1. 1
Introduction
This essay seeks to demonstrate that although the Thai middle class deserves some
credit for deepening democracy in Thailand, it does not translate to Thailand being a
liberal democracy by any interpretation. The promulgation of the 1997 Constitution,
fondly referred to as the ‘People’s Constitution’ which was meant to usher in a
democratic era has not only been abused, but repealed and replaced with an oppressive
military-backed Constitution in 2007.
This paper approaches the question by analysing the different political players in
Thailand, and critically evaluating whether their actions or policies furthers
democratisation efforts, or erodes it.
It is submitted that this paper not only evaluates procedural democratic ideals – namely,
free and fair elections – but also substantive democracy involving civil and political
rights.
Thai middle class
In this part of the essay I will demonstrate through the events of 1973, the 1990s, and
the post-2006 Thaksin era, the Thai middle class does not subscribe to democratic
ideals.
Firstly, in the student-led uprising of 14 October 1973 where the Thai state was
confronted with the bourgeoisie resulted from socio-economic policies and expanded
national education scheme. This uprising subsequently lead to the downfall of the Sarit,
Thanom, and Praphat military regime, and the establishment of a constitutional
democracy. However, this ‘victory for democracy’ was undermined on 6 October 1976

2. 2
when the military opened fire on protestors at Thammasat University that was met by
middle-class apathy.1
Although short lived, I will consider the quality of democracy during this three-year
period to see whether democratic ideals were embraced by the middle class. Firstly, the
electocrats elected were largely interested in short-term financial and factional gains.
For this group, the establishment of parliamentary democracy served as nothing more
than a golden opportunity to convert their questionable wealth and influence into
national politics. 2Tejapira submitted that this group treated politics as nothing more
than a business, oftentimes selling public policy to the highest bidder.3
Ockey considers an alternative angle, namely that the 6 October massacre evidences the
‘lack of a unified middle class with a clear awareness of its interests’.4 Benedict
Anderson attributed this to the new middle class’ insecurity that their ‘ascent from
backstreet dust would end where it had begun’, and as such, ‘those who had sincerely
supported the mass demonstrations in 1973 welcomed the return to dictatorship three
years later’.5
This interpretation of the 1973-1976 events evidences that not only did the middle-class
not demonstrate a comprehensive knowledge of substantive democratic ideals; it was
also a low-quality, and exclusionary procedural democracy.
1 Kasian Tejapira, 2006. ‘Toppling Thaksin’. In New Left Review 39:12
2 ibid
3 ibid:14
4 James Ockey, 2004. ‘Making democracy: Leadership, class, gender, and political participation in
Thailand’ (University of Hawaii Press) page 160
5 Benedict Anderson, 1997. ‘Withdrawal symptoms: Social and cultural aspects of the October 6
Coup.’ In Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars 9:19

3. 3
The Thai economic boom in the 1980s-1990s through the diversification of its economy,
shift from traditional agricultural to industrialization oriented exports, and also a big
influx of foreign direct investment lead to many scholars of modernization theory
predicting that this new urban middle class will nurture democratic ideals in Thailand.
However, as I will prove in this part of the paper, the middle class actions were not
always motivated by greater adoption of democratic ideals.
Firstly, this is evidenced when the middle class who firstly protested against the
Chatichai government, which lead to a military coup that instated General Suchinda as
their leader. The Far Eastern Economic Review reported at the time that the coup “was
widely accepted” and “almost popular.”6. However, public opinion on the unelected
General Suchinda only changed when he ran for office, backtracking on his earlier
promise that he was uninterested. In response to this event, public opinion on the 1991
coup-makers changed. No longer were they viewed as selfless, but instead greedy, self-
interested and corrupt. Only after public opinion had changed did protests that lead to
ejection of the military government started. Englehart argues that this clearly
demonstrates that the protests were more about ‘corruption than democracy in any
formal, procedural form’.7
Englehart’s argument is corroborated by Girling and Voravidh’s submission that the
‘middle class tends to be pragmatic, materialistic and self-interested –
They only support democracy if the alternative provides conditions antithetical to their
interests’.8
6 Rodney Tasker, 1991. ‘Popular Putsch’. Far Eastern Economic Review page 17
7 Neil Englehart, 2003. ‘Democracy and the Thai middle class: Globalisation, modernization, and
constitutional change. In Asian Survey (43) 2:261
8 Erik Kuhonta, 2008. ‘A research note on the middle class and democracy in Thailand’.
<http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1025&context=erik_kuhonta> accessed
17th March 2015

