The document analyzes the semantics of the noun phrase "fact that p". It argues that this phrase does not denote an actual fact. It considers two alternatives: 1) treating "fact" as vacuous or 2) forcing a truthful reading of the complement "p". The author ultimately defends the second alternative, arguing that "fact that p" implies "p" is true and yields a denotational/referential reading of "p", rather than denoting an actual fact.

1. The semantics of fact that p
Ana Clara Polakof
Doutorando PUC-Rio/Bolsista CNPq
anaclarapo@gmail.com
The purpose of this work is to analyze the semantics of the noun phrase fact that p. A
fact is usually defined as an ontological entity that may be characterized in different ways: as
a true proposition, as an abstract entity that results from the instantiation of a property in a
concrete entity, as something that may be the object of our knowledge, among others. The
notion of fact, thus, is complicated. This is probably why the idea that the fact that p denotes a
fact has been so broadly accepted (see Cresswell 1985, Kratzer 2002 and 2012, Vendler 1967,
Zucchi 1993), and why very different structures have been treated as denoting facts (see 1 to
4). First, we argue that the noun phrase fact that p does not denote a fact (in none of the
conceptions here mentioned). If it did, (7b) should not be grammatical and it is.
Second, we consider two possible alternatives. The first, and perhaps less
controversial, is to treat –in those cases– fact as a vacuous word (as used by Heim and Kratzer
1998: 61-62). This alternative could be defended by showing that the agrammatical sentences
in (5) (Abney 1987: 15) may be transformed into the grammatical sentences in (6) by
introducing the noun fact (in the respective DP) for grammaticality reasons. The second
alternative, and probably more controversial, defends that what fact does in some of those
cases (questions are excluded, since –as Higginbotham [1997: 382] has argued– they do not
have truth values) is force a truthful (or referential) reading of the complement. The idea is
that, when we have fact that p, the only possible reading of the sentence p is a transparent and
referential one. Thus, it provides –when they may be provided– the truth and falsity
conditions for utterances (Heim and Kratzer 1998: 243).
Third, we compare the two alternatives. We argue that examples (6) and (7) may be
given as evidence for the first, while (8) may be given as evidence for the second. It seems
clear that, even though the noun phrase in (8a) is due to syntactic restrictions, fact that p
implies that p is true. The problem is to decide whether it is better to treat it as semantically
vacuous, and make an exception in cases as (8), or to argue that it forces a reading that yields
1 as the value of the sentence p. If we take the second alternative, we have to explain why
sentences as (7b) are grammatical, and if we take the first, we have to explain why the
paraphrase from (8a) to (8b) seems so natural.
Fourth, and last, we will defend the second alternative, for it avoids assuming that the
noun fact may be semantically vacuous, and provide an explanation for cases as (7b) [which
involves recurring to reference]. We will restate that, in virtue of the evidence provided, it is a
mistake to treat the phrase fact that p as denoting a fact, and that –in those cases– we have a
denotational/referential reading of the complement.

2. (1) fact that you came
(2) fact that the sky is blue
(3) fact that we're running
(4) fact that he will come
(5) a. *did [that John built a spaceship] upset you?
b. *I wondered if [that John built a spaceship] had upset you
c. *I told you about [that John built a spaceship]
(6) a. Did [the fact that John built a spaceship] upset you?
b. I wondered if [the fact that John built a spaceship] had upset you
c. I told you about [the fact that John built a spaceship]
(7) a. That we're running is an event
b. The fact that we're running is an event
(8) a. It is a fact that you came
b. It is true that you came
References
Abney, S. The English noun phrase in its sentential aspect. Ph. D. thesis, MIT, 1987.
Cresswell, M. J. Interval Semantics for Some Event Expressions. In Cresswell, M. J.
Adverbial Modification. Interval Semantics and Its Rivals. Dordrecht: Reidel, 1985.
Heim, I. and Kratzer, A. Semantics in Generative Grammar. Malden/Oxford/Victoria:
Blackwell Publishing, 1998.
Higginbotham, J. The Semantics of Questions. In Lappin, S. The Handbook of Contemporary
Semantic Theory, pp. 361-384, 1997 [Paperback Edition]
Kratzer, A. Facts: Particulars or Information Units? Linguistics and Philosophy 25, 655–670,
2002.
Kratzer, A. Facts: Particulars or Information Units? In Kratzer, A. Modals and Conditionals.
Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 161-183, 2012.
Vendler, Z. Linguistics and Philosophy. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1967.
Zucchi, A. The Languages of Propositions and Events. Issues in the Syntax and Semantics of
Nominalizations, Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1993.