Minorities Rights in Islam and situation in pakistan

Assignment 4
Minorities Rights in Islam and situation in pakistan
Group Members
Abdul Wahab 150535
Muhammad Arslan 150520
Saadullah Anjum 150529
Submitted to DR Umer Riaz Abbasi

Contents
Minorities Rights in Islam and situation in pakistan..................................................................................1
Minorities in Muslim Societies.................................................................................................................3
Classical Legal Doctrines..........................................................................................................................3
Muslim Minorities in Non-Muslim Societies.............................................................................................8
Estimates of Muslim Minority Communities. ...........................................................................................8
Etiology of Muslim Minority Communities...............................................................................................9
Definition in Relation to the Ummah. ....................................................................................................10
Qurʿānic View of Minorities. ..................................................................................................................12
Relations between the Ummah and Muslim Minorities. ........................................................................13
Issues and Assessments.........................................................................................................................15
Minorities situation in pakistan .............................................................................................................17
The Lahore Resolution...........................................................................................................................17
The Hindu Community...........................................................................................................................21
The Sikh Community..............................................................................................................................21
The Ahmadi’s / Qadianis Community in Pakistan ...................................................................................22
Conclusion.............................................................................................................................................23
References ............................................................................................................................................24

Minorities in Muslim Societies
The status and treatment of minorities in Muslim societies (or, more generally, under Islamic law)
has always been of special concern to outside powers seeking to establish themselves as their
protectors. It has also been a favorite subject of Western Orientalists who perceived it as a major
source of internal schism. Non-Muslim neighbors and observers in the modern age no longer
content themselves with traditional notions of tolerance and the absence of persecution, but
expect full social, political, and legal equality of Muslims and non-Muslims. Their critical regard
has called forth strong reactions from many Muslims who try to show that Islam has in fact a
much better record of protecting minority rights than have other civilizations, particularly the
West. The subject therefore continues to be sensitive, raising considerable controversy.
Classical Legal Doctrines
The status and treatment of non-Muslims in Muslim societies (dār al-islām) have varied greatly
over time and space. Legal theory has never been uniform throughout the Muslim world and has
often been far removed from practice. Traditional rules and regulations clearly show the impact
of history, particularly the experience of Prophet Muḥammad and the conditions of Muslim
conquest. Whereas relations between Muḥammad and his followers and their polytheist
neighbors had almost from the outset been tense, if not openly hostile, relations with the Jews
and Christians of the Arabian Peninsula passed through phases of understanding and cooperation
to growing distrust, animosity, and in some cases confrontation.
Muḥammad had originally hoped to be acknowledged as Prophet by the guardians of all the
monotheist traditions. After his move (the Hijrah) to Medina in 622, Muslims entered into a
formal alliance with the local Jewish and polytheist tribes,which was documented in the so-called
Constitution (sahīfah) of Medina, granting all allies internal autonomy with Muḥammad acting as
supreme head and arbiter of the newly established community. When recognition of his
prophethood was denied and when the political loyalty of some Jewish tribes appeared to be in
doubt, Muḥammad turned against them until they had been expelled or killed. The Constitution
of Medina has come to be widely regarded by contemporary Muslims as the blueprint for a
political community (ummah) that is based on the Qurʿan and includes as its citizens both
Muslims and non-Muslims.
Mirroring the concerns of the young and vulnerable community, the Qurʿan touches repeatedly
on the question of whether it is lawful for Muslims to entertain friendly relations (muwālāh) with
unbelievers. The guiding principle (see sūrahs 3:28, 5:51, 29:46 and 60:8–9) is that the believers
should treat the unbelievers decently and equitably as long as the latter do not act aggressively

toward them. A reactive principle linking the treatment of non-Muslims to their behavior toward
the Muslims, this clearly reflects the conditions of the early period, when Muslims were still a
small minority facing large and partly hostile non-Muslim majorities.
The reactive principle appears less prominently in the provisions of Islamic law (fiqh). Beneath
the apparently rigid division between dār al-islām and dār al-harb (non-Muslim lands) concerning
territory, and between Muslims and non-Muslims concerning people, one finds the fine
distinctions characteristic of Islamic legal reasoning. The basic distinction was between
polytheists or nonbelievers on the one hand—with whom there was to be no social interaction
(e.g., shared food, intermarriage) and who were to be fought until they either converted, entered
into a treaty agreeing to protect the rights of Muslims and their clients within their realms, or
were killed or enslaved—and the “People of the Book” (ahl al-kitāb) on the other, whose faith
was founded on revelation, who were to be granted protection, and with whom social
intercourse was allowed. In the course of Muslim conquest and expansion, the people counted
as “People of the Book” increased beyond the Jews, Sabaeans, and Christians mentioned in the
Qurʿan to include Zoroastrians (Majus) and eventually Buddhists and others.
The Hanafī law school extended protection to non-Arab pagans, and Mālik ibn Anas (d. 796),
founder of the Mālikī school, even included Arab polytheists provided that they did not belong
to the clan of the Prophet, the Quraysh. As a result, the category of polytheists was steadily
reduced until, in the modern era, it had lost all practical relevance. At the same time, the state
of those monotheist groups (e.g., the Bahāʿīs in Iran or the Ahmadīyah-Qādiānīs in India and
Pakistan) that developed after Islam and were regarded by the respective Muslim majorities as
renegades or apostates remained precarious. In legal theory, they had to be fought until they
repented and (re-)converted or were killed.
The status of the “people of the book” was secured by a contract of protection (dhimmah), which
in principle was unlimited and which, in accordance with the Qurʿanic injunction (sūrah 2:256),
“No compulsion in religion,” guaranteed their life, body, property, freedom of movement, and
religious practice (if carried on discreetly). Protection was granted against the exaction of tribute,
dues, and taxes of various kinds. Out of these dues and taxes two main inconsistently defined
categories evolved: a land tax (kharāj) often to be paid in kind, which soon came to be imposed
on all owners of land thus categorized irrespective of their religious affiliation; and a poll tax
(jizyah) levied on all able-bodied free adult dhimmī males of sufficient means. The various law
schools varied considerably as to the definition of the legal rights and obligations of the protected
people (dhimmīs). The most liberal among the Sunnī schools was the Hanafī (dominant in the
Ottoman Empire among other places), which granted dhimmīs equal rights with regard to
property and parts of criminal law (notably diyah, or blood money), but not in the domains of
family law, inheritance, or testimony.
The primary purpose of all practical measures and legal provisions seems originally to have been
to mark unmistakably the boundary between Muslims and non-Muslims. Basing themselves on
the notoriously unclear text of sūrah 9:29 (“fight the infidels until they pay the jizyah out of their

