QUESTION 1Which of the following statements about the correlat.docx

QUESTION 1
Which of the following statements about the correlation
coefficient between variable X1 (Number of advertisements
placed the previous week) and variable X2 (Number of calls
received the previous week) is correct:
-The correlation coefficient is not statistically significant at 5%
level
-The correlation coefficient is not statistically significant at
10% level
-Number of ads placed the previous week is not independent
from the number of calls received previous week
-An increase in the number of ads placed the previous week
would cause the number of calls to increase by 61 percent
-A decrease in the number of ads placed the previous week
would cause the number of calls to decrease by 0.61 percent
1 points
QUESTION 2
Which of the following statements about the estimated model is
correct:
-The proportion of variance in Y explained is 59.11%
-The difference between R squared and adjusted R squared
indicated that the overall model is insignificant
-The sample size of 12 is too small for regression to be
performed
-The intercept of -270 means that next week should be expected
270 fewer calls than the previous week
-The F-value of 3.85 is greater than 2.0; therefore, the model is
significant
1 points

QUESTION 3
The unexplained variance in Y (Number of Calls Received) is
=0.9208
=0.5882
=0.4969
=0.4118
0
1 points
QUESTION 4
Which of the following statements is correct:
-None of the independent variable are statistically significant at
5% level
-The effect of X2 (Calls Received Previous Week) variable is
statistically significant at 5% level
-The effect of X3 (Airline Bookings) variable is statistically
significant at 5% level
-All of the independent variables are statistically significant at
5% level
The dependent variable is statistically significant at 5% level
1 points
QUESTION 5
Which of the following statements is correct:
-The regression model produces an unbiased estimate of the
dependent variable
-The regression model produces good estimates because the
average residual is less than 5%

-The average error produced by the regression model is 13 calls
-The average error produced by the regression model is about 74
calls
-The average error produced by the regression model is
insignificant at 5% level
Analysis of counterfeit fashion purchase behavior in UAE --
Cedwyn Fernandes
Fernandes (2013) introduces us to the issue of counterfeiting
in the marketplace of the United Arab Emirates. United Arab
Emirates (UAE) has an open economy where counterfeiting
takes place often because it happens to be a mecca of
international trade which includes auto parts, beauty and
fashion products. UAE has an estimated total of $1.02 billion
of counterfeited merchandise per year.
The UAE has held a steady marketplace for high-end retail
shoppers, making it a zesty attraction/destination for the luxury
market.
Due to this fact, the UAE government has taken measures to
halt counterfeiting—especially of fashion/beauty merchandise
through Dubai’s customs and the Department of Economic
Development.
However, according to the author there is still the issue of the
demand side that has yet to be resolved. In order to alleviate
the demand of counterfeit products, it is stated that one should
understand the consumer’s behavior and reasoning behind
purchasing counterfeit items.
The author defines counterfeit as “products bearing a trademark
that is identical to, or indistinguishable, from a trademark

registered to another party” resulting in a violation of the
original trademark owners’ rights.
Several studies have covered this counterfeit issue of luxury
good items within a global context. This particular paper
focuses on UAE because there has yet to be any revealing
studies that touch on the UAE demography.
Therefore, the purpose of this study is to find out what
influences the demand for counterfeit products in the UAE
market in order to assist with future attempts of reducing
counterfeit trading in the UAE.
The author has identified factors that motivate consumers’
voluntary purchase intention of counterfeits: fashion
consciousness, subjective norm, ethical judgment, value
consciousness, self-ambiguity, and demographic factors (age,
education, income).
The author also defines the terminology to help readers better
understand the variables that motivate the behavior of
purchases.
· Fashion consciousness is when the consumer is aware of
new trends in fashion and up to date with all the styles.
· Subjective norm is when an individual is subject to societal
pressures, such as gain acceptance or approval by peers.
· Ethical judgment is when an individual carefully evaluates
and makes decisions based on one’s defined morality.

· Value consciousness is when the consumer is capable of
understanding perceived price points for quality merchandise.
· Self-ambiguity is derived from the concept of self-identity.
It is defined as the belief or confidence in one’s own
individuality or the “self.”
Thus the following theoretical framework have been proposed
based on the Ajzen’s Theory of Planned Behavior:
H1: Fashion consciousness is positively related to the intended
purchase of counterfeits.
H2: Subjective norm is a significant factor in the intended
H3: Ethical judgment is negatively related to the intended
H4: Value consciousness is positively related to the intended
H5: Self–ambiguity is positively related to the intended
From the results of the study, the LLPC (less likely to purchase
counterfeits) sample indicated that ethical judgment and value
consciousness are the only significant variables having an
impact on the counterfeit purchase intention.
Whereas, the MLPC (more likely to purchase counterfeits)
sample indicated that ethical judgment, subjective norm, value
consciousness and self-ambiguity are significant to intent

REFERENCE:
Fernandes, C. (2013). Analysis of counterfeit fashion purchase
behavior in UAE, Journal of Fashion Marketing and
Management, 17(1), 85-97.
Shame or Pride? The moderating role of self-construal on moral
judgements concerning fashion counterfeits
What are counterfeits? Counterfeits according to authors
Kim and Johnson (2014) are unauthorized identical copies of an
original brand-name product. Usually their price and quality are
much lower than those of originals. When thinking of
counterfeits, apparel and accessory items come to mind, but
counterfeiting is not limited to fashion-related categories only.
The most interesting two facts is that the buying and selling of
counterfeit items is a billion dollar industry and most consumers
do not always knowingly purchase these items.
Even though there are many organizations trying to regulate

against anti-counterfeiting, counterfeiting is such a big business
around the world that it makes it hard to keep it under control.
Because counterfeiting is fueled by consumer demand, a large
amount of research has looked into consumers’ purchasing of
counterfeits as an instance of moral decision making, and this
creates a limitation.
The actual focus of this study is on the moderating role of
individuals’ self-view (interdependent, independent) in the
relationship between moral emotions and moral judgements
made concerning the purchase of fashion counterfeits.
According to the authors, previous research has taken a
rationalist approach, which is a belief or theory that opinions
and actions should be based on reason and knowledge, on
cognitive processes involved in moral decision making rather
than including the influence of consumer emotion. So, the
authors hoped that the research and findings for this study
would possibly be a major contribution to the literature.
Based on reviewing previous literature, this article
conducted two experimental studies to test formed hypotheses
and operationalize self-construal, ego-focused emotion and
other-focused emotion in multiple ways. There are four
hypotheses have made by the author; H1,H3,H4 were
completely supported, and H2 was supported only for pride. The
study 1 proved that moral emotions will influence moral
judgment concerning the purchase of a counterfeit, and the
influence of moral emotion on moral judgment will be
moderated by self-construal; specifically for pride, the
influence of the association of ego-focused emotions with a
moral judgment will be higher for the independents versus
interdependents. On the other hand, study 2 proved that
individuals whose independent self-construal is primed are more
likely to judge the counterfeit as more morally wrong to
purchase when pride is induced than when shame is induced;
however, the individuals whose interdependent self-construal is

opposite.
For the limitations of this research, first, the emotions
which in studies 1 and 2 are not identical to experienced
emotions. Second, there are just only two emotions: shame and
pride, which were selected to represent ego-focused or other-
focused. Third, the findings are not viewed cautiously enough.
Finally, the sample of participants was not diverse.
Business History Review 85 (Summer 2011): 319–344.
doi:10.1017/S0007680511000407
© 2011 The President and Fellows of Harvard College. ISSN
0007-6805; 2044-768X (Web).
L
Véronique Pouillard
Design Piracy in the Fashion Industries of
Paris and New York in the Interwar Years
During the Great Depression, counterfeiters of the newest
styles posed a challenge to the high-fashion designers who
dominated Parisian design. Meanwhile, New York, tradition-
ally the destination of the fi rst corporate buyers of Paris cou-
ture, became a potential contender for the role of fashion cap-
ital. Scrutiny of French and American laws reveals that strong
national interests were at stake in the fashion business. In
France, the law safeguarded copyrights of fashion design
while, in the United States, legislators denied such protection
to American fashion.
uxury garments and textiles are illegally copied more often than
any

other items in the marketplace. Seizures of all pirated goods to-
taled close to $273 million in the U.S. in 2008.1 In January of
that
year, more than one million dollars of copied, or “knocked off”
fashion
accessories were seized in Manhattan.2 Fashion products,
including
garments, handbags, or watches, compose a substantial share of
the
traffi c in international counterfeiting, because smugglers,
sellers, and
buyers face smaller physical and legal risks for traffi cking in
these
This article was written with the support of a Harvard–
Newcomen fellowship at Harvard
Business School. The author would like to thank Sundeep Bisla,
Reggie Blaszczyk, Florence
Brachet Champsaur, Patrick Fridenson, and Daniel Levinson
Wilk for allowing her to present
preliminary versions of the article in workshops and for their
generous comments.
1 U.S. Immigration and Custom Enforcement,
www.ice.gov/pi/nr/0901/090108washington/
htm, accessed 20 May 2009. On the transatlantic fashion
business, see: Regina L. Blaszczyk,
“Aux couleurs franco-américaines: Quand la haute couture
parisienne rencontre la confec-
tion new-yorkaise,” Le Mouvement social 221 (2007): 9–32;
Nancy L. Green, Ready-to-Wear
and Ready-to-Work: A Century of Industry and Immigrants in
Paris and in New York
(Durham, N.C., 1997); Alexandra Palmer, Couture and
Commerce: The Transatlantic Fash-

ion Trade in the 1950s (Vancouver, 2001); Nancy Troy, Couture
Culture (Cambridge, Mass.,
2002).
2 Better Business Bureau, “High Fashion at Low Prices?”
http://www.bbb.org/us/article/
high–fashion–at–low–prices–bbb, accessed 25 May 2009.
Véronique Pouillard / 320
goods than they would for dealing in works of art, drugs, or
counter-
feit money.3
Copying a fashion object can occur in two ways, sometimes
simul-
taneously: the design is copied or the label, or brand, is
imitated. The
brand is protected under commercial law, while the design is
covered
by patent or intellectual law. However, it is more diffi cult to
enforce
copyright protection for products like fashion that often only
register
small variations.
Between the wars, although Paris haute couture was the inter-
national center of fashion creativity, it could not cater to the
growing
demands of the international markets because production
remained
local and rooted in craftsmanship. Paris couturiers therefore
authorized
foreign entrepreneurs to buy and reproduce their designs legally

under
specifi c conditions. Buyers from New York, the up-and-
coming, com-
peting fashion center, comprised the largest international group
of
Paris high-fashion clients. Paris couture enterprises, ranging
from one-
person businesses to fi rms like the house of Lelong that
employed three
thousand workers, were creating and selling exclusive designs
to pri-
vate clients and to entrepreneurs who selected, reproduced, and
sold
Paris fashions. Much of the reproduction that took place was
legal, but
some was not.4
From the nineteenth century on, there were frequent contacts
be-
tween Paris and New York designers. While the production of
garments
in the two cities has been the subject of historical research, the
produc-
ers’ policies have not been accorded the same level of
scrutiny.5
Thorstein Veblen commented, in 1899, that fashion is created
when
garments undergo changes that, although not strictly necessary,
are
integral to the aspirational nature of fashion.6 Pierre Bourdieu,
in La
Distinction, describes how fashions trickle down from the fi rst
group
that adopts them.7 As soon as imitators take over a style, the fi
rst group

