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Multi-level issues in evolutionary theory, organization science,
and leadership☆
Francis J. Yammarino a,⁎ , Fred Dansereau b,1
a Center for Leadership Studies and School of Management,
State University of New York at Binghamton, Binghamton, NY
13902-6000, United States
b Jacobs Management Center and School of Management, State
University of New York at Buffalo, Buffalo, NY 14226, United
States
a r t i c l e i n f o a b s t r a c t
Available online 19 October 2011 Multi-level issues are critical
in the physical, social, and behavioral sciences. We articulate
issues related to multiple levels of analysis in theory building
and theory testing and explore
them from evolutionary theory (ET) and organization science
and leadership (OSL) perspec-
tives. Specifically, analogous multi-level concepts and notions
in ET and OSL are identified,
aligned, and illustrated. Ideas from evolutionary psychology are
included in the ET perspec-
tive, while notions from the varient approach are included in the
OSL perspective. Several
exemplars in OSL that incorporate ET and multi-level

perspectives are presented. Numerous
examples and lessons learned from ET and implications of
multi-level issues and multiple
levels of analysis for future theory building and theory testing
in OSL are discussed as well.
© 2011 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
Keywords:
Multi-level theory building
Multi-level theory testing
Multiple levels of analysis issues
Evolutionary theory
Organization science
Leadership
Evolutionary psychology
Varient approach
Fallacies
False dichotomies
Analytic tools
1. Introduction
Multi-level issues, or multiple levels of analysis in both theory
building and theory testing, are critical in research in the
physical, social, and behavioral sciences (see Dansereau &
Yammarino, 2003, 2005, 2007; Dansereau, Yammarino, &
Kohles,
1999; Futuyma, 2005; Gould, 2002; Klein & Kozlowski, 2000;
Miller, 1978; Rousseau, 1985; Wilson, 1980, 2002; Wolfram,
2002; Yammarino & Dansereau, 2002, 2004, 2006, 2008,
Yammarino & Dansereau, 2009a, 2009b). Work on multi-level
issues
in organization science and leadership (OSL) (e.g., Anderson,
1999; Dansereau, Alutto, & Yammarino, 1984; Dansereau, Cho,
& Yammarino, 2006; Dansereau & Yammarino, 1998a, 1998b,

2003, 2007; Dansereau, Yammarino, & Markham, 1995a, 1995b,
Dansereau et al., 1995b; Dansereau et al., 1999; DeChurch,
Hiller, Murase, Doty, & Salas, 2010; Gupta, Tesluk, & Taylor,
2007;
Klein & Kozlowski, 2000; Markham, 2010; Meyer, Gaba, &
Colwell, 2005; Mumford, Hunter, & Bedell-Avers, 2008;
Peterson,
1998; Rousseau, 1985; Yammarino & Dansereau, 2002, 2004,
2008, 2009a, 2009b; Yammarino, Dionne, Chun, & Dansereau,
2005) has been influenced by research on levels of analysis
from other scientific fields (e.g., Gould, 2002; Miller, 1978;
Wolfram,
2002). In particular, evolutionary theory (ET) (Darwin, 1859,
1871; Dawkins, 1976; Futuyma, 2005; Galton, 1869; Gould,
2002;
Sober & Wilson, 1998; Wilson, 1980, 2002), a comprehensive,
well-established interdisciplinary theory, can provide important
insights for organization science and leadership on multi -level
issues.
The Leadership Quarterly 22 (2011) 1042–1057
☆ We thank Chet Schriesheim, the LQYR Editor, and the
anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments.
⁎ Corresponding author. Tel.: +1 607 777 6066; fax: +1 607
777 4422.
E-mail addresses: [email protected] (F.J. Yammarino),
[email protected] (F. Dansereau).
1 Tel.: +1 716 645 3236; fax: +1 716 645 2863.
1048-9843/$ – see front matter © 2011 Elsevier Inc. All rights
reserved.
doi:10.1016/j.leaqua.2011.09.002
Contents lists available at SciVerse ScienceDirect

The Leadership Quarterly
journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/leaqua
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.leaqua.2011.09.002
mailto:[email protected]
mailto:[email protected]
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.leaqua.2011.09.002
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/journal/10489843
While there have been attempts to infuse evolutionary theory
ideas into the field of organization science and leadership
(e.g., Kniffin, 2009; Kniffin & Wilson, 2010; Luxen & Van De
Vijer, 2006; Markoczy & Goldberg, 1998; Nicholson, 1997,
2008; Nicholson & White, 2006; Pierce & White, 1999, 2006;
Van Vugt, Hogan, & Kaiser, 2008), this prior work has
primarily
focused on variables and some processes and has typically
ignored levels of analysis issues. Multi-level issues in ET offer
in-
sights regarding those same issues in OSL. As such, via an
alignment, discussion, and illustration of analogous multi-level
notions from ET and OSL, we hope to enhance the transfer or
translation of knowledge on these topics from a mature and
established field of work (ET) to a newer and developing one
(OSL). Simply, knowledge of the use of multi-level notions in
ET can facilitate the understanding of their use in OSL,
providing lessons learned, and thus enhance multi-level theory
building
and theory testing in the latter field of study.
Thus, our purpose here is to identify, explore, and align a set of
multi-level issues from the different disciplinary perspectives
of ET and OSL. Multi-level concepts from evolutionary

psychology (e.g., de Waal, 2002; Nicholson, 1997, 2008;
Nicholson & White,
2006; Pierce & White, 1999, 2006; Sober & Wilson, 1998) are
included in the ET perspective, while notions from the varient
approach (e.g., Dansereau et al., 1984, 1999, 2006; Yammarino
& Dansereau, 2009a) are included in the OSL perspective, to
provide
additional insights on multi-level issues and facilitate the
transfer or translation of learning from one field to the other.
The key multi-level concepts and issues of focus are
summarized in Table 1. For each of these prominent multi-level
ideas, as
shown in the table, a direct alignment can be established
between evolutionary theory and organization science and
leadership
perspectives. After an articulation of primary notions in
evolutionary theory and the subfield of evolutionary
psychology, these
multi-level issues in ET and OSL are explicated and illustrated
in subsequent sections (organized around Table 1). Implications
and examples for a better understanding of multi-level issues,
including multiple levels of analysis in theory building and
theory
testing, in organization science and leadership are then
discussed.
2. Evolutionary theory
2.1. Fundamental notions
Evolutionary theory is supported by literally thousands of
research studies from all areas of biology (e.g., botany,
genetics,
molecular biology, and zoology) and numerous other fields
(e.g., anthropology, archeology, ecology, economics, and

sociology).
The key ideas and concepts from ET have been very well
developed (see Darwin, 1859, 1871; Dawkins, 1976; Futuyma,
2005;
Galton, 1869; Gould, 2002; Nicholson, 1997, 2008; Nicholson
& White, 2006; Sober & Wilson, 1998; Wilson, 1980, 2002) and
can be summarized here.
Table 1
Multi-level issues in evolutionary theory, organization science,
and leadership.
Multi-level issue/concept Evolutionary theory Organization
science and leadership
Levels of analysis (entities) Genes, cells, organisms, demes,
species,
clades
Persons, dyads, groups, organizations,
strategic groups, industries
Units of analysis (perspectives on entities) Organism level
Species level Person level Group level
Wholes (homogeneity) Organism Species Person Group
Parts (heterogeneity) Gene, cell Organism, deme Gene, behavior
Person, dyad
Collective (higher level) Deme, species Clade Dyad, group
Organization
Adjacent (multiple) levels (multi-level effects) Interact in
synergy, orthogonally, or in
opposition (homology, reductionism,
and emergent properties; multi-level
selection theory)

Interact in alignment, misalignment,
or opposition (cross-level, level-specific,
and emergent effects; multi-level and
meso theories)
Level or entity changes over time Selection, drift, and drives
(Lamarckism,
anagenesis, cladogenesis, punctuated
equilibrium, catastrophic mass extinction,
mutation pressure, directional speciation)
Stability of wholes, parts, and lower
level; emergent, level ends,
transformation up or down, level
change up or down
Fallacies
Ecological Organisms are not just disaggregated
species
Persons are not just disaggregated
groups/organizations
Individualistic Species not just aggregated organisms
Groups/organizations are not just
aggregated persons
False dichotomies Individual–environment Individual–
environment
Nature–nurture Person–situation
Free will–determinism Gene–learning and development
Analytical tools Preserved results analysis, frequency
analysis, heritability (h2), and dynamic
computational modeling and simulation
to assess variation within and between

organisms, species, etc.
Multi-level analysis (RCM, HLM, MLSEM,
WABA), heritability (h2), and dynamic
computational modeling and simulation
to assess differences within and
between persons, groups, etc.
1043F.J. Yammarino, F. Dansereau / The Leadership Quarterly
22 (2011) 1042–1057
Darwin's notion of “descent with modification” is a powerful
explanatory principle (Nicholson & White, 2006) and quite
straightforward. Gould (2002, p. 13) indicates that “natural
selection” is based on three undeniable facts—overproduction
of
offspring, variation, and heritability. As noted by Wilson (2002,
p. 7), only a single paragraph is needed to explain Darwin's
simple
theory of adaptations:
Evolution explains adaptive design on the basis of three
principles: phenotypic variation, heritability, and fitness conse -
quences. A phenotypic trait is anything that can be observed or
measured. Individuals in a population are seldom identical
and usually vary in their phenotypic traits. Furthermore,
offspring frequently resemble their parents, sometimes because
of shared genes but also because of other factors such as
cultural transmission. It is important to think of heritability as a
correlation between parents and offspring, caused by any
mechanism . . . Finally, the fitness of individuals—their
propensity
to survive and reproduce in their environment—often depends
on their phenotypic traits. Taken together, the three principles

