50 years working together against oil pollution from ships

Tank Shipping before 1967
HISTORIC
The 2,300 tonne Glückauf, built in the UK in
1886, was the first “petroleum steamer”,
using a combination of sail and coal to carry
cargoes of refined oil products in separate
tanks serving a growing demand for kerosene
for lighting and gasoline for newly introduced
automobiles. The size and design of ships
evolved rapidly in the early 20th century,
leading to increasingly common occurrences
of oil washing up on shorelines. The rapid
increase in the number of oil fired ships
replacing coal, along with an increasing
number of tank vessels, led to a recognition
that work was needed to establish the
consequences of spilling oil into the sea. In
the interwar years, the League of Nations
Committee of Experts coordinated early
research into the extent to which oil persisted
and drifted at sea.
Oil tankers played an important role in the
Second World War and the seaborne oil trade
grew steadily in the 1940s and 1950s as a
result of increased demand in the
industrialised world. The construction of oil
refineries in consuming rather than producing
countries and the growing importance of the
Middle East as an oil producing region meant
that more and more crude oil was being
transported by sea.
The closure of the Suez Canal in 1956
resulted in larger ships to address the
economics of longer journeys around the
Cape of Good Hope. Advances in engine
design, improved steel quality and the move
to welded rather than riveted construction,
allowed tankers of 100,000 dwt. By 1966,
Very Large Crude Carriers (VLCCs) of over
200,000 dwt were in service.
The rising number of instances of operational
discharges of oil from ships led the UK to
organise a conference in 1954, resulting in
the adoption of the first international treaty
addressing oil pollution from ships. The
International Convention for the Prevention of
Pollution of the Sea by Oil (OILPOL) did not
address accidental pollution, but the fact that
the Convention was adopted at all was an
achievement because only eight of the 32
countries attending said they regarded oil
pollution as a problem and some saw no
requirement for a Convention at all.
The Convention’s primary purpose was to
establish a series of zones where the
discharge of oily wastes was prohibited, an
approach that had been used by individual
countries since the 1920s. Countries were
required also to provide port facilities for the
reception of oil waste from non-tankers (there
was no such requirement for tankers).
The International Maritime Consultative
Organisation (now IMO), established in 1948,
took over responsibility for OILPOL. Evidence
showed that the Convention was not as
effective as hoped, and IMCO called a
conference in 1962 to amend OILPOL. These
amendments entered into force in May 1967 –
but by then government and public attitudes
towards oil pollution changed following events
in March that year.Drawing made by G.J. Frans Naerebout
and published in Op de Lange Deining

At 297 metres long, Torrey Canyon was one of
the largest vessels in the world at the time. The
tanker was carrying a cargo of 119,000 tonnes
of Kuwaiti crude oil for discharge at Milford
Haven in Wales when she ran aground on the
Seven Stones Reef in the south-west United
Kingdom on 18th March 1967. Investigations
into the accident showed the grounding was a
result of operational errors and misjudgments
by the crew.
Attempts at salvaging the ship were
unsuccessful and any decision to remove the
cargo was hampered by poor weather and the
limited availability of resources. The ship broke
up over the 12 days following the grounding,
and the cargo was lost which affected the
coasts of south-west England, the Channel
Islands and Brittany, France.
Oil pollution at sea was a recognised problem
by 1967, but the scale of the release of oil
from this incident was unprecedented and was
to have profound consequences. The incident
caught the governments of the affected
countries unprepared and the new medium of
television transmitted images which resulted in
immense public pressure to find solutions.
HISTORIC
The world’s first major oil spill Incident
Without suitable plans, the response was
largely improvised and techniques developed
prior to the incident were overwhelmed by the
volume of spilled oil. Attempts were made to
mitigate the spill by bombing the casualty in an
attempt to burn it. The oil did ignite initially,
but the limitations of burning oil at sea that we
now understand became very evident.
Clean-up in the UK focused primarily on the
application of a variety of degreasing agents to
oil floating at sea and stranded on the beaches.
This technique did serve to assist with oil
removal but additional environmental damage
also resulted. In France, degreasers were used
to a lesser extent in favour of other techniques,
including the early use of oil recovery
skimmers at sea.
The oil affected a wide variety of wildlife and
economic activities, notably tourism and
shell-fisheries. Liability for the costs of the
response and pollution damage was disputed
and compensation was made available only
after a protracted legal process. Faced with the
potential recurrence of such an incident, the
British Prime Minister at the time called on the
Council of IMCO (now IMO) to meet in
extraordinary circumstances to consider
possible changes in maritime law and
international regulations.
IMCO met subsequently in May 1967 and
drafted 21 “proposals for study”, including
suggestions requiring all vessels to carry
compulsory liability insurance; to make
shipowners responsible for the damage done by
their vessel without consideration of
negligence; a call for studies leading to less
toxic detergents, and the enforcement of
international agreements.
Ten points from the meeting addressed the
prevention of accidents at sea directly:
• Introduction of traffic lanes at sea
• Introduction of areas off-limits to
tankers carrying hazardous cargoes
• Shore stations to control ships
approaching and leaving port
• More navigational aids on large tankers
• A speed limit on large ships
when close to land
• Periodic tests of shipborne
navigational equipment
• Stronger tankers, with double hulls to
prevent leakage from accidents
• Equipping tankers with flaps or
drogues to assist stopping at sea
• Requiring ships to carry adequate
charts and sailing directions
• Tougher regulations on navigational training
for crews and officers
These recommendations were greeted with
mixed reviews at the time but set in motion
many of the regulations and features taken for
granted today.

