1. ModernInternational HumanitarianLaw Failstoeffectivelyregulate armed conflicts which involves
the participation of multinational forces. Critically discuss this statement with reference to
international practice and academic commentary.
Module: International Law of Armed Conflict
Student Number: 650042321
Word Count: 3906 (within the 5% limit)

2. ModernInternational HumanitarianLaw Failstoeffectivelyregulate armed conflicts which involves
the participation of multinational forces. Critically discuss this statement with reference to
international practice and academic commentary.
As Dr Ferraro1
observes:“thequestion of the applicability and application of international
humanitarian law (IHL) to multinationalforces (M.F) isat the forefrontof legaldiscussion.”2
Indeed,
Zwanenburg3
notesthatwhilst“nota new phenomenon […] perhapsmorethan everbefore,today’s
military operationsarecarried outby [M.F]”;4
atrendthat is unlikelytochange inthe near future.5
Howeverthe ICRC6
cautionsthat “certain States and internationalorganisations (I.Os) engaged in
[operations] havebeen reluctantto acceptthat[IHL] is applicableto their actions,even when criteria
forits applicabilityhavebeen fulfilled.”7
Accordingly,itisnecessarytoconsiderhow IHL appliesto
armedconflicts (A.C) involvingM.F. PartOne addressedthe applicabilityof IHLto M.F whilstPart
Two examinesshortfallsalreadyexistingwithinIHLwhichare themamplifiedbythe involvementof
M.Fs. Overall,itisassertedthatIHL failstoeffectivelyregulateA.CsinvolvingM.Fs. However,itis
firstappropriate tooutline the relevantterminology.
1 Dr Tristan Ferrara is a Legal Adviser is the Legal Division of the International Committee of the Red Cross,
Geneva.
2 Tristan Ferrara,“The Applicability and Application of International Humanitarian Lawto Multinational Forces”
(2013) Vol.95 International Reviewof the Red Cross 561-612,561
3 Martin Zwanenburg is a senior legal adviser atthe Ministry of Defence of the Netherlands.
4 Martin Zwanenburg, “International Humanitarian LawInteroperability in Multinational Operations”(2013)
Vo.95 International Reviewof the Red Cross 681-705,681
5 Martin Zwanenburg, “International Humanitarian LawInteroperability in Multinational Operations”(2013)
Vo.95 International Reviewof the Red Cross 681-705,681
6 International Committee of the Red Cross
7 International Committee of the Red Cross,“International Humanitarian Lawand The Challenges of
Contemporary Armed Conflicts”Report of the 31st International Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent
(28 Novemner-1 December 2011) 30

3. Terminology:Multinational ForcesandArmedConflicts
Multinational Force
The term ‘M.F’refersto a militaryforce oroperationconductedbytroopsof two or more States
actingtogether.8
M.Fsvary in size,functionsandcommandstructure andcan be distinguished
betweenthose ledbyanI.O suchas NATO or the UnitedNations(U.N) andthose thatare ledby the
States.9
ArmedConflict
The presence of an internationalarmedconflict(IAC) isspecifiedinCommonArticle.2of the 1949
GenevaConventionsas:“all casesof declared war orof any armed conflict thatmay arise between
two or more high contracting parties,even if the stateof waris not recognized,theconvention shall
also apply to all casesof partial or total occupation of theterritory of a high contracting party even if
the said occupation meetswith no armed resistance.”10
A non-international armedconflict(NIAC)is
definedunderCommonArticle.3of the same Conventionas “armed conflictsthatarenon-
internationalin natureoccurring in oneof the High contracting parties.” 11
Furthermore,perStewart,
whenwaroccurs between “two differentfractionsfighting internally butsupportedby two different
states”,12
such a conflictmaybe consideredinternationalised.13
Forinstance,the 1998 Conflictinthe
8 NATO defines M.F as:“An operation conducted by two or more nations actingtogether”. See: NATO
Standardisation Agency, NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions (English and French),APP-06, 2013 p.2-M-11;
Zwanenburg (n-4) 684
9 ibid
10 1949 Geneva Conventions (i) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed
Forces in the Filed;1949 Geneva Convention (ii) for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded Sick and
Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea; 1949 Geneva Convention (iii) Relativeto the Treatment of
Prisoners of War;1949 Geneva Convention (iv) Relativeto the Protection of Civilian Personsin Timeof War.
11 ibid Common Article.3
12 See also:Gertrude C. Chelimo, “Defining Armed Conflictin International Humanitarian Law”(2011) Vol.3
No.4 Law and Justice: Student Pulseavailableat: http://www.studentpulse.com/articles/508/defining-armed-
conflict-in-international-humanitarian-law
13 James G Stewart, “Towards a singledefinition of armed conflict in international humanitarian law: A critique
of internationalized armed conflict”(2003) Vol.85 No.850 International Review of the Red Cross,313- 350, 315

