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The Law of
Unintended Consequences
MSRC & CELA
Alex Harmon, Chris Mills, Matti Neustadt Storie
GDPR Impact on
Cybersecurity Readiness and
Response
Special Thanks
The Responders’
Greatest Risk
Data
Minimization
Hypotheticals
Web App Compromise and Data Breach
Investigation stops
because IIS logs have
had all client IP
addresses (c_ip)
redacted
Attacker exfiltrates
several GB worth of
data
Attacker pivots into
database system
housing customer
data .
Web app
compromised via an
XSS attack.
DMCA Repeat Infringer
Legal risk incurred
because no DMCA
Safe Harbor
Alleged infringer
email is redacted
DMCA Safe Harbor
requires the user to
be terminated.
Multiple DMCA
Complaints received
alleging copyright
infringement
Stealing Intellectual Property
Law Enforcement
issues a search
warrant to Microsoft
40 days after the
event.
Customer engages
law enforcement to
enforce IP rights.
Microsoft customer
has their Azure
account compromised
and loses millions in
intellectual property.
Right of rectification
Right to be informed
Right to access
Right to data portability
Right to be forgotten (erasure)
Right to object
Right to restrict processing
Why Would GDPR Do this?
Right of rectification
Right to be informed
Right to access
Right to data portability
Right to be forgotten (erasure)
Right to object
Right to restrict processing
Why Would GDPR Do this?
Right to hide evidence of a crime
Right to disrupt business operations
Right to prevent legal or regulatory compliance
Not Included
NOT
GDPR Myths
Fact:
Deletion within 30 days does
only addresses 1 DSR.
Data Subject Rights & 30 Day Impact:
a
rr r r
r rrrrr
aaa
Controller? Processor? Both?
Per the reg: “… the natural or legal person, public
authority, agency or other body which, alone or jointly
with others, determines the purposes and means of
the processing of personal data.”
Per the reg: “… a natural or legal person, public
authority, agency or other body which processes
personal data on behalf of the controller.”
Simply: Decides how the data is processed. Simply: Processes the data at the direction of the
controller.
Decides:
• What data to collect
• Where & how to use the data
• How to share the data
• When to dispose of the data
Responsible for:
• Creating the IT systems and processes to facilitate the
Controller’s needs.
• Protecting the collected data
• Storing and processing the data per the Controller
GDPR Myths
Fact:
Data Asset Classifications used
for engineering are broad rules
to ensure compliance in all
situations. Response scenarios
may differ.
GDPR: Personal Data
• “Personal Data”
• For Incident Responders:
• Security Obligations
• Notification Requirements
• Are we a controller or a
processor? Yes.
https://aka.ms/EntOnlineSvcDataTaxonomy
Developed for All Enterprise Online Services
Defines Data Types and Gives Examples
GDPR Myths
Fact:
You don’t need an exception.
You need a legitimate interest.
GDPR Article 6
Do responders need
personal
information?
Logs.
More logs.
Even more logs.
Web app compromised via an XSS
attack.
Customer name
Web app IP address
• Determine affected
customers
• Determine affected assets
Attacker pivots into database
system housing customer data.
Other customer data
Information about third parties
belonging to the customer
• Identify specifically which data
were accessed
• Identify total scope of
exfiltrated data (i.e. size)
Attacker exfiltrates several GB
worth of data
Exfiltration log information – IP
addresses
• Identify the attacker to detect
further attempts
GDPR Article 6
GDPR Article 6
GDPR and Security
• GDPR Compliance is never an excuse to
avoid securing your system.
• Security incident responders and analysts
NEED some of the same data that’s being
redacted or prematurely expired because of
a well-intentioned but ultimately damaging
effort to comply with GDPR.
• Real security investigations have been
hampered or entirely prevented due to
these issues.
Operationally
Variants approved for OPG, C+AI, AI&R, and WDG
Covers Security Logs, Telemetry, Crash Dumps
3-Year Retention from Time of Collection
Can Reject Certain Data Subject Rights Requests
Call To Action
Ask questions.
Understand what you might be missing.
Talk to your engineers.
Enable retention.
Thank you.
@TheChrisAM

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BlueHat Seattle 2019 || Are We There Yet: Why Does Application Security Take ...
