IMO is hosting an exhibition to mark 50 years of successful cooperation between government and industry since the grounding of the tanker Torrey Canyon in 1967. This cooperation has achieved a dramatic and sustained reduction in major oil spills from ships, effective systems for oil spill preparedness and response and a comprehensive mechanism for providing compensation to victims.
2. Tank Shipping before 1967
HISTORIC
The 2,300 tonne Glückauf, built in the UK in
1886, was the first “petroleum steamer”,
using a combination of sail and coal to carry
cargoes of refined oil products in separate
tanks serving a growing demand for kerosene
for lighting and gasoline for newly introduced
automobiles. The size and design of ships
evolved rapidly in the early 20th century,
leading to increasingly common occurrences
of oil washing up on shorelines. The rapid
increase in the number of oil fired ships
replacing coal, along with an increasing
number of tank vessels, led to a recognition
that work was needed to establish the
consequences of spilling oil into the sea. In
the interwar years, the League of Nations
Committee of Experts coordinated early
research into the extent to which oil persisted
and drifted at sea.
Oil tankers played an important role in the
Second World War and the seaborne oil trade
grew steadily in the 1940s and 1950s as a
result of increased demand in the
industrialised world. The construction of oil
refineries in consuming rather than producing
countries and the growing importance of the
Middle East as an oil producing region meant
that more and more crude oil was being
transported by sea.
The closure of the Suez Canal in 1956
resulted in larger ships to address the
economics of longer journeys around the
Cape of Good Hope. Advances in engine
design, improved steel quality and the move
to welded rather than riveted construction,
allowed tankers of 100,000 dwt. By 1966,
Very Large Crude Carriers (VLCCs) of over
200,000 dwt were in service.
The rising number of instances of operational
discharges of oil from ships led the UK to
organise a conference in 1954, resulting in
the adoption of the first international treaty
addressing oil pollution from ships. The
International Convention for the Prevention of
Pollution of the Sea by Oil (OILPOL) did not
address accidental pollution, but the fact that
the Convention was adopted at all was an
achievement because only eight of the 32
countries attending said they regarded oil
pollution as a problem and some saw no
requirement for a Convention at all.
The Convention’s primary purpose was to
establish a series of zones where the
discharge of oily wastes was prohibited, an
approach that had been used by individual
countries since the 1920s. Countries were
required also to provide port facilities for the
reception of oil waste from non-tankers (there
was no such requirement for tankers).
The International Maritime Consultative
Organisation (now IMO), established in 1948,
took over responsibility for OILPOL. Evidence
showed that the Convention was not as
effective as hoped, and IMCO called a
conference in 1962 to amend OILPOL. These
amendments entered into force in May 1967 –
but by then government and public attitudes
towards oil pollution changed following events
in March that year.Drawing made by G.J. Frans Naerebout
and published in Op de Lange Deining
3. At 297 metres long, Torrey Canyon was one of
the largest vessels in the world at the time. The
tanker was carrying a cargo of 119,000 tonnes
of Kuwaiti crude oil for discharge at Milford
Haven in Wales when she ran aground on the
Seven Stones Reef in the south-west United
Kingdom on 18th March 1967. Investigations
into the accident showed the grounding was a
result of operational errors and misjudgments
by the crew.
Attempts at salvaging the ship were
unsuccessful and any decision to remove the
cargo was hampered by poor weather and the
limited availability of resources. The ship broke
up over the 12 days following the grounding,
and the cargo was lost which affected the
coasts of south-west England, the Channel
Islands and Brittany, France.
Oil pollution at sea was a recognised problem
by 1967, but the scale of the release of oil
from this incident was unprecedented and was
to have profound consequences. The incident
caught the governments of the affected
countries unprepared and the new medium of
television transmitted images which resulted in
immense public pressure to find solutions.
HISTORIC
The world’s first major oil spill Incident
Without suitable plans, the response was
largely improvised and techniques developed
prior to the incident were overwhelmed by the
volume of spilled oil. Attempts were made to
mitigate the spill by bombing the casualty in an
attempt to burn it. The oil did ignite initially,
but the limitations of burning oil at sea that we
now understand became very evident.
Clean-up in the UK focused primarily on the
application of a variety of degreasing agents to
oil floating at sea and stranded on the beaches.
This technique did serve to assist with oil
removal but additional environmental damage
also resulted. In France, degreasers were used
to a lesser extent in favour of other techniques,
including the early use of oil recovery
skimmers at sea.
The oil affected a wide variety of wildlife and
economic activities, notably tourism and
shell-fisheries. Liability for the costs of the
response and pollution damage was disputed
and compensation was made available only
after a protracted legal process. Faced with the
potential recurrence of such an incident, the
British Prime Minister at the time called on the
Council of IMCO (now IMO) to meet in
extraordinary circumstances to consider
possible changes in maritime law and
international regulations.
IMCO met subsequently in May 1967 and
drafted 21 “proposals for study”, including
suggestions requiring all vessels to carry
compulsory liability insurance; to make
shipowners responsible for the damage done by
their vessel without consideration of
negligence; a call for studies leading to less
toxic detergents, and the enforcement of
international agreements.
Ten points from the meeting addressed the
prevention of accidents at sea directly:
• Introduction of traffic lanes at sea
• Introduction of areas off-limits to
tankers carrying hazardous cargoes
• Shore stations to control ships
approaching and leaving port
• More navigational aids on large tankers
• A speed limit on large ships
when close to land
• Periodic tests of shipborne
navigational equipment
• Stronger tankers, with double hulls to
prevent leakage from accidents
• Equipping tankers with flaps or
drogues to assist stopping at sea
• Requiring ships to carry adequate
charts and sailing directions
• Tougher regulations on navigational training
for crews and officers
These recommendations were greeted with
mixed reviews at the time but set in motion
many of the regulations and features taken for
granted today.
4. The extraordinary session of the Council
of IMCO (now IMO) in May 1967 recognised
some of the problems arising from the
incident were legal in nature and established
an ad-hoc Legal Committee that met for the
first time in June 1967. Representatives
of 22 countries and observers from five
non-governmental organisations gathered
to examine:
• The definition of the evil to be remedied
• Legal aspects of preventive action
including the questions raised when
a State is threatened by or affected
by a casualty
• Liability and remedies
• Emergency measures - governmental
or inter-governmental - including
salvage procedures
• The rights of coastal States to intervene
The liability of ship and cargo owners for damage
to third parties caused by spills of oil or other
hazardous and noxious substances were at the heart
of the discussions along with consideration of the
need for a new international system of liability
incorporated in a multilateral convention.
Details included:
• The kind of damage which should be
covered by a convention for the purposes
of compensation
• The issue of whether strict liability
should be introduced
• Adjustments to the existing system
of limitation of liability
• Requirements for compulsory insurance
• What courts should have jurisdiction
COMPENSATION AND LIABILITY
The Legal Committee of IMO
These issues formed the basis of the
work of the Legal Committee for years to
come and led to the adoption by IMO of a
comprehensive international liability and
compensation regime, as well as the
conclusion in 1969 of the Intervention
Convention. This liability and compensation
regime began with the adoption of the Civil
Liability Convention in 1969, followed by the
adoption of the Fund Convention in 1971.
Subsequent work of the Legal Committee
resulted in the creation and adoption of
a number of key conventions, including:
• The Athens Convention relating to the
Carriage of Passengers and their Luggage
by Sea, 1974, and its Protocol of 2002
• The Convention on Limitation of
Liability for Maritime Claims, 1976,
and its Protocol of 1996
• The 1984 and 1992 Protocols to the Civil
Liability Convention and Fund Convention
to increase the limits of liability
• The Salvage Convention 1989
• The HNS Convention, 1996,
and its Protocol of 2010
• The Bunkers Convention 2001
• The Protocol of 2003 to the
Fund Convention, 1992
• The Nairobi Wreck Removal
Convention, 2007
5. The Torrey Canyon incident exposed the
difficulty for a coastal State to respond to a
marine casualty on the high seas without the
permission of the shipowner. In 1967, the UK
government was unable to respond directly to
the release of oil until the shipowner was
satisfied that all attempts at salvage had been
exhausted, by which time the vessel was
deemed a constructive total loss. The balance
at that time was in favour of protecting the
interests of shipowners, cargo owners and in
supporting the principle of the freedom of the
high seas.
To alleviate the situation, the International
Convention Relating to Intervention on the
High Seas in Cases of Oil Pollution Casualties
was adopted in 1975. A later Protocol
extended the convention to include marine
pollution by other substances. Today the
convention has 89 State parties.
The Intervention Convention affirms the
right of a Coastal State to take measures on
the high seas that are necessary to prevent,
mitigate or eliminate danger to its coastline or
its related interests from pollution, or the
threat of pollution, following a marine
casualty.
The Coastal State can only take action that is
necessary and must consult with interested
parties, like the Flag State of the ship
involved, the owners of the ship and cargo and
suitable independent experts. If a Coastal
State takes measures beyond those permitted
under the Convention it is liable to pay
compensation for any resultant damage.
PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE
Intervention Convention
6. COMPENSATION AND LIABILITY
Industry Compensation Schemes
Settlement signing ceremony for the claims of the French and UK governments
Claims were made by the governments of the UK
and France against the owner of the vessel but it
had no assets in the UK. The UK and French
governments presented their claims in a United
States district court which applied the US
Limitation of Liability Act of 1851. This Act
limited the liability of the owners to the value of
the vessel after the incident. As the vessel had
been lost, there was no residual value. The
governments appealed the liability judgment and
agreed a settlement of some US$ 9 million. At the
The aftermath of the Torrey Canyon incident in
1967 highlighted the need to establish an
international and uniform system to compensate
those affected by oil pollution from tankers.
At the time of the incident there was much
relevant legislation in the affected territories of
France and the UK, but some of this legislation
was conflicting and it was clear that obtaining
compensataion for the clean-up operations and
damage caused by the incident would
be difficult.
time it was the largest settlement for a ship-sourced
oil pollution damage claim.
This difficult situation led to pressure to develop a
system, funded by the oil industry and shipowners,
that would guarantee sufficient compensation for
future oil pollution incidents. Representatives of
industry proposed an interim solution in the form of
two private compensation schemes and these were
to remain in operation until new international
conventions came into force.
The Tanker Owners Voluntary Agreement concerning
Liability for Oil Pollution (TOVALOP) was established
and administered by ITOPF Ltd. It was signed in
1969 by seven major oil companies who operated a
significant part of the world’s tanker fleet, to provide
compensation for the costs of clean-up operations
and damage caused by tankers.