abandons it and moves on to a newer one. Fashions therefore
fulfi ll a
dual function: they satisfy a need for imitation while fulfi lling
the de-
sire for individual differentiation and change. Fashions undergo
cy-
cles: skirt lengths, for example, vary from one season to the
next. Certain
3 Danielle Allérès, “La propriété industrielle dans l’univers du
luxe,” Réseaux 88/89
(1998): 4; Stephen Mihm, A Nation of Counterfeiters:
Capitalists, Con Men, and the Making
of the United States (Cambridge, Mass., 2007).
4 Mary Lynn Stewart, “Copying and Copyrighting Haute
Couture: Democratizing Fashion,
1900–1930s,” French Historical Studies 28, no. 1 (2005): 103–
30; about the U.S., see Sara
Beth Marcketti, “Design Piracy in the United States Women’s
Ready-to-Wear Apparel Indus-
try, 1910–1941,” PhD diss., Iowa State University, 2005, 2.
5 Troy, Couture Culture; Palmer, Couture and Commerce;
Blaszczyk, “Aux couleurs
franco-américaines,” 9–32.
6 Thorstein Veblen, The Theory of the Leisure Class (Boston,
1973, fi rst published 1899).
7 Pierre Bourdieu, La Distinction: Critique sociale du jugement
(Paris, 1979).
Design Piracy in the Fashion Industry / 321

producers and consumers, copyists in particular, help to speed
up the
fashion cycles, and thus are critical to the process.8
Although the view that the French are a nation of originators
while
the Americans are only imitators is often repeated, I will show
that each
country has had its own ideas about legal protections of fashion.
Even
the couturiers, who create or direct the production of original
designs
in the form of handmade prototypes in their workshops and
embody
design innovation in the luxury business, are ambivalent about
the
issue. While Coco Chanel publicly expressed her view that
piracy was a
welcome sign of success, talented designers like Madeleine
Vionnet
and Jeanne Lanvin believed that creativity should be protected.
While
Vionnet and Lanvin were open to the dissemination of their
designs,
they wanted to be able to remain in control of their creations,
for in-
stance by establishing licensed manufactured lines of their
clothes and
perfumes.9
In this article, I explore the confl icting beliefs of two groups of
fash-
ion professionals during the interwar years: one group held that
fash-
ion design should be protected, while the other maintained that
every-

one should have access to fashion designs and be allowed to
copy them.
In France, the creation of a system protective of fashion designs
was
founded on the principle that fashion was a branch of high art,
whereas,
in the U.S., fashion was perceived in functional terms, and thus
its de-
signs were not protected. Under French law, fashion creators
were held
in the same high regard reserved for artists, while American law
as-
signed them a lower status. I explore these confl icting views of
fashion
design by examining associations of fashion professionals: the
Cham-
bre syndicale de la couture parisienne and the Protection
artistique des
industries saisonnières in Paris; the Fashion Originators’ Guild
of Amer-
ica; and major fashion entrepreneurs, like Coco Chanel and
Madeleine
Vionnet in Paris, and the New York designers and
manufacturers Mau-
rice Rentner and Elizabeth Hawes.
The issue of creativity impelled fashion entrepreneurs to
federate.
The French association Protection artistique des industries
saison-
nières, founded by Vionnet and her lawyer, Armand Trouyet,
sued every
copier they could fi nd. In New York, the Fashion Originators’
Guild of
America, founded by Rentner and his lawyer Sylvan Gotshal,
gathered

together enterprises that agreed to label the products they sold
and to
check the origin of the designs they retailed. These associations
shared
similar goals on both sides of the Atlantic, and they
collaborated from
the late 1930s on.
8 Roland Barthes, Système de la mode (Paris, 1967), 332.
9 Geoffrey Jones, Beauty Imagined: A History of the Global
Beauty Industry (Oxford,
2010).
Parisian Haute Couture
Fashion ties business and art together. Ever since Charles
Freder-
ick Worth established what is considered to have been the fi rst
haute-
couture house in Paris in 1857, French couturiers have been
considered
artists, which enabled them to market their designs as their own
exclu-
sive property. Several factors contributed to the development of
the
fashion industry in Paris. Skilled craftspeople, relying on
ancient tradi-
tions, offered exceptional technical possibilities to fashion
designers.
High-quality museums, art exhibitions, and a fascinating city
landscape

were acknowledged inspirations. The proximity of the royal
court, and
later of socialites’ and artists’ circles, created sustained
demand. Tour-
ism benefi ted from the attraction created by fashions, and the
visitors
to the city provided an international clientele. During various
periods,
the support of both national and city governments, in the form
of tax
cuts on luxury products, for example, helped to boost the
fortunes of an
industry that was considered essential to the nation’s wealth.
The reign of Paris over both national and international high-
fashion
markets lasted from the mid-nineteenth century to the middle of
the
twentieth. After World War I, the city’s fashion sector
continued to
be structured as a craft industry that mainly consisted of small
and
medium-sized limited-liability companies. “Everything [was]
arranged
for couturiers to work in Paris,” observed an American fashion
designer
in the early 1930s.10 At that time, American experts also
noticed that the
fashion and textile industries, then employing nearly half a
million peo-
ple in France, depended on the leading fashion designers. At the
top of
the fashion hierarchy were the designers, supported by the
premières,
experienced seamstresses who directed the workshops that were
spe-

cialized according to type of garment: fl ou (for dresses),
tailoring, coats,
millinery. Most of the workforce was female, although some
skills, like
tailoring and fur cutting and sewing, were dominated by men.
The
workers were organized according to a strict hierarchy based on
experi-
ence and skills: premières were at the top, apprentices occupied
the
bottom rung, and the pay matched their places on the
professional lad-
der. A few dozen couture houses were aesthetic leaders and
innovators,
not only in Paris but also abroad. Their dominance, often
described in
the international media as the dictature of fashion, did not face
much
international resistance.11 Fashion had acquired a powerful
place in
consumers’ imaginations and, by offering a range of
possibilities for
representations of the self, had become a means of self-
empowerment.12
10 Elizabeth Hawes, Fashion is Spinach (New York, 1938), 16.
11 “The Dressmakers of France,” Fortune, Aug. 1932, 17.
12 Gilles Lipovetsky, L’empire de l’éphémère: La mode et son
destin dans les sociétés
modernes (Paris, 1987).

As higher-end couturiers in Paris claimed worldwide superiority
on the
basis of their exquisite craftsmanship and cosmopolitanism, the
city be-
came a magnet for foreign dressmakers.13
Paris haute couture had built global fame while remaining
quintes-
sentially local. The top stratum of private clients traveled to
Paris
throughout each year to order custom-made clothing. Fashion
shows, a
practice that started after 1910, were organized in Paris for the
press
and the buyers four times a year: the two major ones took place
in Au-
gust and February, and two smaller midseason shows were held
in Oc-
tober and April. The winter collection, shown in August, was
the most
important, and it marked the start of the year’s fashion
“revolutions.”14
Fashion professionals and press from around the world traveled
to
Paris, drawn by the aesthetic attraction of the city’s shows.
Corporate
buyers purchased haute-couture garments, along with the right
to re-
produce them. A French salesperson was required to open an
account
for the foreign buyer, whose card was not transferable. The
purchases
had to be paid for through a French bank, and the buyer had to
give the
couture house a certifi cate proving that the merchandise was
intended

for resale outside France.15 Foreign buyers worked most often
through
a commissionaire, an agent who ensured the purchaser’s
representa-
tion in Paris, introduced her to suppliers, and oversaw the
shipment
and insurance of wares.16
Beginning in the late 1920s, haute-couture designs were
increasingly
transmitted to foreign retailers and clothing manufacturers
through
sales of paper or fabric patterns (toiles). Foreign retailers had to
obtain
buyers’ cards from the employers’ syndicate, Chambre
syndicale de la
couture parisienne, when paying an advance on a purchase,
sometimes
called “viewing rights” (droit de vision), in order to gain entrée
to the
shows’ openings.17
According to one American observer, the price of a legal, or
even of
an illegal, garment copy of very good quality could be
calculated in this
13 “L’infl uence parisienne,” International Textiles 2 (28 Nov.
1934): 21, Victoria & Albert
Museum, Archives of Art & Design (hereafter AAD); “Le but de
l’Offi ciel de la Couture et de la
Mode de Paris,” L’Offi ciel de la couture et de la mode de
Paris: Organe de propagande et
d’expansion de l’art français 4 (Mar. 1924): 1.
14 Fashion Forecast Conferences, Proceedings, Rockefeller

Center, 6, Sept. 1933, 3, box
72, folder 10, New York Public Library, Fashion Group
International Archive (hereafter
FGIA).
15 Im-ex. la grande revue belge pour le développement et
l’expansion des industries du
vêtement (Brussels, Feb. 1926), 19.
16 Willy Devos, “L’Utilité de l’intervention du
commissionnaire pour l’acheteur étranger,”
Im-ex. La grande revue belge, 28.
17 Didier Grumbach, Histoires de la mode (Paris, 1993), 61–62;
Georgette Deschamps, La
Crise dans les Industries du Vêtement et de la Mode à Paris
pendant la période de 1930 à
1937 (Paris, 1937), 51.
way: “The exactitude . . . varies with the price, which varies
with the
amount of perfection any given copy house sees fi t to attain. A
really per-
fect copy of a model costs in a copy-house just about a half
what it costs
in the place where it was born.”18 In the mid-1930s, exact
reproductions
of one seasonal line of thirty to seventy-fi ve designs by New
York manu-
facturers on Seventh Avenue cost an estimated $30,000 to
$50,000
(around half-a-million dollars in today’s prices).19 The one-

time repro-
duction fee cost a corporate buyer an estimated 30 percent to 40
per-
cent of the price of one original haute-couture garment in Paris.
There
was no system of royalties for reproducing haute-couture
fashions.20
Couture houses generally adopted practices of secrecy that
induced
them not to reveal their sales. Until the early 1930s, only 25
percent of
their business on average was with corporate buyers, who paid
in cash,
unlike the private buyers who were generally slow to pay. It
was consid-
ered improper to urge prestigious clients to pay their bills, and
they
often paid late, either as a way of signaling their prestige or as a
conse-
quence of dwindling fortunes.21 Prominent textile
manufacturers, like
Rodier or Bianchini-Férier, provided couturiers with a form of
credit by
furnishing small quantities of fabrics in advance of payment and
then
waiting to see what would sell in a collection, before supplying
more
fabrics. Most fi rms continued to advance fabric to established
couture
houses in the event of a few bad seasons. Such loans were
rewarded by
the couturiers’ showcasing of the textiles.22
The Development of Copying in Paris