lead to the seemingly inevitable outcome—a tendency for
fitness-enhancing traits to increase in frequency over multiple
generations.
ET describes adaptive changes of populations primarily by
combining the mechanisms of variation (e.g., genetic mutations
and recombinations) and natural selection. In evolution,
variation generally enhances the diversity (i.e., more
heterogeneity)
and explorative capability of a population, while possibly
reducing its immediate adaptiveness. By comparison, selection
(primarily natural selection, but also sexual selection)
eliminates less adaptive individuals (organisms) and promotes
more adaptive individuals (organisms), increasing the average
adaptiveness of the population, while narrowing its diversity
(i.e., more homogeneity). Successful adaptation of populations
requires both of these mechanisms (variation and selection)
and in some type of balance, depending on the nature of the
fitness landscape (see Futuyma, 2005; Gould, 2002). Thus
fitness (i.e.,
probability of surviving or reproducing in a given environment)
is both a relative concept (e.g., one organism relative to
another)
and a local concept (e.g., domain-specific to one or some but
not necessarily all locations) (Wilson, 2002).
Evolution comprises the cumulative effect of these three
independent processes: replication (heritability or
reproduction),
variation (random changes or mutations), and selection (the
“best”-adapted organisms survive and pass on their
characteristics
to subsequent generations). Evolution is the response of a
population to environmental (external) change (broadly defined)
when
the characteristics of the organisms vary, variation is heritable,

and variation influences reproduction and survival. Variation
can
be caused by spontaneous mutation from the exchange of
genetic material in reproduction or by random or systematic
environ-
mental impairments or enhancements. Essentially, organisms
(individual or group) are a product of natural selection. They
acquire
properties and behaviors, through many generations of variation
and selection, which enable them to reproduce and survive
in their environments. Evolution selects for the properties and
behaviors, and those that confer survival advantages upon an
organism have meaningful implications for evolution. Any
heritable property or behavior that increases the relative
frequency
of the gene(s) related to them in subsequent generations is (are)
a survival advantage. As such, gene frequency has a great deal
to do with mating, survival of offspring, and reproductive
success.
Darwin (1859), who believed that selection acted primarily on
organisms, had no idea that genes were the causal mechanism
that makes heritability possible. The work of many others (e.g.,
Dawkins, 1976; Galton, 1869; Mayr, 1942) subsequently sheds
light on this issue. Genes, which serve as the medium that
transmits properties and behaviors (attributes) from generation
to
generation, are encoded in DNA in cells. Through their complex
interaction with the environment, genes control the production
of amino acids, which in turn regulate the development of cells,
hormonal and neurochemical release, and, ultimately,
properties,
cognitions, emotions, and behaviors (Dawkins, 1976).
Dawkins (1976) argued for a “gene's eye view” of evolution,
asserting that genes—and not organisms or species—were the

targets of natural selection and that evolution was about
“replicators” (genes) as mediated at each generation by
“interactors”
(organisms interacting with the environment). Others (see
Gould, 2002) have insisted that evolution also can occur at the
organism, species, and other levels of analysis or biological
organization. Beyond long-term (and even short-term) genetic
evolutionary processes, nongenetic evolutionary processes,
characterized by psychological and cultural mechanisms of
inheritance
and often resulting in rapid responses to environmental change,
are also possible. These alternative processes facilitate “group -
level” selection (Wilson, 2002).
The “modern synthesis” in ET indicates that mutations to DNA
create new variants of existing genes within a species. Natural
selection permits the best-adapted individuals to produce the
greatest number of surviving offspring, ensuring that adaptive
variants of those genes become more common. While selection
can be viewed as a process of removing poorly adapted
individuals,
it can also be a creative process. Comparative studies of
development indicate how genes operate and evolve; research in
ecology
has highlighted the role organisms play in creating their own
environments; studies of fossils question the role of competition
per
se; and various scholars (e.g., Gould, 2002; Wilson, 1980) have
endorsed a multi-level view of evolution, with selection
occurring
at many levels of analysis (e.g., genes, organisms, social groups
within species), including the between-species level (e.g.,
groups
of different species). Most species appear to modify their
environment, and this species–environment interaction can
change

how selection affects them. Essentially, species at least parti ally
construct their own environment.
2.2. Evolutionary psychology
Although not without critics (e.g., Buller, 2009; Ehrlich, 2000;
Panksepp & Panksepp, 2000; Sewell, 2004; Usher, 1999), the
goal of evolutionary psychology (de Waal, 2002; Nicholson,
1997, 2008; Nicholson & White, 2006) is to apply the various
ideas
1044 F.J. Yammarino, F. Dansereau / The Leadership Quarterly
22 (2011) 1042–1057
from ET to provide an evolutionary explanation of human
behavior. According to Pierce and White (1999), “members of
our
species are born with a large repertoire of genetically encoded
psychological mechanisms, which are the foundation of human
behavioral responses. Psychological mechanisms are not
preprogrammed behaviors; rather, they are activated by
perceptions of
our environment” (p. 843). Thus human and social behavior is a
consequence of the interconnections between heritable psycho-
logical mechanisms, which are likely domain-specific, and
environmental cues.
Evolutionary psychology does not focus solely on genetic
explanations of behavior and so is not genetically deterministic,
but rather includes the key idea that important aspects of human
behavior have been naturally selected and adapted (see de
Waal, 2002; Nicholson & White, 2006). Moreover, just because
something is genetically influenced does not mean it must have
a purpose, must be “good” or “positive,” or is not a by-product

of other traits or characteristics (de Waal, 2002). As such,
traits,
behaviors, and characteristics should not be considered in
isolation, but rather as a set and in terms of the development
and
ancestral forms that produced them.
Nicholson (1997) summarizes evolutionary psychology in terms
of four key assumptions: evolutionary psychology provides a
biogenetic conception of humans; humans have adapted
physically and also have an adapted mind; human bodies and
minds are
adapted for an ancestral environment; and specific adaptations
can be used for more than one purpose (extended adaptation of
unchanged biological functions to new uses). As an old species
in a modern world, humans have retained our ancient
psychology
but use it in new ways in the current environment.
The implications of these assumptions, according to Nicholson
(1997), are twofold: misfit consequences, as many of our expe-
riences and problems are outcomes of misfits between our
ancient psychology and the modern environment; and use of
ancient
instincts in an attempt to create and shape social relations and
systems consistent with our nature. As such, only domain-
specific
adaptations are possible, multiple causes (e.g., multiple genes)
may be involved, and genetic determinism is not a given
because
environments also play a role in the process. In general,
evolutionary psychology “provides an integrated and inclusive
account of
human nature as a bridge, designed by natural selection,
between biological imperatives and environmental
contingencies”

(Nicholson, 1997, p. 11).
3. Multi-level issues and concepts
3.1. Levels of analysis
With this background, we can now consider a variety of
prominent multi-level issues and concepts from both
evolutionary
theory and organization science and leadership perspectives.
Across the sciences, scholars have noted the importance of
clearly
specifying the levels of analysis at which phenomena are
expected to exist theoretically, and that it is critical to ensure
the measurement of constructs and data analytic techniques
correspond to the asserted levels of analysis, so that inference
drawing is not misleading or artifactual (Dansereau &
Yammarino, 2003, 2005, 2007; Dansereau et al., 1999;
Futuyma, 2005;
Gould, 2002; Markham, 2010; Miller, 1978; Rousseau, 1985;
Wilson, 1980, 2002; Wolfram, 2002; Yammarino & Dansereau,
2002, 2004, 2006, 2008, 2009a, 2009b). Levels of analysis are
inherent in theoretical formulations—implicit or assumed, used
to develop the boundary conditions under which a theory is
expected to hold, or explicitly incorporated. Understanding
how and if levels are specified permits an examination of the
potential or degree of prevalence of theoretical
misspecification.
Moreover, identification of relevant levels-of-analysis issues
may help account for mixed, inconsistent, and contradictory
findings
in prior research. Without explicit incorporation of levels -of-
analysis issues, incomplete understanding of a construct or
phenomena
may lead to faulty measures, inappropriate data analytic
techniques, and erroneous conclusions.

Theoretical revolutions in science often occur when other levels
of analysis are considered. For example, a revolution in biology
occurred when some scholars suggested, and subsequently
demonstrated, that evolution can occur at a level of analysis
higher
than the organism level (see Gould, 2002; Wilson, 1980, 2002).
A well-known revolution in physics occurred when some
scholars
asserted, and subsequently demonstrated, that quantum
mechanics operates at a level of analysis lower than the atomic
level (see
Wolfram, 2002). Likewise, we can advance OSL theory building
and theory testing by including lower and higher levels of
analysis
in theory development and hypothesis generation, measurement,
data analysis, and inference drawing.
Levels of analysis are the entities or objects of study. Entities
are typically arranged in hierarchical order such that higher
levels
(e.g., species and groups) include lower levels (e.g., organisms
and persons, respectively), and lower levels are embedded in
higher
levels. They are “banded together in a rising series of
increasingly greater inclusion, one within the next” (Gould,
2002, p. 674).
Although there is “nesting,” there can be “decoupling” among
levels as processes and properties at one level may differ from
those at other levels (Gould, 2002; Miller, 1978).
3.1.1. ET and levels
In ET work, genes, cells, organisms, demes, species, and clades
are six typical entities of interest, also referred to as levels
of selection or levels of organization (Gould, 2002). As noted

by Gould (2002), “individuals are made of parts and aggregate
into collectivities … genes in cells, cells in organisms,
organisms in demes, demes in species, species in clades … and
we may
choose to direct our evolutionary attention to any of the levels”
(p. 674).
Genes are regions or subunits of DNA that control hereditary
characteristics via sequences or segments used to produce spe-
cific proteins or RNA. The sum total of genes in a cell or
organism is called the genome. Cells are one of the most basic
units of life,
consisting of multiple genes; they are the structural and
functional units of living organis ms. Organisms are living
things, plant or
animal, composed of one or more cells, with the ability to
function or act independently; they are the traditional units of
selection
22 (2011) 1042–1057
in classical Darwinian microevolution (Gould, 2002). Demes are
a local population of interbreeding organisms of the same
species
that share a distinct gene pool. Species are typically defined as
an interbreeding group, capable of producing fertile offspring
that
does not or cannot productively breed with another group; they
are the fundamental taxonomic units of biological classification
and are the basic unit of macroevolutionary change (Gould,
2002). Clades are a group of organisms (e.g., a species) derived
from a
single common ancestor and all descendents of that ancestor.