Shipowners’ liability under TOVALOP was originally
limited to a maximum of US$10 million per
incident. A supplementary scheme was introduced
by the oil companies, increasing the compensation
available to US$30 million per incident.
This second scheme was known as CRISTAL
(Contract Regarding an Interim Supplement to
Tanker Liability for Oil Pollution). Both schemes
remained in operation until 1997.
7. In the 1960s there was a rise in awareness of,
and concern for, environmental issues. It was
against this backdrop that the extraordinary
meeting organised at IMCO (now IMO) in May
1967 proposed a number of changes in ship
design and operations that led directly to the
development of the International Convention
for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships
(MARPOL). MARPOL is the main international
convention addressing prevention of pollution
of the marine environment by ships from
operational or accidental causes.
MARPOL expanded on the elements of the
earlier OILPOL Convention, which was no
longer adequate to address a changing
industry. Annex 1 of MARPOL covers pollution
by oil and initially developed the requirements
for continuous monitoring of oil-water
discharges, shore-based reception facilities
and segregated ballast tanks, as well as
establishing a number of Special Areas
geographically that further restricted
discharges of oil in specified zones.
PREVENTION
Pollution Prevention - MARPOL
The 1978 Protocol further developed these
provisions and required new larger tankers to
be fitted with “Crude Oil Washing” systems
to minimise the quantity of oil remaining on
board after discharge. Later developments to
Annex 1 in the 1990s introduced a mandatory
requirement for double hulls for tankers.
The Convention, in its modern form
and much amended, also incorporates
requirements preventing pollution from
chemicals transported in bulk and packaged
form, sewage, garbage and air emissions
(including CO2) from ships.
8. Ballast water is taken on board ships to maintain
stability, to allow steerage and for safety in bad
weather conditions. Fifty years ago, ballast water
was carried in a tanker’s cargo tanks, resulting in
the discharge of oily water overboard. However,
ballast water is now carried in segregated ballast
tanks and remains free of cargo oil or fuel oil and
can be discharged overboard.
The 1978 MARPOL Protocol introduced the
concept known as "protective location of
segregated ballast tanks". This meant that the
ballast tanks, which are empty on the
cargo-carrying leg of the voyage and only loaded
with ballast water for the return leg, are
positioned where the impact of a collision or
grounding is likely to be greatest and, by doing
so, reducing the risk of a spill of the amount of
cargo released if there is an incident.
Subsequent amendments in 1983 took this
segregation concept further by banning the
carriage of oil in the forepeak tank, the ship's
most vulnerable point, in the event of a collision.
PREVENTION
Segregated Ballast Tanks
MARPOL expanded on the elements of the
earlier OILPOL Convention, which was no
longer adequate to address a changing
industry. Annex 1 of MARPOL covers
pollution by oil and initially developed the
requirements for continuous monitoring of
oil-water discharges, shore-based reception
facilities and segregated ballast tanks, as
well as establishing a number of Special
Areas geographically that further restricted
discharges of oil in specified zones.
9. The International Convention for the Safety of
Life at Sea (SOLAS), 1974, and its successive
revisions, is generally regarded as the most
important of all international treaties
concerning the safety of merchant ships. The
first version of SOLAS was adopted in 1914,
in direct response to the sinking of the
Titanic, with subsequent revisions in 1929,
1948 and 1960. The fifth and current version,
which has been much amended, was adopted
in 1974.
The objective of the SOLAS Convention is to
specify minimum safety standards for the
construction, equipment and operation of
ships. Flag States are responsible for ensuring
that ships under their flag comply with the
requirements, and a number of certificates
are prescribed in the Convention as proof that
this has been done. Governments that are
signatories to SOLAS are allowed to inspect
ships of other signatory states if there are
clear reasons for believing that the ship and
its equipment do not comply with the
requirements of the Convention. This
procedure is known as Port State Control.
PREVENTION
Safety Of Life At Sea - SOLAS
SOLAS covers the full range of safety issues
that may affect the ship, including fire
protection; life-saving appliances and
arrangements; radio communications; safety
of navigation; managing the safe operations
of a ship and the carriage of cargoes and
dangerous goods, in particular mandating
inert gas systems and imposing stricter
regimes for surveys and certification. These
measures, together with the related Codes
that underpin the implementation of SOLAS,
provide a comprehensive safety framework for
international maritime transport.
SOLAS is well-supported by shipping industry
initiatives such as the ICS Bridge Procedures
Guide which is the definitive industry
publication on best practice for safe
navigation. Two additional industry
publications: the IACS Common Structural
Rules and the OCIMF and ICS International
Safety Guide for Oil Tankers and Terminals,
are described elsewhere in the exhibition.
10. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, IMCO
(now IMO) adopted two international treaties
to ensure that adequate compensation was
available to people who suffer damage resulting
from spills of persistent oil
from tankers.
The treaties share the cost of marine oil
spill incidents between the shipowner and
the oil receivers and they established the
first International Oil Pollution Compensation
Fund (IOPC Fund), creating what is now known
as the international liability and compensation
regime.
The regime places the liability for damage on
the owner of the ship from which the polluting
oil escaped or was discharged. It is strict
liability with some specific exceptions.
It means that the owner has to pay for
admissible claims resulting from pollution
damage regardless of fault. In return, the
owner has the right to limit liability to a certain
amount in respect of any one incident. Ships
are required under the relevant Convention to
maintain insurance or other financial security
in sums equivalent to the owner's total liability
for any one incident.
COMPENSATION AND LIABILITY
The Legal Framework for Compensation
This regime is now complemented by the
Bunkers and Wreck Removal Conventions,
and potentially the 2010 HNS Convention,
which offer separate compensation schemes for
other types of incidents at sea than those
covered by the original regime.
The first tier of compensation is paid by the
shipowner’s insurer. It is usually the third party
liability Protection and Indemnity Club (P&I
Club) of the owner of the ship involved in the
incident. The second tier of compensation is
paid by an international fund, the IOPC Fund
which is financed by receivers of oil after sea
transport in those States party to the relevant
treaties which are:
• The 1992 Civil Liability Convention
(1992 CLC) - 136 States Parties
• The 1992 Fund Convention
- 114 States Parties
• The 2003 Supplementary Fund Protocol
(which provides an optional additional layer
of compensation) - 31 States Parties
11. The human element remains the most important
contributing factor in maritime accidents.
The causes of marine casualties include
collisions, groundings, fires, explosions and
other accidents, which in the majority of
cases are a result of human error.
To address this, the International Convention
on Standards of Training, Certification and
Watchkeeping for Seafarers was adopted in 1978
to promote the safety of life and property at sea
and the protection of the marine environment
by establishing agreed common international
standards of competence for seafarers.
PREVENTION
Standards of Training, Certification and
Watchkeeping for Seafarers (STCW)
A major revision to the Convention in
1995 further enhanced Port State Control
measures allowing mutual oversight and
consistency in the application of
standards; quality standards systems
(QSS); oversight of training, assessment,
and certification procedures and new
training requirements. Responsibility was
placed on parties, including those issuing
licenses and Flag States employing foreign
nationals, to ensure seafarers meet
objective standards of competence and
observe the rest period requirements
for watchkeeping personnel.
Another major revision in 2010, known
as the "The Manila Amendments", brought
training standards in line with modern
day requirements, requiring updated
and improved training to meet new
developments in ship technology,
operation and security.
12. ISGOTT is a comprehensive guide to the safe
transport and handling of crude oil and refined
products on tankers and at terminals. It was first
published in 1978, combining the contents of the
“Tanker Safety Guide (Petroleum)” published by
the International Chamber of Shipping (ICS) and
the “International Oil Tanker and Terminal Safety
Guide” published by the Oil Companies
International Marine Forum (OCIMF).
Revised editions have been regularly published
under the oversight of ICS, OCIMF and the
International Association of Ports and Harbors
(IAPH) to ensure that the guide continues to reflect
current best practice and legislation.
PREVENTION
The International Safety Guide for Oil Tankers and Terminals (ISGOTT)
The Guide provides operational advice
to help personnel involved in tanker and
terminal operations and it is a general
industry recommendation that a copy of
ISGOTT is kept and used on all tankers and
at every terminal, so that there is a
consistent approach to operational
procedures when ships are at terminals.
13. An understanding of the fate and behaviour
of spilled oil and of the equipment and
techniques used in pollution response have
improved significantly in the past fifty years.
Scientific teams established in the 1970s
conducted research programmes which,
combined with practical lessons learned
from spills, have resulted in the development
of enhanced strategies for response and the
development of improved equipment such
as booms, skimmers, dispersant and oil
spill models.
The use of chemical dispersants has changed
over time. Industrial machinery de greasers
were adopted initially for oil spill response.
However, their application at large incidents
led to inappropriate dosing and their use was
not always successful and in some cases led
to adverse impacts. However, with proper
planning and well designed application
equipment the potential of chemical response
was recognised. Manufacturers developed
a range of dispersants to meet national
standards, that are intended specifically to
disperse oil into droplets in the water column
which would then break down naturally.
Continuous development of dispersants has
ensured their major role in marine oil spill
response in many countries.
Studies of large scale releases of oil
demonstrated that oil slicks eventually
disperse naturally, with some oils persisting
longer than others. These studies led to the
grouping of hydrocarbon oils according to
their assay characteristics, allowing easier
reference when deciding response strategies
in future incidents. As a result, a more rapid
and accurate assessment of the potential of
a spill to affect a shoreline can be made.
PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE
Oil Pollution Response
Experience and research has also highlighted
the advantages of limiting clean-up in
sensitive areas, such as mangroves and salt
marshes, and has led to the promotion of
natural cleaning on appropriate shorelines.
Other techniques have been developed for
effective oil spill response in cold climates.
Advances have improved remote sensing
enabling it to become an important tool in the
detection and evaluation of oil contamination.
Developments with radiation scanners and
satellite based radar, together with rapid
interpretation of images, have encouraged
their effective use as operational tools.
Organisations such as Oil Spill Response
Limited, established by four oil companies
and now with 42 oil company Members and
~100 Associates Members, are prepared to
respond to oil spills globally. The Global
Response Network and International Spill
Control Organisation ensure their response
contractor members are at the forefront of
response technology. ITOPF is funded by the
shipping industry to provide technical advice
to promote effective response to pollution in
the marine environment.
