Calder jones

Gravity Probe B • A Management Study • STANFORD

Gravity Probe B: Lessons from a
Management Study
Brad Jones
Johnson Space Center (formerly Stanford University)
&
Ned Calder
Massachusetts Institute of Technology

“Always be suspicious of news you want to hear.”
– Francis Everitt, Stanford University ~ GP-B Principal Investigator

February 7 2007 Calder-Jones - 1


How Einstein Got Physics Out of Two Problems
& into a Third!
• Special Relativity (1905) -- very well tested
– Reconciled Maxwell’s 1865 electromagnetics with Newton’s
mechanics by changing Newton’s theory at high speeds
– “E = mc2” comes from special relativity

• General Relativity (1916) -- very incompletely tested
– Einstein’s theory of gravity
– Solved inconsistency between special relativity and Newton’s theory
of gravity by replacing Newton’s force with curved space-time

• The fix Einstein landed us in -- unsolved after 90 years!
– General relativity can’t be reconciled with quantum mechanics -- our
theory of atoms and elementary particles



Purpose of Gravity Probe B
• To measure with respect to
framework of distant Universe,
two tiny drift effects on gyros in
orbit around the Earth
– geodetic 6,614.4 mas/yr
– frame-dragging 42.0 mas/yr
• Effects predicted by Einstein’s
General Theory of Relativity
• 1 mas (milliarc second) =
width of human hair seen at
10 miles



Management Study Overview
• Project Purpose: To examine the
impact and effectiveness of having a
university prime contractor on a large
scale NASA program
• Project Objective: Extract a set of
best practices for managing NASA-
University-Industry relationships
• Research Conducted with Over 40
Interviews:
– Stanford University
– NASA Marshall Space Flight Center
– NASA Headquarters
– Lockheed Martin (Sunnyvale & Palo
Alto)
– NASA Kennedy Space Center @
Vandenberg Air Force Base
– Independent Review Team



Why GP-B?
• GP-B was a perfect case study
because…
– One of the first programs with a
university prime
“How did it work out?”
– NASA-University-Industry all
represented
– Technical complexity stressed the
management environment
– One of NASA’s longest mission
“What took so long?”
• Management Experiment
– Originated in 1985 from a comment
by then NASA Administrator Mr.
James Beggs :
GP-B will be an interesting
management experiment in addition
to an interesting scientific
experiment.
– Vast difference of opinion on success
of the Management Experiment


Best Practices Summary
1. Organizational Asymmetries – Strategically leveraging
capability asymmetries while managing cultural differences.
2. Contextual Transitions – Recognizing and managing
transition points when programmatic requirements and
processes change significantly.
3. Adaptive Program Management – Recognizing the need for
emphasis on different aspects of the program management’s
competencies at different stages of the program life cycle.
4. ‘Aerospace Knowledge’ at Universities – Establishing the
importance for the university to acquire aerospace experience
and for NASA to ensure that key personnel are treated as
investments as opposed to costs.
5. Managing Risk – Providing proper oversight for the unique
management challenges encountered on university programs
through the use of risk management techniques.



Organizational Asymmetries
Leveraging Capability Differences and Managing Cultural Differences:

Industry/
Universities
Government
-Flat -Hierarchical
Environment -Knowledge focus -Mission focus
-Individuality -Teamwork
Culture -Informal -Formal
-Entrepreneurial -Cost conscious
-Radical Innovation -Incremental Innovation
Capability -Efficient -System/Process



Organizational Asymmetries
Leveraging Capability Differences and Managing Cultural Differences:

Industry/
Universities
Government
NASA MSFC: “It was extremely difficult to get the
university personnel to stop tinkering and start
-Flat -Hierarchical
producing.”
Environment -Informal -Formal
SU: “Lockheed is only out to make a profit!”
-Focus on Individuality -Focus on Team Work
NASA HQ: “Universities excel at radical innovation
Culture -Focus on Knowledge -Focus on Cost
– something industry generally lacks.”
-Entrepreneurial
-Radical Innovation -Incremental Innovation
Capability -Efficiency -System/Process



Boundary Spanning Agents
• Facilitators with understanding of the cultural, capability, and
process differences between the collaborating organizations.

