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From Power Plant to POL
Cyber-Criminals are on you!
POWERBOX
Mastering Power
Powerbox
Patrick Le Fèvre – Chief Marketing & Communications Officer
Kraftforum - Gothenburg
May 18 - 2017
POWERBOX Mastering Power
Powerbox – Smart Grid Security
Presenter – Patrick Le Fèvre
2
Patrick Le Fèvre is an international marketer and engineer who has worked in power
electronics for over three decades.
His career has been focused on power products since 1982 when he started with a start-
up called Micro-Gisco (France).
He joined Powerbox Sweden in September 2015 as Marketing Director and in January
2016 was promoted Chief Marketing and Communication Officer for the all Group.
Prior Powerbox, he held senior marketing and communication roles at Ericsson, Power
Modules division, for 20 years.
Patrick Le Fèvre is the author of several articles and marketing papers presented at
various conferences, and deeply involved in a number of groups and associations related
to power-supplies, energy efficiency and contributing to promote new technologies within
the power community.
Patrick Le Fèvre received most of his education in France, where he studied electronics,
microelectronics and industrial marketing, and where he received a civil engineer degree
in 1982.
www.prbx.com
POWERBOX Mastering Power
Powerbox – Smart Grid Security
Company key numbers
3
>1M
Units/year
150
Power people
15
Countries
3.500
Custom projects
since 1974
>90%
Returning customers
25
R&D and Engineering
>6M
6,000,000 hours
Proven MTBF
3
R&D center in Europe
1974
Gnesta
UN.GC
Environmental
Social
Governance
engagement
POWERBOX Mastering Power
Powerbox – Smart Grid Security
The journey!
4
→Smart Grid overview
→At start was Aurora
→From simple to complex attacks
→Securing the Smart Grid
→Are we safe at board level?
→Conclusions
→Happy to answer your questions
POWERBOX Mastering Power
Powerbox – Smart Grid Security
The business case
5
→Reduce cost to consumers
→Better ability to manage peaks on demand
→Defer or avoid to build extra infrastructures
→Reducing greenhouse gases and carbon
footprint
→Integration of renewable energies (wind,
solar… ) into the grid
→Smart metering and better control of energy
distribution and consumption
→Flexibility
POWERBOX Mastering Power
Powerbox – Smart Grid Security
From Electricity to Intelligent Network
6
→Smart Grid (SG) is an ecosystem
→Migration from Electricity generation and
distribution to intelligent network
→From Generator to Consumer SG is
transforming into a huge data network
→New technologies and connected devices
(e.g. IoT) are increasing interfaces
→Risk of intrusion and cyber-attacks are
increasing as Grid connectors booming
POWERBOX Mastering Power
Powerbox – Smart Grid Security
At start it was a Grid…
7
Source: Institute for Energy Research (IER)
POWERBOX Mastering Power
Powerbox – Smart Grid Security
Then arrived the Smart Grid…
8
e.g. The IEC 60870 is a set of standards which define
systems used for tele-control in supervisory control and
data acquisition (SCADA) in electrical engineering and
power system automation applications.
