1. Playing Chess in Pyongyang: A brief review of
DPRK’s Foreign Relations.
By Peter Machielse
August 2011
1

2. “North Korea, for all the peculiarities of Kim Il Sung, is the most
important bastion in the Far East in our struggle against American
and Japanese imperialism and Chinese revisionism”
1
1
A statement of Soviet official during 1984 (Oberdorfer, 2001 p 154).
2

3. List of abbreviations
DPRK
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea)
ROK
Republic of Korea (South Korea)
PRC
Peoples Republic of China
NPT
Non Proliferation Treaty
IAEA
International Atomic Energy Agency
UN
United Nations
UNSC
United Nations Security Council
3

4. Index
Introduction
5
The establishment of the DPRK
6
The concept of “Juche”
7
DPRK, PRC and the Soviet Union
8
PRC’s change and rapprochement to the South
9
Rangoon bombing and the 1988 Olympics
10
The collapse of the Soviet Union
11
First nuclear crisis
12
Sunshine Policy
12
Second nuclear crisis
13
Six Party talks
14
Conclusion
15
References
17
4

5. Introduction
While George W. Bush described the DPRK, together with Iraq and Iran as: “States like these,
and their terrorist allies, constitute an axis of evil, arming to threaten the peace of the world” 2.
While this statement calks the relations between the two countries and reveals the new policy
of the Bush administration (De Ceuster & Melissen 2008), it is still unlikely that the U.S. will
invade the DPRK by military means (Howard, 2004). Despite the fact that the DPRK (when
looking at military quantities) is a larger threat than the two other members of the “axis of evil”
the U.S. Prefer to solve the nuclear crisis by diplomatic means rather than military means
(Howard, 2004).
Scholars who try to understand DPRK's policy decision process are often forced to guess, due
to the absence of reliable information. Although an increasing amount of North Koreans
manage to flee to South Korea, the linchpin are “regular” citizens who can shed a light on
North Korea's daily life, but are unable to reveal the policy making process. The last high
ranked defector was Juche architect Hwang Jang-Yop, who left the country in 1997 (Rich,
2010). Byman & Lind (2010) pointed out the means used by the DPRK to prevent the system
to collapse due to internal means. They distinguish the following factors: “preventing
revolution, restrictive social policies, manipulation of ideas and information, use of force, cooptation, manipulation of foreign government and institutional coup-proofing” (Byman &
Lind, 2010 p 47).
However there are internal treats for DPRK’s regime, this paper rather focuses on external
affairs. DPRK’s behavior cannot be analyzed without taking the international development
into account. The relations of great powers cannot be understood without regional dynamics
(Kerr, 2005). Much of DPRK’s behavior is determined by external developments or other
countries pressure or attitudes. Therefore this paper gives a brief overview of the major
developments the regime faced since its establishment on the 9 September 1948 and how they
responded on those developments. For example what was the effect on the DPRK when the
PRC changed his policy, what happened when the Soviet Union collapsed and why the
DPRK’s regime started to play the nuclear card? This paper tries to give a short introduction
on those matters. Nonetheless to say, this paper is just a short introduction and will not claim
2
http://edition.cnn.com/2002/ALLPOLITICS/01/29/bush.speech.txt/
5

6. to be a complete overview of the matter. Rather it functions an introduction of international
relations and the way major powers have their interest in the Korean peninsula.
Therefore two questions are central in this research:
1 What major shifts in the global political landscape affected DPRK’s and why did this
affected them?
2 How did the DPRK respond on these shifts?
The establishment of the DPRK
Scobell (2006) describes the DPRK as an eroding totalitarian regime and emphasizes that the
next switch of power from Kim Jong Il to his successor will be the greatest challenge for the
current elite. Scobell (2006) argues that the DPRK meets the six totalitarian characteristics
(Friedrich & Brzezinski, 1956) of: presence of a dictator, presence of a single mass party,
presence of a system of terror, monopoly of means of communication and physical force,
central direction and planned economy through state planning.
On the eve of the end of the Japanese occupation (1910-1945), the U.S., U.K. and China
signed the Cairo agreement. Part of the agreement indicated that after the defeat of Japan,
Korea should be free and independent (Matray, 1978). In February 1945 at the Yalta
conference President F. D. Roosevelt proposed a Chinese, U.S., Soviet trusteeship over Korea,
but only one week before the Japanese surrender (when the Soviet finally declared war to
Japan) the U.S. took care of their postwar policy. The U.S. suddenly realized that the Soviets
probably would occupy the whole peninsula and in haste they did the Soviet a proposal. On
the evening of 10 of August Dean Rusk proposed (based on a National Geographic map) that
the U.S. should occupy the Korean peninsula below the 38 parallel and the Soviets the
Northern part (Oberdorfer, 2001). Surprisingly the Soviets accepted the proposal (Hwang,
2010). The view that the Soviets entered Korea with advanced planning and the U.S. acted in
a haze is countered by Cumings (2004). He indicates that the U.S. planned a postwar
occupation only six months after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor (7 December 1941) and
the Soviets were the ones without a deliberately plan and at that time, usually made ad hoc
decisions.
6

