2. • At face value, the term “post-conflict reconstruction”
could mean both the restoration of economic, political
and social structures that existed prior to the outbreak of
violent conflict (Pankhurst 2003), or the redesign of
these structures to prevent the recurrence of large-scale
violence.
• The latter use of the term is more common, though post-
conflict reconstruction always involves elements of
restoration too. Post-conflict reconstruction and
peacebuilding are typically seen as very closely
interlinked, if not interchangeable concepts:
Post-conflict reconstruction and
peacebuilding
3. – Last week’s definition: Peacebuilding involves “sustained and
multidimensional efforts to address the structural causes of
conflict … and to reconcile relationships affected by conflict”
(Barnes 2009:14);
– “post-conflict reconstruction is aimed at establishing
institutions that are superior to those that existed before the
violent escalation of the conflict and do not contain the same
failures that led to the conflict in the first place” (Wolff 2006:156).
– Furthermore, “[f]illing the bold, and often vague, pronouncements
of peace settlements with substance is the unique contribution
that post-conflict reconstruction makes to conflict settlement, and
in doing so it is, indeed, a fundamental and necessary element
of the conflict settlement process” (Wolff 2006).
Post-conflict reconstruction and
peacebuilding
4. • Introduction: Is after the war before the war?
• The liberal international peacebuilding paradigm
• The blind spots of post-conflict reconstruction: gender
and informal political institutions
• Problems of violence and spoilers in peace processes
• Summary
Lecture outline
6. • Between one-third and one-half of all ended
conflicts revert to warfare within five years
(Lomborg 2004);
• 36% of civil wars that ended between 1945 and
1996 experienced renewed warfare (Walter
2004);
• 30% of civil wars that ended between 1945 and
1999 reverted to warfare within two years (Doyle
and Sambanis 2006).
The track record of war recurrence
(summarised by Call and Cousens 2007)
7. • 41 of 103 civil wars between 1945 and 1998 were
concluded through negotiated settlement;
• the mean survival of a civil war settlement is
approximately 42 months;
• approximately 37% of peace agreements end in a return
to civil violence within five years.
The track record of negotiated
civil war settlements (Hartzell et al. 2001)
8. • Rwanda: 1993 Arusha Accords
→ Note that failure is here being conceived of in
negative peace terms. i.e. a return to warfare.
Failed conflict settlements -case studies
9. • “Post-conflict” generally refers to a period when the
“formal” phase of fighting has stopped and the threat of
violence – apart from isolated incidents – is apparently
over (Handrahan 2004). In other words, it is generally
conceptualised in a negative peace way.
“Post-conflict”
10. Yet the term ‘post-conflict’ is misleading on various interrelated
accounts:
– because “after” the violence might be before the [new] violence
(cp. previous slides);
– because there might not be a “true” end point to violent ethnic
conflict (Lake and Rothchild 1996);
– because peace agreements need not [and maybe cannot?]
resolve the conflicting goals of the contending parties, cp.
Northern Ireland and Bosnia and Herzegovina: “peace
agreements do not resolve conflicts – at best they provide a
framework in which conflicting goals can be accommodated and
pursued by means other than political violence” (Wolff 2006);
– because peace agreements may hold, yet witness changing
forms of violence rather than a total end to violence;
– because conflict can take on both violent and nonviolent forms
and as such exists in all societies at all times (consider Conflict
Resolution theory).
Why the term “post-conflict” is misleading
11. • demobilisation;
• demining;
• disarmament;
• establishment of international and local civilian police
forces;
• rebuilding infrastructure;
• establishment of the rule of law and a working judiciary;
• institution-building;
• socio-economic rehabilitation [and reorganisation];
• organising and supervising electoral processes;
• education and promotion of human rights;
• democratisation;
• capacity-building;
• psycho-social healing (Llamazares 2005).
Common items on the peacebuilding agenda
13. • “The Security Council recognizes that peacebuilding …
requires short and long-term actions tailored to address
the particular needs of societies sliding into conflict or
emerging from it. These actions should focus on
fostering sustainable development, the eradication of
poverty and inequalities, transparent and accountable
governance, the promotion of democracy, respect for
human rights and the rule of law and the promotion of a
culture of peace and non-violence” (UN 2001 cited in
Call and Cousens 2007: 4-5).