hands while they are small/humble”), Muslim jurists tended to translate the submission of non-
Muslims to Muslim rule into the requirement of humility and humiliation. Prevailing norms and
expectations were mirrored in the so-called Pact of ʿUmar (al-shurūt al-ʿUmarīyah), attributed to
the second caliph, ʿUmar ibn al-Khattāb (r. 634–644), but probably not formulated before the
eighth century. This laid down a number of restrictions regarding dress and hairstyle, worship,
the construction and repairing of churches and synagogues, the height of houses, the use of
animals, and so forth, which served not only to identify the dhimmīs, but also to discriminate
against them. Shīʿī thought and law went further in that it considered non-Muslims to be ritually
impure (najis), thereby banning (at least theoretically) social interchange and intermarriage
altogether.
Practice.
Practice, however, frequently did not conform to the restrictive notions of the ʿulamaʿ (religious
scholars). The actual situation of the dhimmis was more closely conditioned by the economic and
political circumstances prevailing within various Islamic territories and by their relations with the
major non-Muslim powers of the day, a correlation still largely valid in the modern age. Yet the
legal norms retained their normative force well into the twentieth century, and if at any time
the dhimmis or individual members of their elites did in fact enjoy better conditions than those
prescribed by the jurists, it was condemned as a deviation from the way things ought to be.
Umayyad Spain and Fātimid Egypt are widely seen as the golden age of harmonious coexistence
among Muslims, Christians, and Jews, whose cultures and heritage were mutually enriched. The
putative deterioration of intercommunal relations beginning in the thirteenth century has been
attributed to the impact of the Mongol invasion rather than the Christian crusades. By that time,
the gradual spread of Islam had reduced the dhimmī populations of the Middle East from
majorities to minorities. Still, community structures were left essentially intact.
In return for submission to Muslim rule, non-Muslims enjoyed considerable autonomy in
personal-status law, worship, and education; they formed largely self-contained units with
separate religious, legal, social, educational, and charitable institutions. Although there was in
most areas no forced segregation in terms of residence or occupation (Morocco and Iran at
certain periods excepted), there was often professional specialization, which has been
characterized by modern scholars as “ethnoreligious division of labor.” Non-Muslims fulfilled
complementary economic roles and functions, some of which were regarded as undesirable,
lowly, or unclean by Muslims. Most importantly, non-Muslims were incorporated into Muslim
society not as individuals but as members of their religious communities. The principle found its
clearest expression in the Ottoman millet system (derived from the Turkish term for an
ethnoreligious group or community) as it had evolved by the nineteenth century. It exerted
administrative control through a number of legally recognized religious communities—notably
the Greek Orthodox and Armenian Christians as well as the Rabbanite Jews—headed by their
clergy with autonomy compensating for the absence of equal status and the denial of political
rights.

In the nineteenth century, European influence and expansion, internal migration, social
differentiation, and cultural change began to affect the dhimmīs’ legal status, communal
organization, and place in society. The Ottoman reform edicts of the Tanzimat period (issued in
1839 and 1856) proclaimed the principle of legal equality between Muslims and non-Muslims
and replaced the jizyahwith general conscription or with the payment of an exemption tax
(bedel-e asker). Religious personal-status law as a powerful marker of communal separateness,
however, was retained. Within the Ottoman and Persian empires, European powers assumed the
role of protector of specific religious communities. Individual Christians and Jews managed to
benefit from increased educational and economic opportunities, gaining access to legal
protection (foreign passports) and privilege (under the system of capitulations). Within the
various communities, a rising commercial and professional middle class began to challenge the
rule of the clergy and notables. The communities as a whole broke out of the place assigned to
them under the old order, but sociocultural change and closer contact also resulted in growing
friction and competition, occasionally exploding into intercommunal violence. Even among the
cosmopolitan elites, the vertical element of religious and ethnic identification became
increasingly superseded but never fully supplanted by the horizontal element of social class.
With the rise of European colonial activity in the Muslim world, the role of non-Muslims as
intermediaries facilitated their economic advancement but also exposed them as dependents—
now on the colonial system rather than on the Muslim ruler. The rise of nationalism and
independence movements made the non-Muslims’ position difficult, if not untenable. When
religious and ethnic affiliation tended to merge, religious communities could be transformed into
nations, and millets turned into minorities. Although certain nationalist movements, such as the
Wafd Party in Egypt or the Congress Party in India, attempted to overcome religious divisions and
to unite Muslims, Christians, Jews, or Hindus under the banner of national unity, the tie between
nationalism and religion was never entirely dissolved. It became more marked in the course of
what has been widely termed the assertion, or surge, of political Islam that since the 1970s has
made itself felt in the entire Muslim world.
Most written constitutions of Muslim states now confirm the principle of equality of all citizens
irrespective of religion, sex, and race. At the same time, however, they usually declare Islam to
be the state religion and the shariʿah (the divine law) the principal (or even exclusive) source of
legislation. The exception to this rule is Lebanon, where the constitution allocates the presidency
to a Maronite Catholic, and after the 1989 Taʿif Accord, divides parliament into sixty-four
Christian and sixty-four Muslim seats. In all other Arab and Muslim countries, the head of state
must be a Muslim, although in Jordan and the Islamic Republic of Iran, non-Muslim and other
minority groups are guaranteed a fixed share of seats in representative political bodies.
Contemporary Debates.
Under the impact of political Islam, suspicion of non-Muslims has reemerged, although individual
thinkers, groups, and activists have adopted widely divergent views. Certain militant Islamic

groups, such as al-Jihād in Egypt, are hostile toward non-Muslims and advocate the reimposition
of the dhimmah regulations. They refer themselves to the medieval scholar Ibn Taymīyah (d.
1328), who conditioned the toleration of non-Muslims on their utility to the Muslim community,
and to the Indo-Pakistani activist Abū al-Aʿlā Mawdūdī (1903–1979) and the Egyptian Muslim
Brother Sayyid Qutb (1906–1966). Some also engage in physical violence aimed at the regimes in
power as much as at the minorities attacked. During World War I, Christian minorities (Greek,
Armenian, and Assyrian) were persecuted in some parts of the Ottoman Empire. An estimated
1.5 million Armenians were killed in a campaign which the Turkish government refuses to
acknowledge as genocidal, and the Young Turk Gov-ernment expelled most American Christian
missionaries from the country. In Egypt, Lebanon, and Iraq, Christian and Jewish minorities were
often singled out for harsh treatment, many being forced to pay jizyah.
At the other end of the spectrum, there are Muslim intellectuals seeking ways to legitimize full
legal and political equality of Muslims and non-Muslims in Islamic terms. They clearly perceive
the need for radical ijtihād (individual inquiry into legal issues) that takes into account the spirit
or maqāsid (intentions) of shariʿah rather than the details of fiqh, looking at the public good (al-
maslahah al-ʿāmmah) rather than the letter of the law. Their primary concern is to preserve the
unity of the national or territorial community and to avoid fitnah (disorder) in its modern guise
of sectarian violence. The dilemma rests in the fact that on this particular issue, shariʿah would,
in order to allow for equality, have to be purged of the provisions of fiqh, whose primary function
is to fix a boundary between Muslims and non-Muslims and to ensure the superiority of the
former.
Between the two extremes there is what might be called a mainstream position that proclaims
the principle of “same rights, same duties” (lahum mā lanā wa ʿalayhim mā ʿalaynā), but limits
legal equality to the “non-religious domain.” The decisive questions are how the religious sphere
is defined and whether non-Muslims can hold public office in an Islamic state which has as its
primary raison d’être the realization of the rule of Islam. Faced with the double challenge of
traditional restrictive norms and modern egalitarian demands, some Muslim reformists resort to
a historical-functional approach: the jizyah is interpreted as the functional equivalent of a
military tax—here they have historical evidence on their side—and national liberation as the
modern equivalent of jihād(war against nonbelievers). If and when non-Muslims participate in
national defense or liberation, the jizyah is no longer incumbent on them, nor do they require
any specific kind of protection. They can therefore be granted citizenship in the Islamic state,
including the right to vote and to participate in political decision-making, but they continue to be
debarred from the highest political, military, and judicial functions.