Great improvements have been made in oil
spill response in the 50 years. Nevertheless,
this remains challenging and continued
research and development, together with
effective knowledge transfer, remain
key objectives.
14. Port State Control is the inspection of foreign
ships in national ports to verify that the
condition of the ship, its equipment, manning
and operation comply with the requirements
of international Conventions such as SOLAS,
MARPOL, and STCW.
In 1982, the Paris Memorandum of
Understanding (Paris MoU) established the
system of Port State Control which today
covers 26 European countries and Canada.
Building on the foundation of the Paris MoU,
other regional MoUs were signed, covering the
Pacific Ocean, South and Central America, the
Caribbean, the Mediterranean, the Indian
Ocean, West and Central Atlantic Africa, the
Black Sea and the Middle East Gulf.
Many of IMO’s most important technical
conventions contain provisions for ships to be
inspected when they visit foreign ports to
ensure that they meet IMO requirements.
PREVENTION
Inspection and Enforcement – Port State Control (PSC)
To facilitate the implementation of Port State
Control, IMO adopted the Resolution on
“Regional Co-operation in the Control of Ships
and Discharges Promoting the Conclusion of
Regional Agreements”. Ships visiting a port in
one country will normally visit other countries
in the region, and it is more efficient if
inspections can be closely coordinated to
focus on sub-standard ships and to avoid
multiple inspections. It also prevents ships
being delayed by unnecessary inspections.
The primary responsibility for the standard of
ships rests with the Flag State - but Port State
Control provides a valuable additional tool to
identify substandard ships.
15. PREVENTION
Inert gas systems
The oil and refined products carried by
tankers can produce flammable vapours and
gases in cargo tanks. Fire is a major threat to
the safety of tanker operations, as just a
single spark can cause a devastating
explosion if it ignites the vapour from an oil
cargo.
Harmful or dangerous flammable gases can
also be present in empty cargo tanks. When
the vapour produced by an oil cargo is mixed
with air and is exposed to an ignition source,
it can cause an explosion resulting in loss of
life, damage to ship and other property and
the possibility of marine pollution.
To prevent such explosions and to ensure the
safety of the ship and its crew, tankers employ
“inert gas systems” to reduce the oxygen
content in cargo tanks. The normal method is
to fill these tanks with
non-explosive/non-reactive inert gas from the
ship's boiler flue. The flue gas is scrubbed or
cleaned and then pumped into the empty
tanks, or into the spaces left above the oil in
loaded tanks, to minimise the risk from fire or
explosion on board. Other systems employ a
separate inert gas generation plant to supply
the gas.
Oil companies have employed inert gas
systems in their tanker fleets in an ad-hoc
manner since the mid 1930s. In 1985, SOLAS
introduced a requirement for inert gas
systems to be fitted to all oil tankers of
20,000 tonnes dwt and above. From January
2016, this requirement has been extended to
all new tankers of 8,000 tonnes dwt and
above. The engineering specifications for inert
gas systems are set out in the International
Code for Fire Safety Systems (FSS Code).
16. PREVENTION
Global Maritime Distress and Safety System
The Global Maritime Distress and Safety
System (GMDSS) is an international network
which uses terrestrial and satellite technology
and ship-board radio-systems to ensure rapid,
automated alerts are sent to shore-based
communication and rescue authorities in the
event of a marine incident. Other ships in the
vicinity of an incident are also alerted. The
system was introduced and is required under
amendments made in 1988 to SOLAS.
GMDSS is mandatory on all ocean-going pas-
senger ships and cargo ships of 300 or more
gross tonnes and which are engaged
on international voyages. The vessel must
be equipped with radio equipment that con-
forms to the international standards set out in
the system.
GMDSS consists of a number of components
including Emergency Position Indicating Radio
Beacon (EPIRB) equipment and search and
rescue locating devices or transponders and
an automated system for distributing mari-
time safety information.
The system enables rapid alerting and loca-
tion of the casualty and assists with coordina-
tion of search and rescue efforts.
17. PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE
Maritime Salvage
The practice of marine salvage and the
international legal framework under which
salvage services are delivered have developed
significantly. With the exception of a small
number of coastal states which provide
state-funded emergency towing vessels, marine
salvage is undertaken by commercial
operators.
The priority in any salvage operation has
always been saving life. Saving property – the
ship and its cargo – used to be the next
priority with little thought for the marine
environment. Over the decades the priorities have
shifted with protection of the environment now
more important than saving property. The salvor
will immediately consider how to minimise the risk
to the environment from the cargo or bunker fuel
onboard a casualty.
In the past five decades, salvage craft have
become more powerful and more manoeuvrable.
Towing practice has developed and advances, like
the introduction of the “Smit Bracket” in the
1970s, have improved the process of controlling a
casualty. Firefighting methods and the introduction
of “hot tapping” to remove cargo and bunkers
have been major developments. The salvage
industry is capable of removing potential
pollutants even from sunken vessels lying at
considerable depth. More recently the
introduction of damage stability software and
the use of air portable salvage equipment and
teams from central locations have enhanced
casualty response.
The legal framework for marine salvage is
underpinned by the 1989 Salvage Convention.
It introduced the idea of “special
compensation” to encourage salvors to assist
ships, which, because of the limited likelihood
of successful salvage or low residual values,
might not otherwise have been commercially
worthwhile to attend.
The Salvage Convention was incorporated into
the most commonly used salvage contract,
Lloyd’s Open Form in its 1990 edition. Special
Compensation evolved into the Special
Compensation P&I Club Clause, known as
SCOPIC, which was introduced in 1999. Under
SCOPIC the salvor receives a tariff rate − and
an “uplift” − for equipment and personnel used
in providing a salvage service even if the
service is unsuccessful. SCOPIC has been a
great success in encouraging commercial
salvors to provide services to casualties that
otherwise might have been left to the
elements.
![In 1967, the grounding of Torrey Canyon focused the
world's attention on the risks and environmental impact
of major marine oil spills. Although this was by no means
the first oil spill from a ship, with the size of oil tankers
increasing throughout the 1950s and 60s, it was the
largest spill at the time. The importance of this incident
is not so much its immediate consequences, but its
significance as a catalyst for positive change. Fifty years
on, the result is a comprehensive regulatory framework,
a demonstrably improved shipping industry, good systems
of preparedness and response and adequate
compensation for those affected by spills.
To mark the important achievements since this incident,
the nine partner organisations representing governments
and the breadth of the oil, shipping and response
industries, have come together to tell the story of the
progress made in the last fifty years.
Oil loaded figures: UNCTADstat. Number of spills: ITOPF
This exhibition tells a success story.
A story of cooperation between government
and industry to achieve a dramatic and sustained
reduction in major oil spills from ships; to establish
effective systems for preparedness and response if
there is an incident and to create a comprehensive
mechanism for providing compensation to those
affected. It is a story to be proud of.
On a global scale, demand for oil remains strong. The
pattern of trade changes as one country moves from
being a net importer to a net exporter, as another’s
economy grows, and as trading partners fluctuate. In all
of this, shipping remains the most effective means of
meeting a country’s demand for oil. The partnership
between government and industry in this global trade is
as important now as it was at the beginning of our story.
Total crude oil, petroleum
product and gas loaded
(million metric tonnes)
Number of spills >7 tonnes
0
500
100
1500
2000
2500
3000
3500
20081970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1998 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
discover
Government & industry collaboration to address the risk of oil pollution from ships
50 years working together
60s 70s 80s 90s 00s 10s discover
Major developments have
occurred in three main areas:
Prevention - includes improved safety of navigation,
ship construction, training and risk reduction.
Evidence from the last 50 years demonstrates how
these important changes have successfully and
dramatically reduced the number and volume of oil
spills. Significant oil spills from tankers are a rare
occurrence today.
Preparedness and Response - have continued to
evolve as both awareness and technology have
advanced and practical experience has led to a better
response to spills when they occur.
Liability and Compensation - in the event of a
ship-source oil spill, a robust system of compensation
and liability is now in place and appropriate funding
mechanisms exist to finance an immediate and
efficient response and compensate those affected.
The timeline [to your right]
marks the important milestones
decade by decade. The main
developments are then
highlighted in more detail.
We invite you to learn more about
this collaborative effort and the
success story it represents.
Today, tankers are designed with double hulls,
duplicate controls, segregated ballast tanks, inert
gas systems, crude oil tank washing equipment and
oily-water separators, all of which were not present
fifty years ago. These innovations, together with
improvements in aids to navigation and many other
aspects of ship design, construction and technology
have all led to much higher standards in tanker
design and operation. At the same time, proactive
industry initiatives and IMO-led guidelines and
Conventions governing safety, ship operations, vetting
and reporting, ship management, crew training and
certification, have all contributed to a safer, cleaner
global industry – as evidenced by the statistics shown
in this exhibition.
In any profession, important lessons can be learned
when an accident does occur. The findings from
investigations that take place after a shipping
incident are vital to inform both government and
industry. Accidents, by their very nature, are
unpredictable, but prompt action can minimise the
consequences. Increasing numbers of States are
ready with procedures and resources to respond
quickly to oil spills. Developments in response
equipment and techniques exploit our improved
understanding of the fate and behaviour of spilled oil
to facilitate rapid recovery of sensitive ecosystems.
And, over the timeline of our story, compensation
conventions have been developed that provide a
balance of responsibility between the entities
involved in the chain of supply and demand.
Convention on
Prevention of Pollution
from Ship (MARPOL)
adopted at IMCO (now
IMO)
Introduction of
segregated ballast
tanks
Publication of ICS
Bridges Procedures
Guide, complementing
SOLAS
Revised version of
Convention for Safety of
Life at Sea (SOLAS)
adopted
Grounding of Torrey Canyon
off Cornwall, UK
Extraordinary meeting of
IMCO (now IMO) to consider
changes in maritime law and
international regulations
Initial developments with
Vessel Traffic Separation
Schemes (VTS)
Establishment of IMCO
Legal Committee to
consider an international
regime for compensation
Intervention Convention
adopted at IMCO
Bonn Agreement - first
regional agreement by
governments bordering
the North Sea for
responding to pollution
incidents
Interim industry
compensation
arrangements TOVALOP
(administered by ITOPF)
and CRISTAL established
1969 Civil Liability
Convention adopted
at IMCO
Establishment of
international scheme
for liability and
compensation as
1969 Civil Liability
and 1971 Fund
Conventions enter
into force
International Convention
on Standards of
Training, Certification
and Watchkeeping for
Seafarers (STCW 78)
adopted
Convention on the
International Regulations
for Preventing Collisions
at Sea 1972 (COLREGs)
adopted and enters into
force
First edition of the
International Safety
Guide for Oil Tankers
& Terminals (ISGOTT)
published by ICS and
OCIMF
OCIMF formed by
18 oil companies
IPIECA formed by major
oil industry companies
at the request of United
Nations Environment
Programme
The first edition of
the OCIMF Ship to
Ship Transfer Guide
Petroleum published.
