HendricksonPQIA 2014

NATO BurdenSharing in Libya: Understanding the Contributions of
Norway, Spain and Poland to the War Effort
«NATO BurdenSharing in Libya: Understanding the Contributions of Norway, Spain
and Poland to the War Effort»
by Ryan C. Hendrickson; Rachel A. Dicke; Phillip A. Roughton; Nicholas Anson
Source:
The Polish Quarterly of International Affairs (The Polish Quarterly of International Affairs), issue: 4 /
2013, pages: 2954, on www.ceeol.com.

RACHEL A. DICKE, NICHOLAS ANSON, PHILLIP A. ROUGHTON, RYAN C. HENDRICKSON
NATO Burden-Sharing in Libya:
Understanding the Contributions of Norway,
Spain and Poland to the War Effort1
NATO’s intervention in Libya witnessed an alliance military operation that
previously had been difficult to predict or imagine. Over the course of eight
months in 2011, NATO’s European allies carried out the majority of all military
strikes on Libya. Such numbers stand in stark contrast to the United States’
leading and dominant role in NATO’s previous air operations in Bosnia and
Kosovo, after which Pentagon military planners argued that “never again” would
America use force in joint NATO operations.2
Moreover, NATO’s Operation
Unified Protector in Libya likely averted a humanitarian disaster in Benghazi,
and after months of missile strikes, helped remove the Qaddafi regime from
power. Certainly, by these standards, the operation was a success and a victory
for the principle of alliance burden-sharing.
Yet by other measures, Operation Unified Protector raised major concerns
regarding alliance military capabilities, and more broadly on the different
national conceptualisations of what is in NATO’s security interest. Only a handful
of the 28 NATO allies willingly used force. In addition, the United States played
a critical enabling role through its air refuelling and force protection missions, as
well as in precision targeting strikes, all of which allowed the European allies to
contribute militarily in ways that would have otherwise been impossible. While
it is clear that a coalition of allies worked together to achieve NATO’s
objectives, it is equally evident that the military burden was not shared across
the alliance, and in a number of cases was openly resisted by some members.
NATO’s military performance in Libya raises important questions over
which allies are willing to use force in NATO operations, and more broadly, over
the principle of military burden-sharing, which has received extensive treatment
The Polish Quarterly of International Affairs, 2013, no. 4 29
1
The research presented here does not represent the views of the U.S. Army or the U.S
Department of Defense.
2
S. Kay, “What Went Wrong with NATO?,” Cambridge Review of International Affairs, vol. 18,
no. 1, 2005, p. 72.

from scholars. Using a structured and focused case study approach, this paper
examines three of Europe’s NATO allies—Norway, Spain and Poland—all of
whom played widely different roles in Operation Unified Protector. Using
previous research on burden-sharing as well as literature more specific to NATO
military operations, we examine three variables across these three NATO allies
—public and governmental support for the strikes, national strategic culture, and
perceived member benefits for the use of force—all in an effort to evaluate the
conditions when a European ally may be willing to act militarily. These research
findings speak to NATO’s ability to meet future security challenges, the role of
European militaries in American foreign policy and, hopefully, will provide
broader insights on the conditions that foster burden-sharing in alliance military
operations.
Literature Review and Methodology
Among the scholarly study of international relations is the theory of
collective action. Mancur Olson maintains that states will cooperate because
they can achieve results they are unable to acquire individually. These desired
results often take the form of public goods, which in the case of a military
alliance, implies security for all of its members.3
One means of promoting
security through cooperation is to form alliances. Typically alliances between
states are formed in response to the shared perception of an external threat.
Analysts have provided a number of explanations for the cohesion of an alliance,
which may depend upon how alliance members evaluate the intensity of this
threat, how effective the leadership of the largest state in the alliance is, or how
flexible the alliance is in adapting to new challenges.4
In the case of NATO, which was formed largely in response to a perceived
threat from the Soviet Union, this military alliance has evolved considerably
Rachel A. Dicke, Nicholas Anson, Phillip A. Roughton, Ryan C. Hendrickson
30 The Polish Quarterly of International Affairs, 2013, no. 4
3
M. Olson, The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups, Harvard
University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1965; see also, T. Sandler, Global Collective Action,
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK, 2004.
4
P.A. Weitsman, Dangerous Alliances: Proponents of Peace, Weapons of War, Stanford
University Press, Stanford, 2004; A. Bennett, J. Lepgold, D. Ungar, “Burden-sharing in the
Persian Gulf War,” International Organization, vol. 48, no. 1, 1994, pp. 39–75. See also,
N. Bensahel, “A Coalition of Coalitions: International Cooperation against Terrorism,” Studies
in Conflict & Terrorism, vol. 29, no. 1, 2006, pp. 35–49; C.A. Wallander, “Institutional Assets
and Adaptability: NATO after the Cold War,” Institutional Organization, vol. 54, no. 4, 2000,
pp. 705–735; M. Chalmers, “The Atlantic Burden-sharing Debate—Widening or Fragmenting?,”
International Affairs, vol. 77, no. 3, 2001, pp. 569–585.
Access via CEEOL NL Germany

since its inception. The organisation originally focused almost exclusively on
the protection of members’ borders from an external threat, yet has now become
an organisation with a much wider range of security interests and operations.
This transition has produced considerable political differences amongst its members,
which include broader debates over the purpose of the alliance, NATO’s
relationship with the European Union, its affiliation with new “partner states,”
appropriate defence-spending levels for its members, as well as the appropriate
role of the United States within the organisation.5
Such differences in views raise
questions over how members perceive their benefits from membership, as well
as why members decide to join NATO military operations.6
Though NATO succeeded in its military operations in the Balkans in the
1990s, many analysts pointed to the operations’ role in generating intra-alliance
debates over “out of area” uses of force, and more generally, on the widely
varying military capabilities of the contributing allies.7
Similar debates became
far more pronounced during NATO’s operation in Afghanistan, where alliance
members contributed to the mission in markedly different manners; members
imposed a range of national “caveats,” or restrictions, for how their troops could
participate in the mission. These varying contributions evoked passionate
intra-alliance debates over members’ conflicting perspectives on whether and
how to use force, and became considerable sources of domestic political tension
NATO Burden-Sharing in Libya
5
A. Holmberg, “The Changing Role of NATO: Exploring the Implications for Security
Governance and Legitimacy,” European Security, vol. 20, no. 4, 2011, pp. 529–546; A. Futter,
“NATO, Ballistic Missile Defence and the Future of U.S. Tactical Nuclear Weapons in Europe,”
European Security, vol. 20, no. 4, 2011, pp. 547–562; C. Wagnsson, “A Security Community in
the Making? Sweden and NATO Post-Libya,” European Security, vol. 20, no. 4, 2011, pp.
585–603; M.J. Mazarr, “Rivalry’s New Face,” Survival: Global Politics and Strategy, vol. 54,
no. 4, 2012, pp. 83–106; H. Edstrom, J.H. Matlary, M. Petersson (eds.), “Utility for NATO—
Utility of NATO?,” in: NATO: The Power of Partnerships, Palgrave Macmillan, New York,
2011.
6
T. Sandler, H. Shimizu, “NATO Burden Sharing 1999–2010: An Altered Alliance,” Foreign
Policy Analysis, vol. 8, no. 3, 2012, pp. 1–18; T. Noetzel, B. Schreer, “Does a Multi-tier NATO
Matter? The Atlantic Alliance and the Process of Strategic Change,” International Affairs, vol.
85, no. 2, 2009, pp. 211–226; T. Sandler, K. Hartley, Political Economy of NATO: Past, Present,
and into the 21st
Century, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK, 1999.
7
J. Sperling, M. Webber, “NATO: From Kosovo to Kabul,” International Affairs, vol. 85, no. 3,
2009, pp. 491–511; J. Huysmans, “Shape-Shifting NATO: Humanitarian Action and the Kosovo
Refugee Crisis,” International Studies, vol. 28, no. 3, 2002, pp. 599–618; J.E. Peters,
S. Johnson, N. Behsahel, T. Liston, T. Williams, European Contributions to Operation Allied
Force, RAND, Santa Monica, 2001.