Members of a clade share common or homologous features
derived
from those ancestors.
3.1.2. OSL and levels
In OSL work, we are interested in human beings in work
organizations and various clusterings of organizations. Four key
levels
of analysis of human beings are relevant (e.g., Yammarino &
Dansereau 2009a; Yammarino et al., 2005). First, individuals or
persons (independent human beings) (e.g., leaders or followers)
allow for the exploration of individual differences. Second,
dyads (two-person groups and interpersonal relationships) (e.g.,
leader-follower dyads) involve one-to-one interdependence
between individuals. Third, groups (workgroups and teams) are
a collection of individuals who are interdependent and interact
on
a face-to-face or “virtual” (non-co-located) basis with one
another. Fourth, collectives are clusterings of individuals that
are larger
than groups and whose members are interdependent based on a
hierarchical structuring or a set of common or shared
expectations.
Collectives can include groups of groups, departments,
functional areas, strategic business units, and organizations per
se, as well
as firms, strategic groups or alliances of organizations, and
industries.
These four levels of analysis represent different perspectives on
the human beings who constitute organizations. They can
be thought of as different lenses through which human beings
can be observed. Given the embeddedness of levels, as one
views human beings from increasingly higher levels of analysis,
the number of entities decreases (e.g., there are fewer

collectives
than groups in an organization) and the size of the entity
increases (e.g., there are a larger number of human beings in
collectives
than in groups).
3.2. Units of analysis
There are three alternatives to consider for each level of
analysis. The physical sciences (e.g., Gould, 2002; Lerner,
1963)
and social sciences (e.g., Dansereau et al., 1984; Yammarino &
Dansereau, 2009a) distinguis h conceptually between two
different
(relevant) views of any level of analysis—wholes and parts. The
third view (independent) indicates that the focal entities are not
relevant and other entities are plausible.
A wholes view is defined as a focus between entities but not
within them; differences between entities are viewed as valid,
and differences within entities are viewed as error (random).
This perspective can be viewed as a between-units case in which
members of a unit are homogeneous, the whole unit is of
importance, entities display similarity among members, and
relation-
ships among members of units with respect to constructs of a
theory are positive. Relationships among theoretical constructs
are a function of differences between units.
A parts view is defined as a focus within entities but not
between them; differences within entities are valid, and
differences
between entities are erroneous. This perspective can be viewed
as a within-units case, also known as a “frog pond” effect, in
which members of a unit are heterogeneous, a member's position
relative to other members is of importance, entities display

complementarity among members, and relationships among
members of units with respect to constructs of a theory are
negative.
Relationships among theoretical constructs are a function of
differences within units. Whether from an ET or OSL
perspective, the
“glue” of parts, depending on the level of analysis, is
interdependence, functional integration, or social structure and
behavioral
interaction (Dansereau et al., 1984; Gould, 2002; Miller, 1978;
Yammarino & Dansereau, 2009a).
Across the sciences, various authors indicate that effects also
may not be evidenced at a focal level (Dansereau et al., 1984;
Gould, 2002; Lerner, 1963; Miller, 1978; Yammarino &
Dansereau, 2009a). In this case of independence, two
possibilities for
a focal level are a focus both between and within entities, or
error between and within entities. In both cases, the focal level
of
analysis does not clarify understanding of the constructs,
variables, or phenomena of interest, and other levels must be
considered.
The members of a unit are independent, free of the unit's
influence, and relationships among members of units with
respect to
constructs of a theory are independent. Relationships among
theoretical constructs are a function of differences between
members
(e.g., persons) independent of higher-level units (e.g., groups).
3.2.1. ET and units
In evolutionary theory, when “organism” is the focal level of
analysis, the organism (wholes) and the interdependent cells or
genes (parts) within the organism are the potential units of

analysis. If the entities are independent at this level, potential
higher
levels (collective) are the deme or species. When “species” is
the focal level of analysis, the species (wholes) and the
interdepen-
dent organisms or demes (parts) within the species are the
potential units of analysis. If the entities are independent at this
level,
a potential higher level (collective) is the clade.
In ET, wholes, a homogeneous perspective, can also imply a
focus on “selection,” either positive (replication) or negative
(subtractive) selection, such as homogeneous species that have
adapted to a simple environment. Parts, a heterogeneous
perspec-
tive, can also imply a focus on “variation” via random mutation,
recombination, and random generation, such as diverse
organisms
that have adapted to various niches in a complex environment
(see Futuyma, 2005). In microevolution, at the organism level,
the proliferation of one part to crowd out others results in
“cancer;” in macroevolution, at the species level, it often results
in
adaptation by “anagenesis” (see below and Gould, 2002).
22 (2011) 1042–1057
3.2.2. OSL and units
In organization science and leadership, when “person” is the
focal level of analysis, the person (wholes) and the interdepen-
dent genes or properties and behaviors over time (parts) within
the person are the potential units of analysis. If the entities are

independent at this level, potential higher levels (collective) are
the dyad or group. When “group” is the focal level of analysis,
the group (wholes) and the interdependent persons or dyads
(parts) within the group are the potential units of analysis. If the
entities are independent at this level, potential higher levels
(collective) are the organization, strategic group, or industry.
In OSL, wholes, a homogeneous perspective, can also imply a
focus on “stability,” such as person (e.g., leader) traits that
remain
constant over time. Parts, a heterogeneous perspective, can also
imply a focus on “change,” such as person (e.g., leader) charac-
teristics that shift over time (see Dansereau et al., 1984, 1999;
3.3. Adjacent levels: multiple levels and multi-level effects
Beyond single levels of analysis viewed separately, another key
issue is that of multiple levels of analysis. In all the sciences,
assuming only one level of analysis or choosing only one level
without consideration of other levels can either mask effects or
indicate effects when none exist (e.g., Gould, 2002; Lerner,
1963; Markham, 2010; Miller, 1978; Yammarino & Dansereau,
2009a; Yammarino et al., 2005). Given the embeddedness of
levels, multiple levels should be considered in combination and
multi-level effects should be identified.
3.3.1. ET and multiple levels
Gould (2002) offers “the grand analogy” of various evolutionary
theory ideas, processes, and concepts between microevolution
at the organism level and macroevolution at the species level.
Moreover, in evolutionary theory, selection at one level of
analysis
may enhance (positively—synergistic), counteract (negatively—
in opposition), or be orthogonal (independent) to selection at

another (higher or lower) level of analysis (Gould, 2002). These
alternatives are plausible because each level differs from all
other
levels in a variety of substantial ways, including the style and
frequency of patterns of change as well as the causes of thes e
changes
over time.
Although Darwin asserted a single-level “reductionist” theory
with organisms as the locus of selection, multi-level selection
theory
(MLST) (Gould, 2002; Wilson, 1980, 2002) espouses the
possibility that natural selection can operate at more than one
biological level
of analysis. Darwin's (1859) three components of selection
(phenotypic variation, heritability, and fitness consequences)
can occur at
both the individual organism level and higher (e.g., species or
group) levels of analysis. Darwin eventually endorsed the
notion of
species-level selection, rejecting reductionism to the organism
level, the lowest level known in his time (see Gould, 2002;
Wilson,
2002). Likewise, many modern scholars have rejected a similar
reductionist position to the gene level, the lowest level known
at
the present time (see Gould, 2002). Natural selection at the
group or higher level (e.g., demes, species, or clades) is far
more complex
than selection at the individual (i.e., organism or gene) level
and does not necessarily result in outcomes that would be
viewed as
“adaptive” when considered from an outside perspective
(Wilson, 2002).
Humans, like other organisms, are biological entities driven by

self-interest to promote survival. These self-preservation and
self-enhancement instincts serve us well (i.e., “selfish gene,”
Dawkins, 1976). But, like the great apes, our closest biological
rela-
tives, and other organisms (e.g., insects), humans are also social
entities. As such, group living is also a likely key element in
our survival (e.g., Gould, 2002; Van Vugt et al., 2008;
Yammarino & Dansereau 2009a). Of course, harmonious group
relations
have not solely characterized human history or the history of
other entities. Lethal intergroup competition is also highly
evident.
As such, evolutionary adaptation has promoted both within-
group solidarity and between-group hostility (e.g., Pierce &
White,
1999; Van Vugt et al., 2008).
Wilson (1980, 2002) uses the term “trait-group” to emphasize
the intimate connections between traits and groups in MLST.
He notes that groups must be defined separately for every trait,
behavior, or activity—a notion consistent with the definition
of groups in OSL and other fields. Moreover, selection at the
level of the group may be just as important as lower-level
selection.
In some cases, the groups are so highly integrated (i.e., wholes)
that they can be called “organisms” themselves, suggesting the
“organismic concept of human groups” (Wilson, 2002). Groups
as a unit of selection and the interconnectedness among
individuals in a group raises the possibility of “group
cognitions” (e.g., shared mental models, consensus decision
making;
also see Klein & Kozlowski, 2000; Yammarino & Dansereau
2009a) and “collective leadership” (e.g., shared leadership,
team
leadership; also see DeChurch et al., 2010; Yammarino &
Dansereau, 2009a).