4. DemocraticRepublicof Congo(DRC) where forcesfromRwanda,Angola,Zimbabwe andUganda
intervenedtosupportvariousgroupstothe conflictinthe DRC.14
Part A
I. Applicabilityof IHLtoan ArmedConflict
Initially,StatesandI.OscontendedthatM.Fscouldnot be consideredapartyto a conflictand
therefore,notboundbyIHL.15
M.Fs generallyoperate onbehalfof the international community(I.C)
as a whole.Therefore,itwasmaintainedthatM.Fswere precludedfrombeinga‘party’or a ‘power’
to the conflictwithinthe meaningof the GenevaConventions.16
Itwasalsosubmitted thatwhen
certaincategoriesof M.F interveneinanarmedconflict (AC) the applicationof IHLisaltered17
for
instance,thata higherthreshold of violence isrequiredtoestablishthe existence of an ACinvolving
the U.N18
and/orpeace-operations.19
Notably,duringthe 2011 Libyanconflict20
“someStates
asserted thatthey were only fulfilling their mandateto protect civilians […] had no belligerent intent”
and therefore,notengagedinanAC.21
However,theseviewspreclude the “firmlyanchored”
distinction betweenjusin bello and jusad bellum:22
14 ibid
15 ICRC (2011) (n-7) 30
16 ibid;1949 Geneva Conventions (n-10)
17For instance,iteither applies differently,does not apply atall or only applies asa matter of policy.
International Committee of the Red Cross,“International Humanitarian Lawand The Challenges of
Contemporary Armed Conflicts”Report of the 32nd International Conference of the Red Cross and Red
Crescent (8-10 December 2015) 21
These legal constraints wereoften based on the factthat M.F operate on behalf of the I.C and under a UN
Security Council mandate.
18 ICRC (2015) (n-17) 21
19 ICRC (2011) (n-7) 31
20 Bruno Pommier, “The use of force to protect civilians and humanitarian action:the caseof Libya and beyond
(2011) Vol.93 No.884 International Review of the Red Cross 1063-1083
21 Ferraro, “International LawProgramme Discussion Summary:The Applicability of International Humanitarian
Law to Multinational Forces”(2014) ChathamHouse, The Royal Institute of Internal Affairs 5-7
22 ICRC (2015) (n-17) 21

5. “By virtue of this distinction,the applicability of IHL to [M.F],like any otheractors,depends
exclusively on thecircumstancesprevailing on theground,irrespectiveof the international
mandatethatmay havebeen assigned to such forces.”23
Therefore,irrespective of whetherornotthe recourse to force islegitimate,engagedunderaUN
SecurityCouncil (UNSC) mandate orisa ‘peace-operation’,where the criteriaestablishinganarmed
conflictare satisfiedaM.F cannotbe absolvedof its obligationsunderIHL.24
However,asM.F,
principallypeace-operations,generallyintervene wherethere isapre-existingNIAC,the issuearises
as to whentheiractionsmeetthe thresholdtobecome apartyto the existingAC. Asthe ICRCnotes:
“this assistancehasnotoften taken the formof full-fledged kineticoperationsagainsta
clearly defined enemy,butrather a sporadicuse of force,logistical support,intelligence
activities […] orparticipation in the planning and coordination of military operations.”25
Furthermore, asZwanenburgasserts:“[I]n multinationaloperations(M.O), thereisno central
authoritythatdeterminesthelaw thatapplies to the operation.”26
Accordingly,“differentstates
contributing troopsto [M.O] may cometo differentconclusionsconcerning theapplication of IHL.”27
As illustratedinthe ISAFoperationinAfghanistan:
“Some[troop contributing countries] (TCC) to thisoperation considered thereto be a [NIAC]
between ISAFand theAfghan governmenton theonehand and oneor moreorganised
armed groupson theother.The Netherlands,atleastinitially, wasof theview thatit wasnot
engaged in an armed conflict.Germany also initially denied thatits forceswere involved in
an armed conflict. Only in February 2010 did theGerman governmentacceptthatin
23 ibid 22;See also:ICRC (2011) (n-7) 30
24 ICRC (2011) (n-7) 31
25 ICRC (2015) (n-17) 22
26 Zwanenburg (n-4) 688
27 ibid 687

