Coercive diplomacy, 26 11-2012 22h38


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  • Coercers
  • Coercive diplomacy, 26 11-2012 22h38

    1. 1. Coercive Diplomacy Peace and Conflict Studies 26.11.2012 Paulina Méndez Stiven Tremaria
    2. 2. Summary 1. Definitions and elements. 2. Variants of the CD. 3. How does CD work? i. Coercer state strategy. ii. Coercive mechanism. iii. Coercive instruments. 4. The adoption of coercive measures and the international law. 5. Limitations and critics to the CD. 6. Case studies.
    3. 3. 1. Definitions and elements A) Definitions: “Efforts to persuade an opponent to stop or reverse an action […] coercive diplomacy is a defensive strategy that is employed to deal with the efforts of an adversary to change a status quo situation in his own favor” (George and Simons, 1994, pp. 7-8). “The use of threatened force, and at times the limited use of actual force to back up the threat, to induce an adversary to change its behavior” (Byman and Baxman, 2002, p. 1). “Coercive diplomacy is ‘forceful persuasion’: the attempt to get a target –a state, a group (or groups) within a state, or a non state actor– to change its objectionable behavior through either the threat to use force or the actual use of limited force” (Art and Cronin, 2003, p. 6).
    4. 4. 1. Definitions and elements B) Elements: - Three basic constitutive elements: demand, threat, time pressure. - Limited and clear objectives: What to demand? Defensive rather than offensive objectives. Typologies: A, B and C. - Coercive but limited means: How to comply? “It seeks to influence, but not to deny choice to the target”. Proportionality between the demand and the threat. - Sufficiently credible threat of punishment: How to convince? Leverage + reputation/credibility + capacity. Level of support of the public opinion.
    5. 5. 1. Definitions and elements B) Elements: - “Sticks and carrots” policy: How works the cost-benefits model? Use of positive inducements: “if you do x, I will do y”. C) Phases of coercion: 1. Threat to use force CD depends on: 2. Demonstrative use of force how much destruction is done to the target how much of military power is drawn upon 3. Full-scale use of force Failure of CD: War
    6. 6. 1. Definitions and elements D) Relations and differences with other diplomatic related concepts : - Deterrence: “Not doing what it is not doing”. Prevent an not initiated or not planned action from occurring. - Compellence: Reverse an action already taken / happened. Overturn the status quo. - Negotiation and Preventive Diplomacy: CD as a way of conflict management (negotiation) and avoidance (PD). - Full-scale force / open war: Use of brute military force to bludgeon an opponent.
    7. 7. 2. Variants of the CD A) By type of participants: Unilateral: Unilateral: It is understood as a It is understood as a single actor holding the single actor holding the coercion. coercion. USA --Cuba USA Cuba Coalition: Coalition: Collection of actors Collection of actors cooperating to achieve cooperating to achieve a common objective. a common objective. Lack of harmony and Lack of harmony and different interest of different interest of coalition’s countries. coalition’s countries. Word War II Word War II Humanitarian Humanitarian coercion: coercion: Use of force for Use of force for humanitarian humanitarian objectives objectives Difficult to identify Difficult to identify between military and between military and civilians. civilians. ••To reconstitute a viable To reconstitute a viable central government in central government in Somalia Somalia
    8. 8. 2. Variants of the CD B) Level of pressure: The Ultimatum, ,explicit or tacit, in which aadeadline is given for The Ultimatum explicit or tacit, in which deadline is given for compliance backed by a credible threat of strong punishment. compliance backed by a credible threat of strong punishment. The weaker, ,gradual turning of the screw, ,in which a sense of The weaker gradual turning of the screw in which a sense of urgency for compliance is diluted and backed only with the threat of urgency for compliance is diluted and backed only with the threat of incrementally severe punishment over time. . incrementally severe punishment over time The even weaker try and see, ,variant of the strategy that lacks both The even weaker try and see variant of the strategy that lacks both urgency for compliance and a clear threat of strong punishment. urgency for compliance and a clear threat of strong punishment.
    9. 9. 3. How does CD work? A) Coercer state strategy : Strategy: It constitutes the creative element in the search for the optimum relationship between political ends and the means available for achieving them. International, regional and local actors To support the strategy with diplomatic weight and economic capacity. Western Europe Libya United Nations Siria Role of the leverage A mediator who pressure the parties to make concessions and to ensure that disputants adhere to the agreements they have entered into. Not necessary a country even institutions Malvinas Islands Argentina - UK USA
    10. 10. 3. How does CD work? B) Commonly used mechanisms:
    11. 11. 3. How does CD work? C) Coercive instruments: 1. Economic sanctions and international isolation: Sanctions: place economic pressure on an adversary. Political isolation: breaking-off of diplomatic relations and/or adoption of multilateral resolutions that condemn adversary's behavior. 2. Support for an insurgency: Create internal war environment by providing money, training and weapons to insurgence forces. Goals and limitations.
    12. 12. 3. How does CD work? 3. Air strikes: Attacks by air of a few, selected targets. 4. Invasions and land grabs: The use of threat of ground troops by the occupation and devastation of valuable territory. Useful when the coercer's demand involves withdrawal from disputed geographic areas. 5. The threat of nuclear attacks: Potentially powerful coercive tool, with very limited applicability. Not recommended with nuclear-armed adversaries: risk of escalation.