4. 4
Englehart then puts forth an alternative theory for the main reason for democratization
of Thailand in the 1990s. He attributed this to the liberalization of Thailand’s economy
during this period, and Thailand’s reliance on foreign investment. How this lead to
democratization was due to the fact that foreign investors had preference for
democratic regimes as it was viewed to be more stable. However, Englehart makes note
that this analysis only impinged on local politics to the extent that it helped
democratization efforts already pursued by activists.9
However, it is important to note that democratic activists at the time like the Campaign
for Popular Democracy (CPD) group consisted of a wide range of players from different
backgrounds, and was not limited to middle-class participation. Furthermore,
monitoring groups like Poll Watch which had been set up to ensure the March 1992
elections were clean and fair, and to encourage democratic consciousness among the
population played a pivotal role in the deepening of democracy too.10
The third case study for the middle-class’ role in democratisation efforts in Thailand
concerns the middle-class involvement in the People’s Alliance of Democracy (PAD),
more commonly known as the ‘Yellow Shirts’. The PAD was formed in 2006, and its core
leaders were Chamlong Srimaung, Sondi Limthongkul, Somsak Kosaisuk, Somekeit
Pongpaibul and Pipob Thongchai. The Yellow Shirts consisted of a loose grouping of
royalists, urban middle class, and ultra-nationalists.11
One of the first instances that demonstrate the Yellow Shirts’ lack of deference towards
the democratic rule of law is seen after the King had tasked the courts to resolve the
political crisis in 2007. After publically supporting the court’s decision to dissolve
9 Englehart:2003:254
10 William Callahan, 1998. ‘Imagining Democracy’ (Institute of Southeast Asian Studies) pages
114-117
11 Nick Nostitz, 2009. ‘Red vs Yellow: Thailand’s crisis of identity’ (White Lotus Press) page 8

5. 5
Thaksin Shinawatra’s Thai Rak Thai party (TRT), and calling for a respect for the rule of
law – they subsequently demonstrated double standards when the court subsequently
issued arrest warrants for nine of the top PAD leaders.12
This I submit is one of the many instances that demonstrates the Yellow Shirts, and the
urban middle class’s hypocritical position when it comes to democracy.
After successfully forcing Thaksin into exile, the PAD leader Sondhi launched the ‘last
whistleblow’ where the PAD would seek to takeover Government House to block a
meeting of the People’s Power Party (PPP) cabinet. After the PAD was successful in
doing so, Prime Minister (PM) Samak Sundaravej offered to call for a referendum to
allow popular opinion to decide the next PM that was promptly rejected by the PAD.
This lead to an impasse which the constitutional court resolved by finding Samak in
violation of the constitution for participating in a television cooking show.13
As only Samak was banned from politics, the PPP top brass chose Somchai Wongsawat,
who was married to Thaksin’s younger sister Yaowapha as PM. In response, the PAD
implemented “King Taksin Operation” aimed at pressuring PM Somchai to resign
unconditionally. This lead to another intervention by the activist constitutional court
which dissolved the PPP for vote buying, and banning the executives, including the PM
from political participation for five years.14
Following this, the PAD announced victory, and more worryingly that they would return
to the streets if the new government was not to its liking. James Ockey argued that the
greatest damage done by PAD’s actions was to that of the democratic system itself. By
12 Duncan McCargo, 2009. ‘Thai politics as reality TV’. In The Journal of Asian Studies (68) 1:14
13 James Ockey, 2009. ‘Thailand in 2008: Democracy and street politics’. In Southeast Asian Affairs
page 323
14 ibid:327