6. Northern Afghanistan,whereGerman forcesweredeployed,therewasan armed conflictin
the senseof IHL.” 28
Consequently,the legal statusof M.Fprovidingsuchsupportitcontentious.The ICRCcontendsthat:
“the complexityof the question […] lies mainly in the factthat […] the supportgiven by M.Fdoesnot
by itself meetthe threshold of intensityrequired forNIACs.”29
Followingthe ISAFcontention,the
ICRC developeda‘Support-BasedApproach’ (S.BApproach)todetermine whetherthe actionsof a
M.F objectivelyformanintegral partof the pre-existingNIACandcantherefore,be linkedtoIHL.30
Accordingly, “greaterfocus[isafforded] to thefunction [of theM.F] than on theconditions of
intensity.”31
The ICRC maintainsthatthe approachshouldproduce a cleardeterminationof the
existence of a“genuinebelligerentintent on the part of the M.F”32
thus,instigatingthe applicationof
IHL.
However, the “S.BApproach”isnot automatic;the classiccriteriaunderthe GenevaConventions
remainsthe principal authority.33
Nevertheless,once “itis deemed thatthe condition of intensity is
notfulfilled by oneof the statesin the coalition party to the NIAC,therelevant state’sfunction is
then examined.”34
Furthermore,whilstTCCs,engagedinanAC,are all assumedbe partyto it, under
the “S.B Approach”,thispresumptionisrebuttable.35
Thisgoessomeway alleviate the concern
amongstStatesand I.Osthat theirinvolvementinaM.F unequivocallyrenders themapartyto a
conflict.36
However,Ferraroacknowledgesthe criticismthat:
28 ibid
29 ICRC (2015) (n-17)22
30 ibid
31 ibid
32 ibid 23
33 ibid
34 Ferraro (n-21) 5-7
35 For instance,medical activities.
36 Ferraro (n-21) 5-7

7. “The ICRCis importing newrules in relation to its ‘S-BApproach’fora NIACwhilst
maintaining thattheclassic ordinary rules of IHL on the classification of conflicts apply […]
the legal basisof the S-B approach isnotfound in any IHL provision.”37
Furthermore,the approachisnon-bindingthus, StatesandI.Os are able to challenge andoverlook
the approach thereby,hamstringingthe applicationof IHL. However:
“[T]his […] approach flowsfromthelogicof IHL and is in line with the principle of distinction
between combatantsand civilians […] The rationalis to link to IHL action thatformsan
integral partof a pre-existing armed conflict.”38
Consequently,itassertsalevel of authorityandinfluence.39
Overall,whilstIHLisapplicable toM.F, the differingviewswithinM.Fasto whethertheyhave
become involvedinanarmedconflictcancreate tensionsandimpactcooperation. 40
Despite the
“S.B Approach”,securingadmissionbythe respectiveStates(orI.Os) of the applicabilityof IHLto
theirsituationremainsachallenge. Therefore, IHL’sabilitytoregulate M.Fengagedinarmedconflict
isdubious.
II. CategorisinganArmedConflict:IAC,NIACorInternationalised
PerFerraro: “Oncethe conditionsforthe existenceof [AC] are met,there should be a pragmatic
approach to determinethe kind of conductto which the [M.F] area party.”41
Thissectionfocuseson
the involvementof M.Fina pre-existingNIAC(pre-NIAC) andthe subsequentclassificationof the
conflicts.
37 ibid
38 ibid 7
39 ibid
40 Ola Engdahl,“Does the involvement of multinational operation forces in armed conflictchallengethe
categorisation of such conflicts?”(2015) Independent Institute of Humanitarian Law2-5
41 Ferraro (n-21)

8. M.Fs become involvedin pre-NIACsby(a) supportingthe State authority againstan OAGor (b)
interveningalongside the non-state actoragainstthe State.42
Some commentatorssubmit thatM.Fs
involvementinternationalisesaconflict;triggering the applicationof IHLpertainingtoIACs.43
However,ProfessorMegretconsidersthat where M.Fsintervene withthe consentof the State “the
M.Fis merely ‘tagging along’withtheState’sown conflict”44
thusmaintainingaNIAC.
Conversely,shouldthe M.F“take centre stage”againstthe non-state actor,there isa strong
inference thatthe conflictwill becomeinternationalised.45
Alternatively,where the M.Fintervenes
alongside the OAG,itamountstoan IAC betweenthe M.Fandthe State.46
However,the conflict
betweenthe hostState andthe OAG remainsaNIAC.47
Indeed, the ICJ inNicaraguav the United
Statesof America48
and the UN International Criminal Tribunalsforthe FormerYugoslavia49
(ICTY)
assertthat conflictsinvolvingM.Fincludes“bothinternational andnon-international dimensions.”50
Condemningly, this“can createsituationsof dizzying and seemingly arbitrary complexity.”51
However, itmaybe the bestwayof satisfyingthe wishesof States.52
The IHLgoverningIACsismore
onerousthanthat governingNIACs.Assuch,Statesmaybecome reluctanttoapproachthe I.C for
assistance were the conflictthentobecome internationalised. Therefore,Engdahl concludes:“Even
though themultinationalsidedo bring a strong internationalelementto the conflict it should always
be regarded asa NIAC.”53
Whilst“in somesituationsthe entanglementof variousarmed conflicts
may lead to theconclusion thatone dimension […] hasovertaken”54
the conflictsremaindistinct.
42 Frederic Megret, “IHL and Multinational Forces:crucial questions”ICRC Intercross Blog,23 August 2013
availableathttp://intercrossblog.icrc.org.blog#stash.kTE4xX8M.dpbs accessed 23/03/2016
43 ibid
44 ibid;Ferraro (n-21) 2
45 Megret (n-42)
46 ibid.Itis immaterial thatthe M.F may coordinateits efforts with the no-state actor.
47 ibid
48 CaseConcerning The Military And Paramilitary Activities In and AgainstNicaragua(Nicaragua v United States
of America) (Merits) Judgement of 27 June 1986
49 See: http://www.icty.org/ and http://www.icty.org/en/action/cases/4
50 Megret (n-42)
51 ibid
52 ibid
53 Engdahl (n-40) 3
54 Megret (n-42)