7. The more Soviet documents became accessible, the more it came clear that the influence of
the Soviets on the political outcome in the North was decisive (the same can be said about
U.S. influence in the South). The Soviets also put Kim Il Sung in charge of the country, thus
the Soviet stake in establishing the DPRK was significantly (Hwang, 2010).
June 25 1950 the modern history of Korea took another dramatic turn, when the Korean War
broke out. For an invasion of the South, Kim needed Soviet and Chinese approval. After a
U.S. statement at the beginning of 1950 that the Korean peninsula was out of their interest,
Kim got permission for the invasion. First he refused Chinese military support, because he
was convinced that he could win the War easily. After the U.S. and U.N. involvement, the
Chinese instantly joined the North Korean forces in November 1950 to prevent the country
from a total defeat, but more importantly to keep a buffer state between China and the U.S.
(Hwang, 2010). The War ended almost at the same place where it broke out (around the 38
parallel), but the Chinese lost 900.000 troops (Oberdorfer, 2001) The great Chinese looses in
the Korean War and the Soviet establishment of the DPRK combined with a great power of
the two countries and a “shared ideology” would determine that the Soviet Union and the
PRC became the most important allies of the DPRK for the next decades (Hwang, 2010).
The concept of “Juche”
To give a comprehensive view of the ideology of the DPRK is beyond the scope of this paper,
but to better understand the way the North Korean regime behaves a very brief summary will
be provided. Due to the strategic position the Korean peninsula is the most often invaded
territory in the world. Invasion of Mongols, Manchurians, Japanese and Han Chinese in the
past made the Joseon Dynasty (1392-1910) build a strong defensive nation to which Kim Il
Sung often refers to (Lee, 2003). During a well known speech in late December 1955, Kim Il
Sung revealed the concept of “Juche” in front of propaganda officials of the North Korean
Communist Party. The core component of self-reliance would make a distinctively Korean
path to socialism with an emphasis on national history and customs (Hwang, 2010). Lee
(2003) states that the claim of “self-reliance” (which can be regarded as a creative Korean
interpretation of Marxism-Leninism) to which many scholar refer to, can be too simplistic.
Juche means “holding fast to an independent position, rejecting dependence on others, using
one’s own brains, believing in one’s own strength, displaying the revolutionary spirit of selfreliance, and thus solving one’s own problems for oneself on one’s own responsibility under
all circumstances” (Lee, 2003 p 105). An important characteristic is military independence to
7

8. defend the country from imperialistic powers. In practice the concept of Juche is implemented
by indoctrination of attitudes and an immeasurable personality cult among the “great” and the
“dear” leader. The system uses the analogy of the body with the leader as the brain, the party
as the nervous system and the people as the muscles and the bones (Lee, 2003).
DPRK, PRC and the Soviet Union
Playing the PRC and Russia against each other for their own benefit was an eager used tactic
in Pyongyang. In July 1961 Kim Il Sung visited Moscow to meet Soviet leader Nikita
Khrushchev whom wants to sign a treaty of friendship with the DPRK in order to recruit him
as an ally against China. The treaty confirmed aid and military support in case of a new war.
With this treaty in his hand, Kim traveled to Beijing and asked the Chinese to match it. They
did and they signed an almost identical treaty (Oberdorfer, 2001).
The “Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance” signed between the Soviet Union
and China faced Nikita Khrushchev after Stalin’s death. When he took power in 1956 he
denounced Stalin’s purges, absolute control over the Soviet system and his personal cult.
While Khrushchev took distance from Stalin’s policy, Mao sent a telegram that states:
“immortal beacon of Comrade Stalin will forever illuminate the path on which the Chinese
people march forward”.
3
Mao increasingly questioned the personal cult in Marxism /
Leninism and the relationship between the two leaders seem to weaken (Morey, 2009). To
mention all incidents is beyond the scope of this paper, but the relationship between the
countries became fragile. During 1969 the relations between the two communist superpowers
China and the Soviet Union worsened. The border conflict between the Soviet Union and
China was a tangible prove (Robinson, 1972). Now China found itself both hostile to the U.S.
and even more to the Soviet Union, which seems to isolate China. These events between the
superpowers should definitely affect the DPRK. The end of the 60s also showed a
questionable increase of terrorism conducted by the DPRK. For example the assassination
attempts at the Blue House (1968), the Pueblo incident (1968), plane hijacking (1969) and the
discovery of the first tunnel (1974), increasingly start to play a more important role in
DPRK’s foreign policy.
3
Mao, Telegram to the USSR on Stalin’s Death in The Writings of Mao Zedong, 1949-1976 ed. Michael Y. M. Kau
(Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1986), 327.
8