For Wilson (2002), “Natural selection is a multi-level process
that operates among groups in addition to among individuals
within groups” (p. 43). In this regard, Wilson (2002) details
multiple meanings of reductionism and holism. A homology
thesis
posits a basic consistency across multiple levels of selection
(analysis) (Gould, 2002; Wilson, 2002). A strong version of this
notion
would view effects across all (many) levels, while a weaker
version would assert effects across at least two levels. Such
cross-level
effects are also called continuities. In contrast, discontinuities
specify differing effects at multiple levels. In particular,
emergents or
emergent properties are not found at lower levels or are
characteristics that “drop out” in the evolution of higher levels
(e.g., Gould,
2002; Miller, 1978). As noted by Gould (2002), “when selection
works upon emergent features, then causal reduction to
individual
genes and their independent summations becomes logically
impossible” (p. 627).
Likewise, in evolutionary psychology, there is no need to take a
reductionist position. As noted by Nicholson (1997), to under -
stand the functioning of human beings as organisms requires
examination from many levels of analysis, not just the genetic
or neurological levels. Moreover, the environment (situation or
higher level) within which human behavior occurs also requires
examination. Thus lower- and not higher-level possibilities
(reduction), higher- and not lower-level possibilities
(emergent), and
22 (2011) 1042–1057

cross-level possibilities (homology) exist in the realm of
evolutionary psychology (e.g., de Waal, 2002; Nicholson, 1997;
Pierce &
White, 1999).
3.3.2. OSL and multiple levels
In organization science and leadership, micro versus macro
theories, processes, and concepts can be either contrasted or
viewed as analogous, depending on various levels-of-analysis
formulations. Adjacent levels can interact in alignment,
misalign-
ment, or opposition to one another, creating various types of
multi-level effects. The focus here for “linking” (multiple)
levels
of analysis is on three general types of multiple-level
formulations—level-specific, emergent, and cross-level
formulations—
from both wholes and parts perspectives, resulting in six cases
relevant for work in OSL. For each of these formulations, we
offer a description and some examples.
In particular, relationships among constructs may be
hypothesized to hold at a lower level (e.g., person) but not at a
higher
level (e.g., group). This possibility may be discussed as a
discontinuity thesis (Miller, 1978), as level-specific
formulations
(Dansereau et al., 1984; Miller, 1978), or empirically as
disaggregated, individual, or level-specific effects (Pedhazur,
1982;
Robinson, 1950). In these cases, the higher level of analysis is
not relevant for understanding the theoretical constructs.

Wholes at a lower level may not aggregate or manifest
themselves at a higher level (independent). This level -specific
wholes
formulation means that members are homogeneous with respect
to the constructs of interest in all lower-level entities (e.g.,
groups), and higher-level entities (e.g., collectives) are not
relevant. Examples of level-specific wholes formulations
include the
notions of psychological climate (James, Joyce, & Slocum
1988), commitment approaches, and various personality
approaches
at the individual level (Yammari no & Dansereau, 2009a); many
team-based and shared leadership approaches at the group
level (Klein & Kozlowski 2000; Yammarino & Dansereau,
2009a; Yammarino et al., 2005); and organizational climate
(Glick,
1985) and organizational missions and visions and strategic
leadership at the organization level.
Parts at a lower level may not aggregate or manifest themselves
at a higher level (independent). This level-specific parts
formulation means that members are heterogeneous with respect
to the constructs of interest in all lower-level entities (e.g.,
groups), and higher-level entities (e.g., collectives) are not
relevant. Examples of level-specific parts formulations include
newer
approaches that consider personality changes across time (see
Yammarino & Dansereau, 2009a) and vertical dyad linkage
(VDL)
and leader–member exchange (LMX in- and out-group)
leadership approaches at the group level (Dansereau et al.,
1995a,
1995b; Yammarino et al., 2005).
In contrast, relationships among constructs may not be asser ted

at a lower level but are hypothesized to manifest themselves
at a higher level of analysis. This possibility may also be
discussed as a type of discontinuity thesis (Miller, 1978), as
emergent
formulations that hold at a higher level (e.g., group) after not
being asserted or found to hold at a lower level (e.g., person)
(Dansereau et al., 1984; Miller, 1978), empirically as higher -
level effects that do not disaggregate, or as emergent effects
(Miller,
1978; Robinson, 1950). In these cases, the lower level of
analysis is not relevant for understanding the theoretical
constructs.
For an emergent wholes formulation, constructs are expected to
hold at a higher (e.g., group) level where members are homo-
geneous with respect to the constructs after not having been
expected or observed at a lower level (independent). Examples
of
emergent wholes formulations include concepts such as group
cohesion, shared mental models, and shared and team leadership
at the team level (DeChurch et al., 2010; Klein & Kozlowski,
2000; Yammarino et al., 2005) and several of the GLOBE
cultural
values dimensions at the society level (House, Hanges, Javidan,
Dorfman, & Gupta 2004).
For an emergent parts formulation, constructs are expected to
hold at a higher (e.g., group) level where members are hetero-
geneous with respect to the constructs after not having been
expected or observed at a lower level (independent). Examples
of emergent parts formulations include concepts such as vertical
dyad linkage and perhaps leader–member exchange (see
Dansereau et al., 1995a, 1995b) and intra-group conflict and
compatible mental models at the team level (Klein &
Kozlowski,
2000) and aspects of organizational subcultures at the

organization level (Katz & Kahn, 1978).
Relationships among constructs also may be hypothesized to
hold at higher (e.g., collective) and lower (e.g., group) levels of
analysis. This possibility is discussed as a homology thesis
(Miller, 1978), empirically as aggregated or ecological effects
(Pedhazur,
1982; Robinson, 1950), and as cross-level explanations
(Behling, 1978; Dansereau et al., 1984; Miller, 1978). Cross-
level formula-
tions (theories, propositions, and hypotheses) are statements
about relationships among variables that are likely to hold
equally
well at a number of levels of analysis (e.g., X and Y are
positively related for individuals and for groups), and they
specify patterns
of relationships replicated across levels of analysis. Models of
this type are uniquely powerful and parsimonious because the
same
effect is manifested at more than one level of analysis (e.g.,
E=mc2, which holds at multiple levels of analysis, is a cross -
level
formulation).
Wholes at a lower level can aggregate or manifest themselves as
wholes at a higher level. This cross-level wholes formulation
means that members are homogeneous with respect to the
constructs of interest in all entities (e.g., groups and
collectives)
at both levels of analysis, but the entities (e.g., groups and
collectives) differ from one another. Examples of cross-level
wholes
formulations include various GLOBE cultural dimensions from
the individual to organization to society levels (House et al.,
2004) and professional and functional titles and associated
expectations about them from the individual to dyad to group to

organization levels (see Yammarino & Dansereau, 2009a).
Wholes at a lower level can aggregate or manifest themselves as
parts at a higher level. This cross-level parts formulation
means that members are homogeneous with respect to the
constructs of interest in all the lower-level entities (e.g.,
groups),
and these differ from one another; in all higher-level entities
(e.g., collectives), however, there is heterogeneity because
members
within the entities differ from one another. Examples of cross -
level parts formulations include functional area task differences
and subsystem subcultures from the individual to organization
and group to organization levels (Katz & Kahn, 1978).
22 (2011) 1042–1057
3.4. Levels over time
Another important multi-level issue for both ET and OSL is the
theoretical specification and empirical test of potentially
changing
variables and phenomena (e.g., traits, properties) and shifting
levels of analysis (entities) over time (see Dansereau et al.,
1999; Gould,
2002). By definition, ET is longitudinal in nature, and the time
frame is generally long. Likewise, although with a relatively
shorter
time frame, OSL must be viewed from a longitudinal
perspective to fully understand relevant phenomena that are
stable or shifting,
changing, and developing over time.