Major developments
in salvage towing
techniques
Key developments in
pollution response
technology as a
result of concerted
research
MARPOL enters
into force
Publication of ICS
Guidelines on
Good Ship
Management,
precursor to IMO
ISM Code
Improvements in
firefighting and
tanker salvage
techniques.
Development and
improvement in
‘hot tapping’
techniques
Lloyds Open Form
Salvage Agreement
amended to encourage
pollution prevention
Salvage Convention
and Article 14
introducing Special
Compensation adopted
International Spill
Control Organization
(ISCO) established
Improvements in
liability and
compensation regime
with introduction of
increased limits
Paris MoU agreed,
introducing Port
State Control for
the inspection of
foreign ships in
national ports
Inert gas systems
made mandatory
on tankers
>20,000dwt
through SOLAS
Global Maritime
Distress and
Safety System
(GMDSS)
introduced
International Convention
on Oil Pollution
Preparedness, Response
and Co-operation
(OPRC) adopted
1992 CLC and Fund
Convention adopted
and entered into force
with wider coverage
and higher limits of
compensation
available
Double hulls
adopted at IMO
through
amendments to
MARPOL Annex 1
STCW 95 revision -
mandatory uniform
seafarer competence
standards adopted
New ship construction
and damage stability
requirements
introduced in SOLAS
Ship Inspection Report
Programme (SIRE)
launched by OCIMF
ICS Code of Practice on
Shipping and the
Environment first published
International Safety
Management (ISM)
Code adopted
CRISTAL and
TOVALOP
terminated as
international
compensation
conventions gain
wider acceptance
E-navigation systems
develop rapidly
Code for Fire Safety
Systems adopted as
part of SOLAS
Adoption of STOPIA
2006 and TOPIA
2006 to promote an
equitable balance of
compensation
between shipping
and oil interests
ICS Guidelines on
Application of ISM
Code are published
to assist uniform
implementation of
ISM Code
Nairobi International
Convention on the
Removal of Wrecks
2007 adopted
Launch of Tanker
Management and
Self Assessment
(TMSA) by OCIMF
Guidelines on places of
refuge for ships in
need of assistance
adopted by IMO
Global Response
Network of oil spill
response organisations
established
Development of bespoke damage
stability software for use by salvors
Entry into force of the Bunkers
Convention to cover pollution
compensation for spills of bunker oil
Entry into force of the Supplementary
Fund Protocol to provide an
additional tier of compensation
IMO/IPIECA Global Initiative
launched to develop national
pollution response preparedness
Guidelines for Vessel Traffic
Services adopted by IMO
Lloyd’s Open Form salvage
contract amended to
encourage pollution prevention
Introduction of Special
Compensation P&I Clause to
promote salvage response
Schedule to phase out
single hull tankers is
accelerated in MARPOL
Automatic Identification
System (AIS)
introduced as part of
SOLAS
STCW-2010 Manila
Amendments to
ensure crew
training standards
meet anticipated
developments is
ship technology
SOLAS - Goal-Based
Standards for design
and construction of
tankers and bulk
carriers introduced
Entry into force of
the Wreck Removal
Convention
IMO Member State Audit
Scheme (IMSAS) introduced
International Code of Ships
Operating in Polar Waters
enters into force
ECDIS widely adopted and
becomes mandatory for
certain ships
International Association
of Classification Societies
- Common Structural
Rules for Tankers and Bulk
Carriers introduced
Marine Terminal
Information System
(MTIS) launched by OCIMF
OCIMF publishes first edition
of the Ship to Ship Transfer
Guide for Petroleum,
Chemicals and Liquefied
Gases
Removal from service of last
remaining single hull tankers
trading internationally
Shipping industry campaign to
promote global ratification of
IMO Conventions
IPIECA and International Oil
and Gas Producers (IOGP)
launch Oil Spill Response Joint
Industry Project (JIP) to
develop learning opportunities
What about the future?
Our understanding of the effect of human activities on
the natural world motivates the pursuit of ever-cleaner
technologies; the introduction of “big data” enables the
tiniest fluctuation outside of the norm to be used to
glean information about performance; and a deeper
appreciation of the importance of our global
population of seafarers drives a holistic approach to
caring for the individual on our ships.
The intelligent, autonomous and smart ship may be
just around the corner. As shown by the focus on cyber
security, the risks and challenges of tomorrow will be
different from those of today. It is likely that employees
of the future will require different skills; perhaps skills
more aligned to information technology as much as
traditional seafaring skills.
The pursuit of safer, cleaner ship operations will
continue to drive legislation and innovation. Novel ship
design and new fuels are already on the horizon –
perhaps, we will even see a return, full circle, to where
we started our story, commercial ships using a variety
of propulsion technologies, including the use of sail.
The IMO and IOPC Funds and the oil, shipping and
response industries, represented by the organisations
involved in this exhibition, will continue to work
together to ensure that global shipping operates safely
and that the response to accidents, including the
availability of compensation, remains effective.
Design © Eco Marine Power Ltd
Tank Shipping before 1967
HISTORIC
The 2,300 tonne Glückauf, built in the UK in
1886, was the first “petroleum steamer”, using
a combination of sail and coal to carry cargoes
of refined oil products in separate tanks serving
a growing demand for kerosene for lighting and
gasoline for newly introduced automobiles. The
size and design of ships evolved rapidly in the
early 20th century, leading to increasingly
common occurrences of oil washing up on
shorelines. The rapid increase in the number of
oil fired ships replacing coal, along with an
increasing number of tank vessels, led to a
recognition that work was needed to establish
the consequences of spilling oil into the sea. In
the interwar years, the League of Nations
Committee of Experts coordinated early
research into the extent to which oil persisted
and drifted at sea.
Oil tankers played an important role in the
Second World War and the seaborne oil trade
grew steadily in the 1940s and 1950s as a
result of increased demand in the
industrialised world. The construction of oil
refineries in consuming rather than producing
countries and the growing importance of the
Middle East as an oil producing region meant
that more and more crude oil was being
transported by sea.
The closure of the Suez Canal in 1956 resulted
in larger ships to address the economics of
longer journeys around the Cape of Good
Hope. Advances in engine design, improved
steel quality and the move to welded rather
than riveted construction, allowed tankers of
100,000 dwt. By 1966, Very Large Crude
Carriers (VLCCs) of over 200,000 dwt were in
service.
The rising number of instances of operational
discharges of oil from ships led the UK to
organise a conference in 1954, resulting in the
adoption of the first international treaty
addressing oil pollution from ships. The
International Convention for the Prevention of
Pollution of the Sea by Oil (OILPOL) did not
address accidental pollution, but the fact that
the Convention was adopted at all was an
achievement because only eight of the 32
countries attending said they regarded oil
pollution as a problem and some saw no
requirement for a Convention at all.
The Convention’s primary purpose was to
establish a series of zones where the discharge
of oily wastes was prohibited, an approach
that had been used by individual countries
since the 1920s. Countries were required also
to provide port facilities for the reception of oil
waste from non-tankers (there was no such
requirement for tankers).
The International Maritime Consultative
Organization (now IMO), established in 1948,
took over responsibility for OILPOL. Evidence
showed that the Convention was not as
effective as hoped, and IMCO called a
conference in 1962 to amend OILPOL. These
amendments entered into force in May 1967 –
but by then government and public attitudes
towards oil pollution changed following events
in March that year.Glückauf - Drawing by G.J. Frans Naerebout
and published in Op de Lange Deining
At 297 metres long, Torrey Canyon was one of
the largest vessels in the world at the time. The
tanker was carrying a cargo of 119,000 tonnes
of Kuwaiti crude oil for discharge at Milford
Haven in Wales when she ran aground on the
Seven Stones Reef in the south-west United
Kingdom on 18th March 1967. Investigations
into the accident showed the grounding was a
result of operational errors and misjudgments
by the crew.
Attempts at salvaging the ship were
unsuccessful and any decision to remove the
cargo was hampered by poor weather and the
limited availability of resources. The ship broke
up over the 12 days following the grounding, and
the cargo was lost which affected the coasts of
south-west England, the Channel Islands and
Brittany, France.
Oil pollution at sea was a recognised problem by
1967, but the scale of the release of oil from
this incident was unprecedented and was to
have profound consequences. The incident
caught the governments of the affected
countries unprepared and the new medium of
HISTORIC
The world’s first major oil spill Incident
television transmitted images which resulted in
immense public pressure to find solutions.
Without suitable plans, the response was largely
improvised and techniques developed prior to
the incident were overwhelmed by the volume of
spilled oil. Attempts were made to mitigate the
spill by bombing the casualty in an attempt to
burn it. The oil did ignite initially, but the
limitations of burning oil at sea that we now
understand became very evident.
Clean-up in the UK focused primarily on the
application of a variety of degreasing agents to
oil floating at sea and stranded on the beaches.
This technique did serve to assist with oil
removal but additional environmental damage
also resulted. In France, degreasers were used
to a lesser extent in favour of other techniques,
including the early use of oil recovery skimmers
at sea.
The oil affected a wide variety of wildlife and
economic activities, notably tourism and
shell-fisheries. Liability for the costs of the
response and pollution damage was disputed
and compensation was made available only after
a protracted legal process. Faced with the
potential recurrence of such an incident, the
British Prime Minister at the time called on the
Council of IMCO (now IMO) to meet in
extraordinary circumstances to consider
possible changes in maritime law and
international regulations.
IMCO met subsequently in May 1967 and
drafted 21 “proposals for study”, including
suggestions requiring all vessels to carry
compulsory liability insurance; to make
shipowners responsible for the damage caused
by their vessel without consideration of
negligence; a call for studies leading to less toxic
detergents; and the enforcement of
international agreements.