6. 6
outrightly refusing to recognise democratic outcomes, and in promoting a coup and
greater involvement of the constitutional court in politics, the PAD had damaged the
foundations of democracy in Thailand.15
Marc Saxer provides an insightful analysis to the reasons why the Thai middle-class did
not democratise as modernisation scholars predicted. Saxer attributes this to the fact
that once ‘democracy was institutionalised, they found themselves to be the structural
minority’. He went on to submit that the Thai middle class feels like they were getting
‘robbed’ as it was their tax revenues that were being used by corrupt politicians to buy
‘rural votes’ instead of upgrading public infrastructure.16
In this part of the essay, I have demonstrated that the Thai middle-class was split in the
1970s, and were not a cohesive class that fought for democratic ideals as later proven in
1976. However, the middle-class deserves some credit for the deepening of democracy
in Thailand in the 1990s, although the economic crisis and civic society organisations
played roles too. In the post-Thaksin era, the urban middle-class with their support for
the Yellow Shirts has ultimately undermined the foundations of democracy in Thailand.
Thaksin Shinawatra
The second part of this paper will demonstrate the highly divisive billionaire Thaksin
Shinawatra playing an active role in blocking democratisation efforts in Thailand by
abusing the Constitutional amendments in 1997.
The 1997 People’s Constitution was intended to promote transparency, accountability
and stability by strengthening the executive, establishing a fully elected bicameral
15 ibid:331
16 Marc Saxer, 2014. ‘How Thailand’s middle class threatens democracy’.
<http://www.socialeurope.eu/2014/01/thailands-middle-class/> accessed 16th March 2015

7. 7
legislature, introducing a new electoral system that favoured larger more stable political
parties, and installing new independent agencies to act as checks and balances.17
However, this noble intention enabled the rise of Thaksin’s TRT. Thaksin won the 2001
elections and became the first PM to complete a four-year term. He subsequently won
the 2005 elections in a landslide victory winning almost 61 per cent of the votes and
almost three quarters of seats in elected Lower House. Prima facie this looks like
democratic rule has finally been established in Thailand. However upon close scrutiny, it
becomes evident that although he derived his legitimacy through elections, he ruled in
an authoritarian manner.18
Moreover, Thaksin’s method of governing was an affront to the principles of the 1997
Constitution. Under Thaksin, wealthy entrepreneurs played a key role in running the
country, and popular participation was, as Duncan McCargo described, ‘reduced to a
consumption mode: voters and citizens would merely be end users of products
developed by a technocratic and entrepreneurial elite’. Additionally, institutions should
not temper government policies.19
Although widely credited with bringing Thailand to the world’s economic stage, it was at
the expense of rampant cronyism and corruption. Critics accuse him of instituting
authoritarian rule behind a façade of democratic legitimacy flowing from elections.20
Additionally, it is submitted that Thaksin also circumvents the 1997 constitution in
order to protect his personal interests and only invokes it when it benefits him. For
17 Thitinan Pongsudhirak, 2008. ‘Thailand Since The Coup’. In Journal for Democracy (19) 4:141
18 ibid:142
19 Duncan McCargo and Ukrist Pathmanand, 2005. ‘Thaksinisation of Thailand’ (NIAS Press) page
14
20 Pongsudhirak 2008:143

8. 8
example, Article 110 of the 1997 Constitution prohibited any Member of Parliament to
own a company holding state concession. Thaksin transferred the bulk of his assets to
wife and children to circumvent this.21
Another example of Thaksin avoiding institutional checks and balances was seen when
he mobilised his allies with the intention of pressuring the Constitutional Court who was
hearing his corruption case. This interference demonstrates a lack of respect towards
the Constitutional Court and also judicial procedures.22
When the Court cleared him of the corruption charges in August 2001, he told reporters
that he derives a greater legitimacy than the appointed independent bodies as he
received eleven million votes in the elections. According to this line of argument, the
TRT’s massive mandate grants them legitimacy to circumvent check and balance
institutions that were set up under the 1997 Constitution.
Furthermore, a 2002 survey found that the newly consumerist Thai peasantry had
suffered from the economic crisis, and consequently became increasingly dependent on
the local godfathers. Politically, these godfathers act as canvassers who mobilise their
network for politicians in return for political favours. Thaksin’s TRT exploited this by
using government budget to buy up these canvassers wholesale.23
On the other hand, Thaksin used his terms in office to dramatically bolster his family’s
fortune. In 1995, Thaksin had put his own fortune at 70billion baht, and by 2003, his
family-owned companies were valued at over 425billion baht – amounting to almost
21 McCargo and Pathmanand 2005:14
22 McCargo and Pathmanand 2005:15
23 Tejapira 2006:28

