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Taking the Attacker Eviction
RED PILL
Taking the Attacker Eviction
RED PILL
Taking the Attacker Eviction Red Pill Frode Hommedal | Telenor | CM2017
Taking the Attacker Eviction Red Pill Frode Hommedal | Telenor | CM2017
Or how to structure your
thinking when countering
espionage
and
sabotage
from
“APT”
Taking the Attacker Eviction Red Pill Frode Hommedal | Telenor | CM2017
In this talk we will look at the
attempted eviction
of a
mission driven
and well organized
adversary
Taking the Attacker Eviction Red Pill Frode Hommedal | Telenor | CM2017
Beware that this is
work in progress
and still a bit rough around the edges
Taking the Attacker Eviction Red Pill Frode Hommedal | Telenor | CM2017
Incident Response
PICERL:
Prepare
Identify
Contain
Eradicate
Recover
Lessons Learned
NIST:
Preparation
Detect & Analyze
Contain & Eradicate & Recover
Post IncidentActivities
Bottom Line:
Eventually you will try to get the
attacker off your network
Taking the Attacker Eviction Red Pill Frode Hommedal | Telenor | CM2017
Incident Response
PICERL:
Prepare
Identify
Contain
Eradicate
Recover
Lessons Learned
NIST:
Preparation
Detect & Analyze
Contain & Eradicate & Recover
Post IncidentActivities
Bottom Line:
Eventually you will try to get the
attacker off your network
Taking the Attacker Eviction Red Pill Frode Hommedal | Telenor | CM2017
Turns out there’s a lot of
uncertainty
to deal with when
responding
to a targeted and advanced
“APT breach”
Taking the Attacker Eviction Red Pill Frode Hommedal | Telenor | CM2017
Incident Response
when facing an APT threat
Best Practice:
Scope before you start responding.
Common Misstep:
Acting too soon, giving your
adversary time to adapt.
Taking the Attacker Eviction Red Pill Frode Hommedal | Telenor | CM2017
Incident Response
when facing an APT threat
Best Practice:
Scope before you start responding.
Common Misstep:
Acting too soon, giving your
adversary time to adapt.
Taking the Attacker Eviction Red Pill Frode Hommedal | Telenor | CM2017
It turns out
“acting too soon”
is a thing when responding to an
APT threat
Taking the Attacker Eviction Red Pill Frode Hommedal | Telenor | CM2017
If you want to respond
effectively you need to
reduce the
uncertainty
and understand when it’s the right time
to act
Taking the Attacker Eviction Red Pill Frode Hommedal | Telenor | CM2017
Understanding common
APT patterns
Taking the Attacker Eviction Red Pill Frode Hommedal | Telenor | CM2017
Intrusion Patterns
of “APT” threats
Sting Operation:
Also called “smash and grab”. A
direct attack to get a specific
piece of information.
Persistent Infiltration:
A long running campaign against
you, where your adversary will
gain and sustain unauthorized
access to your infrastructure for
a long period of time.
Response:
When responding, you should
take into consideration what
kind of pattern you are seeing.
Taking the Attacker Eviction Red Pill Frode Hommedal | Telenor | CM2017
Intrusion Patterns
of “APT” threats
Sting Operation:
Also called “smash and grab”. A
direct attack to get a specific
piece of information.
Persistent Infiltration:
A long running campaign against
you, where your adversary will
gain and sustain unauthorized
access to your infrastructure for
a long period of time.
Response:
When responding, you should
take into consideration what
kind of pattern you are seeing.
Taking the Attacker Eviction Red Pill Frode Hommedal | Telenor | CM2017
The Structure
of an APT infiltration
Access:
An APT infiltration is all about
access.They work a lot to gain
and sustain access.
Extract:
The purpose of gaining access is
to find and extract useful
information (or abuse your
infrastructure).
Deliver:
All of this is done to deliver on
goals set for the attacker’s
mission.
Taking the Attacker Eviction Red Pill Frode Hommedal | Telenor | CM2017
The Structure
of an APT infiltration
Access:
An APT infiltration is all about
access.They work a lot to gain
and sustain access.
Extract:
The purpose of gaining access is
to find and extract useful
information (or abuse your
infrastructure).
Deliver:
All of this is done to deliver on
goals set for the attacker’s
mission.
Taking the Attacker Eviction Red Pill Frode Hommedal | Telenor | CM2017
The Structure
of an APT infiltration
Access:
An APT infiltration is all about
access.They work a lot to gain
and sustain access.
Extract:
The purpose of gaining access is
to find and extract useful
information (or abuse your
infrastructure).