among the NATO allies.8
NATO’s 2011 military operation in Libya, Operation
Unified Protector, produced a similar range of perspectives on the alliance’s
performance, with its critics noting that only a handful of members contributed
militarily to the mission. A number of allies stated from the onset their
unwillingness to contribute militarily to the mission.9
These different perspectives
raise questions over the future of the military alliance and its ability to project
and use force to face future security challenges. Thus, the willingness to “share
the burden” in alliance military operations remains an ongoing challenge for
NATO, and given the very recent differences and widely varying contributions
witnessed in Unified Protector, additional research on this issue is merited.
In this research, we will assess how three NATO allies—Norway, Spain and
Poland—contributed to Operation Unified Protector. These states were chosen
due to the very different ways each viewed and contributed to the operation,
from a willingness to conduct bombing operations in Libya to outright
opposition to any military contribution at all. In addition, these states also have
quite different strategic cultures, which ostensibly presents additional challenges
for burden-sharing and the possibility of joint operations within the alliance. In
this respect, Norway, Spain and Poland represent, arguably, the widest range of
European perspectives within NATO, and thus provide good and different
perspectives on who was willing to share the burden. Such a focus also allows
for an examination of European defence capabilities and contributions, and thus
an assessment of how some European states can contribute to a major NATO
military operation.
8
S. Rynning, NATO in Afghanistan: The Liberal Disconnect, Stanford University Press, Palo
Alto, 2012; S. Saideman, D. Auerswald, “Comparing Caveats: Understanding the Sources of
National Restrictions upon NATO’s Mission in Afghanistan,” International Studies Quarterly,
vol. 56, no. 1, 2012, pp. 67–84; R. Rupp, NATO after 9/11: An Alliance in Continuing Decline,
Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2006.
9
E. Hallams, B. Schreer, “Towards a ‘Post-American’ Alliance? NATO Burden-Sharing after
Libya,” International Affairs, vol. 88, no. 2, 2012, pp. 313–327; C.A. Buckley, “Learning from
Libya, Acting in Syria,” Journal of Strategic Security, vol. 5, no. 2, 2012, pp. 81–104; J.P. Bell,
R.C. Hendrickson, “NATO’s Visegrad Allies and the Bombing of Qaddafi: The Consequence of
Alliance Free-Riders,” Journal of Slavic Military Studies, vol. 25, no. 2, 2012, pp. 149–161;
A. Menon, “European Defence Policy from Lisbon to Libya,” Survival, vol. 53, no. 3, 2011,
pp. 75–90; T. Valasek, “What Libya Says about the Future of the Transatlantic Alliance,” Centre
for European Reform, July 2011; G. Chapell, “Operation Unified Protector: No ‘Swan Song’for
NATO,” Polish Quarterly of International Affairs, vol. 20, no. 2, 2011, pp. 63–78. For a more
optimistic perspective, see I.H. Daalder, J.G. Stravridis, “NATO’s Victory in Libya: The Right
War to Run and Intervention,” Foreign Affairs, vol. 91, no. 2, 2012, pp. 2–7.

During the Cold War, burden-sharing within the alliance traditionally was
determined by how much a member state was devoting to defence spending,
which often produced complaints from American legislators as well as nearly all
of NATO’s secretaries general that most of Europe was not devoting enough to
defence.10
In the Cold War’s aftermath, and especially in light of NATO’s
membership expansion rounds, the alliance has broadened the definition of how
a member state can contribute to the alliance, which may mean troop
contributions to a NATO operation, the sharing of niche military capabilities that
a member state may have, intelligence-sharing with allies, or even simply the
use of a member state’s airspace. In the most lenient sense of burden-sharing, all
NATO member states benefit from having stable democracies in Europe, and in
this sense, healthy democratic civil-military relations across Europe is good for
all of NATO’s allies and contributes to members’ security.11
For each state examined in this analysis, three variables stand out as factors
that may determine if a NATO ally is willing to participate in a military
operation. For this study, first, it seems important to evaluate the significance in
an alliance member’s public approval for the use of force. Some research suggests
that public approval ratings are instrumental in determining if a government is
willing to use military force.12
Thus, in order to examine this variable, we
examine national public opinion during NATO’s use of force in Libya, as well as
the overall popular sentiments expressed by the national parliaments—including
minor political parties—to determine the national mood for the use of force. The
inclusion of national parliamentary action in our analysis has similarly been
identified as an important aspect of NATO members’ willingness to use force,
especially in Afghanistan.13
Second, a state’s national strategic culture has been
viewed by many as central in determining foreign policy directions, especially
10
For a Cold War example of such transatlantic tensions, see D.M. Abshire, Preventing World War
III, Harper and Row, New York, 1988. On NATO secretaries generals’ concerns over European
defence expenditures, see R.C. Hendrickson, Diplomacy and War at NATO: The Secretary
General and Military Action after the Cold War, University of Missouri Press, Columbia, 2006.
11
T.S. Szayna, NATO’s Further Enlargement: Determinants and Implications for Defence
Planning and Shaping, RAND, Santa Monica, 2001.
12
J. Ringsmose, B.K. Børgesen, “Shaping Public Attitudes towards the Deployment of Military
Power: NATO, Afghanistan and the Use of Strategic Narratives,” European Security, vol. 20,
no. 4, 2011, pp. 505–528.
13
S. Saideman, D. Auerswald, op. cit.

on the decision to use force.14
With 28 different members in the alliance, it
seems useful to determine a member’s political culture with regard to NATO in
order to determine the alliance’s place in the overall context of a member’s
foreign policy. As NATO’s importance and relevance in a member state
increases, we anticipate that an ally will be more willing to engage in military
operations. Finally, the literature on collective action within alliances suggests
that member states must perceive national benefits in order to contribute to the
broader strategic goals of a military operation. Using statements made by senior
foreign policy leaders, as well as the member’s previous history with Libya and
in North Africa, we seek to examine how each state determined the “national
benefits” for using force in this case. We pay special attention to the willingness
to contribute militarily to Operation Unified Protector given the strong diplomatic
pressure applied by the United States on the European allies, especially as the
operation progressed and financial and logistical pressures increased for those
members who agreed at the mission’s onset to help militarily.15
In sum, this
research approach seeks to examine these allies from multiple perspectives in
order to evaluate a range of variables that may shape burden-sharing actions
within NATO. We begin our analysis with Norway.
Norway
Among the European allies, the Norwegian contribution to Operation
Unified Protector came immediately and entailed significant military support.
Norway contributed six F-16 fighter planes before NATO’s official endorsement
to use force, assisting the U.S.-led Operation Odyssey Dawn and then the NATO
operation.16
The initial decision to send assistance came on 18 March, the day
after UNSC Resolution 1973, which permitted the enforcement of a no-fly zone
14
J. Angstrom, J.W. Honig, “Regaining Strategy: Small Powers, Strategic Culture and Escalation
in Afghanistan,” Journal of Strategic Studies, vol. 35, no. 5, 2012, pp. 663–687; J. Glenn,
“Realism versus Strategic Culture: Competition and Collaboration?,” International Studies
Review, vol. 11, no. 3, 2009, pp. 523–551; T. Noetzel, B. Schreer, “All the Way? The Evolution
of German Military Power,” International Affairs, vol. 84, no. 2, 2008, pp. 211–221;
I.B. Neumann, H. Heikka, “Grand Strategy, Strategic Culture, Practice: The Social Roots of
Nordic Defence,” Cooperation and Conflict, vol. 40, no. 1, 2005, pp. 5–23.
15
B. Klapper, R. Burns, “Gates Presses Allies to Do More against Iraq,” Army Times, 8 June 2011,
www.armytimes.com/article/20110608/NEWS/106080307/Gates-presses-allies-do-more-again
st-Libya.
16
“The Norwegian Government is working for a broad coalition in the Libya operation,”
23 March 2011, www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/fd/whats-new/News/2011/the-norwegian-govern
ment-is-working-for-.html?id=636373.