POWERBOX Mastering Power
Powerbox – Smart Grid Security
The Threats
9
→Hackers & Crackers
→Computer Criminals
→Terrorism
→Cyberwar
→Industrial Espionage
→Insiders
POWERBOX Mastering Power
Powerbox – Smart Grid Security
The Threats
10
Threat-Source Motivations Threat Actions
Hacker, cracker
• Challenge
• Ego
• Rebellion
• Hacking
• Social engineering
• System intrusion, break-ins
• Unauthorized system access
Computer criminal
• Destruction of information
• Illegal information disclosure
• Monetary gain
• Unauthorized data alteration
• Computer crime (e.g., cyber stalking)
• Fraudulent act (e.g., replay, interception)
• Information bribery
• Spoofing
• System intrusion
Terrorism
• Blackmail
• Destruction
• Exploitation
• Revenge
• Bomb/Terrorism
• Information warfare
• System attack (e.g., distributed denied of service)
• System penetration
• System tampering
Industrial espionage
(companies, foreign government, other
government interest)
• Competitive advantage
• Economic espionage
• Economic exploitation
• Information theft
• Intrusion on personal privacy
• Social engineering
• System penetration and unauthorized access
Insiders
• Curiosity
• Ego
• Intelligence
• Monetary gain
• Revenge
• Blackmail
• Malicious code (e.g., virus, logic, Trojan horse)
• Fraud and theft
• System sabotage
• Input falsified, corrupted data interception
POWERBOX Mastering Power
Powerbox – Smart Grid Security
The Consequences
11
→Population
→Reputational
→Infrastructures
→Regulatory
→Equipment
→Data protection and privacy
→Safety
→Economic
POWERBOX Mastering Power
Powerbox – Smart Grid Security
The Consequences
12
Category Consequences
Population
• Population affected, e.g., loss of power or observable quality issues (flicker)
• Safety related issues
Reputational • Loss of trust and confidence
Infrastructures • Shut down of dependent infrastructure
Regulatory • Sanctions / Warnings, penalties (€), disgorgement (€) and other compliance measures
Equipment
• Damage to ICT equipment
• Damage to power systems equipment
Data Protection and Privacy • Disclosure or modification of personal or sensitive data
Safety
• Minor or serious injury
• Loss of life
Economic
• Cost of electrical losses
• Customer outage costs, i.e. cost of energy not supplied
• Congestion costs, resistive power losses, power import, ancillary service usage
• Investigation and repair time, work time lost
The real life…
From Aurora to POL
POWERBOX Mastering Power
Powerbox – Smart Grid Security
At start was the AURORA
14
→2006 / 2007 The Aurora project
– Idaho National Lab. accessed a generator
– Supervisory Control & Data Acquisition (SCADA) used to
access and send commands
– Generator destroyed through simulated “cyber attack”
→Lessons learned
– Physical damage can result from a cyber attack
– Public / Private partnership complicated
– Lack or regulatory and guidance
– Discovering a new word of threats
→Aurora opened the Pandora BoxMarch 04, 2007
POWERBOX Mastering Power
Powerbox – Smart Grid Security
From simple to complex attacks
15
→April 2007
– Exploit of Microsoft zero-day vulnerability to access
energy company SCADA
– Origin of the attach through simple phishing
– Taking advantage of windows DNS vulnerability
→August 2010
– Mutant of the “Stuxnet” worm propagated through
SCADA into Smart Grid
– Suspected to be the first attack from another government
not involving military action
POWERBOX Mastering Power
Powerbox – Smart Grid Security
Dark Christmas for Ukraine
16
→ Direct attacks toward regional distribution system
(Ivano-Frankivsk region)
→ 225 000 customers impacted
→ Multiple modus operandi
– Phishing e-mails - BlackEnergy 3 malware
– KillDisk attacking Master Boot record
– Control of Human Machin Interface (HMI)
– Control of UPSs operation
– Physical sabotage
→ February 25, 2016 US Dept. of Homeland Security
(DHS) issued a formal alert
December 24, 2015
POWERBOX Mastering Power
Powerbox – Smart Grid Security
Ransomware shutdown BWL
17
→Michigan - Board of Water & Light (BWL)
attacked through Ransomware
→BWL forced to shutdown all IT systems
→FBI involved in the investigations
→Several months for BWL to restore
→Attack suspected to come from another
country from cyber-criminal organization
→This case is considered as part of a
mechanism to attack Energy Suppliers
April 26, 2016
POWERBOX Mastering Power
Powerbox – Smart Grid Security
Connecting SG to DDoS
18
→September 2016 – OVH (France)
– Massive Distributed Denial-of-Service DDoS
attack through 150 000 IoT devices (CCTV
cameras and smart-meters) 1Tbps
→October 2016 – Dyn (USA)
– Dyn getting “tens of millions” of messages from
Internet-connected devices, including smart-
meters
→November 2016 – Deutsche Telekom
– More than 900 000 customers knocked offline -
Routers infected by a new variant of a computer
worm known as Mirai
POWERBOX Mastering Power
Powerbox – Smart Grid Security
Securing the Smart Grid
19
→ The US Department Of Energy (DOE) released a
number of projects and initiatives, as well other
governmental agencies
→ December 2016 – White House published the
“National Electric Grid Security And Resilience Plan”
→ The European Network and Information Security
Agency (ENISA), the EU-funded SPARKS (Smart
Grid Protection Against Cyber Attacks – project) and
many others building safer SG
→ International projects aiming to bridge US and EU
into a common protection alliance in discussion
POWERBOX Mastering Power
Powerbox – Smart Grid Security
What about at board level?