3.4.1. ET, time, and levels
The essence of evolutionary theory is changes within and across
various levels of organization or selection (analysis) over time.
The production and the elimination of “individuals” at the
organism level are termed birth and death, respectively; at the
species
level, these events are called speciation and extinction,
respectively (Gould, 2002). Moreover, mutation at the organism
level and
various other mechanisms at the species level are sources of
variation in new “individuals” over time. In particular, three
major
styles of changes in entities over time can be distinguished:
first, selection, as discussed above, is differential proliferation
due to
traits or properties of “interactors,” such as natural (organism)
selection and species selection. Second, drift is random
differential
proliferation that entails random “sorting” at the organism
level; genetic drift occurs within the deme or species, and
founder drift
results in founding new demes or species; at the species level,
drift occurs within the clade, and founder drift results in
founding
new clades (Gould, 2002).
Third, drives, opposite or at least orthogonal to selection, are
directional variation within and between “individuals,” which
direc-
tionally change species and clades, for example, by changing
organisms and species, respectively, from within. Drives
include several
mechanisms such as the following (for details, see Gould,
2002): Lamarckism, a type of drive at the organism level,
espouses the

“soft” inheritance of acquired characteristics. For example, in
cultural evolution, based on gene (biology)-culture co-
evolution, culture
reinforces patterns of social behavior that reflect adaptive traits
and properties in humans (Wilson, 1978). Anagenesis is a type
of
drive at the species level; it occurs when the population of an
entire species changes on a genetic level without a split or
branching.
In contrast, cladogenesis is when a branching occurs or a
species splits into two genetically distinct populations that
adapt to different
environments, ecosystems, or other factors. Punctuated
equilibrium asserts that evolution occurs not in degrees of
gradualism, but
rather in rapid bursts separated by long periods of stasis or
relatively little change. Catastrophic mass extinction is an
abrupt
end to one or many species in a short period of time—for
example, due to a major external or environmental event
(asteroid strike,
flood, or volcanic eruption in a geographic region). Mass
extinctions may also be caused by a sharp drop in the rate of
speciation.
Mutation pressure, a reproductive drive at the organism level, is
a biased production of new organisms. The frequency of
occurrence
is very low if the mutation is harmful to the organism, because
selection at the organism level effectively suppresses changes at
the
lower (gene or cell) level. Analogously, directional speciation, a
reproductive drive at the species level, is a biased production of
new
species. The frequency of occurrence here is potentially quite
common because species do not strongly suppress organism and
deme selection, and new species originate because of change

that emanates from the parent.
3.4.2. OSL, time, and levels
In organization science and leadership, while much has been
written about changing variables or constructs over time and
strategies for analyzing these changes (e.g., Chan, 1998;
Gottman, 1995; Yammarino et al., 2005), relatively little has
been written
about changing entities (levels of analysis) over time (for
exceptions, see Dansereau et al., 1984, 1999; Yammarino &
Dansereau,
2009a). Based on the varient paradigm, Dansereau et al. (1999)
consider the plausible units of analysis (wholes, parts, indepen-
dence, and null) at two points in time to account for entity
changes over time. A 16-cell matrix results for understanding
changes
or stability in levels of analysis over time.
In particular, for various levels of analysis, Dansereau et al.
(1999) define, describe, and illustrate the following
components:
four types of stable conditions (in terms of wholes, parts, lower -
level independent units, and null over time); three types
of changes that move the focus up from a lower to a higher level
(transformation up from parts to wholes, level change up
from independent units to wholes, and level change up from
independent units to parts); three types of changes that move
the focus down from a higher to a lower level (transformation
down from wholes to parts, level change down from wholes to
independent units, and level change down from parts to
independent units); and six types of changes that indicate the
beginning
or end of a level (three “emergents” from null or nothing to
wholes, parts, or independent units, and three “ends” from
wholes,

parts, or independent units to null or nothing).
As an example, a portion of the work of Klein and Kozlowski
(2000) can be cast in terms of the Dansereau et al. (1999)
frame-
work. Klein and Kozlowski (2000) offer two forms for the
emergence or change of entities over time—composition and
compila-
tion. Composition, based on isomorphism, suggests that lower-
level entities (e.g., individuals), based on shared mental models
and
similar information and expertise, combine in a linear or pooled
fashion with stable or uniform interactions over time, resulting
in
higher-level entities (e.g., teams) viewed from a homogeneous
perspective. In this case, lower-level wholes shift to higher
level
wholes over time. Compilation, based on discontinuity, suggests
that lower-level entities (e.g., individuals), based on compatible
mental models and diverse information and expertise, combine
in a non-linear or adaptive fashion with irregular or non-
uniform in-
teractions over time, resulting in higher-level entities (e.g.,
teams) viewed from a heterogeneous perspective. In this case,
lower-level
wholes shift to higher-level parts over time.
The Dansereau et al. (1999) framework for understanding
change and stability in entities over time can be extended to
more
than two levels, to more than two time periods, and to various
intervals of time (e.g., hours, days, months, years, decades, and
22 (2011) 1042–1057

generations). The incorporation and use of this framework
offers a way to conceptualize and then test longitudinal and
dynamic
views on levels of analysis for a more complete approach to
theory building and testing in OSL.
3.5. Fallacies
For evolutionary theory and organization science and
leadership, it is critical to avoid committing a “fallacy of the
wrong level”
(Dansereau & Yammarino, 2006; Dansereau et al., 2006; Gould,
2002). In the inference-drawing process, traits, properties, rela-
tionships, and even theories cannot be attributed to, or expected
to operate or hold at, one level of analysis given empirical
results
(or lack thereof) regarding entities at another level of analysis.
An ecological fallacy occurs when lower levels of analysis are
pre-
sumed to be mere disaggregations of higher-level entities. In
contrast, an individual fallacy occurs when higher levels of
analysis
are presumed to be mere aggregations of lower-level entities.
Work by Robinson (1950) and others (e.g., Dansereau et al.,
1984,
2006; Rousseau, 1985) in the social sciences and by numerous
scholars in the physical sciences (e.g., Lerner, 1963; Miller,
1978;
Wolfram 2002) highlights the problems and issues associated
with such fallacies.
3.5.1. ET and fallacies
In evolutionary theory, while Gould (2002) notes “the grand
analogy” between microevolution features at the organism level

and macroevolution features at the species level, he also
discusses that these features are not identical. Organisms cannot
be
viewed as just disaggregated species, and species cannot be
seen as just aggregated organisms —processes, properties, traits,
and other aspects of these entities can vary by level of analysis
or biological organization, such that some can emerge or hold
at one level but not at other levels.
Nicholson (1997) states that evolutionary psychology avoids
both the individualistic fallacy (e.g., societies are just
individual
characteristics manifested at or aggregated to a larger scale) and
the ecological fallacy (e.g., individuals characteristics are
just manifestations or disaggregations of societies on a lower
scale). Moreover, evolutionary psychology does not take solely
a reductionist position, instead allowing for both emergents and
homology.
3.5.2. OSL and fallacies
In organization science and leadership, while Dansereau et al.
(1984) and Yammarino and Dansereau (2009a) note that
similarities may be apparent between micro elements at lower
levels and macro elements at higher levels, they also make
clear that these elements are not identical. Persons cannot be
viewed as just disaggregated groups or organizations, and
groups
or organizations cannot be seen as just aggregated persons—
processes, constructs, relationships, theories, and other aspects
of these entities can vary by level of analysis, such that some
can emerge or hold at one level and not at other levels.
Dansereau and Yammarino and colleagues (Dansereau &
Yammarino, 2006; Dansereau et al., 1984, 2006; Markham,

2010;
Yammarino & Dansereau, 2009a; Yammarino et al., 2005)
elaborate on various aspects of fallacies of the wrong level for
organi-
zation science in general and for leadership research in
particular. They also offer a variety of potential solutions to,
and ways to
avoid, such ecological and individual fallacies in theory and
hypothesis formulation, measurement, data analysis, and
inference-
drawing procedures.
3.6. False dichotomies
Various Aristotelian “either-or” controversies, that have existed
for several millennia, can be expressed as, and often degrade
to, false dichotomies and inappropriate dualisms. In terms of
multi-level issues in evolutionary theory and organization
science
and leadership, these dichotomies typically relate to some
version of “the individual versus the environment.” In ET, this
trans-
lates into the “nature–nurture” and “free will–determinism”
debates; in OSL, it is the “person–situation” and “genes–
learning/
development” debates. In both ET and OSL, the goal is to
resolve Aristotelian “either-or” controversies with a “Galilean
approach”
characterized by integration of the components of each duality.
3.6.1. ET and dichotomies
Relevant to evolutionary theory, Wolfram (2002) states that
“even though a system may follow definite underlying laws, its
overall behavior can still have aspects that fundamentally
cannot be described by reasonable laws” (p. 750). According to

him,
this idea explains the phenomenon of “free will;” i.e.,
organisms (e.g., humans) still show variation in behavior that is
not
accounted for by theories (rules) per se. In short, systems or
entities have free will.
Further, de Waal (2002) notes that “ancient dualisms”—such as
mind–body, human–animal, and nature–culture—prevent
psychology from fully adopting, endorsing, and employing ET
in its theories and conceptualizations of human behavior (also
see
Nicholson & White, 2006). But, just as neuroscience is breaking
down the mind–body dualism, so too will ET and evolutionary
psychology undermine the human–animal and nature–culture
dualisms (de Waal, 2002).
Nicholson (1997) argues that the nature–nurture dichotomy is
false because the institutions that socialize and nurture
humans are ones that have come from our natures. He notes that
these patterns of socialization have persistent and replicated
themes across cultures and are not arbitrary or accidental, yet
their manifestations differ greatly to deal with local
environments
(for a related discussion, see Van Vugt et al., 2008).
Pierce and White (1999) note that humans are not
preprogrammed and that we have a large and flexible set of
behaviors that
permit considerable latitude and the exercise of free will. Given
that these behaviors are flexible and not completely biologically
22 (2011) 1042–1057

predetermined, some may be learned. The “nature versus
nurture” debate then centers on how much of human behavior is
learned
versus how much is biologically determined. Nature predisposes
humans to act in particular ways in specific circumstances,
but learning and cognitions can then alter our actions and
behaviors. Rather than thinking of “nature–nurture” and “free
will–
determinism” as “either-or” controversies, it is useful to think
about both notions operating in each case—nature and nurture
as
well as free will and determinism affect human behaviors,
actions, and interactions (see Pierce & White, 1999).
3.6.2. OSL and dichotomies
In organization science and leadership, there is a long history
related to the “person–situation” debate (e.g., Dansereau et al.,
1995a, 1995b, 1999; Epstein & O'Brien, 1985; Johns, 2006;
Schneider, 1983; Yammarino & Dansereau, 2009a). This
discussion can
also be framed in terms of an “individual–environment” debate,
or the micro–macro distinction, where an integration can occur
to resolve the debate by viewing higher levels of analysis as the
context (situation or environment) for or boundaries on lower
levels of analysis (Dansereau et al., 1984, 1999; Johns 2006;
Schneider (1983), rather than assuming person (lower-level) or
situation (higher-level) explanations of effects, offers a
person-by-situation or interactional psychology explanation for
behavior. Likewise, Epstein and O'Brien (1985) conclude that it
is the person within situation (context) that matters for
explanation of phenomena; again, there is an appeal to integrate
these