9. Perthe 2011 Libyanconflict,55
the conflictbetweenthe M.Fand the State authoritywasan IAC
whilstthe conflictbetweenthe rebels(OAG) andthe LibyanGovernmentremainedaNIAC.56
Despite
the fact that the rebelswere inreceiptof stronginternational support “theconflictwasnotprimarily
onebetween the Libyan Stateand the [I.C] in which the rebels would havesimply acted underUN
control.”57
Nevertheless,Engdahl acknowledges the suggestion thatinvolvementof M.Facting undera UN
mandate shouldinternationalise aconflict:58
“The forcesconcerned are representativeof the internationalcommunity […].Act[ing] on a
highermoral ground than theiropponents [they]should beheld to the highestpossible
standards.”59
Shoulda conflictbecome internationalised,the non-state actorswouldbe affordedcombatprivilege
and exceptfromprosecutionbytheirState.60
Furthermore,itwouldrun contraryto the spiritof IHL
to treat combatantsandnon-state actors differentlydependingon which militaryforce captures
them,forinstance.61
Itmay alsobe desirable to‘humanise’certainarmedconflicts byconsidering
themto be IACs:62
“[whilst IAC] obligationsaremoreonerous,nothing islostfroma humanitarian
pointof view,even in cases wherethe conflict is arguably technically non-international.”63
Sucha
considerationisparticularlyrelevantwhenestablishingthe rightsandtreatmentof detainees.64
Nevertheless, Statesare reluctant toaffirmthistransformative feature.Rather,the characterof the
A.Cis basedon the actionsandnature of the parties andnot exclusivelyonthe multinational
55 Pommier (n-20)
56 Megret (n-42); See also Pommier (n-20)
57 Megnet (ibid);Engdahl (n-40); Pommier (ibid)
58 Engdahl (n-40) 3-4
59 ibid
60 ibid 3-5
61 ibid 5
62 Megret acknowledges that, although based on the factual elements of a conflict,determining the
categorisation of a conflictis also linked to “a certain normative ambition.” Megret (n-42)
63 ibid
64 ibid

10. character of one.65
Accordingly,differenttypesof conflictcanexistsimultaneously. However,
although“[not] a complicated legal issue,and well within the spirit of IHL […] it may provedifficultin
practice.”66
To thisextent,notonlydoesIHLapplyto M.F, but itis alsoflexibleenoughtobe appliedtoarange
of scenariosincluding, where the M.Faligns itself withthe State orAOG.However, determining
whetherthe conflictisaNIAC,IACor internationalised remainsacontentioustopicandafurther
hurdle facingthe applicationof IHL.
iii) EstablishingWhoisPartyto an ArmedConflict
As the ICCRCnotes:“the involvementof [M.F] in armed conflicts raises a set of issues related to the
determination of who should beconsidered a party to an [A.C] […] Should itbe argued thatonly
[TCCs] area partyto the conflict[…]?Whatabout[I.O] underwhosecommand and controlthe[M.F]
operate”such as the U.N or NATO?67
Operationsunderthe leadershipof anI.Oinvolve TCCsplacingtheirarmedforcesatthe I.O’s
disposal.68
However,regardingattribution,IHLissilent.69
Condemningly, “thesequestions[havenot]
attracted sufficientanalysis.”70
Accordingly,the issueneedstobe addressed.
It has beenassertedthat “only [TCCs] areparty to theconflict for thepurposesof IHL.”71
However,
Megretcounters:
65 Engdahl (n-40) 3-5
66 ibid 5
67 ICRC (2011) (n-7) 32
68 ICRC (2015) (n-17) 23
69 ibid
70 ICRC (2011) (n-7) 32
71 Ferraro (n-21) 9