in Libyan airspace. Norwegian aircraft were deployed only three days later.17
Overall, Norway contributed six F-16 fighters, flew 2,832 hours on 674
missions, and dropped 586 bombs, almost half of which were flown and dropped
within the first three weeks of the mission.18
Although Norwegian forces
withdrew in August 2011 after they had exhausted their supply of armaments,
they were responsible for almost 10% of all allied sorties.19
From the onset of Norway’s military actions, most measures of public
opinion utilised in this analysis suggest strong support for the strikes on Libya.
Norway has a multi-party political system that often results in coalition
governments, and was in the midst of a coalition government during the Libya
operation. In March 2011, seven political parties had representation in
parliament, the Storting, with the Labour, Centre, and the Socialist Left parties
leading the government in the so called Red-Green coalition. The Progress party
is the largest opposition party, with the Conservative party close behind, and the
Christian People’s party and the Liberal party have the fewest members.20
In all,
the majority coalition includes 86 of the 169 seats in the Storting. Yet, despite
the presence of this coalition with significant minority factions, the government
quickly mobilised to contribute militarily, with little to no objection raised by the
opposition parties. Although the issue was not debated in the Storting, Prime
Minister Jens Stoltenberg called and met with government ministers and the
military chief prior to the use of force, while Foreign Minister Jonas Støre
personally called each of the parliamentary party leaders.21
The outcome was
broad support for a Norwegian contribution.22
The only significant opposition
came months later and was related to the perceived lack of consultation with
17
J.G. Støre, “Government and Libya,” Aftenposten, 27 April 2011.
18
T. Heier, Forsvaret til Libya 2011. Klar til strid?, The Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies,
September 2012.
19
G. O’Dwyer, “Norway Withdraws F-16s from Libya Ops,” Defensenews.com, 11 August 2011,
www.defensenews.com/article/20110811/DEFSECT01/108110302/Norway-Withdraws-F-16s-
from-Libya-Ops; T. Harding, M. Day, “NATO Goes Cap in Hand to Germany after Libya
Depletes Bomb Stocks,” The Daily Telegraph, 29 June 2011.
20
“Members of the Storting,” 2012, Stortinget.no; I. Karacs, “Norwegian Leader Who Grew Up in
Government,” The Times, 27 July 2011.
21
J.G. Støre, op. cit.
22
S. Barstade, L.I. Stake Land, “Increasing Libya Scepticism in SV,” Aftenposten, 18 April 2011.

parliament as a whole. Yet even with these concerns, it is important to note that
at the time, parliament still remained supportive of the mission.23
Like parliament, Norwegian public opinion was mostly in favour of the
intervention. In a poll conducted in April 2011, 70% of Norwegians expressed
support for their military contribution to the mission, while only 17% thought it
was wrong.24
In sum, there was clearly strong support for Norway’s military
contribution to the enforcement of a no-fly zone over Libya, both in the public at
large and among the majority and minority party coalitions.
As for Norway’s strategic culture vis-à-vis NATO, the organisation has been
called “the essential source of security and stability in an unpredictable world.”25
Immediately after UNSCR 1973 authorised the use of force, Norway supported
the resolution and promptly began assessing what NATO would need and how
Norway could contribute, according to Defence Minister Grete Faremo.26
The
importance of fulfilling the commitments requested by the alliance was also
expressed by State Secretary of Defence Roger Ingebrigtsen as a means of
strengthening Norway’s security. In his view, Norway “will honour [its]
commitments and responsibilities. [It] will see these missions successfully through.”
He further stated: “The need for a more equitable Alliance burden-sharing is of
great importance. Norway is spending its fair share on defence ….”27
This
support is in keeping with the traditional relationship between Norway and
NATO. Norway’s dedication to the organisation was particularly strong during
the Cold War, when despite a lingering tendency towards neutrality, Norway
quickly gained a reputation as a committed and loyal ally. After the Cold War,
some scholars contend that Norway adapted admirably to the new direction of
the alliance, continuing to actively participate in NATO peacekeeping operations,
23
S. Gedde-Dahl, “War Must Be Adopted in Parliament,” Aftenposten, 13 June 2012.
24
“Norway will contribute six F-16 aircraft in Libya to enforce UN Security Council resolution on
a no-fly zone over Libya. Do you think it is right or wrong for Norway to participate in this
action?,” Norwegian Social Science Data Services, April 2011, http://mma.nsd.uib.no//webview/
index.jsp?study=http://mma.nsd.uib.no:80/obj/fStudy/MMA1007&mode=documentation&v=2&sub
mode=variable&variable=http://mma.nsd.uib.no:80/obj/fVariable/MMA1007_V11&top=yes.
25
R. Ingebrigtsen, “Nordic Defence Cooperation—A Mini-NATO to the North?,” Norwegian
Ministry of Defence, 24 June 2011, www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/fd/whats-new/Speeches-and-
articles/Speeches-and-articles-by-other-apolitica/speeches-and-articles-by-state-secretary-2/sp
eeches-and-articles/nordic-defence-cooperation—a-mini-nato-.html?id=648561.
26
“Norway supports UN resolution on Libya,” Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 18 March
2011, www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/ud/press/news/2011/un_libya.html?id=636202.
27
R. Ingebrigtsen, “Nordic Defence Cooperation …,” op. cit.

implementing defence reforms to increase future contributions despite its
smaller size, and supporting newer members so they could also participate.28
In
addition, Norway recently increased its defence budget, specifically citing the
need to bolster NATO capabilities in the face of European defence spending
cuts.29
Others believe that Norway’s continuing preoccupation with NATO–
Russian relations and “High North” policies have resulted in a slight lag in
adapting to the newer, modern strategic culture of NATO.30
Although the state
initially had some reservations when it joined the Alliance, e.g., no nuclear
weapons were allowed to be deployed on Norwegian territory, it seems clear that
NATO has been and remains a “cornerstone of Norwegian security policy.”31
The state’s defence forces have been specifically structured for compatibility
with NATO forces, and special emphasis has been placed in the national budget
on NATO participation. Though not a member of the European Union, Norway
has attempted to reconcile NATO and EU force capabilities, and has assisted
other Nordic states with integration into the NATO force structure.32
Though its numbers have often been small, Norway’s rhetorical support for
NATO has been witnessed in the field. To NATO’s strikes in Kosovo in 1999,
Norway contributed intelligence officers, four F-16s, and the personnel required
to maintain the aircraft. Norway also participated with a single battalion of
peacekeepers in the Kosovo Protection Force (KFOR).33
To Afghanistan,
28
R.C. Hendrickson, “NATO’s Northern Allies: Contributions in the Post-Cold War Era,” European
Security, vol. 8, no. 1, 1999, pp. 64–78; Sir I. Forbes, “Minding the Gap,” Foreign Policy, 141,
March/April 2004, pp. 76–77; Mark Kramer, “NATO, the Baltic States, and Russia: A Framework
for Sustainable Enlargement,” International Affairs, vol. 78, no. 4, 2002, pp. 731–756; S. Lodgaard,
“Norway and NATO at 50,” Journal of International Affairs, vol. 4, no. 1, 1999, pp. 1–6.
29
D. Majumdar, “Norway: NATO Losing Self-Defence Ability,” Defensenews.com, 12 January
2012, www.defensenews.com/article/20120112/DEFREG01/301120003/Norway-NATO-Losing-Self-
Defense-Ability.
30
M. Petersson, H.L. Saxi, “Shifted Roles: Explaining Danish and Norwegian Alliance Strategy
1949–2009,” Journal of Strategic Studies, iFirst article, 2012, pp. 1–28; J. Angstrom,
J.W. Honig, op. cit.
31
H. Blakkisrud, “Norwegian Foreign Policy in the 20th
Century,” 5 January 2000,
www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/ud/documents/tidsskrift_og_nyhetsbrev/2000/norwegian-foreign-
policy-in-the-20th-cen.html?id=425725.
32
R. Ingebrigtsen, “Nordic Defence Cooperation …,” op. cit.; “The Defence Budget 2001 Short
Version,” 10 November 2001, www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/fd/documents/Handbooks-and- brochures/
2000/The-Defence-Budget-2001—-Short-version.html?id=419249; H. Blakkisrud, op. cit.
33
“Trond Bolle spying for NATO in Yugoslavia,” Aftenposten, 19 September 2012; “Norwegian
spy group operated on three continents,” Aftenposten, 4 February 2011; M. Petersson, H.L. Saxi,
op. cit.