20
→ Power community is not used to deal with security
→ Hacker could access a system through industrial
SCADA without any problem
→ How much is PMBus secured?
→ Is the power industry too confident?
→ Insider threats are real (Dolphin case)
→ Cyber criminality is increasing faster than we could
imagine
→ Power industry must deploy strategies to include
highest level of security in any layer of software
POWERBOX Mastering Power
Powerbox – Smart Grid Security
Conclusions
21
→ Smart Grid is a very complex architecture requiring
high level of cooperation to protect
→ Learning by mistake is not an option!
→ Governmental initiatives are accelerating though
political instability increasing threats at high pace
→ Creating awareness and educating power designers
and systems architects business critical
→ In front of Cyber Criminality, nothing is for granted
→ Cyber security starts at board level
→ Sounds dramatic though a lot of fun ahead!
POWERBOX Mastering Power
Powerbox – Smart Grid Security
References
22
Is your Smart Grid Secured (IEEE)
http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/stamp/stamp.jsp?tp=&arnumber=7790948
February 25, 2016 US Dept. of Homeland Security (DHS) issued a formal alert
https://ics-cert.us-cert.gov/alerts/IR-ALERT-H-16-056-01
Analysis of the Cyber Attack on the Ukrainian Power Grid
http://www.nerc.com/pa/CI/ESISAC/Documents/E-ISAC_SANS_Ukraine_DUC_18Mar2016.pdf
ENISA – Smart Grid Security
https://www.enisa.europa.eu/topics/critical-information-infrastructures-and-services/smart-grids/smart-grids-and-smart-metering/ENISA_Annex%20II%20-
%20Security%20Aspects%20of%20Smart%20Grid.pdf
Salesforce Security CTO: How A DDoS Attack Can Impact A Smart Grid
http://www.crn.com/news/internet-of-things/video/300083164/salesforce-security-cto-how-a-ddos-attack-can-impact-a-smart-grid.htm
White House – National Electric Grid Action Plan
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/whitehouse.gov/files/images/National_Electric_Grid_Action_Plan_06Dec2016.pdf
Digital attack tracking
http://www.digitalattackmap.com
Book to read:
"Countdown to Zero Day“ by Kim Zetter
https://www.amazon.com/Countdown-Zero-Day-Stuxnet-Digital/dp/0770436196
POWERBOX
Mastering Power
Thanks for your attention!
For more information contact patrick.le-fevre@prbx.com

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Cyber Attacks Threaten Power Grid Security

  • 1. From Power Plant to POL Cyber-Criminals are on you! POWERBOX Mastering Power Powerbox Patrick Le Fèvre – Chief Marketing & Communications Officer Kraftforum - Gothenburg May 18 - 2017
  • 2. POWERBOX Mastering Power Powerbox – Smart Grid Security Presenter – Patrick Le Fèvre 2 Patrick Le Fèvre is an international marketer and engineer who has worked in power electronics for over three decades. His career has been focused on power products since 1982 when he started with a start- up called Micro-Gisco (France). He joined Powerbox Sweden in September 2015 as Marketing Director and in January 2016 was promoted Chief Marketing and Communication Officer for the all Group. Prior Powerbox, he held senior marketing and communication roles at Ericsson, Power Modules division, for 20 years. Patrick Le Fèvre is the author of several articles and marketing papers presented at various conferences, and deeply involved in a number of groups and associations related to power-supplies, energy efficiency and contributing to promote new technologies within the power community. Patrick Le Fèvre received most of his education in France, where he studied electronics, microelectronics and industrial marketing, and where he received a civil engineer degree in 1982. www.prbx.com
  • 3. POWERBOX Mastering Power Powerbox – Smart Grid Security Company key numbers 3 >1M Units/year 150 Power people 15 Countries 3.500 Custom projects since 1974 >90% Returning customers 25 R&D and Engineering >6M 6,000,000 hours Proven MTBF 3 R&D center in Europe 1974 Gnesta UN.GC Environmental Social Governance engagement
  • 4. POWERBOX Mastering Power Powerbox – Smart Grid Security The journey! 4 →Smart Grid overview →At start was Aurora →From simple to complex attacks →Securing the Smart Grid →Are we safe at board level? →Conclusions →Happy to answer your questions
  • 5. POWERBOX Mastering Power Powerbox – Smart Grid Security The business case 5 →Reduce cost to consumers →Better ability to manage peaks on demand →Defer or avoid to build extra infrastructures →Reducing greenhouse gases and carbon footprint →Integration of renewable energies (wind, solar… ) into the grid →Smart metering and better control of energy distribution and consumption →Flexibility
  • 6. POWERBOX Mastering Power Powerbox – Smart Grid Security From Electricity to Intelligent Network 6 →Smart Grid (SG) is an ecosystem →Migration from Electricity generation and distribution to intelligent network →From Generator to Consumer SG is transforming into a huge data network →New technologies and connected devices (e.g. IoT) are increasing interfaces →Risk of intrusion and cyber-attacks are increasing as Grid connectors booming
  • 7. POWERBOX Mastering Power Powerbox – Smart Grid Security At start it was a Grid… 7 Source: Institute for Energy Research (IER)
  • 8. POWERBOX Mastering Power Powerbox – Smart Grid Security Then arrived the Smart Grid… 8 e.g. The IEC 60870 is a set of standards which define systems used for tele-control in supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) in electrical engineering and power system automation applications.
