This powerpoint explains my involvement in a 2007 electronic home monitoring fraud investigation in Whatcom County, Washington. To be clear, I am no longer a deputy with the WCSO. I was dismissed on Jun 22nd, 2012 for reasons related to what is described in this PowerPoint.

1. Electronic Home
Monitoring Fraud
Investigation
Discovered: 2007
by: Paul R. Murphy, (Former Detective,
3A147, Whatcom County Sheriff’s Office)
(Redacted For Public Release)

2. System Overview
 Basic operation of electronic home
monitoring (EHM)/electronic home
detention (EHD) programs across the
United States.
 EHM vs. EHD
 Electronic Home Monitoring is a safe and
valid alternative to incarceration, for
lesser crimes, if properly administered.

3. Criminal Justice Corruption
 Corruption
 Possibly the single greatest case of
corruption in Whatcom County history. If
there was one larger, I’m not aware of it.
 Far reaching implications.
 Nationwide impact.
 3,141 counties in the United States.

4. Electronic Home Monitoring in
Whatcom County, Washington
 AKA: Electronic Home Detention
 Occurs in two forms:
 Privately, through privately owned
monitoring outfits and bail bond
company’s.
 Law Enforcement administered through
the County Sheriff’s Office.

5. Electronic Home Monitoring in
Whatcom County, Washington
 Typically through Jail Alternatives
Programs or Court ordered through
Judgment and Sentencing (J&S), Pre-
Trial Release conditions or bail bond
process, in accordance with requirements
set forth in RCW 9.94A.734
 EHM is NOT permitted for certain crimes
per the RCW.

6. EHM Exclusions per RCW
 (1) Home detention may not be imposed for offenders
convicted of the following offenses, unless imposed as partial
confinement in the department's parenting program under
RCW 9.94A.6551:
(a) A violent offense;
(b) Any sex offense;
(c) Any drug offense;
(d) Reckless burning in the first or second degree as
defined in RCW 9A.48.040 or 9A.48.050;
(e) Assault in the third degree as defined in RCW 9A.36.031;
(f) Assault of a child in the third degree;
(g) Unlawful imprisonment as defined in RCW 9A.40.040; or
(h) Harassment as defined in RCW 9A.46.020.

7. EHM Fraud Was Discovered
ONLY In Private Companies
 The WCSO program was contracted through
WASPC.
 There was no fraud found in the WCSO
administered monitoring program. The WCSO
administered program was found to be fully
accountable through initial set-up at subject
residence, physical random spot checks and
found to be fully responsive to system alerts.
 There were others, but I personally posted PC
for “Escape” on one work release EHM subject
that failed to check-in.

8. Private Monitoring
 No contracts of any kind were found between
any privately held company or Whatcom County
government entity.
 No contract means no accountability. ie;
Privatized incarceration.
 Convictee’s had to pay for their own daily monitoring.
 Convictee's were choosing private monitoring due to
lesser cost than WCSO managed monitoring.
 Approx. $15 per day private, compared to $20 per day
through WCSO.

9. Private Monitoring vs. WCSO
 If private monitoring costs $5 less per
day, paid entirely by the subject detainee,
why would anyone choose the higher cost
WCSO program?

10. Behavioral Interventions (BI)
 A Colorado based company.
 http://bi.com/
 The only US company at that time
providing the technology services for
electronic home monitoring.
 All private and all LE monitoring entities
in the US subcontract through BI for
electronic monitoring technology
services.

11. BI Monitoring Equipment
 The only equipment available at that time
were two older systems of unknown
manufacture. Both were radio-frequency
(RF) based systems, which have since
been discontinued and replaced with a
better BI 9000 global positioning satellite
(GPS) based system.

12. BI Monitoring Equipment
 On site monitoring system technology has
improved significantly, but as you’ll see in
following slides it has no bearing on the inability
of the system to identify subscriber fraud
problems, like what were discovered in the
following private monitoring instances of fraud.
 The BI system cannot compensate for insider
compromise. If you have a bad subscriber, that
entire company is compromised.

13. Electronic Monitoring:
Basic Operation
 Functions similar to a home alarm system
like ADT.
 Monitored systems and “the box” are
linked electronically to BI, through
telephone landlines or cellular
connections.
 DTMF (dual tone - multi frequency)
Communicates through telephone
connections like a PC modem.

14. Electronic Monitoring:
Basic Operation
 System alarms, out-of-zone trips, periodic
checks and routine system self-check faults are
reported ONLY to the subscriber entity.
 EHM faults and trips are not reported to the
courts. Not reported to LE. Not reported to
911. BI reports non-compliance ONLY to the
subscriber.
 In other words, if the subscriber doesn’t
report the violation, it didn’t happen!