The extraordinary session of the Council
of IMCO (now IMO) in May 1967 recognised
some of the problems arising from the
incident were legal in nature and established
an ad-hoc Legal Committee that met for the
first time in June 1967. Representatives
of 22 countries and observers from five
non-governmental organisations gathered
to examine:
• The definition of the evil to be remedied
• Legal aspects of preventive action
including the questions raised when
a State is threatened by or affected
by a casualty
• Liability and remedies
• Emergency measures - governmental
or inter-governmental - including
salvage procedures
• The rights of coastal States to intervene
The liability of ship and cargo owners for damage
to third parties caused by spills of oil or other
hazardous and noxious substances were at the heart
of the discussions along with consideration of the
need for a new international system of liability
incorporated in a multilateral convention.
Details included:
• The kind of damage which should be
covered by a convention for the purposes
of compensation
• The issue of whether strict liability
should be introduced
• Adjustments to the existing system
of limitation of liability
• Requirements for compulsory insurance
• What courts should have jurisdiction
COMPENSATION AND LIABILITY
The Legal Committee of IMO
These issues formed the basis of the
work of the Legal Committee for years to
come and led to the adoption by IMO of a
comprehensive international liability and
compensation regime, as well as the
conclusion in 1969 of the Intervention
Convention. This liability and compensation
regime began with the adoption of the Civil
Liability Convention in 1969, followed by the
adoption of the Fund Convention in 1971.
Subsequent work of the Legal Committee
resulted in the creation and adoption of
a number of key conventions, including:
• The Athens Convention relating to the
Carriage of Passengers and their Luggage
by Sea, 1974, and its Protocol of 2002
• The Convention on Limitation of
Liability for Maritime Claims, 1976,
and its Protocol of 1996
• The 1984 and 1992 Protocols to the Civil
Liability Convention and Fund Convention
to increase the limits of liability
• The Salvage Convention 1989
• The HNS Convention, 1996,
and its Protocol of 2010
• The Bunkers Convention 2001
• The Protocol of 2003 to the
Fund Convention, 1992
• The Nairobi Wreck Removal
Convention, 2007

The Torrey Canyon incident exposed the
difficulty for a coastal State to respond to a
marine casualty on the high seas without the
permission of the shipowner. In 1967, the UK
government was unable to respond directly to
the release of oil until the shipowner was
satisfied that all attempts at salvage had been
exhausted, by which time the vessel was
deemed a constructive total loss. The balance
at that time was in favour of protecting the
interests of shipowners, cargo owners and in
supporting the principle of the freedom of the
high seas.
To alleviate the situation, the International
Convention Relating to Intervention on the
High Seas in Cases of Oil Pollution Casualties
was adopted in 1975. A later Protocol
extended the convention to include marine
pollution by other substances. Today the
convention has 89 State parties.
The Intervention Convention affirms the
right of a Coastal State to take measures on
the high seas that are necessary to prevent,
mitigate or eliminate danger to its coastline or
its related interests from pollution, or the
threat of pollution, following a marine
casualty.
The Coastal State can only take action that is
necessary and must consult with interested
parties, like the Flag State of the ship
involved, the owners of the ship and cargo and
suitable independent experts. If a Coastal
State takes measures beyond those permitted
under the Convention it is liable to pay
compensation for any resultant damage.
PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE
Intervention Convention

Industry Compensation Schemes
Settlement signing ceremony for the claims of the French and UK governments
Claims were made by the governments of the UK
and France against the owner of the vessel but it
had no assets in the UK. The UK and French
governments presented their claims in a United
States district court which applied the US
Limitation of Liability Act of 1851. This Act
limited the liability of the owners to the value of
the vessel after the incident. As the vessel had
been lost, there was no residual value. The
governments appealed the liability judgment and
agreed a settlement of some US$ 9 million. At the
The aftermath of the Torrey Canyon incident in
1967 highlighted the need to establish an
international and uniform system to compensate
those affected by oil pollution from tankers.
At the time of the incident there was much
relevant legislation in the affected territories of
France and the UK, but some of this legislation
was conflicting and it was clear that obtaining
compensataion for the clean-up operations and
damage caused by the incident would
be difficult.
time it was the largest settlement for a ship-sourced
oil pollution damage claim.
This difficult situation led to pressure to develop a
system, funded by the oil industry and shipowners,
that would guarantee sufficient compensation for
future oil pollution incidents. Representatives of
industry proposed an interim solution in the form of
two private compensation schemes and these were
to remain in operation until new international
conventions came into force.
The Tanker Owners Voluntary Agreement concerning
Liability for Oil Pollution (TOVALOP) was established
and administered by ITOPF Ltd. It was signed in
1969 by seven major oil companies who operated a
significant part of the world’s tanker fleet, to provide
compensation for the costs of clean-up operations
and damage caused by tankers.
Shipowners’ liability under TOVALOP was originally
limited to a maximum of US$10 million per
incident. A supplementary scheme was introduced
by the oil companies, increasing the compensation
available to US$30 million per incident.
This second scheme was known as CRISTAL
(Contract Regarding an Interim Supplement to
Tanker Liability for Oil Pollution). Both schemes
remained in operation until 1997.

In the 1960s there was a rise in awareness of,
and concern for, environmental issues. It was
against this backdrop that the extraordinary
meeting organised at IMCO (now IMO) in May
1967 proposed a number of changes in ship
design and operations that led directly to the
development of the International Convention
for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships
(MARPOL). MARPOL is the main international
convention addressing prevention of pollution
of the marine environment by ships from
operational or accidental causes.
MARPOL expanded on the elements of the
earlier OILPOL Convention, which was no
longer adequate to address a changing
industry. Annex 1 of MARPOL covers pollution
by oil and initially developed the requirements
for continuous monitoring of oil-water
discharges, shore-based reception facilities
and segregated ballast tanks, as well as
establishing a number of Special Areas
geographically that further restricted
discharges of oil in specified zones.
PREVENTION
Pollution Prevention - MARPOL
The 1978 Protocol further developed these
provisions and required new larger tankers to
be fitted with “Crude Oil Washing” systems
to minimise the quantity of oil remaining on
board after discharge. Later developments to
Annex 1 in the 1990s introduced a mandatory
requirement for double hulls for tankers.
The Convention, in its modern form
and much amended, also incorporates
requirements preventing pollution from
chemicals transported in bulk and packaged
form, sewage, garbage and air emissions
(including CO2) from ships.