9. PRC’s change and rapprochement to the South
In International Relations, major shifts in foreign policies could be a result of small events.
This happened when a visit of a U.S. ping pong team visited China in April 1971. It was the
starting sign of the so called “Ping Pong diplomacy” that resulted in a enforcing of the
relations between the two powers after 22 years of hostility since the Korean War (Hong &
Sun, 2000). In order to prevent complete isolation the PRC successfully tried to strengthen the
relations with the U.S. (Ross, 1986). What started with a secret visit off Henry Kissinger on
July 9 1971 in Beijing (while Kim Il Sung was in China as well) (Oberdorfer, 2001) ended in
the signing of the Shanghai Communique at the 27 of February 1972 (Ross, 1986). This
sudden shift between the two majors power drove both Seoul and Pyongyang to uncertainty.
Kim Il Sung and Park Chung Hee were surprised by the move and left both in doubt about the
continuing support and intentions of their important allies. Despite a statement four months
earlier that negotiations with South Korea will only occur after the ouster of the Park regime,
Kim Il Sung made a huge switch. The uncertainty about the PRC-U.S. alliance drove Kim to
seek for negotiations (Oberdorfer, 2001). At the 6 of August 1971, Kim stated that “we are
ready to establish contact at any time with all political parties, including the (ruling)
Democratic Republican Party, and all social organizations and individual personages in South
Korea” (Oberdorfer, 2001 p 12). Secret meetings in both countries between high officials
resulted finally in a remarkable joint statement on the 4 July 1972 that surprised both Koreas
and the rest of the world (Oberdorfer, 2001). This joint agreement states: “First, unification
shall be achieved through independent efforts without being subject to external imposition or
interferences. Second, unification shall be achieved through peaceful means, and not through
use of force against one another. Third, a great national unity, as a homogeneous people, shall
be sought first, transcending differences in ideas, ideologies and systems (Oberdorfer, 2001 p
24)”.
While Park Chung Hee could benefit domestically from the dialogue with the North, Kim Il
Sung used the joint statement to end his diplomatic isolation. At the end of 1970 before the
dialogue started, North Korea only had diplomatic relations with 35 countries (nearly all
socialistic states). South Korea in contrast had diplomatic relations with 81 countries. An
important result of the dialogue with the South was that short after those dialogues five
Western European countries recognized the DPRK and many neutral countries as well. Four
years after the talks started North Korea was already recognized by 93 states and could
9

10. compete in that perspective with the South (96). Another major achieved of the DPRK was
that they established direct talks with the U.S. for the first time (Oberdorfer, 2001).
Rangoon bombing and the 1988 Olympics
At 9 October 1983 the world was shocked by a terrorist attack on the South Korean Elites
including President Chun Doo Hwan. The president survived, but seven others did not. After
the bombing, Burma broke diplomatic relation and Japan (which had no diplomatic relations)
imposed sanctions on the North Korean regime. One of the North Korean terrorist who was
caught admitted that they first planned to assassinate Chun during a visit to Gabon, but this
probably would have resulted in a decrease of support from the African countries in the UN
General Assembly. The Rangoon bombing got a strange twist, because the day before the
bombing the PRC served as a messenger between the U.S. (this was a common strategy of the
DPRK) and North Korea with a proposal to participate in three party talks with South Korea
and the U.S. This means that North Korea accepted South Korea as a full participant an
important diplomatic sign (Oberdorfer, 2001). Within two days North Korea played the role
of reconciler and terrorist.
The rest of the 80 the relations between the countries and North Korean behavior can be
characterized by up and downs. Ups were the family reunions during the fall of 1985, but with
the coming Seoul Olympics the DPRK engaged in terrorism again by blowing a Korean Air
airliner and killing all 115 passengers.
Relations with the two communist countries the PRC and the Soviet Union (the biggest
sponsor since the establishment of the DPRK) remained without big changes. Kim Il Sung
was constantly playing China and the Soviets to each other, because he knew that both of the
blocks would not drive them in the hands of the opponent. However they distrusted the Kim
regime, Korea was strategically simply too important. A striking citation of a Soviet official
during 1984 states: “North Korea, for all the peculiarities of Kim Il Sung, is the most
important bastion in the Far East in our struggle against American and Japanese imperialism
and Chinese revisionism” (Oberdorfer, 2001 p 154). When Reagan visited China in 1984 and
China changes his course under Xiaoping, Kim was worried again and responded by inviting
himself to Moscow. When the Chinese heard this they immediately answered by a travel to
Pyongyang in order not to drive Kim to much in Soviet hands (Oberdorfer, 2001).
10

