Senior_Thesis

Diplomacy at 70,000ft
The Impact Of Cold WarAerial Reconnaissance on
US-Soviet Relations
David Mackley
11/13/2015

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Once while reviewing foreign press articles and sensitive intelligence briefings, the leader
of the Soviet Union, Nikita Khrushchev, bitterly asked his Minister of Defense, Rodion
Malinovsky, how does the American enemy “know so quickly about all our innovations?”
Malinovsky replied with a shrug, “evidently the credit for that goes to their aerial reconnaissance
and other advanced technology that they have.”1 The 1950’s was critical time for both the US
and the Soviet Union. Both sides had to create the appearance of strength if they were going to
negotiate with each other. Aerial reconnaissance was making it difficult for Khrushchev to
continue to keep up the illusion of strength. Aerial reconnaissance was Khrushchev’s biggest
nuisance.
Just as American aircraft maintained a constant presence around and often within the Iron
Curtin, so too did the subject of aerial reconnaissance remain a persistent challenge in US-Soviet
relations. Although providing an important security function, the aerial reconnaissance programs
of the Eisenhower administration failed to achieve meaningful progress in cooling global
tensions between the two Superpowers. Instead, it often inflamed them. Eisenhower’s
administration acted recklessly by ignoring Soviet protests until finally the Soviets were able to
leverage these protests against the administration, which brought peace talks to a standstill.
Furthermore, these missions failed to change public and congressional fears concerning Soviet
capabilities. By investigating the effect of these missions, it may well be possible, in an age
when camera carrying drones grace both the battlefield and beyond, to better understand the risks
inherent in such overt methods of intelligence gathering.
1 Khrushchev and Khrushchev, Memoirs of Nikita Khrushchev,Vol. 2, (University Park, Pa: Pennsylvania State
Univ., 2007), 512

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In order to better understand the aerial reconnaissance programs, which Eisenhower
credited for 80-90% of US intelligence gathered on the Soviet threat, it is necessary to broden the
scope of the investigation beyond conventional methods.2 Historians have mostly ignored the
bulk of these missions. In terms of spying at this time historians look to agents on the ground and
the U-2 flight of May 1st. My work hopes to cover the expanse of these missions starting during
the Truman era and even beyond the famed Powers flight. To ignore not only the effect of other
U-2 flights but also the flights carried out by conventional aircraft prior to the introduction of the
U-2 is to ignore the bulk of American intelligence gathering. A full investigation of airborne
intelligence gathering which does not include early flights is not a full investigation in the least.
Scholarship on the subject is plentiful but often lacking depth or variety. Much of what is
written is written for broad appeal. Titles typically contain eye-catchers such as “declassified” or
“untold” or imply that the reader is embarking on a journey through the mysterious world of
spying. The truth is that most of these books rely on decades old information and rarely stray
beyond the U-2 or its predecessors. Michael R. Beschloss’s book, MAYDAY the U-2 Affair: the
untold story of the greatest US-USSR spy scandal, is an example. Beschloss, although his work
was greatly valuable to me and other writers of the subject, Beschloss does not engage with
aerial reconnaissance prior to the introduction of the U-2. Beschloss stands out however from so
many other authors because he does put forth an argument. Beschloss like the author of Spy
Flights of the Cold War, Paul Lashmar, does focus on the political actors and consequences at
play. It is agreed between the two authors that the U-2 incident of 1960 is an important moment
in US-Soviet relations and attempts to determine which actors set the events in motion.
Beschloss like so many paint Khrushchev as a mad man who slyly pulls the rug out from under
2 Lashmar, Spy Flightsof the Cold War. (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1996), 3

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Eisenhower. Scholars are generally very uncritical of Eisenhower. Lashmar however offers a
much more interesting and original argument which features prominently the contributions of
General Curtis LeMay to the reckless implementations of aerial reconnaissance. Lashmar also
stands apart from his peers by looking critically at aerial reconnaissance throughout the Cold
War. My work hopes to further assess the motives and contributions of other actors of the
Eisenhower administration. By narrowing the focus on this era it is possible to better understand
the complexity of the US spy program over Soviet skies during a time when peace looked
obtainable.
Post-War Situation
To start, at the conclusion of the Second World War the world was effectively split in
two: Capitalist democracy in the West and Communism in the East. The partnership which saw
the defeat of Nazi Germany, bringing soldiers from both fronts together at the Elbe River and the
shaking of hands of Heads of States was at an end. By 1948 the changing mood and political
alliances was palpable as observed by General Lucius Clay in a note to the US State Department,
in which he pleaded that despite a lack of evidence the tension was “real” and felt in every Soviet
citizen he was in contact with.3 In his infamous speech which called for the opposition to the
Soviet Union and communism, Winston Churchill, declared an Iron Curtin had descended upon
Europe; the Grand Alliance would not live to harmoniously dictate the fate of the world it had
created. Instead the US hoped to stifle growing Soviet ambitions in Europe with the threat of
nuclear power. Yet the Truman administration’s advantage was short lived. The Soviets had
through means of espionage acquired their own atomic bomb and consequently set into motion
the Cold War.
3 Curtis, Peebles, Twilight Warriors: Covert Air Operations against the USSR. (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute
Press, 2005), 5.

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From the moment the US was thrusted into the arms race two sharply dividing roads
presented themselves. On one side were the military hawks calling for preventative war; on the
other side sat the diplomats, ever sure that co-existence was possible. Luckily, the world never
saw the horror of nuclear war. The result was an air of uncertainty. How long until the US was
matched or over taken in nuclear weapons? Could the Soviets be trusted not to strike if the
opportunity presented itself as surely it had been presented to the US? The answers to these
questions would, like the questions themselves, play an inescapable role in determining US-
Soviet policy, relations and potentially the fate of the free world. The answers to these questions
were far too important to be left to chance. During the Second World War, the US relied heavily
on the British for their airborne intelligence and learned a great deal about aerial reconnaissance
as a result. Yet, for some inexplicable reason, at the conclusion of the Second World War, the
US military scrapped much of its intelligence infrastructure and personal.4
Rise of American Aerial Intelligence
In the absence of intelligence on the Soviet Union and a proper organization with which
to collect intelligence, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) was founded in 1947. The early
years were spent building from the ground up. By the start of the Eisenhower administration the
CIA still had little to show for itself. Collectively the US government obtained the bulk of its
intelligence on Soviet Russia (at least 50% by 1952) came from what were referred to as “paper
mills.” In his book, The Craft of Intelligence, head of the CIA under Eisenhower, Allen Dulles
describes the industry of fabricated data, “They turned out information by the yard…Often their
information is plausible, well-reasoned and beautifully organized. There is only one fault with it.
4 David Lindgrem, Trust but Verify: Imagery Analysis in the Cold War. (Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute press,
2000), 23

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It doesn’t come from the horse’s mouth as claimed.”5 In post war Europe one could make a fair
amount of money by selling information on the Soviet Union to Western intelligence. Acquiring
bad information or information which was unsupported wasted money at best and at worst
wasted time. The result was that what little valuable intelligence had been gained was lost in a
sea of misinformation and pure fantasy.6
At the time military leaders had little to no understanding of what the CIA was capable
of, often demanding the impossible. Harry Rositzke, member of the Soviet Division of the CIA
recalled a heated conversation with an Army colonel who, while pounding on his desk,
demanded that the CIA put into place “an agent with a radio on every goddamn airfield between
Berlin and the Urals.”7 The request was absurd. Recruiting agents during the Stalin years, as US
ambassador Charles Bohlen would later recall, was “the equivalent of signing an order for [the
agent’s] arrest if not his execution.”8 A new method had to be employed.
Prior to his retirement in 1948, United States Air Force (USAF) General Carl Andrew
conducted inquiry boards to make clear the lessons of the previous war. These boards concluded
many things but noted particularly that with exception to only a handful of agents, nearly all of
allied intelligence was in the hands of the British and although their continued allegiance was
assured, continued reliance on the British in this manner was unwise. Air Force General and
head of the Strategic Air Command (SAC) Curtis LeMay took note of the board’s concerns and
undertook various initiatives to remedy the situation. Among the tasks set out by the USAF and
LeMay specifically were the creation of potential targets, weather information as it pertains to
5 Dulles, Craft of Intelligence.(New York, New York: Harper & Row, 1963), 216
6 Peebles, Twilight Warriors, 9
7 Lashmar, Spy Flightsof the Cold War, 129
8 Lindgrem, Trust but Verify, 23