Ten points from the meeting addressed the
prevention of accidents at sea directly:
• Introduction of traffic lanes at sea
• Introduction of areas off-limits to
t ankers carrying hazardous cargoes
• Shore stations to control ships
approaching and leaving port
• More navigational aids on large tankers
• A speed limit on large ships
when close to land
• Periodic tests of shipborne
navigational equipment
• Stronger tankers, with double hulls to
prevent leakage from accidents
• Equipping tankers with flaps or
drogues to assist stopping at sea
• Requiring ships to carry adequate
charts and sailing directions
• Tougher regulations on navigational
training for crews and officers
These recommendations were greeted with
mixed reviews at the time but set in motion
many of the regulations and features taken for
granted today.
Photo: PA
The extraordinary session of the Council
of IMCO (now IMO) in May 1967 recognised
some of the problems arising from the Torrey
Canyon incident were legal in nature and
established an ad-hoc Legal Committee that
met for the first time in June 1967.
Representatives of 22 countries and observers
from five non-governmental organisations
gathered to examine:
• The definition of the evil to be remedied
• Legal aspects of preventive action
including the questions raised when a
State is threatened by or affected by
a casualty
• Liability and remedies
• Emergency measures - governmental
or inter-governmental - including
salvage procedures
• The rights of coastal States to intervene
The liability of ship and cargo owners for
damage to third parties caused by spills of oil
or other hazardous and noxious substances
were at the heart of the discussions along with
consideration of the need for a new
international system of liability incorporated in
a multilateral convention.
Details included:
• The kind of damage which should be
covered by a convention for the purposes
of compensation
• The issue of whether strict liability
should be introduced
• Adjustments to the existing system
of limitation of liability
• Requirements for compulsory insurance
• What courts should have jurisdiction
LIABILITY AND COMPENSATION
The Legal Committee of IMO
These issues formed the basis of the
work of the Legal Committee for years to come
and led to the adoption by IMO of a
comprehensive international liability and
compensation regime, as well as the
conclusion in 1969 of the Intervention
Convention. This liability and compensation
regime began with the adoption of the Civil
Liability Convention in 1969, followed by the
adoption of the Fund Convention in 1971.
See display cabinet below
Subsequent work of the Legal Committee
resulted in the creation and adoption of
a number of key conventions, including:
• The Athens Convention relating to the
Carriage of Passengers and their Luggage
by Sea, 1974, and its Protocol of 2002
• The Convention on Limitation of
Liability for Maritime Claims, 1976,
and its Protocol of 1996
• The 1984 and 1992 Protocols to the Civil
Liability Convention and Fund Convention
to increase the limits of liability
• The Salvage Convention 1989
• The HNS Convention, 1996,
and its Protocol of 2010
• The Bunkers Convention 2001
• The Protocol of 2003 to the
Fund Convention, 1992
• The Nairobi Wreck Removal
Convention, 2007
The Torrey Canyon incident exposed the
difficulty for a coastal State to respond to a
marine casualty on the high seas without the
permission of the shipowner. In 1967, the UK
Government was unable to respond directly
to the release of oil until the shipowner was
satisfied that all attempts at salvage had been
exhausted, by which time the vessel was
deemed a constructive total loss. The balance
at that time was in favour of protecting the
interests of shipowners, cargo owners and
in supporting the principle of the freedom of
the high seas.
To alleviate the situation, the International
Convention Relating to Intervention on the
High Seas in Cases of Oil Pollution Casualties
was adopted in 1973. A later Protocol extended
the Convention to include marine pollution by
other substances. Today the Convention has
89 State parties.
The Intervention Convention affirms the
right of a Coastal State to take measures on the
high seas that are necessary to prevent,
mitigate or eliminate danger to its coastline or
its related interests from pollution, or the threat
of pollution, following a marine casualty.
The Coastal State can only take action that is
necessary and must consult with interested
parties, like the Flag State of the ship involved,
the owners of the ship and cargo and suitable
independent experts. If a Coastal State takes
measures beyond those permitted under the
Convention it is liable to pay compensation for
any resultant damage.
PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE
Intervention Convention
LIABILITY AND COMPENSATION
Industry Compensation Schemes
Settlement signing ceremony for the claims of the French and UK governments - See display cabinet
Claims were made by the governments of the UK
and France against the owner of the vessel but it
had no assets in the UK. The UK and French
governments presented their claims in a United
States district court which applied the US
Limitation of Liability Act of 1851. This Act
limited the liability of the owners to the value of
the vessel after the incident. As the vessel had
been lost, there was no residual value. The
governments appealed the liability judgment and
agreed a settlement of some US$9 million. At the
The aftermath of the Torrey Canyon incident in
1967 highlighted the need to establish an
international and uniform system to compensate
those affected by oil pollution from tankers.
At the time of the incident there was much relevant
legislation in the affected territories of France and
the UK, but some of this legislation was conflicting
and it was clear that obtaining compensataion for
the clean-up operations and damage caused by the
incident would be difficult.
time it was the largest settlement for a ship-sourced
oil pollution damage claim.
This difficult situation led to pressure to develop a
system, funded by the oil industry and shipowners,
that would guarantee sufficient compensation for
future oil pollution incidents. Representatives of
industry proposed an interim solution in the form of
two private compensation schemes and these were to
remain in operation until new international
conventions came into force.
The Tanker Owners Voluntary Agreement concerning
Liability for Oil Pollution (TOVALOP) was established
and administered by ITOPF. It was signed in 1969 by
seven major oil companies who operated a significant
part of the world’s tanker fleet, to provide
compensation for the costs of clean-up operations
and damage caused by tankers.
Shipowners’ liability under TOVALOP was originally
limited to a maximum of US$10 million per incident.
A supplementary scheme was introduced by the oil
companies, increasing the compensation available to
US$30 million per incident.
This second scheme was known as CRISTAL (Contract
Regarding an Interim Supplement to Tanker Liability
for Oil Pollution). Both schemes remained in
operation until 1997.
In the late 1960s and early 1970s, IMCO
(now IMO) adopted two international treaties to
ensure that adequate compensation was
available to people who suffer damage resulting
from spills of persistent oil from tankers.
The treaties share the cost of marine oil
spill incidents between the shipowner and
the oil receivers and they established the
first International Oil Pollution Compensation
Fund (IOPC Fund), creating what is now known
as the international liability and compensation
regime.
The regime places the liability for damage on
the owner of the ship from which the polluting
oil escaped or was discharged. It is strict
liability with some specific exceptions.
It means that the owner has to pay for
LIABILITY AND COMPENSATION
The Legal Framework for Compensation
• The 1992 Civil Liability Convention
(1992 CLC) - 136 States Parties
• The 1992 Fund Convention
- 114 States Parties
• The 2003 Supplementary Fund Protocol
(which provides an optional additional layer
of compensation) - 31 States Parties
This regime is now complemented by the
Bunkers and Wreck Removal Conventions,
and potentially the 2010 HNS Convention, which
offer separate compensation schemes for other
types of incidents at sea than those covered by
the original regime.
admissible claims resulting from pollution
damage regardless of fault. In return, the owner
has the right to limit liability to a certain amount
in respect of any one incident. Ships are
required under the relevant Convention to
maintain insurance or other financial security in
sums equivalent to the owner's total liability for
any one incident.
The first tier of compensation is paid by the
shipowner’s insurer. It is usually the third
party liability Protection and Indemnity Club
(P&I Club) of the owner of the ship involved in
the incident. The second tier of compensation is
paid by an international fund, the IOPC Fund
which is financed by receivers of oil after sea
transport in those States party to the relevant
treaties which are:
Admissable claims
Ballast water is taken on board ships to maintain
stability, to allow steerage and for safety in bad
weather conditions. Fifty years ago, ballast water
was carried in a tanker’s cargo tanks, resulting in
the discharge of oily water overboard. However,
ballast water is now carried in segregated ballast
tanks and remains free of cargo oil or fuel oil and
can be discharged overboard.
The 1978 MARPOL Protocol introduced the
concept known as "protective location of
segregated ballast tanks". This meant that the
ballast tanks, which are empty on the
cargo-carrying leg of the voyage and only loaded
with ballast water for the return leg, are
positioned where the impact of a collision or
grounding is likely to be greatest and, by doing
so, reducing the risk of a spill and of the amount
of cargo released if there is an incident.
Subsequent amendments in 1983 took this
segregation concept further by banning the
carriage of oil in the forepeak tank, the ship's
most vulnerable point, in the event of a collision.
PREVENTION
Segregated Ballast Tanks
In the 1960s there was a rise in awareness of,
and concern for, environmental issues. It was
against this backdrop that the extraordinary
meeting organised at IMCO (now IMO) in May
1967 proposed a number of changes in ship
design and operations that led directly to the
development of the International Convention
for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships
(MARPOL). MARPOL is the main international
convention addressing prevention of pollution
of the marine environment by ships from
operational or accidental causes.
MARPOL expanded on the elements of the
earlier OILPOL Convention, which was no
longer adequate to address a changing
industry. Annex 1 of MARPOL covers pollution
by oil and initially developed the requirements
for continuous monitoring of oil-water
discharges, shore-based reception facilities
and segregated ballast tanks, as well as
establishing a number of Special Areas
geographically that further restricted
discharges of oil in specified zones.
PREVENTION
Pollution Prevention - MARPOL
The 1978 Protocol further developed these
provisions and required new larger tankers to
be fitted with “crude oil washing” systems
to minimise the quantity of oil remaining on
board after discharge. Later developments to
Annex 1 in the 1990s introduced a mandatory
requirement for double hulls for tankers.
The Convention, in its modern form
and much amended, also incorporates
requirements preventing pollution from
chemicals transported in bulk and packaged
form, sewage, garbage and air emissions
(including CO2) from ships.
The International Convention for the Safety of
Life at Sea (SOLAS), 1974, and its successive
revisions, is generally regarded as the most
important of all international treaties
concerning the safety of merchant ships. The
first version of SOLAS was adopted in 1914, in
direct response to the sinking of Titanic, with
subsequent revisions in 1929, 1948 and 1960.
The fifth and current version, which has been
much amended, was adopted in 1974.
The objective of the SOLAS Convention is to
specify minimum safety standards for the
construction, equipment and operation of
ships. Flag States are responsible for ensuring
that ships under their flag comply with the
requirements, and a number of certificates are
prescribed in the Convention as proof that this
has been done. Governments that are
signatories to SOLAS are allowed to inspect
ships of other signatory states if there are
clear reasons for believing that the ship and its
equipment do not comply with the
requirements of the Convention. This
procedure is known as Port State Control.