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BlueHat Seattle 2019 || Building Secure Machine Learning Pipelines: Security ...
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BlueHat v18 || First strontium uefi rootkit unveiled
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BlueHat v18 || The law of unintended consequences - gdpr impact on cybersecurity readiness and response

  • 1. The Law of Unintended Consequences MSRC & CELA Alex Harmon, Chris Mills, Matti Neustadt Storie GDPR Impact on Cybersecurity Readiness and Response
  • 3.
  • 4.
  • 7. Web App Compromise and Data Breach Investigation stops because IIS logs have had all client IP addresses (c_ip) redacted Attacker exfiltrates several GB worth of data Attacker pivots into database system housing customer data . Web app compromised via an XSS attack.
  • 8. DMCA Repeat Infringer Legal risk incurred because no DMCA Safe Harbor Alleged infringer email is redacted DMCA Safe Harbor requires the user to be terminated. Multiple DMCA Complaints received alleging copyright infringement
  • 9. Stealing Intellectual Property Law Enforcement issues a search warrant to Microsoft 40 days after the event. Customer engages law enforcement to enforce IP rights. Microsoft customer has their Azure account compromised and loses millions in intellectual property.
  • 10. Right of rectification Right to be informed Right to access Right to data portability Right to be forgotten (erasure) Right to object Right to restrict processing Why Would GDPR Do this?
  • 11. Right of rectification Right to be informed Right to access Right to data portability Right to be forgotten (erasure) Right to object Right to restrict processing Why Would GDPR Do this?
  • 12. Right to hide evidence of a crime Right to disrupt business operations Right to prevent legal or regulatory compliance Not Included NOT
  • 13. GDPR Myths Fact: Deletion within 30 days does only addresses 1 DSR.
  • 14. Data Subject Rights & 30 Day Impact: a rr r r r rrrrr aaa
  • 15. Controller? Processor? Both? Per the reg: “… the natural or legal person, public authority, agency or other body which, alone or jointly with others, determines the purposes and means of the processing of personal data.” Per the reg: “… a natural or legal person, public authority, agency or other body which processes personal data on behalf of the controller.” Simply: Decides how the data is processed. Simply: Processes the data at the direction of the controller. Decides: • What data to collect • Where & how to use the data • How to share the data • When to dispose of the data Responsible for: • Creating the IT systems and processes to facilitate the Controller’s needs. • Protecting the collected data • Storing and processing the data per the Controller
  • 16.
  • 17. GDPR Myths Fact: Data Asset Classifications used for engineering are broad rules to ensure compliance in all situations. Response scenarios may differ.
  • 18. GDPR: Personal Data • “Personal Data” • For Incident Responders: • Security Obligations • Notification Requirements • Are we a controller or a processor? Yes.
  • 19. https://aka.ms/EntOnlineSvcDataTaxonomy Developed for All Enterprise Online Services Defines Data Types and Gives Examples
  • 20. GDPR Myths Fact: You don’t need an exception. You need a legitimate interest.
  • 21. GDPR Article 6 Do responders need personal information? Logs. More logs. Even more logs.
  • 22. Web app compromised via an XSS attack. Customer name Web app IP address • Determine affected customers • Determine affected assets Attacker pivots into database system housing customer data. Other customer data Information about third parties belonging to the customer • Identify specifically which data were accessed • Identify total scope of exfiltrated data (i.e. size) Attacker exfiltrates several GB worth of data Exfiltration log information – IP addresses • Identify the attacker to detect further attempts
  • 25. GDPR and Security • GDPR Compliance is never an excuse to avoid securing your system. • Security incident responders and analysts NEED some of the same data that’s being redacted or prematurely expired because of a well-intentioned but ultimately damaging effort to comply with GDPR. • Real security investigations have been hampered or entirely prevented due to these issues.
  • 26. Operationally Variants approved for OPG, C+AI, AI&R, and WDG Covers Security Logs, Telemetry, Crash Dumps 3-Year Retention from Time of Collection Can Reject Certain Data Subject Rights Requests
  • 27. Call To Action Ask questions. Understand what you might be missing. Talk to your engineers. Enable retention.