Ballast water is taken on board ships to maintain
stability, to allow steerage and for safety in bad
weather conditions. Fifty years ago, ballast water
was carried in a tanker’s cargo tanks, resulting in
the discharge of oily water overboard. However,
ballast water is now carried in segregated ballast
tanks and remains free of cargo oil or fuel oil and
can be discharged overboard.
The 1978 MARPOL Protocol introduced the
concept known as "protective location of
segregated ballast tanks". This meant that the
ballast tanks, which are empty on the
cargo-carrying leg of the voyage and only loaded
with ballast water for the return leg, are
positioned where the impact of a collision or
grounding is likely to be greatest and, by doing
so, reducing the risk of a spill of the amount of
cargo released if there is an incident.
Subsequent amendments in 1983 took this
segregation concept further by banning the
carriage of oil in the forepeak tank, the ship's
most vulnerable point, in the event of a collision.
PREVENTION
Segregated Ballast Tanks
MARPOL expanded on the elements of the
earlier OILPOL Convention, which was no
longer adequate to address a changing
industry. Annex 1 of MARPOL covers
pollution by oil and initially developed the
requirements for continuous monitoring of
oil-water discharges, shore-based reception
facilities and segregated ballast tanks, as
well as establishing a number of Special
Areas geographically that further restricted
discharges of oil in specified zones.

The International Convention for the Safety of
Life at Sea (SOLAS), 1974, and its successive
revisions, is generally regarded as the most
important of all international treaties
concerning the safety of merchant ships. The
first version of SOLAS was adopted in 1914,
in direct response to the sinking of the
Titanic, with subsequent revisions in 1929,
1948 and 1960. The fifth and current version,
which has been much amended, was adopted
in 1974.
The objective of the SOLAS Convention is to
specify minimum safety standards for the
construction, equipment and operation of
ships. Flag States are responsible for ensuring
that ships under their flag comply with the
requirements, and a number of certificates
are prescribed in the Convention as proof that
this has been done. Governments that are
signatories to SOLAS are allowed to inspect
ships of other signatory states if there are
clear reasons for believing that the ship and
its equipment do not comply with the
requirements of the Convention. This
procedure is known as Port State Control.
PREVENTION
Safety Of Life At Sea - SOLAS
SOLAS covers the full range of safety issues
that may affect the ship, including fire
protection; life-saving appliances and
arrangements; radio communications; safety
of navigation; managing the safe operations
of a ship and the carriage of cargoes and
dangerous goods, in particular mandating
inert gas systems and imposing stricter
regimes for surveys and certification. These
measures, together with the related Codes
that underpin the implementation of SOLAS,
provide a comprehensive safety framework for
international maritime transport.
SOLAS is well-supported by shipping industry
initiatives such as the ICS Bridge Procedures
Guide which is the definitive industry
publication on best practice for safe
navigation. Two additional industry
publications: the IACS Common Structural
Rules and the OCIMF and ICS International
Safety Guide for Oil Tankers and Terminals,
are described elsewhere in the exhibition.

In the late 1960s and early 1970s, IMCO
(now IMO) adopted two international treaties
to ensure that adequate compensation was
available to people who suffer damage resulting
from spills of persistent oil
from tankers.
The treaties share the cost of marine oil
spill incidents between the shipowner and
the oil receivers and they established the
first International Oil Pollution Compensation
Fund (IOPC Fund), creating what is now known
as the international liability and compensation
regime.
The regime places the liability for damage on
the owner of the ship from which the polluting
oil escaped or was discharged. It is strict
liability with some specific exceptions.
It means that the owner has to pay for
admissible claims resulting from pollution
damage regardless of fault. In return, the
owner has the right to limit liability to a certain
amount in respect of any one incident. Ships
are required under the relevant Convention to
maintain insurance or other financial security
in sums equivalent to the owner's total liability
for any one incident.
The Legal Framework for Compensation
This regime is now complemented by the
Bunkers and Wreck Removal Conventions,
and potentially the 2010 HNS Convention,
which offer separate compensation schemes for
other types of incidents at sea than those
covered by the original regime.
The first tier of compensation is paid by the
shipowner’s insurer. It is usually the third party
liability Protection and Indemnity Club (P&I
Club) of the owner of the ship involved in the
incident. The second tier of compensation is
paid by an international fund, the IOPC Fund
which is financed by receivers of oil after sea
transport in those States party to the relevant
treaties which are:
• The 1992 Civil Liability Convention
(1992 CLC) - 136 States Parties
• The 1992 Fund Convention
- 114 States Parties
• The 2003 Supplementary Fund Protocol
(which provides an optional additional layer
of compensation) - 31 States Parties

The human element remains the most important
contributing factor in maritime accidents.
The causes of marine casualties include
collisions, groundings, fires, explosions and
other accidents, which in the majority of
cases are a result of human error.
To address this, the International Convention
on Standards of Training, Certification and
Watchkeeping for Seafarers was adopted in 1978
to promote the safety of life and property at sea
and the protection of the marine environment
by establishing agreed common international
standards of competence for seafarers.
PREVENTION
Standards of Training, Certification and
Watchkeeping for Seafarers (STCW)
A major revision to the Convention in
1995 further enhanced Port State Control
measures allowing mutual oversight and
consistency in the application of
standards; quality standards systems
(QSS); oversight of training, assessment,
and certification procedures and new
training requirements. Responsibility was
placed on parties, including those issuing
licenses and Flag States employing foreign
nationals, to ensure seafarers meet
objective standards of competence and
observe the rest period requirements
for watchkeeping personnel.
Another major revision in 2010, known
as the "The Manila Amendments", brought
training standards in line with modern
day requirements, requiring updated
and improved training to meet new
developments in ship technology,
operation and security.

ISGOTT is a comprehensive guide to the safe
transport and handling of crude oil and refined
products on tankers and at terminals. It was first
published in 1978, combining the contents of the
“Tanker Safety Guide (Petroleum)” published by
the International Chamber of Shipping (ICS) and
the “International Oil Tanker and Terminal Safety
Guide” published by the Oil Companies
International Marine Forum (OCIMF).
Revised editions have been regularly published
under the oversight of ICS, OCIMF and the
International Association of Ports and Harbors
(IAPH) to ensure that the guide continues to reflect
current best practice and legislation.
PREVENTION
The International Safety Guide for Oil Tankers and Terminals (ISGOTT)
The Guide provides operational advice
to help personnel involved in tanker and
terminal operations and it is a general
industry recommendation that a copy of
ISGOTT is kept and used on all tankers and
at every terminal, so that there is a
consistent approach to operational
procedures when ships are at terminals.