• Barnes (2009: 18): positive peace has been achieved
“where democratic governance is established, where
human rights are protected, and where sustained
progress can be made towards development”.
Some peacebuilding standards
14. • Since the end of the Cold War, the international
organisations [and to a lesser extent also the
international NGOs] that have been most prominent in
peacebuilding efforts have been strongly committed to
the liberal international peacebuilding paradigm (Paris
1997).
• “The central tenet of this paradigm is the assumption that
the surest foundation for peace, both within and between
states, is market democracy, that is, a liberal democratic
polity and a market-oriented economy” (ibid.: 56).
The liberal international peacebuilding
paradigm
15. • Democracy empowers the people, increases legitimacy,
responsiveness and accountability of the political system (e.g.
Rueschemeyer et al. 1992);
• (consolidated) democracies are less likely to experience ethnic
violence (Gurr 2000);
• economic and political freedoms reinforce each other (Lipset
1959; Moore 1966);
• free market economies – if accompanied by the “right” social
policies – can increase the wealth of a country and reduce
socioeconomic inequalities (Williamson 2002);
• according to modernisation theory, all countries will become free
market democracies anyway (Huntington 2000; Rustow 1970).
Arguments in favour of the liberal international
peacebuilding paradigm
16. • Political and economic transitions are tumultuous, conflict-ridden
and lengthy processes (Huntington 2000);
• the liberal international peacebuilding paradigm increases the
risk of violent conflict by recommending multiple transitions at the
same time;
• war-shattered states are ill-equipped to manage the societal
competition induced by political and economic liberalisation
(Paris 1997);
• the institutional and political incoherence of countries undergoing
regime change open up opportunities for political leaders to
manipulate ethnic identities for their own benefit (Snyder 2000);
• neoliberal reforms lead to [temporary??] economic deterioration
and tend to increase socioeconomic inequalities (Huber and Solt
2004; Przeworski 1991).
Shortcomings of the liberal international
peacebuilding paradigm
17. Part III:
The blind spots of post-conflict reconstruction:
gender and informal political institutions
18. • Although there has been increasing awareness of the
gendered oversight in ethnic conflict studies, women’s
concerns are still typically excluded from peace processes
(Handrahan 2004; Pankhurst 2003), despite UN Resolution
1325, and peace processes are usually highly masculinised.
• This failure to consider women’s concerns reflects implicit or
explicit attempt to restore pre-conflict gender roles, and the
patriarchal constraints and norms of the international
development community (ibid.).
• The neglect of women’s particular concerns reinforces their
symbolic role as mere objects/vessels in ethnic wars; the
neglect of gender relations and gendered structures of society
more widely constrains expectations of men and masculinity
as well as women and femininity.
The first blind spot: gender
19. The post-conflict period may pose as much, if not more
security threats to women (Handrahan 2004):
• because trafficking in women, female slavery and gang rapes
become more likely;
• because women might be forced into prostitution out of
economic necessity;
• because domestic violence increases;
• because “honour” killings and suicides are more likely to
occur.
Heightened security concerns for women after
conflict
20. • Failing to include former female combatants in the
reintegration process may pose a serious security threat
(MacKenzie 2009).
• Women’s potential to contribute to economic, political
and social development is underestimated (Pankhurst
2003).
• Peacebuilding efforts that do not meet social realities are
perceived as artificial and likely to cause tensions
(Handrahan 2004).
Implications of this gendered oversight
for the peacebuilding project
21. • Week 14: Informal political institutions are enduring
structures that shape political interactions, but – unlike
formal political institutions - are safeguarded through
entrenched social mechanisms, not formally codified nor
guaranteed by the state (Lauth 2000). Examples include
networks of corruption and structures of civic life.
• Despite an increasing awareness about the relevance of
informal political institutions (Varshney 2001; Wimmer
2002), peace research, ethnic conflict studies and
peacebuilding efforts have paid far more attention to
questions of formal institutional design.
The second blind spot: informal political
institutions
22. • Corruption can be broadly defined as acts in which
public officials violate the formal rules and duties of their
position in exchange for wealth or status gains either for
themselves, their family or a private clique (Nye 1967).