In addition to the system of buying and legally reproducing
fash-
ions, the American designer Elizabeth Hawes remembered a
“general
atmosphere of bootlegging” in 1920s Paris couture that was not
entirely
new.23 Paris couturiers acknowledged that copying started at
home,
since not only did the copyists have to operate close to their
sources,
but the operations also required the sort of capable workforce
that was
available in the city.24 In 1929, Lucien Klotz, secretary general
of the
18 Hawes, Fashion is Spinach, 38.
19 “FOGA et al., Sue Lucille Baldwin Here,” Women’s Wear
Daily (hereafter WWD),
14 Oct. 1936, sec. 1, 1, 35. For currency conversions, see
www.measuringworth.com/.
20 Véronique Pouillard, “In the Shadow of Paris? French Haute
Couture and Belgian
Fashion between the Wars,” in Producing Fashion: Commerce,
Culture, and Consumers, ed.
Regina Lee Blaszczyk (Philadelphia, 2007), 62–81.
21 Werner Sombart, Luxus und Kapitalismus (Munich, 1922).
22 “The Dressmakers of France,” Fortune, Aug. 1932, 76, 78.
23 Hawes, Fashion is Spinach, 46; on the copying practices
prior to the time frame of this
article, see Troy, Couture Culture.
24 Philippe Simon, La Haute Couture: Monographie d’une
industrie de luxe (Paris, 1931),

142.
Society of Authors and Artists’ Rights, estimated the number of
copy
houses in Paris at more than one hundred.25 Since copying was
an ille-
gal activity, all transactions were made in cash. Copy houses
therefore
had an advantage over haute-couture establishments, which had
to ex-
tend credit to their private clients over periods of months.26
Copy
houses generally maintained a double set of books.27 They were
careful
to keep the copied items in their commercial venues for the
shortest
time possible, choosing instead to take the copied garments
home, where
seizures were not authorized, or to friends. In order to deceive
the po-
lice and prevent raids, copyists visited clients, and they did not
hold fi t-
ting appointments at fi xed hours.28
Haute-couture garments could be copied at every stage: through
the workers, the intermediaries, and the clients themselves. The
work-
ers and models of haute-couture houses were often accused of
using
their proximity to the designers to earn additional money. In
1931, they

could receive on average 50 to 100 French francs (the
equivalent of
2009 US$150 to $300) for sneaking a new design out of the
originator’s
house. Another option was to hire haute-couture workers for
after-hours
work in copy houses that involved replicating the pieces they
had been
sewing during the day.29
International corporate buyers, on their end, simply joined
forces:
instead of each one buying twelve dresses, they would pool
their re-
sources among three or four buyers. What seemed a way for
them to
share investment costs was considered fraud by the Paris
houses, al-
though it was diffi cult to build legal cases to prevent and
punish such
practices. An increasing number of couturiers demanded that the
buy-
ers, who did not pay royalties for reproducing purchased
designs, order
a minimum number of garments upon admission. Buyers failing
to
meet this requirement could be blacklisted and refused entry to
future
openings. Surveillance and jurisprudence constantly forced the
copyists
to refi ne their methods. In the 1920s, copyists increasingly
worked from
toiles, the raw-linen couture prototypes that were not well
protected by
the law in the early 1930s.30 Copying toiles was even easier
than copy-

ing dresses: no workshop or salon was needed—only a room and
a travel-
ing salesman were required. Smugglers cultivated an extended
network
of foreign correspondents, selling them toiles, sketches, and
references
25 Bertram J. Perkins, “Klotz Deplores Ineffi ciency of French
Style Piracy Laws,” WWD,
22 May 1929, sec. 1, 1.
26 Véronique Pouillard, Hirsch & Cie Bruxelles, 1869–1962
(Brussels, 2000), 33.
28 Simon, La Haute Couture, 156–57.
29 Georges Le Fèvre, Au secours de la couture (industrie
française) (Paris, 1929), 103–11.
30 Simon, La Haute Couture, 146.
(sheets of information on the cut, fabric, buttons, and other
materials
needed to copy a garment) for amounts ranging from 100 to 200
French
francs (2009 US$300 to $600).31
Private clients were also suspected of helping copyists. One
tactic
used by foreign buyers was to lend garments they had just
purchased
for the period between delivery in Paris and the arrival of the
dress at
the purchaser’s fi nal destination. Stories were told of clients

lending
their new high-fashion dresses to copyists in order to earn back
some of
the money they had spent on their wardrobes. Another account
re-
ported that the mistress of the director of a famous couture
house al-
lowed her dresses to be copied for a fee.32
In the late 1920s, the French couture industries lost an
estimated
fi ve hundred million French francs to copying, equal to one
billion of
today’s dollars, according to journalist George Le Fèvre.33 The
French
lawyer Armand Trouyet proposed that haute-couture houses
seek dam-
ages, which they would calculate by multiplying the number of
counter-
feited labels by the average price of the garments produced
under those
labels.34
After World War I, haute-couture houses were able to apply
juris-
prudence built upon a 1793 intellectual property law to expand
prose-
cution of the theft of original clothing models. The Institut
national
copyrighted designs, which it recorded, along with a reference
number
and the hour and date of the design’s deposit, in order to
establish pre-
cedence. If a couturier suspected the theft of a design, he or she
would
notify the police, who would send an offi cer to visit the

suspected copy-
ist’s home in order to seize dresses, toiles, or sketches, which
were then
sealed and transmitted to the clerk’s offi ce of the tribunal.35
The fi rst
fi nding of intentional infringement was punished by a fi ne; the
second
could add a prison term of from one to six months.
Nevertheless, illegal
copying persisted in both domestic and foreign markets.36
Supplying Unauthorized Copies to the American Market
International fashions were based on clusters of enterprises in
both
France and the United States fi nanced largely by domestic
capital. Be-
yond this local structure, the fashion business, from its Parisian
core to
31 Ibid., 145.
33 Le Fèvre, Au secours de la couture, 93.
34 William P. Carney, “Paris Plans Curb on Bootleg Styles,”
New York Times (hereafter
NYT ), 8 Nov. 1931, E4.
36 Ibid., 134.
its importers and planned new centers, drew strength from
transnational

sources. In 1931, the American businessman Paul Bonner
reminded his
fellow New Yorkers that Paris couturiers had built their
dominant posi-
tion on an ability to understand and anticipate the desires and
needs
of an international clientele a couple of years in advance.37
Both inter-
national and local experts built their expertise as intermediaries,
which
some, mainly Americans, labeled “fashion forecasting.”
The Paris fashion business early on developed commercial
relations
with the United States, the home of most of the foreign buyers.
By the
1930s, 80 percent of the American fashion business operated in
New
York’s garment district. Beginning in the nineteenth century,
French
textile and fashion companies opened foreign offi ces to
facilitate ex-
porting to the United States and other countries.38
Entrepreneurs who wanted to obtain unauthorized copies of
Paris-
couture creations usually hired sketchers, described by the
American
entrepreneur Andrew Goodman in this way: “the copyist, the
schemer,
the sharp guy who sends his designers to showings with
sharpened
pencils . . . run out to the men’s room and quickly make
sketches.”39
Sketchers were helped by the postal services, the cable, and the
tele-

phone, cutting not only into the creators’ businesses, but also
into the
earnings of more traditional intermediaries, like the
commissionaires,
whose potential clients “were quite satisfi ed with their present
connec-
tions in Paris just so long as they continued to send sketches of
new
models at $1 per sketch.”40 Sketching at the Paris fashion
openings was
forbidden, but Women’s Wear Daily noted “the diffi culties . . .
encoun-
tered in enforcing the existing French laws.”41 Lawsuits failed
to dis-
courage the copyists. Article twenty-fi ve of the French code of
criminal
procedure stipulated fi nes ranging from ten to two thousand
francs
(equivalent to 2009 US$20 to $4,500), plus payments for the
damages
that were eventually awarded to the victim.42 Copyists
condemned for
repeat offenses often managed to pursue their activity by
obtaining the
protection of infl uential clients.43
In Fashion is Spinach, an account of her career that became a
best
seller in the U.S. in 1938, American fashion professional
Elizabeth Hawes
37 Intervention at the Fashion Group by Paul Bonner, 6 May
1931, box 72, folder 3, FGIA.
38 Union Centrale des Arts Décoratifs, Commerce de la France
(Paris, 1926), 101.
39 Transcript of Andrew Goodman interview about the Uptown

Retail Guild, 2, reference
x–20, Gladys Marcus Library, Fashion Institute of Technology
(FIT) special collections, New
York.
40 Bertram J. Perkins, “New York Trip Disappoints
Commissionaire,” WWD, 24 May
1929, sec. 1, 4.
41 “Paris Papers Warn of Copying Penalties,” WWD, 25 Apr.
1929, sec. 1, 14.
recalled her working days in a Paris copy house. Despite her
avowal that
fashion was not as vital as its participants claimed (just as
spinach
“doesn’t cook up to much”), Hawes managed to build a long
career in
the fashion business. She studied at the Parsons School of
Design in
New York and then at Vassar College, from which she
graduated in
1925. She did a brief unpaid apprenticeship at Bergdorf
Goodman be-
fore leaving for Paris in July 1925. There she worked in a copy
house
until the spring of 1926, sketching for American buyers.44 She
became a
sketcher in order to complete her design education in Paris. In

couture
houses, she was introduced either as a private customer or as
the assis-
tant of a foreign buyer. As a sketcher working for a clandestine
Paris
copy house, Hawes earned 500 French francs a month, the
equivalent
of about $20.45 She combined the job with freelancing for a
New York
copy house that paid her $1.50 per sketch. Hawes was able to
draw
some fi fteen accurate sketches from memory after each
presentation,
producing a total of three hundred sketches in one season. She
also du-
plicated her sketches for a few other buyers who did not have
their own
teams. Her earnings totaled between $500 and $1,000 a season
(the
equivalent of 2009 US$29,700 to $59,300, using the GDP
indicator),
and she could live in “comparative luxury” on $100 a month in
mid-
1920s Paris.46 Hawes wrote that she was conscious at the time
of being
a thief, and she got into trouble in several houses. She worked
as a fash-
ion correspondent for American fi rms, legally designed and
sketched
for Macy’s and Lord & Taylor, and started writing as a fashion
corre-
spondent for the New Yorker under the pen name “Parisite.”47
Model renters (loueurs de modèles) bought couture garments,
toiles,
or patterns in Paris and then rented them out for copying. Some

Ameri-
can buyers rented garments by the hour for other manufacturers
to
copy. The price to rent a garment decreased with the age of the
design.
While Paris couturiers forbade renters to attend their shows,
they found
it diffi cult to enforce the ban. One attempt consisted of placing
invisible
signs inside the dress. Haute-couture designs imported by U.S.
fi rms
that reproduced designs legally were exempted from paying a
tariff, on
the condition that they remain with the importer for a defi ned
period,
generally one year. Once the dress was copied, it was usually
resold to a
Latin American or Canadian fi rm.48 Renters often made
arrangements
44 Elizabeth Hawes, vita, Box 1, 1, reference x–149, Gladys
Marcus Library, FIT Special
Collections.
46 Ibid., 53.
47 Guillaume Garnier, “Le milieu de la mode,” in Paris-
Couture: Années trente, ed. Guil-
laume Garnier (Paris, 1987), 123.
48 Palmer, Couture and Commerce.