Norway contributed six F-16s, four helicopters, and one jet designed for electronic
warfare.34
Norwegian personnel led a Provincial Reconstruction Team in the
north of Afghanistan, supplied a rapid reaction force, and trained Afghan
defence and police personnel. There were no limitations on where Norwegian
personnel could operate in the north, but Norway refused to send additional
troops to the south.35
Alongside Norway’s long-standing support for NATO, its strategic culture
and foreign policy also emphasise strong and robust support for the United
Nations and humanitarianism. Notably, it was a Norwegian, Trygvie Lie, who
served as the United Nations’ first secretary general. Moreover, like its
Scandinavian neighbours Norway prides itself on its extensive financial support
of foreign aid and humanitarian contributions. The country has a long history of
such support. Norway also funnels significant amounts of aid through the United
Nations, supporting such organisations as UNICEF, UN Habitat, and the United
Nations Development Programme.36
In sum, Norway’s strategic culture places
a high value on NATO and United Nations relevance in its foreign policy. Thus,
in an operation that had UN Security Council approval, and eventually NATO’s
authorisation as well, we would expect meaningful participation in the Libyan
operation, which is exactly what occurred.
As the crisis in Libya unfolded and the eventual military operation
commenced, strong evidence exists that Unified Protector fit closely with
Norway’s strategic culture. After decades of repressing the Libyan people, the
Qaddafi government arrested critics and spurred the February uprising. Once the
34
K. Barøy, “Norwegian Air Forces in Afghanistan Require Considerable Support,” Aftenposten,
1 December 2001; T. Hertzberg, “Does the U.S. Help in Terror War?,” Aftenposten,
30 November 2001.
35
“Norwegian Force Contributions to ISAF in Afghanistan,” 6 November 2007,
www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/fd/press-centre/Press-releases/2007/Norwegian-force-contribution
s-to-ISAF-in.html?id=488551; A.-G. Strøm Erichson, “United for a Modern Defence,”
28 February 2006, www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/fd/whats-new/Speeches-and-articles/minister/
forsvarsminister-stroem-erichsen/2006/united-for-a-modern-defence.html?id=420743.
36
Ø.H. Skånland, “‘Norway Is a Peace Nation’: A Discourse Analytic Reading of the Norwegian
Peace Engagement,” Cooperation and Conflict, vol. 45, no. 1, 2010, pp. 34–54; K.V. Laati-
kainen, “Norden’s Eclipse: The Impact of the European Union’s Common Foreign and Security
Policy on the Nordic Group in the United Nations,” Cooperation and Conflict, vol. 38, no. 4,
2003, pp. 409–441; O. Kjørven, “Norwegian Support for Education for All,” Forum for
Development Studies, vol. 31, no. 2, 2004, pp. 355–370; T.L. Haaland, “Participation in Peace
Support Operations for Small Countries: The Case of Norway,” International Peacekeeping,
vol. 14, no. 4, 2007, pp. 493–509.

civil conflict began, Qaddafi referred to the rebels as “rats” and called on his
supporters to “purify” Tripoli, causing outrage in the international community.37
The humanitarian aspect of the conflict was emphasised by Foreign Minister
Jonas Støre in a number of public addresses highlighting Norway’s $60 million
Kroner contribution to emergency relief efforts and close cooperation with
international aid organisations such as the Red Cross. The Norwegian Red Cross
in particular was sent to Libya in February 2011, almost a full month before
official international action. Norway also raised its accepted refugee quota in
order to admit more Libyan refugees.38
Duty to the UN and the relevance of
international rule of law also played a large role in speeches by government
officials. Defence Minister Grete Faremo stated that “all UN member states are
responsible for implementing the Security Council’s resolution. Norway will
now, together with our allies, consider whether, and if so how, NATO could help
to implement the UN resolution.”39
In addition, Norway imposed economic
sanctions against Libya on 11 March, citing a previous UN Security Council
Resolution, UNSCR 1970, which addressed the widespread human rights
violations in Libya a little over a week prior to the state’s contribution of
military forces.40
Multiple declarations of support for the Libyan people by
37
“World Report 2012: Libya,” Human Rights Watch, 22 January 2012, www.hrw.org/
world-report-2012/world-report-2012-libya; “Gaddafi address: ‘Do not leave Tripoli to the
rats’,” BBC News, 25 August 2011, www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-14670827; “Gaddafi
calls rebels ‘rats, crusaders, and unbelievers’,” Reuters, 25 August 2011, www.reuters.com/
video/2011/08/25/gaddafi-calls-rebels-rats-crusaders-and?videoId=218684820.
38
“Unacceptable Use of Violence against the Libyan People,” 22 February 2011,
www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/ud/press/news/2011/unacceptable_violence_libya.html?id=634501;
“Norway provides support for emergency medical assistance in Libya,” 23 February 2011,
www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/ud/press/news/2011/assistance_libya.html?id=634600; “Norway
supports UN resolution on Libya,” op. cit.; J. Stoltenberg, “Statement on Libya in Paris,”
19 March 2011, www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/smk/Whats-new/Speeches-and-articles/stats
ministeren/statsminister_jens_stoltenberg/2011/statement-on-libya-in-paris.html?id=636260;
J.G. Støre, “A Political Solution Must Be Found in Libya,” 29 March 2011, www.regjeringen.no/
en/dep/ud/press/news/2011/libya_solution.html?id=637001; J.G. Støre, “Statement at Conference
on Libya,” 29 March 2011, www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/ud/Whats-new/Speeches-and-articles/
speeches_foreign/2011/libya_london.html?id=637002; J.G. Støre, “Address to the Storting on
the Situation in Libya and Norway’s Participation in the International Response,” 9 May 2011,
www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/ud/Whats-new/Speeches-and-articles/speeches_foreign/2011/addr
ess_libya.html?id=642453; J.G. Støre, “Historic Turning Point for Libya,” 20 October 2011,
www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/ud/press/news/2011/turning_point.html?id=661258.
39
“Norway supports UN resolution on Libya,” op. cit.
40
“Sanctions against Libya adopted,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 11 March 2011,
www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/ud/press/news/2011/sanctions_libya.html?id=635667.

government officials who emphasised the protection of human rights, support
for refugees, and the importance of multilateral action were borne out by
Norwegian foreign policy action.41
Thus, Norway’s behaviour comported
closely with its strategic culture, which emphasises NATO, the United Nations,
and its longstanding support for humanitarian action.
An examination of benefits Norway might receive from participating in
Operation Unified Protector must take into account both economic and
normative factors. Economically, Norway has some significant ties to Libya.
The Norwegian fertilizers and chemicals group Yara International brokered
a deal with the National Oil Corporation (NOC) of Libya and the Libyan
Investment Authority in 2009 that created the Libyan Norwegian Fertilizer
Company, Lifeco, with half ownership belonging to Yara International. The
agreement also involved the transfer of natural gas from NOC to Lifeco over the
long-term.42
This cooperation indicates that Norway had a stake in stabilising
Libya quickly to maintain the partnership and maintain the transfer of natural
gas from a purely Libyan company to one in which Norway had a 50% share.
Norway’s oil industry is another potential variable to consider. The
fifth-largest oil exporter globally in 2007 and the seventh-largest in 2010,
Norway receives a quarter of its government revenues from oil. Norway’s oil
industry is the largest in the state when measured by export value and
government revenues and employs more than 200,000 people.43
The industry
was made even more profitable by the turmoil in Libya in February 2011, with
North Sea oil shooting up in price.44
By this standard, a case could be made that
internal turmoil in Libya provided a financial boost to Norway’s oil exports, and
thus Norway may have had material incentives to see oil prices continue to
increase as the crisis progressed. However, this potential benefit is offset by the
41
“Unacceptable Use of Violence against the Libyan people,” op. cit.; “Norway provides support
for emergency medical assistance in Libya,” op. cit.; “Norway supports UN resolution on
Libya,” op. cit.
42
“Norwegian fertilisers group Yara International ASA, National Oil Corporation of Libya and
Libyan Investment Authority sign final JV agreement,” Nordic Business Report, 9 February
2009.
43
“Norway’s oil and gas resources,” Ministry of Petroleum and Energy, www.regjeringen.no/
en/dep/oed/Subject/Oil-and-Gas/norways-oil-and-gas-resources.html?id=443528; “Resource Report
2011: Status and Challenges on the NCS,” Norwegian Petroleum Directorate, 9 November 2011,
www.npd.no/en/Publications/Resource-Reports/2011/Chapter-1.
44
“Norway seen to bag NOK 50bn on higher oil prices in 2011,” Nordic Business Report,
25 February 2011.