9. 9
nine percent of all the stocks trading on the Thai stock market. 24 Besides bolstering his
personal wealth, Thaksin also plundered the revenue of the Government Lottery Office
(GLO). Promoting his friend, Surasit Sangkapong as its Director General, did this. Since
the GLO’s coffers were not subjected to parliamentary scrutiny, Thaksin treated it as his
personal cash cow to fund his wildly populist policies designed to appeal to the rural
voters. Using this fund to avoid parliamentary scrutiny is argued to be another example
of Thaksin circumventing an institution set up under the 1997 Constitution.
Additionally, Thaksin also undermined the autonomy of the police force by interfering
with promotions. However unlike his predecessors, Thaksin went further through his
anti-drugs policy and suppression of ‘dark influences’. To carry out these policies,
Thaksin relied on an inner circle of senior police officers. One of Thaksin’s objectives for
introducing these policies was to undermine the financial base of his political rivals who
are oftentimes involved in the drug trade.25 In executing the policies to undermine his
political rivals, Thaksin authorised the narcotics suppression officers and police to ‘take
all necessary steps’ – including extra-judicial killings. These killings that began hours
before the launch of the war on drugs, ended with over three thousand people dead.
Humans Rights Watch condemned this policy, charging it to be a violation of due process
that every human being is entitled to, and also a violation of basic human rights.26
All this coupled with the fact that he made the military his long-term political base by
promoting his relatives and classmates from the Armed Forces Academies Preparatory
School Class 10 had effectively created an elaborate network entirely dependent, and
subordinated to Thaksin.27
24 McCargo and Pathmanand 2005:216
25 McCargo and Pathmanand 2005:227
26 ‘Human rights abuses and the war on drugs’.
<http://www.hrw.org/reports/2004/thailand0704/4.htm> accessed 19th March 2015
27 McCargo and Pathmanand 2005:147

10. 10
Although he derived his legitimacy from elections, his consolidation of power while
undermining the independent bodies is submitted to be an affront to good democratic
practice. Thaksin’s government effectively amounts to an authoritarian rule with no
space for meaningful opposition.
Monarchy
This section of the paper seeks to demonstrate that although absolute monarchy in
Thailand ended in 1932, King Bhumibol, through a cultural passive counter-revolution
has established himself as the most hegemonic monarch in modern Thai history.28
McCargo suggests that the royal institution operates on a ‘network monarchy’ – a form
of semi-monarchical rule ‘underpinned by nostalgia for pre-1932 absolute monarchy
while being tempered by a reluctant recognition that no modern Thai King can be an
absolute ruler’. The main features of this network monarchy are that the King has the
final say in political decisions in times of crisis, he is the ultimate source of national
legitimacy and most importantly, is intimately involved in politics.29
Generally when a leader is unable to be an autocrat, he has an incentive to cooperate
with others in the formation of a non-autocratic government. However in Thailand,
although the King permits the formation of apparently representative governments, he
later utilities his networks to undermine them.30
The 1973 events demonstrate this, where frustrated with the shortcomings of the
military, bureaucratic and political leadership, he supported the student-led uprising
28 Tejapira 2006:17
29 Duncan McCargo, 2005. ‘Network Monarchy’. In The Pacific Review (18) 4:500-501
30 ibid:502