PREVENTION
Safety Of Life At Sea - SOLAS
SOLAS covers the full range of safety issues
that may affect the ship, including fire
protection; life-saving appliances and
arrangements; radio communications; safety
of navigation; managing the safe operations of
a ship and the carriage of cargoes and
dangerous goods, in particular mandating
inert gas systems; and imposing stricter
regimes for surveys and certification. These
measures, together with the related Codes that
underpin the implementation of SOLAS,
provide a comprehensive safety framework for
international maritime transport.
SOLAS is well-supported by shipping industry
initiatives such as the ICS Bridge Procedures
Guide which is the definitive industry
publication on best practice for safe
navigation. Two additional industry
publications: the IACS Common Structural
Rules and the OCIMF and ICS International
Safety Guide for Oil Tankers and Terminals, are
described elsewhere in the exhibition.
The human element remains the most important
contributing factor in maritime accidents.
The causes of marine casualties include
collisions, groundings, fires, explosions and other
accidents, which in the majority of cases are
a result of human error.
To address this, the International Convention
on Standards of Training, Certification and
Watchkeeping for Seafarers was adopted in 1978
to promote the safety of life and property at sea
and the protection of the marine environment
by establishing agreed common international
standards of competence for seafarers.
PREVENTION
Standards of Training, Certification and
Watchkeeping for Seafarers (STCW)
A major revision to the Convention in
1995 further enhanced Port State Control
measures allowing mutual oversight and
consistency in the application of standards;
quality standards systems (QSS);
oversight of training, assessment, and
certification procedures; and new training
requirements. Responsibility was placed on
parties, including those issuing licenses and
Flag States employing foreign nationals, to
ensure seafarers meet objective standards
of competence and observe the rest period
requirements for watchkeeping personnel.
Another major revision in 2010,
known as the "The Manila Amendments",
brought training standards in line with
modern day requirements, needing updated
and improved training to meet new
developments in ship technology, operation
and security.
ISGOTT is a comprehensive guide to the safe
transport and handling of crude oil and refined
products on tankers and at terminals. It was first
published in 1978, combining the contents of the
“Tanker Safety Guide (Petroleum)” published by the
International Chamber of Shipping (ICS) and the
“International Oil Tanker and Terminal Safety
Guide” published by the Oil Companies
International Marine Forum (OCIMF).
Revised editions have been regularly published
under the oversight of ICS, OCIMF and the
International Association of Ports and Harbors
(IAPH) to ensure that the guide continues to reflect
current best practice and legislation.
PREVENTION
The International Safety Guide for Oil Tankers and Terminals (ISGOTT)
The Guide provides operational advice
to help personnel involved in tanker and
terminal operations and it is a general
industry recommendation that a copy of
ISGOTT is kept and used on all tankers and
at every terminal, so that there is a
consistent approach to operational
procedures when ships are at terminals.
An understanding of the fate and behaviour
of spilled oil and of the equipment and
techniques used in pollution response have
improved significantly in the past fifty years.
Scientific teams established in the 1970s
conducted research programmes which,
combined with practical lessons learned
from spills, have resulted in the development
of enhanced strategies for response and the
development of improved equipment such
as booms, skimmers, dispersant and oil
spill models.
The use of chemical dispersants has changed
over time. Industrial machinery degreasers
were adopted initially for oil spill response.
However, their application at large incidents
led to inappropriate dosing and their use was
not always successful and in some cases led to
adverse impacts. However, with proper
planning and well designed application
equipment the potential of chemical response
was recognised. Manufacturers developed
a range of dispersants to meet national
standards, that are intended specifically to
disperse oil into droplets in the water column
which would then break down naturally.
Continuous development of dispersants has
ensured their major role in marine oil spill
response in many countries.
Studies of large scale releases of oil
demonstrated that oil slicks eventually
disperse naturally, with some oils persisting
longer than others. These studies led to the
grouping of hydrocarbon oils according to
their assay characteristics, allowing easier
reference when deciding response strategies in
future incidents. As a result, a more rapid and
accurate assessment of the potential of
a spill to affect a shoreline can be made.
PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE
Oil Pollution Response
Experience and research has also highlighted
the advantages of limiting clean-up in sensitive
areas, such as mangroves and salt marshes,
and has led to the promotion of natural
cleaning on appropriate shorelines. Other
techniques have been developed for effective
oil spill response in cold climates. Advances
have improved remote sensing enabling it to
become an important tool in the detection and
evaluation of oil contamination. Developments
with radiation scanners and satellite based
radar, together with rapid interpretation of
images, have encouraged their effective use as
operational tools.
Organisations such as Oil Spill Response
Limited (OSRL), established by four oil
companies and now with 42 oil company
Members and ~100 Associates Members, are
prepared to respond to oil spills globally. The
Global Response Network and International
Spill Control Organization (ISCO) ensure their
response contractor members are at the
forefront of response technology. ITOPF is
funded by the shipping industry to provide
technical advice to promote effective response
to pollution in the marine environment.
Great improvements have been made in
oil spill response in the last 50 years.
Nevertheless, this remains challenging and
continued research and development, together
with effective knowledge transfer, remain key
objectives.
Port State Control is the inspection of foreign
ships in national ports to verify that the
condition of the ship, its equipment, manning
and operation comply with the requirements of
international Conventions such as SOLAS,
MARPOL, and STCW.
In 1982, the Paris Memorandum of
Understanding (Paris MoU) established the
system of Port State Control which today
covers 26 European countries and Canada.
Building on the foundation of the Paris MoU,
other regional MoUs were signed, covering the
Pacific Ocean, South and Central America, the
Caribbean, the Mediterranean, the Indian
Ocean, West and Central Atlantic Africa, the
Black Sea and the Middle East Gulf.
Many of IMO’s most important technical
conventions contain provisions for ships to be
inspected when they visit foreign ports to
ensure that they meet IMO requirements.
PREVENTION
Inspection and Enforcement – Port State Control (PSC)
To facilitate the implementation of Port State
Control, IMO adopted the Resolution on
“Regional Co-operation in the Control of Ships
and Discharges Promoting the Conclusion of
Regional Agreements”. Ships visiting a port in
one country will normally visit other countries
in the region, and it is more efficient if
inspections can be closely coordinated to focus
on sub-standard ships and to avoid multiple
inspections. It also prevents ships being
delayed by unnecessary inspections.
The primary responsibility for the standard of
ships rests with the Flag State - but Port State
Control provides a valuable additional tool to
identify substandard ships.
Photo: USCG
PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE
Maritime Salvage
The practice of marine salvage and the
international legal framework under which salvage
services are delivered have developed significantly.
With the exception of a small number of coastal
states which provide state-funded emergency
towing vessels, marine salvage is undertaken by
commercial operators.
The priority in any salvage operation has always
been saving life. Saving property – the ship and its
cargo – used to be the next priority with little
thought for the marine environment. Over the
decades the priorities have shifted with protection
of the environment now more important than
saving property. The salvor will immediately
consider how to minimise the risk to the
environment from the cargo or bunker fuel onboard
a casualty.
In the past five decades, salvage craft have become
more powerful and more manoeuvrable. Towing
practice has developed and advances, like the
introduction of the “Smit Bracket” in the 1970s,
have improved the process of controlling a casualty.
Firefighting methods and the introduction of “hot
tapping” to remove cargo and bunkers have been
major developments. The salvage industry is
capable of removing potential pollutants even
from sunken vessels lying at considerable
depth. More recently the introduction of
damage stability software and the use of air
portable salvage equipment and teams from
central locations have enhanced casualty
response.
The legal framework for marine salvage
is underpinned by the 1989 Salvage
Convention. It introduced the idea of
“special compensation” to encourage salvors
to assist ships, which, because of the limited
likelihood of successful salvage or low
residual values, might not otherwise have
been commercially worthwhile to attend.
The Salvage Convention was incorporated into
the most commonly used salvage contract,
Lloyd’s Open Form in its 1990 edition. Special
Compensation evolved into the Special
Compensation P&I Club Clause, known as
SCOPIC, which was introduced in 1999.
Under SCOPIC the salvor receives a tariff rate
− and an “uplift” − for equipment and
personnel used in providing a salvage service
even if the service is unsuccessful. SCOPIC
has been a great success in encouraging
commercial salvors to provide services to
casualties that otherwise might have been left
to the elements.
Remote hot tapping operations - Photo: SMIT
PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE
Regional Cooperation and the International Convention on Oil Pollution
Preparedness and Response (OPRC)
National governments are often more able to
prepare and respond to pollution incidents when
they work with neighbouring countries, in order
to share expertise, experiences and resources.
The first regional agreement for oil pollution was
signed in Bonn, Germany in 1969 by countries
bordering the North Sea. Many other such
agreements are now in place globally, a number
of which are arranged through the IMO and the
United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP)
under regional conventions. The first of these, the
Barcelona Convention adopted in 1976, led
eventually to the formation of a regional
coordination centre in the Mediterranean Sea.
Other regional centres coordinate preparedness and
response around the world.
The International Convention on Oil Pollution
Preparedness and Response OPRC ’90 came
into force in 1995 to provide for the first time a
global framework to facilitate international
cooperation and mutual assistance for major marine
pollution incidents. OPRC encourages states to
develop and maintain a preparedness and
response capability of their own, while recognising
the importance of regional cooperation and joint
working with the oil and shipping industries to
deal with major pollution emergencies.
States which ratify OPRC commit to the
following key obligations:
• Require ships under the national flag, as
well as operators of offshore units, ports
and oil handling facilities, to have oil
pollution emergency plans.
• Oblige ships to report incidents of
pollution to coastal authorities.
• Establish stockpiles of oil spill response
equipment; conduct oil spill response
exercises; and develop contingency plans
for dealing with pollution incidents.
Designated national authorities and focal
points responsible for oil pollution
preparedness and response must be identified.
• Provide assistance to others in the event of
a pollution emergency and provision is
made for the reimbursement of any
assistance provided.
IMO works with governments and industry to
enhance the capacity of States to meet the
requirements of the Convention by providing
manuals, guidelines, training aids and courses
and technical assistance. At present, 109
States representing 74% of the world’s tonnage
are party to OPRC.
The Global Initiative (GI) launched in 1996, is
an umbrella programme under which
governments, through IMO, and the oil industry,
through IPIECA, work together to assist
countries in developing national structures and
capability for oil spill preparedness and
response.