notions in terms of lower and higher levels of analysis.
Johns (2006) extends these notions to further develop the idea
and importance of “context” as a higher level of analysis within
which behavior occurs and without which behavior often
becomes uninterpretable. For example, individual behavior
occurs
within a group context, individual and group behaviors occur
with an organizational context, and so on. In this way, lower
and
higher levels of analysis together, in integration, explain the
phenomena of interest.
Similarly, in human behavioral genetics research, Arvey and
Bouchard (1994), Arvey, Rotundo, Johnson, Zhang and McGue
(2006), and Ilies, Arvey and Bouchard (2006) identify and
explicate both genetic (lower-level) and environmental (higher-
level) factors that influence individual differences in a variety
of topic areas (e.g., personality, leadership). They partition the
between-person behavioral (phenotypic) variance into its
genetic and environmental components, recognizing that
heredity
and environment both play key roles and are intimately
connected in human development and behavior. Avoiding the
“either-
or” controversy in favor of an integration, Arvey and colleagues
suggest that genes likely establish general predispositions
and natural inclinations (e.g., a baseline) that are then altered or
shaped by the environment (e.g., learning and development)
to increase or decrease an individual's likelihood of displaying
particular traits and behaviors.
3.7. Analytical tools
Given the diverse and multi-level nature of the issues and
concepts addressed here for evolutionary theory and

organization
science and leadership, a variety of multi-level methods and
analytic tools are required for assessing and testing these
notions
empirically.
3.7.1. ET and tools
In evolutionary theory, because past causes cannot be observed
directly, research and methodology attempt to draw conclu-
sions from the preserved results (historical, geological, and
fossil records) of these past causes. According to Gould (2002,
p. 59),
Darwin developed four general procedures for this purpose:
extrapolation to longer times and effects of actual historical
changes
observed; explication and ordering of several phenomena as
sequential stages from a single historical process; inference of
history
as an explanation for a large set of seemingly disparate
observations; and inference of history from single objects based
on oddities
and imperfections that must denote paths of prior change.
In ET, beyond these procedures and methods, researchers often
attempt to assess variation and differences within and be-
tween species, organisms, and other entities. A variety of
analytic tools are used for these purposes. “Relative
frequencies” are
used to assess many evolutionary ideas and approaches, and
“dominant relative frequencies” are employed for the
assessment
of punctuated equilibrium notions (Gould, 2002). Heritability
(h2), which is a correlation between parents and offspring
caused
by any mechanism, including but not limited to genes (e.g.,

Gould, 2002; Wilson, 1980, 2002), is also used. The behavioral
genetic
study of human traits has been a key component of evolutionary
research since the time of Darwin and Galton, and along with
observational studies and molecular genetic studies, can provide
a more complete research approach for evolutionary
psychology.
Another approach is the use of dynamic computational modeling
and simulation (e.g., Wolfram, 2002), which focuses on
complex
nonlinear interactions among various biological elements, levels
of biological organization, and environmental elements. Using
such modeling, Wolfram (2002) showed for various aspects of
evolutionary theory and natural selection that simple rules
(ideas, notions, theories) can lead to and explain both simple
and complex evolutionary phenomena.
3.7.2. OSL and tools
In organization science and leadership, Arvey and Bouchard
(1994), Arvey et al. (2006), and Ilies et al. (2006) identified the
relative contributions of genotypic and environmental
differences to variation in heritable constructs across
individuals. The h2
coefficient estimates the proportion of phenotypic variance
(between individuals) accounted for by genetic differences. For
several
constructs (e.g., intelligence, 60% to 80%; personality, 35% to
50%; attitudes, about 30%; work values, about 35%; leadership,
about
30%), approximately one third of the variation may be due to
genetic differences, while two thirds of the variation can be
attributed
to nongenetic (e.g., environmental) differences.

22 (2011) 1042–1057
Another tool is dynamic computational modeling and simulation
(e.g., Dionne & Dionne 2008; Hulin & Ilgen 2000) of complex
nonlinear relations among various traits, behaviors, properties,
levels of analysis, and environmental characteristics for
organiza-
tion science and leadership phenomena. Dionne and Dionne
(2008), for example, developed a computational model for a
levels-
based comparison of four types of leadership that represent
three different levels—individual, dyad, and group—across a
dynamic
group decision-making optimization scenario.
Random coefficient models (RCM), including hierarchical
linear modeling (HLM), multi-level structural equation models
(MLSEM), and within and between analysis (WABA), based on
the varient approach, are among the other approaches for
analyzing
multi-level notions (for details and organization science and
leadership examples, see Bliese, Chan, & Ployhart, 2007;
Dansereau
et al., 1984, 2006; Dansereau & Yammarino, 2000, 2006;
Drasgow & Schmitt, 2002; Gooty & Yammarino, 2011; Klein &
Kozlowski,
2000; Yammarino, 1998; Yammarino & Markham, 1992). All
these analytic tools for assessing multiple levels of analysis
have
procedures for testing multi-level meditation, moderation, and
longitudinal (processual, developmental) notions.
4. Implications and conclusions

4.1. Theory building and theory testing in OSL
Theory or theory building, and data or theory testing, require an
interplay that recognizes the importance of both notions (see
Van Maanen, Sorensen, & Mitchell 2007); and considering
multi-level issues can foster a balance between and an
integration of
these inductive and deductive processes (Dansereau et al., 1984;
Yammarino & Dansereau, 2009a). Addressing multi-level issues
in theory building will help overcome “what theory is not”
(Sutton & Staw, 1995; Weick, 1995) and facilitate internal
consistency,
logic, clarity, novelty, and contribution—all key dimensions of
“good” theory (Klein & Zedeck, 2004; Whetton, 1989).
Likewise,
incorporation of multi-level issues into theory testing will help
address “poor” methods and data (Dansereau & Yammarino,
2006; Dansereau et al., 1984; Yammarino & Dansereau, 2009a;
Yammarino et al., 2005) and enhance internal logics, sampling,
data collection, statistical analyses, and drawing of inferences —
all key dimensions of “good” methods (see Van Maanen et al.,
2007).
The multi-level issues presented and illustrated above for ET
and OSL can facilitate and enhance understanding of all these
aspects of organizational and leadership research. Theory and
theory building without levels of analysis is incomplete;
data and theory testing without levels of analysis is
incomprehensible. These “realities” hold for both ET and OSL,
as aligned
and juxtaposed above; and OSL scholars can learn lessons
regarding the importance of multi-level issues from scholars'
work
in the more-established ET realm.

For example, evolutionary theory scholars often discuss
competition at the organism level and cooperation at the species
level
that can occur simultaneously; and they assess, measure, and
analyze these ideas at multiple levels to draw conclusions about
them in terms of MLST (multi-level selection theory) (e.g.,
Gould, 2002; Sober & Wilson, 1998; Wilson, 1980). The former
idea, competition, is an example of a wholes (homogeneity)
perspective at the organism level; the latter idea, cooperation, is
an instance of a wholes perspective at the species level; and the
simultaneity means the formulation is a cross-level one in
nature.
So, we have a clear example of a cross-level wholes formulation
from the organism to the species level that then can be assessed
and tested to determine its merit and validity for ET.
An analogous case for OSL scholars might be the study of
competition and cooperation in terms of individual performance
and decision making differences together with team
performance and decision making differences of those same
individuals
(e.g., Dionne & Dionne, 2008; Yammarino & Dansereau,
2009a). In this instance, there is a wholes perspective endorsed
at the
individual level (individual differences), a wholes perspective
employed at the team level, and a cross-level formulation that
is of interest. Similarly, Van Vugt et al. (2008) discuss the
evolution of leading and following as a solution to a social
coordination
problem involving, among other elements, intra-group
peacekeeping and inter-group competition. In this case, there is
a wholes
perspective employed at both the leader (individual level) and
the group level, and thus a cross-level (wholes) formulation
of focus. The constructs in these formulations can then be
measured and analyzed at multiple levels to assess their merit

and validity
for individual, team, and cross-level behaviors in organizations
and for leadership, decision making, and performance. As such,
we
have the parallel examples in OSL (to that from ET) of cross -
level wholes formulations and effects from the individual to the
team
levels. Thus, the example from the more mature and established
field of ET provides scholars with some potential insights to
the study of the newer instances in OSL, and levels knowledge
is transferred or translated across disciplines to enhance this
latter
field of study.
ET, as a well established interdisciplinary approach, also
endorses the position that simple notions can explain complex
phenomena (e.g., Gould, 2002; Wilson, 2002; Wolfram, 2002).
For example, Gould's (2002) comprehensive review of evolu-
tionary theory, using a levels-of-analysis perspective, recounts
the history of evolution from simple to complex explanations
and then back to simple explanations of evolution and its
various aspects and applications at multiple levels. Wol fram
(2002),
also cognizant of levels of analysis, similarly shows how simple
computational dynamic models (simulations) at a focal level,
can explain a variety of simple and complex evolutionary ideas
which may occur at higher or lower levels. Likewise,
Stix (2008) contrasted the current competing evolutionary
theories of human origins and migrations—the more complex
multi-regional (higher-level) theory that posits modern
characteristics evolved from archaic hominid populations in
Africa,
Asia, and Europe that inter-bred so they remained a single
species; and the simpler (lower-level) out-of-Africa theory that
asserts
humans with modern traits left Africa and settled the world. He

demonstrated that the most recent data from DNA analysis and
tracking favor the latter, simpler view.
22 (2011) 1042–1057
In all these cases, as in science in general, simple explanations
are preferred to complex ones, especially when they account for
phenomena equally well; and levels of analysis offer one way to
help clarify and simplify such explanations. So, for OSL,
learning
from the mature established ET field, simple notions or theories
can hold great promise for explaining a variety of both simple
as
well as complex behaviors in organizations at various levels of
analysis. Complexity, and explaining complex behaviors, does
not
require complex underlying rule structures (i.e., complex
theories or ideas); and levels of analysis issues provide a way to
frame
such explanations (see Wolfram, 2002; Yammarino &
Dansereau, 2009a).
As noted by Yammarino and Dansereau (2009a), however,
organizational and leadership research is currently in a
“complex”
phase, after having been in a much “simpler” phase earlier in its
history. To help jump-start a return of the field to simpler
explanatory times, they develop and illustrate four simple OSL
theories using a levels-of-analysis perspective to account for
complex phenomena. And importantly, in terms of the etiology
of these theories, all four have their foundations in evolutionary
theory ideas which serve as the ultimate explanation of why the
behaviors in the theories exist (see Scott-Phillips, Dickins, &