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combat situations, and methods for the procurement of electronic intelligence (ELINTL) often
referred to as “Ferret flights.”9
Ferret flights composed the vast majority of reconnaissance flights. The goal of these
flights was fairly straight forward and quickly became routine. The object of the missions was to
detect Soviet radar and early warning stations along the perimeter of (and eventually within) the
Soviet Union. In order to detect these stations, modified bomber aircraft carrying electronic
equipment and intelligence personal (referred to as “Ravens”) flew provocatively close to the
nation’s boarder. Fearing incoming attack or simply monitoring US reconnaissance aircraft,
Soviet radar stations became active and guided interceptors to suspicious aircraft. Equipment on
board the reconnaissance aircraft then detected radar signals, radio signals, and navigational
equipment aboard interceptors. With this data US intelligence was able to determine weaknesses
in the Soviet air defense.
Weaknesses in Soviet air defenses could be determined in a number of ways. For
example, by flying in range of radar stations electronic intelligence specialists, “Ravens”, could
determine when and for how long Soviet radar stations tracked their flight. If an aircraft entered
sensitive airspace they could expect to be either tracked by radar or intercepted by Soviet fighter
aircraft. Noting radar signal strength and interceptor response times the US was able to
understand the limitations of Soviet defenses.
Successes of these boarder flights were immediate. On the 29th of August a WB-29
“weather” aircraft launched from Alaska collected radioactive dust floating just outside of the
Soviet Far East, confirming the detonation of the first Soviet nuclear bomb.10 These flights also

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gave evidence that the Soviets had been unsuccessful in the construction of early warning sites in
the far north. In 1954 the CIA prepared charts which proved Soviet radar had gaps miles wide in
the far north, potentially allowing the US to bomb its enemy undetected.11
Boarder flights, however, had their limitations. In discussing the necessity of U-2 aircraft
in his book The Craft of Intelligence, former Director of the CIA, Allen Dulles, noted that many
targets did not give off signals which announced their presence. Targets such as missile sites
under construction had to be seen up close.12 The USAF was determined to photograph the
Soviet interior, using reconnaissance aircraft and eventually employing the famed Lockheed U-2.
It is important to make mention that many conventional aircraft used to overfly key strategic
Soviet airbases were modified bombers indistinguishable from regular bomber aircraft from the
ground. The U-2 stood alone at this time as the only strictly reconnaissance aircraft in the US
arsenal; and it was shrouded in secrecy. Invading Soviet airspace changed the nature of aerial
reconnaissance from merely provocative to reckless. Border flights, while a source of annoyance,
did not violate any laws or put lives in immediate risk. Once flights crossed Soviet borders the
US was engaged in a breach of sovereign Soviet territory. Flights into Soviet territory would
garner protest from the Soviets and occasionally violence. Quickly a military affair became a
diplomatic one.
Provocative and Dangerous Practices
Danger is an inherent risk in military operations and flying in general. The danger to
pilots is of less concern however when considering the nature of these reconnaissance missions.
The danger inherent is shared by those whom may be most affected by a war between the great
11 Early Cold War Overflights: 1950-1956 : Symposium Proceedings Held at the Tighe Auditorium, Defense
Intelligence Agency,Washington,DC, 22-23 February 2001, edited by R. Cargill Hall. Washington,DC: Office of
the Historian National Reconnaissance Office, 2003.; Lindgrem, Trust but Verify, 27
12 Dulles, Craft of Intelligence,67

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powers. As previously mentioned, the vast majority of reconnaissance missions and overflights
were conducted with modified bombers, such as the RB-47, RB-29, and the British Canberra B-
57 medium bomber. US commanders seemed not to give much importance to this fact nor to the
way in which missions were conducted. Eisenhower himself stated that had a Soviet aircraft,
especially a bomber type aircraft, crossed into American airspace he would have declared it an
act of war.13 Given such a strong aversion to breaches of airspace one would think that
Eisenhower, a man who understood and held a great deal of clout within the military, would have
taken better care not to permit the flying of provocative missions. Still that is exactly what
happened.
A number of examples of needlessly reckless missions and practices come to mind.
Although not officially endorsed by military leadership, one practice among ferret aircrews was
the use of chaff (scraps of metal) to confuse radar operators. Radar relies on bouncing signals off
of objects in the air. After a signal rebounds from an airborne object electronic equipment tells
an operator how far from the base of the signal’s origin the object was encountered. When scraps
of metal were released from an aircraft mid-flight multiple returning signals would appear on
radar screens indicating not as a singular aircraft, but as a squadron of bombers. This would often
prompt Soviet defenses to go into high alert, fearing Armageddon. When leadership became
aware of the practice they attempted to stop it by restricting access to chaff. Substitutions were
not hard to come by however, recalls former ‘Raven’ Bruce Bailey. Ferret crews merely began
storing crushed beer cans in the wheel-wells of their aircraft. Again, when within range of Soviet

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early warning, crews would release the beer cans creating the illusion of multiple bombers on the
horizon.14 One can only imagine the outrage at such provocative methods.
Another such example was a mission, which was flown by Colonel Harold Austin
(retired), over Murmansk on the 8th of May, 1954. The mission from the outset was clearly a
risky one. The objective was to send a reconnaissance aircraft over Soviet territory and
photograph radar stations and airfields. Colonel Austin was instructed to fly with three other
aircraft out of Norway and turn south. The flight would have appeared routine to anyone looking.
So routine did the flight appear, that the accompanying aircraft pilots were alarmed when, as
ordered, Colonel Austin’s RB-47E banked east toward the Soviet Union; these pilots however
made no call over the onboard radio as communication was prohibited by their commanders. The
mission seemed at first to be going exceptionally well; photos were taken of a number of
industrial sites and airfields which had rarely (Colonel Austin believed his crew to have been the
first) been seen by an RB-47E in the daylight. Unfortunately, Colonel Austin’s commanders had
made a few errors in their planning of Colonel Austin’s flight. Colonel Austin later noted that
they were not made aware that previous nighttime flights by the British had only nine days
earlier “stirred the air defense caldron.”15 Thus, they were caught off guard by a sudden violent
exchange with MiG aircraft in the skies of Russia.
The second error commanders had made was to seriously underestimate the defenses
Colonel Austin’s crew would encounter. It was known at the time that the Soviets had completed
testing on a new MiG aircraft, the MiG-17. Many airmen were concerned as data on the aircraft
was limited; Colonel Austin had prior to his flight inquired about the aircraft. Intelligence
14 Ibid, 117
15 Early Cold War Overflights: 1950-1956,212

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officers assured the colonel that it was unlikely that the crew would encounter the aircraft since
they assumed that the Soviets had not put enough into production to warrant any fear. This
miscalculation nearly proved fatal.
Colonel Austin was under instruction to fly at an altitude of 40,000 feet during his
mission. At 40,000 feet it was known that Soviet MiG-15 and assumed that MiG-17 jet powered
fighter aircraft became unstable and prone to gun malfunctions. If anything went awry, it was
also suggested by intelligence officers that the crew should increase their airspeed and merely
outrun the pursuing aircraft. Neither of these assertions proved to be true. Multiple MiG aircraft,
including no small number of MiG-17s, intercepted Austin’s flight. The pursuing MiGs fired
multiple shots; Austin recalls seeing white phosphorous rounds passing above and below his
aircraft. One MiG-17 fired a burst from its 23 mm cannon disabling the aircraft’s intercom
system and damaging its fuel system. In retaliation a member of Austin’s crew maned the tail
mounted machine gun and returned fire briefly from the tail section of the aircraft before the gun
malfunctioned. The short burst proved effective enough to force the pursuing MiGs to retreat to a
safe distance. One MiG had attempted, Austin believes, to get into position to ram the aircraft (a
strategy encouraged by Soviet commanders in the event one could not shoot down an enemy
aircraft16) but for no apparent reason retreated. Darting back for the safety of England the flight
was pursued by Soviet MiGs at least 100 miles into northern Finland before breaking off. The
incident made headlines in Finland and caught the attention of General LeMay who personally
debriefed Austin. Eisenhower called for an end to overflights shortly thereafter. Policy
concerning overflight missions had not really changed however. By November of that same year
35 million dollars was allocated by Eisenhower to the construction of the U-2 under the
16 Orlov, The U-2 Program, 11

