Coercive diplomacy is the diplomacy of threats. Rather than relying on negotiation, diplomats will sometimes threaten adverse consequences if a demand is not met. Sometimes this works; at other times, it does not. Factors that influence the success of coercive diplomacy are similar to the factors that influence the success of other types of threats: the threat must be credible, the adverse consequence must be severe enough that the potential recipient really wants to avoid that outcome, and the demand must be clear and possible to meet. Even when these factors are present however, coercive diplomacy is risky. As with other threats, it tends further damage relationships and lead to a potential backlash against the threat and/or the threatening country later on. Backlash can, at times, be limited if the threat is combined with more integrative or exchange-based approaches. If rewards for compliance are offered in addition to the threat for non-compliance, the chances of success may be greater; also if the threat is seen to be legitimate, the chances of success may also rise.

1. Coercive Diplomacy
Definition:
Coercive diplomacy is the diplomacy of threats. Rather than relying on negotiation,
diplomats will sometimes threaten adverse consequences if a demand is not met. Sometimes
this works; at other times, it does not.
Factors that influence the success of coercive diplomacy are similar to the factors that influence
the success of other types of threats: the threat must be credible, the adverse consequence
must be severe enough that the potential recipient really wants to avoid that outcome, and the
demand must be clear and possible to meet. Even when these factors are present however,
coercive diplomacy is risky. As with other threats, it tends further damage relationships and
lead to a potential backlash against the threat and/or the threatening country later on. Backlash
can, at times, be limited if the threat is combined with more integrative or exchange-based
approaches. If rewards for compliance are offered in addition to the threat for non-compliance,
the chances of success may be greater; also if the threat is seen to be legitimate, the chances of
success may also rise.
Explanation:
The term 'coercive diplomacy' falls under the theory of coercion as a foreign
policy tool. In their book The Dynamics of Coercion-American Foreign Policy and the Limits of
Military Might, Daniel Byman and Matthew Waxman define coercive diplomacy as "getting the
adversary to act a certain way via anything short of brute force; the adversary must still have
the capacity of organized violence but choose not to exercise it". Coercion strategy "relies on
the threat of future military force to influence an adversary's decision making but may also
include limited uses of actual force". Joseph Nye emphasizes that coercive diplomacy depends
upon the credibility and the cost of the threat. "If a threat is not credible, it may fail to produce
acceptance and it may lead to costs to the reputation of the coercing state. In general, threats
are costly when they fail, not only in encouraging resistance in the target, but also in negatively
influencing third parties observing the outcome."
According to Alexander George, coercive diplomacy seeks to achieve three objectives. First, it
attempts to persuade an adversary to turn away from its goal. Second, it seeks to convince an
adversary to reverse an action already taken. Third, it may persuade an adversary to make
"fundamental changes in its government". When constructing a coercive diplomacy strategy,
policymakers must consider certain variables or "empty boxes" that must be filled. They must
decide "what to demand of the opponent; whether and how to create a sense of urgency for
compliance with demand; whether and what kind of punishment to threaten for
noncompliance; and whether to rely solely on the threat of punishment or also to offer
conditional inducements of a positive character to secure acceptance of the demand".