Muslim Minorities in Non-Muslim Societies
About one-fifth of the estimated 1.5 billion Muslims in the world today are religious and political
minorities in non-Muslim societies. A more precise estimation of the size of Muslim populations
in many countries is difficult because of the absence of reliable demographic statistics. The
problem is exacerbated by the lack of ethnic or religious classifications in most national statistics.
Estimates of even relatively small Muslim minority populations vary widely: for example, in
Hungary one estimate claims 6,000 Muslims and another claims the Muslim minority population
to be 105,000; in Poland one estimate is 15,000, another 333,000; and in Romania, 35,000 against
an estimate of 346,000. Even in countries with large populations, much controversy exists—for
example, in China estimates range from 14.6 to 144 million Muslims in the country. The number
and proportion of Muslims in countries where they are in the majority is generally known and
accepted. It is only when they are in a minority status that not only their numerical strength but
their very existence is questioned.
Estimates of Muslim Minority Communities.
Through the 1990s, the generally accepted estimation of Muslim minority communities was that
they form approximately one-third of the world Muslim population. Hence, of the 1.2 billion
estimated total Muslim population in 1994, about 33 percent were estimated to be living as
minorities in non-Muslim societies.As the total population of Muslims continued to grow, the
percentage of Muslims living as minorities has shifted from 33 percent in 1994 to 20 percent of
world Muslim population in 2006; this is a result of a combination of factors such as the
emergence of newly independent states that reclassified Muslim communities into Muslim
majority nations (see Table 1). It is also interesting to note that among the minority communities,
close to one-half of the world's Muslim minorities (47.5 percent) are in India alone, followed by
China, Russia, Kenya, and Kazakhastan (see Table 2).
Minorities are generally defined in terms of numbers, indicating that in their area of residence,
they are proportionately less than all the other groups combined, including the majority.
However, Muslim minorities that constitute a small proportion of large populations make up
numerically significant communities and often exceed in population size many of the Muslim
majority countries.
Table 3 presents countries with the ten largest Muslim populations in the world, distributed not
only among countries in which Muslims enjoy an absolute majority, but also found in countries
where Muslim communities constitute a relatively small minority in percentage terms, such as
those in India and China. These communities are numerically large and represent a sizeable
percent of the global Muslim population, as evident in Table 4. Indeed, a review of the ten largest

Muslim populations reveals that at least two of these are in minority countries. Minority status,
therefore, is not simply a game of numbers.
A review of the ten largest Muslim populations in the world reveals that at least two of these are
in non-Muslim countries, i.e., India and China. While the Muslims in the world now form 20
percent of the population, Muslim minority communities constitute 20 percent of the worldwide
Muslim population. Among the 350 million Muslims currently living in minority communities 149
million (or 47.5 percent) are in one country, India, which now has the largest Muslim minority
community in the world.
Etiology of Muslim Minority Communities.
The etiology of Muslim minority communities is varied. Ali Kettani has classified Muslim minority
communities into three types based on their historical origins and varying situations as per his
analysis in the late 1980s:
1. they were once in the majority but later lost power and through attrition and absorption
became a minority, as in Palestine, Ethiopia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina;
2. they were in a minority as rulers, but their rule ended, and they remained as religious
minorities, as in India and the Balkans; and
3. they were non-Muslims who converted to Islam in a non-Muslim environment, as in Sri
Lanka.To this a fourth category may be added: those who came as immigrants and made their
homes in non-Muslim lands.
In addition to size, minorities can also be defined in terms of ideological affiliations, where
minorities may constitute people whose ideas or values are distinct, to a greater or lesser degree,
from those of the majority around them. We might have religious or political minorities who form
a subculture (such as Protestants in Europe, Catholics in America, Muslims in Europe and North
America) and sometimes a counterculture (such as Catholics in Northern Ireland, Basques in
Spain, Palestinians in Israel). Minorities have also been identified in racial and ethnic terms, such
as the classification of nationalities in central and eastern Europe, or under the euphemism of
“visible minorities,” as in Canada. Alternatively, minorities have also been defined in terms of a
lesser degree of political participation or access to economic resources, as in the case of the
colonies in Africa and Asia under the former British, French, and Dutch rule, or in South Africa,
where until 1994, a powerful political minority dominated a disadvantaged majority.
A particular minority might have one or a combination of the above characteristics based on
culture, race, ethnicity, or religion, and in varying degrees of intensity and relevance. Muslim
minorities come in all of the above forms and in significant numbers and proportions that cannot
be ignored in most countries of the world. The one common denominator that approximates a

generic classification is their religious affiliation—professed or ascribed, current or historic—that
gives them an identity with an onus of responsibility.
Definition in Relation to the Ummah.
Besides having to contend with the hardships of minority living in the middle of an alien or
alienated majority, Muslim minorities face the additional challenge of defining their own position
in the context of the larger Muslim ummah (community). Ironically for them, the “in-group” is
the physically distant ummah of which they consider themselves a part, and the “out-group” is
seen as the majority non-Muslim community within which they reside.
The concept of ummah is crucial to the understanding of the Muslim minority situation,
contextually as well as topically. Muhammad Asad, in his well-known translation and
commentary on the Qurʿān, explains that “the word ummah primarily denotes a group of living
beings having certain characteristics or circumstances in common” (The Message of the Qurʿān,
Gibraltar, 1980, p. 177). Thus, he points out, the term ummah is often used as synonymous with
community, people, nation, genus, generation. In his brief but seminal article on the Qurʿānic
concept of ummah, Abdullāh al-Ahsan identifies a number of usages from the Qurʿān and
classifies them as follows:
 1. the exemplar of an ideological group of people such as Abraham (16:120);
 2. a particular period or span of time that applies to a particular community
(7:34 and 11:8);
 3. a group of more committed people within the larger community (7:159);
 4. a circumstantially or professionally unified group of people (28:23); and
 5. a community based on common beliefs, law, and custom (5:48). Thus ummah, as a
community based on shared beliefs and experiences, is found in as many variations and
forms as there are differences among nations and peoples.
The Muslim ummah, however, has no variants, for it is based on one set of beliefs, focusing on
the oneness of God, the prophethood of Muḥammad, one code of practice guided
by sharīʿah(Islamic law) and shared experiences through common history of Islam and Muslims—
the early persecutions; the trials, tribulations, and triumphs, all have come to characterize the
common Muslim experience leading to the emergence of an “ummah consciousness.”
The Qurʿān defines the Muslim ummah as those people who surrender to God and follow His
guidance as sent through Prophet Muḥammad who was sent as a messenger to all humanity.
Muslims, therefore, are a group of people committed to a set of beliefs and entertaining a sense
of mission and a special role in human history. God says in the Qurʿān: “And thus we have willed