15. Operational Example
For example, an EHM detainee decides to
skip out on his zone of containment or
attempts to defeat the system in some way.
 The monitoring system immediately alerts
BI, electronically, automatically.
 BI in turn also alerts the subscriber entity
of the breach through voice, email, fax or
other electronic notifications.

16. The Key Point & The Flaw
 The BI SUBSCRIBER, the entity under
contract with BI for electronic monitoring
services, NOT BI, decides whether or not
to act on the alert!
 If the subscriber doesn’t alert authorities,
or 911, then the courts and LE never
become aware of the breach!

17. Personal Notes
 I was a commissioned law enforcement officer
of 11 years experience.
 I have significant investigative experience.
 I have extensive training and experience in
sophisticated leading edge avionics and
computer technology used on premier US Air
Force Fighter/Bomber aircraft and various
USAF communications systems.

18. Personal Notes
 I do not believe that the problems I identified
with electronic home monitoring is the fault of
anything BI has control of.
 Current EHM law needs to be changed to close
the loophole, requiring BI to also notify, 911, LE
and the courts of system alerts and breaches.
 The monitoring technology is sound and it
works well, but ONLY when it’s properly
administered.

19. Personal Notes
 All problems I found were traced back to disreputable
and/or criminally compromised subscribers providing
EHM services through the courts
 EHM subjects can be on scheduled and monitored work
release, or 24x7 home detention EHM inmates,
depending on Judgment & Sentencing (J&S)
stipulations.
 Work release EHM clients are deemed to have
“Escaped” if they leave, or fail to report back to their
monitored residence, according to the scheduled
timeframes imposed by the courts.

20. EHM Case & Findings
 Now that you have an overview of how
the EHM system works, I’ll go through the
evolution of this case and the resultant
findings as it relates to the 2007 Whatcom
County, Washington investigation.

21. EHM Case Disclosure
 I was investigating an unrelated case and it was
learned from an informant that inside circle
people could “buy time off the clock” through a
local private monitoring company.
 It was further disclosed that inside circle people,
“friend’s of XXXXXXX,” could buy, sell, trade
services of all kinds, mostly criminal in nature,
to illegally have unmonitored & unreported EHM
“time off.”

22. EHM Case Disclosure
 Examples cited were as follows:
1. Trading for drugs.
2. Trading for drug related activities.
3. Buying “time off the clock.”
4. To help out friends.
5. Smuggling assistance.
6. Trading for sex.
7. Trading for stolen property.

23. Research
 I discussed the informant’s disclosure
with my supervisor XXX. XXXXXXXX.
 I didn’t understand at that time how
electronic monitoring was administered.
We didn’t think it was possible for such a
thing to happen.
 A formal investigation began around early
2007.

24. Research
 I spoke with other Whatcom County employees
involved with in-house monitoring and learned
how the system worked and how it was
managed by WCSO jailers, through the primary
BI subscriber, Washington Association of
Sheriff’s and Police Chiefs (WASPC.)
 I began researching Whatcom County court
records and found that the majority of cases of
interest involved the principles noted on the
next slide.

25. Principle Players
 XXXXXX Monitoring
 XXXXXXXXXXXXXX, LLC
 XXXXXXX Bail Bonds
 XXXXXXX Bail Bonds
 XXXXXXXXXX (owner)
 XXXXXXXXXX (owner)
 XXXXXXXXXX (owner)
 XXXXXXXXXXXX (Public Defender’s Office)
(Redacted for public release)

26. Case Development
 Through researching cases and court
records, it was discovered that most
affected cases had an affidavit submitted
by the BI subscriber, certifying full
completion and compliance of EHM
Judgment & Sentencing (J&S).
 It was determined that XXXXXXXXXXX,
of the Public Defender’s office, is who
primarily sought the private monitoring.

27. Case Development
 Numerous specific instances of EHM non-
compliance were identified.
 Numerous felony forgery crimes for filing false
affidavits through the courts were identified.
 Through consult with my supervisor, it was
determined that we needed to involve FBI for
the public corruption aspect. I then contacted
FBI Special Agent XXXXXXXXXX about the
case and we began a concurrent investigation.

28. Case Development
 I personally notified all Whatcom County
department heads and supervisors,
including Sheriff Elfo, about the findings
and that an investigation had started.
 All expressed concern about what was
alleged to be occurring and expressed
clear understanding and agreement that
the investigation should continue.