11. The 1988 Olympics were both a great opportunity to show South Koreas to the outside world
and a great opportunity to seek for diplomatic relations. After the Communist boycott of the
1984 L.A. Olympics North Korea tried to convince their communist allies to boycott the
Seoul Olympics as well. After failing to get a couple of sports to North Korea, they decided to
boycott the Seoul Olympics and responded with a airplane bomb which killed 115 people on
the 7 October of 1987 (Ha, 1998). On the eve of the Olympics Roh Tae Woo launched his
“North Politics” that would change the approach to North Korea and their allies. Especially
relations with the PRC and the Soviet Union was since the start of the 80’s one of the aims of
South Korean foreign policy (Oberdorfer, 2001). In 1987 during Roh Tae Woo’s presidential
campaign he said that “we will cross the Yellow Sea” (Oberdorfer, 2001 p 187). Seoul soon
had relations with Hungary. Kim Il Sung was aware that other Communist countries would do
the same. Under the lead of new Soviet leader Gorbachev the Cold War was melting down
and relations between the U.S. and the Soviet Union start to normalize. Also the relation with
South Korea started with informal meetings. Kim Il Sung hurried to reverse the Soviet
directions, but in vain (Oberdorfer, 2001).
The collapse of the Soviet Union
On the 1 of January 1991 the Soviet Union finally established full relationships with South
Korea, which drove Kim Il Sung even more in a diplomatic isolation. With a languish of
Communism in Europe and a conceived betrayal of the biggest sponsor, North Korea
responded in a way that would be more and more common for the rest of its existence (Kim,
2007). In a statement the DPRK interpreted the alliance as an end of the DPRK-Soviet
alliance and stated: “no other choice but to take measures to provide for ourselves some
weapons for which we have so far relied on the alliance” (Mack, 1993 p 342). The start of the
90s were tough for the DPRK. The Soviet Union demanded hard currency instead of
concessional arrangements and China the most important ally that was left start to gallivant
with the South. On August 24 1992 the geopolitical situation changed dramatically when the
South Korea signed formal relationships with China. In return South Korea had to give up the
relations with Taiwan (South Korea was the only Asian country that still recognized Taiwan)
(Oberdorfer, 2001). In a couple of years Communism disappeared in Europe, the Soviet
Union collapsed and China signed relations with South Korea. Where Kim Il Sung could rely
blindfold on his allies during the last decades, now nothing was sure anymore and playing the
nuclear card was became an evident tool for regime survival (Roy, 2010). During 1991 the
11