2. Alexander George developed a framework in which a number of "variants" or methods of
using coercive diplomacy could be deployed to achieve these objectives. These variants include
the following:
1. Ultimatum
2. Tacit Ultimatum
3. Try-and-See
4. Gradual Turning of the Screw
Requirement for Success:
Among the numerous theories on coercive diplomacy, Peter Viggo
Jacobsen’s (1998) ideal policy succinctly identifies the four key conditions the coercer must
meet to maximize the chance of success to stop or undo acts of aggression:
1. A threat of force to defeat the opponent or deny him his objectives quickly with little
cost.
2. A deadline for compliance.
3. An assurance to the adversary against future demands.
4. An offer of inducements for compliance.
The first requirement in Jacobsen’s 'ideal policy' is to make the threat so great that non-
compliance will be too costly for the resisting actors. The second requirement demands that
after maximizing the credibility of the threat, the coercer must set a specific deadline, as failure
to set a deadline for compliance "is likely to be interpreted as evidence that the coercer lacks
the will to implement the threat". Assurance against new demands must also be carried out for
greater chance of success. Jacobsen points out that the incentive to comply with the coercer's
demands will be significantly downgraded if the resisting actor fears compliance will merely
invite more demands. The last requirement for successful coercion is the effective use of
inducements, which are important facilitators used to give more credibility and assurance.
Case Study:
1. Success:
President John F. Kennedy used coercive diplomacy successfully in 1962 when
he was able to bring about a peaceful resolution to the Cuban Missile Crisis and avert possible
warfare between the United States and the Soviet Union. When Kennedy learned of the Soviet
Union's attempt to deploy forty-two medium-range and twenty-four intermediate-range
ballistic missiles into Cuba, he established a naval blockade and threatened an invasion of Cuba
with force to remove the missiles already there.
Instead of resorting to a strictly military strategy to forcibly remove the missiles, Kennedy
decided to use coercive diplomacy. He initiated this strategy by first using the 'Try-and-See'
approach. The giant naval blockade, along with a massive buildup of U.S. military forces, was a
message to Nikita Khrushchev to persuade him that the U.S was able and willing to use force if

3. needed to remove this missile threat from Cuba. The blockade limited the showdown to
Kennedy and Khruschev rather than develop into all-out war. Because of Kennedy's tough naval
blockade, Khruschev "directed all Soviet vessels carrying missiles and other military equipment
to Cuba to immediately turn back".
To intensify the coercive diplomacy strategy, Kennedy shifted from the 'Try-and-See' approach
to a hybrid of a virtual 'ultimatum' and a carrot-and-the stick approach.[6] Kennedy addressed
the sense of urgency about the growing hostile situation by standing firm and tightening the
naval blockade as well as conveying to Khruschev the continued threat of a possible invasion of
Cuba. As a result of Kennedy's successful use of coercive diplomacy added to negotiated
concessions, Khruschev agreed to remove missiles in place and to discontinue the deployment
of new missiles into Cuba while the U.S. agreed to remove its Jupiter missiles stationed in
Turkey and to call off any invasion of Cuba.
2. Failure:
During the 1990–91 Gulf War, coercive diplomacy failed to persuade Saddam
Hussein to exit Kuwait and move his military forces back to Iraq; though the use of deterrence
effectively convinced the Iraqi president that he could not invade further south into Saudi
Arabia, it did little to expel him from Kuwait. Initially, the Bush administration along with the
United Nations issued sanctions to pressure Iraq to withdraw troops inside Kuwait. The UN
Security Council placed economic sanctions by imposing an embargo on Iraq's imports and
exports. This initial stage of the crisis was the United States' attempt to use the coercive
diplomatic variant, 'Gradual Turning of the Screw' to apply pressure on Saddam Hussein to
comply to the demands to leave Kuwait.
Then the Bush administration, along with the UN Security Council, used the variant 'ultimatum'
by setting a deadline of January 15, 1991, for the withdrawal of Iraqi troops from Kuwait. When
this deadline came and passed, without Saddam Hussein's compliance, Operation Desert Storm
commenced and military force was used to remove Iraq's forces from Kuwait. Despite the
massive build-up of U.S. forces along the Saudi Arabia/Kuwait border, economic sanctions, and
a declared deadline for withdrawal, Saddam Hussein failed to remove his forces. In this
instance, coercive diplomacy failed, leading to the Gulf War, which concluded with the United
States and coalition forces succeeding in removing Saddam Hussein's troops from Kuwait. Thus,
when implementing coercive diplomacy not only the benefits but also the aftermath must be
considered. Especially in 21st century, every nation is interdependent so other forces by state
actors may affect a nation's diplomacy.