cost to Norway of participating in the air strikes, which was substantial enough
to scale back operations in June and add a supplementary defence budget. Thus,
Norway’s military intervention does not seem to necessarily square with its
narrow oil interests and therefore does not provide for a compelling reason for
intervention.
One potential regional security benefit gained from Norway’s military
actions may have been its willingness to project force, especially in light of its
ongoing security concerns with the High North and Russia. Though Norway did
not expressly vocalise such views, by using military force it demonstrated that it
had meaningful military capabilities and the ability to defend itself in some
capacity. In addition, Norway demonstrated its dedication to an alliance that still
guarantees security, which remains paramount in Norway’s security priorities.45
Further, Norway has put considerable effort into crafting a humanitarian persona
on the international stage and was very clear that the human rights violations
perpetrated by the Qaddafi regime were one of the main reasons for its
participation in the Libyan mission. The reputational losses suffered through
inaction were likely to have been high for a country that prides itself on the
issue. Through these lenses, Norway arguably received security benefits by
demonstrating its role as a security provider—rather than consumer?—to the
alliance, and potentially as a deterrent to any possible Russian threat that may
develop in the future. In this regard, the “benefits” analysis provides additional
insights on Norway’s willingness to contribute military forces to Unified
Protector.
Spain
The Spanish government contributed six aircraft, 600 service members, and
one submarine to NATO’s mission in Libya. Four of the Spanish aircraft were
F-18s and two more were used for refuelling and surveillance missions.46
Spain
later added another aircraft to the operation and extended its participation in the
45
G. O’Dwyer, “Libya Operations Threaten Nordic Budgets,” Defensenews.com, 19 June 2011,
www.defensenews.com/article/20110619/DEFFEAT04/106190303/Libya-Operations-Threaten
-Nordic-Budgets.
46
“Spanish maritime surveillance plane carries out its first mission in Libya without incident,” La
Moncloa, 26 March 2011, www.lamoncloa.gob.es/IDIOMAS/9/Gobierno/News/2011/260320
11SpanishMaritime.htm.

NATO-led operation, but was clear that it would not contribute ground troops.47
Spanish aircraft flew 62 missions consisting of airstrikes, reconnaissance
missions, and refuelling operations.48
In addition, on 3 April 2011, Spain sent
15 tons of humanitarian aid to Libya. The Spanish frigate Mendez Nunez
intercepted 37 suspicious vessels and conducted seven inspections off Libya’s
coast.49
In short, Spain clearly contributed to Operation Unified Protector, but in
a limited capacity, and significantly less than Norway.
Spanish public opinion on its engagement in Libya indicated strong backing
for the operation.50
Despite this support, Spain’s military contribution to
Operation Unified Protector was quite limited during the entirety of the conflict.
Defence Minister Carme Chacon reiterated the need for NATO to protect the
Libyan people from Col. Muammar Qaddafi.51
On 22 March 2011, the president
of the Spanish government, Mariano Rajoy, requested authorisation from the
lower house of parliament for the participation of Spanish forces in the
enforcement of the United Nations Security Council Resolutions on the Libyan
crisis.52
Overall, the Spanish parliament authorised the use of Spanish forces in
Libya with a vote of 333 votes in favour to three opposed and one abstention.53
It
is notable, however, that when parliament voted it did not provide carte blanche
endorsement of UNSC Resolution 1973, which allowed members to take all
necessary measures to protect civilians. This section of the resolution was left
out of parliament’s vote, as it permitted a wider range of possible military
operations. In addition, parliament initially provided only a one-month
47
“Spain extends the military mission in Libya for a further two months,” Spain Review.Net,
10 October 2011, www.spainreview.net/index.php/2011/04/20/spain-extends-the-military-
mission-in-libya-for-a-further-two-months.
48
“Spanish maritime surveillance plane…,” op. cit.
49
“Spanish participation in multi-national force in Libya,” La Moncloa, 25 March 2011,
www.lamoncloa.gob.es/IDIOMAS/9/Gobierno/News/2011/25032011SpanishParticipation.htm.
50
“Barometer of the Elcano Royal Institute—Results May–June 2011,” Real Instituto Elcano,
May–June 2011, www.realinstitutoelcano.org/wps/wcm/connect/2f3ab4004782c0609ccadc139
1bdd296/27Oleada_Informe_Completo.pdf?MOD=AJPERES&CACHEID=2f3ab4004782c06
09ccadc1391bdd296.
51
“As long as threat of Gaddafi still hangs over the people of Libya, the NATO mission must
remain in place,” La Moncloa, 29 September 2011, www.lamoncloa.gob.es/IDIOMAS/9/
Gobierno/News/2011/29092011_Libya.htm.
52
“Press Conference by the President of the Government and the Secretary-General of NATO,”
La Moncloa, 26 April 2012, www.lamoncloa.gob.es/idiomas/9/presidente/intervenciones/
conferenciasdeprensa/20120426_pgandnatopressconference.htm.
53
Ibidem.

timeframe for Spain’s aerial contributions, and a three-month limit for naval
assistance. Though analysts have found it difficult to explain the imposition of
these limits, it does suggest that the government was concerned about the
possibility of parliamentary opposition.54
Trinidad Jimenez, Spain’s minister of Foreign Affairs, similarly stressed
support for the humanitarian mission in Libya and began focusing on what
a post-Qaddafi Libya would look like.55
Rajoy and the Peoples’ Party
consistently expressed their desire to participate in NATO-led missions in Libya
and Afghanistan.56
Research done by Mestres and the Spanish think tank FRIDE
has shown that while Spanish voters and parliamentary coalitions do not support
what they deem offensive (non-defensive) operations such as the conflict
involving the United States in Iraq, Spaniards are willing to intervene militarily
in order to protect citizens from humanitarian crises.57
Spanish public opinion polls conducted by Barómetro del Real Instituto
Elcano show that in May 2011, 59% of Spaniards thought that the rebels would
defeat Qaddafi and 46% supported Spanish troops being involved in Libya with
only 40% opposed. Only 33% of Spaniards supported a complete withdrawal of
Spanish forces from Libya and Afghanistan.58
Thus, these findings suggest that
a majority of the public favoured military engagement, though a considerable
minority opposed the mission. The parliament, however, was generally unified
in Spain’s limited engagement.
Unlike Norway, Spain has a much different history and strategic culture
vis-à-vis NATO. Upon Spain’s entry into NATO in 1982, a significant
proportion of the Spanish population was opposed to membership.59
Despite
54
M. Gonzales, “Spain Sets Own Rules of Engagement for Libya Mission,” El Pais, 24 March
2011, http://elpais.com/elpais/2011/03/24/inenglish/1300947641_850210.html.
55
“Trinidad Jimenez attends the International Contact Group on Libya in Istanbul,” La Moncloa,
15 July 2011, www.lamoncloa.gob.es/IDIOMAS/9/Gobierno/News/2011/15072011Istanbul
TrinidadJimenez.htm.
56
“Spain’s War in Afghanistan,” FRIDE, January 2010, www.fride.org/publication/705/
spain’s-war-in-afghanistan.
57
L. Mestres, “Why Libya Isn’t Iraq for Spain: The Responsibility to Protect,” 31 March 2011,
www.cidob.org/en/publications/opinion/seguridad_y_politica_mundial/why_libya_isn_t_iraq_
for_spain_the_responsibility_to_protect.
58
“Barometer of the Elcano Royal Institute…,” op. cit.
59
J. Walker, “Spanish Poll Shows a Majority Oppose NATO Ties,” The Guardian, 29 October
1984.