    13. 13. 3. How does CD work? D) Coercing / target state approach: Counter-coercive strategies: - Negotiations designed to fracture coalition support. - Take advantage of domestic constraints in the coercer state. - Tight control over media and internal propaganda. - Create counter-alliances. - Create actual or prospective coercer’s casualties. - Use peacekeepers or aid workers as hostages. - Increase nationalism at home. - Threat to use WMD against coercer’s troops and civilian targets.
    14. 14. 4. The adoption of coercive measures and the international law Charter of the United Nations: Limitations and concessions. Chapter I Article 2. 4. All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.
    15. 15. Chapter VII ACTION WITH RESPECT TO THREATS TO THE PEACE, BREACHES OF THE PEACE, AND ACTS OF AGGRESSION Articles 39 - 42  The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace and shall make recommendations or decide what measures shall be taken.  The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of armed force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions. Chapter VIII REGIONAL ARRANGEMENTS Article 53 • No enforcement action shall be taken under regional arrangements or by regional agencies without the authorization of the Security Council.
    16. 16. In 1989, the General Assembly adopted resolution A/RES/44/215, which called upon the developed countries to refrain from exercising political coercion through the application of economic instruments with the purpose of inducing changes in the economic or social systems, as well as in the domestic or foreign policies of other countries
    17. 17. 5. Limitations and critics to the CD A) Critics: - CD as interference in internal affairs: Sovereignty-related issues. - CD as status quo strategy: “The coercer defends the status quo because of the benefits it confers, the target tries to overthrow the status quo because of the injury it inflicts” (Art and Cronin, 2003, p. 8). Reluctance of super powers to adopt revisions of “unfair” situations or attend “rightful” demands. - Differences between “genuine” CD vs. “disingenuous” CD. - The question of lawfulness of CD measures and human rights.
    18. 18. 5. Limitations and critics to the CD B) Limitations and challenges: - The question of effectiveness of CD: why is CD difficult? Credibility and power are at stake. Will this be the coercer’s last demand, or is it only the first in a series of demands? Multiple coercers and multiple targets. Boomerang and domino effects: Escalation. The role of positive inducements or “carrots”. Military superiority is not guarantee of success. Si vis pacem, para bellum.
    19. 19. 5. Limitations and critics to the CD B) Limitations and challenges: - What are the prerequisites for success? 1. Clarity about the objectives. 2. Sufficient domestic and international support. 3. Strong leadership and motivation: accept cost and risks. 4. Dissuasion: Target’s fear of unacceptable escalation. 5. Effectiveness of instruments and mechanisms. CD case reports Success Failure Ambiguous 1945-1990 data: 7 cases. George (1994) 29% 43% 28% 1990-2001 data: 8 cases. Art and Cronin (2003) 25% 63% 12% Combined cases (average) 27% 53% 20% Source: Art and Cronin, 2003, p. 387.
    20. 20. 6. Case studies: A) By the United States: Iraq (1990-1991): Goal Withdrawal Iraqi forces of Kuwait (in the scope of the Gulf War, 1990-1991). Mechanisms 1) Diplomatic pressure: Build a strong UN supported international coalition: 10 + 29 country members. Political isolation: UNSC Res. 660 (Aug. 2). 2) Economic pressure: Economic sanctions: UNSC Res. 661 (Aug.6): full trade embargo. 3) Military pressure: Air strikes: UNSC Res. 670 (Sep. 25): civil aviation sanctions + aerial attacks. Ground troops invasion: Operation Desert Storm (open war): ~956.600 men. Limitations Saddam Hussein as a complex target for CD: individual interests. Impossibility to manage Iraqi internal situation (Kurdish und Shiite’s uprisings) as a mean of coercion. “US decision makers wanted Iraq weakened but not destroyed” (Alterman, 2003, p.283).
    21. 21. 6. Case studies: A) By the United States: Iraq (1990-1991): Desired outcomes Iraq removed forces from Kuwait. No spread of the conflict, ex. to Saudi Arabia. Blockade Iraq’s possibilities for counter-coercion. Undesired outcomes Requirement of direct use of force. High number casualties: - Coalition: 482 men / Iraq: ~35.000 men, ~75.000 wounded, ~3.664 civilians. Negative socio and economical consequences for the Iraqi population. Iraq’s defiance of cease-fire resolutions: chemical and biological weapons. Conflictive relations between US and Iraq → US-led invasion in 2003. Final outcome FAILURE
    22. 22. 6. Case studies: B) By the European Union and USA: Iran (2003- until now): Goal Contain the Iranian nuclear program. Mechanisms The EU-3 adopted a coercive diplomatic approach vis-à-vis Iran. Sticks and carrots strategy. - Agreements Weakening Economic pressure: - Seizure of assets - Sanctions on exports to Iran (the energy, shipping and insurance) Limitations -The first military intervention of the European Union. - Asymmetry of motivation. - The EU had the additional problem of being the spokesperson for the rest of the world, including the USA, and sometimes Russia and China as well.
    23. 23. 6. Case studies: B) By the European Union and USA: Iran (2003- until now): Desired outcomes Iran continues reporting in a irregular way to IAEA about the nuclear activities. Undesired outcomes Iran declares itself to be a nuclear state Avoid uranium enrichment and ensure that uranium is exported to other countries reached Final outcome -The first session of fresh negotiations in April went well (April 2012) - United States toughens economic sanctions against Iran
    24. 24. • Are all countries able to exercise coercive diplomacy? • Have they succeed in its coercive diplomacy efforts? • What have the difficulties been? • What lessons can be drawn?
    25. 25. Thanks for your attention