11. 11
against the Thanom Kittikachorn and Praphas Charusathien military regime.31 However,
merely three years later in 1976 the palace gave tacit support to the bloody events of 6
October. Appearing on radio two days after the massacre of student demonstrators, the
king expressed a strong endorsement for the military coup.32
On the other hand, when Chatichai Choonavan succeeded Prem Tinsulanond as Prime
Minister in 1988, Chatichai tried to dismantle the undemocratic networks the King and
Prem had built. However, as this was against the King’s interest, the palace had not only
supported the military coup against him in 1991, but also given the coup leaders prior
consent.33 In relation to the much-criticised draft constitution written by the military
regime for allowing an unelected person to be PM, the King weighed in and urged the
people to accept it as it was ‘reasonable’ and could ‘gradually be amended the
democratic way’.34
This I submit demonstrates that the King is not only supporting a military regime at the
expense of democratic ideals, he does not conform with the traditional model of a
constitutional monarchy who is supposed to be above politics.
Additionally in 2006 when the military overthrew the democratically elected Thaksin
government, the King gave the military-appointed government a royal blessing. In his
birthday speech, the King applauded the ‘personal sacrifice’ made by the new Cabinet
members to ‘salvage’ the country.35
31 Michael Connors, 2003. ‘Democracy and National Identity in Thailand’ (Routledge Curzon) page
130
32 Tejapira 2006:12
33 Kevin Hewison, 1997. ‘Political oppositions and regime change in Thailand’. In Political
Oppositions in Industrialising Asia (Routledge) page 70
34 Kevin Hewison, 1997. ‘The monarchy and democratisation’. In Political Change in Thailand
(Routledge) page 70
35 ‘Thailand’s king endorses the coup’, 2006. <http://www.asiasentinel.com/politics/thailands-
king-endorses-the-coup/> accessed 12 March 2015

12. 12
The wording used by the King in his birthday speech aptly demonstrates how little
deference he has towards a democratically elected government (albeit one being ridden
with corruption and cronyism). Hewison suggests that this is due to the King referring
to himself as ‘elected king’, on the basis of the palace’s enormous popularity. Ergo,
conferring upon him a ‘super-mandate’ from the people that then justifies his
interventions in the politics. This establishes that he has little regard for what Morrell
and Chai-Anan call the ‘political noise of representative processes’.36
This form of picking whoever suits his interest most is submitted to be inherently
illiberal as it marginalises formal political institutions and procedures. It also
undermines democratic principles such as the rule of law and popular sovereignty.37
While scholars suggests that monarchies in Southeast Asia can provide special assets to
support democratic transition, it is argued here that in Thailand, the monarchy has long
been dedicated to resisting democratic change, embracing the cause of political reform
only belatedly and reluctantly.38 King Bhumibol, and the royal institution in Thailand is
undoubtedly one of the parties guilty of blocking democratisation efforts in the country.
Military
The last section of this paper will demonstrate that from the outset of modern Thai
politico-history, the military has acted in its interest at the expense of democracy and
the traditional separation of military and civilian politics.
36 David Morrell and Chai-Anan Samudavinija, 1981. ‘Political conflict in Thailand: Reform,
reaction, revolution’ (Oelgeschlager, Gunn & Hain) page 271
37 McCargo 2005:501
38 McCargo 2005:504