12. support from Moscow was gone, the Chinese ties with South Korea were growing and China
forced the DPRK to agree with a dual entry of both Koreas to the U.N. (United Nations).
Therefore the DPRK felt the pressure to sign two agreement in December 1991. The
agreements concerning an “Agreement on Reconciliation and a Non Aggression agreement
(Oberdorfer, 2001).
First nuclear crisis
During the 90s North Korea starts to see the more and more value in their nuclear program in
relation to the outside world. The first time the nuclear issue became clear was when a U.S.
surveillance satellite photographed a nuclear vessel under construction at Yongbyon. When
U.S. surveillance kept going it became clear that the nuclear program took serious proportions
(Oberdorfer, 2001). The start of the first nuclear crisis had his roots by ratifying the Non
Proliferation Treaty in 1985. In March 1992 it signed the IAEA (International Atomic Energy
Agency) safeguard agreement. This agreement requires North Korea to accept IAEA
inspectors to examine all their nuclear equipment. The IAEA stated that the DPRK was not
transparent in revealing their pre 1992 plutonium production and asked for more inspections
of nuclear waste to determine the right amount (U. S. estimated 8-10 kg enough for two
nuclear weapons). As a response the DPRK withdrew from the NPT and wanted to solve the
problem due to bilateral talks with the U.S. North Korea succeeded in establishing talks with
the U.S. and asked for security assurances as well. Finally the first nuclear crisis was solved
by signing the Agreed Framework in October 1994. This framework pushed the DPRK to stop
their program, but in return they received a light water project. Further in the 90s the DPRK
succeeded in lifting their sanctions if they stopped their long range missiles project too
(Samore, 2003).
Sunshine Policy
A major switch in the ROK foreign policy occurred when Kim Dae Jung took office in 1998.
While former presidents formulated strong policies towards the DPRK, Kim rather focused on
engagement and formulated his famous “sunshine policy” to get the DPRK out of its isolation.
During the sunshine policy projects between the two Koreas were established like meetings of
separated families, two cross border railway connections, Gaesung industrial complex and the
historical meeting between Kim Jong Il and Kim Dae Jung during the 2000 summit (Kwon &
Lim, 2006).
12

13. During his inauguration Kim Dae Jung outlined the core principles of the sunshine policy as:
‘No armed provocation by the North will be tolerated; a takeover or absorption of the North
will not be attempted; North–South reconciliation and cooperation will be expanded
beginning with those areas which can be most easily agreed upon’ (Mou, 2003a, p 2). While
the start of the sunshine policy was hopeful, soon came clear that the DPRK was not the most
reliable partner. During 2001 little progress was made to strengthen inter Korean relations and
the relations worsened when the DPRK launched a sea attack in 2002. For the DPRK the
sunshine policy was a great opportunity to receive aid and financial support, so it was
important for them to maintain the inter Korean talks for the following reasons: First, the
grouping within the axis of evil forced the DPRK to show the outside world that the U.S. was
wrong in doing so. Second, the DPRK was aware of the 2002 ROK elections and wanted a
president that would maintain the sunshine policy (it happened when Roo Mo Hyun was
elected). Third, to polish the image that is damaged due to domestic suppression. Forth, try to
strategically blame the U.S. as an obstacle for inter Korean progress (Rigoulot, 2003). Inter
Korean relations and the hope of a more peaceful future worsened when the second nuclear
crisis broke out.
Second nuclear crisis
During 2002 the discovery of DPRK’s secret program to enrich uranium for nuclear weapons
triggered the second nuclear crisis. The DPRK responded to withdrawal from the NPT and
decided to expel IAEA inspectors from the country. This is often called the “second nuclear
crisis” The relation between the DPRK and the IAEA since 1992 can be described as a chain
of incidents whereby the IAEA mostly accused the DPRK for a lack of transparency. The
NPT functioned from 1994 till 2002 to force the DPRK to meet the safeguard obligations (De
Ceuster & Melissen, 2008).
From 2002 the Bush administration sought for means to involve China in the talks to
denuclearize the DPRK. Bush's administration preferred multilateral talks to bilateral talks
and was hoping for China using its potential influence on the DPRK (Glaser & Liang, 2008).
Eventually the PRC was not eager to join the talks, but the debilitated 1994 agreement and the
second 2002 North Korean Nuclear crisis made the Chinese aware of the potential hazards.
The U.S. judged that bilateral talks with the DPRK were doomed to fail because of the lack of
leverages. They proposed a multilateral approach including China. China first responded
reserved, because they were not sure they U.S. Claims of the DPRK produces highly enriched
13