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codenamed “project AQUATONE” and its tail-mounted missile defense system “RAINBOW”.17
Policy had not changed, only practice.
Motives of Leadership
Overflight missions were never removed from political scrutiny; that is, political figures
involved were aware of the risks. In a 1952 memorandum to Churchill from the Secretary of Air
seeking the approval of a joint US overflight operation, the Secretary noted that due to the loss of
an American aircraft a year prior and the poor timing of the election year American officials
were unlikely to take on the task themselves but could be persuaded to loan aircraft to the Royal
Air Force (RAF).18 The mission was accepted but Truman expressed concerns and limited
incursion for the mission and subsequent to 275 miles into Soviet territory. Primary concerns at
this time were not of diplomatic repercussions, as much as a fear of losing advanced equipment
to the Soviets.19 Under Eisenhower, military overflights came under even greater scrutiny yet
were no less provocative or risky.
Eisenhower was recorded as having raised his concerns when it came to the authorization
of new missions. Following Soviet protests in 1956, a memorandum was circulated among
officials stating that Eisenhower had informally halted further overflight missions in December
of 1956. It is difficult to say based on the document for how long the ban lasted or if the ban was
specifically aimed at the Air force, only noting who saw the document, but it does occur only a
few months after the introduction of the U-2. At this point it appears that any further overflight
missions would be under the strict authorization of Eisenhower. In considering those most
17 MEMORANDUM OF CONFERENCE WITH THE PRESIDENT (November 24, 1954); PROJECT
AQUATONE: OPERATIONAL CONCEPT-WINTER/SPRING 1950
18 Early Cold War Overflights: 1950-1956, 445
19 Ibid, 451

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interested in overflight missions it is easy to see why Eisenhower might want to bring the risky
task of aerial reconnaissance over the Soviet Union under his wing. Between the Airforce and the
CIA, those involved with the project took very strong stances when it came to the question of
how best to conduct these missions and what ends the information would achieve.
LeMay, as the head of Strategic-Air-Command (SAC), played a pivotal role in aerial
reconnaissance during and before the Eisenhower administration. LeMay could be called the
father of SAC; he transformed the organization from nothing to the vanguard of the nuclear age.
SAC was America’s first defense and greatest offense. If war between the great powers was
declared then SAC would be called upon to deliver nuclear devastation on the Soviet
Motherland. A task of this importance and moral repugnance required a leader of unmovable
convictions. LeMay was perhaps the strongest believer in the mission of SAC and carried with
him, as one might expect, an attitude of “victory by any and all means”. LeMay had been an
early advocate of ‘preventative war’ against the Soviets while the advantage was still in favor of
the US. Once, Hal Austin recalled, while talking with LeMay in his retirement home of the Air
Force Village West in the late 80’s, LeMay had lamented that the US had not started World War
Three back in the 50’s. “Maybe” said LeMay, “we’d all have been better off if we’d got it over
with then.”20
Lucky for everyone LeMay never ignited such a conflict, instead he had devised a
different way to threaten the Soviet foe: aerial reconnaissance. With help from an old war buddy,
USAF Colonel Raymond Sleeper, (then working at the Air War College) LeMay devised of
“Project Control”, in 1953.21 The radical new ideas concerning aerial reconnaissance at the time
21 Ibid, 100-101

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suggested that these operations were more than a way to peek across the border. LeMay and
Sleeper believed that the act of flying aerial reconnaissance aircraft above Soviet territory
presented the Soviets with an important dilemma. The Soviets in the early days had two choices
when confronted with an invader aircraft: shoot or don’t shoot. Shooting meant inflaming tension
with an advisory that was in the act of proving that aircraft could reach strategic targets. Not
shooting said a great deal more about military capabilities. Generals and politicians could issue
protests, as the Soviets had, but if these protests were made as public denouncements, then the
Soviets had to admit to everyone just what LeMay hoped to achieve: that America had
technologically superior forces and could leverage its political goals against the Soviets
unchallenged. Admission of such a thing was unthinkable. The nuclear stand-off between the
two nations hinged upon an image of equal ability to destroy the other. LeMay and Sleeper
concluded that the psychological and political threat of unchallenged aerial supremacy gave the
United States all it needed to dictate demands to the Soviet Union including for free elections in
Eastern Europe, acknowledgement of the right to freely travel, and the release of political
prisoners inside the USSR.22 Although seemingly unlikely, Project Control did not sound far-
fetched at the time.
The power of aerial reconnaissance and the impact it had on diplomacy certainly colored
LeMay’s views on the Cold War. In many ways it made him arrogant and much too willing to
start World War Three. Once LeMay had told Robert Sprague of the Sprague Electrical
Company and member of the Gaither Committee that he was not worried about Soviet bombers
or the threat of war. Sprague was assured that if the Soviets were going to attack the US, his
aerial reconnaissance aircraft, which flew all around the Soviet border, every second of

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everyday, would alert SAC hours in advance. LeMay supposedly even invited Sprague to see the
room in which the latest intelligence was being processed. If the Soviets made a move toward
Armageddon LeMay would not hesitate. LeMay is quoted as having said to Sprague, “If I see
that the Russians are amassing their planes for an attack I’m going to knock the shit out of them
before they take off the ground.”23 Note that LeMay was not suggesting that he would act in
retaliation of Soviet aggression (as was Eisenhower’s policy) but rather in the event his
intelligence suggested a threat.24 Caught off guard by the comment, Sprague replied that
LeMay’s proposition flew in the face of national policy. LeMay reportedly made the retort that “I
don’t care. It’s my policy. That is what I am going to do.”25
In this example we see a differing approach to aerial reconnaissance and an enlightening
side of LeMay, the man most responsible for these missions and their ultimate results. If LeMay
expressly cared very little for the input of politicians, one has to wonder if he was willing at all to
restrain himself in the name of improving relations. LeMay by all accounts was a danger to US-
Soviet relations and reconnaissance missions gave him the confidence to conduct himself as he
did.
Like the Airforce, the CIA had a hand in aerial reconnaissance. The CIA was led by
similarly driven individuals as the SAC. The director of the CIA, however, is something of a
legend. Allen Dulles, brother of John Foster Dulles Eisenhower’s Secretary of State, helped from
its outset to construct the CIA and had worked closely with the President in developing and
deploying the U-2. Allen Dulles was a firm believer in the power of intelligence. Unlike
Eisenhower, who sought to restrain CIA ambition for the U-2, Dulles was entirely unfazed by the
24 Ibid, 96
25 Ibid, 111-113

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notion of aerial reconnaissance, particularly over the Soviet Union. Allen Dulles can be called
and has been called many things but no one has ever, with exception to Senator Joseph
McCarthy, accused him of being sympathetic to, let alone being, a communist. Ever ready to
climb into the mind of his enemy Allen Dulles was extremely familiar with the works of Marx,
Lenin and particularly the writings of Stalin. Dulles’ brother John, Eisenhower’s Secretary of
State similarly is said to have had three copies of Stalin’s Problems of Leninism, one at home,
one in the office, and one in the car.26
Some of those working close with Eisenhower including his son, John, remarked that
Dulles was far too emotionally involved in his work and too over-zealous for the work of
intelligence.27 Much like LeMay, Dulles was an adamant anti-communist and it is doubtful that
he cared for a peaceful co-existence with the CIA’s chief antagonist. Above all else, however,
Dulles was a lover of the covert craft of intelligence. For Allen the ends justified the means and
so he saw no great risk in U-2 missions or aerial reconnaissance in general. In his book The Craft
of Intelligence, Allen Dulles states his feelings on aerial reconnaissance plainly. Dulles remarks
callously in his book that aerial reconnaissance is preferable as it does no harm to the general
population; agents muddle up the lives of the people on the ground but aircraft merely take their
photos and no one is the wiser.28 That is assuming of course that the aircraft can remain aloft; it
was regular Soviet farmers who had discovered Francis Powers after he plunged some 65,000
feet out of the air.29 Perhaps it was not that aerial reconnaissance was harmless, but rather that
Dulles was careless. Dulles loved nothing more than the cat and mouse game of the CIA and the
U-2 made his work easy. Allen praised the aircraft in his book stating that it was far and above
26 Marks, Power and Peace: The Diplomacy of John Foster Dulles. (Praeger, 1993), 99
27 Grose, Gentleman Spy, 408-409
28 Ibid, 476
29 Powers and Gentry, Operation Overflight, 89-91