29. Case Development
 I verified that no contracts existed
between any Whatcom County
government function and the private
monitoring outfits.
 Although it appeared that what had been
disclosed was in fact occurring, we
struggled with how best to prove it for
arrest and prosecution.

30. Case Development
 I discussed the case at length with monitoring
experts and Agent XXXXXXX. It was
determined that BI’s in-house electronic records
would show precisely what, if any, violations
had occurred.
 Agent XXXXXXXX, through Seattle AUSA
XXXXXXXXXX, found grounds for a Grand Jury
on the matter, to subpoena BI for their in-house
records to show EHM non-compliance by local
subscribers.

31. Case Development
 “The plan” we had was that I would be
pursuing local-state charges within
Whatcom County and Agent XXXXXX
would handle any instances of
intercounty, interstate federal crimes.
 Agent XXXXXX acquired BI’s electronic
records under GJ subpoena for a sample
batch of approximately 50 subjects.

32. Case Findings
 Agent XXXXXXXX emailed the subpoenaed
Grand Jury info and spreadsheets to my county
email: pmurphy@whatcomcounty.us from his
email: XXXXX.XXXXXX@ic.fbi.gov
 With BI’s electronic records, we identified a
number of specific instances of non-compliance
for which provably false affidavits had been
submitted through the courts, falsely certifying
EHM J&S compliance.

33. Case Findings
 It was determined that BI had in fact
notified local subscribers for every
instance of monitoring non-compliance,
but the notifications were disregarded,
likely for the reasons the informant cited.
The alerts were not reported to any
authority, court or LE entity that I could
identify.
 We now had the proof.

34. Case Examples
 In most instances, the inmate was
handed a monitoring “box” and ankle
bracelet over the counter at the place of
business.
 Some claimed to have been given extra
plastic tamperproof ankle bracelet clips.
 I identified instances where “the box” had
never even been plugged in. Not even
one time.

35. Case Examples
 In one clear instance I recall, a full-time
(24x7) electronically monitored subject
was completely unaccounted for during
the entire 270 day EHM sentence!
 That subject’s whereabouts were literally
not known for the entire period, yet a false
affidavit had been filed afterwards,
certifying full J&S compliance in court.

36. Case Examples
 Through the course of further
investigation, I identified no subject that
was ever physically spot-checked, in-
person, for any EHM alert. Not one.
 It was widely known that EHM trips and
alert violations would not lead to a 911
call or a physical check of the subject at
the residence by any person.

37. Case Examples
 I learned several ways that the system
had been defeated:
1. Extra plastic ankle bracelet clips were being
provided in order to allow the inmate to remove
the ankle sensor and reinstall it without it
appearing tampered with. (Indicating foreknowledge that
the resultant “strap tamper” alerts from BI would be ignored.)
2. Put the bracelet on a table near a lamp.
3. Put the bracelet on a house pet. (Keeps the bracelet
temperature close to that of normal for humans.)

38. Case Progress
 When we had developed the case and were
preparing to move forward with a search
warrant to seize local subscriber records, Agent
XXXXXXX suddenly withdrew without
explanation after essentially a verbal tirade
directed at me in the last phone call I had with
him.
Note: I later learned that the agent had retired shortly after these events
took place. There was never any follow-up with me by any other federal
agency and my messages to Agent XXXXXXX went unanswered.

39. Case Progress
 I didn’t know then exactly what occurred
or why, aside from what my supervisor
told me.
 It was near the end of my two-year term in
detectives and I was denied an extension
to complete the case.
 I was quietly sent back to patrol division.
 No charges were ever filed.

40. Case Conclusions
 It was clear that unaccountable private
EHM was occurring through complicity at
some level by the PD office and likely
through the prosecutor’s office as well.
 I was told only that the case was
“embarrassing to the county” and that
Sheriff Elfo “shut it down.”
 XXXXXXXXX took my place in detectives.

41. Case Conclusions
 Before Agent XXXXXX divested himself
of the case, I do recall him telling me that
the case had “national significance” and
that XXXXXX Monitoring (and others)
were providing EHM services all along
western Washington, in all counties down
to Oregon. I recall being told of similar
problems identified in other states as well.

42. Case Conclusions
 It was determined that the EHM fraud allowed the
subject detainee to have the appearance of having
complied with court ordered detention, without any
accountability or verification of actual compliance.
 It was determined that subject detainees had a built-in
alibi through court documented, alleged monitored time
at home, which could later be verified by police through
court records.
Police: Where were you on XXXX date and time?
Suspect: I was at home on electronic monitoring. Check the
court records.