13. 13
The 1932 coup d’état which lead to the first written constitution in Thailand was no
matter how beautifully written, a document to consolidate power in the hands of the
military elite.39
In 1991, after the military overthrew the Chatichai elected government on alleged
grounds of rampant corruption, the coup-makers formed the National Peace Keeping
Council (NPKC) to run the country. The leaders appointed Anand Panyarachun as PM. At
first, the military-lead leadership gained popular support in Thailand due to its
undemocratic nature as he was seen as to be not beholden towards any party or interest
group. However when they sensed that opposition was building towards their regime
following the election of General Suchinda to PM, and the hunger strikes by Chalart
Vorachart and Chamlong Srimaung – the military opened fire upon the protestors
leading to the events of ‘Bloody May 1992’. It is submitted that the quelling of legitimate
dissent is infringing upon the civil liberties of the Thai people.40
Following the 2006 coup against Thaksin, the military formed the Council for National
Security (CNS) in order to govern the country. The CNS then formed a separate
Constitutional Drafting Assembly (CDA), assigning them the responsibility to draft a
Constitution within six months. This process however was lacking any semblance of
democracy as the CNS had issued binding guidelines on the content of the Constitution,
and also had ignored any meaningful public consultation. Additionally, although the
draft Constitution was offered before public referendum, the military had cautioned the
electorate that if they rejected the draft Constitution, the military would pick one of the
previous seventeen constitutions.41
39 Kobkua Suwannathat-Pian, 2003. ‘Kings, Country and Constitutions’ (Routledge Curzon) page
36
40 Englehart, 2003:256
41 Bjorn Dressel, 2009. ‘Thailand’s elusive quest for a workable constitution’. In Contemporary
Southeast Asia 31 (2):303

14. 14
Moreover, the composition of the Constitution drafters drew questions of legitimacy of
the drafting process. According to Articles 19-25 of the military’s interim constitution –
Two-hundred CDA members would be elected from the military appointed 2000-strong
National People’s Assembly (NPA). From this pool of two hundred candidates, the CNS
will shortlist a hundred candidates for the CDA, who will subsequently elect twenty-five
members to the Constitution Drafting Committee. The problem with this selection
process is that all of the initial candidates are appointed by the military, which will have
considerable influence on the drafting process removing any sort of democratic
elements.42
Furthermore, the nomination process at the first stage was undermined by ballots being
circulated hours before voting which invited lobbying, bloc voting and more
importantly, vote buying.43 As a consequence of these efforts, the military’s interests
were significantly better represented in the Constitution Drafting Committee as
compared to the people’s interests.
By analysing the debates on the 2007 constitution, one can subsume that it was focussed
on institutional arrangements to prevent a concentration of executive power and single-
party dominance through the reinforcement of the independent oversight agencies and
the judiciary. This exercise reinforced the trend towards ‘judicialising’ Thai politics that
had begun with the 1997 Constitution.44
These provisions are obviously intended to minimise the role Thaksin Shinawatra and
his Thai Rak Thai politicians play in Thai politics by removing their legal and moral
42 Ibid:303
43 ‘200 shortlisted to draft new Charter, but accusations made of improper NPA vote’, Bangkok
Post, 20 December 2006
44 Dressel 2009:304

15. 15
legitimacy gained through popular elections. By creating these dubious institutions, it
would be easier for the military, or the bureaucrats to take extra-democratic measures
to oust an elected Prime Minister.45
Prior to the constitutional referendum, Somkid Lertpaitoon, the CDC Secretary had
warned the Thai people that if they reject the draft constitution, it would be replaced
with a CNS-drafted version. Additionally, the military junta passed legislation
prohibiting criticism of the draft constitution, making those who do so liable to heavy
fines or imprisonment. This had the effect of muzzling dissent, while indirectly coercing
the population to adopt the Constitution. This severely hampered the right to autonomy
of choice an otherwise democratic regime would provide.46
The 2007 Constitution had the effect of undermining the executive by preventing single-
party dominance. This was achieved by altering critical institutional arrangements,
resulting in a dispersion of political power, hence diminishing the impact of democratic
electoral process. Also, by reverting from single-member to multi-member
constituencies, it fragments the vote that prevents a concentration of votes for a single
popular party. Additionally, this bloc voting provides individual politicians incentives to
pursue personal interests rather than collective party strategies, further undermining
party solidarity in Parliament.47
Moreover, the number of Senators was also dropped from 200 to 150, with 76 being
directly elected while the remaining 74 being appointed by a seven-member Senate
Selection Committee consisting of heads of independent agencies and judges. As the
senators are responsible for the appointment of the independent agencies and judges, it
45 Dressel 2009:305
46 Dressel 2009:306
47 Dressel 2009:310-311