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superior to an agent on the ground in terms of results. Information derived from U-2 photographs
was matched only by physical technical charts acquired from within the Soviet Union itself.30
A sense of being above the law permeated CIA headquarters. For example of disregard
for restraint one could consider Richard Bissell, Co-Director of the National Reconnaissance
Office for the CIA. Bissell, although better known for his role in the Bay of Pigs invasion, also
worked very closely with the U-2 project. Bissell characterizes well the general mood of the
CIA. In his memoirs he notes that many within the CIA felt unrestrained by the ethics, morals,
and rules which dictated the world outside of the CIA.31 Bissell for one hated rules. One day,
while driving down the road with his secretary, Bissell decided to take a short cut down a one-
way street in the wrong direction. Bissell would question later the logic of obeying the rules
when there were no cars on the road. John McMahon, an employee of Bissell at the time recalled
an instance in which Bissell told his aids not to bother him while he was planning a mission by
citing government rules which were in conflict with his plans. “Your job” Bissell is remembered
as saying, “is to use the regulations and laws to permit me to do it.”32 The attitudes present in not
only Bissell but also Dulles no doubt came into play when designing missions over the Soviet
Union. If mission planners show such disregard for their own laws why should it be believed that
international laws restrained CIA aircraft over the skies of the Soviet Union?
Open Skies, a New Look, and a Potential Ally
The reason for the reckless behavior carried out by the administration stems from a
number of areas. In understanding the minds which put these missions into action one must first
30 Dulles, Craft of Intelligence,67
31 Taubman, Secret Empire: Eisenhower, the CIA, and the Hidden Story of America's Space Espionage.(Simon and
Schuster, 2003), 114
32 Ibid, 123

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consider the environment. As previously noted, the Stalin years had delivered the world into the
Cold War with the Soviet fetishism of secrecy. There was an air of uncertainty fed off of
misinformation and fear. Uncertainty was made worse in the West with the death of Stalin. After
Stalin’s death the US could not be sure who they were going to be dealing with and whether the
new leader would be as calculating as Stalin; of course, Stalin was not the ideal adversary, but he
had reframed from open hostility with the US. Could his replacement be trusted to maintain the
peace? The answer of who was calling the shots in the USSR came at the conclusion of a
particularly controversial proposal: Eisenhower’s ‘Open Skies’.
Eisenhower had a vision for his presidency. Often referred to as the ‘New Look’
Eisenhower believed a weak economy, more than a weak military, was the key to Soviet victory
over the United States. If the American economy was hampered by wasteful spending then
America would be unable to meet Soviet aggression in the future. Eisenhower wanted to reduce
military spending in favor of cost effective solutions, his greatest obstacle was the apparent
threat of Soviet military superiority. If the people believed the Soviets posed an immediate threat
then the military would be allocated funds to overtake the Soviet lead. Each side, by reason of
suspicion would be forced to perpetuate an arms race based on fear masquerading as fact. If the
Cold War had been caused by secrecy then it could be cured with transparency. Thus, in Geneva
during a July 1955 summit conference Eisenhower proposed to the Soviets a plan in which both
sides could legally overfly each other’s military and industrial facilities. The proposal was
responded to at first by Nikolai Bulganin (the leader of the Soviet delegation) with modest
reception; Bulganin said that the proposal would be considered after closer study. US officials
were pleased with the Soviet response, that is until they were ambushed during a tea break by a
finger waving Nikita Khrushchev, whom in direct response recalls Colonel Andrew Goodpaster,

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to the proposal simply repeated to Eisenhower “Niet, Niet, Niet […]!”33 It was apparent to the
US from this moment on who was actually in charge of the Soviet Union.
Eisenhower must have been somewhat confused by the response from the spirited
Khrushchev. The Soviets had as much to gain from transparency as the Americans in terms of
threat assessment. To US officials it must have seemed that the Soviets had more to gain from
the proposal, which contained provisions, which would have allowed the Soviets use of
American airfields, for unlike the USAF, the Soviets could not conduct overflights of the
mainland United States. Also, the plan would have mandated the exchange of technical
information concerning military installations.34 Russian historian and former Soviet officer Col.
Orlov suggest that Khrushchev may have opposed the proposal as it would have made evident
that Soviet capabilities were far less impressive than western nations believed.35 The outright
rejection disappointed Eisenhower greatly but the event revealed two things: Khrushchev’s pull
within the Soviet government and the hurdle of overcoming Soviet suspicions and an inferiority
complex. If an improved relation with the Soviets was a key element of Eisenhower’s strategy
(and it certainly was) then he ought to have been more considerate of the impact aerial
reconnaissance missions would have upon Khrushchev and the Soviet government. Instead,
Eisenhower shook his head at a missed opportunity for improved relations and continued the
development of the U-2.
History of Unheard Protests
Apprehension on the part of the Soviet government in dealing with the United States,
especially on anything to do with aerial reconnaissance, was understandable. Aerial
34 Polmar, Spyplane:The U-2 History Declassified. (Osceola, WI: MBI Pub., 2001), 85

19
reconnaissance was a constant challenge for Soviet generals and politicians alike. Since the very
outset of USAF aerial reconnaissance missions in or around the USSR, the Soviets had made
protests of them through diplomatic channels. In 1958, in a fit of anger, Andrei Gromyko said
publicly that “Mankind has several times been on the brink of war, which could have flared up
instantly through irresponsible or provocative actions of the U.S. Airforce.”36 The State
Department responded in turn by pointing out that it was for this reason that Open Skies had
been proposed; a fair point but it does little to address the problem. American responses to Soviet
protest were typically the same, recycling excuses or fabrications ad nausea even in instances
where the Soviets could produce evidence. A common means of denial came from either
exploitation of Soviet ignorance (such as failure to properly identify the aircraft in question) or
by convenient circumstances. For example, the Soviets had protested a 1956 flight of a B-57
aircraft over the Vladivostok area, giving an uncharacteristically accurate description of the
event.37 The US responded nearly a month later on January 11, 1957 (not long after, one might
recall, the President called for a halt to overflights) stating simply that the only known flights in
the area of the Sea of Japan were USAF training flights38. The US never admitted to purposeful
overflights and always maintained a backup story in the event of protest or capture of man or
equipment. Colonel Austin’s crew had two sets of maps, had they been downed they were under
orders to destroy the mission specific maps (eating them if necessary).39
The Soviets had also continually protested the use of high altitude balloons, of which it
can be reasonably assumed based on the staggering number of balloons lost over their period of
use (out of 516 balloons launched only 44 were recovered; one significant loss in 1958 gave the
36 Beschloss,MAYDAY, 158
38 Ibid, 574
39 Ibid214

20
Soviets access to America’s most advanced camera technology the likes of which were later used
on satellites), the Soviets acquired more than enough evidence of US intentions.40 Still the story
was always the same; in response to a protest of a balloon overflight early in 1956, the United
States’ Department of State replied with copies of the latest press release on high altitude
weather balloons (again the explanation proved convenient as the response was a half-truth
thanks to the cooperation on the part of Navy weather researchers).41 CIA officials attempted to
recycle the “weather research” story after the famous incident involving a U-2 was shot down by
a Soviet missile, but due to plentiful evidence were quickly found out. For the Soviets, the
exposure of the American reconnaissance program following that mission must have been very
triumphant; finally Soviet protests would be heard!
Missed Opportunity for Improved Relations
It is difficult to fully grasp how utterly devastated relations between the US the Soviet
Union were at the conclusion of the U-2 incident without first discussing the warming of
relations between the two heads of State in 1959 at the invitation of a visit to America by
Eisenhower himself. This meeting represented a great many things to the Soviet State and to
Khrushchev himself. American perceptions of the Soviet Union had for many years been at odds
with the character of Stalin. Khrushchev was a welcomed departure from the days of Stalinism.
A reformer, Nikita Khrushchev had opposed openly Stalinism, gulags, political violence and
Stalin himself. Khrushchev laid out his positions in his secret speech. The CIA was caught off
guard by Khrushchev’s actions, uncertain at first if the speech had occurred at all.42 After
learning of Khrushchev’s secret speech Allen Dulles had suggested to Eisenhower that Soviet
40 Lindgrem, Trust but Verify, 39-40
41 Early Cold War Overflights: 1950-1956, 557-560
42 Grose, Gentleman Spy, 420