with intermediaries, in violation of the U.S. tariff law. The
invisible
signs placed in the dresses enabled designers to fi nd the
intermediaries
who had bought haute-couture pieces in Paris with fraudulent
inten-
tions. Another strategy was to mark the dresses inside clearly
with in-
delible ink to discourage attempts to pass them along for
copying.49
Developing French–American cooperation to block renters in
the
United States proved to be diffi cult.50 For example, in 1936,
the most
famous American design renter of the time, Elsie Cobin, was
found in
possession of nine original pieces produced by the Parisian
couturier
Robert Piguet. Yet Piguet was the one who had to justify
himself.51 Rent-
ers like Elsie Cobin openly showed collections in New York.
Can Fashion Creativity be Protected?
French law offered three types of protection: patents for
inventions,
patents for designs, and copyrights of designs and brands, as
well as
trademark protection. Copyright was the preferred method for
protect-
ing French designs, although this system did not deter French,
Euro-
pean, and American copyists from plagiarizing Parisian
aesthetic inno-
vations. Nevertheless, French law still offered the best

protection.
American law offered a different type of protection for fashion.
U.S. copyright law was designed to protect artistic productions.
During
the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the defi nition of
art in
copyright law had gradually expanded, either by defi nition or
through
judicial interpretation. Between the wars, copyright
infringement was
subject to penalty, not only for high art, but also for popular
songs,
phonograph records, radio broadcasts, advertisements, designs
for works
of art, photographs, and motion pictures.52 Advertising designs
were
protected as a major form of communication in the emerging
mass-
consumption society. Brands and logos were protected by
trademark
law, but fashion was not covered by American copyright law.
Therefore,
the only option for protecting a fashion design was to take out a
patent,
which, in the U.S., covered not only technical innovation but
also de-
sign. Obtaining a patent, however, was too slow and expensive,
and the
procedure was unable to keep pace with the seasonal rhythm of
fashion
changes.
49 Fr. Marle, “Lettre de Paris: La Resquille dans la Haute
Couture Parisienne,” Textilis 9
(1 June 1937): 9.

50 Committee Meeting Records (hereafter CMR), 9 Dec. 1939,
Lucien Lelong, Archives of
the Chambre Syndicale de la Couture Parisienne (hereafter
CSCP).
51 “Piguet Divulges Names of Firms to Which Early Model
Shipments Went,” WWD,
1 Sept. 1936, sec. 1, 1.
52 Sylvan Gotshal, The Pirates Will Get You: A Story of the
Fight for Design Protection
(New York, 1945), 7.
During the interwar period, various groups, most critically the
Fash-
ion Originators’ Guild of America, attempted to enlarge the
scope of
American copyright protection to include fashion designs, an
initiative
that coincided with the increasing self-confi dence of American
design-
ers. The argument for instituting design protection in the U.S.
was two-
fold. First, high-end American retailers wanted to protect Paris
fashion,
as they intended to continue playing the role of intermediaries.
They
prided themselves on bringing the fi nest designs to American
markets.
Second, a growing number of American fashion professionals
were ad-

vocating the development of original American fashions, which
were
threatened by cheap copies of Paris designs. Protecting Paris
designs
paradoxically would diminish the cultural hegemony of Paris
fashions.
Thus, an important sector of the American industry opposed pla-
giarism strictly on the grounds of its negative effect on the
American
fashion business. American buyers who legally purchased Paris
cou-
ture, and had the right to reproduce it, were making seasonal
invest-
ments, taking a risk in their creative choices, selecting what
they con-
sidered the appropriate designs for the American market, and
importing
them at high cost. The risk to them resided in the public’s
unpredictable
response. Lower-priced manufacturers illegally copying designs
im-
ported from Paris cut off follow-up orders to the higher-end
manufac-
turers, causing them to lose a substantial part of their
investment.
When a woman accustomed to buying clothes in the higher-end
seg-
ment saw cheap copies of her dresses in the stores, she would
reject
those styles. But copying was also the symptom of a fast-
growing econ-
omy and booming demand across the market, factors to which
higher-
end couture houses and manufacturers, whether French or
American,

were ill equipped to respond.53
Fashion and the Law in the United States
Just before World War I, Thorvald Stolberg, the American
register
of copyrights, had expressed the opinion that the U.S. should
adopt
laws similar to those of France. Members of Congress then
proposed
successive revisions of the American copyright law that would
include
fashion, but they faced resistance from other members, who
argued that
the practicality of American-made garments made them distinct
from
works of art. During the mid-1920s, these disparate views
culminated
in congressional debate on the Vestal bill.
The goal of this bill, submitted by Representative Albert H.
Vestal
of Indiana, who chaired the Congressional Committee on
Patents from
53 Geoffrey Jones and David Kiron, “Cisco Goes to China:
Routing an Emerging Econ-
omy,” Harvard Business School case 805–020 (July 2004).
1925 to 1929, was to establish a quick and inexpensive method
of regis-
tering designs. Its opponents were mainly department-store

members
of the National Retail Dry Goods Association (NRDGA), who
feared
that copyright owners would be able to exert pressure on retail
prices,
thereby concentrating power in the hands of a small number of
Paris
designers.54 The bill underwent several rounds of discussion,
during
which one side argued for legislation to protect design
originality and
the other expressed retailers’ fear of loss of control.55 Another
argument
against copyright protection was based on the view of America
as a
fashion democracy.56 Representatives asserted that the Vestal
bill was
“designed to take away from the poor working girl the right to
wear the
same pattern of goods that the wealthy people do.”57 Fashion
copyright
was thus perceived as subverting the American ideal of social
mobility.
Conversely, advocates for copyright protection argued that it
would
provide employment for designers; encourage manufacturers to
produce
in larger series, and therefore at cheaper prices, even if they
used original
designs; and improve the conditions of competition in
manufacturing—
while claiming that protection would not undermine competition
be-
tween fashion lines. The Vestal bill passed the House in 1930
and went

on to the Senate, but Congress adjourned the next day. The bill
was dis-
cussed again in a Senate committee the following year, but the
wide
range of products it covered became a source of concern,
leading to a
further—and permanent—delay in voting the bill into law.58
Americans, like attorney Sylvan Gotshal, who tried to extend
appli-
cation of the American copyright law to fashion, encountered a
major
obstacle when advocating that fashion should be considered
equal to
other arts.59 This assertion was easily dismissed on the grounds
that the
cyclical nature of fashion indicated a lack of true invention.60
Fashion
was viewed as a form of perpetual recycling of a limited number
of de-
signs, which were themselves limited by the functional
requirements of
the body’s shape.
Fashion and the Law in France
French law did not distinguish between fi ne and applied art.61
Therefore, in the French legal view, a fashionable garment and
a painting
54 Gotshal, The Pirates, 31–32.
55 “Hearings on Vestal Bill,” NYT, 14 Dec. 1930.
56 Jessica Daves, Ready-Made Miracle: The American Story of
Fashion for the Millions
(New York, 1967), 10.

57 Gotshal, The Pirates, 37.
58 Ibid., 38–41.
59 Ibid., 7–8.
60 Ulrich Lehmann, Tigersprung: Fashion in Modernity
(Cambridge, Mass., 2001).
were both art.62 The practices of renting dress models and
copying origi-
nal designs and toiles became progressively illegal. The
Chambre syndi-
cale de la couture et de la confection pour dames et fi llettes, a
trade asso-
ciation created in Paris in 1868, monitored three commercial
activities in
women’s fashion: dressmaking, tailoring, and “confection”
(ready-made
garments).63 In 1911, the organization became the Chambre
syndicale
de la couture Parisienne (hereafter Chambre syndicale), whose
pur-
pose was to guard only the interests of the high-end
dressmaking pro-
fession.64 As an employers’ syndicate, it included directors of
haute-
couture houses in Paris, like Jeanne Lanvin, Jean Patou, Jacques
Worth,
Lucien Lelong, and Madeleine Vionnet. Provincials were not
accepted,
and confectioners were no longer allowed to be members. Some
leading
fi gures of Paris couture, like Marcel Rochas and Coco Chanel,

chose to
remain outside the Chambre syndicale.65
The Chambre syndicale developed exclusivity policies in an at-
tempt to retain some control over the reproduction of fashion
design.
The association adopted a rule that allowed only foreign
manufacturers
to reproduce couture garments.66 The Paris couturiers strictly
denied
reproduction rights to French manufacturers outside the capital.
French
provincial manufacturers could neither attend the openings nor
buy
couture designs to reproduce legally. French manufacturers,
dissatis-
fi ed with this situation, repeatedly lobbied the Chambre
syndicale for
the right to reproduce haute couture based on the same qualifi
cations
that were imposed on foreign buyers, but they did not persuade
the
Chambre syndicale to change its policies during the interwar
period.67
The Chambre syndicale also tried to make its voice heard
regarding
the protection of design in the United States. Jacques Worth, a
third-
generation member of the house of Worth who eventually
became pres-
ident of the Chambre syndicale, had strong connections to the
Ameri-
can market. Highly respected by his Paris peers, he was active
at the
Customs Commission (Commission des douanes), and he

traveled fre-
quently to the United States, where he often addressed
professional
meetings.68 After Worth went to New York to discuss the
piracy issue
62 Bernard Edelman and Nathalie Heinich, L’art en confl its
(Paris, 2002).
63 Garnier, “Le milieu de la mode,” 75.
64 On the Chambre Syndicale, see Grumbach, Histoires. On
Vionnet, see Betty Kirke,
Madeleine Vionnet (San Francisco, 1998); Pamela Golbin,
Madeleine Vionnet: Puriste de
la mode (Paris, 2009); and Florence Brachet Champsaur, “Aux
Galeries Lafayette and the
Couture Industry, 1890–1952,” paper presented at the joint
BHC-EBHA conference, Milan,
12 June 2009.
65 CMR, 30 May 1933, 1, CSCP.
66 Deschamps, La Crise dans les Industries du Vêtement.
67 “Accord entre la haute couture et la confection,” CMR, 4
July 1930, 5–6 and 22 Jan.
1932, CSCP.
68 General Assembly Records, 7 May 1930, 3, CSCP.
with American buyers, the French couturiers and Americans
buyers
discussed the possibility of founding a joint association, but all
negotia-