• Where corrupt networks form around ethnic solidarities –
and there is ample evidence to suggest that they often
do (Mauro 1995; Wimmer 2002) – this not only harms
economic growth (Mauro 1995) but also fosters
socioeconomic inequalities between ethnic groups and
leads to political exclusion (Ndikumana 1998).
The relevance of corruption
23. • Corruption thereby decreases both the
effectiveness and legitimacy of the state, fosters
grievances, intensifies competition over
resources and contributes to inter-ethnic
tensions (Wimmer 2002).
• By implicitly or explicitly accepting corruption,
peacebuilding efforts can restore old or create
new sources of resentment (Call and Cousens
2007).
The relevance of corruption
24. • According to Varshney (2001), structures of civic life that
are interethnic and associational have a significant
impact on the prospects of ethnopolitical stability, as they
can countervail events that would otherwise lead to the
polarisation of ethnic groups.
• But although the empowerment of civil society features
prominently on the peacebuilding agenda of international
organisations such as the EU and UN, their civil society
programmes for instance in Bosnia and Herzegovina
have been ambiguous at best and detrimental at worst
(Belloni 2001).
The relevance of structures of civic life
26. “War may end, but if former combatants lack
jobs and skills and if weapons are easily
available, then violent crime may increase and
rob citizens of their security and their hopes for
a robust peace dividend” (Stedman 2002).
Violence and DDR
27. 1) Strategic and tactical use of violence to
undermine peace.
2) Potential rise in criminal violence that can
undermine the value of peace.
3) Psychological and physical effects of past
violence.
(Stedman 2002)
3 problems violence poses for peace
implementation
28. 1) To overcome or minimize the threat of spoilers.
2) To demobilize soldiers & reintegrate them into
civilian life.
3) To lay foundations for future long-term
peacebuilding: reform of police & judiciaries;
wider disarmament in society; building local
capacity for human rights & reconciliation.
(Stedman 2002)
3 priorities in sustaining peace
29. “Although the tasks of disarmament and
demobilization are often bundled,
demobilization plays a far greater role in
ensuring successful peace implementation”
(Spear 2002)
Disarmament, Demobilization and
Reintegration (DDR)
30. • Demobilization “is only possible when there is
some measure of disarmament. Similarly, the
success of demobilization efforts is contingent
upon effective rehabilitation of the former
combatants and their integration into civilian life
or a restructured army”.
• DDR has “a symbolic and political importance
beyond the sum of its parts”.
(United Nations Development Programme 2002)
Disarmament, Demobilization and
Reintegration (DDR)
31. • Spoilers are “leaders and factions who view a
particular peace as opposed to their interests
and who are willing to use violence to undermine
it” (Stedman 2002:103).
• Spoilers can be positioned inside or outside of a
peace agreement (cp. President Juvenal
Habyarimana as inside spoiler, and the
Committee for the Defense of the Revolution as
outside spoiler in Rwanda).
Spoilers
32. • Spoiler problems also differ according to the number of
spoilers, the type of spoiler (limited, greedy or total) and
the locus of the spoiler problem (Stedman 1997).
• Which management strategy is most appropriate
depends largely on the spoiler type. Broadly speaking,
“total spoilers … must be defeated or so marginalized
that they can do little damage” (ibid.:14), greedy spoilers
“require a long-term strategy of socialization” (ibid.:15)
and limited spoilers can be appeased through
inducements.
Spoilers
33. • As Stedman (2002) acknowledges himself, his
framework calls for caution regarding spoilers, but has
little predictive or prescriptive value. Ultimately, it is
neither possible to know the motivations of spoilers nor
which strategy of spoiler management is likely to
backfire.
The problem with the spoiler framework
35. • There are [arguably] four crucial reasons why peacebuilding (or:
post-conflict reconstruction) efforts fail: due to the inherent
contradictions of the liberal international peacebuilding paradigm,
peacebuilders’ blind spots regarding gender issues and informal
political institutions, and the fact that it is impossible to anticipate
the type or extent of the spoiler problem in peace processes.
• From this follows that the success rate of peacebuilding projects
may be improved by adopting a more moderate liberalisation
agenda in post-conflict societies; taking the diverse experiences of
women during conflict situations seriously in the peace process;
addressing the risks of corruption and fostering interethnic
structures of civic life; and appreciate that peacebuilding efforts
will always be vulnerable to spoilers.
Summary