21
behavior had improved so much by 1958 that it may be advantageous to invite the new leader.43
Khrushchev was very much impressed with Eisenhower and had reason to believe that the
meeting marked a future where the Soviets could sit across from the US in frank diplomatic talks
and be treated as equals. When Eisenhower went ahead with the U-2 mission GRANDSLAM, he
unwittingly sent the message to Khrushchev that nothing had changed and the US was
determined to carry on in defiance of Soviet sovereignty.
In early 1959 Khrushchev was hashing out the details of an invitation by a number of
Scandinavian countries to visit their countries in a bid to improve already warm relations. The
invitation however was quickly withdrawn as protests within these nations mounted against the
Soviet Union. Khrushchev recalled that, although no statements were made, there was a deep
feeling of annoyance at the capitalist world among Soviet officials; Khrushchev recalls in his
memoirs feeling greatly insulted.44 Yet just as the capitalists of Scandinavia had turned their
noses up at them, the Soviets were suddenly shocked to find a personal invitation from President
Eisenhower himself, leader of the capitalist world, to Khrushchev to visit his country.
Khrushchev remembers, “I must confess that at first I didn’t believe it. It was all so unexpected.
We were not at all prepared for something like that. Our relations then were so strained that an
invitation for a friendship visit…seemed simply unbelievable!”45 In his memoirs Khrushchev
reflected on the state of US-Soviet relations from the revolution up until his invitation from
Eisenhower. In the years following the revolution and Civil War, the United States refused to
acknowledge the Soviet government as legitimate. Then, in 1959 Soviet officials would be
43 Ibid, 462
44 Khrushchev and Khrushchev, Memoirs, Vol. 3, 91
45 Ibid, 93

22
welcomed and received warmly by the US; how far the backward nation had come since its
beginnings! The thought seemed to give Khrushchev pause.
Khrushchev took a great deal of care in planning his trip. So excited and so eager to show
what his country was capable of Khrushchev sought out the best aircraft suited for the trip in the
Soviet Union. Khrushchev ultimately settled on the TU-114 turbo-prop airliner despite its glaring
record for malfunctions. Aircraft designer Andrei Tupolev himself insisted on the aircraft and as
a show of confidence sent his son along with other experts to travel with Khrushchev in the event
of any malfunction.46 The aircraft did just as Khrushchev had hoped in transporting his
delegation from Moscow to Washington in a single leg—the first aircraft of its kind to do so.
Khrushchev wanted to show off the power of the Soviet Union during his trip and as American
ground crews scrambled to find an adequate ramp for the enormous TU-114 (which they could
not) Khrushchev was beaming.47
With exception to some poorly-timed comments on the part of Vice President Nixon as
well as a cancelled trip to Disneyland, Khrushchev’s trip had gone fairly smoothly and rejoined
Eisenhower at Camp David for the final part of his trip. The reaction by Khrushchev to the
invitation to Camp David stands as a prime example of the sort of care Khrushchev took in
defending himself from humiliation. When Khrushchev first heard of his invitation to Camp
David, he began a large inquire to figure out just what Camp David was. Questioning why talks
would not be held in Washington, Khrushchev had feared that Camp David was reserved for the
humiliation and quarantining of foreign guests. After the Soviet government was unsuccessful in
determining if Camp David was an honor or a bust, the American embassy assured Khrushchev
46 Khrushchev and Khrushchev, Memoirs, Vol. 3, 96-97
47 Ibid, 102

23
that it was a fitting honor. Talks at Camp David, however, accomplished little; progress came at
a much needed retreat to Eisenhower’s personal farm.
The two men of similarly humble beginnings seemed to relax and spoke frankly about
easing global tension. Eisenhower presented Khrushchev with a beef heifer as a gift and
Khrushchev returned the favor, promising the delivery of a number of birch trees straight from
Russia.48 The outing proved restful and Eisenhower recalled that a different side of Khrushchev
seemed to take hold as he sat on the porch, pinning red stars to the shirts of Eisenhower’s
enthused grandchildren.49 Returning to Camp David, talks resumed with little to show for the
occasion. At the conclusion of the trip the two men were exhausted and frustrated that the key
issues raised in their talks (Berlin, lend-lease credits, and disarmament) remained unresolved.
Still, the outing gave Khrushchev the confidence to deal with the United States and the friendly
mood struck between the two leaders would have been fortuitous in the coming Paris Summit
meeting.
The summit meeting would have been the right opportunity to cash in on Khrushchev’s
improved mood. Unfortunately, Eisenhower ignored his own warnings about the physiological
impact GRANDSLAM might have on Khrushchev during a time of the Berlin crisis.50 Maybe if
Khrushchev had made mention of his growing agitation during his visit, Eisenhower would have
thought twice about sending the U-2. Khrushchev, however, was silent on the subject. The U-2,
whether Khrushchev knew enough about the aircraft to curse it specifically, was a source of
aggravation for Khrushchev. In 1956 the Soviet government sent an invitation to General Nathan
Farragut Twining of the air force to attend a Soviet Aviation Day. Although the invitation
49 Newton, Eisenhower: The White House Years. (New York: Doubleday, 2011), 302
50 MEMORANDUM OF CONFERENCE WITH THE PRESIDENT (April 3, 1959)

24
perplexed both Twining and Eisenhower by extending the invitation through military channels to
Twining alone, Eisenhower approved the invitation and permitted Twining and a group of
officials to attend as official guests.51 The event was fairly typical of Soviet military parades and
there were no surprises akin to the reveling of the Tu-4 years earlier. Curiously though, after the
air show and reception Twining was approached by Khrushchev himself (some sources suggest
he had been drinking heavily) who led him and other western delegates to a nearby park. At the
park Khrushchev began an impromptu toast, interrupting himself by asking US officials if they
would like to see some Soviet missiles. Twining replied that he would, to which Khrushchev
responded “First you show us your aircraft and stop sending intruders into our airspace. We will
shoot down uninvited guests. We will get all of your Canberras. They are flying coffins.” It was
at this point Khrushchev noticed an American attaché dumping out his glass.52 A little over a
week thereafter an aircraft was tracked on radar entering Soviet airspace; it was the very first
flight of the U-2. Khrushchev received word of the flight and blinded by rage, wrongly
concluded that it must have been a Canberra sent by General Twining as proof that they in fact
were not flying coffins.53 From the very outset Khrushchev was not amused by the U-2. When
interceptors and missiles failed to stop the mysterious aircraft, the U-2 became a needle in
Khrushchev’s side and he was desperate to remove it.
U-2 Incident
The Soviet military maintained vigilance over Soviet skies but with the introduction of
the Lockheed U-2 powered glider Soviet military leaders were once again impotent in the face of
American air power. Whereas slow and low flying bombers had been prey to interceptors, the U-
52 Orlov, The U-2 Program, 7

25
2 entered the scene flying nearly 30,000 feet higher than any aircraft on earth. Unfortunately, the
U-2 was not invincible and Soviet leaders were resolved to defend their airspace. The time would
come when altitude could not save American ambition.
At the inception of the U-2 project intelligence experts gave the aircraft a short life span.
After its maiden flight American intelligence officers estimated the U-2 had 3-4 years of aerial
supremacy before Soviet counter-measures would be successful.54 The maiden flight of
Lockheed’s unique powered glider took place on July 4, 1956. 55 By 1960 it seemed to the CIA
that 4 years had come and gone without incident and little could stop U-2 missions.56 The
President, CIA and the Airforce began to ignore their own better judgement about Soviet
capabilities. Francis G. Powers, the Pilot of the only U-2 shot down over the Soviet Union
himself acknowledged the growing fear among U-2 pilots as the program wore on. It could not
last forever and there was a growing sense among U-2 pilots that missile strikes were a matter of
if and not when.57 The question of when must have seemed obscure to the CIA since, by their
own estimates in a 1957 report, the CIA estimated Soviet SA-2 GUIDELINE missiles to have
been capable within that same year of being operational with a relative accuracy of up to
60,000ft. Estimates from the same report also predicted that the Soviets would be fielding even
more advanced Surface-To-Air missile systems by 1960, the capabilities of which, had they
proven accurate, would have made the SA-2 which concluded the May 1st flight look antique.58
Beside the apparent oversight of their own estimates the CIA had grown accustom to the sight of
54 Lindgrem, trust but verify, 49
55 It is difficult to designate exactly what the U-2 aircraft is beside to say a reconnaissance aircraft. To call it a jet
aircraft is sufficient but fails to describe the unique airframe and large wing surface. “Powered glider” is the most
applicable term in my opinion.
56 Orlov, (1998, September 7). The U-2 Program: A Russian Officer Remembers, 7
57 Powers and Gentry, Operation Overflight: The U-2 Spy Pilot Tells His Story for the First Time. (New York: Holt,
Rinehart and Winston,1970), 60
58 NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE

26
MiG aircraft on returning U-2 film, in which fighter aircraft can be seen stalling, having tried
unsuccessfully to make contact with the intruder aircraft.59 Pilots on the other hand, such as
Powers himself were on edge, knowing full-well that SAMs had already and with greater
frequency been fired at them in the past.60 By all accounts, the Soviets were well on their way to
ending U-2 overflights, yet the US took little care in ensuring diplomatic goals would not be
endangered by reckless programs.
An opportunity to rid themselves of the U-2 problem eventually presented itself during
May Day celebrations in 1960 over the skies of the Urals. SA-2 missiles found their target and
knocked pilot Francis Powers out of the sky. The May 1st mission of 1960, codenamed
“GRANDSLAM” in which Powers’ U-2 was brought down was itself a particularly brazen
mission, considering how late in the program’s life it had been carried out. GRANDSLAM came
at an interesting time. Fears of a Soviet lead in rocketry had sent congress into a stir not since
seen since the alleged “Bomber Gap.” Democrats, hoping to paint Eisenhower as soft of defense,
leveraged claims of looming Soviet ICBMs against their congressional opposites, just in time for
the upcoming election cycle.61 Intelligence officials as well as the military were of course
interested in new information to do with Soviet capabilities and so pressed Eisenhower to
authorize the longest U-2 mission to date.
GRANDSLAM was to fly from the Peshawar airbase in Pakistan, to an air base in Bodø,
Norway crossing the territory of Afghanistan, as well as border territory in the far north of
Finland, and Sweden. Powers estimated the flight would take 9 hours to complete.
59 Polmar, Spyplane,92
60 Powers and Gentry, Operation Overflight, 67
61 "Chronology of Two-year Dispute on 'Missile Gap'" New York Times, February 9, 1961. 4

27
GRANDSLAM, according to Powers, was to be the very first U-2 mission in which the aircraft
did not return to the base from which it took off.62
The mission was exceedingly bold and perhaps even unnecessary. In a morning
conference with Allen Dulles the president expressed a number of concerns about Dulles’ latest
proposal: a new round of overflights. Eisenhower expressed concern on a number of points, most
strikingly, that the mission was unnecessary. Areas in the North were of greater interest at the
time, yet the Powers flight began in the south. Eisenhower made the point that Tyura Tam’s
continued construction would not yield much new information and the need for new photos of
the site was by no means a case of “this year or never.”63 Eisenhower clearly was not convinced
by Dulles’s appeal for new missions and put off his authorization until after conversing with
Secretary Herter. GRANDSLAM was a behemoth of a mission and its failure only highlights the
arrogance of the administration in its implementation of the U-2 program.
What resulted from the downing of Powers’ U-2 has been called the U-2 incident. A
culmination of American negligence and Soviet agitation, the incident gave Khrushchev the
leverage needed to challenge American policy over the skies of the Soviet Union. What followed
was a somewhat typical response from Washington. Once again an experimental weather aircraft
had been reported as having flown off course. The response of the Soviets, however, would be
anything but typical. Finally Eisenhower had been caught in a lie. The Soviets responded by
acknowledging their responsibility for shooting down the intruding aircraft but left out key
details about the status of the aircraft and its pilot. In the meantime the Eisenhower
administration was padding its cover story, going as far as revealing the U-2 as a NASA weather
62 Powers and Gentry, Operation Overflight, 73
63 MEMORANDUM OF CONFERENCE WITH THE PRESIDENT (April 3, 1959)

28
plane. When finally the US had painted itself into a corner, Khrushchev sprung his trap. With a
grin Khrushchev told the Supreme Soviet all about his scheme. Khrushchev reveled that Powers
was alive, the U-2 was enough intact, and that the US government lies through its teeth. Powers
meanwhile would face charges of espionage. Soviet efforts to halt overflights of their territory
had delivered results.
It is thought by some sources that May 1st was chosen because many military officers
would be absent from their posts and fewer interceptor aircraft would be present. These sources
also suggest that it was due to the absence of aircraft cluttering radar screens that the U-2 was far
more visible to SAM sites. More importantly, the intrusion of the U-2 during one of the Soviet
Union’s most important holidays and only days before the Paris summit enraged Khrushchev and
made the affair personal. What followed were a series of angry telephone calls to the head of
Soviet Air Defense Force demanding the plane be brought down.64 Soviet SAM sites took aim
and succeeded in disabling Powers’ aircraft. The Soviets were slow to inform nearby sites of the
downing and so after Powers bailed out of the U-2 excited SAM batteries struck the U-2 again
during its descent and later a Soviet interceptor mistaken for the U-2.65 From that moment on
US-Soviet relations entered a tail-spin.
What Khrushchev did not say, however, is of importance here too. Khrushchev noted in
his memoirs that during his whole speech he made a point not to denounce or otherwise accuse
Eisenhower.66 The reason being that Khrushchev hoped that it would come to light that men such
as Allen Dulles (whom offered to step down during the crisis) had acted rouge and deliberately
64 Orlov, The U-2 Program, 10-11
65 Ibid, 11

29
invaded the USSR.67 Eisenhower refused to take the easy way out and in a press conference on
May 11th told the whole nation about the U-2 and American aerial reconnaissance objectives.
Not only did Eisenhower take responsibility for the U-2, he defended it. The immediate effect of
the conference angered Khrushchev who had hoped that Eisenhower would save face and the
Summit meeting along with it.
The Paris Summit was still attended by the four powers, the United States, Great Britain,
France, and The Soviet Union. It was hoped that Summit could still be saved but found instead
that Khrushchev had taken the Summit hostage. Talks were held in preparation for the Summit to
address the issue of the U-2 incident. What followed was a long rant by Khrushchev, in which he
makes an important statement regarding the future of US-Soviet relations: “The President of the
USA was to make a return visit to our country…And we were being prepared to accord a good
welcome to the high guest…At present we cannot express such cordiality … [provocative
flights] created conditions clearly unfavorable for this visit. The Soviet people cannot and do not
want to be sly.”68 In the end, Khrushchev refused to have the meeting until Eisenhower
apologized for his intrusions. Eisenhower refused and failed entirely to capitalize on the
relationship of respect he had cultivated with Khrushchev only months before. That relationship
could have been salvaged. Even when it appeared the Summit meeting was doomed, Khrushchev
demanded in a phone call to English Prime Minister Harold Macmillan, whom was also present
at the pre-summit meeting, that his “friend” Eisenhower make an apology.69 Even up to his
death, Khrushchev hoped to one day host Eisenhower in Moscow.
67 Newton, Eisenhower: The White House Years, 315-316
68 Department of State. "FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1958–1960." history.state.gov.May
20, 1960.
69 Beschloss,MAYDAY the U-2 Affair: The Untold Story of the Greatest US-USSR Spy Scandal. (New York: Harper
and Row, 1986), 278

30
Failure to Share Findings
Another source of failure stemmed from how best to inform Congress and the public.
Aerial reconnaissance had been employed with the expressed intent of better assessing the Soviet
threat and giving military leaders accurate assessments of Soviet capabilities so that they may
better prepare the military for the day it would be needed. If it came to light that Soviets
possessed a superior force, ideally the Airforce would approach Congress with its concerns and
receive adequate funding. Conversely, were it discovered that Soviet forces did not pose an
immediate threat, funding could be allocated to other endeavors. Eisenhower had believed that
without the sort of information Aerial reconnaissance provided the nation could only build its
military based on fears.70 A military which knew its enemy could prepare for it and not waste its
resources needlessly. Aerial reconnaissance fit well with Eisenhower’s “New Look” plan to cut
wasteful military spending. The reality however was more complicated. The Airforce benefited
from exaggerating the Soviet threat, so much so that the Airforce comprised the majority of
military funding in 1960 at $20 billion or half of the defense budget.71 The battle for greater
funding resulted in the Bomber Gap of the early 1950s and the Missile Gap of the late 1950s and
early 1960s. These controversies often misrepresented or outright ignored the intelligence the
administration possessed. Some felt information was withheld from the public for political gains.
Nixon for one accused “leftists” in the CIA of withholding information concerning Soviet
missile capabilities so as to perpetuate the fears of Soviet supremacy in the field. Nixon blamed
the CIA for his defeat at the hands of Kennedy as the missile gap controversy made Republicans
look weak on military issues.72
71 Ibid, 205