  • 9. POWERBOX Mastering Power Powerbox – Smart Grid Security The Threats 9 →Hackers & Crackers →Computer Criminals →Terrorism →Cyberwar →Industrial Espionage →Insiders
  • 10. POWERBOX Mastering Power Powerbox – Smart Grid Security The Threats 10 Threat-Source Motivations Threat Actions Hacker, cracker • Challenge • Ego • Rebellion • Hacking • Social engineering • System intrusion, break-ins • Unauthorized system access Computer criminal • Destruction of information • Illegal information disclosure • Monetary gain • Unauthorized data alteration • Computer crime (e.g., cyber stalking) • Fraudulent act (e.g., replay, interception) • Information bribery • Spoofing • System intrusion Terrorism • Blackmail • Destruction • Exploitation • Revenge • Bomb/Terrorism • Information warfare • System attack (e.g., distributed denied of service) • System penetration • System tampering Industrial espionage (companies, foreign government, other government interest) • Competitive advantage • Economic espionage • Economic exploitation • Information theft • Intrusion on personal privacy • Social engineering • System penetration and unauthorized access Insiders • Curiosity • Ego • Intelligence • Monetary gain • Revenge • Blackmail • Malicious code (e.g., virus, logic, Trojan horse) • Fraud and theft • System sabotage • Input falsified, corrupted data interception
  • 11. POWERBOX Mastering Power Powerbox – Smart Grid Security The Consequences 11 →Population →Reputational →Infrastructures →Regulatory →Equipment →Data protection and privacy →Safety →Economic
  • 12. POWERBOX Mastering Power Powerbox – Smart Grid Security The Consequences 12 Category Consequences Population • Population affected, e.g., loss of power or observable quality issues (flicker) • Safety related issues Reputational • Loss of trust and confidence Infrastructures • Shut down of dependent infrastructure Regulatory • Sanctions / Warnings, penalties (€), disgorgement (€) and other compliance measures Equipment • Damage to ICT equipment • Damage to power systems equipment Data Protection and Privacy • Disclosure or modification of personal or sensitive data Safety • Minor or serious injury • Loss of life Economic • Cost of electrical losses • Customer outage costs, i.e. cost of energy not supplied • Congestion costs, resistive power losses, power import, ancillary service usage • Investigation and repair time, work time lost
  • 13. The real life… From Aurora to POL
  • 14. POWERBOX Mastering Power Powerbox – Smart Grid Security At start was the AURORA 14 →2006 / 2007 The Aurora project – Idaho National Lab. accessed a generator – Supervisory Control & Data Acquisition (SCADA) used to access and send commands – Generator destroyed through simulated “cyber attack” →Lessons learned – Physical damage can result from a cyber attack – Public / Private partnership complicated – Lack or regulatory and guidance – Discovering a new word of threats →Aurora opened the Pandora BoxMarch 04, 2007
  • 15. POWERBOX Mastering Power Powerbox – Smart Grid Security From simple to complex attacks 15 →April 2007 – Exploit of Microsoft zero-day vulnerability to access energy company SCADA – Origin of the attach through simple phishing – Taking advantage of windows DNS vulnerability →August 2010 – Mutant of the “Stuxnet” worm propagated through SCADA into Smart Grid – Suspected to be the first attack from another government not involving military action
  • 16. POWERBOX Mastering Power Powerbox – Smart Grid Security Dark Christmas for Ukraine 16 → Direct attacks toward regional distribution system (Ivano-Frankivsk region) → 225 000 customers impacted → Multiple modus operandi – Phishing e-mails - BlackEnergy 3 malware – KillDisk attacking Master Boot record – Control of Human Machin Interface (HMI) – Control of UPSs operation – Physical sabotage → February 25, 2016 US Dept. of Homeland Security (DHS) issued a formal alert December 24, 2015