tions stopped after the stock market crashed in October 1929.69
The couturiere Madeleine Vionnet was infl uential in federating
her
Paris peers as a way to protect fashion design. Vionnet had
founded her
own couture house in Paris in 1912. Celebrated for her use of
the bias
cut and lightweight fabrics, Vionnet had launched her career by
copying
models for a London shop.70 Historian Betty Kirke notes that
Vionnet’s
awareness of copyists started while she was working at the
house of Cal-
lot Soeurs under the direction of Madame Gerber-Callot.71
Vionnet was
inspired by the commercial strategies of Callot Soeurs, whose
directors
took every opportunity to sue counterfeiters. Nancy Troy has
explored
Vionnet’s attempts to build an early system of licensing her
product and
collecting royalties, especially in the American market;
nevertheless,
her creations were widely copied in the United States.72
Vionnet’s de-
signs were not only represented in higher-end Manhattan
department
stores; they also trickled down fast and far. In 1931, the trade
press was
writing about Vionnet’s “black skirt and bright green jacket
which was
to usher in the vogue of the contrast coat now spread to prairie
towns
and the smallest city dressmakers.”73 Both the fashion and
trade press

advertised illegal Vionnet copies or imitations in every price
range. Vi-
onnet modifi ed models at very short notice before openings,
and she in-
stalled dyeing facilities inside her house that enabled her to
change the
colors of the clothes she was planning to model on a whim,
taking the
copyists by surprise. Vionnet successfully sued copyists who
were sell-
ing illegal reproductions of her dresses to Bergdorf Goodman,
Saks-
Fifth Avenue, and the pattern fi rm Butterick, the oldest such
company
on the market.74
In 1921, Vionnet and the general director of her fi rm, the
lawyer
Louis Dangel, founded the Association pour la protection des
arts plas-
tiques et appliqués (Association for the Protection of Visual and
Applied
Arts).75 The Association brought together creators of all types
of applied
arts to fi ght copyists. They pooled their fi nancial resources,
advertised
their activities in press campaigns, and documented their cases.
The
Association worked outside consular jurisdiction by appearing
before
70 Paul Johnson, Creators: From Chaucer and Dürer to Picasso
and Disney (New York,
2006), 227; Stewart, “Copying and Copyrighting Haute

Couture,” 112, 128.
71 “Couturiers Who Count,” WWD, 26 June 1931, sec. 1, 4.
72 Troy, Couture Culture.
73 “Couturiers Who Count,” WWD, June 26, 1931, s. 1, p. 4.
74 Ibid.
75 Grumbach, Histoires, 27; Simon, La Haute Couture, 153.
the magistrate, a procedure they intentionally chose in order to
equate
copying with theft. The Association proceeded by seizing
counterfeited
designs and garments. Its actions were decisive in building
jurispru-
dence that conferred the status of art on haute couture, and it
advocated
the establishment of international copyright laws.
In 1930, Vionnet and Armand Trouyet, the lawyer who by then
had
replaced Dangel, founded the Protection artistique des
industries
saisonnières (hereafter PAIS), which played a key role in
protecting
fashion design. Trouyet was president of PAIS from its
inception. The
purpose of the new association was not fundamentally different
from
that of previous groups, but PAIS became more infl uential and
came to
be considered by some members of the Chambre syndicale as a
parallel
organization. During the 1930s, PAIS was mostly engaged in

repressing
illegal copying of fashion designs. Proceedings were started by
the de-
signers themselves, and in some cases the Paris professional
associa-
tions acted as plaintiffs. Cases could be settled either through
amicable
agreements or by lawsuits. PAIS effectively reinforced case law
in favor
of the creators and, as a preventive policy, blacklisted buyers
who oper-
ated outside the law. Despite Vionnet’s best efforts, the
copyists man-
aged to sneak into every house, often backed by international
buyers.
On occasion, various French professional associations would
col-
laborate in the fi ght against copying. For example, the
Chambre syndi-
cale, PAIS, and the Association pour la défense des arts
plastiques
joined forces with the couture and millinery houses of Lewis,
Caroline
Reboux, Agnès-Drécoll, Louiseboulanger, Patou, Jenny,
Suzanne Tal-
bot, Vionnet, and Schiaparelli, to wage a battle against the
house of
Lebrun, a Parisian enterprise that sold false labels manufactured
by
the fi rm of Faure & Cie in Saint-Etienne.76 In that case,
counterfeit la-
bels were affi xed to cheap copies of haute-couture designs. In
covering
the affair, the American press acknowledged that a part of the
counter-

feit merchandise was probably intended for the U.S. market.
Daniel
Reagan, commercial attaché to the American embassy in Paris,
admit-
ted to Armand Trouyet, director of PAIS, “It is possible, of
course, that
these style bootleggers had agents in the United States to whom
they
sent faked models, afterward sending forged labels and trade-
marks
separately.”77
In a few cases, Chambre syndicale members themselves failed
to
abide by the industry rules.78 For example, in 1930, Trouyet
found out
that the house of Alice Choquet, member of the Chambre
syndicale, had
76 CMR, 27 Oct. 1931, 2, CSCP.
77 William P. Carney, “Paris Plans Curb on Bootleg Styles,”
NYT, 8 Nov. 1931, E4.
78 Madeleine Chapsal, La chair de la robe (Paris, 1991), 213.
been convicted for the seventh time of copying designs, most
recently
from the house of Vionnet.79 Trouyet used an agent to prove
the facts,
and the case was settled out of court. The offending house paid
a fi ne
that went to the welfare fund of the Chambre syndicale, and
Choquet

was allowed to remain in the association.80
Among all the fashion designers of the interwar years, the two
that
stood out as stars were Vionnet and Coco Chanel. They were
polar op-
posites, both in their business models and in how they exercised
their
creativity. Vionnet considered the fi ght against piracy a just
cause, and
she worked hard to convince her peers to join in the battle to
defeat it.
But she failed to persuade Chanel, who developed her own
methods of
combating design piracy. Buyers attending Chanel’s fashion
shows were
under stricter surveillance than they were at any others.81
Chanel did
not hesitate to sue counterfeiters, and she did so on several
occasions.
But she refused to join Parisian fashion associations, and she
publicly
acknowledged that copying was the highest form of fl attery. In
her Amer-
ican perfume advertisings, Chanel advertised herself as the
“most cop-
ied and popular couturiere, ardent sponsor of Youth.”82 The
addition of
her own fabrics to her line of original garments strengthened
Chanel’s
position on copying.83 Since her dresses were more likely to be
copied
in Chanel fabrics, she was able to retain some of the benefi ts
she lost to
copying through sales of the material.84 Chanel’s modern take
on repro-

duction, combined with her “Ford Model T dress,” the little
black dress
that was the fashion counterpart of the basic Ford car, and her
use of
tie-in products, such as perfumes and fabrics, formed aspects of
a co-
herent business strategy. Chanel’s position was that illegal
copying
was the ultimate advertisement, costing nothing to the creator.
Eliza-
beth Hawes recalled, “There is an old tradition in Paris that the
day a
designer isn’t copied, he is dead.”85 Elsa Schiaparelli had a
similar atti-
tude. An argument could be made that accepting piracy was the
only
way to deal with it, but this required having considerable
economic and
social capital.86 Chanel had both.
79 CMR, 15 Oct. 1930, 3 and 2 Apr. 1931, 18, Affaire Aîné–
Montaille, CSCP.
80 CMR, 24 Sept. 1930, 5–7, Affaire Alice Choquet, CSCP.
81 Chapsal, La chair, 213; Daves, Ready-Made Miracle, 148;
Hawes, Fashion is Spinach,
60–61.
82 Advertisement for Chanel, Vogue, U.S. edition, 1 Nov. 1934,
99.
83 Fashion Group Bulletin, Jan. 1933, no. 3, box 144, Fashion
Group International Ar-
chive, New York Public Library.
84 Advertisement for dresses in “Chanel Cloth” for the brand
Rose Amado, Madison Ave.,

New York, in Vogue, U.S. ed. 15 Mar. 1932, 26.
86 Pierre Bourdieu, “Le capital social: Notes provoisoires,”
Actes de la recherches en
sciences sociales 31 (1980): 2–3.
Could New York Develop Design Creativity without Paris?
Contrary to the hypothesis that fashion design did not develop
in
the U.S. until the outbreak of World War II, when the Paris
fashion in-
dustry was isolated by the German occupation, attempts to build
an
American design industry actually started shortly after 1910.87
During
the interwar period, a movement to legitimize American style
gained
momentum, characterized by recurring campaigns to promote
national
styles and incremental attempts to institutionalize the American
fash-
ion business. The emergence of American design was partly an
outcome
of the Depression, which awakened both a need and a desire to
buy na-
tional goods, a call that became the marketing expression of
protection-
ist policies. American designers and journalists were also
demonstrat-
ing more confi dence in American design. For example, in 1927,

a New
York Times journalist, disappointed by that year’s season in
Paris, won-
dered in print whether the U.S. market should develop its own
home-
grown line.88 The Times’ chief fashion editor, Virginia Pope,
was a
strong supporter of New York’s creative talent.89
American talent was not properly recognized at this time for
two
main reasons. First, in the United States, designers, rather than
being
couturiers, as they were in France, were most often employees
of entre-
preneurs, and they were hired to work by the day or the hour. A
second
reason was that the New York fashion industry was
experiencing diffi -
culties in building its own image and creating symbolic capital.
Fortune
magazine asserted that the United States already had haute
couture: a
compound of famous names, like Elizabeth Hawes, and obscure
ones,
like Nettie Rosenstein. The money was there: New York
entrepreneurs
were earning as much, if not more, than their Parisian
counterparts, and
prices of high-end New York designs were in the same bracket
as those
produced in Paris: between $90 and $300 in 1933 (today
US$9,000 to
$30,000, using a GDP indicator).90 Fabrication costs of a dress
were
then nearly half as much in France as in the United States,

where labor
costs were higher. What the New York fashion world mostly
lacked was
self-confi dence.
After her period of sketching ended, Elizabeth Hawes returned
to
New York, where she became a stylist for department stores and
manu-
facturers. In response to America’s need for more designers, she
opened
87 Sandra Stansbery Buckland, “Promoting American
Designers, 1940–44: Building Our
Own House,” in Twentieth–Century American Fashion, ed.
Linda Welters and Patricia Cun-
ningham (New York, 2005), 99–121.
88 “Seek Real Change in Women’s Styles,” NYT, 24 Apr. 1927,
E19.
89 Claudia B. Kidwell and Margaret C. Christman, Suiting
Everyone: The Democratiza-
tion of Clothing in America (Washington D.C., 1974), 177.
90 “The Dressmakers of the U.S.,” Fortune, Dec. 1933, 37–38.
her own shop in New York in 1928 with capital provided by the
rich
cousin of a friend. She lost that partner’s backing after the
October 1929
crash, but then found new capital and went on, incorporating
Hawes,