you to be a community of the middle way [ummatan wasaṭan] so that you may be a witness to
the truth before all mankind” (2:143).
The constitution adopted by the first Islamic state established by Prophet Muḥammad in Medina
declares in its first article: “Believers and Muslims of Quraysh and Yathrib and those who follow
and meet them and strive with them constitute one single community [ummatan waḥīdatan] to
the exclusion of all others in mankind [min dūn al-nās].” (For a concise discussion of the articles
see W. Montgomery Watt, Islamic Political Thought [Edinburgh, 1968], especially pp. 130–134.)
In the Islamic tradition, then, all Muslims belong to the ummah. All non-Muslims, though living
within the same territorial confines, are outside the ummah. However, when Muslims are the
dominant community they are required to abide by the rules governing the rights and obligations
of non-Muslim minorities, dhimmī (the protected ones), as specified in the Qurʿān and
the ḥadīth (traditions of the Prophet). Thus the dhimmī are those non-believers who reside
within the Islamic political domain. They live in dār al-islām under the protection of the Muslims,
and in lieu of obligation to render military service they make payment of a nominal tax
called jizyah which entitles them to protection. However, nonbelievers, like believers, are
created by God to inherit the earth, khalāʿif al-arḍ(vicegerents) with honor and dignity in their
human person and with equal claims to the rubūbīyah (sustainership) of God. They are entitled
to the hidāyah (guidance) from God and, like all children of Adam, are exalted with the power of
choice (the ability to say no), thereby attaining a status higher than that of the angels. Murad
Hoffman refers to the collection of these rules and injunctions as the Qurʿānic Minority Statute
(Islam, p. 168).
If Muslims are living as part of non-Muslim communities, their treatment by the non-Muslim
majority is subject to the varying conditions that are prevalent in that setting. There is an on-
going debate, however, on what the ummah can expect from the Muslim minority and an equally
strong debate on what can be expected from the ummah for the cause of those Muslims living
under non-Muslim jurisdiction.
Since the Muslim minority community is often perceived by Muslims in majority situations as an
integral part of the larger Muslim community, albeit a part that is living outside its jurisdiction,
minority status is often seen as a transitory phase, a redressable accident of history. Thus, as was
often done through history, the Muslim minorities might be encouraged or advised to pursue
one of the following two courses: when subjected to the hardships of living in non-Muslim
societies, Muslim minorities undertake hijrah (migration) to a Muslim or another more
hospitable land or they may respond to repression and threats to their survival by jihād (taking
up arms or undertaking extraordinary effort). The Qurʿānic sanction for this line of argument is
sought in the following verse: “Those who believe and suffer exile and strive with might and main
in God's cause with their goods and their persons, have the highest rank in the sight of God: they
are the people who will achieve salvation” (9:20).

It is obvious that in the areas where Muslim minorities reside, Islam is not the dominant religion
or culture, and there is no positive inducement for the growth and nurture of Islamic values and
practices. In many of these areas, Muslim minorities encounter active hostility and complain of
calculated efforts by the majority to ensure that Islamic norms do not prosper even in their
individual lives, Muslims cease to render allegiance to Islam or to pursue the Islamic way of life.
Such is the situation, sometimes mild, sometimes aggravated, in which one out of every five
Muslims is living today. After the events of September 11, 2001, which included the attacks on
the Twin Towers in New York and the Pentagon in Washington, D.C., and with the subsequent
train bombings in London and Madrid, the situation for Muslim minorities in Western societies
became more challenging. Entire minority communities were blamed for the acts of the few and
the burden of responsibility and guilt derived from persecution and discrimination against
possibly innocent people was lifted with the call for “justice.” The subsequent decision of the
United States and its “coalition of the willing” to declare war in Afghanistan and then on Iraq
created much resentment in the Muslim world and further aggravated the situation for Muslim
minority communities worldwide.
Qurʿānic View of Minorities.
In the early history of Islam we have two models for minorities to follow. One is the Meccan
model, in which Muslims facing persecution opted for hijrah, and the other is the Abyssinian
model, in which a state of tolerance and peaceful coexistence was achieved within a non-Muslim
majority context through exerting extraordinary effort. For Muslim minorities today, the
adoption of one of these two models is inevitable. Both are viable, yet one might be more
workable than the other. The third alternative, of doing nothing, will maintain a state of
continuous belligerence which is neither necessary nor desirable. Thus a minority Muslim is
expected to become a muhājir (migrant) or a mujāhid (one who strives for a cause). When
Muslims are living in non-Muslim lands it is incumbent on them to organize with other Muslims
to preserve and enhance their Islamic identity. The isolationist approach to preservation is
excluded on the basis of an equally important need and indeed duty of the Muslim to
do daʿwah (invite people to Islam). Thus, dialogue with non-Muslims is encouraged both for the
purpose of mission and for the objective of attaining peaceful coexistence with non-Muslims in
their lands.
Historically, the dār al-islām has been confronted not only with the realm of the other, in
principle hostile, not-yet Muslim world (dār al-ḥarb), but it has also been complemented by the
realm of compromise (dār al-ṣulḥ), beginning with the famous armistice agreement that Prophet
Muḥammad signed with the people of Mecca in 628 CE, two years before returning to that city
in 630 CE Thus the options available to Muslim minorities are varied, Islamically valid, and
practically viable. Problems remain as to the role of the larger Muslim ummah in the affairs of
the Muslim minorities living “beyond their jurisdiction.” Should the ummah do something about