31
Aerial reconnaissance missions involved a lot of risk. One could argue that the risk
involved was worth it if it meant security and measured military spending. However, due to a
lack of communication and minimal transparency Congress was easily persuaded to fund bomber
and missile programs. The continued spending angered Eisenhower and furthered the sort of
arms buildup that had been driving distrust between the US and Soviets in the first place.
In the 1950s offensive rocket technology was still incapable of carrying accurately a
nuclear warhead to a distant target. The best option available to the United States and the Soviet
Union was to send long range bombers. Bombers at the time were however relatively slow and
counter measures were employed with success since the Second World War. The prevailing
wisdom was that if one were to send enough aircraft into enemy territory fast enough, significant
damaged could be done despite assured losses. Having significant numbers of aircraft was key to
successfully knocking out one’s opponent. As told by Allen Dulles in his book, The Craft of
Intelligence, as early as 1954 intelligence reports seemed to suggest the Soviets were going to
shift their military production dramatically to the production of super-sonic long range bombers.
The evidence, Dulles explains, suggested that Soviets had the production capability to begin a
crash program to dwarf American B-52 production. Capability however, Dulles points out, is
very different than intent. By 1957 Soviets shocked the world, not with legions of new bombers,
but with space bound rockets.73
In a series of hearings before the Senate sub-committee on the Air Force beginning on
April 16th through July, 1956 the leaders of the Air Force discussed the Soviet threat and the Air
Forces ability to match it. The Air Force had troubling news. On Wednesday May 2nd, 1956
General LeMay was called before the Committee to give his assessments of both the Soviets and
73 Dulles, Craft of Intelligence,162-163

32
his organization, SAC. LeMay’s testimony was alarming. LeMay stated that Soviet bomber
production differed from the US in two ways. For one, Soviet bombers outnumbered US
production and was showing no signs of slowing. Second and of most concern to LeMay, was
that Soviet aircraft were becoming technologically more sophisticated than what the Air Force
currently fielded. LeMay expressed concern that the US was relying too much on outdated piston
driven aircraft while jet powered B-52s were being produced at a slower rate than the Soviet
equivalent the “Bison”. In short, LeMay wanted greater funding for the Air Force and its bomber
program.74
Other Air Force generals parroted LeMay’s argument. General Earle E. Partridge,
commander in chief of the Air Defense Command and Continental Air Defense Command made
similarly worrisome claims at his hearing. Partridge testified that by 1959 it was estimated that
Soviet forces would be so numerous US defenses would be incapable of successfully repelling a
bomber assault.75 The General also claimed the Soviet Tu-4 long range bomber76 had exceeded
1,000 operational numbers but were in decline as they were being phased out. In place of the Tu-
4 would be the Soviet long range turboprop bomber, codenamed “Bear”. The General gave his
estimates of production numbers but the Defense Department censored the document. The Tu-95
“Bear”, which is still in current service with Russia, was estimated by Partridge at the time as
being capable of striking US soil without refueling.77 The only answer to the coming Soviet
“Bear” was an arsenal of B-52s at the ready.
74 STUDY OF AIRPOWER: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on the Air Force of the Committee on the Armed
Services, United States Senate, Eighty-Fourth Congress,Second Session,1956, 103, 114-115
75 Ibid, 237
76 The Tu-4 “Bull” is best remembered as the production model of the reverse engineered B-29 captured during the
Second World War.
77 STUDY OF AIRPOWER, United States Senate, Eighty-Fourth Congress (1956), 237-238

33
The statements made by members of the Air Force were meant with challenge not long
after the Committee closed its hearings. Secretary of Defense Charles Wilson did not wait to
voice his disagreements with General Twining’s assessments during the Committee hearings on
July 2nd. Twining had asserted that Soviet technological advances in aircraft design had
surpassed that of American designs. Wilson took issue with Twining’s statement and noted
“there are a great many people with reason who believe the same thing.”78 While not taking issue
with Twining’s statements about lack luster B-52 numbers or the apparent lead in Soviet
production of M-4 “Bison” jet powered bomber aircraft79 Wilson did note an important detail
that had gone unmentioned. Soviets did not possess tanker aircraft and thus could not perform
mid-air refueling. If Soviets wanted to attack American targets they would be forced to sacrifice
their aircraft and crews in the process (assuming they could reach the targets at all). Fowler
Hamilton the general counsel asked Wilson if it were possible that Soviets possessed tanker
intelligence officers did not know of. It was possible Wilson conceded, but that would mean that
at least some of the bomber type aircraft currently known about would in fact not be a threat. A
bomber, Wilson notes, cannot serve two roles simultaneously. If the Soviets did have tanker
aircraft then offensive bomber numbers would have to be revised downward.80
Wilson’s views were in line with the actual data. CIA estimates in March of that year
would present a more sober view of the Soviet threat. Bomber numbers were still high for 1960
but placed current “Bison” numbers around 40 and “Bear” numbers around 35. Twining’s
warning of current Soviet dominance did not hold water. Wilson however was correct in his
assessment of the state of Tanker aircraft. Soviets showed no signs of moving beyond the
79 The M-4 “Bison” was considered the Soviet equivalent to the B-52 at the time although Secretary Wilson believed
the B-52 to be superior. Yet another way in which Wilson set his opinions apart from Twining. (See STUDY OF
AIRPOWER, page 1677)

34
experimental phase of mid-air refueling.81 The National Intelligence Estimate report also made
mention that airfields best suited for US bound long-range bomber aircraft could exist in only six
base areas yet only one area outside of Leningrad had long range bomber aircraft stationed there.
One might interpret this to mean that more bombers were being built to fill those airfields, but
NIE numbers suggest a shift in focus from long-range bombers (total of 400 “Bison” by 1960) to
medium range bombers (total of 700 “Badger” by 1960).82 U-2 photographs would also call into
question the “Bison” estimate when photographs of the Ramenskaya airfield outside of Moscow
showed significantly fewer aircraft present than expected.83 Dulles recalls in his book that further
evidence came to light and by 1957 it was increasingly clear that Soviets had limited their
bomber production in favor of missile technology.84 The controversy stemmed partly from a lack
of conclusive data but the lack of data was also used to the advantage of the Air Force. The
bomber gap showed how easily the public could be misled about Soviet intentions.
At the launch of the Soviet satellite Sputnik the Bomber gap controversy seemed to
disappear and was replaced with the Missile gap. The American public was increasingly
concerned that if Soviets could reach space they could reach US shores. Questions were being
raised about American missile technology and what would be done to stand up to the Soviets. All
but the White house seemed alarmed by the news. Ever level headed, Eisenhower was not at all
bothered by the news. The reason for Eisenhower’s calm stems from how much he knew to
begin with. On the 23rd of May, 1957 the National Security Council discussed CIA reports of
what they believed were preparations for a satellite launch in the area now known as Gagarin's
81 Central Intelligence Agency, edited by Steury, Donald Paul, Intentions and Capabilities: Estimates on Soviet
Strategic Forces, 1950-1983.(Washington,D.C., 1996), 19-20
82Central Intelligence Agency Estimates on Soviet Strategic Forces, 1950-1983,19-21
84 Dulles, Craft of Intelligence,163-165