Inc., in 1930.91 She designed her own fashion line and was
described in
Fortune magazine as the “well-known Hawes.” During the
1930s, Hawes
catered to New York elites, designing and selling high-end
clothes. At
the same time, she was designing clothes and accessories for
manufac-
turers, which she helped to advertise for department stores by
endors-
ing her own lines in the media. Her style was characterized by
soft lines
and bias-cut clothes. In 1931, she showed her fashions in Paris,
an occa-
sion she remembered as a success but that, according to the New
York
Times, was received coldly by the Paris crowd.92 In 1932, she
com-
mented that she felt New York should replace Paris as fashion
center of
the world.93
She advocated that American designers free themselves from
con-
formism, a condition for which she held the social
establishment as re-
sponsible as the Paris haute-couture circles: “To be fashionable
in the
USA . . . was to conform: to dress in accordance with an
example or
pattern; to show obedience to the benevolent dictator. . . . The fi
rst
American elected fashion dictator of American women’s fashion
was
Chanel.”94 Ironically, although Chanel was perceived as the
epitome of

fashion dictatorship in the U.S., she herself behaved as a
copyright free
rider in France.
American attempts to develop national styles were minimized
by
the French press, which maintained the view that while the
French cou-
turiers were taking design risks, American women were
spending their
money on American goods.95
Protecting Fashion Design in the United States
The Fashion Originators’ Guild of America (hereafter FOGA)
was
incorporated in 1932 for the purpose of protecting creativity in
Ameri-
can fashion design.96 The Guild was initiated by the New York
dress
manufacturer Maurice Rentner, who became its president.
Rentner’s
company, which he founded in 1909, added a number of
offshoots and
91 Hawes, vita, 1, FIT.
92 Ibid.; “Paris Cold to Show of American Designer,” NYT, 25
July 1931, 2.
93 “Finds Style Center Here,” NYT, 14 Apr. 1932, 18.
94 Elizabeth Hawes, book draft, box 3, folder 1, reference x–
149, Gladys Marcus Library,
FIT Special Collections.
95 Bertram J. Perkins, “Dress Up America Aims Somewhat
Misinterpreted,” and “Les

Echos Cites Failure to Create American Style,” both in WWD,
19 May 1933, sec. 1, 2.
96 Marcketti, “Design Piracy,” 53.
was one of the longest-lasting fi rms in the garment district.
Rentner
and his colleagues often traveled to Paris to see the collections,
and the
prices of his dresses matched those of Parisian high fashion.97
As fashion historian Sarah Beth Marcketti demonstrated in her
groundbreaking dissertation, FOGA had been preceded by other
initia-
tives of American retailers. As early as in 1912, the Society of
American
Fashions was founded with the purpose of opposing fake
labels.98 Be-
tween the wars, several American associations attempted, with
varied
degrees of success, to rally dress manufacturers around the
issues of
copying and origination.
At the beginning, FOGA attracted manufacturers that produced
garments selling in the price ranges of $22.50 (today US$350,
using
the CPI indicator) and up: high-end manufacturers and
dressmakers
making custom-made clothes (some enterprises combined both).
Shortly
after its incorporation, FOGA counted 130 members, mostly
from New

York. All these enterprises employed one or more in-house
designers
and produced between 200 and 450 new designs per year: some
Paris
reproductions, some adaptations, and some “totally U.S.
designs.”99
New members of FOGA committed themselves not to buy or sell
illegal
copies of designs. FOGA sent undercover investigators to retail
stores.
Retailers that refused to discard items that FOGA judged to be
illegal
copies were marked by a red card, signifying that FOGA
members would
not do business with them.100
FOGA eventually comprised six sections: dresses, coats, junior-
miss
clothing, sportswear, textiles, and protective affi liates. The
latter were
not full members but constituted a special category of
manufacturers in
the lower price ranges. The list of FOGA members in 1932–33
included
Hattie Carnegie, Jo Copeland, Joseph Halpert, Omar Kiam,
Anna
McCormick, Bergdorf Goodman, Saks-Fifth Avenue, Filene’s
Brothers,
Milgrim’s, Pattullo-Modes, Herbert Sondheim, Tailored
Women, Jay-
Thorpe, and Bonwit Teller & Co., all upper-grade couturiers,
manufac-
turers, and retailers.101 Notably, the list of FOGA’s textile
associates
contained not only New York members, but also those in the
U.S. retail

branches of high-end French textile manufacturers, such as
Bianchini
Férier; Coudurier, Fructus & Descher; and Ducharne.102
FOGA members began to schedule their own New York
openings
during one week per season. The dress and coat divisions gave
their fi rst
97 Daves, Ready-Made Miracle, 61–62.
99 “The Dressmakers of the U.S.,” 38.
100 Transcript of Andrew Goodman interview, 1–2, FIT.
101 “The Dressmakers of the U.S.,” 142; Marcketti, “Design
Piracy,” 130.
102 Advertisement for FOGA, WWD, 26 June 1933, 10–11.
show in July 1933, announcing that their clothes models were
made
from fabrics supplied by the textile division, which had some
French
members.103 While FOGA continued to support this week of
fashion
shows, the event itself did not become offi cial until 1956, when
New
York mayor Robert Wagner established Fashion Week.104
The Dress Creators League was incorporated on November 11,
1932,
with the intention of uniting manufacturers that produced
dresses
priced between $10.75 and $16.75. FOGA lowered its threshold

of
$22.75 to accept members of the League as protective affi liates
in April
1935, but the associations remained distinct from each other. In
Octo-
ber 1935, FOGA again lowered its price base and asked the
retailers of
wholesale lines selling items between $6.75 and $8.75 to sign
an anti-
piracy statement, a controversial move. In the fall of 1936,
FOGA in-
cluded the popular price lines of $3.75 and less (today US$58,
using a
CPI indicator). The Popular Priced Dress Manufacturers Group,
how-
ever, opposed this attempt because it suspected that FOGA was
trying
to impose a monopoly on the American dress trade.
Under the New Deal, during the brief period of the National
Indus-
trial Recovery Administration (NIRA), FOGA was accorded a
place of
increasing importance. NIRA conferred the force of law on
FOGA’s
codes.105 Expectations that U.S. copyright legislation would
eventually
include fashion design were high during this period. The lawyer
Sylvan
Gotshal, a prominent supporter of strengthening American
copyright
law, described NIRA’s impact on copyright as minimal.
Nevertheless,
NIRA launched a public movement of support for the practice of
label-
ing garments with the names of both the groups that belonged to

FOGA
and the manufacturer, and for banning labels that claimed false
origins
(such as fake Paris labels). On October 12, 1933, Eleanor
Roosevelt and
her daughter attended the public launching of the NIRA coat-
and-suit
label. The new Coat and Suit Code Authority, presided over by
George
W. Alger, regulated the use of labels on garments. The
inaugural event
took place at Del Monte-Hickey, a New York factory on
Seventh Ave-
nue, where the two fi rst labels issued under the National
Recovery Ad-
ministration (NRA) program were sewn into garments made for
Elea-
nor Roosevelt and her daughter.106
The application of NIRA policies was controversial.107 In late
No-
vember 1933, the Uptown Retail Guild of New York gave a
dinner to
103 Advertisement, “Members of the Fashion Originators Guild
of America Announce
Their Opening Dates,” WWD, 28 June 1933, 3.
104 “Fashion Week Announced,” NYT, 7 Dec. 1956, 42.
105 Marcketti, “Design Piracy,” 119, 120, 131, 136–38, 145–46.
106 “Mrs. Roosevelt and Mrs. Dall to Get First NRA Coat
Labels,” WWD, 4 Oct. 1933,
sec. 1, 1.
107 Alan Brinkley, Liberalism and Its Discontents (Cambridge,
Mass., 1998), 37–44.

honor Maurice Rentner, chairman of FOGA, at the Waldorf
Astoria,
hosting fi ve hundred department-store executives and other
fashion-
retail professionals.108 During his speech, P. A. O’Connell,
former presi-
dent of NRDGA, enumerated NRA’s virtues. He made the case
that it
would help to eliminate “economic banditry,” “the stampede of
price
cutting,” and “the prostitution of quality.” Only 10 percent of
the busi-
ness, according to O’Connell, had an obstructive attitude toward
NRA
policies. Rentner concluded the event by underlining the need to
en-
courage the public’s appreciation of “artistic detail,” rather than
bol-
stering their dependence on mass production. “Ingenuity of
fashion is
the antidote for excessive consumer thrift. If beauty and
originality are
stressed, feminine fancy will be caught and tightened purse
strings will
be loosened.”109
In order to eradicate illegal copying of original fashions in the
U.S.,
FOGA established its own registration system that was
reminiscent of
French copyright law. Fashion originators could register a

sketch, or even
a description of a model article of clothing, for a period of six
months.
The item was assigned a date and a number. Foreign models and
li-
censed copies of foreign designs could not be registered.110
The National
Federation of Designs, Inc., kept the models registered by
FOGA, and
its clearing house was the Design Registration Bureau. By 1936,
FOGA
was registering between 40,000 and 50,000 models a year.111
FOGA encouraged retailers to sign contracts (4,000 in 1933)
pledg-
ing that they would not buy or sell designs obtained from
copyists.112
FOGA launched investigations to ensure that none of its
members was
reselling original Paris couture garments to renters of model
designs.
The organization worked to establish cooperation among French
cou-
ture houses and American manufacturers and custom authorities
in
tracking illegally imported models.113
FOGA also supported lawsuits against New York sketching
busi-
nesses, on the grounds that such services were illegally copying
FOGA
members’ designs.114 While FOGA’s agenda was similar to that
of PAIS,
it did not benefi t from the legislative framework that existed in
France
and so had to build its own system of registration and

enforcement. Fines
paid by enterprises for infringement of the rules were not
redistributed
108 “Rentner to be Honored,” NYT, 20 Nov. 1933, 17.
109 “Retailers See NRA as a Lasting Boon,” NYT, 22 Nov.
1933, 5.
110 Unlike in other countries, such as, for example Germany
and Belgium. Pouillard,
Hirsch & Cie.
111 Marcketti, “Design Piracy,” 133–35.
112 “The Dressmakers of the U.S.,” 142.
113 “Piguet Divulges Names of Firms to which Early Model
Shipments Went,” WWD,
1 Sept. 1936, sec. 1, 1.
114 “FOGA et al., Sue Lucille Baldwin Here,” WWD, 14 Oct.
1936, sec. 1, 35.
to the plaintiffs, but to charitable associations, a policy similar
to those
of PAIS and the Chambre syndicale in Paris.115
In January 1933, before FOGA expanded to include lower-
priced
manufacturers, the Washington offi ce of NRDGA started an
inquiry
into FOGA’s legality. Rentner’s response that FOGA did not
restrain
trade may well have been contradicted by FOGA’s red-carding
policy,

but his main argument concerning the protection of creativity
held
some force: “It cannot be illegal to protect property rights in
style
merchandise.”116
At the end of 1935, FOGA counted 250 members. There were
be-
tween 12,000 and 12,500 cooperating retailers in thirty-two
states. In
March 1936, the list of red-carded retailers included 400 stores
across
the country. Strawbridge & Clothier and Bloomingdale’s were
given
red cards at some point.117 One of their colleagues, Andrew
Goodman,
recalled that Filene’s was red carded and that it then started a
civil law-
suit against FOGA. Filene’s lost. However, Goodman expressed
the
opinion, echoing Hawes, that “in this business copyrighting is
ridicu-
lous. By the time something is copyrighted it’s dead. The legal
protec-
tion for such a thing is cumbersome and unworkable. . . . In this
country
the person who is protected is the copyist.”118
Opposition to FOGA developed among two main groups of
fashion
professionals: the manufacturers of cheaper lines and some
retailers.
While FOGA had strong links with some New York retailers,
the organi-
zation’s decision to extend its oversight to lines wholesaling at
less than