this situation? Should the worldwide Muslim ummah be concerned about its constituents in
diaspora?
Many Muslims would argue that the ummah has very little choice. If Muslims follow the spirit of
their faith, then they have obligations toward each other, wherever they reside, individually and
collectively. These obligations derive from the Islamic concept of the brotherhood of the faithful.
Although in doctrinal terms this concept is present in other faiths as well, in Islam it is spelled out
in very clear terms: “And the believers, both men and women are the protectors of one another”
(Qurʿān 9:7). Elsewhere the Qurʿān says, “All believers are but brethren” (10:49).
One of the most concise, yet regnant statements in the Qurʿān with regard to the obligations that
faith imposes on individuals as well as collectivities is to be found in the verse (103:3) that
prescribes four categories of obligations: faith (īmān), action (aʿmāl), exhortation to truth (tawāṣū
bi al-ḥaqq), and exhortation to perseverance (tawāṣū bi al-ṣabr). Faith and action are individual
obligations. Since faith is not an acquisition which once acquired can thereafter be taken for
granted, it needs continuous nurturing through action (Qurʿān 2:214). This interaction of faith
and action makes an individual into an Islamic “whole” and it becomes obligatory for him/her to
reinforce others in preserving and enhancing their Islamic “wholeness.”
The last two categories of obligations (tawāṣū bi al-ḥaqq and tawāṣū bi al-ṣabr) are social in
nature, involving the individual within the larger Muslim community and requiring policies, plans
of action, and methodologies to implement them. In contemporary Muslim populations, whether
as majorities or as minority communities, many national and international organizations, formal
associations, centers for learning and research, and even organized community groups have
become active and outspoken in their efforts to serve Islam and Muslims worldwide. The crisis
of minority living need no longer be embedded in a litany of woes; it can be confronted with the
verve of the mujāhid and the élan of the muhājir. However, caution should be exercised in
preserving the true nature of this resurgent “ummah consciousness” and preventing it from
deteriorating into Pan-Islamic consciousness, the particular from determining the universal, the
political from subverting the religious and social.
Relations between the Ummah and Muslim Minorities.
By definition the “ummah of Islam” includes all those who profess to be Muslim. In practice
today, the “Muslim world” is oftentimes defined as one comprising the fifty-six member states
with Muslim majority populations that came together in Morocco on September 25, 1969, to
establish the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), with headquarters in Jiddah, Saudi
Arabia and regional offices in Geneva and New York.
However, a quick review of the demographics reveals that not all of the world's Muslims live in
Islamic states and fully one-fifth, approximately 350 million of the total 1.5 billion Muslims in the
world today, live as minorities in non-Muslim societies. These are the frontline communities that

pay the price for their identity as Muslims, which is often seen through the same lenses that are
applied to their “home” countries. These minority communities routinely suffer from
marginalization and discrimination in the host country and are often made to settle the “debts”
incurred by the Muslim majority countries from their political, economic, and social engagements
and entanglements.
Often Muslims in Muslim majority countries postulate certain political obligations toward their
coreligionists who reside as minorities in non-Muslim states. This impels them to energetic
expressions of concern over the plight of these minority communities, generally in times of crisis.
In some cases Muslim majority intervention antagonizes the perpetrators of the crisis who
invariably resent this as interference from the outside.
Contemporary Muslim societies lack clear policies in respect to Muslim minority communities,
and there is much confusion about the exact nature of the relationship that should obtain
between the ummah and the Muslim minorities. From the point of view of the minorities
themselves, the issue is not very clear and adds to their minority predicament. The
Muslim ummah can thus elect one of two options: adopt a patron-client relationship in regard to
the Muslim minorities, treating them as spiritual and cultural (and even economic and political)
colonies of the Muslim world on alien soil; or treat minorities as autonomous bodies, sharing the
attribute of sovereignty with their non-Muslim compatriots and at par with Muslim majority
communities.
The first option is more favored and most widely accepted among Muslim majority communities
who find in the Qurʿānic verse, “and the believers, both men and women, are the protectors of
one another” (9:71), an irrevocable obligation of the ummah toward the Muslim minorities.
However, in terms of policy and action, Muslim majorities are hedged in by contemporary
political and economic realities and are left with the second option.
Thus, what we euphemistically term the Muslim world today are several national sovereign
entities (members of the OIC) each with independent political and economic structures, and with
policies and priorities defined by their national interests. These entities have formed several
regional alliances or economic and trade agreements among themselves, however, there is
nothing particularly Islamic about them. They have their exact parallels, pre-dating them, in the
non-Muslim world. Even the largest of these, the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC),
in its conception, structure, and functioning is not much different from the European Economic
Community (EEC), the Organization of American States (OAS), or the United Nations (UN) with its
various affiliates. They have no mandate for action even within their own member states. How
can the OIC then expect to be heard by sovereign entities outside the range of its membership?
Nevertheless, it is generally agreed that there exists among all Muslims a sense of mutual
belonging. It may not be institutionalized in form, but it can be invoked readily and forcefully
whenever occasion arises, and it constitutes the characteristic feature of the Muslim community
worldwide.

“Ummah consciousness” is an integral part of Muslim faith and belief and inherent in Islamic
doctrine. It derives from the Qurʿānically-imposed duty incumbent on those “who have attained
to faith, enjoining upon one another patience in adversity (ṣabr) and enjoin[ing] upon one
another compassion (marḥamah)” (Qurʿān 90:17). Ummah consciousness, then, is the epitome
of that concern; that feeling of solidarity that Muslims everywhere feel for each other. Patience,
or ṣabr is not an argument in favor of inaction. In the Qurʿānic meaning, ṣabr is a positive concept
that brings out the best in man, separating the weak from the strong (2:45–46).
The exercise of marḥamah as the twin attribute of ṣabr ensures an individual's continued
adherence to human values and acts as a brake against savage impulses. It reminds Muslims that
whatever the provocation and however severe the crisis, they cannot adopt just any means to
resolve their predicament. They have of necessity to be guided in their choices
by ṣabr and marḥamah, and in practicing these principles they will preserve their own humanity.
To formulate these into plans of action in contemporary societies is the challenge of great
magnitude facing the Muslim ummah.
Issues and Assessments.
Is it, however, possible to lead an Islamic life under the rule and control of non-Muslims? Muslims
have rarely had this experience before in their history. If they were in a numerical minority in
non-Muslim lands, they either lived as rulers (in India, for instance, despite the fact that their
population never exceeded 10 percent, they ruled the country for close to a thousand years), or
they enjoyed the protection of a powerful Muslim state. For centuries Muslims were such a
dominant world power that non-Muslim states could not conceive of mistreating Muslims living
within their jurisdiction. All Muslims are familiar with the wa mʿatiṣmā syndrome in Islamic
history. It signifies the ummah's obligations toward Muslim minorities and is based on the
historic launching of an army by the Caliph Mutawakkil in the third/ninth century, in response to
the call for help from a lone woman in Sindh.
At the beginning of the twenty-first century the situation is quite different. Muslims currently
living as minorities can hardly expect any immediate change in their minority status, not can they
expect instant help from their Muslim majority brethren. The most relevant question to consider
is how should they learn to adjust themselves, emotionally and religiously, as well as
economically and politically, to their minority status. Thus, any deliberations on the status of
Muslim minorities should candidly discuss ways in which Muslims living in non-Muslim states can
learn to lead useful, productive and comfortable lives, without in any way compromising their
Islamic identity.
A second related subject of discussion emanates from the fact that Muslims, wherever they live,
regard themselves as constituting one ummah. Under the present circumstances, when
approximately one-fifth of them (350 million) live as minorities in sovereign, non-Muslim states,
what should be the proper relationship between the Muslim minorities and the Muslim majority

