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Walter LaFeber, America, Russia, and the Cold War, 1945-2006 10e, November 20, 2006
One of the central themes that occurs throughout Walter LaFeber’s book, America,
Russia, and the Cold War, 1945-2006, is how U.S. foreign policy between the Soviet Union and
third world countries are based off of cultural, domestic, and historical misinterpretations. In
chapter nine, “New Frontiers and Old Dilemmas”, he argues how the events that took place from
1957 to 1962 set a precedent to U.S. foreign policy in response to Soviet nuclear advancement
third world countries, and how these events ultimately lead to the Kennedy administration
“intensifying Cold war Tension” and the involvement in Vietnam (LaFeber 228). At the
beginning of the chapter, LaFeber talks about the launch of Sputnik and how the booster rocket
that helped launch Sputnik into orbit was more significant than Sputnik itself because the soviets
now acquired long range missiles, which generated the fear of there being a “missile gap”
between the U.S. and the Soviet Union.
LaFeber uses the scenario of Sputnik to illustrate how it effects a series of events. He
begins by demonstrating how the “missile gap” affects the presidential Election of 1960 and how
Eisenhower’s reluctance to expand military spending allowed candidates, such as John F.
Kennedy, to use the fear of an advanced soviet-nuclear arsenal as his platform to generate votes
and expand military spending once he became president. LaFeber also makes a small, but
significant, detour into how the Soviets knew that their ICBM program was not a threat, because
they only made one version of the missile, but this sort of information leads to LaFeber’s
analysis of the deterioration of Sino-Soviet relations. The Chinese wanted the Soviets to use their
weapons to influence “Wars of Liberation” in third world countries, which the Soviets absolutely
refused to do because they knew that their ICBM program was weak compared to U.S. long-
range bombing forces. While the Soviets rejected China’s strategy of Wars of Liberation, they

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exploited their imaginary lead in nuclear missiles and utilized this exploitation to negotiate about
the rearming process of Western Germany. The Eisenhower Administration stood firm in
rejecting Soviet demands in 1958, which were to control western Germany. There were a few
small debates between U.S. officials about either reforming U.S. policy towards the Soviet
Union or further expansion of the military, but while these debates where going on, there was a
continuous split between NATO members. In 1959, most western mainland-European countries
formed the European Economic Community, which emphasized the economic independence
from the United States.
While these economic pacts were being made, the Soviets saw this as an opportunity to
exploit their ICBM missiles to gain influence in a third world country that is ninety miles from
the coast of the U.S., which was Cuba. With the emergence of Fidel Castro, due to his appeal to
peasant society and the history of U.S. neglect to economic reformation in Cuba and Latin
America, a Cuban-Soviet relationship was born. With the emergence of a determined Kennedy
administration to refocus on third world countries, Kennedy pushed for the disposition of Castro
through The Bay of Pigs operation, which was an ultimate failure. LaFeber illustrates how this
failure “was a public confession by the United States that it had failed to understand or deal with
the most significant political change in the hemisphere in fifty years” (LaFeber 222). With the
failure of the Bay of Pigs came the failure of the Vienna conference which resulted in the
construction of the Berlin wall to cut off East Germany from West Germany, and the
neutralization of Laos which halted the U.S. policy of containing China. The events that took
place within the first eleven months of the Kennedy administration marked a period of repeated
failures and with the Civil war in Vietnam escalating quickly, the U.S. found another way into
containing China. Ultimately, LaFeber’s book is highly revelatory because of his use of

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historical context to set the scene, the way he draws parallels between different third world
countries fight for independence, and how he chronologically illustrates how one event leads to
the next.
In order to enhance the authenticity of his argument LaFeber uses a substantial amount of
primary sources. He uses primary sources such as interviews, an excerpt from the Eisenhower
farewell address, archives, maps, and an excerpt from Forbes magazine. He also uses a few
secondary sources such as books and one documentary to further explain and support his
argument. With the combination of both primary and secondary sources, LaFeber’s analysis of
his evidence allows him to put together a narrative exposition that demonstrates the
chronological effect of U.S. foreign policy from 1957-1962. LaFeber also uses his evidence to
physically show his readers how U.S. policy fell short of misunderstanding certain situations. For
example, he uses an excerpt from an interview with the Secretary of Defense, Robert McNamara,
who talks about how the Presidents administration was “hysterical about Castro…” (LaFeber
221). Overall, LaFeber effectively uses his evidence to align this chapter with one of his main
themes in the book, which is how the U.S. misunderstands either Soviet or third world countries
intentions.
As a whole, the argument that LaFeber presents in chapter nine is incredible. The way
that he connects the argument within the chapter to the whole book is distinct. He uses historical
context to set the scene; he draws a parallel between the revolutions that occurred in Latin
American countries to the revolutions that occurred in Asia or Africa and how the U.S. refused to
see these revolutions as different; and he uses chronology to guide the readers through his
argument in which he illustrates how one event effects another event. In this chapter, LaFeber’s
argument is logical. He investigates how an over exploited “missile gap” crisis has a ripple effect

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on world affairs and how it ultimately continues to make U.S. policy extremely aggressive
without a full understanding of the situations that they get themselves into, which leads to a
series of failures at the beginning of the Kennedy administration, and the U.S. involvement in
Vietnam. Although LaFeber constructs a great argument, there is one thing that I would’ve liked
to see which is a further explanation, and textual evidence, of the Vienna conference of 1961.
The Vienna Conference fits within his argument, but I feel like textual evidence would let the
readers know how important this event is compared to all the other events within this chapter.
Besides that, I think LaFeber makes a strong argument and provides the right amount of detail
and evidence to support his argument throughout this chapter, and the theme of his book.