An understanding of the fate and behaviour
of spilled oil and of the equipment and
techniques used in pollution response have
improved significantly in the past fifty years.
Scientific teams established in the 1970s
conducted research programmes which,
combined with practical lessons learned
from spills, have resulted in the development
of enhanced strategies for response and the
development of improved equipment such
as booms, skimmers, dispersant and oil
spill models.
The use of chemical dispersants has changed
over time. Industrial machinery de greasers
were adopted initially for oil spill response.
However, their application at large incidents
led to inappropriate dosing and their use was
not always successful and in some cases led
to adverse impacts. However, with proper
planning and well designed application
equipment the potential of chemical response
was recognised. Manufacturers developed
a range of dispersants to meet national
standards, that are intended specifically to
disperse oil into droplets in the water column
which would then break down naturally.
Continuous development of dispersants has
ensured their major role in marine oil spill
response in many countries.
Studies of large scale releases of oil
demonstrated that oil slicks eventually
disperse naturally, with some oils persisting
longer than others. These studies led to the
grouping of hydrocarbon oils according to
their assay characteristics, allowing easier
reference when deciding response strategies
in future incidents. As a result, a more rapid
and accurate assessment of the potential of
a spill to affect a shoreline can be made.
Oil Pollution Response
Experience and research has also highlighted
the advantages of limiting clean-up in
sensitive areas, such as mangroves and salt
marshes, and has led to the promotion of
natural cleaning on appropriate shorelines.
Other techniques have been developed for
effective oil spill response in cold climates.
Advances have improved remote sensing
enabling it to become an important tool in the
detection and evaluation of oil contamination.
Developments with radiation scanners and
satellite based radar, together with rapid
interpretation of images, have encouraged
their effective use as operational tools.
Organisations such as Oil Spill Response
Limited, established by four oil companies
and now with 42 oil company Members and
~100 Associates Members, are prepared to
respond to oil spills globally. The Global
Response Network and International Spill
Control Organisation ensure their response
contractor members are at the forefront of
response technology. ITOPF is funded by the
shipping industry to provide technical advice
to promote effective response to pollution in
the marine environment.
Great improvements have been made in oil
spill response in the 50 years. Nevertheless,
this remains challenging and continued
research and development, together with
effective knowledge transfer, remain
key objectives.

Port State Control is the inspection of foreign
ships in national ports to verify that the
condition of the ship, its equipment, manning
and operation comply with the requirements
of international Conventions such as SOLAS,
MARPOL, and STCW.
In 1982, the Paris Memorandum of
Understanding (Paris MoU) established the
system of Port State Control which today
covers 26 European countries and Canada.
Building on the foundation of the Paris MoU,
other regional MoUs were signed, covering the
Pacific Ocean, South and Central America, the
Caribbean, the Mediterranean, the Indian
Ocean, West and Central Atlantic Africa, the
Black Sea and the Middle East Gulf.
Many of IMO’s most important technical
conventions contain provisions for ships to be
inspected when they visit foreign ports to
ensure that they meet IMO requirements.
PREVENTION
Inspection and Enforcement – Port State Control (PSC)
To facilitate the implementation of Port State
Control, IMO adopted the Resolution on
“Regional Co-operation in the Control of Ships
and Discharges Promoting the Conclusion of
Regional Agreements”. Ships visiting a port in
one country will normally visit other countries
in the region, and it is more efficient if
inspections can be closely coordinated to
focus on sub-standard ships and to avoid
multiple inspections. It also prevents ships
being delayed by unnecessary inspections.
The primary responsibility for the standard of
ships rests with the Flag State - but Port State
Control provides a valuable additional tool to
identify substandard ships.

PREVENTION
Inert gas systems
The oil and refined products carried by
tankers can produce flammable vapours and
gases in cargo tanks. Fire is a major threat to
the safety of tanker operations, as just a
single spark can cause a devastating
explosion if it ignites the vapour from an oil
cargo.
Harmful or dangerous flammable gases can
also be present in empty cargo tanks. When
the vapour produced by an oil cargo is mixed
with air and is exposed to an ignition source,
it can cause an explosion resulting in loss of
life, damage to ship and other property and
the possibility of marine pollution.
To prevent such explosions and to ensure the
safety of the ship and its crew, tankers employ
“inert gas systems” to reduce the oxygen
content in cargo tanks. The normal method is
to fill these tanks with
non-explosive/non-reactive inert gas from the
ship's boiler flue. The flue gas is scrubbed or
cleaned and then pumped into the empty
tanks, or into the spaces left above the oil in
loaded tanks, to minimise the risk from fire or
explosion on board. Other systems employ a
separate inert gas generation plant to supply
the gas.
Oil companies have employed inert gas
systems in their tanker fleets in an ad-hoc
manner since the mid 1930s. In 1985, SOLAS
introduced a requirement for inert gas
systems to be fitted to all oil tankers of
20,000 tonnes dwt and above. From January
2016, this requirement has been extended to
all new tankers of 8,000 tonnes dwt and
above. The engineering specifications for inert
gas systems are set out in the International
Code for Fire Safety Systems (FSS Code).

PREVENTION
Global Maritime Distress and Safety System
The Global Maritime Distress and Safety
System (GMDSS) is an international network
which uses terrestrial and satellite technology
and ship-board radio-systems to ensure rapid,
automated alerts are sent to shore-based
communication and rescue authorities in the
event of a marine incident. Other ships in the
vicinity of an incident are also alerted. The
system was introduced and is required under
amendments made in 1988 to SOLAS.
GMDSS is mandatory on all ocean-going pas-
senger ships and cargo ships of 300 or more
gross tonnes and which are engaged
on international voyages. The vessel must
be equipped with radio equipment that con-
forms to the international standards set out in
the system.
GMDSS consists of a number of components
including Emergency Position Indicating Radio
Beacon (EPIRB) equipment and search and
rescue locating devices or transponders and
an automated system for distributing mari-
time safety information.
The system enables rapid alerting and loca-
tion of the casualty and assists with coordina-
tion of search and rescue efforts.