$10.75 caused some rifts between the original FOGA members
and
manufacturers of cheaper dresses. Nevertheless, they all
renewed their
agreements in 1936.119 However, FOGA did not join the two
major re-
tailers’ associations, the National Retail Dry Goods Association
and the
Associated Merchandising Corporation.120
In 1935, a group of members of NRDGA and the Association of
Buying Offi ces sent out a confi dential questionnaire, asking
their mem-
bers to provide their feedback about FOGA. The answers to the
ques-
tionnaire indicated that the decision to cover cheaper lines was
per-
ceived as a bid by FOGA for control of “non-signatory specialty
apparel
and other stores in the lower-price fi eld.”121
The Popular Priced Dress Manufacturers Group became another
major opponent of FOGA, issuing a statement that it considered
the
115 “Fashion Guild Plans Protection Campaign,” WWD, 22 May
1934, sec. 2, 8.
116 “Question Dress Guild Plans,” NYT, 21 Jan. 1933, 29.
118 Transcript of Andrew Goodman interview, 2, FIT.
119 “Two Guilds in Accord,” NYT, 4 Mar. 1936, 30.
121 “Retailers Attack Dress Style Plan,” NYT, 21 Dec. 1935,
30.

organization’s design registration system to be illegal.122 The
Popular
Priced Dress Manufacturers Group fi led a petition with the
Federal
Trade Commission, requesting that it launch an investigation
into
FOGA’s actions. The petition was backed by three hundred
contractors
that produced dresses for $4.75 and less, on the grounds that
FOGA
was practicing an “unlawful boycott, a monopoly in illegal
restraint of
trade and blacklisting”; they asked for a “cease and desist”
order to be
issued against FOGA.123 Middle- and low-priced dress retailers
feared
that FOGA’s actions would impact their volume sales. In
response, FOGA
declared that its policies were adopted to suppress the “evils” of
the in-
dustry, the worst of them being piracy; that its membership was
en-
tirely voluntary; that the association was fairly administered;
and that
its objective was neither monopoly nor boycott. FOGA members
argued
that they were trying to preserve their place as the second
echelon in
the hierarchy of fashion emulation, immediately below haute
couture.
They seemed hesitant to defi ne their organization’s place,
stating that
the original designs they were creating were not “as novel” as

the ones
purchased abroad. The FOGA members condemned style piracy
for the
use of cheap materials of inferior quality and for the use of
sweatshop
labor. Copyists competed on the basis of price, cutting costs
through a
system of bidding the cutting and assembly work to contractors,
who
lowered costs at the expense of the workforce.124 While they
claimed
that style pirates did not send their buyers to Paris, the example
of Eliz-
abeth Hawes shows that they were not being entirely truthful.
The lack
of coherence in FOGA’s argument hindered its response to the
charges
fi led by the Federal Trade Commission.
* * *
In May 1939, New York–based FOGA and Parisian PAIS
announced
that they would collaborate by checking the deliveries of haute-
couture
garments suspected of having been bought on behalf of model
rent-
ers.125 PAIS expected FOGA to police the U.S. market, with
the result
that suspected American copyists would be banned from
attending sub-
sequent fashion shows in Paris. Trouyet had assigned PAIS to
be the sole
authority for handling cooperation between Paris and American
fash-
ion fi rms.126 As the war approached, the work of PAIS

continued under
122 Marcketti, “Design Piracy,” 122, 138.
123 “Peace Move Made in Guild Dispute,” NYT, 3 Mar. 1936,
30.
124 WWD, 6 Apr. 1939, 1, 6.
125 WWD, 16 May 1939, 4.
126 Bertram J. Perkins, “FOGA–Paris Plan to Check Delivery to
Model Renters Interests
Returning Buyers,” WWD, 3 May 1939, 1; and “Trouyet, PAIS
Piracy Defense Head, Resigns,”
WWD, 26 May 1939, 1.
the direction of an inner division of the Chambre syndicale,
which pre-
vented design renters from entering the haute-couture houses,
blocking
the renters’ attempts to circumvent the establishments’
guardians. The
fl ow of American buyers to Paris was disrupted in 1940, and in
the
spring, the links between Paris and New York fashion were cut
off by
the German invasion and occupation of Paris.
American opponents of style protection, such as the Popular
Priced
Dress Manufacturers Group, believed that the burden of
protection
would fall on retailers. More generally, they were convinced
that piracy

boosted economic growth. Ultimately, FOGA’s opponents won
the bat-
tle, and FOGA was found guilty of violating the Sherman Anti-
Trust Act
in 1941, based on its policy of red-carding the retailers that
promoted
copies.127 After the war, FOGA still survived, but with reduced
numbers,
and it shifted its activity to design patents. These patents were
dedi-
cated to protecting functional design, which does not entirely
overlap
with fashion. Up to 1940, thirty-nine bills for fashion-related
patent
and copyright-law revisions were proposed to Congress, but all
failed to
receive approval.128
Conclusion
While historians often describe Paris and New York fashion as a
contrast between art and industry, I have shown in this
examination of
trade associations on both sides of the Atlantic that the picture
is in-
complete. The Parisian PAIS and New York’s FOGA shared a
similar
agenda, working preventively by registering designs and
repressively by
blacklisting opponents and fi ling lawsuits. Maurice Rentner in
New
York and Madeleine Vionnet in Paris both sought protection for
their
investments. Their contrasting approaches grew out of the
differences
in French and U.S. copyright laws. France protected fashion

design
under its copyright law, and Paris couturiers hired teams of
specialized
lawyers to protect their ideas.129 By contrast, U.S. copyright
law did not
cover fashion, so American designers had to either resort to
design pat-
ent law or invoke their commercial right to protect their brands.
Ameri-
can jurisprudence also remained weak when it came to
protecting fash-
ion designs.
The legislators of the two countries did not agree on the
creative
merit of fashion design: while the French protected fashion as
high art,
the U.S. Congress denied fashion that status. Fashion copying
was not a
127 Marcketti, “Design Piracy,” 142–43.
128 Ibid., 112–15.
problem exclusively of transatlantic commerce. Between the
wars, Ber-
lin and Vienna were also centers of illegal fashion copying.
After World
War II, the Chambre syndicale de la couture parisienne worked
suc-
cessfully with European countries, including Italy and Belgium,
to curb

fashion piracy.
Today, the dilemma remains. The strong protections offered to
fash-
ion design by European law have been emulated by emerging
fashion-
producing centers like Japan and India. While U.S. laws contain
severe
charges against counterfeiting, they do not protect fashion
design. Some
experts argue that the absence of copyright protection is a factor
in the
economic dynamism of American fashion.130 The experience of
an ear-
lier era has demonstrated that copying pushes today’s American
design-
ers to innovate.131 However, not all American fashion
designers agree
that the outcome of this policy has been positive. The Council
of Fash-
ion Design of America continues to lobby the U.S. Congress to
pass the
Design Prohibition Act, which it introduced in 2006, that would
add
fashion design to U.S. copyright law.132
. . .
VERONIQUE POUILLARD is assistant professor of history at
the Uni-
versité Libre de Bruxelles and director of the seminar on
fashion at the Insti-
tut d’Histoire du Temps Présent in Paris. She is currently
writing a book on
the transatlantic history of the fashion business.

130 Kai Raustiala and Christopher Springman, “The Piracy
Paradox: Innovation and Intel-
lectual Property in Fashion Design,” Virginia Law Review 92
(2006).
131 Ruth La Ferla, “Imitate that Zipper!” NYT, 2 Sept. 2009,
accessed on nytimes.com,
3 Sept. 2009.
132 Committee on the Judiciary, United States House of
Representatives, “Statement of
the United States Copyright Offi ce before the Subcommittee on
Courts, the Internet, and In-
tellectual Property,” 109th Congress, 2nd Sess., 27 July 2007,
on-line at www.copyright.gov/
docs/regstat072706, accessed 2 Sept. 2009.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further
reproduction prohibited without permission.
Consumer Attitudes Toward
Fashion Counterfeits:
Application of the Theory of
Planned Behavior
Hyejeong Kim,
1
and Elena Karpova
2

Abstract
This study examines consumer motivations that can explain
attitudes toward purchasing fashion
counterfeit goods and tests the underlying mechanism of intent
to purchase fashion counterfeits
based on the theory of planned behavior. A random sample of
female college students (N ¼ 336)
participate in this study. Product appearance, past purchase
behavior, value consciousness, and
normative susceptibility are significant predictors of attitude
toward buying fashion counterfeit
goods. Attitude, subjective norm, and perceived behavioral
control are significantly related to
intent to purchase fashion counterfeit goods. This research
extends the theory of planned
behavior and tests two additional paths that significantly
improve explanatory power of the
theory and prediction of consumer intent to buy fashion
counterfeit goods.
Keywords
counterfeits, fashion, theory of planned behavior
Product counterfeiting is a global issue that causes significant
economic and social problems
(Gilgoff, 2004). Counterfeit trade is estimated at $500 billion
globally, accounting for between
5% and 7% of the total world trade (Johnson, 2006). The U.S.
share represents $286.8 billion
(63%) of that (Tucker, 2005). The International Anti-
Counterfeiting Coalition (ICC) reported that
in the United States counterfeit goods and piracy are
responsible for the loss of more than $200

billion and 750,000 jobs a year (Cook & Writer, 2006). The city
of New York, with estimated annual
counterfeit sales of $23 billion, loses approximately $1 billion
in tax revenue annually (Tucker, 2005).
‘‘Counterfeit’’ refers to copies made to deceive consumer into
believing that the goods are
authentic (Bamossy & Scammon, 1985), whereas ‘‘knock-off’’
refers to copies that are not identical
but similar to the authentic goods in essence, name, form, or
meaning (Prendergast, Chuen, & Phau,
2002). Counterfeiting is a serious problem for the fashion
industry (Oldenburg, 2005). The U.S.
Customs and Border Control reported at midyear 2006 that 45%
of seized counterfeits were fashion
1
Auburn University
2 Iowa State University
Corresponding Author:
Hyejeong Kim, PhD, Department of Consumer Affairs, Auburn
University, 308 Spidle Hall, Auburn, AL 36849
E-mail [email protected]; phone: (334) 844-1316; fax: (334)
844-1340.
Clothing & Textiles