South
Asian
Seas
West and
Central
Africa
South-East
Pacific
North-East
Pacific
Pacific
Pacific
East
Asian
Seas
Northwest
Pacific Northwest
Pacific
ROPME
Sea AreaRed Sea
& Gulf of
Aden - PERSGA
Eastern
Africa
Black Sea
Mediterranean
North-East
Atlantic
OPRC Member States. UNEP Regional Seas. IMO/IPIECA GI Programme Regions (shaded green).
When a ship is hired or chartered to carry a
cargo, the charterer will take steps to ensure
the ship is operated professionally, its
certificates and insurances are valid, and that
it is in a condition suitable to complete a
voyage safely. Similarly, terminal operators,
Port State Control authorities, insurers and
underwriters will often require information on
the ship to ensure only safe ships are allowed.
Vetting is the process by which all this
information on a ship is gathered and
professionally assessed and a decision on
chartering is made. A significant part of this
information is obtained by physical inspection
of a ship by a marine professional.
Oil companies have had processes in place for
vetting ships for many decades. In the 1970s
and 1980s multiple ship inspections during a
ship’s port call created a new risk, distracting
ship’s crews from safely handling their
cargoes. Something had to be done, so the
major oil companies, through the Oil
Companies International Marine Forum
(OCIMF), collaborated to share inspection
reports through the Ship Inspection Report
Programme (SIRE) database. SIRE was
launched in 1993 to provide a standardised
inspection format, with objective reports that
can be shared and used by, currently, nearly
400 vetting departments globally.
PREVENTION
Ship Vetting and Ship Inspection Report
Programme (SIRE)
SIRE inspections take place around the world
using a cadre of nearly 500 trained and
accredited ship inspectors. At the heart of the
system is a large database of technical and
operational information about tankers used for
carrying oil, gas and chemicals.
Since its introduction, more than 335,000
inspection reports have been submitted to the
SIRE database. In excess of 20,000
inspections on more than 8,500 tankers have
been conducted in the last 12 months. On
average, more than 12,000 reports each month
are download by the 400 users of the SIRE
programme which includes 60 Port State
Control agencies. OCIMF’s SIRE programme
encourages ship operators to maintain high
standards of ship management, and provides
tanker charterers with the information
necessary to hire the best quality tankers to
carry their oil.
In parallel, a number of national
administrations developed the EQUASIS
database in 2000 to collate existing
safety-related information on ships from both
public and private sources for publication on
the internet.
For vessels in distress or in need of assistance
there is often the need to find an appropriate
location where the vessel can be stabilised or
repaired. Such a “Place of Refuge” can be a
port or a sheltered natural site. The shipping
industry recognises that the risk of pollution is
a sensitive issue for coastal States. However,
failure to offer a place of refuge may mean the
condition of the vessel deteriorating with the
risk of pollution over a wider area.
In response to a series of incidents, IMO
adopted two Resolutions in 2003 on
“Guidelines on Places of Refuge for Ships in
need of Assistance” and on “Maritime
Assistance Services” (MAS), recommending
that all coastal States establish a maritime
assistance service for receiving reports,
monitoring a ship’s situation and serving as a
point of contact.
PREVENTION
Places of Refuge
In 2007 IMO’s Maritime Safety Committee
approved “Guidelines on the Control of Ships in
an Emergency” which, along with the 1989
Salvage Convention and the 1979 Search and
Rescue Convention, also bear on the issue of
Places of Refuge.
In response to the IMO Resolutions, some
countries and regions have identified and
published complementary guidance as well as
identifying potential locations for refuge. Other
countries believe that the decision will need to be
made on a case by case basis due to technical,
political, and other factors and may require
specific conditions to be met before a ship can
use a port of refuge. Nevertheless, many in the
shipping and salvage industries would like to see
an improvement in response to requests for a
place of refuge in other parts of the world.
For vessels in distress or in need of assistance
there is often the need to find an appropriate
location where the vessel can be stabilised or
repaired. Such a “Place of Refuge” can be a
port or a sheltered natural site. The shipping
industry recognises that the risk of pollution is
a sensitive issue for coastal States. However,
failure to offer a place of refuge may mean the
condition of the vessel deteriorating with the
risk of pollution over a wider area.
In response to a series of incidents, IMO
adopted two Resolutions in 2003 on
“Guidelines on Places of Refuge for Ships in
need of Assistance” and on “Maritime
Assistance Services” (MAS), recommending
that all coastal States establish a maritime
assistance service for receiving reports,
monitoring a ship’s situation and serving as a
point of contact.
PREVENTION
Places of Refuge
In 2007 IMO’s Maritime Safety Committee
approved “Guidelines on the Control of Ships in
an Emergency” which, along with the 1989
Salvage Convention and the 1979 Search and
Rescue Convention, also bear on the issue of
Places of Refuge.
In response to the IMO Resolutions, some
countries and regions have identified and
published complementary guidance as well as
identifying potential locations for refuge. Other
countries believe that the decision will need to be
made on a case by case basis due to technical,
political, and other factors and may require
specific conditions to be met before a ship can
use a port of refuge. Nevertheless, many in the
shipping and salvage industries would like to see
an improvement in response to requests for a
place of refuge in other parts of the world.
The Protection and Indemnity Clubs
(P&I Clubs) which are members of the
International Group of P&I Clubs (IG) insure
over 90% of world ocean-going tonnage and
over 95% of all ocean-going tankers.
Shipowner's liability cover provided by the IG
Clubs, along with the IG's claims pooling and
reinsurance arrangements, are a key factor in
enabling world seaborne trade, protecting the
marine environment and in meeting the
interests of all those affected by oil pollution.
The international oil pollution compensation
regime is underpinned by IG Club cover through
the financial guarantees (“blue cards”) that the
IG Clubs issue to shipowners for the purposes
of the 1992 Civil Liability Convention. The
Clubs also provide a unique claims handling
service to manage the aftermath of a
ship-sourced oil pollution incident.
The great majority of all cases of ship-sourced
oil pollution damage are handled by the
individual P&I Clubs alone. Shipowners rely on
their P&I Clubs to handle claims both from a
financial and administrative perspective.
Incidents can be complex and involve a range
of different parties and interests. Quick and fair
resolution to the handling and settlement of
LIABILITY AND COMPENSATION
The Role of the P&I Clubs − Compensation
claims is important and the IG Clubs have
extensive experience over many years of
handling oil pollution damage claims within the
international compensation regime.
The IG is an active representative body within the
IOPC Funds system, and it works jointly with the
IOPC Funds to ensure that the system operates
for the benefit of all parties. This work has
included the creation of the Small Tanker Oil
Pollution Indemnification Agreement 2006
(STOPIA 2006) and the Tanker Oil Pollution
Indemnification Agreement 2006 (TOPIA 2006).
These two voluntary agreements apply to tankers
entered in P&I Clubs that are members of the IG
and reinsured through the pooling arrangements
of the Group.
Most sea-going ships are “classed” to verify the
structural strength and integrity of the ship’s
hull and equipment, as well as the reliability of
other essential systems. Classification
Societies achieve this by developing and
applying their own rules and by verifying
compliance on behalf of Flag State
Administrations with applicable international
and national regulations throughout the life
cycle of the ship.
Classification by a society recognised by the
Flag State is a condition for certification under
SOLAS and, in many cases, is a prerequisite
for registration of a ship with the Flag State.
Periodic surveys are undertaken to verify
that a vessel is maintained in compliance
with the relevant classification and
related requirements.
The International Association of Classification
Societies (IACS) is an association of the
leading Classification Societies which develops
PREVENTION
Class and Common Structural Rules
and promotes minimum technical standards,
in part through Unified Requirements which
include Common Structural Rules for different
ship types. The IACS Common Structural Rules
came into force in 2006, and cover double hull
tankers with a length of 150 metres and
greater and bulk carriers with a length of 90
metres or greater.
IMO’s Maritime Safety Committee confirmed in
2016 that the Rules submitted by each of the
12 IACS Member Societies for oil tankers and
bulk carriers conform to the requirements of
IMO’s Goal-Based Ship Construction
Standards under SOLAS.
Use of Common Structural Rules that conform
to the Goal-Based Standards drives
improvements in safety by setting a standard
for design and construction that an individual
Classification Society must meet as a
prerequisite for certifying oil tankers and bulk
carriers under SOLAS.
The IMO Member State Audit Scheme is
intended to provide an audited Member State
with a comprehensive and objective
assessment of how effectively it administers
and implements those mandatory IMO
instruments which are covered by the Scheme.
Amendments to eight IMO instruments,
including MARPOL, made audits of Member
States mandatory from the beginning of 2016.
The IMO Instruments Implementation Code
provides the standards for conducting an audit.
The scheme addresses issues such as:
• Conformance in enacting appropriate
legislation for the IMO instruments to
which a Member State is a party
• Implementation and enforcement of the
applicable laws and regulations by the
Member State
• Delegation of authority to Recognised
Organisations (ROs)
• The control and monitoring mechanism of
the survey and certification processes by
the Member States
It is expected that the audit scheme will bring
about other benefits, such as identifying where
capacity-building activities − like the provision
of technical assistance by IMO to Member
PREVENTION
IMO Member State Audit Scheme (IMSAS)
States − would have the greatest effect. In doing so,
targeting of appropriate action to improve
performance will be improved. The Member States
themselves would receive valuable feedback to
assist them in improving their own capacity to put
applicable instruments into practice. Generic
lessons learnt from audits could be provided to all
Member States to share the benefits more widely.
The shipping industry has developed
complementary audit and quality management
schemes, an example of which is the International
Association of Classification Societies (IACS)
Quality System Certification Scheme (QSCS).
QSCS has its roots in a number of serious
casualties at the end of the 1980s and early
1990s. Many of these were the result of
operational failings, prompting IMO, in 1993, to
adopt “Guidelines on the Enhanced Programme of
Inspections during Surveys of Bulk Carriers and Oil
Tankers”. IACS responded by creating the QSCS,
which is one of the key criteria for membership of
IACS by a Classification Society. This remains
central to the IACS ethos and compliance is
mandatory for its Classification Society members.
The Protection and Indemnity Clubs (P&I
Clubs) which are members of the International
Group of P&I Clubs (IG) insure over 90% of
world ocean-going tonnage and over 95% of all
ocean-going tankers.
The P&I Clubs undertake measures to promote
vessel quality by commissioning P&I surveys
of newly entered vessels over 12 years of age,
and tankers over 10 years of age carrying
heavy fuel oil, to ensure these vessels are of an
acceptable standard for entry into a Club.