11. “[T]heoriginal argumentsof why [IHL] should notapply [to I.Os] […] becauseI.O could notbe
partyto humanitarian treatieswereneververy convincing in the first place, notably in view
of the pragmatismand theflexibility of the lawsof war.” 72
Moreover,Ferrarocritiques:
“There [would] besomething artificialaboutpretending thattheI.Ocan be read out of the
equation,given thatStatesderivetheir mandatesfromand operateunderitscontrol.” 73
Accordingly, I.Oscanbe heldto be party to an armedconflict.
Whetheror notthe I.O,the TCC, or bothare party to the conflictdependsonthe structure of the
organisation principally,the level of authorityand‘control andcommand’assertedbythe I.Oover
the troops.74
For instance, “by virtueof thecommand and controlstructureof the U.N operations
and the delegation of operationalcontrolto the U.N by the TCC”75
it isgenerallyassumed thatthe
U.N exertsthe ‘requisite control’tobe considered partytothe conflict.76
Thisis to the exclusionthe
of the TCCs andthe otherU.N memberStates.77
Thiscan be contrastedto the positionof NATOwhere TCCsare involved andassertinfluence at
strategic,operational andtactical levels of the commandstructure.Forinstance,the NATO
operationsin Libya78
andAfghanistan:79
“TCCs are so closely associated with the NATO command and controlstructurethatit is
almostimpossibleto discern whetherit is NATOitself or the TCCs thathaveoverall effect
overmilitary operations.”80
72 Megret (n-42)
73 Ferraro (n-21) 9
74 ICRC (2015) (n-17) 23-24;Megret (n-42); Ferraro (n-21) 9
75 Ferraro (ibid) 4
76 ICRC (2015) (n-17) 24; Ferraro (n-21) 4
77 ICRC (ibid);Ferrero (ibid)
78 See NATO: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/71679.htm
79 See NATO: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_8189.htm
80 ICRC (2012) (n-17) 24

12. Accordingly,IHLisattributable tobothNATOand the TCCs simultaneously.81
Appraisingly:
“concurrenceof responsibilityis thenotion thatseems mostlikely to promotehumanitarian
outcomes,especially in the contextwhereimmunitiesmay representa significantobstacleto
engaging theresponsibilityof [I.O]s.”82
However,the presumptionof attributionisrebuttable.83
Additionally,Dannenbaumcautionsthat“dualattribution […] hasbeen affirmed repeatedly in theory
[…] while failing to attributeconductto two ormore entities.”84
Moreover,“thereis an ongoing
debate,based on particularthe diverging caselaw, on whetherthe to apply an ‘effectivecontrol’or
an ‘overall control’test”85
whenestablishingtowhomthe actionsare attributable. 86
Consequently,
“statestake differing viewsregarding thecommand and controlstructures,and therefore,who
should beconsidered partyto the conflict.”87
Thus hinderingthe applicationof IHLto M.F.
Moreover,U.N missionsare notentirelyimmunefromState interference.Thus,the questionis
raised:“whethertheextentof interferencecan disrupttheeffective controland the chain of
command, [resulting in] themission no-longer[being] considered a U.N mission.”88
Inthe absence of
an authoritative decidingbody,determiningthe applicationof IHL,the questionis lefttoStates,
againresultingin differingviews. 89
Ultimately,“thereisno‘one size fitsall’approach.”90
Whilston
the one hand,thisallowsIHL to be appliedtoa range of scenarios,onthe otherhand,itsapplication
isultimatelysubjecttothe will of TCCs. Thus,applicationof IHLto M.F ishinderedanditsadequacy
doubtful.
Part B
81 ibid
82 Megret (n-42)
83 ICRC (2015) (N-17) 24
84 Tom Dannenbaum, “Dual Attribution un the Context of Military Operations”(2015) Vo.12 International
Organisation LawReview 401-426,426
85 ICRC (2015) (n-17) 23
86 ibid
87 Ferraro (n-21) 4-9
88 ibid 4
89 ibid 4
90 ICRC (2015) (n-17)23

13. i) CommonArticle.1tothe GenevaConventions:Who’sResponsible andWhatFor?
CommonArticle.1tothe four GenevaConventionsstates: “TheHigh Contracting Partiesundertake
to respectand to ensurerespect forthe presentConvention in all circumstances.” WhilstI.Oscannot
be party to the GC, theyare neverthelessboundbythe provision:91
“Asan [I.O] enjoying
internationallegal personality…[TheUN] should bebound by theobligationsenunciated in Common
Article.1 […] whetherthey are customary norms,generalprinciplesof law or something else.”92
Moreover,the ICJaffirmedthat“such an obligation doesnotderive fromthe Conventions,butfrom
the generalprinciples of humanitarian law to which theConventionsmerely givespecific
expression.”93
Assuch,itappliestobothStatesandI.Os.The issue now liesinitsinterpretation.
On the one hand,a broadinterpretationof the provisionhasbeenadopted:
“The participating High Contracting Partiescall upon all parties,directly involved in the
conflict or not,to respect and to ensureforthe [GC] in all circumstances,to disseminateand
takemeasuresnecessary forthe prevention and suppressionof breachesof the
convention.”94
On the otherhand,KalshivenandFocarellihave condonedsuchanexpansive readingof the Article.1
as not beingenvisagedbythe provision’sdrafters.95
Furthermore,Hoppoldconsiders:
91 F. Megret and F Hoffman, “The UN as a Human Rights Violator? Some Reflections on the United Nations.”
(2003) Vol.24 Human Rights Quarterly 314
92 ibid
93 Nicaragua v USA (n-48) Para 104;See also,TMeron, “The Geneva Conventions as Customary Law” (1987)
Vol.81 American Journal of International Law348
94 “Conference of High ContractingParties to the Fourth Geneva Convention: Declaration”Geneva, 5
December 2001
95 F. Kalshoven,“The Undertaking to Respect and Ensure Respect in All Circumstances:From Tiny Seed to
RipeningFruit” (1999) Vol.2 Yearbook of international Humanitarian Law3; C. Focarelli,“Common Article1 of
the 1949 Geneva Conventions: A Soap Bubble?” (2010) Vol.21 European Journal of International Law1 25

