1. Kelsey Salter
Sentientism
Philosopher Peter Singer outlines his views on the equality and rights of animals and his
basis for ‘sentientism’ in his essay, The Animal Liberation Movement. The Animal Liberation
Movement is a justice movement that has gained popularity over the last 50 years that defends the
interests and sentience of animals. Singer argues that animals should be considered sentient beings
in that they have the “the capacity to suffer or experience enjoyment or happiness”. (Singer, 1985.)
Therefore, because animals are sentient beings as humans also are, their interests should be given
equal consideration. In this paper, I will reconstruct Singer’s argument on sentience, and then offer
criticisms that challenge his theory.
Early on in Singer’s argument, he outlines the difference held in the values held by society
when it comes to humans and when it comes to animals. He defines this difference as ‘speciesism’.
Singer declares speciesism to be on par with other negative social constructs such as racism and
sexism, in agreement with Bentham’s writings. Singer also draws conclusions from the writings
of Bentham when he writes, “The capacity for suffering and enjoying things is a prerequisite for
having interests at all, a condition that must be satisfied before we can speak of interests in any
meaningful way.” (Singer, 1985.) Singer accompanies this statement with a narrative that very
clearly outlines the principle of sentience. He mentions that if a child were to kick a stone up a
road, the stone would not feel pain the duration of the time it is being kicked. However- if a child
were to kick a mouse up a road, the mouse would feel pain and suffer the entire time. This is
Singer’s basis for sentientism. While other philosophers believe that cognitive abilities should play
a part in determining interests for animals, Singer believes that is not so. Singer refutes these

2. arguments when he mentions that a disabled person with less cognitive abilities than an animal is
still able to suffer as much as the animal with the same cognitive ability. Singer is also advocating
for the equal consideration of interests to be extended towards animals as well as to humans. He
does not advocate for animals to have equal rights to humans, for the differences between the two
species are too vast. Animals of course, are not active participants in our society. He merely
believes that animals’ pain and suffering should be considered equally to the pain and suffering
that humans experience. Animals and humans indeed do both have the interest to not suffer. Lastly,
Singer’s views call for a change in society. Singer is opposed to animal experimentation for
scientific and medical research, the role of animals in factory farming, and hunting animals for
sport. Singer believes that fully eliminating these facets of animal suffering caused by humans is
necessary to consider animals’ interests equal to human interests.
I will now expand on some criticisms I believe could be brought forth to Singer’s argument.
Singer’s argument has been labeled before as too ‘vague’. He does not specify each and every
animal that would be considered. Do insects feel pain? If they do, should we stop using
exterminators and pesticides to rid them from our homes? Should I consider an animals interests
over my own when I am being attacked by one? How much of my lifestyle must I change to fit
this model of equal consideration of interests? Singer does not expand enough on the exact effects
of this model, he only mentions factory farming, hunting for sport, and scientific and medical
research. If we did stop all animal involvement in medical research, what would happen? Would
we be able to fight death and disease in the same way that we do now? Surely not, we need these
animals to test medications because testing on humans is unethical. This could compromise our
own interests and health. Another factor that Singer does not expand enough upon is the issue of
measurement. How are we able to calculate suffering? Where is the stopping point? Must we not

3. associate ourselves with animals at all to prevent suffering? What parameters must we set in place?
Where do we draw the line? There are other concerns involved within our ecological and scientific
community when it comes to conservation. How will we be able to study the Earth and the
environment without any animal suffering? How do we study animals themselves? There are too
many generalities in Singer’s argument. These are all questions that must be answered before equal
consideration of interests using the theory of sentientism can be implemented today.
Personally, I think sentientism and equal consideration of interests does not seem entirely
plausible to be a practical measure today. I think that while the general idea is well and good, there
are too many complications that would implicate difficulties to humans. Large-scale changes
would have to be in place before any of this can be considered, and I do not see our society agreeing
to them. However, some strengths I believe sentientism does have are that considering everyone’s
needs and interests is a very positive model for maximizing overall good, even if it is very
utilitarian. Preventing the suffering of animals is also a very morally sound concept that I believe
most will agree with. Some disadvantages of sentientism are that it could be implemented if only
humans were practical and flexible enough to do so. Unfortunately, sentientism could be asking
too much of today’s society. Many aspects of the way we live would have to change to implement
these views into action and it would not be cost-effective. We would have to change the way we
live, eat, work, and heal other humans. Utilizing these practices would be very helpful to
minimizing the pain and suffering of animals, but unfortunately – they would likely cause more
harm than good for humans.

4. Works Cited
Singer, Peter. The Animal Liberation Movement. Nottingham: Old Hammond, 1985. PDF.
DesJardins, Joseph R. Environmental Ethics: An Introduction to Environmental Philosophy.
Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 1993. 123-135. Print.