Deliver:
All of this is done to deliver on
goals set for the attacker’s
mission.
Taking the Attacker Eviction Red Pill Frode Hommedal | Telenor | CM2017
Why you are targeted
by an APT attack team
Adversarial Relationship:
For you to ever be targeted by
an APT attack team you must be
relevant for some kind of
adversarial relationship.
Provide Access:
And you must provide access to
something that will help the
offensive party gain an
advantage in that relationship.
Collection:
What you are observing though
is only the collection part of a
much bigger process.
Taking the Attacker Eviction Red Pill Frode Hommedal | Telenor | CM2017
Why you are targeted
by an APT attack team
Adversarial Relationship:
For you to ever be targeted by
an APT attack team you must be
relevant for some kind of
adversarial relationship.
Provide Access:
And you must provide access to
something that will help the
offensive party gain an
advantage in that relationship.
Collection:
What you are observing though
is only the collection part of a
much bigger process.
Taking the Attacker Eviction Red Pill Frode Hommedal | Telenor | CM2017
Why you are targeted
by an APT attack team
Adversarial Relationship:
For you to ever be targeted by
an APT attack team you must be
relevant for some kind of
adversarial relationship.
Provide Access:
And you must provide access to
something that will help the
offensive party gain an
advantage in that relationship.
Collection:
What you are observing though
is only the collection part of a
much bigger process.
Taking the Attacker Eviction Red Pill Frode Hommedal | Telenor | CM2017
Why you are targeted
by an APT attack team
Adversarial Relationship:
For you to ever be targeted by
an APT attack team you must be
relevant for some kind of
adversarial relationship.
Provide Access:
And you must provide access to
something that will help the
offensive party gain an
advantage in that relationship.
Collection:
What you are observing though
is only the collection part of a
much bigger process.
Taking the Attacker Eviction Red Pill Frode Hommedal | Telenor | CM2017
Why you are targeted
by an APT attack team
Adversarial Relationship:
For you to ever be targeted by
an APT attack team you must be
relevant for some kind of
adversarial relationship.
Providing Access:
And you must provide access to
something that will help the
offensive party gain an
advantage in that relationship.
Observing Collection:
What you are observing though
is only the collection part of a
much bigger process.
Taking the Attacker Eviction Red Pill Frode Hommedal | Telenor | CM2017
Intermission
Taking the Attacker Eviction Red Pill Frode Hommedal | Telenor | CM2017
The IR and eviction process should not really be about
evicting the attackers
but rather
keeping them out
and preventing them from effortlessly re-entering
Taking the Attacker Eviction Red Pill Frode Hommedal | Telenor | CM2017
It also shouldn’t be about
cleaning networks
but rather
mitigating risk
as effectively as possible
Taking the Attacker Eviction Red Pill Frode Hommedal | Telenor | CM2017
And sometimes this actually means leaving your
network compromised
while covertly containing the
most important risks
by using what you learn from the attackers
Taking the Attacker Eviction Red Pill Frode Hommedal | Telenor | CM2017
So how do we
make that decision?
Taking the Attacker Eviction Red Pill Frode Hommedal | Telenor | CM2017
By structured analytical thinking using
analytical models
Taking the Attacker Eviction Red Pill Frode Hommedal | Telenor | CM2017
DwellTime
The time an attacker has stayed
undetected in your network.
Short:
Hours to day. Good changes of
catching up with the attacker.
Medium:
Days to weeks.You may catch
up if you have a capable and
enabled team.
Long:
Months to years. Depending on
the attacker your chances are in
all fairness pretty slim without a
full purge or migration.
Taking the Attacker Eviction Red Pill Frode Hommedal | Telenor | CM2017
DwellTime
The time an attacker has stayed
undetected in your network.
Short:
Hours to day. Good changes of
catching up with the attacker.
Medium:
Days to weeks.You may catch
up if you have a capable and
enabled team.
Long:
Months to years. Depending on
the attacker your chances are in
all fairness pretty slim without a
full purge or migration.
Taking the Attacker Eviction Red Pill Frode Hommedal | Telenor | CM2017
Intrusion Patterns
of APT threats
Sting Operation:
Also called “smash and grab”. A
direct attack to get a specific
piece of information.
Persistent Infiltration:
A long running campaign against
you, where your adversary will
gain and sustain unauthorized
access to your infrastructure for
a long period of time.
Response:
When responding, you should
take into consideration what
kind of pattern you are seeing.