14. “[O]nemightconcludethat thatCommon Article.1 [GC] empowers,ratherthan obliges,Statesto
intervenewhen parties to conflict breach their obligationsunderthe[GC].”96
However,thiswould “seemcontrary to theplain meaning of Common Article.1.”97
Statesalready
have a positive obligationunderArticle.1toensure thatthe partiestothe conflictrespectIHL“inall
circumstances.”Thisobligationarisesnotfrombeingpartytothe conflictbutmerelybeingsignatory
to the GC.98
Indeed,Article.1“should beseen as encompassing an obligation to refuseordersgiven
by a Force Commanderwhich would entailbreaching IHL”99
andplacingan obligationonTCCsto
ensure all operationsrespect100
IHL.Accordingly,Article.1isfarreachingand should,inprinciple,
ensure compliance withIHLthus,effectivelyregulatingof A.CsinvolvingM.F.However,tofulfil the
obligation,StatesandI.Osmustbe aware of what IHL entailsinthe firstinstance;anaspect
challengedbydifferinginterpretationsandIHLratifications.
ii) RatificationandInterpretation:Issuesof ConsistencyandCoherency
Perthe ICRC:
“The ‘unityof effort’[soughtin operations] isoften impacted by inconsistentinterpretationsof
IHL by [TCC] operating on thebasisof differentlegalstandards.
[…]
[A]n importantpracticalchallengeis to ensurethat[operations] areconducted taking into
consideration thedifferentlevels of ratification of IHL instrumentsand thedifferent
interpretationsof thosetreatiesand customary IHL.”101
96 Mathew Happold, “Comment- obligations of States contributingUN peacekeeping missionsunder Common
Article1 to the Geneva Conventions” in Krieger, Heike (Ed.) Enforcing International. Humanitarian Law in
Contemporary African Conflicts (CambridgeUniversity Press, 2014) 382-398,395
97 Happold (n-96) 395
98 ibid
99 ibid 396
100ibid 396
101 ICRC (2011) (n-7) 32

15. Althoughthe GenevaConventions have beenuniversallyratified,the situationregardingtheir
Additional Protocols(APs) andotherIHLtreatiesisdiverse;173 Statesare boundbyAdditional
Protocol.1(AP.1)102
and167 AdditionalProtocol.2(AP.2).103
Consequently,“itis highly likely thatin a
[M.O] someforceswill be bound by treaties thatdo not bind someof the otherforces which they are
cooperating.”104
Forinstance,Article.52of AP.1 providesthat“attacksshall be limitedstrictlyto
militaryobjectives.”Furthermore,Article.57(2)(a)(i) entailsforprecautionstobe takento ascertain
the legitimacyof the target.105
Therefore,whilstthe ‘Principleof DistinctionbetweenCiviliansand
Combatants’isconsideredinternational customarylaw (ICL),106
StatessignatorytoAP.1are subject
additional obligationsunderArticle.57.Accordingly,one State’stroopsmaybe able to performa
militarytaskwhilstanotherisnot. Furthermore,althoughithasbeenmaintainedthatmanyof the
rulesandobligationscontainedinthe APsare considered ICLthe methodof obtaining“evidence of a
general practice acceptedaslaw”107
is “imprecise and leavesmuch roomforinterpretation.”108
Moreover,the rule of stare decisis doesnotapplyto the ICJ or otherinternational courtsor
tribunals109
andthe inconsistenciesinthe Courts’approachtowardsIHL criticised:
102 1977 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949,and relatingto the Protection of
Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I)
103
1977 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949,and relatingto the Protection of
Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II). Other IHL treaties with varyinglevels of ratification
include:the 1954 Hague Convention on the Protection of Armed Conflictand its two Protocols of 1954 and
1999; the 2008 Convention on Cluster Munitions. Critically,AP ratification does notincludethe “most
important military power in the word today, the United States, or other important military powers such as
Pakistan and Turkey.” Zwanenburg (n-4) 688
104 Zwanenburg (n-4) 689
105 AP.1 Article57
“(2)With respect to attacks, the following precautions shall be taken:
(a)those who plan or decide upon an attack shall:
(i) do everything feasible to verify that the objectives to be attacked are neither civilians nor civilian
objects and are not subject to special protection but are military objectives within the meaning of
paragraph 2 of Article 52 and that it is not prohibited by the provisions of this Protocol to attack
them.”
106 ICRC: Customary International Law https://www.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v2_cha_chapter1_rule1
107 CaseConcerning North Sea Continental Shelf (Judgement) [1969] ICJ Reports Para 77
108 Zwanenburg (n-4) 689
109 GilbertGuillaume,“The use of precedent by international judges and arbitrators”(2011) Vol.2 No.1
International Journal of DisputeSettlement 5-23