43. Case Conclusions
 Instances of arrestee’s being booked into
jail while wearing an ankle bracelet were
identified.
 Instances of EHM clients being contacted
away from their residence were identified.
 No additional charges for “Escape” or
court accountability for non-compliance
were ever identified.

44. Case Conclusions
 Persons for which significant criminal and
violent history existed, who should have been
ineligible by RCW, received EHM anyway.
 Persons were identified serving EHM for
serious felony crimes.
 I recall at least one instance of one subject
serving two concurrent felony convictions, on
one EHM J&S. The courts were unaware and it
was never addressed that I’m aware of.

45. Case Conclusions
 For a time afterwards, no one would discuss the
case at all. It was as if it had never been
discovered. It was like it never happened.
 I reasoned to myself that perhaps the FBI
decided that it needed to go completely federal
and Agent XXXXXX just couldn’t disclose that
to me at the time.
 After a couple of years, it became clear that no
action would ever be taken on the case.

46. Case Implications
 I’ve had plenty of time to evaluate what
occurred in this case and awareness of several
things has come to mind.
 There are other reasons, but this is a primary
reason why Bill Elfo sought to create an
atmosphere of hostility against me and sought
to discredit me personally, I speculate because
of his affiliation with XXXXXX XXXXX.
 I can prove what occurred.

47. Case Implications
 Approximately 2 years later, on November 29th,
2009, Maurice Clemmons murdered 4
Lakewood PD police officers.
 What was not widely reported is that Clemmons
cut off his EHM ankle bracelet on November
25th.
 Clemmons was on the loose for 4 days and
no notifications were ever given to LE or the
courts that I could identify.

48. KPLU News Report
 From the article…
 “Martin and Armstrong also report new details about the
ankle bracelet the Arkansas native was required to
wear as part of his ability to post bond. According to the
records, friend Darkus Allen told authorities Clemmons
cut off the tracking bracelet on November 25th, telling
Allen: "When they come to this door, I got something for
'em," (as related by Allen).
 No 911 call. No BOLO. No “Watch For”.
No PC. No warrant. No physical checks of
any kind. Completely ignored.

49. KPLU News Report
 Also from that article…
“The Seattle Times' Jonathan Martin and Ken Armstrong report Pierce
County detectives spotted Clemmons just after midnight on November
29th, about seven hours before the murders at Forza Coffee Shop. One
deputy was familiar with him, and ran a records check to see if
Clemmons had any outstanding warrants. That check came up clear,
according to the Times: It is yet another example — a particularly
dramatic one — of how close authorities came to stopping Clemmons
before he acted on a pledge to kill as many police officers as he could.
The Pierce County deputy's check for warrants also reinforces the
importance of an accumulation of missteps by the state Department of
Corrections and others in the days leading up to Clemmons' crime.”

50. ABC News Report
December 1, 2009
 Excerpted from the article…
“After the attack, Troyer said, an electronic monitoring
device put on Clemmons by the bond company was found
to have been cut off his ankle.”
 Again, no 911 call. No BOLO. No “Watch For”. No PC.
No warrant. No advisory whatsoever to any LE or court
authority.
(I haven’t been able to, but I’d like to find out if the ankle
monitor was physically cut, severing the fine wires
embedded in the plastic strap, or if the tamperproof plastic
joining clip was removed.)

51. Seattle Times News Report
 Clemmons was out on $190,000 bail with EHM
conditional release.
 The monitoring company admitted to receiving a “strap
tamper” alert on November 25th.
 No one went to physically check on Clemmons.
 No one physically verified the monitor bracelet was
actually on him.
 Had there been such an advisory to 911 or law
enforcement, Clemmons would likely have been in
custody and therefore unable to murder 4 police
officers.

52. Seattle Times News Report
 Excerpted from the report…
“The owner of Jail Sucks, John Wickert, told authorities that
the bail-bond company did, in fact, receive a "strap tamper"
signal on Nov. 25. But, according to a report describing
Wickert's account, an "office person" at Jail Sucks called
and spoke with Clemmons, "and they believed at the time
things were OK.“
 This is a clever deception. BI’s system would have
been sending “strap tamper” alerts at regular
intervals for 4 days, a clear indication the ankle
bracelet had been removed and Clemmons’
whereabouts were unknown.

53. Seattle Times News Report
 On the morning of November 29th, at 0038 hours,
Pierce County Deputies Levi Redding and William
Marquis spotted Clemmons in a car driving south in the
13000 block of C Street South in Tacoma.
 They recognized Clemmons by sight and ran his name
through their in-car MDC. Clemmons was clear of all
wants and warrants at that time.
 As a result, Clemmons was not contacted at that time,
but the observation was documented in a police field
information report (FIR) that was published by media
sources.