Boundary
Agent
University NASA

Organizational/Knowledge
Boundary

• Either substantial previous experience with each organization or
develop needed skills on the job.
• Boundary agents developed through exchanging team members



Contextual Transitions
Phase A: Phase B: Phase C: Phase D: Phase E:
NASA Definition:
Preliminary Analysis Definition Design Development Operations

Science Program Conceptual Definition, Technology Development, Hardware Development,
Definition: Specification Development & Innovation Integration, & Testing
Contextual Transition
Management Led by PI or PM with Strong Science Technology Led by PM with Strong
Division: Background Aerospace Management
Background

GP-B Management Aerospace Aerospace
PI & Scientist Led Scientist
Division: Management Management
Led
Led Led

Contextual Transition: Management Experiment NASA Guided
Procurement of Flight Hardware



Adaptive Program Management
High Low

Science Technical Ability
Managerial Ability

Potential Program
Management Shift(s)

Procurement of Launch
Flight HW

Low Phase A Phase B Phase C Phase D Phase E High

• Multi-Talented Program Manager (Sci. & Mgmt.) may not require any changes
• Critical for NASA to make university aware of the potential management shift early
• Management team should embody relevant competencies not just the Program Manager



Adaptive Program Management
High Low

LM: “There was a substantial period of time where

Science Technical Ability
Managerial Ability

Stanford’s management didn’t appear to know how
to complete aProgramprogram.”
Potential space
Management Shift(s)
NASA MSFC: “Lockheed over-powered Stanford’s
contract management capabilities.”
IRT: “At one point, it was recommended that LM
become the prime since they had experience
Flight HW
developing spacecraft.”

Low Phase A Phase B Phase C Phase D Phase E High

• Multi-Talented Program Manager (Sci. & Mgmt.) may not require any changes
• Critical for NASA to make university aware of the potential management shift early
• Management team should embody relevant competencies not just the Program Manager



Implementing/Maintaining Aerospace Knowledge
University Operations Involving Aerospace

Flight HW

100%
Practices (%)

Ideal Transition

50% Gravity Probe B

Maintain Aerospace
15% Experience at University

Phase A Phase B Phase C Phase D Phase E

• Implementation too early impairs productivity, while too late leads to ineffectiveness
and rejection
• NASA needs to conduct early training sessions on procedure writing, quality
assurance, part tracking, etc. for university employees to aid in an efficient transition.


Implementing/Maintaining Aerospace Knowledge
University Operations Involving Aerospace

Flight HW
SU: “It took us awhile, but in the end we had a very
100%
competent team, in terms of ability to build flight
Practices (%)

hardware.” Ideal Transition
NASA MSFC: “SU was testing flight HW without test
50% procedures, by the end they were as savvy as any
Gravity Probe B
contractor at utilizing aerospace processes.”
NASA HQ: “Stanford doesn’t realize the resources it
Maintain Aerospace
15% has developed.” Experience at University

Phase A Phase B Phase C Phase D Phase E

• Implementation too early impairs productivity, while too late leads to ineffectiveness
and rejection
• NASA needs to conduct early training sessions on procedure writing, quality
assurance, part tracking, etc. for university employees to aid in an efficient transition.


Efficiently Managing Risk
Risk Management
High System Implemented
Procurement of
Flight HW Launch
NASA Support

Not Necessarily High
Number of Personnel
Note: Actual Number of
Personnel Based on
Risk Management

Ideal NASA Support

GP-B NASA Support

Low Phase A Phase B Phase C Phase D Phase E

• Overwhelming positive response by all organizations on effectiveness of the system
• Implement risk management system early to aid management
• Avoid: Man-loading & fluctuating personnel



Efficiently Managing Risk
Risk Management
High System Implemented
Procurement of
Flight HW Launch

NASA MSFC: “After the risk system was
introduced, High relationship felt much more like a
Not Necessarily the
NASA Support

Number of Personnel
partnership.”
Note: Actual Number of
Personnel Based on
SU: “The new approach to risk management really
Risk Management

helped us work with Marshall to identify what the
Ideal NASA Support
real concerns were.”
GP-B NASA Support
LM: “The risk system provided us the ability to
gauge NASA’s response to any situation.”

