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© 2016 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.
Hacking HTTP/2
New attacks on the Internet’s Next Generation Foundation
Itsik Mantin, Nadav Avital
August 2016
© 2016 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.
• Itsik Mantin
• Director of Security Research at Imperva
• 15 years experience in the security industry
• Holds an M.Sc. in Applied Math and Computer
Science
• Nadav Avital
• Application security research team leader
• 10 years of industry experience, mostly hacking
and security technology
• Holds B. Sc. in Computer Science
Speakers
© 2016 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.
Credit
• Noam Mazor,
Application Security researcher at Imperva
• Alex Maidanik and Avihai Cohen,
Technion - Israeli Institute of Technology
© 2016 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.
The Research
• Unexplored territories of HTTP/2
– New mechanisms
– New server implementations
HTTP/2
© 2016 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.
The Servers
© 2016 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.
Outline
HTTP/2 Motivation and Background
HTTP/2 Technology
The Attacks
Summary and Conclusion
© 2016 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.
HTTP/2 Motivation
• HTTP 1.1 is no longer suitable for
modern web content
– Large number of web resources per page
– Latency
– Head of Line blocking
– Large headers
© 2016 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.
2016 Web
© 2016 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.
HTTP/2 Design Principles
• Main goal: speed
– Reduce latency
– Reduce bandwidth
• Support gradual deployment
– Preserve HTTP 1.1 semantics
(over a new binary layer)
– Negotiation protocol (ALPN)
• Encryption
– Mandated by many implementations
© 2016 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.
© 2016 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.
Lightfast Adoption
Web Clients
Content Delivery
Networks
Sites
Web Servers
© 2016 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.
HTTP/2 Technology
© 2016 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.
HTTP/2 Technology
HPACK
Server Push
Stream
Multiplexing
HPACK
Compression
Flow Control
© 2016 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.
HTTP/2 Transport Layer
•Binary objects
•The smallest data delivery unit
•Can include headers, data, settings, etc.
Frame
•Carrying Request+Response
•Multiple frames
Stream
•Application layer connection over TCP connection
•Carries multiple streams (using Stream Multiplexing)
HTTP/2 Connection
© 2016 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.
HTTP/2 Binary Layer
© 2016 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.
© 2016 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.
New 0-day DoS Attacks
CVE-2016-1546
CVE-2015-8659* (not by Imperva)
CVE-2016-0150
CVE-2016-1544
CVE-2016-2525
© 2016 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.
Attack Summary
Compression
Stream
Dependency
& Priority
Stream
Multiplexing
Flow Control
© 2016 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.
• CVE-2016-1546 – Window size Compression
Stream
Dependency
& Priority
Stream
Multiplexing
Flow Control
Attacking HTTP/2 Flow Control Mechanism
© 2016 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.
Flow Control
• Based on WINDOW_UPDATE frames
• Defined to protect endpoints that operate
under resource constraints
• Specific to a connection
• Spec only defines format and semantics
• Mandatory and cannot be disabled
© 2016 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.
Flow Control LDR Attack Flow
ClientsServer
Attacker reduces window size
Request for a large resource (Stream 1)
Request for a large resource (Stream 3)
• When Jetty gets a request for a
resource larger than the
window size, the thread that
handles the request is going to
sleep (30 seconds)
• In ApacheIIS the attacker keeps
the connection alive by slowly
increasing the window size
• By sending multiplies requests
an attacker can make all the
threads sleep for a long time
and cause a denial of service
Users cannot get responses
Slowly increase the window size
Single HTTP/2
connection
© 2016 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.
© 2016 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.
• CVE-2015-8659* - memory cleanup Compression
Stream
Dependency
& Priority
Stream
Multiplexing
Flow Control
Attacking HTTP/2 Dependency Mechanism
© 2016 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.
Stream Priority & Dependency
• Optional (can be ignored)
• Each stream can be given an explicit
dependency on another stream
• Allow an endpoint to express how it
would prefer its peer to allocate
resources
• The graph is a tree
© 2016 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.
Stream Dependency Cycle
• Assume MAX_CONCURRENT_STREAM = 4 (tree size)
• Send the priority frames
– Stream 7  stream 5 (forces the server to remove of stream 7)
– Stream 5  stream 3
• Stream 3 is saved in the same address as stream 7
• Dependency cycle is created
13
11
9
7
5
3
© 2016 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.