countries? Should Muslim governments or Muslim international organizations continue to
forcefully support every cause of Muslim minorities and condemn all non-Muslim governments
whenever and wherever a Muslim minority in these regions feels that any of its rights are being
violated? Is this in the long term interests of the minority itself? What kind of climate of peace
and harmony does this create at the international level? How does it affect the relations of
Muslim states with non-Muslim states? What about economic, trade, and other relations
between them? Should the minority communities be encouraged to expect support from
the ummah in all matters of dispute with their non-Muslim countrymen? How does this affect
the day-to-day relationship between minorities and the people with whom they are destined to
live in perpetuity?
If any of these scenarios is not Islamically feasible, then what is the proper form of relationship
between the ummah and the Muslim minority communities? A candid discussion of these and
other related issues is necessary to understand the true nature of the Muslim minority problem
in the contemporary world.
There are grounds to argue that no effort to uplift the condition, moral or material, of Muslim
minorities anywhere is likely to bear fruit unless it also touches on and enriches the quality of life
of others in the societies of their residence. The minority problem is essentially a problem
between the Muslim minority and the non-Muslim majority among whom it resides. Hence, there
is a need for understanding and accommodation between these two parties. If the objective is to
enhance and maintain the quality of Islamic life among Muslim minority communities and if these
communities are to be strengthened in their steadfastness to Islamic practice as well as beliefs,
the avenues of interaction and peaceful coexistence with the non-Muslim majorities must be
explored.
It should be recognized that the problems of Muslim minorities are different in many ways from
the problems of the Muslim world. To deal with their own particular situation, Muslim minorities
have to achieve a social and political identity that is distinct from the Muslim majority
communities, and in this the Muslim majority communities should extend their assistance and
support. This is ultimately in their best interests. The ummah deliberations should be inclusive,
future and solution-oriented, and result in the formulation of concrete and specific proposals,
the presentation and examination of practical and functional ideas. Muslim minorities in any
country should not be used as pawns in the game of power between Muslim states and non-
Muslim states.
Furthermore, the Muslim world should not only encourage the Muslim minorities to pursue
justice and truth (taʿmarūna bi al-maʿrūf), they should also caution and advise them when they
appear to be taking the wrong path (tanhawnā ʿan al-munkar). Islam, being a code of conduct
covering all aspects of human life, provides clear cut rules on how a struggle for rights and redress
of wrongs is to be conducted. Finally, efforts to achieve a life of security, equality, and dignity for
minorities in their societies of residence can be effective only if both Muslim majorities and
minorities are truly convinced that minority living is not a historical or even a moral aberration.

Considering the fact that more than one-fifth of the 1.5 billion Muslims in the world today are
living in the minority situation that cannot be expected to change, a sincere and honest effort to
engage in leading, under non-Muslim aegis, a fully rewarding Islamic life should not just be
aspired for, but also attempted. Islam, as Muslims believe, is a way of life which encapsulates all
human situations and vouchsafes guidance for spatial and temporal infinity. “We,” God assures
in the Qurʿān, “have neglected nothing in (this) Book” (6:38).
Minorities situation in pakistan
Introduction
All resolutions of the All India Muslim League since 1940 made categorical commitments for
granting religious and cultural freedom to all religious minorities. In Pakistan Minority community
is able to assert that it is completely safe. For all those who are guided by reason and humankind’s
becoming a modern, civilized and responsible state. The ethnic communities and diverse cultures
included Punjabi, Baloch, Sindhi, Seraiki and similarly beside Islam, the believers of Hindu, Sikh,
Christian and others religious were also living in Pakistan. The cultural diversity of the country is
under threat and religious minorities and various ethnic communities are being denied rights and
Identity. Pakistan was established in August 1947 as a homeland for the Muslims of British India.
It is a predominately Muslim Country but there are several religious groups within Pakistan, the
Hindus and the Christian being the biggest religious minorities. The following table shows the
division of population on the basis of religion. “Religious Groups in Pakistan Census 1998
The Lahore Resolution
When the All India Muslim League demanded the establishment of Pakistan in 1940, it was fully
conscious that there will be the followers of other religions in Pakistan. It assured the non-
Muslims that their freedom to practice religion will be protected and they will have secure life
under laws of Pakistan. The Lahore Resolution, March 1940, that demanded the creation of a
homeland for the Muslims, specially assured the religious minorities about the rights. The
relevant paragraph of the Lahore Resolution reads: “That adequate, effective and mandatory
safeguard should be specifically provided in the constitution for minorities in these units and in
regions for the protection of their religious, cultural, economic, political, administrative and other
rights and interests in constitution with them and in other parts of India where the Musalman
are in a minority adequate-effective and mandatory safeguard shall be specifically provided in
the constitution for them and other minorities for the protection of their religious, cultural,
economic, political, administrative and other rights and interests in consultation with them”
(Sarwar 2009). All resolutions of the Muslim League and the statements of the Quaid-eAzam
Mohammad Ali Jinnah during 1940-47 repeated the promise of security of life and freedom of

religion in Pakistan. Quaid-e-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah made a categorical promise of
freedom of religion and equality of all
Religious Minorities in Pakistan
citizens before law in his first address to Pakistan’s Constituent Assembly on August 11, 1947. He
said that in Pakistan “Hindus would cease to be Hindus and Muslims would cease to be Muslims
not in the religious sense because that is the personal faith of each individual, but in political
sense as citizen of state… you are free to go to your mosque or to any place of worship in this
state of Pakistan. You may belong to any religion or caste or creed… that has nothing to do with
the business of the state” (Zafar, 2001), (Jinnah, n.d). The Objectives Resolution, March 1949,
passed by Pakistan’s Constitution Assembly also recognized the rights of religious minorities. It
says: “All persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to the
equal protection of the law. In this respect, the law shall prohibit any discrimination and
guarantee to all persons equal and effective protection against discrimination on any ground such
a race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin,
property, birth or other status” (International covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966). “In
those states in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist, persons belonging to such
minorities shall not be denied the right, in community with the other members of their group, to
enjoy their own culture, to profess and practice their own religion, or to use their own language”
(International covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966) The PPP Co-Chairman and former
president Asif Ali Zardari declared in his massage on the eve of Minorities Day on August 11,
2014: “On the eve of Minorities Day today there is a grim thought that crosses the mind: there is
no minority community in the country that does not feel besieged and hardly any minority
community is able to assert that it is completely safe” (http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/E-Paper/
Lahore/2014-0811/page-1/de…).
The Constitutional of 1973 and the Rights of the Minorities All constitution of Pakistan provide
equal rights to religious minorities. They have freedom to worship and follow their culture. The
1973 Constitution provides fundamental rights to all citizens which provide important
protections to religious minorities. The constitution of 1973 provided to minorities laid great
emphasis of Fundamental Rights. The Fundamental Rights are given as under; All citizens are
equal before law. No person should be deprived of life and liberty. There should be no
discrimination on the ground of religion, caste, creed, sex or place of birth. All form of slavery
and force labour are guaranteed. The freedom of speech, expression, association and cultural
activities are guaranteed. The freedom of religious teaching of minorities within there institutions
are granted. Safeguard against discrimination in government services and provided protection to
the maintenance and development of the religious institutions of all communities are provided.
The state shall safeguard the legitimate rights and interests of minorities, including their due
representation in the Federal and Provincial services.

