4. Whereas the successful prosecution of
the war requires every possible
protection against espionage and
against sabotage to national-defense
material, national-defense premises, and
national-defense utilities...;
Now, therefore, by virtue of the authority
vested in me as President of the United
States, and Commander in Chief of the
Army and Navy, I hereby authorize and
direct the Secretary of War ... to
prescribe military areas in such places
and of such extent as he or the
appropriate Military Commander may
determine, from which any or all persons
may be excluded, and with respect to
which, the right of any person to enter,
remain in, or leave shall be subject to
whatever restrictions the Secretary of
War or the appropriate Military
Commander may impose in his
discretion.
Executive Order 1099, February 19, 1942
6. Memorandum from J. R. Oppenheimer to Brigadier General Farrell, May 11, 1945
7. 7. Psychological Factors in Target Selection
A. It was agreed that psychological factors in the target selection
were of great importance. Two aspects of this are (1) obtaining the
greatest psychological effect against Japan and (2) making the initial
use sufficiently spectacular for the importance of the weapon to be
internationally recognized when publicity on it is released.
B. In this respect Kyoto has the advantage of the people being more
highly intelligent and hence better able to appreciate the significance
of the weapon. Hiroshima has the advantage of being such a size
and with possible focussing from nearby mountains that a large
fraction of the city may be destroyed. The Emperor's palace in Tokyo
has a greater fame than any other target but is of least strategic
value.
Minutes of the second meeting of the Target Committee, Los Alamos, May 10-11, 1945
8. “I told [assistant Secretary of War John McCloy]
that my own opinion was that the time now and the
method to deal with Russia was to keep out mouths
shut and let our actions speak for our words. The
Russians will understand them better than anything
else... I told him this was a place where we really
held all the cards. I called it a royal straight flush
and we mustn't be a fool about the way we play it...
we have coming into action a weapon which will be
unique.”
Diary of Secretary of War Henry Stimson, May 14, 1945
10. Memorandum from R. Gordon Arneson, Interim Committee Secretary, to Mr. Harrison, June 6, 1945
11. “Our experience in the Pacific war is so diverse as to casualties
that it is considered wrong to give any estimate in numbers. …
An important point about Russian participation on the war is
that the impact of Russian entry on the already hopeless
Japanese may well be the decisive action levering them into
capitulation at that time or shortly thereafter if we land in
Japan. ...
General Marshall said that it was his personal view that the
operation against Kyushu was the only course to pursue.”
Minutes of Meeting Held at the White House on Monday, 18 June 1945
12. “Admiral Leahy recalled that the President had been interested
in knowing what price the casualties for Kyushu would be...He
pointed out that the troops on Okinawa had lost 35 percent in
casualties. If this percentage were applied to the number of
troops to be employed in Kyushu, he thought from the similarity
of the fighting...that this would give a good estimate of
casualties to be expected.
General Marshal pointed out that the total assault troops for the
Kyushu campaign were shown in the memorandum prepared
for the President as 766,700.”
Minutes of Meeting Held at the White House on Monday, 18 June 1945
13. “...I again gave [Truman] my reasons for eliminating
one of the proposed targets [Kyoto]. ...He was
particularly emphatic in agreeing with my
suggestion that if elimination was not doe, the
bitterness which would be caused...might make it
impossible during the long post-war period to
reconcile the Japanese to us in that area rather
than to the Russians.”
Diary of Henry Stimson, July 24, 1945
16. “The strategic plans of our armed forces for the
defeat of Japan...had been prepared without the
reliance on the atomic bomb... I was informed that
such operations might be expected to cost over a
million casualties, to American forces alone...
My chief purpose was to end the war in victory with
the least possible cost in the lives of the men in the
armies which I had helped to raise.”
Henry Stimson, “The Decision to Use the Bomb,” Harper's Magazine, February, 1947
17. Q U E S T IO N S F O R
C O N S ID E R A T IO N
What do you agree with most?
What do you disagree with?
What surprised you?
What historical context contributes to each
viewpoint?
How does this contribute to your understanding of
this event/time period?
Has your perspective of this era or these people
changed?
What ideas are you struggling with? What
