of unification' that 'we find the concept of racism beginning to enter the public
debate' (Czarina Wilpert, 1993:67). Another belief, shared by some sociologists and other
social scientists, is that racism is particularly endemic in eastern Germany. Some argue that
before reunification, there existed a truly multi-cultural society in the west which has now all
but disappeared. Another problem is that most politicians and members of the intellectual
elite do not consider themselves to be in any way nationalistic.
One change that the post-reunification explosion of racist violence has brought about, then,
is a growing recognition in German society that racism exists. There is also a broad
understanding and desire that something should be done to counter it. However, there is
much confusion as to the roots of this racism. The question whether 'the ethnic nation state
itself provides a basis for institutional racism and thus legitimacy to racist ideologies'
(Wilpert, ibid:70) is not often posed. One way ofapproaching this question is to examine one
of the most fundamental institutions of the nation state, citizenship. My analysis begins,
though, with an examination ofthe multifaceted significance of exclusion from citizenship,
by focusing on Germany's refugees, asylum seekers and other 'foreigners'.

41
PART I
THE ASYLUM DEBATE IN GERMAN POLITICS
FROM 'OPEN ARMS' TO A GERMAN BASTION WITHIN FORTRESS EUROPE
CHAPTER TWO
REFUGEES AND ASYLUM SEEKERS
Globally, the rise in the munbers of refugees and asylum seekers during the past decade has
forced this issue to the top of the political agenda in many countries. Many of the worlds
poorest regions are struggling to accommodate hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of
desperate people fleeing from a whole range ofdisasters, wars and other emergencies. Only a
tiny fraction ofthose in need of asylum ever reach the relative safety of a country which has
the means ofproviding them with the necessities for survival. Some European states have a
long tradition of welcoming refugees, and since the formation of the West German state in
1949, Germany too is constitutionally committed to accept politically persecuted refugees.
Part I ofthis study analyses the 'asylum debate' in Germany, against the background ofrising
refugee numbers since the mid-eighties. I will seek to demonstrate that the right to asylum
had a peculiar significance for Germany in the Cold War period. To avoid examining the
asylum debate in a narrow, legalistic way, I will first assess the meaning of the right to
asylum for those affected, encompassing considerations ofan economic, social, demographic
and sociological nature.
Refugees are foreigners by definition: Chapter three shows that it is impossible for Germans
to be refugees inside Germany. But who counts as a foreigner in Germany?! This question
can be answered from a legal point ofview.2
A foreigner is a person who has no (and no right
to a) German passport. The political dimension is more differentiated. 'The question as to
who is regarded as a foreigner is not a question of passport, but one of judgement by the
indigenous population', argued the German business daily Handelsblatt (Walter Kaltefleiter,
30 December 1993). For example, Scandinavians and Britons, despite having cultural habits
1 An interesting description of how a Gennan might view the experience of being foreign in Gennany is
Bernt Engelmann's (1991), while Claudia Koch-Arzberger's study concentrates on various aspects of
foreigners' lives (1993).

42
that differ from German ones, are not considered members of a different culture. 'Africans
and Asians, on the other hand, even when they were bom in Germany, are classified prima
facie as members of different cultural groups' (ibid). The political issue as to who is a
foreigner can only be established on the basis of research, the paper continued: 'it
characterises the level of discussion of this problem in Germany that there are no relevant
solid empirical studies'.
Some apparently manage to shake offthe tag 'foreigner'. Migrant workers who were at first
resented as Gastarbeiter - Italians, Portuguese, Spaniards and Greeks - have 'meanwhile
become established, often assimilated' and 'are rarely considered to be "foreigners" now',
argued Namo Aziz (1992:37). 'Today it is rather the refugees and asylum seekers who have
come from the far-away ''third'' world who encounter rejection, particularly as they are, as a
rule, poor, and until recently they were, in addition, prohibited from working' (ibid). Aziz's
statement illustrates the changing socio-political nature ofthe term 'foreigner'.
At the outset, refugees - as foreigners - share some ofthe characteristics of certain sections
of the settled 'guest worker' population still considered foreign, namely Turkish people.
Despite a few success stories of Turkish entrepreneurs, the vast majority are relatively poor
and in lower grade jobs.
In this chapter I examine asylum seekers and refugees in Germany within the context of
inward labour mobility. They constitute part of the third 'wave' of immigration into
Germany since the Second World War. First, immediately after the war, millions of ethnic
Germans arrived after being displaced from East European countries. The second much
smaller influx consisted of Gastarbeiter in the fifties and sixties, whose dependants joined
them throughout the seventies. The third consisted of a combination of asylum seekers, who
first came in somewhat larger numbers (ie more than 100,000 a year) from 1988 onwards,
and ethnic Germans from the East and Germans from the former GDR in 1989 and 1990.
Like previous new immigrants, asylum seekers and refugees tend to occupy the bottom rung
ofthe labour market ladder. Their isolated3
position puts them in a more vulnerable situation
2 Germany lacks the principal differentiation between immigrants and other foreigners found in other
legal systems (cfOtto Kimminich, 1980:12).
3 Isolated in terms ofthe individual nature of their arrival and their presence, and lack of organisation as
asylum seekers/refugees.

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