• Both stream 7 and 3 are located
in the same memory address
• stream_update_dep_set_top
function is in infinite loop
Stream
7
address
Infinite
loop
Same
address for
stream 3
Stream Dependency Denial of Service
© 2016 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.
© 2016 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.
• CVE-2016-0150
Compression
Stream
Dependency
& Priority
Stream
Multiplexing
Flow Control
Attacking HTTP/2 Stream Multiplexing Mechanism
© 2016 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.
Stream Multiplexing
• multiple request and response at
the same time over a single
connection.
• The partition of the TCP connection
is purely logical
© 2016 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.
Stream Abuse
ClientsServer • Attacker sends multiple
requests on the same stream
• HTTP.sys in Windows 10
crashes (Blue Screen of
Death)
Open HTTP/2 connection
Send two requests on one stream
Users cannot get responses
© 2016 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.
© 2016 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.
• CVE-2016-1544 - HPACK Bomb
• CVE-2016-2525 - Wireshark
Compression
Stream
Dependency
& Priority
Stream
Multiplexing
Flow Control
Attacking HTTP/2 Compression Mechanism
© 2016 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.
Headers Compression
• Both sides (Client/ Server) maintain headers tables per TCP
connection direction
• These tables consist of static and dynamic parts
• These tables are used as dictionaries to compress/
decompress the headers
© 2016 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.
Headers Compression
© 2016 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.
HPACK Bomb Attack Flow
ClientsServer • Attacker sends a request
with extremely long header
“X” (Header frame)
• The request contains
maximum number of
references to header “X”
• By sending 14 frames,
attacker can crash nghttp
Send requests with thousands
header references
Insert long header to the dynamic table
Users cannot get responses
16,000
references x
4 KByte
--------------
64 MByte
16,000
references x
1-byte
--------------
16 KByte
© 2016 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.
HPACK Bomb – Calculation
• The default size of the dynamic table is 4KB
• Request can contain 16KB of headers
• One request can be decompressed to 16K*4KB = 64MB
• 14 requests will be decompressed to 14*64MB = 896MB, enough to crash our
nghttp server
© 2016 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.
© 2016 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.
HPACK Bomb – Collateral Damage
• Wireshark
– Uses nghttp2 library to decompress
headers
– Other application that rely on nghttp2
library may be vulnerable
© 2016 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.
Risk Mitigation
© 2016 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.
Mitigation
• Abandon your HTTP/2 plans?
– HTTP/2 is the next generation protocol for the Internet
– HTTP/2 serves acute business needs
– Dozens of CVEs published every month for non-HTTP/2
servers
• Choose “secure” server implementation?
– None was found immune
– What about 3rd party software?
– More vulnerabilities to come
• Patch?
– Build patching framework
Compression
Stream
Dependency
& Priority
Stream
Multiplexing
Flow Control
© 2016 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.
How to win the Patching Race? How do I know that a
vulnerability exists?
When will patch be
ready?
What’s the impact of patch
(and reboot) on my
business?
Is patch stable? Am I
risking my business?
© 2016 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.
Web Application Firewall and Virtual Patching
Web Application Firewall
(on premise/ cloud)
Security
flaw
Business owner
focuses on business
Server remains intact
Server remains protected
© 2016 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.
© 2016 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.
Summary
• HTTP/2 protocol is an excellent technology to provide the next generation of the
Internet
• HTTP/2 is gaining popularity and support by all significant web stake holders
• We demonstrated new attacks on implementations of significant HTTP/2 servers
– Utilizing the significant power given to the sender
– Implementation pitfalls
© 2016 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.
Conclusions
• HTTP/2 is here to stay, and rightfully so
• HTTP/2 extends the attack surface for web attackers
– New highly customizable transport mechanisms
– New code released to the wild
– Unplowed land
• The HTTP/2 ecosystem is still not security-mature.
