2. Bio
David Hume was a skeptical philosopher living and
writing in Scotland during the 18th century, which is
often called the “Age of Enlightenment.”
As a skeptic, he shared the spirit of the Enlightenment
in one respect: he was critical of faith and religion.
However, in another respect, he was in conflict with the
Enlightenment: he was also skeptical of the power of
human reason to achieve certainty in most areas.
He was the author of several important works of
philosophy.
3. On the Dialogues Concerning
Natural Religion
One of Hume’s better known works is the Dialogues
Concerning Natural Religion, which the work from
which the assigned reading selection is taken.
The format of the work follows a tradition among some
philosophers that is at least as old as the works of Plato
published in ancient Greece: the dialog format.
The format is one that seeks to present philosophical
arguments in the form of a fictional dialog rather than a
long treatise.
4. As the title of the work suggests, it is critical of
“natural religion.”
“Natural theology” or “natural religion” is a field that
seeks to prove religious doctrines (such as the existence
of God) on the basis of observations of the natural
world.
5. Characters in the Dialog
Selection
In the assigned reading selection from the Dialogues,
two fictional characters appear, each representing
opposing philosophical positions. The characters are:
Cleanthes: A natural theologian; stand-in for Thomas
Aquinas and certain other natural theologians.
Philo: Speaks for Hume; a skeptic and agnostic.
6. Terms
As the Dialogues is written in 18th-century British
English, please note the following non-standard terms it
uses.
“ideal system”: Any system of ideas on any subject,
whether in a human or divine mind.
“corruption”: Decay; the process of dying or being
destroyed. (Contrasted with “generation.”)
Note: In the dialog, “order” implies goal-directedness.
7. Hume’s Crucial Premise
In the dialog selection, Philo, speaking for Hume,
advances a crucial premise about order.
Philo (Hume) relies on that premise to raise two
(implicit) criticisms of Thomas Aquinas’ Argument from
Design.
8. Hume’s crucial premise can be expressed as follows:
Order is not any more inherent in ideas than in
matter.
9. Notice that Hume (Philo) supports this crucial premise
by appealing to certain things of which we have
experience.
What things? In the 2nd paragraph on p. 162, he gives
the example of vegetation in the wild, which seems to
come into order on its own through causes which
exceed our experience and understanding.
This appears to be a case of matter coming into order
on its own.
Also, in the same paragraph, he mentions certain cases
of ideas in disorder: cases of madness (i.e., insanity).
10. Hume’s First Criticism of the
Argument from Design
Relying on his mentioned crucial premise, Hume (Philo)
gives his first (implicit) criticism of Aquinas’ Argument
from Design: that the argument does not answer the
question what is the cause of the order of ideas in God’s
mind, and the question of what the cause of that cause
is, etc.
In other words, Hume’s first criticism of the Argument
from Design is that it leads to an infinite regress of
questions about causes.
11. However, Cleanthes, the natural theologian
representing Aquinas, is not impressed by that criticism.
In the 1st paragraph on p. 163, Cleanthes gives his
response:
It doesn’t matter if we cannot grasp the entire, infinite
causal chain.
The observable order in nature clearly implies that its
proximate cause is a supreme intelligence: God.
12. Hume’s Second Criticism of
the Argument from Design
At this point, Hume (Philo) gives his second (implicit)
criticism of Aquinas’ Argument from Design.
Recall again Hume’s crucial premise:
Order is not any more inherent in ideas than in
matter.
Relying on this crucial premise, Hume attacks the
“archer analogy” in the Argument from Design.
13. Recall again Aquinas’ Argument from Design:
1. We see that non-intelligent things (e.g., natural bodies)
always or for the most part work toward some end, i.e.,
goal.
2. So, natural bodies reach their end, not by chance, but by
design. (From 1)
3. An arrow is shot to its target by an archer.
4. So, whatever lacks intelligence similarly cannot move
toward a goal unless it is directed by some being with
intelligence. (From 3)
5. Therefore some intelligent being exists by whom all natural
bodies are directed to their end; and this being we call
God. (From 2 and 4)
14. Premises 3 and 4 in Aquinas’ argument constitute the
“archer analogy.”
Hume’s crucial premise implies that the “archer
analogy” is a hasty generalization.
In other words, if order (i.e., goal-directedness) is not
any more inherent in ideas than in matter, then there is
no reason to think that just because an arrow depends
on an intelligent agent to reach its goal, that non-
intelligent natural bodies also depend on an intelligent
agent to reach their goals.
15. If that criticism is correct, then Premise 4 in Aquinas’
Argument from Design is uncertain.
But if Premise 4 is uncertain, then Aquinas’ conclusion,
which affirms the existence of God, is also uncertain
and unproved.
This is Hume’s position: he is a skeptic and an agnostic
about God’s existence, but not a definite atheist.