considerable protests, the Spanish government pushed for its entry into NATO
and the eurozone.60
After Spain’s integration into NATO, relations normalised and Spain began
to increasingly participate in NATO-led operations in the post-Cold War era. For
example, Spain contributed 8,000 peacekeeping personnel in Bosnia and
Kosovo, and over the course of 10 years, more than 22,000 Spanish personnel
were deployed to the Balkans.61
Spain contributed to the NATO humanitarian
operation in Pakistan in 2005 and has also contributed to the war in Afghanistan,
although with significant caveats regarding the safety of Spanish soldiers. In
2009, Spain increased its presence in Afghanistan to 1,500 soldiers and accepted
assignments in Badghis province, which is considered to be more dangerous
than other areas where Spanish troops had previously operated, signalling some
willingness on Spain’s part to remove caveats and potentially allow their soldiers
to participate in more dangerous areas. Spain has stuck with its commitment to
NATO despite some casualties and setbacks.62
Thus, by these measures, Spain’s
past foreign policy behaviour suggests a strategic culture that is favourable to
NATO and its evolving security role.
At the same time, Spain has been called upon by NATO and the U.S. to
contribute more to NATO-led operations.63
Spain was also painfully slow in
deploying its military forces to Pakistan in the aftermath of the earthquake there
in 2005. With regard to defence spending levels, Spain is ranked third from the
bottom in NATO, and by percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP), only
Lithuania and Luxembourg contribute less.64
Moreover, prior to the Libyan
conflict, some argued that Spain’s role in the Mediterranean was shrinking
despite calls from within Spain for an increased role in North Africa, particularly
in states like Libya that were swept up in violence during the Arab Spring.65
60
“Spanish Defence Minister’s ‘Trick Argument’ about Joining NATO,” BBC Summary of World
Broadcasts, 16 March 1981, www.lexisnexis.com/hottopics/lnacademic.
61
“Spanish Foreign Policy in the Balkans: Wasted Potential,” FRIDE, January 2010,
www.fride.org/publication/710/spanish-foreign-policy-in-the-balkans:-wasted-potential.
62
“Spain’s War in Afghanistan,” op. cit.
63
M. Bennett, “Is Spain Pulling Its Weight in NATO?,” Center for Defence Studies, 21 June 2011,
www.defensestudies.org/cds/2011/06.
64
“Spain ranked third from bottom on defence spending within NATO,” BBC Europe, 18 April
2012.
65
“Spain’s Diminished Policy in the Mediterranean,” FRIDE, January 2010, www.fride.org/
publication/709/spanish-development-policies:-the-obstacles-to-progress.

One additional variable to consider in Spain is its diminished economy.66
Spain at the time the Libya decision surfaced had been suffering from an
unemployment rate of 21% and was engaged in extended talks with the European
Union over its failing economy.67
Thus, an extended military engagement would
very likely be opposed in Spain, and in this respect may limit the influence of
Spain’s strategic culture and its ability to contribute militarily.68
In sum, Spain’s
strategic culture is definitely favourable to the alliance, but with important
limitations that constrain how much Spain is willing to contribute, and given its
financial duress, future major contributions to alliance missions seem unlikely
unless Spain’s direct national interests appear threatened.
With the case of Spain’s actions in Libya, the evidence shows that much like
their strategic culture suggests, this NATO ally provided military support, but
with considerable limitations on the extent to which Spain was willing to
contribute. As noted above, Spain contributed air and naval power, but only in
a very limited manner. Spain clearly did more than the vast majority of the allies
through its willingness to assist militarily, but did so with its own set of special
caveats and contributions. In this respect, its willingness to assist militarily
generally fits quite closely with the recent history of Spain’s strategic culture
toward NATO.
In terms of measuring the benefits evident from Spain’s military
contributions, Spanish political leaders consistently expressed their concern for
the Libyan people under the Qaddafi regime. Chacon, Rajoy, and Jimenez
consistently reiterated the Spanish government’s desire to protect the Libyan
people from violence, and in this respect, the presence of humanitarian interests
again appears relevant in shaping this ally’s interests.69
Thus, the primary
benefits for Spain’s participation in the Libyan crisis revolve around protecting
66
“Crisis in Libya Weighing on Spanish Economy: EWP, UGA, BBVA, STD,” Seeking Alpha,
28 February 2011, http://seekingalpha.com/article/255388-crisis-in-libya-weighing-on-spanish-
economy.
67
“As Spain’s economy sinks again, many in Catalonia want out; calls for independence latest
consequence of European debt crisis,” USA Today, 28 September 2011, http://usatoday30.
usatoday.com/news/world/story/2012/09/28/as-spain-sinks-many-in-catalonia-want-out/57848
100/12.
68
J. Lipow, “Can NATO Survive an Accident-Prone Euro?,” Defence and Security Analysis,
vol. 28, no. 3, 2012, pp. 226–233.
69
“We have demonstrated our firm commitment to protecting citizens when their leaders turn
against them,” La Moncloa, 16 September 2011, www.lamoncloa.gob.es/idiomas/9/gobierno/
news/2011/16092011carmechacon.htm.

innocent civilians as well as Spain’s commitment to stopping human rights
violations. Perhaps the country’s interest in Libya is shaped by its track record in
North Africa, where Spain actually has a less impressive record of advocating
for human rights and has worked closely with authoritarian governments.70
At
one point, Spain’s relations were so close with Qaddafi that he received
a symbolic key to the city of Madrid.71
Thus, Spain may have viewed its actions
in Libya as “righting a wrong” that had been evident through its previous
willingness to cooperate with non-democratic North African leaders. Moreover,
Spain’s proximity to Libya and North Africa may also pose a potential benefit to
participating in the ousting of the Qaddafi regime, in that the conflict had close
regional relevance.72
Another potential benefit for Spain’s participation in NATO’s Libyan
operation is simply to show its support for the alliance. Spain’s commitment to
NATO has been called into question at times by the United States and by some
of the European allies.73
Spain does not want to be seen as a non-contributor in
the NATO alliance and this may explain the limited yet formidable contribution
to the NATO operation in Libya. Of Spanish citizens polled, 58% supported
Spanish military intervention following a U.N. mandate,74
while Spanish voters
turned former President Jose Aznar out of office for participating in the
non-U.N. sponsored intervention in Iraq.
Apart from its interests in humanitarian affairs and as a participating member
of NATO, Spain also had an economic relationship with the Qaddafi regime
prior to March of 2011. Perhaps most notable is Spanish oil company Respol,
which held the capacity to produce 360,000 barrels of oil per day from Libya
prior to the civil war, and thus had a strong interest in ending the violence,
removing Qaddafi, and restoring economic stability to Libya.75
In 2009, Spanish
Foreign Minister Morantinos attended Col. Qaddafi’s celebration of his 40th
anniversary as dictator of Libya. Thus, Spain had a strong economic relationship
70
“Spain’s Diminished Policy…,” op. cit.
71
“Spaniards Question Why They Should Pay for Libya Bombs,” RT, 11 July 2011, http://rt.com/
news/libya-spain-economic-nato.
72
“Spain’s Diminished Policy…,” op. cit.
73
M. Bennett, op. cit.
74
“Barometer of the Elcano Royal Institute…,” op. cit.
75
L. Baratti, “Respol’s Doubled Q4 Profit Is Overshadowed by Libya,” Oilgram News,
25 February 2011.