The state should give the following protections to the minorities:
1. “Freedom of trade, business or profession
2. Freedom of speech
3. Right to information
4. Freedom to profess religion and to manage religious institutions
5. Safeguard against taxation for purposes of any particular religion
6. Safeguard as to educational institutions in respect of religion
7. Provision as to property
8. Protection of property rights
9. Equality of citizens
10. Right to education
11. Non-discrimination in respect of access to public places
12. Safeguard against discrimination in services
13. Preservation of language, script and culture” (Ahmed, 2010).
The Former Federal Minister of Law (PPP), Dr. Babar Awan said in his article “Wakalat Nama”
published in Roznama Dunya, according to the article 36, protection of minorities: “The State
shall safeguard the legitimate rights and interests of minorities, including their due
representation in the Federal and Provincial services” (Awan, 2014). Minority representation in
the Parliament and Provincial Assemblies are: National Assembly 10 reserved seats Provincial
Assemblies Punjab 8 seats Sindh 9 seats Khyber Pakhtun Khwa 3 seats Balochistan 3 seats
The Christian Community
The Christian community which has traditionally enjoyed full freedom of worship and peace in
Pakistan, has sometimes been targeted here. However, unlike India where the Christians,
including nuns and priests, have been hounded and killed mercilessly by the bands of RSS and
other militant Hindu factions. The Christians in Pakistan have been generally treated with respect
and tolerance which is the hallmark of Islamic teachings. Enjoying this freedom, the Christians

have contributed their potential to different areas of national development. They have run some
of the best educational institutions and have operated quality health care centres and hospitals.
They have been peaceful even in the face of the worst provocation and violence. Given this
congeniality enjoyed by the Christians, the attack on a church comes as a shock that was difficult
to absorb. President Pervez Musharraf who sent two of his ministers to Bahawalpur to express
solidarity with the families of the victims, issued a strong statement vowing the government
would do everything in its power to track down the culprits and bring them to justice. Those who
expressed their horror and revulsion at the killings included all notable, political and religious
leaders. Two delegations of Ulema’s met Religious Affairs Ministers, Col. Retd. SK Tressler to
convey him their sympathy and anguish at the killings. Condemning the incidents in strongest
terms, the leaders of Jammat-eIslami and JUI rightly emphasized the point that Islam teaches
tolerance to its adherents and the attack on a gathering of worships could not be the done by
the Muslim. “Thetreatment meted out by the Holy Prophet (PBUH) to the enemies of Islam at
the Conquest of Makkah is actually what Islam stands for. It is this spirit of peace and co-existence
in Islam that Christians in Pakistan have led their life free of any fear or threat to their life and
property” (Wattoo, November 2001). When the Pakistan Government established the Minority
Affairs Commission, an important Christian leader Dr. John Joseph, Bishop of Faisalabad Diocese,
welcomed the establishment of the Commission for identifying the problems faced by the
minorities. He said that it was a right step in the right direction which would help the neglected
minority to join the mainstream of national development. He said that nomination for the
Commission should be made amongst the qualified persons having adequate knowledge of
religion so that commonly acceptable legislation be proposed to redress the basic problems of
minorities. He said that equal rights should be provided to them in getting administration and
employments. He adds that personal laws for Christians also require immediate legislation rights.
He says that we shall try to resolve these problems through the Commission. Dr. John Joseph says
that although minorities in Pakistan are enjoying equal rights, yet the ideal system to establish
this equality is joint electoral system. However, he conceded that separate electoral system
should continue for the interim period to pave the way for joint electoral system by elevating the
socio-economic conditions of minorities through special development schemes launched by
minority representatives elected under the present system. Commenting on Christian-Muslim
relations, Bishop John Joseph says that Christian-Muslim Relations Commission headed by him
has worked satisfactorily during the past years. He tells that it has brought the two communities
closer to each other and many welfare institutions established by this Commission are helping
Pakistanis irrespective of their religions. The
“Commission had also extended help for effecters of national calamities. He told that the third
block on leper home has completed at a cost of Rs 20 lacs” (The Muslims, 1991). The Christian
community in Pakistan and all over the world is celebrating Christmas with religious enthusiasm
to mark the birthday of Jesus Christ, lengthy preparations and shopping from the different places
are being done. Bishop of Lahore, Dr. Alexander John Malik, Archbishop of Lahore, Lawrence J.
Saldanha, Francis Nadeem and Bishop of Riwind Samuel Azriah asked the community to be more

generous towards the less fortunate people so that Christmas joy could be shared with them and
their suffering could be mitigated. Christmas is the festival of love, life and light. “God in the
person of Jesus Christ loved the world and shared His very person with humanity. This is turn asks
all and sundry to share their blessings with all, who are poor, needy and marginalized. Jesus Christ
identified Himself with the poor, weak and suffering and said if anyone did anything good for
them one would be doing it to him” (Malik, 2005).
The Hindu Community
The Hindus live in all provinces of Pakistan. Their main concentration is in Sindh followed by
Khyber Pakhtoon Khwa. They are engaged in different professions: agriculture, business,
government and non-government jobs, artisans and labour. Their “business activities range
between small shopkeepers and wealthy owners of jewellery shops and larger stores. They
control the whole trade in several towns in Sindh. Reports of their maltreatment in the Baloch
areas are rare” (Syed, 2006). Hindus of Pakistan have a very low profile but on the other hand
they have some organizations (PHP) Pakistan Hindu Panchayat, (PHWA) Pakistan Hindus Welfare
Association, and the (KHG) Karachi Hindu Gymkhana who work for the betterment of the Hindus
community. They promote social development, organize and educate them to be a part of
Pakistan success. Few Hindus have achieved positions of great eminence, some are well known
jurists and lawyers, one of them, being Bhagwan Das, who is the most senior judge in the
Supreme Court of Pakistan next only to the Chief Justice. Majority of Hindus of Sindh are placed
in the lower caste called untouchables or Dalit. “They work as landless bonded labourers, or
servants doing jobs (sweepers, scavengers, etc). About a million of them live in what used to be
the Mirpurkhas division nearly 350,000 in the extremely arid district of Tharparkar” (Syed, 2006).
The Sikh Community
Since the creation of Pakistan in 1947, the Sikh community has been living with comfort and ease,
Sikh had long played an important role in village life across the undivided Punjab playing an
important role as businessmen and traders. Many towns of the Pakistan, such as the town of
Nankana Sahib, the birthplace of Sikhism’s founder Guru Nanak Dev. Each of Nankana Sahib’s
nine gurdwaras are associated with different events in Guru Nanak Dev’s life. The major places
associated with the Sikh Guru are Nankana Sahib, Kartarpura or Manzoorpura in Narowal,
Chooharrkana or Frooqabad, maternal village of Dear Chahi, Punja Sahib in Hasanabdal, Rohats
Fort, Aimanabad near Gujranwala; Pakpattan Chawali Mashaekh, Vehari; and Makhdoompur
Pahurran in Multan district. The picturesque town of Hasan Abdal comes alive non-stop
cavalcade as Sikhs from all over Pakistan and indeed all over the world throwing the famous