54. Seattle Times News Report
 At about 0815 hours, 7 hours and 23 minutes later, the
following officers were murdered by Clemmons.
• Sgt. Mark Renninger, 39. He had 13 years of law enforcement
experience, and is survived by a wife and 3 children.
• Officer Ronald Owen, 37. He had 12 years of law enforcement
experience, and is survived for his former wife and a daughter.
• Officer Tina Griswold, 40. She had 14 years of law enforcement
experience, and is survived by her husband and two children.
• Officer Greg Richards, 42. He had eight years of law enforcement
experience, and is survived by his wife and three children.

55. KOMO News Report
 The KOMO coverage of the events of that
terrible day.
 http://www.komonews.com/news/local/78088
192.html?tab=video&c=y

56. Case Implications
 The tragedy and the pain of the Lakewood PD
murders will not subside for a very long time.
 They could have likely been prevented by an
alert or a notification to authorities of the EHM
breach.
 That was one incident, from one county.
 There are 3,141 counties in the United
States….
 Take a minute to think about that.

57. Summary
 It was completely within Sheriff Elfo’s purview to
extend my time in the detective unit to finish this
case. The extension was adamantly denied.
 Had I been permitted to follow though on this
case, even minimally, to complete the
investigation and refer criminal charges, untold
numbers of other crimes and acts of violence
would likely have been prevented.

58. Summary
 XXXXXXXXXX did later attempt to find my case
records, which had been stored in the IT
accessible “shared drive” in a detective unit
folder titled “EHM case.”
 The running report narrative and other records
that I had been updating to that folder were
gone.
 It’s clear to me they had to have been
intentionally deleted, but no explanation was
ever found or given.

59. Summary
 We had chosen a random batch of
approximately 50 subjects, out of thousands
just from Whatcom County.
 It would take extensive research to identify the
sheer number of instances of non-compliance,
but even worse, instances where crimes and
other activities were committed under the built-
in court documented alibi of allegedly having
been “at home on electronic monitoring.”

60. Summary
 This is what makes Sheriff Elfo’s “corruption”
memo laughable to me. I had reported this to all
the correct people. FBI was even involved.
 Sheriff Elfo is the one that stopped the
investigation!
 My supervisor, WCSO Staff, County Prosecutor
Dave McEachran and Jail Chief Wendy Jones
were also advised.
 Who else would I have reported it to?

61. Summary
 Although not directly implicated, numerous
peripheral Outlaw Motorcycle Gang (OMG)
influences were also identified.
 On at least two occasions, I was urged by my
supervisor to delete county emails related to the
Grand Jury information obtained by Agent
XXXXXX.
 Note: It is a federal crime, against WCSO policy
and against Whatcom County policy to delete
government emails.

62. Summary
 On at least one occasion, shortly after returning
to patrol, I was surreptiously called to a meeting
at the former Cascade substation by
XXXXXXXXXX and XXXXXXXXXX. They
physically inspected and perused through the
files on the patrol MDT computer I got from
XXXXXXXXXXX, I believe, looking for evidence
that I retained the GJ information and related
EHM investigation files.

63. Summary
 Although some minimal changes were
made following the Lakewood
murders, this basic problem exists to
this day and has not been corrected.
 ***Draft Copy*** This is what I can recall from
memory. I’ll be working on researching notes,
logs and other documentation related to this
case to include more specific details and case
subjects as time permits.

64. What The Public Thinks Happens
When a Subject Escapes EHM…

65. This Is What Actually Happens…

66. References
 RCW 9.94A.734 Home detention — Conditions.
http://apps.leg.wa.gov/rcw/default.aspx?cite=9.94A.734
 KPLU News Report http://www.kplu.org/post/newly-released-records-
reveal-more-about-maurice-clemmons-investigation-police-murders
 ABC News Report http://abcnews.go.com/GMA/lakewood-cop-killer-
suspect-maurice-clemmons-killed-
police/story?id=9213986&page=3#.T7iWb8XNnHQ
 Seattle Times News Report
http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/localnews/2014155225_clemmons0
8m.html
 KOMO News Report
http://www.komonews.com/news/local/78088192.html?tab=video&c=y

67. References
 Stay Home Monitoring http://www.stayhomemonitoring.com/
 Whatcom County Alternative Corrections
http://www.whatcomcounty.us/sheriff/jail/alt_corrections.jsp
 WCSO.org Alternatives to Corrections
http://www.whatcomcountysheriff.org/2011/04/13/alternatives-to-
incarceration/