with the Libyan government prior to NATO intervention. In this context, perhaps
Spain felt a domestic moral obligation to prevent additional atrocities from
Qaddafi after its long support for him and his regime, as well as substantial
economic interests in fostering Qaddafi’s exit. In sum, though it limited its
engagement, Spain likely saw important domestic political interest in helping
Libya resolve its humanitarian crisis, and thus could not afford to remain
unengaged.
Poland
Unlike Norway and Spain, Poland chose not to participate in the Libya
operation militarily. While Poland offered diplomatic support and humanitarian
aid to Libyan civilians, Poland did not aid in flying sorties, the enforcement of
the no-fly zone, or any of the other military facets of Operation Unified
Protector. The Polish president stressed that humanitarian aid would be the
extent of Poland’s contribution due to Poland’s large military deployment in
Afghanistan.76
Several variables provide insight on Poland’s reluctance to
participate in this alliance operation.
By a number of measures, Polish public opinion was clearly opposed to its
own military involvement in Libya. Poland’s major political parties are Civic
Platform (PO), Law and Justice (PiS), Your Movement (TR),77
Polish People’s
Party (PSL), and the Democratic Left Alliance (SLD).78
At the time of the Libya
operation, the Polish parliament was led by a coalition of Civic Platform and the
Polish People’s Party, a coalition that controlled 235 of the 460 seats in
parliament.79
On 19 March 2011, Civic Platform, the Polish People’s Party, and
another smaller party, Poland Comes First, all endorsed UN Security Council
Resolution 1973, which placed a flight ban over Libya.80
Also on 19 March,
Prime Minister Donald Tusk announced at an emergency EU–African
Union–Arab League Summit that Poland would not contribute militarily to any
76
“Polish President says humanitarian aid to Libya priority,” BBC Worldwide Monitoring,
28 March 2011, www.accessmylibrary.com/article-1G1-252625489/polish-president-says-
humanitarian.html.
77
Formerly Palikot’s Movement (RP), but before that it was Movement of Support during the time
the Libyan crisis began.
78
“Parties and Elections in Europe—Poland,” 2011, www.parties-and-elections.eu/poland.html.
79
“Parties and Elections in Europe—Poland,” op. cit.
80
“Polish Parties Back UN Resolution on Libya,” BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 19 March 2011,
www.accessmylibrary.com/article-1G1-251950338/polish-parties-back-un.html.

action in Libya, though Tusk noted that he supported the UN resolution and
offered humanitarian aid.81
Tusk elaborated by saying “there are no military or
geographical reasons to send Polish soldiers there,” a point supported by almost
all of the opposition parties as well.82
Joining with the prime minister and the
other parties that had declared Poland would not participate, the Law and Justice
party also expressed its view that Poland was not able to assist. Karol Karski,
deputy chairman of the Sejm Foreign Affairs Committee, noted “simply put, our
army would not make it. No other decision could be made.”83
According to Polish public polling, 55% of Poles believed that Western air
forces were justified in their use of force in Libya. Poles, however, were less
favourable to the idea of providing Libyan rebels with supplies, with only 43%
in favour, while 39% objected. Most importantly, though, was the response to
the question, “Do you think that Poland should send its soldiers to fight in the
conflict in Libya?” Echoing the sentiment of Poland’s political parties, a strong
majority of 88% opposed the deployment of forces to Libya.84
In addition to
public opinion polling, lawmakers had to contend with the then-upcoming
parliamentary election in October 2011. The possibility of upsetting a large
portion of the electorate may have contributed to the decisions of the Polish
lawmakers. With only 43% in favour of NATO military action, and strong
opposition to the use of Polish ground troops in any capacity, the Tusk
government had strong political incentives to distance itself from any military
aspect of Operation Unified Protector. Overall, the polling data squared closely
with the actions of Polish political parties and government officials; all were
unified in their opposition to participation in the Libya operation, though they
were willing to let NATO use force.
Poland’s strategic culture vis-à-vis NATO, however, provides less insight on
its unwillingness to assist militarily. Poland joined NATO in 1999 after its 1997
invitation at NATO’s Madrid Summit. Poland had historically been an oppressed
state living under communist rule since the end of the second World War until
the Cold War’s end. With the understanding that Poles had been economically
81
“Tusk: Poland Will Refrain from Military Operation in Libya,” The Warsaw Voice, 21 March
2011, www.warsawvoice.pl/WVpage/pages/article.php/16086/news.
82
Quoted in “Polish Politicians, Experts React to Premier’s Refusal to Send Troops to Libya,”
BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 22 March 2011.
83
“Polish Politicians, Experts React…,” op. cit.
84
“Polish Public Opinion,” CBOS, April 2011, www.cbos.pl/PL/publikacje/public_opinion/2011/
04_2011.pdf.

marginalised for decades, and had only been a democracy for less than 10 years
at the time of their membership invitation to NATO, questions were raised about
their potential to contribute to the alliance in a meaningful way.85
Poland
proceeded to demonstrate that NATO’s commitment to the country was wise.
From the onset of its full membership, Poland contributed to NATO operations
and its role in the security of Europe and, among the newest members from the
Madrid expansion round, most actively supported NATO’s military operation in
Kosovo through diplomatic backing.86
Laura Chappell maintains that Poland is an “Atlanticist” that prefers to focus
on its attachment to NATO to the detriment of other European Security
arrangements, such as the EU’s European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP).87
She makes a compelling case that Poland has a strong commitment to NATO as
a buffer against Russia due to NATO’s Article 5 agreement and the American
military protection that comes with it. While Poland initially viewed ESDP in
a sceptical light, the Poles eventually warmed up to the concept and started
“participating in missions outside of its immediate defence interests.”88
Still,
despite its full inclusion into ESDP, Poland still focuses on its security through
a Russian lens, and as a result places more emphasis on its NATO and American
relationships.
In addition to being in favour of NATO’s expanding role in European and
global security, the Poles continue to cultivate a very close relationship with the
United States. Crediting the Americans with freeing them from communism,
post-Soviet Polish governments have traditionally supported American foreign
policy goals, even when their direct interests were not in jeopardy.89
Following
the 9/11 terrorist attacks, Poland “rushed to declare unqualified assistance to the
U.S.” and also “supported recourse by the North Atlantic Council to Article 5 of
85
D.M. Glantz, “Problems of NATO Enlargement: The Accomplishments, Strengths, and
Weaknesses of the U.S. Military (Security) Assistance Program,” Journal of Slavic Military
Studies, vol. 11, no. 4, 1998, pp. 1–71.
86
R.C. Hendrickson, “NATO’s Visegrad Allies: The First Test in Kosovo,” Journal of Slavic
Military Studies, vol. 13, no. 2, 2000, pp. 25–38.
87
L. Chappell, “Poland in Transition: Implications for a European Security and Defence Policy,”
Contemporary Security Policy, vol. 31, no. 2, 2010, pp. 225–248; see also, O. Osica, “Poland:
A New European Atlanticist at a Crossroads?,” European Security, vol. 13, no. 4, 2004,
pp. 301–322; J. Lubecki, “Poland in Iraq: The Politics of the Decision,” The Polish Review,
vol. 50, no. 1, 2005, pp. 69–92.
88
L. Chappell, op. cit., p. 225.
89
J. Lubecki, op. cit., pp. 69–92.