The individual P&I Clubs also maintain loss
PREVENTION
The Role of the P&I Clubs – Loss Prevention
prevention teams to promote awareness of
risk, by publishing loss prevention materials
and statistics, and by illustrating how incidents
may be avoided. These activities are supported
by education and training initiatives by the P&I
Clubs and the IG, for the officers, crew and
managers of shipowner members.
The response to wildlife affected by oil has
been one of the least understood and most
underestimated elements of oil spill response.
Traditionally, rehabilitation of live animals was
often attempted, but was only rarely
successful. Despite the intensive care and good
intentions of those involved, oiled wildlife was
previously unlikely to survive cleaning,
rehabilitation and release. Considerable efforts
by scientists and non-governmental
organisations (NGOs) to develop rehabilitation
methodologies have resulted in a greatly
improved situation.
Oiled wildlife response is the combination of
activities that aim to minimise the impact of
an oil spill on wildlife by both prevention of
oiling and mitigating the effects when oiling
has taken place. Targeted animals typically
include marine, coastal and aquatic birds,
marine reptiles, such as sea turtles, and
marine and aquatic mammals, including seals,
sea lions, otters and cetaceans.
PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE
Response to Oiled Wildlife
Response activities include:
• Assessment of the risks to wildlife
• Real-time monitoring of the location of
wildlife in relation to spilled oil
• Protection of nesting sites and land-based
sites occasionally used by marine wildlife
• Deterring wildlife from the area of a spill
• Pre-emptive capture and collection of
unaffected animals and their offspring or eggs
• Removal of dead animals and necessary
euthanasia
• Rehabilitation of live oiled animals, their
release to the wild and monitoring of
post-release survival
Successful wildlife response relies upon
formalised relationships between NGOs,
governments and industry. A good example is the
Global Oiled Wildlife Response System.
Successful systems are in place in many regions
and have been effective in many instances in the
last 20 years. However, there is still important
work to do to ensure the response to oiled wildlife
is as effective as possible.
PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE
Contingency Planning for Oil Pollution
Effective response to a spill of oil depends
largely on the preparedness of the
organisations and individuals involved.
Response can be enhanced greatly by
developing and maintaining plans to address all
likely contingencies. In the late 1960s and early
1970s, government authorities and the oil
industry initiated the development of
well-resourced and tested contingency plans at
local, national, and international levels.
Contingency plans are now widely accepted and
mandated by national law in many States as
required by the OPRC Convention. Robust plans
ensure effective notification, assessment and
response to marine spills and other incidents by
identifying in advance the organisational
arrangements and resources as well as
appropriate strategies that will be needed.
In planning to cope with a range of scenarios from
localised, operational spills to complex
multi-jurisdictional incidents, industry and
governments developed the concept of “tiered
response”. It allows for a level of equipment and
resources proportionate to the risk to be
immediately available and for this to be
supplemented by additional resources and
capabilities, available both nationally and
internationally if needed.
Contingency planning has helped improve the
ability to respond to spills, but levels of
preparedness remain inconsistent across the world.
IMO and industry continue to work in areas where
contingency plans may be inadequate and where
personnel have limited training through regional
cooperation programmes, workshops and regular
exercises.
TIER 1 capabilities describe the operators’ locally
held resources used to mitigate spills that are
typically operational in nature occurring on or near
an operator’s own facility. The resources also
provide an initial response to spills that may
potentially escalate beyond the scope of Tier 1
initial actions and capabilities.
TIER 2 capabilities refer to additional, often shared,
national or regional resources necessary to
supplement a Tier 1 response or support an
escalating response. Tier 2 capability includes a
wider selection of equipment and expertise suited
to a range of strategic response options.
TIER 3 capabilities are globally available resources
that further supplement Tiers 1 and 2. They
complete the international resources for spills that
require a substantial external response due to
incident scale, complexity and/or impact potential.
Photo: USCG
Vessel Traffic Services (VTS) are shore-based
systems which range from the provision of
simple information messages to ships, such as
the position of other traffic or meteorological
hazard warnings, to extensive management of
traffic within a port or waterway similar to air
traffic control. VTS is governed by SOLAS and
also the Guidelines for Vessel Traffic Services
adopted by IMO in 1997.
Generally, ships entering a VTS area report to
the authorities, usually by radio, and may be
tracked by the VTS control centre. Ships must
keep radio watch on a specific frequency for
navigational or other warnings and they may
be contacted directly by the VTS operator if
there is risk of an incident. In areas where
traffic flow is regulated, the ship may be given
instructions as to how it should proceed.
Typical VTS systems include the use of
radar, closed-circuit television (CCTV), VHF
radiotelephony and the Automatic
PREVENTION
Vessel Traffic Services (VTS) and Automatic
Identification System (AIS)
Identification System (AIS) to keep track of
vessel movements and provide navigational
safety in a defined geographical area.
Technologies to assist VTS operators are
expected to continue to evolve and offer new
levels of sophistication.
The Automatic Identification System (AIS) is an
automatic tracking system for identifying and
locating ships by electronically exchanging
data with other nearby ships, AIS base
stations, and satellites.
In 2000, IMO adopted new regulations as part
of a revision of parts of SOLAS which require
AIS to be fitted on all international voyaging
ships of 300 or more gross tonnes and on all
passenger ships regardless of size. The
information provided by AIS equipment such
as unique identification, position, course and
speed can be displayed on a screen or an
Electronic Chart Display and Information
System (ECDIS).
In 1992, MARPOL was amended to require all new
tankers of 5,000 dwt and above to be built with
double hulls, to reduce the risk of the release
of cargo, notably oil, in the event of grounding
or collision.
PREVENTION
The Introduction of Double Hulls
– A New Era in Ship Construction
The requirement for double hulls was also applied
to existing ships under a programme
that began in 1995, which meant all tankers would
have had to be converted, or taken out of service,
when they reached a certain age (up to 30 years
old). This measure was initially to be phased in
over a number of years, allowing a smooth
transition from single to double hulls
and uninterrupted trade.
However, the need to introduce double hulls more
quickly led to stricter accelerated timetables
for the phasing-out of single-hull tankers.
2015 marked the final phase out of single hull
tankers, with all tankers engaged in international
trade now of double hull construction.
Photo: John, GCaptain.com
The international liability and compensation
regime is a successful solution to the lack of an
international system for compensating victims
of oil pollution damage brought to light in
the 1960s.
When it was introduced the international
compensation regime was a new concept and it
remains unique. That is because the burden of
the risk is shared between both the shipowner
and the oil receivers, creating a compensation
fund which is overseen by governments.
LIABILITY AND COMPENSATION
The Compensation Regime In Action
It is this spirit of cooperation that has enabled
the continued success of the international
system. Since 1978, 150 incidents have been
dealt with and more than £600 million of
compensation having been paid by the IOPC
Funds alone.
Many more “first tier” incidents have been paid
for by the P&I Clubs under the Civil Liability
Conventions.
PREVENTION
Global Maritime Distress and Safety System
The Global Maritime Distress and Safety System
(GMDSS) is an international network which uses
terrestrial and satellite technology and ship-board
radio-systems to ensure rapid, automated alerts are
sent to shore-based communication and rescue
authorities in the event of a marine incident. Other
ships in the vicinity of an incident are also alerted.
The system was introduced and is required under
amendments made in 1988 to SOLAS.
GMDSS is mandatory on all ocean-going passenger
ships and cargo ships of 300 or more gross tonnes
and which are engaged on international voyages.
The vessel must be equipped with radio equipment
that conforms to the international standards set out
in the system.
GMDSS consists of a number of components
including Emergency Position Indicating Radio
Beacon (EPIRB) equipment and search and rescue
locating devices or transponders and an automated
system for distributing maritime safety information.
The system enables rapid alerting and location of
the casualty and assists with coordination of
search and rescue efforts.
PREVENTION
Inert gas systems
The oil and refined products carried by tankers
can produce flammable vapours and gases in
cargo tanks. Fire is a major threat to the safety
of tanker operations, as just a single spark can
cause a devastating explosion if it ignites the
vapour from an oil cargo.
Harmful or dangerous flammable gases can
also be present in empty cargo tanks. When the
vapour produced by an oil cargo is mixed with
air and is exposed to an ignition source, it can
cause an explosion resulting in loss of life,
damage to ship and other property and the
possibility of marine pollution.
To prevent such explosions and to ensure the
safety of the ship and its crew, tankers employ
“inert gas systems” to reduce the oxygen
content in cargo tanks. The normal method is
to fill these tanks with non-explosive and
non-reactive inert gas from the ship's boiler
flue. The flue gas is scrubbed or cleaned and
then pumped into the empty tanks, or into the
spaces left above the oil in loaded tanks, to
minimise the risk from fire or explosion on
board. Other systems employ a separate inert
gas generation plant to supply the gas.
Oil companies have employed inert gas
systems in their tanker fleets in an ad-hoc
manner since the mid 1930s. In 1985, SOLAS
introduced a requirement for inert gas systems
to be fitted to all oil tankers of 20,000 tonnes
dwt and above. From January 2016, this
requirement has been extended to all new
tankers of 8,000 tonnes dwt and above. The
engineering specifications for inert gas
systems are set out in the International Code
for Fire Safety Systems (FSS Code).
Improvements have been made to the system
of compensation over time. The IOPC Funds
and the International Group of P&I Clubs (IG)
have continued to work with international,
regional and intergovernmental organisations −
as well as the oil and shipping industry − to
encourage the worldwide adoption of the oil
pollution compensation regime. The continued
aim is to provide the best protection to those
affected by marine oil spills.
There is ongoing work to identify those
regions or countries which require particular
attention and support to help them adopt the
regime or to ensure that it is properly
implemented nationally. The work is
informed by analysis of factors such as
trends in the production, transportation and
import of oil as well as consideration of the
risk of oil spills.
LIABILITY AND COMPENSATION
Compensation − The Work Continues
The collaborative efforts of the organisations
involved in this outreach programme have been
successful. The cooperation between the IOPC
Funds, the IG, IMO and ITOPF shows the
benefit of working together and drawing on
each organisation’s areas of expertise to
achieve wider coverage and better application
of the regime. It forms part of the wider effort
conducted by IMO to advocate the adoption of
global maritime rules and standards and
conventions in shipping.](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/exhibition-50yearsworkingtogether-170309151918/85/50-years-working-together-against-oil-pollution-from-ships-1-320.jpg)