Maritime Salvage
The practice of marine salvage and the
international legal framework under which
salvage services are delivered have developed
significantly. With the exception of a small
number of coastal states which provide
state-funded emergency towing vessels, marine
salvage is undertaken by commercial
operators.
The priority in any salvage operation has
always been saving life. Saving property – the
ship and its cargo – used to be the next
priority with little thought for the marine
environment. Over the decades the priorities have
shifted with protection of the environment now
more important than saving property. The salvor
will immediately consider how to minimise the risk
to the environment from the cargo or bunker fuel
onboard a casualty.
In the past five decades, salvage craft have
become more powerful and more manoeuvrable.
Towing practice has developed and advances, like
the introduction of the “Smit Bracket” in the
1970s, have improved the process of controlling a
casualty. Firefighting methods and the introduction
of “hot tapping” to remove cargo and bunkers
have been major developments. The salvage
industry is capable of removing potential
pollutants even from sunken vessels lying at
considerable depth. More recently the
introduction of damage stability software and
the use of air portable salvage equipment and
teams from central locations have enhanced
casualty response.
The legal framework for marine salvage is
underpinned by the 1989 Salvage Convention.
It introduced the idea of “special
compensation” to encourage salvors to assist
ships, which, because of the limited likelihood
of successful salvage or low residual values,
might not otherwise have been commercially
worthwhile to attend.
The Salvage Convention was incorporated into
the most commonly used salvage contract,
Lloyd’s Open Form in its 1990 edition. Special
Compensation evolved into the Special
Compensation P&I Club Clause, known as
SCOPIC, which was introduced in 1999. Under
SCOPIC the salvor receives a tariff rate − and
an “uplift” − for equipment and personnel used
in providing a salvage service even if the
service is unsuccessful. SCOPIC has been a
great success in encouraging commercial
salvors to provide services to casualties that
otherwise might have been left to the
elements.

Regional Cooperation and the International Convention on Oil Pollution
Preparedness and Response (OPRC)
National governments are often more able to
prepare and respond to pollution incidents when
they work with neighbouring countries, in order
to share expertise, experiences and resources.
The first regional agreement for oil pollution was
signed in Bonn, Germany in 1969 by countries
bordering the North Sea. Many other such
agreements are now in place globally, a number
of which are arranged through the IMO and the
United Nations Environment Programme
(UNEP) under regional conventions. The first of
these, the Barcelona Convention adopted in
1976, led eventually to the formation of a
regional coordination centre in the
Mediterranean Sea. Other regional centres
coordinate preparedness and response around the
world.
The International Convention on Oil Pollution
Preparedness and Response OPRC ’90 came into
force in 1995 to provide for the first time a global
framework to facilitate international cooperation and
mutual assistance for major marine pollution
incidents. OPRC encourages states to develop and
maintain a preparedness and response capability of
their own, while recognising the importance of
regional cooperation and joint working with the oil
and shipping industries to deal with major pollution
emergencies.
States which ratify OPRC commit to the
following key obligations:
• Require ships under the national flag, as well
as operators of offshore units, ports and oil
handling facilities, to have oil pollution
emergency plans.
• Oblige ships to report incidents of pollution
to coastal authorities.
• Establish stockpiles of oil spill response
equipment; conduct oil spill response
exercises and develop contingency plans for
dealing with pollution incidents. Designated
national authorities and focal points
responsible for oil pollution preparedness
and response must be identified.
• Provide assistance to others in the event of a
pollution emergency and provision is made
for the reimbursement of any assistance
provided.
IMO works with governments and industry to
enhance the capacity of States to meet the
requirements of the Convention by providing
manuals, guidelines, training aids and courses
and technical assistance. At present, 109
states representing 74% of the world’s
tonnage are party to OPRC.
The Global Initiative (GI) launched in 1996, is
an umbrella programme under which
governments, through IMO, and the oil
industry, through IPIECA, work together to
assist countries in developing national
structures and capability for oil spill
preparedness and response.
South
Asian
Seas
West and
Central
Africa
South-East
Pacific
North-East
Pacific
Pacific
Pacific
East
Asian
Seas
orthwest
acific Northwest
Pacific
ROPME
Sea AreaRed Sea
& Gulf of
Aden - PERSGA
Eastern
Africa
Black Sea
Mediterranean
North-East
Atlantic

In 1992, MARPOL was amended to require all
new tankers of 5,000 dwt and above to be
built with double hulls, to reduce the risk of
the release of cargo, notably oil, in the event
of grounding or collision.
PREVENTION
The Introduction of Double Hulls –
A New Era in Ship Construction
The requirement for double hulls was also
applied to existing ships under a programme
that began in 1995, which meant all tankers
would have had to be converted, or taken out
of service, when they reached a certain age
(up to 30 years old). This measure was
initially to be phased in over a number of
years, allowing a smooth transition from
single to double hulls and uninterrupted
trade.
However, the need to introduce double hulls
more quickly led to stricter accelerated
timetables for the phasing-out of single-hull
tankers. 2015 marked the final phase out of
single hull tankers, with all tankers engaged in
international trade now of double hull
construction.
Photo by John, GCaptain.com