35
Start were both Sputnik and Gagarin launched from.85 Eisenhower was also made personally
aware at the time of Sputnik’s launch of missile launch preparations at Tyuratam, a facility only
recently discovered accidently by U-2 photo reconnaissance.86 Eisenhower knew many details
about the Soviet missile program yet withheld that knowledge. The president believed that it
would be a terrible waste to reveal his knowledge and put the U-2 program at risk only 16
months into its life span.87 Unwilling to speak out against fears of Soviet superiority Eisenhower
failed to capitalize on a possible benefit of U-2 intelligence gathering.
The result of Eisenhower’s restraint was a new wave of fear and confusion. The New
York Times captured the confusion of the times in its articles. One article from November 18,
1957 entitled “US closing missile gap with Soviet, survey shows” attempted to give perspective
on the controversy. The article featured a chart which listed various US missile projects and their
progress. The article attempted to present both the optimistic and pessimistic interpretations of
the apparent US inferiority but concluded only that the US had a late start. The article suggests
that the US fight to catch up.88 People were distressed by the Sputnik news; by rooting on the
United States missile program it is evident that the public sought some sort of reassurance.
Eisenhower could have captured the hearts of millions and changed the way Americans
perceived Soviet rocketry. Instead he allowed secrecy get the better of him.
There was a sense among Eisenhower’s staff that Eisenhower should make some kind of
announcement about the U-2. Many wished Eisenhower would talk about the U-2 program but
85 NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL BRIEFING: LATEST SOVIET GUIDED MISSILE TEST ACTIVITIES
May 23, 1957, 1-2
86 Lindgrem, Trust but Verify, 45; Beschloss,MAYDAY, 148
88 “U.S. Closing Missile Gap with Soviets, Survey Shows”, New York Times, Richard Witkin, November 11, 1957, 1

36
Eisenhower was obsessed with secrecy, blowing up over minor intelligence leaks.89 Sputnik was
an embarrassment but the U-2 could prove that the US never lost dominance. Eisenhower even
came close to revealing the project along with enlarged photos during a press conference, only to
refuse at the last minute.90 At a time when Khrushchev was making bold lies about Soviet
capabilities to produce missiles like sausages Eisenhower refused to challenge Khrushchev for
fear of revealing his sources.91 One could imagine Eisenhower confronting Khrushchev’s claims
of a missile stockpile and their ability to produce them. Eisenhower might point to Intelligence
reports which increasingly by 1960 began to suggest that Soviets were not missile hoarders. Like
the Bomber gap before it the Soviets had chosen not to mass produce their early missile designs.
In total by 1960 the Soviets did not have many ICBMs to speak of, only 10-25. Of the 10-25 it
looked as though only a handful were operational during the early sixties.92 The public would
have no doubt found comfort knowing that Soviet ambitions and actual capabilities were far less
troubling than they had been lead to believe. Eisenhower never debunked the myth however.
Kennedy would inherent the controversy. The result of Eisenhower’s secrecy was a confused,
angry public and a reinvigorated arms race.
Result of Carelessness
Due to Eisenhower’s unwillingness to show restraint in the months and days
leading up to the Paris Summit meeting what was not resolved in Paris in 1960 would find
resolution in the coming decades.
89 Mieczkowski, Yanek. Eisenhower's Sputnik Moment:the Race for Space and World Prestige. (Ithaca: Cornell
University Press,2013), 72
91 Ibid, 154
92 Peebles, Twilight Warriors, 57

37
Following the U-2 incident and a promise by Eisenhower to never, for the duration of his
office, send an aircraft across the Soviet border, the Soviets (perhaps hoping to catch Eisenhower
in another lie) shot down an RB-47 over the Barents Sea, north of the Kola Peninsula. The shoot
down cost the lives of 4 crew members and saw the imprisonment of Lt. John McKone and Lt.
Olmstead. Although the Soviets maintained that the aircraft had entered Soviet airspace, Lt. John
McKone and Lt. Olmstead were released on a few conditions because the Soviet government had
learned that the new President (Kennedy) would not permit aircraft to overfly Soviet Airspace.93
Among the issues which remained unresolved was the Soviet ultimatum to remove all
western troops from West Berlin. Unable to push the west out the Soviets resolved to construct
the Berlin Wall. Severed diplomatic connections also made it difficult to discuss the growing
anxiety over US military ICBMs in Turkey. Khrushchev would later rationalize not telling the
US government about sending missiles to Cuba by recalling all those years the US lied about
American reconnaissance and U-2 Overflights.94 As previously mentioned the U-2 incident also
greatly endangered aircraft flying in proximity of the Soviet border. Due to the environment
American aerial reconnaissance created several military aircraft would be shot down over alleged
international waters as well as civilian aircraft such as the Korean airliner KAL 007 during the
course of the Cold War.95
Conclusion
To conclude, the aerial reconnaissance missions of the Eisenhower administration greatly
damaged US-Soviet relations at a time when new opportunities for a cooling of relations were
93 William White, The Little Toy Dog: The Story of the Two RB-47 Flyers, Captain John R. McKone and Captain
Freeman B. Olmstead. (New York: Dutton,1962), 285-286

38
entirely possible. While these missions were undertaken with the best of intentions and began at
a time when no other possibilities presented themselves, the Eisenhower administration and its
military leaders allowed the program to take on greater risk at the expense of global security. By
failing to take seriously Soviet protests to these reconnaissance missions, the Eisenhower
administration inhibited a positive diplomatic relationship between both the nations and their
leaders. The ultimate result is that when the time comes to finally ease tension between nations it
becomes necessary yet ironically self-defeating to acknowledge one’s own spying and thereby
call into question why trust should be granted at all.

39
Bibliography
Primary
Congress, STUDY OF AIRPOWER: hearings before the Subcommittee on the Air Force of the
Committee on the Armed Services, United States Senate, Eighty-Fourth Congress,
Second Session, 1956 Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office,
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CIA
Documents
MEMORANDUM OF CONFERENCE WITH THE PRESIDENT (11/24/1954)
(retrieved 11/13/15)
MEMORANDUM OF CONFERENCE WITH THE PRESIDENT (4/3/1959) (retrieved
11/13/15)
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE NUMBER 11-5-59 SOVIET GUIDED
MISSILES AND SPACE VEHICLES (11/5/1959) (retrieved 11/13/15)
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL BRIEFING: LATEST SOVIET GUIDED
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PROJECT AQUATONE: OPERATIONAL CONCEPT-WINTER/SPRING 1950
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Early Cold War Overflights: 1950-1956: Symposium Proceedings Held at the Tighe
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February 2001, edited by R. Cargill Hall. Washington, DC: Office of the
Historian National Reconnaissance Office, 2003.
Intentions and Capabilities: Estimates on Soviet Strategic Forces, 1950-1983.
Washington, D.C.: edited by Donald Paul Steury, History Staff, Center for
the Study of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, 1996.
Department of State. "FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1958–1960."
history.state.gov. May 20, 1960. http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-
60v09/d168#fn-source (accessed November 12, 2015).
Dulles, Allen. Craft of Intelligence. New York, New York: Harper & Row, 1963.
New York Times
"Chronology of Two-year Dispute on 'Missile Gap'" New York Times, February 9, 1961.

40
“U.S. Closing Missile Gap with Soviets, Survey Shows” Richard Witkin, November 18,
1957
Orlov, A. (1998, September 7). The U-2 Program: A Russian Officer Remembers. Retrieved
September 16, 2015, from https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-
intelligence/kent-csi/vol42no5/pdf/v42i5a02p.pdf
Powers, Francis Gary, and Curt Gentry. Operation Overflight: The U-2 Spy Pilot Tells His Story
for the First Time. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1970.
Khrushchev, Nikita, and Sergei Khrushchev. Memoirs of Nikita Khrushchev. University Park,
Pa: Pennsylvania State Univ., 2007.
White, William Lindsay. The Little Toy Dog: The Story of the Two RB-47 Flyers, Captain John
R. McKone and Captain Freeman B. Olmstead. New York: Dutton, 1962.
Secondary
Beschloss, Michael R. MAYDAY The U-2 Affair: The Untold Story of the Greatest US-USSR Spy
Scandal. New York: Harper and Row, 1986.
Grose, Peter. Gentleman Spy: The Life of Allen Dulles. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1994.
Lashmar, Paul. Spy Flights of the Cold War. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1996.
Lindgrem, David T. Trust but Verify: Imagery Analysis in the Cold War. Annapolis, Maryland:
Naval Institute press, 2000.
Mieczkowski, Yanek. Eisenhower's Sputnik Moment: The Race for Space and World Prestige.
Cornell University Press, 2013.
Newton, Jim. Eisenhower: The White House Years. New York: Doubleday, 2011.
Taubman, Philip. Secret Empire: Eisenhower, the CIA, and the Hidden Story of America's Space
Espionage. Simon and Schuster, 2003.
Peebles, Curtis. Twilight Warriors: Covert Air Operations against the USSR. Annapolis, Md.:
Naval Institute Press, 2005.
Polmar, Norman. Spyplane: The U-2 History Declassified. Osceola, WI: MBI Pub., 2001.

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