Low Phase A Phase B Phase C Phase D Phase E

• Overwhelming positive response by all organizations on effectiveness of the system
• Implement risk management system early to aid management
• Avoid: Man-loading & fluctuating personnel



Implementation and Other Applications
• Implementation of these practices
is a joint effort
Partnership
Mutual awareness and understanding
at all levels
NASA should provide leadership, but
universities must have autonomy
• Other Applications
Results can be generalized to
situations that:
• Involve organizational asymmetries
• Involve contextual transitions
Examples
• Center-to-Center collaboration
• Internal NASA development programs



Backup Slides



Justification for University Prime Contractors

• Interdependent space
vehicle
– Science payload must be a
significant portion of overall
vehicle development
• Novel, path-dependant
technology development
Gravity Probe B
– Specifications depend on
development
– Exploit university capabilities
• Program management
capability
– Aerospace processes
– Risk management

LISA


GP-B
Telescope Quartz Block Assembly

SENSOR
CONTROLLER (Payload) ACTUATOR
(Payload/Spacecraft) (Spacecraft)
Thruster

Quartz Block Assembly Thruster
Dewar Telescope (inside)
Probe (inside)

• Interdependent Payload and Spacecraft
• Path-dependent development process, integrated spec derivation
• High-level of novel technology development


GP-B: The Main Systems

Gyroscope Telescope Science Instrument

Cryogenic Probe
Payload Space Vehicle


Gravity Probe B: Technological Development

100% Space Vehicle Funding
(Million $) 70
Usable
60
Launch

40
End SM

20
1959 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
0%

Conceptual Definition and Design Shuttle Test Development Operations 0
1959-1983 1984-1992 1993-2003 2004~2010
1959. Conceptually realized (Beginning of GPB) 1984. Begin 1995. NASA says go Apr. 2004.
STORE directly to flight, GPB launch
1961. First contact with NASA begin contract
1985. Begin NAS8-39225, July 2004.
1964. NASA grant begins, retroactive 1963 contract STU ends End IOC
NAS8-36125
1977. End NASA grant 1990-1991. FIST Sept. 2005.
1986. Challenger End SM
accident, 1991-1994. GTU-0
STORE 2006.
becomes GPB 1994-1995. GTU-1 Publish
Tech results,
1996. End NAS8-36125 end NAS8-
1990. STU begins 39225
1997. GTU-2
2005-2010.
1999. PL Test 1 Potential
for further
2000. PL Test 2 GPB
experiments
2001. PL integrated
with spacecraft 2010. End
battery life
2002. SV Acoustic & Thermal Vac
Tests

2003. SV moved to
VAFB



Risk Management System



Risk Management System Cont’d



Where Does NASA Go From Here?
• Conclusions
– NASA should concentrate early & continuously on:
• Foster collaborative, not contractor, relationships
• Implement management best practices
• Provide oversight through risk management techniques
– Develop a set of guidelines for universities
– When certain criteria present, universities are the
prudent choice as prime contractor
• Limitations
– Single organizational arrangement
– Single academic institution
– Idiosyncrasies of GP-B


Benefits of Stanford University
• Practical Aerospace Training
– Aerospace Project Management Experience
– Spacecraft Development & Flight Experienced Personnel
Trained by NASA
– Excellent Facilities Including a Flight Proven Mission Operations
Center (MOC)
• Technology Advancement Capabilities
– Proven Research Capabilities & Technology Advances
– One of a Kind Teaming & Collaboration between Engineering &
Science Departments
– Nationally Ranked Programs in Science, Engineering, &
Business Perfect Formula for Successful Collaboration



About the Authors
Ned Calder Brad Jones
Research Scientist Payload Safety Engineer
Massachusetts Institute of Technology Johnson Space Center
ncalder@mit.edu bradley.t.jones@nasa.gov
617-388-9029 281-244-1098 (work)
650-278-0928 (cell)

GP-B Experience: GP-B Experience:
– Technical liaison and cryogenics – Flight director and launch
specialist team lead
Education: Education:
– M.S. Technology and Policy – M.S. (in progress) Aero/Astro
Massachusetts Institute of Stanford University
Technology – M.E. Management and
– B.S. Physics Systems Engineering
Northwestern University Cornell University
– B.S. Civil Engineering
Texas A&M University


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