16. 16
presents a clear conflict interest that not only undermines the Senate, but also the
legitimacy and independence of the agencies and courts.48
The revision of Article 237(2) of the Constitution allows the Constitution Court to
dissolve an entire political party if one of its members is found violating election law.
This confers upon the judges’ far-reaching powers in the Thai political process. In a
liberal democratic government, a provision like this serves as a great protector against
corrupt political practices. However, as was established in the preceding paragraph, the
‘independent’ bodies and courts in Thailand in 2007 suffers from a lack of
independence. Dressel concludes that these ‘further judicialisation’ of Thai politics is
meant to contain the influence of the urban and rural poor whom constitute the majority
of the electorate in Thailand.49
Moreover, Article 309 of the 2007 Constitution granted blanket amnesty to all actors in
the 2006 coup, and 2006-2007 military administrations. The vague wording used leaves
a possibility for wider interpretation of amnesty to also cover future military actions.50
By analysing the constitutional changes promoted by the military, it is obvious that the
military is acting in its own interests, despite the fact that it claims otherwise. When
compared to the military coup in 1992, it is also evident that the military’s role in Thai
politics is not on the wane, but instead it is constantly increasing with the military
systematically consolidating power in the Thai political realm.
The fact that the military’s Internal Security Operations Command had passed the
Internal Security Act 2008 substantiates this claim. This Act confers wide discretion to
48 Dressel 2009:311
49 Dressel 2009:311-313
50 Paul Chambers, 2010. ‘Thailand on the brink’. In Asian Survey (50) 5:847

17. 17
the top military officers to define what constitutes an internal security threat, and
allowing indefinitely arrests and detentions without warrants, while preventing the
prosecution of soldiers for human rights violations.51 This Act is submitted to be an
affront to the rule of law as it circumvents the appropriate judicial procedures and the
right to due process. Additionally, this legislation provides no safeguards for Thai civil
liberties.52
On May 22 2014, the National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO) toppled the elected
government of Yingluck Shinawatra. The establishment of martial law and further
deterioration of Thai democratic rights followed quickly behind. Under martial law,
political activities are banned, public assemblies of more than five people are deemed
illegal, the media is heavily censored, police are given wide discretion to search and
seize items, and people can be summoned and detained for up to seven days without
charge.53
Furthermore, the NCPO leader Prime Minister General Prayuth Chan-ocha is able to
order any criminal case to be held in a military court. Human Rights Watch criticizes this
to be against the principles of a fair trial as there is no assurance that those charged will
be given an equitable, impartial and independent administration of justice. This is
submitted to be a further erosion of the Thai judiciary, and also democratic rights.54
51 Internal Security Act 2008. <http://thailaws.com/law/t_laws/tlaw0342.pdf accessed> 15
March 2015
52 Paul Chambers, 2010. ‘Thailand on the brink: Resurgent military, eroded democracy’. In Asian
Survey 50 (5):848-849
53 ‘Multiple targets Thai martial law’, 2015. <http://www.asiasentinel.com/politics/multiple-
targets-thailand-martial-law/> accessed 19 March 2015
54 ‘Thailand: End military detention of civilians’, 2015.
<http://www.hrw.org/news/2015/02/13/thailand-end-military-detention-civilians> accessed
19 March 2015

18. 18
The fact that 73 people have faced trial before the military courts for participation in
anti-coup protests, 23 people for lèse majesté under the Computer Crime Act, and 54
people for charges of committing acts of terrorism further evidences the fact that
martial law in 2014 was meant to silent military regime opposition.55 Furthermore,
Human Rights Watch has criticized this detention of civilians as being an infringement of
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) that ensures due
process and arbitrary arrest or detention.56
In this section of the essay, I have critically analysed the key events in modern Thai
history where the military had played a role in. In each event I have proven that the
military does not act ‘for the greater good’ of the nation as it proudly proclaims, but
instead to protect its own interests.
Conclusion
The Thai middle class deserves credit for the democratisation of Thailand in the 1990s
that lead to the creation of various independent monitoring institutions. Nevertheless, it
is important to note that the contribution towards democracy made by the Asian
Financial Crisis, and other activists during that period. However, I argue that the middle
class now is one of the biggest obstacles towards further democratisation in Thailand.
Through its participation with the PAD, it has set a dangerous precedent of claiming
veto over the democratic process and reserving for itself moral authority to decide the
PM. This, I submit erodes the foundations of Thai democracy.
55 ‘Multiple targets Thai martial law’, 2015. <http://www.asiasentinel.com/politics/multiple-
targets-thailand-martial-law/> accessed 19 March 2015
56 ‘Thailand: End military detention of civilians’, 2015.
<http://www.hrw.org/news/2015/02/13/thailand-end-military-detention-civilians> accessed
19 March 2015

