The document discusses the strengths, weaknesses, and improvements needed in implementing Technical Authority at NASA. It finds Engineering and Safety Technical Authority are generally well implemented but Health and Medical Technical Authority is not fully implemented and needs improvements. The roles of Technical Authorities have been clarified in the updated NPR 7120.5E. A proposed solution is to utilize existing Engineering and Safety Technical Authorities to raise awareness of potential Health and Medical issues earlier in project cycles.
9. Engineering Technical Authority - NASA Chief Engineer Michael Ryschkewitsch SMA Technical Authority - NASA Chief, Safety and Mission Assurance Bryan O’Connor Health & Medical Technical Authority - NASA Chief Health and Medical Officer Dr. Rich Williams Agency Technical Authorities
31. HMTA Process for Human Space Flight Programs and Projects – Figure 1 CHMO JSC CMO JSC POC Center SMA TA (SMA Director) Project SMA TA Project Engineering TA Project Engineering (aware of issue ) Project SMA (aware of issue) Center Engineering TA Info Info Center CMO ( Where it exists ) Flow of Authority Flow of Issue Coordination
32. HMTA Process for Non-human Space Flight and R&T Programs / Projects - Figure 2 CHMO CHMO POC Center SMA TA (SMA Director) Project SMA TA Project Engineering TA Project Engineering (aware of issue ) Project SMA (aware of issue) Center Engineering TA Info Info Center CMO ( Where it exists ) Flow of Authority Flow of Issue Coordination
All 10 Centers have been looked at once. GSFC has had a second round in Nov 2010. The issues discussed are not being identified as Center, program or project specific.
We will discuss the HMTA “road ahead” and the late identification of issues later in the presentation.
Survey helped shape policy change - we will see how this difference is addressed in Rev E of 7120.5 later in the presentation. Also titles of TA position differ between Centers.
We have seen the Implementation Plans being modified at Centers to include SMA-TA but not HMTA. PMs need to review their Program/Project Plans for alignment with Center TA plans.
Only non-compliance outside of SW during initial Surveys. Some PMs did not include the SMA-TA in their “core team” when asked. Staffing concern is that the SMA-TA is stretched too thin and will miss important issue.
HMTA findings were written against HQ (not Centers). Another area where the Survey has helped shape policy changes.
Many people interviewed thought HMTA was the same as, or related to OSHA.
Many people interviewed thought HMTA was the same as, or related to OSHA.
Many people interviewed thought HMTA was the same as, or related to OSHA. A few specific exceptions where NASA requirements are more stringent than OSHA are included in HMTA.
What does this mean to the Program/Project? NPR 1800.1 – there are some NASA requirements that exceed the OSHA standard – these become HMTA requirements.
Looks a lot like Engineering or SMA areas but can also affect the human – therefore also HMTA.
EES – went to a Dissenting Opinion at HQ level by OCHMO. SOFIA – flying with door open created acoustic condition that exceeded the NASA requirements.
The HMTA system is counting on the program/project TA to raise potential issues so that the proper HMTA personnel can get involved earlier in the process of resolution.
Project TA may have to provided additional data, etc to the CMO, JSC, or CHMO if needed to assist in resolution of issue.
Project TA may have to provided additional data, etc to the CMO or CHMO if needed to assist in resolution of issue.
Prior thinking – Why is the Technical Authority flow for programs different from projects? Why does Headquarters own level 2 (program level) requirements? Answer Multiple centers will be engaged in many programs to take full advantage of the Agency’s human and facility resources. In this multi-center environment having the flow of Technical Authority by-pass the Center Director provides Headquarters the role of adjudicating differences between projects at different Centers. This avoids any concerns about a conflict of interest that might arise if the Center Director of the Host Center adjudicated differences between his/her Center and another Center. Current view - Based on experience, the original concern related to conflict of interest proved unnecessary. This is part of the expanded role of the CD that in implemented in Rev. E
TA role as Systems Engineering lead reflects different implementation seen during OCE Surveys.
Residual risk is the remaining risk that exists after all mitigation actions have been implemented or exhausted in accordance with the risk management process. NASA Policy for Safety and Mission Success (NPD 8700.1)