  • 17. POWERBOX Mastering Power Powerbox – Smart Grid Security Ransomware shutdown BWL 17 →Michigan - Board of Water & Light (BWL) attacked through Ransomware →BWL forced to shutdown all IT systems →FBI involved in the investigations →Several months for BWL to restore →Attack suspected to come from another country from cyber-criminal organization →This case is considered as part of a mechanism to attack Energy Suppliers April 26, 2016
  • 18. POWERBOX Mastering Power Powerbox – Smart Grid Security Connecting SG to DDoS 18 →September 2016 – OVH (France) – Massive Distributed Denial-of-Service DDoS attack through 150 000 IoT devices (CCTV cameras and smart-meters) 1Tbps →October 2016 – Dyn (USA) – Dyn getting “tens of millions” of messages from Internet-connected devices, including smart- meters →November 2016 – Deutsche Telekom – More than 900 000 customers knocked offline - Routers infected by a new variant of a computer worm known as Mirai
  • 19. POWERBOX Mastering Power Powerbox – Smart Grid Security Securing the Smart Grid 19 → The US Department Of Energy (DOE) released a number of projects and initiatives, as well other governmental agencies → December 2016 – White House published the “National Electric Grid Security And Resilience Plan” → The European Network and Information Security Agency (ENISA), the EU-funded SPARKS (Smart Grid Protection Against Cyber Attacks – project) and many others building safer SG → International projects aiming to bridge US and EU into a common protection alliance in discussion
  • 20. POWERBOX Mastering Power Powerbox – Smart Grid Security What about at board level? 20 → Power community is not used to deal with security → Hacker could access a system through industrial SCADA without any problem → How much is PMBus secured? → Is the power industry too confident? → Insider threats are real (Dolphin case) → Cyber criminality is increasing faster than we could imagine → Power industry must deploy strategies to include highest level of security in any layer of software
  • 21. POWERBOX Mastering Power Powerbox – Smart Grid Security Conclusions 21 → Smart Grid is a very complex architecture requiring high level of cooperation to protect → Learning by mistake is not an option! → Governmental initiatives are accelerating though political instability increasing threats at high pace → Creating awareness and educating power designers and systems architects business critical → In front of Cyber Criminality, nothing is for granted → Cyber security starts at board level → Sounds dramatic though a lot of fun ahead!
  • 22. POWERBOX Mastering Power Powerbox – Smart Grid Security References 22 Is your Smart Grid Secured (IEEE) http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/stamp/stamp.jsp?tp=&arnumber=7790948 February 25, 2016 US Dept. of Homeland Security (DHS) issued a formal alert https://ics-cert.us-cert.gov/alerts/IR-ALERT-H-16-056-01 Analysis of the Cyber Attack on the Ukrainian Power Grid http://www.nerc.com/pa/CI/ESISAC/Documents/E-ISAC_SANS_Ukraine_DUC_18Mar2016.pdf ENISA – Smart Grid Security https://www.enisa.europa.eu/topics/critical-information-infrastructures-and-services/smart-grids/smart-grids-and-smart-metering/ENISA_Annex%20II%20- %20Security%20Aspects%20of%20Smart%20Grid.pdf Salesforce Security CTO: How A DDoS Attack Can Impact A Smart Grid http://www.crn.com/news/internet-of-things/video/300083164/salesforce-security-cto-how-a-ddos-attack-can-impact-a-smart-grid.htm White House – National Electric Grid Action Plan https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/whitehouse.gov/files/images/National_Electric_Grid_Action_Plan_06Dec2016.pdf Digital attack tracking http://www.digitalattackmap.com Book to read: "Countdown to Zero Day“ by Kim Zetter https://www.amazon.com/Countdown-Zero-Day-Stuxnet-Digital/dp/0770436196
  • 23. POWERBOX Mastering Power Thanks for your attention! For more information contact patrick.le-fevre@prbx.com