16. “The InternationalCriminalTribunalsforthe formerYugoslavia and forRwanda have
engaged extensively in the interpretation of IHL norms[…] these tribunalshavefrequently
delved deeply into the question of how a particularrule should be understood […] whilstthe
ICJhasbeen criticised forits ‘light treatment’of IHL.”110
Furthermore,some Statesdisagree withthe interpretationsof the ICTY.111
Consequently,thereisa
lack of continuityinthe interpretationandtherefore,applicationof IHL.For instance,the
interpretationof whatconstitutesa‘militaryobjective’andtherefore,alegitimatetarget,varies
considerablybetweenStates.112
AlthoughnotpartytoAP.1 the U.S considersArticle.52(i) and(ii) as
reflectingICL.113
However,theirinterpretationof the provisionis“considerably broaderthan thatof
many otherStatesincluding the U.S’NATOallies.”114
Similarly,there are varyinginterpretationsof
whatamountsto ‘directparticipationinhostilities’whereby,underAP.1Article.53a civilian
becomesalegitimate target.115
The GenevaConvention116
andProtocolsdonotdefine ‘direct
participation’however,the ICRChaspublishedits InterpretativeGuidanceon theNotion of Direct
Participation in Hostilities117
and,althoughcriticisedbysome andnotlegallybinding,isan
110 Zwanenburg (n-4) 691; See also:David Kretzmer, “The Advisory Opinion:the lighttreatment of
international humanitarian law.”(2005) Vol.99 No.1 American Journal of International Law88-102, referringto
the Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in theOccupied Palestinian Territory.
111 See: Operational LawExperts Roundtable on the Gotovina Judgement: Military Operations,Battlefield
Reality and the Judgement’s Impact on Effective Implementation and Enforcement of International
Humanitarian Law.International Humanitarian LawClinic,Emory Law School,2012.Availableat:
www.law.emory.edu/fileadmin/NEWWEBSITE/Centres_Clinics/IHLC/Gotovina_Meeting_Report.pdf
112 Zwanenburg (n-4) 692
113 Memorandum for John H. McNeill,AssistantGeneral Counsel (International),OSD (9 May 1986) in Law of
War Documentary Supplement, Unites States Army Judge Advocate General’s Legal Center and School,2007 pg
399 Article.52(3). Availableat
<https://openlibrary.org/authors/OL7099261A/Judge_Advocate_General's_Legal_Center_and_School_(United
_States._Army)._International_and_Operationa>
Cited in Zwanenburg (n-4) 692
114 Kenneth Watkin,“Coalition operations:a Canadian perspective”in Michael D,Casted (ed), International
Law and Military Operations, U.S Naval War College International Law Studies (Vol.84, 2008) pg 255
115 Zwanenburg (n-4) 693
116 1949 Geneva Convention (n-10)
117 Nils Melzer, Interpretative Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities under International
Humanitarian Law, ICRC, Geneva, 2009.

17. authoritative works concerningthe applicationof Articles.53.118
However,comparedtothe ICCRC
the U.S adopts a considerablybroacherinterpretation.119
Furthermore:
“Even between statesworking particularclosely with the United States,there remain areas
of the definition pf ‘direct participation in hostilities’ on which there is consensusand other
areaswhich thereare differentviews.”120
Consequently,the U.S considerscertainobjectstobe legitimatetargetswhilstitsalliesconsider
themto be civilianobjects.121
StatesandI.Oshave soughttoovercome suchchallengesthrough
varyingmethodsof legal interoperability122
however, the issueremainsthatIHLinitself failsto
effectivelyregulatearmedconflictsinvolvingM.FCritically,CommonArticle.1cannotbe adheredto
whenStatesfail toagree as to the interpretationandstandard of IHL inthe firstinstance.
iii) DetentionandHumanRights:LookingBeyondIHL
ConcerningIHLand M.F “challenges areparticularly acutewhen in relation to proceduralsafeguards
fordetention in NIACs.”123
ComparedtoIHL regulatingIACs,IHLgoverningNIACsisconsiderablyless
comprehensive.BellingerandPadmanabhan’sidentificationof fourcontroversiesconcerning
detectioninNIACshighlightedthe shortfall of IHLinthisarea.124
However,international human
118 Zwanenburg (n-4) 693
119 ibid
120 ibid 695;Stephen Pomper, “Toward a limited consensus on the lawof immunity in non-international armed
conflict:makingprogress through practice”in Kenneth Watkin and Andrew J. Norris (eds), Non-International
Armed Conflict in the Twenty-First Century, US Naval War College International Law Studies (Vol.88, 2012) 182
121 Zwanenburg (n-4)695
122 See: ibid 698- 705
123 ICRC (2011) (n-7) 32
124 John B. Bellinger III and Vijay M.Padmanabhan,“Detention Operations in Contemporary Conflicts:Four
Challenges for the Geneva Conventions and ExistingLaw” (2011) Vol.105 No.2 American Journal of
International Law202:
“1. Which individuals are subject to detention?
2. What legal process must the state provide to those detained?
3. When does the state’s right to detain terminate?