When a ship is hired or chartered to carry a
cargo, the charterer will take steps to ensure
the ship is operated professionally, its
certificates and insurances are valid, and that
it is in a condition suitable to complete a
voyage safely. Similarly, terminal operators,
Port State Control authorities, insurers and
underwriters will often require information on
the ship to ensure only safe ships are allowed
to berth. Vetting is the process by which all
this information on a ship is gathered and
professionally assessed and a decision on
chartering is made. A significant part of this
information is obtained by physical inspection
of a ship by a marine professional.
Oil companies have had processes in place for
vetting ships for many decades. In the 1970s
and 1980s multiple ship inspections during a
ship’s port call created a new risk, distracting
ship’s crews from safely handling their
cargoes. Something had to be done, so the
major oil companies, through the Oil
Companies International Marine Forum
(OCIMF), collaborated to share inspection
reports through the Ship Inspection Report
Programme (SIRE) database. SIRE was
launched in 1993 to provide a standardised
inspection format, with objective reports that
can be shared and used by, currently, nearly
400 vetting departments globally.
PREVENTION
Ship Vetting and Ship Inspection Report
Programme (SIRE)
SIRE inspections take place around the world
using a cadre of nearly 500 trained and
accredited ship inspectors. At the heart of the
system is a large database of technical and
operational information about tankers used
for carrying oil, gas and chemicals.
Since its introduction, more than 335,000
inspection reports have been submitted to the
SIRE database. In excess of 20,000
inspections on more than 8,500 tankers have
been conducted in the last 12 months. On
average, more than 12,000 reports each
month are download by the 400 users of the
SIRE programme which includes 60 Port
State Control agencies. OCIMF’s SIRE
programme encourages ship operators to
maintain high standards of ship management,
and provides tanker charterers with the
information necessary to hire the best quality
tankers to carry their oil.
In parallel, a number of national
administrations developed the EQUASIS
database in 2000 to collate existing
safety-related information on ships from both
public and private sources for publication on
the internet.

Contingency Planning for Oil Pollution
Effective response to a spill of oil depends
largely on the preparedness of the
organisations and individuals involved.
Response can be enhanced greatly by
developing and maintaining plans to address
all likely contingencies. In the late 1960s and
early 1970s, government authorities and the
oil industry initiated the development of
well-resourced and tested contingency plans at
local, national, and international levels.
Contingency plans are now widely accepted
and mandated by national law in many states
as required by the OPRC Convention. Robust
plans ensure effective notification, assessment
and response to marine spills and other
incidents by identifying in advance the
organisational arrangements and resources as
well as appropriate strategies that will be
needed.
In planning to cope with a range of scenarios from
localised, operational spills to complex
multi-jurisdictional incidents, industry and
governments developed the concept of “tiered
response”. It allows for a level of equipment and
resources proportionate to the risk to be
immediately available and for this to be
supplemented by additional resources and
capabilities, available both nationally and
internationally if needed.
Contingency planning has helped improve the
ability to respond to spills, but levels of
preparedness remain inconsistent across the
world. IMO and industry continue to work in areas
where contingency plans may be inadequate and
where personnel have limited training through
regional cooperation programmes, workshops and
regular exercises.
TIER 1 capabilities describe the operators’ locally
held resources used to mitigate spills that are
typically operational in nature occurring on or near
an operator’s own facility. The resources also
provide an initial response to spills that may
potentially escalate beyond the scope of Tier 1
initial actions and capabilities.
TIER 2 capabilities refer to additional, often
shared, national or regional resources necessary to
supplement a Tier 1 response or support an
escalating response. Tier 2 capability includes a
wider selection of equipment and expertise suited
to a range of strategic response options.
TIER 3 capabilities are globally available resources
that further supplement Tiers 1 and 2. They
complete the international resources for spills that
require a substantial external response due to
incident scale, complexity and/or impact potential.

The international liability and compensation
regime is a successful solution to the lack of
an international system for compensating
victims of oil pollution damage brought to
light in the 1960s.
When it was introduced the international
compensation regime was a new concept and
it remains unique. That is because the burden
of the risk is shared between both the
shipowner and the oil receivers, creating a
compensation fund which is overseen by
governments.
The Compensation Regime In Action
It is this spirit of cooperation that has enabled
the continued success of the international
system. Since 1978, 150 incidents have been
dealt with and more than £600 million of
compensation having been paid by the IOPC
Funds alone.
Many more “first tier” incidents have been
paid for by the P&I Clubs under the Civil
Liability Conventions.

The Protection and Indemnity Clubs (P&I
Clubs) which are members of the
International Group of P&I Clubs (IG) insure
over 90% of world ocean-going tonnage and
over 95% of all ocean-going tankers.
The P&I Clubs undertake measures to
promote vessel quality by commissioning P&I
surveys of newly entered vessels over 12
years of age, and tankers over 10 years of age
carrying heavy fuel oil, to ensure these vessels
are of an acceptable standard for entry into a
Club.
PREVENTION
The Role of the P&I Clubs – Loss Prevention
The individual P&I Clubs also maintain loss
prevention teams to promote awareness of
risk, by publishing loss prevention materials
and statistics, and by illustrating how
incidents may be avoided. These activities are
supported by education and training
initiatives by the P&I Clubs and the IG, for the
officers, crew and managers of shipowner
members.

Vessel Traffic Services (VTS) are shore-based
systems which range from the provision of
simple information messages to ships, such
as the position of other traffic or
meteorological hazard warnings, to extensive
management of traffic within a port or
waterway similar to air traffic control. VTS is
governed by SOLAS and also the Guidelines
for Vessel Traffic Services adopted by IMO in
1997.
Generally, ships entering a VTS area report to
the authorities, usually by radio, and may be
tracked by the VTS control centre. Ships must
keep radio watch on a specific frequency for
navigational or other warnings and they may
be contacted directly by the VTS operator if
there is risk of an incident. In areas where
traffic flow is regulated, the ship may be given
instructions as to how it should proceed.
Typical VTS systems include the use of radar,
closed-circuit television (CCTV), VHF
radiotelephony and the Automatic
PREVENTION
Vessel Traffic Services (VTS) and Automatic
Identification System (AIS)
Identification System (AIS) to keep track of
vessel movements and provide navigational
safety in a defined geographical area.
Technologies to assist VTS operators are
expected to continue to evolve and offer new
levels of sophistication.
The Automatic Identification System (AIS) is
an automatic tracking system for identifying
and locating ships by electronically
exchanging data with other nearby ships, AIS
base stations, and satellites.
In 2000, IMO adopted new regulations as part
of a revision of parts of SOLAS which require
AIS to be fitted on all international voyaging
ships of 300 or more gross tonnes and on all
passenger ships regardless of size. The
information provided by AIS equipment such
as unique identification, position, course and
speed can be displayed on a screen or an
Electronic Chart Display and Information
System (ECDIS).