Gurdwara Panja Sahib to celebrate the Baisakhi festival pulsating with the proverbial fun, food
and frolic. The Sikh festival celebrated every year on April 13 once in many years it occurs on April
14, lends a lively colorful and noisy ambience to the town. The Sikh’s have every kind of freedom
of work in the territory of Pakistan. They are working as Parliamentarians, Police Man, Army
Cadets, Lawyers, Shopkeepers, Traders and they also work in the different government
organizations and they receive all the benefits which the other employees of the government
get. The government gave them the pension and senior citizenship allowances when they passed
the age of 60.
The Ahmadi’s / Qadianis Community in Pakistan
The conservative Muslim groups demanded in the early 1950s that the Ahmadis / Qadianis should
be declared as non-Muslims. This demand was not accepted. Then in the years of Bhutto rule, a
similar movement started in 1947. The conservative and orthodox Muslim groups staged country
wide agitations and strikes to press the government to declare Ahmadis as non-Muslims. Finally
Bhutto took the issue to the National Assembly. This after a detailed consideration passed the
second constitutional amendment on September 7, 1974, designating Ahmadya / Qadiani
community as non-Muslims. Several restrictions were imposed on their religious activities by the
military government of General Zia ul Haq in 1984. (for detail see Urdu articles 7th September:
Yume Khatme Naboowat… Ashiqanay Rasool PBUH k lye Yume Fatah Mubeen by Maulana Abdul
Naeem, Jung Lahore 5th September 2014, Zawiya Nazar by MuftiMuneb ur Rehman, Daily Dunya,
Friday September 5th, 2014, Aqeeda Khatmay Naboowat, Daily Dunya, Sunday September 7th,
2014, 7th September Yume Thafuz Khatmay Naboowat PBUH by Maulana Mujeeb ur Rehman
Inqlabi, Daily Dunya Sunday, 7th September, 2014.
Other Minorities Several other religious groups exist in Pakistan but their number is extremely
small. These include Parsis, Bhais of Iran, Jews (only in Karachi), Budhists who living and enjoying
a very peaceful life in Pakistan.
Treatment with the Minorities in Pakistan There have been two competing views about how to
treat religious and cultural diversity in Pakistan. One is the liberal, democratic and progressive
vision that the creator of the country, Quaid-e-Azam Mohammad AliJinnah, and some of his close
associates held. On the question of character of the new state, the Quaid had no ambiguity about
it, resting on the idea of citizenship rights, irrespective of
the religious affiliations of groups and individuals. He understood the logic of the modern nation-
state and its fundamental constitutional principle- that the state will be inclusive and will not
discriminate against any religion or community of faith. His historic speech before the
Constituent Assembly of Pakistan testifies to this fact. He said: “You may belong to any religion
or caste or creed that has nothing to do with the business of the state…we are starting in the
days when there is no discrimination between one caste or creed and another. We are starting
with this fundamental principle that we are all citizens and equal citizens of one state…you will

find that in course of time Hindu would cease to be Hindus and Muslims would cease to be
Muslim, not in the religious sense because that is the personal faith of each individual but in the
political sense as citizens of the state” (Rais, 2006). It is the sense of exclusion, favoritism and on
top of all insecurity and fear that the rise of Islamic radicalism has brought to the religious
minorities. Among all the minorities, the Christians have made a tremendous contribution to our
national development. They have run some of the best educational care centres and hospitals as
well as they all are working as a teacher and playing a vital role in the success and betterment of
the society. All laws are subject to the Constitution of Pakistan. Article 227 provides that all
existing laws shall be brought in conformity with the injections of Islam; however, Article 227(3)
declares: “Nothing in this part shall affect the Council of Islamic Personal laws of non-Muslim
citizens or their status as citizens. Therefore, the provisions of the ordinances overriding of the
Constitution, it may be recalled that in 1991 a federal statue was promulgated whereby Islamic
Shariah became the supreme law of the land” (Chaudhary, 2006). Section 1(4) of the Enforcement
of Shariah Act lays down: “Nothing contained in this Act shall affect the Personal Laws, religious
freedom, traditions, customs and way of life of the non-Muslims” (Chaudhary, 2006). Mr. Duncan
Hooper, October 25, 1947, Research Society of Pakistan said: “I have repeatedly made it clear,
especially in my opening speech to the Constituent Assembly, that the minorities in Pakistan
would be treated as our citizens and will enjoy all rights and privileges that any other community
gets. Pakistan shall pursue that policy and do all it can to create a sense of security and confidence
in the non-Muslims Minorities in Pakistan” (Hooper, 1947)
Conclusion
Integrating religious Minorities into the national political and into our society as equal citizens
will require social reforms and affirmative legislation to give them entitlement to land, living
space in urban areas and jobs. We also need to stem forcefully the tide of religious extremism.
The Christian, Hindu community, the largest of the Pakistan’s minorities, is quite proud of its
history and religion. They have made their presence felt in education, trade and the arts. Since
independence the Christian, Hindu and other communities has lived in relative peace in the
country.

References
1. Ahmad, Manzoor. (2010). The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, KLP
Publications, Karachi, pp 11-16.
2. Article 26 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, U.N. (1966). South Asian Minority
Affairs, title page Centre for South Asian Studies, Lahore.
3. Awan, Dr. Babar. (2014). Wakalat Nama, Roznama Dunya, Lahore.
4. Chaudhary, Michelle. (2006, 08 03). Dawn, Lahore.
5. Dawn. (2004, 12 25). Lahore: Dawn.
6. Dawn. (2009, 08 09). Lahore: Dawn.
7. Hooper, M. D. (1947, 10 25). 461. (D. M. Afzal, Interviewer) Lahore: University of the Punjab.
8. (2001). International Founder of Sikh affairs, Canada, Vol 11. No. 01.
9. Jinnah, M.Ali. (n.d). speech as Governor General of Pakistan 1947-1948, Karachi, Karachi
Pakistan Publication. pp. 09.
10. Malik, Dr. Alexander john, (2005, 12 25). The Nation, Lahore.
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(2002). South Asian Minority Affairs, An International Journal of South Asian Studies, Centre for
South Asian Studies, Lahore, Vol. 16 No. 1 & 2. pp 29-31.
14. Sarwar, Kh. Mansoor, (2009). Terk To Pakistan. Institute of Pakistan Historical Research,
Izharsons Printers, 9- Rattigan Road Lahore, pp 271-272.
15. Syed, Anwar. (2006, 06 19). The Dawn, Lahore.
16. The Muslim, (1991, 12 16). Islamabad.
17. The News, (1999, 08 31). Lahore.
18. The News. (2009, 08 04). Lahore.
19. The News. (2009, 09 07). Lahore.
20. Wattoo, Hamid Raza, (November 18, 2001). The News, Lahore, Pakistan.
21. Retrieved form http://census.gov.pk/Religion.htm.
22. Zafar, S.M. (27 February, 2001). The Nation, Lahore.

Minorities Rights in Islam and situation in pakistan

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