18. rightslaw (IHRL) has enteredthe field.Whilstthe applicationof IHRL alongside IHLisa contentious
subjectinitself,125
itisgenerallyacceptedthatIHRLcontinuestoapplyduringanarmedconflictand
operatesconcurrentlyalongsideIHL.126
Thus,itservesto‘fill the IHL gap’in thisarea.Notably,the
extra-territorial applicationof the EuropeanConventionof HumanRightsandits Article.5rights
pertainingtodetention were utilisedin Al-Jedda v theUnited Kingdom [2011];127
Al-Skeiniv the
United Kingdom [2011]128
and Hassan v the United Kingdom [2014].129
However,the extra-territorial
applicationof the ECHR hasprovencontentiousamongstStatesandacademiccommentators.As
Malloryand Wallace have cautioned: “if Statesare expected to uphold human rightsobligations
during extra-territorialmilitary operations,itwill deter themfromcontributing troopsto [UN peace-
operations].”130
Therefore,the applicationof humanrightsinthisfieldmayprove tobe a catch-22.
However,the developmentof the CopenhagenPrinciples,131
designedtoaddressesthe uncertainties
surroundingthe legal basisfordetentionandthe treatmentof detaineesduringmilitaryoperations
inNIACs, mayserve to alleviatethese concerns.132
Appraisingly,the Principleswere ‘welcomed’by
16 Statesincludingthe Five PermanentMembersof the SC133
and whilstnon-binding,will
4. What legal obligations do states have in connection with repatriating detainees at the end of
detention?”
125 Bruce ‘Ossie’Oswald,“Some controversies of detention in multinational operationsand the contributions
of the Copenhagen Principles”(2013) Vol.95 International Reviewof the Red Cross 707-726,712-15
126 ibid
127 Al-Jedda v the United Kingdom [2007] Judgement of the Grand Chamber, Eur. Ct. H.R., ApplicantNumber:
27021/08
128 Al-Skeine v the United Kingdom [2011] Judgement of the Grand Chamber, Eur. Ct. H.R., ApplicantNumber:
Application No. 55721/07
129 Hassan v the United Kingdom [2014] Judgement of the Grand Chamber, Eur. Ct. H.R., Application No.
29750/09
130 Conall Mallory and StuartWallace,“The ‘deterrent argument’ and the responsibility to protect” (2015)
Vol.19 No.8 The International Journal of Human Rights 1213-1125,1213
131 The Copenhagen Principles and Guidelines arethe outcome of a five-year longprocess that was initiated by
the Danish Government in 2007.The process was initiated in recognition of the fact that bilateral or ad-hoc
solutions to detention duringinternational military operationsoften led to unacceptabledifferences in the
handlingof detainees, which, accordingto the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs,arenot only unsatisfactory in
relation individual protection but attimes also constitutea hindranceto effective military cooperation. See:
http://www.ejiltalk.org/the-copenhagen-process-principles-and-guidelines/
132 Oswald (n-125) 723
133 ibid 722;See also,3rd Copenhagen Conference on the Handlingof Detainees in International Military
Operations,Copenhagen, 18-19 October 2012,Minutes of the Meeting as Recorded by the Chair pg 4.
Availableathttp://um.dk/en/~media/UM/English~site/Documents/Politics-and-
diplomacy/Official%20minutes_CP%20ny.pdf

19. neverthelessinformpractice.134
However,boththe SwedishandRussiandelegationsexpressed
“concernsaboutthePrinciples reflecting IHRL appropriately.”135
Assuch,the challenge remainsto
“develop a common standard thatwilladequately reflectstates’obligationsundertheapplicable
bodiesof [I.L].”136
Anobstacle the ICRCbelievescanbe overcome throughthe developmentof
meansof “treaty lawor otherwise.”137
Overall,IHLfailstoeffectivelyregulateissuesof detention in
NIACsan issue thatis,once again, due to the varyinglegal standardsandinterpretationsbetween
States,is exasperatedinthe contextof M.F.
Conclusion
Overall,whilstIHLhas the potential toregulate armedconflictsinvolvingM.Fthere isa distinctlack
of coherencyamongstStatesandacademicopinionregarding itsapplication.IHLischallengedby
each of the aspectsaddressedabove.Critically, shouldanyone of these inhibititsapplication it
consequently failstoregulate the conflict. Some of the challenges discussed are notisolatedtoA.C
involvingM.Fshowever,the varyinglevelsof ratification combinedwithbroadly differing
interpretationsof IHLprovisionsserve to exuberate the issues whenappliedtoM.Fs.Owingtothe
level of ambiguitywithineachaspect,one iscompelledtoconclude thatIHLdoesnot effectively
regulate conflictsinvolvingM.Fs.
134 Oswald (n-125)723
135 ibid 722;See also,3rd Copenhagen Conference (n-133) 4
136 ICRC (2011) (n-7) 32
137 ibid

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