West, 2011).
Theory 1 asserts that option cutting and commitment are
positively related based on between-persons differences (inter-
individual differences or whole persons); a level -specific theory
at the person level of analysis. From an evolutionary theory per -
spective, Yammarino and Dansereau (2009a) note that this
effect may matter because without it or something similar, it
would
likely be impossible for individuals to make decisions and stay
with or attach to them (also see Scott-Phillips et al., 2011). The
assertion means that an individual can commit to a course of
action and pursue it. Without this capability, or something
similar
to it, when faced with a threat, there would be too many
(virtually unlimited) options to pursue, and the individual would
likely
experience analysis paralysis. In such a situation, if a predator
was starting to attack, this paralysis would have resulted in
extinc-
tion. Thus this effect, or something like it, may be quite
important for the survival of humans. Those individuals with
capabilities
to cut options and become committed may have been likely to
pass that characteristic on in an evolutionary sense.
Theory 2 asserts that investments and returns are positively
related based on between-dyads differences (whole dyads);
a level-specific theory that emerges at the dyad level of
analysis. From an evolutionary theory perspective, Yammarino
and
Dansereau (2009a) note that this effect may matter because
without it or something similar, it seems unlikely that
individuals
would have seen benefits from interacting with others (making
investments), even if only for a very short time (also see Scott-

Phillips
et al., 2011). For example, those individuals who are likely to
see returns (for example, of a sexual nature) from interacting
with others
are those who are more likely to have children. Thus the
capability implicit in the assertion would be passed on in an
evolutionary
sense. Moreover, without this effect, it would be difficult for a
child to survive because a child cannot fend for himself or
herself.
Thus, if providing for the child did not provide some benefit to
the parent or other caregiver, the child would be unable to
survive.
Theory 3 asserts that interdependence and cohesion are
positively related based on between-groups differences (whole
groups); a level-specific theory that emerges at the group level
of analysis. From an evolutionary theory perspective,
Yammarino
and Dansereau (2009a) note that this effect may matter because
without it or something similar, it seems unlikely that people
would have cooperated with or bonded to one another (also see
Scott-Phillips et al., 2011). Specifically, when faced with
the need to hunt or protect themselves, individuals are almost
by definition interdependent with each other because
they would likely be unable to eat or survive without one
another. As a result, cooperation and cohesion serve as ways for
human beings to compete successfully relative to other species;
and in a somewhat interesting way, cooperation provides
a way to compete with other species. Because those individuals
who cooperate will likely survive, it is their capability for
group-level cooperation and cohesion in response to
interdependence that would be passed on in an evolutionary
sense.
Theory 4 asserts that titles and expectations are positively

related based on between-collectives differences (whole collec-
tives); a cross-level theory from person to dyad to group to
collective levels of analysis. From an evolutionary theory
perspective,
Yammarino and Dansereau (2009a) note that this effect may
matter because without it or something similar, it seems
unlikely
that language would have developed (also see Scott-Phillips et
al., 2011). Language provides a way to learn from the
knowledge
of the past about how things occur. Thus the ability to title an
event and use this title in the future provides an advantage in
the
competition of a species for survival. Obviously, without
language, each event and approach to it would have to be
rediscovered
by each generation. With the learning of words (titles) and their
meaning (expectations), it becomes possible to use the
successes
of the past to cope with the present. As such, this capability
increases the likelihood of human survival and so would be
passed on
in an evolutionary sense.
Likewise, relying on the combination of “simpler” ideas and
levels of analysis and evolutionary theory perspectives,
Lawrence
(2010) attempts to explain and understand leadership as a
function of four independent and at times conflicting basic
human
drives that have evolutionary and biological bases. These are
the drives (1) to acquire what is needed to survive and for the
conception and survival of offspring; (2) to defend oneself and
offspring; (3) to bond, or form long-term mutually caring
and trusting relationships with others; and (4) to comprehend,
or learn, create, innovate, and understand oneself and the

environ-
ment. To accomplish this purpose, Lawrence (2010) relies on
both of Darwin's books (1859, 1871). In the latter book, The
Descent
of Man, Darwin notes the most important difference between
humans and other species is our innate moral sense or
conscience.
As such, while the first two drives are common across species,
the third and fourth are unique to humans.
Lawrence (2010) builds the case that our brain has evolved for,
and has specific structures involved in, leadership and
decision making which integrate and resolve conflicts among
the four drives. He asserts that when all four primary drives
are fulfilled and balanced long-term by leaders who also help
and influence their followers and stakeholders to do likewise,
then an optimal state of leadership, good (moral) leadership,
will be achieved. For Lawrence (2010), misguided (amoral)
leadership is when leaders as well as followers and stakeholders
whom they influence fulfill one or some drives but ignore
or suppress other drives; bad (immoral) leadership is when
leaders lack the drive to bond and have influence over others
22 (2011) 1042–1057
and only fulfill their own drives to acquire, defend, and
comprehend; and evil (immoral) leadership, a subset of bad
leadership,
is the actual killing of others.
So, for Lawrence (2010), anyone with a conscience or a moral
sense has the potential to be a good leader and can be involved
in leadership per se. He also uses his approach to describe and

categorize a number of historical and contemporary leaders in
the
political, economic–corporate, and religion–art–science arenas.
Thus, Lawrence (2010) presents an evolutionary-based approach
to leadership that includes multiple levels of analysis—the first
and second drives (to acquire and defend) are individual -level
phenomena; the third drive (to bond) is fulfilled at the dyad,
group/team, and higher levels; and the fourth drive (to
comprehend)
can be viewed as multi-level and cross-level in nature.
As these “simple” theories of Yammarino and Dansereau
(2009a) and Lawrence (2010) employ both evolutionary theory
and
levels-of-analysis perspectives as foundations, they can serve as
exemplars of the transfer or translation of learning across fields
from ET to OSL. In essence, as developed and illustrated by
these scholars, multi-level OSL theory and research must
become the
norm, not the exception, for the advancement of our field, and
can be informed by the alignment of the analogous multi-level
issues from ET.
4.2. Multi-level issues in OSL
Individual differences notions, one-to-one dyadic
(interpersonal) relationships, group and team dynamics, theories
and
models within different types of organizations and industries,
strategic-level ideas, and cross-cultural approaches are all
levels-
of-analysis conceptualizations and formulations that OSL
scholars should address more fully. In these cases, as in ET,
higher levels
of analysis also can serve as moderators, mediators, and
contexts (environments) in various multi-level approaches that

should
be considered in future theory and research. As in ET,
constructs and variables must be defined explicitly to include
single or
multiple levels of analyses, and relationships must be specified
explicitly to incorporate levels of analyses, whether single-
level, multiple levels, or multi-level in nature.
Measures and assessments, in turn, as those in ET, must be
developed with the level(s) of analysis of the concepts,
constructs,
and theory in mind. Measurement and assessments must be
conducted at the appropriate level(s) of analysis; and, at a
minimum,
justification and tests for aggregation are necessary when
concepts are measured and assessed at a lower level than thei r
theo-
retical specification. Next, like in ET, the choice of a data-
analytic technique should be driven by theory and include the
appropri-
ate multi-level tools and analyses. Because many OSL
formulations are process-oriented or developmental, as in ET,
designs and
data collection must be longitudinal in nature, requiring the use
of appropriate longitudinal multi-level data analytic techniques.
Finally, in terms of drawing inferences, analogous to procedures
in ET, alignment of theory (with explicit multiple levels-of-
analysis specifications) and data (with explicit incorporation of
multiple levels of analysis in measurement and analysis) must
have a multi-level focus. When these concerns are addressed,
OSL research will better emulate and align with more
established
work like in ET and understanding in our field will advance to
the cutting edge.
As noted by Nicholson and White (2006) and Van Vugt et al.