14. uranium was true, they thought that DPRK's nuclear program was mainly used to blackmail
the U.S., they were afraid that the U.S. Wanted to end the Kim Dynasty by any means and
finally, China's role in the political arena during the Xiaopeng era was marginal. During a
press announcement after the meeting between Bush and Jiang Zemin Bush announced that
“we agreed that the peace and stability must be maintained. Both sides will continue to work
towards a nuclear-weapon-free Korean Peninsula and a peaceful resolution of this issue
(Glaser & Liang, 2008). Also bilateral between the U.S. and the DPRK collapsed due to the
crisis and the PRC and ROK initiated a multilateral framework, what resulted in the Six party
talks including PRC, U.S., ROK, DPRK, Japan and Russia (De Ceuster & Melissen, 2008).
Six Party talks
The six party talks shows us that the interest of the neighboring countries and the U.S. in the
Korean Peninsula are high, mainly because of the strategically position of Korea. Like many
times in the happened in the history of the DPRK, diplomatic talks went up and down. The
first round of the six party talks was held in 2003 in Beijing. 2004 saw two rounds and a
breakthrough was realized in 2005 when the countries reached an agreement to freeze
DPRK’s nuclear program and to denuclearize the country. In October 2006 the progress was
thrown back when the DPRK conducted a nuclear test. The regime faced sanctions that were
shared by Russia and the PRC and isolated the DPRK as it never was before. The talks
reached “Agreement on Initial Actions for the Implementation of the Joint Statement” in
February. In 2007 the DPRK allows IAEA inspectors for the first time since 2002 and
bilateral talks with the U.S. were established (De Ceuster & Melissen, 2008). During April
2009 the DPRK launched a rocket and justified is as a satellite launch. The U.S. and its allies
asked the U.N.S.C. for sanctions and after the denunciatory statement of the U.N.S.C.
president the DPRK decided to withdraw from the six party talks (Weitz, 2011). When the
current President Lee Myung Bak was elected a stronger policy against the DPRK was
formulated and incidents like the Gangwha island incident 4 and the incident with a marine
vessel 5 let the ROK government to judge the sunshine policy as a failure.6 However the six
party talks are stopped, the external pressure on the regime to change can be characterized by
sanctions, which are often very low in achieving the desired results (Ruediger, 2006). The six
4
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-pacific-14009913
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8589507.stm
6
http://articles.cnn.com/2010-11-19/world/south.korea.sunshine.policy_1_inter-korean-relations-mountkumgang-north-korea?_s=PM:WORLD
5
14

15. part talks also show that despite the diplomatic isolation and the poor economic conditions
especially China does not want the regime to collapse. The PRC prefers regional stability and
is aware of the strategically position of the Korean peninsula (De Ceuster & Melissen, 2008).
Conclusion
A short description of the historical developments concerning the DPRK shows us a country
that has regime survival as a main goal and it also shows us that the regime will do anything
to succeed in this perspective. Even involvement in terrorism and the development of nuclear
weapons are used for regime survival.
Since the establishment of the DPRK it relied mostly on the Soviet Union and the PRC.
Especially after the ties between the PRC and the Soviet Union worsened, Kim Il Sung used
this to play the great powers constantly to each other. Both countries did not want the DPRK
to rely on the opponent and it seemed that Kim Il Sung understood this very well. However,
developments in the global political area forced the DPRK to change their strategy. The
Soviet Union collapsed and the most important supporter suddenly disappeared. The new
strategy depends mainly on playing the nuclear card. Regional stability is a main aim for the
countries in the Six Party talks and the DPRK with nuclear weapons is a constant treat for the
regional stability. With the nuclear weapons on their side, the DPRK is an important actor and
is able to blackmail other countries in order to ensure in regime survival.
Although the Six Party talks aim on a denuclearized North Korea, the chance that the talks
will have this outcome is unlikely. The existence of the DPRK in the political arena is mainly
build on the possession of nuclear weapons. The country has a small economy and compared
to countries in the Middle East the natural resources are low. So giving up the nuclear
program will weaken the position of the DPRK strongly. Therefore it is highly unlikely that
the country will do so.
Because of the geographical position of the Korean peninsula Korea faced a lot of invasions
throughout the history. Today, ironically it seems a big advantage for the regime to reach their
beloved survival. It is clear that most countries among the six party talks have a great interest
in the Korean peninsula and this placed the DPRK in a “luxury” position. Economically the
DPRK has nothing to offer, but in case of regional stability the country plays a leading role.
By threatening the regional stability with nuclear weapons the country is able to “blackmail”
15

16. other countries and prevent them from invading the country. Therefore the chance that a fast
end of the “Kim Dynasty” will be caused by external developments is unlikely.
Striking is also the ups and downs in regarding the ROK relations. When the DPRK faced
themselves with a increasing diplomatic isolation like PRC rapprochement to the U.S. they
tried to strengthen the inter Korean relations, resulting in the 1972 joint statement. Also the
collapse of the Soviet Union and the establishment of PRC-ROK relations forced the DPRK
to approach their capitalist southern neighbors for increasing their relationship resulting in the
1991 December agreements.
16

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