Moreover, things may get worse when websites start utilizing HTTP/2 capabilities
• Without external protection and virtual patching, the business owner will always be behind in the
patching race
http://www.imperva.com/DefenseCenter/HackerIntelligenceReports
Download the full report here:

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Hacking HTTP/2 : New attacks on the Internet’s Next Generation Foundation

  • 1. © 2016 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved. Hacking HTTP/2 New attacks on the Internet’s Next Generation Foundation Itsik Mantin, Nadav Avital August 2016
  • 2. © 2016 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved. • Itsik Mantin • Director of Security Research at Imperva • 15 years experience in the security industry • Holds an M.Sc. in Applied Math and Computer Science • Nadav Avital • Application security research team leader • 10 years of industry experience, mostly hacking and security technology • Holds B. Sc. in Computer Science Speakers
  • 3. © 2016 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved. Credit • Noam Mazor, Application Security researcher at Imperva • Alex Maidanik and Avihai Cohen, Technion - Israeli Institute of Technology
  • 4. © 2016 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved. The Research • Unexplored territories of HTTP/2 – New mechanisms – New server implementations HTTP/2
  • 5. © 2016 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved. The Servers
  • 6. © 2016 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved. Outline HTTP/2 Motivation and Background HTTP/2 Technology The Attacks Summary and Conclusion
  • 7. © 2016 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved. HTTP/2 Motivation • HTTP 1.1 is no longer suitable for modern web content – Large number of web resources per page – Latency – Head of Line blocking – Large headers
  • 8. © 2016 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved. 2016 Web
  • 9. © 2016 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved. HTTP/2 Design Principles • Main goal: speed – Reduce latency – Reduce bandwidth • Support gradual deployment – Preserve HTTP 1.1 semantics (over a new binary layer) – Negotiation protocol (ALPN) • Encryption – Mandated by many implementations
  • 10. © 2016 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.
  • 11. © 2016 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved. Lightfast Adoption Web Clients Content Delivery Networks Sites Web Servers
  • 12. © 2016 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved. HTTP/2 Technology
  • 13. © 2016 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved. HTTP/2 Technology HPACK Server Push Stream Multiplexing HPACK Compression Flow Control
  • 14. © 2016 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved. HTTP/2 Transport Layer •Binary objects •The smallest data delivery unit •Can include headers, data, settings, etc. Frame •Carrying Request+Response •Multiple frames Stream •Application layer connection over TCP connection •Carries multiple streams (using Stream Multiplexing) HTTP/2 Connection
  • 15. © 2016 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved. HTTP/2 Binary Layer
  • 16. © 2016 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.
  • 17. © 2016 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved. New 0-day DoS Attacks CVE-2016-1546 CVE-2015-8659* (not by Imperva) CVE-2016-0150 CVE-2016-1544 CVE-2016-2525
  • 18. © 2016 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved. Attack Summary Compression Stream Dependency & Priority Stream Multiplexing Flow Control
  • 19. © 2016 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved. • CVE-2016-1546 – Window size Compression Stream Dependency & Priority Stream Multiplexing Flow Control Attacking HTTP/2 Flow Control Mechanism
  • 20. © 2016 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved. Flow Control • Based on WINDOW_UPDATE frames • Defined to protect endpoints that operate under resource constraints • Specific to a connection • Spec only defines format and semantics • Mandatory and cannot be disabled
  • 21. © 2016 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved. Flow Control LDR Attack Flow ClientsServer Attacker reduces window size Request for a large resource (Stream 1) Request for a large resource (Stream 3) • When Jetty gets a request for a resource larger than the window size, the thread that handles the request is going to sleep (30 seconds) • In ApacheIIS the attacker keeps the connection alive by slowly increasing the window size • By sending multiplies requests an attacker can make all the threads sleep for a long time and cause a denial of service Users cannot get responses Slowly increase the window size Single HTTP/2 connection
  • 22. © 2016 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.
  • 23. © 2016 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved. • CVE-2015-8659* - memory cleanup Compression Stream Dependency & Priority Stream Multiplexing Flow Control Attacking HTTP/2 Dependency Mechanism
  • 24. © 2016 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved. Stream Priority & Dependency • Optional (can be ignored) • Each stream can be given an explicit dependency on another stream • Allow an endpoint to express how it would prefer its peer to allocate resources • The graph is a tree
  • 25. © 2016 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved. Stream Dependency Cycle • Assume MAX_CONCURRENT_STREAM = 4 (tree size) • Send the priority frames – Stream 7  stream 5 (forces the server to remove of stream 7) – Stream 5  stream 3 • Stream 3 is saved in the same address as stream 7 • Dependency cycle is created 13 11 9 7 5 3
  • 26. © 2016 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved. • Both stream 7 and 3 are located in the same memory address • stream_update_dep_set_top function is in infinite loop Stream 7 address Infinite loop Same address for stream 3 Stream Dependency Denial of Service
  • 27. © 2016 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.