(2008), there is a growing interest in ET ideas and an increasing
application of them to a variety of areas “in and around”
organizations and leadership (e.g., cognitions, decision making,
emo-
tions, motivation, negotiation, interpersonal relations, group
dynamics, ethical behaviors, gender issues, social structure, and
culture). The use of analogous multi-level concepts and issues
in ET and OSL provide one way to begin to address these
ideas in future work. For example, from a more micro
perspective, using behavioral genetics notions, Ilies et al.
(2006) point out
developments that occur in genetic studies of between-
individual differences variables, genetic influences on
organizational out-
comes, genetic–environment interactions on behavioral
constructs, and person–situation interactions on attitudes and
perfor-
mance. From a more macro perspective, using ET and
Darwinian ideas, Pierce and White (1999, 2006) assert and
demonstrate
that the resources context (a higher level of analysis) affects
emergent social structure and behaviors in groups and
collectives
(lower levels of analysis). From a more multi-level perspective,
Yammarino and Dansereau (2009a) use ET ideas and
explanations
to understand the etiology of the effects for four theories that
constitute a new kind of OSL. In all these cases, a multi-level
perspec-
tive on ET and OSL in combination is employed, and multi-
level issues in ET offer an opportunity to expand our knowledge
of multi-
level theory building and theory testing in OSL.
There are many ways to pursue OSL topics using the multi-level
approach described here. Focusing on leadership, we provide

some additional examples from previous research that have
begun to pursue new directions and lines of work that can be
further
enhanced based on this multi-level approach. The examples are
organized in terms of first, theory development from inductive
and deductive perspectives; second, literature reviews; third,
validity; and fourth, empirical testing. Modeling these
leadership
exemplars in future research would result in theories that are
anchored in a specific level or multiple levels of analysis,
theoretically
and empirically, parsimonious or unique from each other, and
repeatedly predictive and observable. Without movement in
this multi-level direction, we will have theories that are limited
as they refer to nothing that can be observed and, therefore, are
not testable, are redundant, are not parsimonious, and ultimately
are not predictive.
First, in terms of theory development in leadership, multi -level
concepts are particularly important because there is a focus on
leaders as persons (e.g., leader traits, perceptions of leaders,
implicit leadership theories) and others who are followers
connected
with leaders in dyads or groups/teams, typically within multiple
collectives (e.g., departments and organizations). Scholars
can then ask, for example, what leadership variables might
explain the evolution of independent individuals to a dyad,
group,
or team composed of interdependent individuals?
A study by Zhou and Schriesheim (2009) illustrates a somewhat
qualitative and inductive way to gain insights to this evolu-
tionary process. Zhou and Schriesheim (2009) focused on both
leaders and followers simultaneously and developed hypotheses

22 (2011) 1042–1057
about how leaders and followers may perceive each other and
when they may be in agreement with one another. Although
focused on LMX, this approach can be employed to build
theories about the development of leader–follower relationships
based
on other leadership views. In another qualitative and somewhat
inductive study, Wallis, Yammarino, and Feyerherm (2011)
used observational and interview techniques in a non-structured
way to develop an understanding of the relationship between
leaders and followers. Although their results supported the
notion of individualized leadership (Dansereau, Yammarino, et
al.,
1995b), this approach can be used to clarify how leaders move
(or evolve) from independent individuals to individuals who are
interdependent with their followers one-to-one in dyads. This
evolutionary process seems to be poorly understood; but
inductive
research similar to that of Zhou and Schriesheim (2009) and
Wallis et al. (2011) would appear to help to clarify it.
Taking a more deductive perspective, current theories of
leadership may be enhanced by further development from a
multi-
level perspective. In this case, a key issue is whether a
particular theory can apply in different ways at multiple levels
of analysis.
Yammarino, Dionne, Schriesheim, and Dansereau (2008), for
example, develop and extend authentic leadership theory and
the concepts of authentic leadership per se and positive
organizational behavior to include several levels of analysis and
multi-
level notions. Such evolutions of existing theoretical

approaches that focus on multiple levels do not preclude
theories that
focus on solely one level and not other levels, but do offer
another venue for future research to pursue.
Second, in terms of literature reviews, there are numerous
contemporary approaches to leadership, each with their own
concepts and relationships. There are, however, very few
reviews that focus on the meaning of key concepts and
relationships
along with the level(s) of analysis that are hypothesized in the
theories and with a careful examination of what level(s) of
analysis are actually tested in the studies reviewed. As an
exception, Schriesheim, Castro, and Cogliser (1999) provide a
compre-
hensive review of the evolution of the LMX literature and raise
very specific questions about levels issues for LMX. Similar
levels-
based questions and issues can arise for other leadership views
but have been largely ignored in literature reviews of these
other
leadership approaches. An exception, for this case, is the
comprehensive levels-based literature review of 17 leadership
theories by
Yammarino et al. (2005). Their review of the literature suggests
that many of the levels of analysis problems described by
Schriesheim
et al. (1999) about LMX may be fairly widespread throughout
the leadership theories in the extant literature. Clearly, much
more
work of this type is needed in future literature reviews of
leadership, especially for those theories not covered by
Schriesheim et al.
(1999) and Yammarino et al. (2005).
Third, in terms of validity, a key question that arises is, what

are the significant differences among the various approaches to
leadership both theoretically and empirically? In terms of
parsimony, this question can be phrased as, are there basic
(simpler)
processes underlying leadership that justify all, or a number of,
the different approaches? Data showing convergence and
discrim-
ination validity seems needed across studies and approaches to
address these issues, and levels of analysis are part of the
solution
toward parsimony and simplicity in leadership work. For
example, in examining LMX, Schriesheim and Cogliser (2009)
provided
a way to examine such issues via levels and raised questions
about the meaning of LMX relative to other more basic
variables.
Moreover, Yammarino and Dansereau (2009a) offered two
parsimonious levels-based leadership theories, and empirical
evidence
for their validity, as a way to integrate and simplify several
leadership approaches. Such levels-of-analysis-related validity
studies
seem necessary to understand the commo nality across
leadership work, but they could also provide validation of the
differences
among multiple theories of leadership.
Fourth, in terms of empirical testing, the notion of levels of
analysis and multi-level issues creates tremendous challenges
and
opportunities for theory testing in OSL. In an organizational
setting, the difficulty arises from the nesting and potential
dependen-
cies of individuals in dyads, groups/teams, and collectives such
as departments and organizations. As pointed out by
Schriesheim,

Castro, Zhou, and Yammarino (2001), the setting creates the
possibility of theorizing “A” but testing “B.” In their review
and illus-
tration, Schriesheim et al. (2001) indicate that without
appropriate levels-based tests, researchers have no real idea
about
the level(s) potentially associated with observed effects in data
collected in the setting. The dominant solution in the literature
is to assume that (1) a particular level (levels) is (are) relevant,
(2) that effects will not occur if the level is incorrect, and
(3) that effects will occur if the level is accurately specified.
Because of the nesting in the setting, however, that is not
necessarily
the case and these assumptions may not hold. Effects may occur
at only one level, or be a manifes tation of higher- and lower-
level
effects simultaneously, or effects may not occur at one level
because the effects hold at a lower level. There are a number of
illus-
trations of how to deal with these various types of multi -level
effects and the multi-level analytic techniques to rule out (test)
the
effects of levels of analysis that seem less plausible based on
the data (e.g., Dansereau & Yammarino, 2006; Dansereau et al.,
1984,
2006; Klein & Kozlowski, 2000; Schriesheim et al., 2001;
Yammarino, 1998). Moreover, as multi-level issues are
considered
more comprehensively, then various methods such as
RCM/HLM, MLSEM, and WABA can be compared and used
simultaneously
rather than separately (see, for example, Gooty & Yammarino,
2011; Klein & Kozlowski, 2000).
In addition, longitudinal studies are clearly necessary to address
evolutionary-type questions in OSL. To focus solely on con-

cepts and relationships over time without regard for levels of
analysis and multi-level issues over time will greatly hamper
theory
building and theory testing. Methods are available to assess the
degree of interdependence among individuals and other entities
over time and changes in entities over time that allow for
interdependencies that do not involve just aggregation (see, for
exam-
ple, Dansereau et al., 1999). Addressing such issues may
provide a window into the role that leaders play in the evolution
or
emergence of groups and teams (e.g., Yammarino & Dansereau,
2009a). Interestingly, a focus on multi-level effects over time
does not preclude concurrent investigations of less changeable
characteristics of entities. Longitudinal studies allow for an
assess-
ment of stability and change in, on the one hand, concepts and
relationships, and on the other hand, entities and levels of
analysis.
Such work allows scholars to tease out those factors in a study
that are less changeable than others. The interaction of more
stable
(e.g., whole person) variables and effects with less stable (e.g.,
person parts) variables, as well as assessments of the stability
and
change or evolution of higher-level entities and variables,
would provide richer, more comprehensive, and likely more
successful
22 (2011) 1042–1057
theories in leadership. Such a multi-level approach to
longitudinal theory building and testing in leadership and all

organization
science can be based on the successes of the analogous multi -
level approaches in ET and other sciences.
5. Conclusion
Overall then, there are three primary transfers or translations of
learning, lessons learned so to speak, for OSL scholars to gain
from the exploration of ET and multi-level issues here. First, as
shown for ET, levels of analysis and multi-level issues are
critical for
the development of a field to become a mature and established
discipline. Therefore, it is important to include a consideration
of
multi-level issues in the formulation and testing of OSL notions
for our field to develop further and faster. Second, as discussed
for
ET, the formulation of simple ideas that are well tested are a
hallmark of an established discipline, and levels of analysis and
multi-
level issues provide a way to facilitate that scientific research
process. OSL scholars might strive to use levels of analysis and
multi-
level issues to formulate and test simple notions in a rigorous
way. Third, again as shown for ET, levels of analysis and multi -
level
concerns are not solely methods issues, but are also theoretical
issues. So, for OSL to advance as a field and mature into a more
established discipline, multi-level issues and levels of analysis
should be addressed in both theory building (conceptualization)
and theory testing (methodology). While employing insights
from the multi-level notions in evolutionary theory is by no
means
easy, doing so will inform organization science and leadership
scholars and bring the goal of better understanding in the field a
bit closer to realization.

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