Research Journal
28(2) 79-94
ª The Author(s) 2010
Reprints and permission:
sagepub.com/journalsPermissions.nav
DOI: 10.1177/0887302X09332513
http://ctrj.sagepub.com
79
at CALIFORNIA ST UNIV NORTHRIDGE on November 7,
2015ctr.sagepub.comDownloaded from
http://ctr.sagepub.com/
goods, including apparel and accessories (Casabona, 2006).
Among the top five brands
counterfeited, four (with Microsoft the fifth) were fashion
brands: Louis Vuitton, Nike, Gucci, and
Prada (McGlone, 2006). Many fashion companies (e.g., Rolex,
Abercrombie & Fitch) use private
investigators and spend millions each year to fight
counterfeiting (Pallay, 2006; Ryan, 2006).
Trademark protection costs directly affect consumers through
higher prices on authentic goods
(Bamossy & Scammon, 1985).
Although an increasing body of literature has investigated why
consumers purchase counterfeits,
most policies and previous studies have focused on the supply

dimension (Bamossy & Scammon,
1985; Bush, Bloch, & Dawson, 1989). Despite the U.S. legal
policies (e.g., the Trademark
Counterfeiting Act of 1984) and industry efforts to limit
production and sale of counterfeits, fashion
counterfeiting is increasing (Casabona, 2006), driven by strong
consumer demand for upscale brands
and perceived price advantage over authentic goods (Bloch,
Bush, & Champbell, 1993). Many peo-
ple knowingly purchase counterfeit products (ICC
Counterfeiting Intelligence Bureau, 2004), an
activity termed as nondeceptive counterfeiting (Grossman &
Shapiro, 1988). Therefore, in many
cases the purpose of selling counterfeits is not to deceive but to
satisfy consumers (Arellano,
1994). Thus, even though government authorities and industry
fight to restrain this illegal activity,
counterfeits are in the market because there is a demand. To
develop appropriate policies, it is
critical to focus on consumers’ motivations, attitudes, and the
underlying mechanism of intent to
purchase fashion counterfeits. The purpose of this study was to
(a) identify motivations that influ-
ence attitudes toward buying fashion counterfeits; (b) use the

theory of planned behavior to examine
the relationships among attitude toward buying fashion
counterfeits, subjective norms influencing
the purchase of fashion counterfeits, and intent to purchase
fashion counterfeits; and (c) test the
inclusion of additional relationships that are expected to
improve the explanatory power of the
theory in the context of buying fashion counterfeits.
Motivations for Buying Fashion Counterfeit Goods
Based on research that studied counterfeiting (e.g., Albers-
Miller, 1999; Ang, Chen, Lim, &
Tambyah, 2001; Bloch et al., 1993; Ha & Lennon, 2006), eight
motivations were selected for
investigation in the context of fashion counterfeits. These
included psychographic characteristics,
product appearance, and past purchase behavior.
Psychographic characteristics. Others’ influence is one of the
most important determinants of an
individual’s behavior (Bearden, Netemeyer, & Teel, 1989). Ang
et al. (2001) suggested that
informational susceptibility and normative susceptibility, as
social influences, affect attitudes
toward purchasing counterfeits. Informational susceptibility is
the tendency to learn about products

or brands by seeking information from knowledgeable others, or
making inferences based on obser-
ving people’s behaviors (Bearden et al., 1989). For instance, a
consumer may observe that some peo-
ple have luxury fashion items and they appear to be popular.
Therefore, the consumer may purchase
counterfeits as an alternative to authentic goods. Normative
susceptibility refers to ‘‘the tendency to
conform to the expectations of others’’ in consumption context
(Bearden et al., 1989, p. 474). When
people think that significant others may not like or approve of
buying fashion counterfeits, or that
buying these goods will not make good impressions, they are
likely to have negative attitudes toward
purchasing counterfeits. Ang et al. (2001) reported a positive
relationship between informational
susceptibility and a negative relationship between normative
susceptibility and attitude toward coun-
terfeit music CDs.
Value consciousness is defined as ‘‘a concern for paying lower
prices, subject to some quality
constraint’’ (Lichtenstein, Netemeyer, & Burton, 1990, p. 56).
Value consciousness differs from

price consciousness in that value includes ‘‘get’’ (i.e., the
benefits a buyer acquires from seller’s
80 Clothing & Textiles Research Journal 28(2)
80
offering) and ‘‘give’’ (i.e., the cost the buyer pays to acquire
the offering) components (Parasuraman
& Grewal, 2000). Consumers tend to select counterfeits when
there is a distinct price advantage over
authentic goods (Albers-Miller, 1999; Bloch et al., 1993;
Cordell, Wongtade, & Kieschnick, 1996;
Prendergast et al., 2002; Wee, Tan, & Cheok, 1995). Ang et al.
(2001) found a positive relationship
between value consciousness and attitude toward counterfeit
music CDs. Tom et al. (1998) reported
that counterfeit buyers rated fake t-shirts as comparable to the
legitimate products in terms of brand,
durability/quality, and function, but superior in price.
Therefore, in purchasing fashion counterfeits,
consumers may perceive that what they get exceeds the amount
they pay because of the design and/

or status associated with upscale designer names.
Integrity, as it is related to lawfulness, is linked to
responsibility, honesty, and self-control
(Rokeach, 1968). Although in the United States purchasing
counterfeits is not criminal or illegal,
lawfulness may predict whether a consumer is likely to engage
in the practice because counterfeiting
involves illegal activities (e.g., infringing intellectual property
and selling unlawful products).
Researchers have found that more lawful-minded consumers are
less willing to buy counterfeits
(Cordell et al., 1996), and integrity is negatively associated
with attitude toward counterfeits (Ang
et al., 2001; de Matos, Ituassu, & Rossi, 2007). Researchers
have tested informational and normative
susceptibility, value consciousness, and integrity in the context
of counterfeited general consumer
products and CDs, not specifically fashion counterfeits. Because
fashion goods are consumed pub-
licly, they are often acquired to make a statement and impress
others. In contrast, CDs are often used
in private settings, when few people can observe the products.
The difference in product usage may
trigger different motivations for buying counterfeits. Therefore,

it is important to retest these
constructs in the context of fashion goods.
Status consumption is ‘‘the motivational process by which
individuals strive to improve their social
standing through conspicuous consumption of products that
confer or symbolize status for both the
individual and surrounding others’’ (Eastman, Fredenberger,
Campbell, & Calvert, 1997, p. 54). Pos-
session of specific products or brands may symbolize status,
such as social class (O’Shaughnessy,
1992). Fashion goods are used to project socioeconomic status
(Damhorst, Miller, & Michelman,
2001). For instance, carrying designer goods is like having a
permit into high society, even though the
item might be not real (Garza, 2006). When consumers cannot
afford genuine goods, they may pur-
chase counterfeits hoping to convey the status associated with
the authentic brand. Wee et al.
(1995) found that brand image was positively related to intent
to purchase counterfeits and suggested
that status conscious consumers were more likely to purchase
fashion counterfeits.
Materialism refers to the importance an individual attaches to
worldly possessions (Belk, 1984).

Richins and Dawson (1992) identified three materialistic traits:
acquisition centrality, acquisition as
the pursuit of happiness, and possession-defined success.
Acquisition centrality means that
materialists view possessions and acquisitions as the core value
of their lives. Acquisition as the
pursuit of happiness means that materialists consider
possessions or acquisitions as requisite to
satisfaction and happiness. Possession-defined success refers to
the tendency to judge people’s
achievements by their possessions. Researchers have found that
consumers tend to perceive
counterfeits as a way to obtain lower-priced branded goods to
satisfy materialistic needs (Albers-
Miller, 1999; Bloch et al., 1993).
Product appearance. Wee et al. (1995) identified three types of
product characteristics related to
purchase of counterfeits: durability, quality, and physical
appearance. We considered only physical
appearance for two reasons. First, in fashion counterfeiting,
product appearance, including trade-
marks or logos, is counterfeiters’ main reason for copying the
product and indicates the original
source of the product. Second, consumers have reported (Kim &

Karpova, 2005) that appearance
is the major reason for buying fashion counterfeits. Scholars
argue that distinctive design of fashion
Kim and Karpova 81
81
luxury goods, including trademark and logo, motivates
consumers to purchase fashion counterfeits
(Ha & Lennon, 2006; Prendergast et al., 2002).
Past purchase behavior. Past behavior may predict attitude
toward the behavior in the future.
d’Astous, Colbert, and Montpetit (2005) suggested that an
individual tends to use ‘‘I’ve-done-it-
in-the-past’’ justification when determining whether to engage
in some activities (p. 293). Past beha-
vior is also a source of information for identifying one’s
attitude (Bem, 1972). d’Astous et al. (2005)
found that past behavior was a significant predictor of attitude
toward and intent to engage in
music piracy. Therefore, compared with consumers who have
not purchased fashion counterfeits,

consumers who have purchased fashion counterfeit goods in the
past may have more positive
attitudes toward engaging in the behavior in the future.
Based on the above discussion, we hypothesized relationships
between consumer motivations and
attitudes toward buying fashion counterfeit goods as follows:
Hypothesis 1a: Informational susceptibility is positively related
to attitude.
Hypothesis 1b: Normative susceptibility is negatively related to
attitude.
Hypothesis 1c: Value consciousness is positively related to
attitude.
Hypothesis 1d: Integrity is negatively related to attitude.
Hypothesis 1e: Status consumption is positively related to
attitude.
Hypothesis 1f: Materialism is positively related to attitude.
Hypothesis 1g: Product appearance of counterfeits is positively
related to attitude.
Hypothesis 1h: Past purchase behavior is positively related to
attitude.
Attitude Toward Buying Fashion Counterfeit Goods
The theory of planned behavior (TPB) explains how an
individual’s attitude toward behavior,

subjective norm, and perceived behavioral control predict
intent, which in turn, leads to
behavior (Ajzen, 1985). The theory defines intent as decision to
act in a particular way
(Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975), and subjective norm refers to social
influence on a particular beha-
vior (Young & Kent, 1985). For instance, an individual might
have a favorable attitude toward
buying counterfeit goods. However, intent to purchase may be
influenced by the person’s belief
about the subjective norm related to counterfeit purchasing.
Furthermore, behavior, at least in
part, may be beyond consumer voluntary control. TPB addresses
the issue by including per-
ceived behavioral control, which refers to perception about how
difficult it is to perform the
behavior of interest (Ajzen, 1991). If the behavior is not
completely determined by the individ-
ual’s will, that person needs special resources and opportunities
to carry out the behavior. The
perceived availability of resources and opportunities may
influence behavioral intent and per-
formance of the behavior. Hypotheses 2 through 4 were based
on TPB in the context of fashion

counterfeits (see Figure 1):
Hypothesis 2: Attitude toward purchasing fashion counterfeit
goods is positively related to pur-
chase intent toward fashion counterfeits.
Hypothesis 3: Perceived behavioral control is positively related
to purchase intent toward fashion
counterfeits.
Hypothesis 4: Subjective norm is positively related to purchase
intent toward fashion
counterfeits.
Research has supported predictability of TPB in the context of
immoral activities. Chang (1998)
compared the validities of TPB and theory of reasoned action as
applied to the context of illegal
82 Clothing & Textiles Research Journal 28(2)
82
software copying. d’Astous et al. (2005) tested TPB in the area
of online music piracy. Penz and

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