19. 19
However, it is also important to note the role played by other political players in
blocking Thai democracy. For example, ex-PM Thaksin who although derived his
legitimacy from elections, consolidated power for himself while undermining the
monitoring bodies. The King is also guilty as he plays an active role by abusing his moral
legitimacy to influence political outcomes. Lastly, the military through either its
military-backed constitutions, declarations of martial law, or abuses of human rights is
argued to be the biggest obstacle for democratisation deepening in Thailand.
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Chapters from edited volumes
Hewison, Kevin. 1997. “Political Oppositions and regime change in Thailand” in Political
Oppositions In Industrialising Asia edited by Garry Rodan, 72-94. London: Routledge.
Hewison, Kevin. 1997. “The monarchy and democratization”. In Political Change in
Thailand edited by Kevin Hewison, 58-74. Canada: Routledge.
Academic Journals
Anderson, Benedict. 1997. Withdrawal symptoms: Social and cultural aspects of the
October 6 Coup. Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars 9:13-30.
Chambers, Paul. 2010. “Thailand on the brink: Resurgent military, eroded democracy”.
Asian Survey 50 (5):835-858.
Dressel, Bjorn. 2009. Thailand’s elusive quest for a workable constitution. Contemporary
Southeast Asia 31 (2):296-325.
Englehart, Neil. 2003. Democracy and the Thai middle class: Globalisation,
modernization, and constitutional change. In Asian Survey (43) 2:253-279.
McCargo, Duncan. 2005. Network monarchy. The Pacific Review (18) 4:499-519.
McCargo, Duncan. 2009. Thai politics as reality TV. The Journal of Asian Studies (68) 1:7-
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Ockey, James. 2009. “Thailand in 2008: Democracy and street politics”. Southeast Asian
Affairs 315-333.

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Ockey, James. 2003. Change and continuity in the Thai political party system. Asian
Survey (43) 4:663-680.
Pongsudhirak, Thitinan. 2008. Thailand Since The Coup. Journal for Democracy (19)
4:140-153.
Tasker, Rodney. 1991. Popular putsch. Far Eastern Economic Review.
Tejapira, Kasian. 2006. “Toppling Thaksin”. New Left Review 39:5-37.
Websites
Erik Kuhonta, 2008. ‘A research note on the middle class and democracy in Thailand’.
<http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1025&context=erik_kuhonta>
Human Rights Watch, 2004. ‘Human rights abuses and the war on drugs’.
<http://www.hrw.org/reports/2004/thailand0704/4.htm>
Human Rights Watch, 2015. ‘Thailand: End military detention of civilians’, 2015.
<http://www.hrw.org/news/2015/02/13/thailand-end-military-detention-civilians>
Internal Security Act 2008. <http://thailaws.com/law/t_laws/tlaw0342.pdf accessed>
Marc Saxer, 2014. ‘How Thailand’s middle class threatens democracy’.
<http://www.socialeurope.eu/2014/01/thailands-middle-class/>
Newspaper Articles
Asia Sentinel. 2006. “Thailand’s king endorses the coup”, 4 December 2006.
Asia Sentinel. 2015. “Multiple targets Thai martial law”, 16 March 2015.
Bangkok Post. 2006. “200 shortlisted to draft new charter, but accusations made of
improper NPA vote”, 20 December 2006.
Unaldi, Serhat. 2014. “Thailand: A coup, the crown, and two middle classes”, The
Diplomat, 23 May 2014.