the Washington Treaty.”90
In addition to these initial diplomatic efforts, Poland
affirmed itself as a staunch supporter of the United States through a meaningful
and sustained response to the U.S. request for assistance in the war in
Afghanistan.91
The Poles continue to be strong supporters of the NATO mission
in Afghanistan with 1,800 Polish troops in the country at the end of 2012.92
In
addition to taking a significant role in Afghanistan, the Poles showed their
strong relationship with the United States by contributing a significant military
garrison to the 2003 invasion of Iraq. This military contribution consisted of
2,400 troops for the Multinational Division, a decontamination platoon of 74
soldiers with equipment, and an Operational and Mobile Reconnaissance Group
(GROM) of 56 commandos.93
When major combat operations ended in 2003,
Bush awarded one of the four stabilisation zones in Iraq to Poland.94
It was
reasoned that this stabilisation zone was a gift from Washington for Warsaw’s
unwavering support of their mission, both logistically and diplomatically. While
other NATO members such as France and Germany were antagonistic towards
Washington’s decision to invade Iraq and several domestic Polish entities opposed
their government’s decision, the Polish government supported the American
effort in immediate and significant ways.95
This support for the United States
seems to be one of the most consistent themes in Polish strategic culture. Thus,
Poland’s foreign policy is often driven by the desire “to preserve the status of
being one of the staunchest allies of the U.S. in Europe.”96
As is evident by their past actions, Poland has been historically in favour of
NATO as an entity of European security and has been willing to contribute
significantly to the alliance, despite the country’s limited military capabilities.
Poland has also been very close to the United States and would often assist
American ambitions, even when not obligated by the alliance. It is for these
reasons that the Polish decision to not participate in the Libya operation runs
90
O. Osica, op. cit., p. 314.
91
M. Zaborowski, “Poland and Transatlantic Relations in the Twenty-First Century,” Defence
Studies, vol. 2, no. 2, 2002, pp. 123–134.
92
“ISAF: Key Facts and Figures,” NATO, 2012, www.nato.int/isaf/docu/epub/pdf/placemat.pdf.
93
“Forces: US&Coalition/Poland,” Central News Network, 2003, http://edition.cnn.com/
SPECIALS/2003/iraq/forces/coalition/poland.
94
R. Taras, “Poland’s Diplomatic Misadventure in Iraq,” Problems of Post-Communism, vol. 51,
no. 1, 2004, pp. 3–17.
95
J. Lubecki, op. cit.
96
O. Osica, op. cit., p. 322.

counter to recent trends in Polish foreign policy and strategic culture, especially
in light of the intense diplomatic pressure brought to bear by the United States in
June 2011 by then U.S. Secretary of Defence Robert Gates, who directly called
upon Poland for military assistance to the mission, which the Poles continued to
oppose.97
For such a staunch ally of the United States and NATO to resist
alliance pressures runs counter to the broader trends in Polish strategic culture.
In this respect, Poland’s strategic culture is less helpful in explaining its
unwillingness to assist militarily.
Shortly after the Polish parliament endorsed UNSC Resolution 1973, Prime
Minister Tusk articulated the government’s official stance on 20 March 2011.
Tusk explained that Poland would not help with the no-fly zone nor would it
deploy the warship Xawery Czernicki to the Mediterranean, but would consider
humanitarian and refugee assistance if needed.98
On 28 March 2011, President
Bronis³aw Komorowski told the world that simply because NATO was involved
“that does not mean Poland’s involvement.” Continuing, the president explained
that “Poland’s armed forces involvement in a huge operation in Afghanistan
induces Poland to focus on humanitarian assistance for Libya.”99
Echoing the
sentiments of Komorowski, Prime Minister Tusk declared that Poland would not
participate in the NATO operation in Libya.100
In April 2011, President
Komorowski repeated to the press what he and Tusk had already had told the
world: The Poles would not be joining NATO in Libya, but would “be prepared
to take some political responsibility for the decision to enforce the no-fly
zone.”101
Explaining this position in perhaps the most forthright expression of
Polish views on Libya, Prime Minister Tusk noted, “The situation in Libya poses
no threat to Poland’s interests and Poland’s security or to NATO’s security in
general.”102
By using this standard, Tusk demonstrated a more conservative
element of his thinking, and by implication, the very limited strategic and
security benefits Poland saw for NATO’s military conduct in Libya. Poland
97
J.F. Burns, T. Shanker, “Nations Bombing Libya Ask for Help Amid Strain,” New York Times,
8 June 2011, www.nytimes.com/2011/06/09/world/africa/09gates.html?_r=0.
98
“Poland Not to Take Part in Military Action in Libya—Premier,” BBC Worldwide Monitoring,
20 March 2011.
99
Quoted in “Polish President says humanitarian aid…, op. cit.
100
“Tusk: Poland Will Refrain…,” op. cit.
101
“Polish Politicians Shy Away from Libya Intervention,” Warsaw Business Journal, 4 April
2011, www.wbj.pl/article-53959-polish-politicians-shy-away-from-libya-intervention.html.
102
Quoted in “Polish Politicians, Experts React… ,” op. cit.

clearly did not feel constrained by NATO’s diplomatic calls for more military
help, and did not feel threatened by American political pressure.
Poland did have some economic interests in Libya prior to the conflict. The
two countries shared a tumultuous relationship for nearly two decades before
normalising relations in 2005 after Qaddafi abandoned his hunt for nuclear
weapons.103
The foundation for Polish–Libyan cooperation was driven by oil
exports from Libya to Poland and Libyan natural resources. In 2007, the Polish
company PGNiG was awarded a gas exploration contract in the Murzuq Basin
worth over $108 million.104
PK Orlen, a Polish oil company, also has had
interest in Libyan oil fields since 2009.105
While it is clear that the Poles did
indeed have some economic interests in the region, this does not appear to have
influenced the government to use force to protect its economic interests. Poland
clearly did not see clear benefits from military engagement, and was also able to
resist diplomatic pressure from NATO and the United States, which also
suggests that it felt that its own reputation in NATO had already been established
as a “security provider” rather than as a free-rider, and thus could abstain from
Unified Protector. When these considerations are coupled with strong public
opposition and placed alongside the presence of a forthcoming national election,
its abstention from the operation makes strong domestic political sense.
Conclusion
The analysis presented here provides strong support for the relevance
of public opinion in shaping member states’ decisions to help NATO militarily.
In short, burden-sharing was largely contingent upon domestic political support.
Where public support was strong, these member states responded with
corresponding military support. We found less support for the idea that the
presence of political coalitions’ impact member states’ foreign policies, though
in the case of Spain, some evidence suggests a concern for potential opposition
from parliament, which resulted in the implementation of some limitations on
Spain’s military contributions and engagement. We found mixed support for
the relevance of strategic culture. In the cases of Norway and Spain, their
103
“Poland–Libya: Thawed Relations,” Warsaw Voice, 12 January 2005, www.warsawvoice.pl/
WVpage/pages/article.php/7410/article.
104
“PGNiG Summary Q4-2012,” Business Monitor Worldwide, 1 October 2012.
105
“PKN Orlen Eyes Libyan Oil Fields,” Warsaw Business Journal, 13 February 2009,
http://wbj.pl/article-44406-pkn-orlen-eyes-libyan-oil-fields.html.

previous relationships with NATO provided good indicators for these states’
eventual military contributions to Operation Unified Protector. However,
Poland’s unwillingness to support the NATO mission in Libya ran counter to its
strategic culture vis-à-vis NATO. Though there would certainly be military
resource limitations on what Poland could provide to the air operation, Poland
still resisted strong American and other allied calls for assistance throughout the
operation.
Given the different ways in which a state’s benefits for military engagement
could be assessed, this measure of our analysis is more easily open to varying
interpretations. Yet despite these analytical limitations, our assessment does
indicate that this measure can provide different insights on why a state may
engage in the operation. Across all three countries examined, unique domestic
considerations appeared relevant, which helped explain why a NATO member
would agree or not agree to participate militarily. This measure, however, when
combined with the significance of public opinion especially, indicates the
ongoing challenges for NATO. An alliance that is shaped largely by domestic
public opinion and narrow domestic political interests and benefits does not
portend well for an alliance that seeks strategic consensus; the security
conditions in Libya failed to meet this test. In this respect, those who call for
NATO to more aggressively engage in political debate and strategic discussions
are correct in their recommendation. NATO needs consensus and shared values
in order to perform most effectively. While NATO may be able to function
through coalitions within the organisation, such a practice invites political animosity
between its members, free-rider behaviour, unilateral tendencies among NATO’s
largest members, and over time likely erodes the core of a collective defence
organisation.

HendricksonPQIA 2014

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