The introduction of the International Safety
Management (ISM) Code in 1998 was an
important step in focusing on the "human
element" of shipping operations, by providing
an international standard for the safe
management by shipping companies of ship
operations including pollution prevention.
The objectives of the ISM Code are to ensure
safety at sea, prevention of human injury or
loss of life and avoidance of damage to the
environment, in particular, to the marine
environment, and to property. In order to
comply with the ISM Code, which is
mandatory under SOLAS, shipping companies
and their vessels must have an operational
Safety Management System, subject to both
internal and external audit.
PREVENTION
International Safety Management (ISM) Code
All ships covered by the ISM Code must be
issued with a Safety Management Certificate
by their Flag State. Shipping companies must
be issued with a valid Document of
Compliance which is, in effect, an
international licence to operate, confirming
that there is a functioning Safety Management
System in place. An important aspect of the
ISM Code and the associated audits is that
they embrace the concept of continuous
improvement which is critical to the
development of a safety culture and improved
environmental performance.
Guidelines on Application of the ISM Code,
produced by the International Chamber of
Shipping and the International Shipping
Federation also play a significant part in
uniform implementation of ISM Code.

The response to wildlife affected by oil has
been one of the least understood and most
underestimated elements of oil spill response.
Traditionally, rehabilitation of live animals was
often attempted, but was only rarely
successful. Despite the intensive care and
good intentions of those involved, oiled
wildlife was previously unlikely to survive
cleaning, rehabilitation and release.
Considerable efforts by scientists and
non-governmental organisations (NGOs) to
develop rehabilitation methodologies have
resulted in a greatly improved situation.
Oiled wildlife response is the combination of
activities that aim to minimise the impact of
an oil spill on wildlife by both prevention of
oiling and mitigating the effects when oiling
has taken place. Targeted animals typically
include marine, coastal and aquatic birds,
marine reptiles, such as sea turtles, and
marine and aquatic mammals, including
seals, sea lions, otters and cetaceans.
PREVENTION
Response to Oiled Wildlife
Response activities include:
• Assessment of the risks to wildlife
• Real-time monitoring of the location of wildlife
in relation to spilled oil
• Protection of nesting sites and land-based
sites occasionally used by marine wildlife
• Deterring wildlife from the area of a spill
• Pre-emptive capture and collection of
unaffected animals and their offspring or eggs
• Removal of dead animals and necessary
euthanasia
• Rehabilitation of live oiled animals, their
release to the wild and monitoring of
post-release survival
Successful wildlife response relies upon
formalised relationships between NGOs,
governments and industry. A good example is
the Global Oiled Wildlife Response System.
Successful systems are in place in many regions
and which have been effective in many instances
in the last 20 years. However, there is still
important work to do to ensure the response to
oiled wildlife is as effective as possible.

The Protection and Indemnity Clubs (P&I
Clubs) which are members of the International
Group of P&I Clubs (IG) insure over 90% of
world ocean-going tonnage and over 95% of
all ocean-going tankers.
Shipowner's liability cover provided by the IG
Clubs, along with the IG's claims pooling and
reinsurance arrangements, are a key factor in
enabling world seaborne trade, protecting the
marine environment and in meeting the
interests of all those affected by oil pollution.
The international oil pollution compensation
regime is underpinned by IG Club cover
through the financial guarantees (“blue cards”)
that the IG Clubs issue to shipowners for the
purposes of the 1992 Civil Liability
Convention. The Clubs also provide a unique
claims handling service to manage the
aftermath of a ship-sourced oil pollution
incident.
The great majority of all cases of ship-sourced
oil pollution damage are handled by the
individual P&I Clubs alone. Shipowners rely on
their P&I Clubs to handle claims both from a
financial and administrative perspective.
Incidents can be complex and involve a range
of different parties and interests. Quick and
fair resolution to the handling and settlement
The Role of the P&I Clubs − Compensation
of claims is important and the IG Clubs have
extensive experience over many years of
handling oil pollution damage claims within
the international compensation regime.
The IG is an active representative body within
the IOPC Funds system, and it works jointly
with the IOPC Funds to ensure that the system
operates for the benefit of all parties. This
work has included the creation of the Small
Tanker Oil Pollution Indemnification
Agreement 2006 (STOPIA 2006) and the
Tanker Oil Pollution Indemnification
Agreement 2006 (TOPIA 2006).
These two voluntary agreements apply to
tankers entered in P&I Clubs that are
members of the IG and reinsured through the
pooling arrangements of the Group.

For vessels in distress or in need of assistance
there is often the need to find an appropriate
location where the vessel can be stabilised or
repaired. Such a “Place of Refuge” can be a
port or a sheltered natural site. The shipping
industry recognises that the risk of pollution
is a sensitive issue for coastal States.
However, failure to offer a place of refuge may
mean the condition of the vessel deteriorating
with the risk of pollution over a wider area.
In response to a series of incidents, IMO
adopted two Resolutions in 2003 on
“Guidelines on Places of Refuge for Ships in
need of Assistance” and on “Maritime
Assistance Services” (MAS), recommending
that all coastal states establish a maritime
assistance service for receiving reports,
monitoring a ship’s situation and serving as a
point of contact.
PREVENTION
Places of Refuge
In 2007 IMO’s Maritime Safety Committee
approved “Guidelines on the Control of Ships in
an Emergency” which, along with the 1989
Salvage Convention and the 1979 Search and
Rescue Convention, also bear on the issue of
Places of Refuge.
In response to the IMO Resolutions, some
countries and regions have identified and
published complementary guidance as well as
identifying potential locations for refuge. Other
countries believe that the decision will need to
be made on a case by case basis due to
technical, political, and other factors and may
require specific conditions to be met before a
ship can use a port of refuge. Nevertheless,
many in the shipping and salvage industries
would like to see an improvement in response to
requests for a place of refuge in other parts of
the world.