  • 28. © 2016 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved. • CVE-2016-0150 Compression Stream Dependency & Priority Stream Multiplexing Flow Control Attacking HTTP/2 Stream Multiplexing Mechanism
  • 29. © 2016 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved. Stream Multiplexing • multiple request and response at the same time over a single connection. • The partition of the TCP connection is purely logical
  • 30. © 2016 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved. Stream Abuse ClientsServer • Attacker sends multiple requests on the same stream • HTTP.sys in Windows 10 crashes (Blue Screen of Death) Open HTTP/2 connection Send two requests on one stream Users cannot get responses
  • 31. © 2016 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.
  • 32. © 2016 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved. • CVE-2016-1544 - HPACK Bomb • CVE-2016-2525 - Wireshark Compression Stream Dependency & Priority Stream Multiplexing Flow Control Attacking HTTP/2 Compression Mechanism
  • 33. © 2016 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved. Headers Compression • Both sides (Client/ Server) maintain headers tables per TCP connection direction • These tables consist of static and dynamic parts • These tables are used as dictionaries to compress/ decompress the headers
  • 34. © 2016 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved. Headers Compression
  • 35. © 2016 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved. HPACK Bomb Attack Flow ClientsServer • Attacker sends a request with extremely long header “X” (Header frame) • The request contains maximum number of references to header “X” • By sending 14 frames, attacker can crash nghttp Send requests with thousands header references Insert long header to the dynamic table Users cannot get responses 16,000 references x 4 KByte -------------- 64 MByte 16,000 references x 1-byte -------------- 16 KByte
  • 36. © 2016 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved. HPACK Bomb – Calculation • The default size of the dynamic table is 4KB • Request can contain 16KB of headers • One request can be decompressed to 16K*4KB = 64MB • 14 requests will be decompressed to 14*64MB = 896MB, enough to crash our nghttp server
  • 37. © 2016 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.
  • 38. © 2016 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved. HPACK Bomb – Collateral Damage • Wireshark – Uses nghttp2 library to decompress headers – Other application that rely on nghttp2 library may be vulnerable
  • 39. © 2016 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved. Risk Mitigation
  • 40. © 2016 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved. Mitigation • Abandon your HTTP/2 plans? – HTTP/2 is the next generation protocol for the Internet – HTTP/2 serves acute business needs – Dozens of CVEs published every month for non-HTTP/2 servers • Choose “secure” server implementation? – None was found immune – What about 3rd party software? – More vulnerabilities to come • Patch? – Build patching framework Compression Stream Dependency & Priority Stream Multiplexing Flow Control
  • 41. © 2016 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved. How to win the Patching Race? How do I know that a vulnerability exists? When will patch be ready? What’s the impact of patch (and reboot) on my business? Is patch stable? Am I risking my business?
  • 42. © 2016 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved. Web Application Firewall and Virtual Patching Web Application Firewall (on premise/ cloud) Security flaw Business owner focuses on business Server remains intact Server remains protected
  • 43. © 2016 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved.
  • 44. © 2016 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved. Summary • HTTP/2 protocol is an excellent technology to provide the next generation of the Internet • HTTP/2 is gaining popularity and support by all significant web stake holders • We demonstrated new attacks on implementations of significant HTTP/2 servers – Utilizing the significant power given to the sender – Implementation pitfalls
  • 45. © 2016 Imperva, Inc. All rights reserved. Conclusions • HTTP/2 is here to stay, and rightfully so • HTTP/2 extends the attack surface for web attackers – New highly customizable transport mechanisms – New code released to the wild – Unplowed land • The HTTP/2 ecosystem is still not security-mature. Moreover, things may get worse when websites start utilizing HTTP/2 capabilities • Without external protection and virtual patching, the business owner will always be behind in the patching race