Most sea-going ships are “classed” to verify
the structural strength and integrity of the
ship’s hull and equipment, as well as the
reliability of other essential systems.
Classification Societies achieve this by
developing and applying their own rules and
by verifying compliance on behalf of Flag
State Administrations with applicable
international and national regulations
throughout the life cycle of the ship.
Classification by a society recognised by the
Flag State is a condition for certification
under SOLAS and, in many cases, is a
prerequisite for registration of a ship with the
Flag State. Periodic surveys are undertaken to
verify that a vessel is maintained in
compliance with the relevant classification
and related requirements.
The International Association of Classification
Societies (IACS) is an association of the
leading Classification Societies which
develops and promotes minimum technical
PREVENTION
Class and Common Structural Rules
standards, in part through Unified
Requirements which include Common
Structural Rules for different ship types. The
IACS Common Structural Rules came into
force in 2006, and cover double hull tankers
with a length of 150 metres and greater and
bulk carriers with a length of 90 metres or
greater.
IMO’s Maritime Safety Committee confirmed
in 2016 that the Rules submitted by each of
the 12 IACS Member Societies for oil tankers
and bulk carriers conform to the requirements
of IMO’s Goal-Based Ship Construction
Standards under SOLAS.
Use of Common Structural Rules that
conform to the Goal-Based Standards drives
improvements in safety by setting a standard
for design and construction that an individual
Classification Society must meet as a
prerequisite for certifying oil tankers and bulk
carriers under SOLAS.

The IMO Member State Audit Scheme is
intended to provide an audited Member State
with a comprehensive and objective assess-
ment of how effectively it administers and
implements those mandatory IMO instru-
ments which are covered by the Scheme.
Amendments to eight IMO instruments,
including MARPOL, made audits of Member
States mandatory from the beginning of
2016. The IMO Instruments Implementation
Code provides the standards for conducting
an audit.
The scheme addresses issues such as:
• Conformance in enacting appropriate legisla-
tion for the IMO instruments to which a
Member State is a party
• Implementation and enforcement of the ap-
plicable laws and regulations by the Member
State
• Delegation of authority to Recognised Or-
ganisations (ROs)
• The control and monitoring mechanism of
the survey and certification processes by the
Member States
It is expected that the audit scheme will bring
about other benefits, such as identifying
where capacity-building activities − like the
PREVENTION
IMO Member State Audit Scheme (IMSAS)
provision of technical assistance by IMO to
Member States − would have the greatest effect.
In doing so, targeting of appropriate action to
improve performance will be improved. The
Member States themselves would receive valuable
feedback to assist them in improving their own
capacity to put applicable instruments into prac-
tice. Generic lessons learnt from audits could be
provided to all Member States to share the bene-
fits more widely.
The shipping industry has developed complemen-
tary audit and quality management schemes, an
example of which is the International Association
of Classification Societies (IACS) Quality System
Certification Scheme (QSCS).
QSCS has its roots in a number of serious casual-
ties at the end of the 1980s and early 1990s.
Many of these were the result of operational fail-
ings, prompting IMO, in 1993, to adopt Guide-
lines on the Enhanced Programme of Inspections
during Surveys of Bulk Carriers and Oil Tankers.
IACS responded by creating the QSCS, which is
one of the key criteria for membership of IACS by
a Classification Society. This remains central to
the IACS ethos and compliance is mandatory for
its Classification Society members.

Improvements have been made to the system
of compensation over time. The IOPC Funds
and the International Group of P&I Clubs (IG)
have continued to work with international,
regional and intergovernmental organisations
− as well as the oil and shipping industry − to
encourage the worldwide adoption of the oil
pollution compensation regime. The continued
aim is to provide the best protection to those
affected by marine oil spills.
There is ongoing work to identify those
regions or countries which require particular
attention and support to help them adopt the
regime or to ensure that it is properly imple-
mented nationally. The work is informed by
Compensation − The Work Continues
analysis of factors such as trends in the pro-
duction, transportation and import of oil as
well as consideration of the risk of oil spills.
The collaborative efforts of the organisations
involved in this outreach programme have
been successful. The cooperation between the
IOPC Funds, the IG, IMO and ITOPF shows the
benefit of working together and drawing on
each organisation’s areas of expertise to
achieve wider coverage and better application
of the regime. It forms part of the wider effort
conducted by IMO to advocate the adoption of
global maritime rules and standards and con-
ventions in shipping.

The TORREY CANYON incident in 1967
highlighted the need to establish an
international and uniform system to
compensate those affected by oil pollution
from tankers.
At the time of the incident there was much
relevant legislation in the affected territories
of France and the UK. However, some of this
legislation was conflicting and it was clear
that obtaining compensation for the clean-up
operations and damage caused by the
incident would be difficult.
Claims were made by the governments of the
UK and France against the owners of the
vessel but it had no assets in the UK. The UK
and French governments presented their
claims in an American district court which
applied the US Limitation of Liability Act of
1851. It limited the liability of the owners to
the value of the vessel after the incident. As
the vessel had been sunk there was no
residual value. The governments appealed the
liability judgement and agreed a settlement of
some US$ 9 million, at the time it was the
largest settlement for an oil claim.
A clear warning
This difficult situation led to pressure to
develop a system, funded by the oil industry
and shipowners, that would guarantee
sufficient compensation for future oil pollution
incidents. Representatives of industry
proposed an interim solution in the form of
two private compensation schemes and these
were to remain in operation until new
international conventions came into force.
The Tanker Owners Voluntary Agreement
concerning Liability for Oil Pollution
(TOVALOP) was established and administered
by the International Tanker Owners Pollution
Federation Ltd (ITOPF). It was signed in 1969
by seven major oil companies to provide
compensation to governments for the costs of
clean-up operations and damage caused by
tankers. Shipowners’ liability under TOVALOP
was originally limited to a maximum of US$
10 million per incident. A supplementary
scheme was introduced by the oil companies
increasing the compensation available to US$
30 million per incident. This second scheme
was known as CRISTAL (Contract Regarding
an Interim Supplement to Tanker Liability for
Oil Pollution). Both schemes remained in
operation until 1997.

50 years working together against oil pollution from ships

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