Taking the Attacker Eviction Red Pill Frode Hommedal | Telenor | CM2017
TheThreatType Matrix
ThreatType:
Strategic |Tactical | Operational
Capability:
Low | Medium | High
Strategic:
You are a high priority and long
term target for your adversary
Tactical:
You are a short/medium term
target for a specific reason
Operational:
You are a target because the
attacker wants infrastructure
Taking the Attacker Eviction Red Pill Frode Hommedal | Telenor | CM2017
TheThreatType Matrix
ThreatType:
Strategic |Tactical | Operational
Capability:
Low | Medium | High
Strategic:
You are a high priority and long
term target for your adversary
Tactical:
You are a short/medium term
target for a specific reason
Operational:
You are a target because the
attacker wants infrastructure
Taking the Attacker Eviction Red Pill Frode Hommedal | Telenor | CM2017
TheThreatType Matrix
ThreatType:
Strategic |Tactical | Operational
Capability:
Low | Medium | High
Strategic:
You are a high priority and long
term target for your adversary
Tactical:
You are a short/medium term
target for a specific reason
Operational:
You are a target because the
attacker wants infrastructure
Taking the Attacker Eviction Red Pill Frode Hommedal | Telenor | CM2017
The RiskType Matrix
RiskType:
Strategic |Tactical | Operational
Impact:
Low | Medium | High
Strategic:
Affects your org’s long term
strategic goals
Tactical:
Affects your org’s current and
near future execution
Operational:
Affects your org’s (IT) operation
Taking the Attacker Eviction Red Pill Frode Hommedal | Telenor | CM2017
The RiskType Matrix
RiskType:
Strategic |Tactical | Operational
Impact:
Low | Medium | High
Strategic:
Affects your org’s long term
strategic goals
Tactical:
Affects your org’s current and
near future execution
Operational:
Affects your org’s (IT) operation
Taking the Attacker Eviction Red Pill Frode Hommedal | Telenor | CM2017
The RiskType Matrix
RiskType:
Strategic |Tactical | Operational
Impact:
Low | Medium | High
Strategic:
Affects your org’s long term
strategic goals
Tactical:
Affects your org’s current and
near future execution
Operational:
Affects your org’s (IT) operation
Taking the Attacker Eviction Red Pill Frode Hommedal | Telenor | CM2017
The CyberThreat
Intelligence Matrix
Mapping your knowledge gaps.
Depth of knowledge:
Footprint | Arsenal |Tradecraft
Stages of attack:
Prep. | Intrusion | Execution
Presentation:
https://www.slideshare.net/Frod
eHommedal/the-cyber-threat-
intelligence-matrix
Essay:
https://www.mnemonic.no/secu
rity-report/making-your-move
Taking the Attacker Eviction Red Pill Frode Hommedal | Telenor | CM2017
The CyberThreat
Intelligence Matrix
Mapping your knowledge gaps.
Depth of knowledge:
Footprint | Arsenal |Tradecraft
Stages of attack:
Prep. | Intrusion | Execution
Presentation:
https://www.slideshare.net/Frod
eHommedal/the-cyber-threat-
intelligence-matrix
Essay:
https://www.mnemonic.no/secu
rity-report/making-your-move
Taking the Attacker Eviction Red Pill Frode Hommedal | Telenor | CM2017
The CyberThreat
Intelligence Matrix
Mapping your knowledge gaps.
Depth of knowledge:
Footprint | Arsenal |Tradecraft
Stages of attack:
Prep. | Intrusion | Execution
Presentation:
https://www.slideshare.net/Frod
eHommedal/the-cyber-threat-
intelligence-matrix
Essay:
https://www.mnemonic.no/secu
rity-report/making-your-move
Taking the Attacker Eviction Red Pill Frode Hommedal | Telenor | CM2017
The CyberThreat
Intelligence Matrix
Mapping your knowledge gaps.
Depth of knowledge:
Footprint | Arsenal |Tradecraft
Stages of attack:
Prep. | Intrusion | Execution
Presentation:
https://www.slideshare.net/Frod
eHommedal/the-cyber-threat-
intelligence-matrix
Essay:
https://www.mnemonic.no/secu
rity-report/making-your-move
Taking the Attacker Eviction Red Pill Frode Hommedal | Telenor | CM2017
The CyberThreat
Intelligence Matrix
Mapping your knowledge gaps.
Depth of knowledge:
Footprint | Arsenal |Tradecraft
Stages of attack:
Prep. | Intrusion | Execution
Presentation:
https://www.slideshare.net/Frod
eHommedal/the-cyber-threat-
intelligence-matrix
Essay:
https://www.mnemonic.no/secu
rity-report/making-your-move
Taking the Attacker Eviction Red Pill Frode Hommedal | Telenor | CM2017
The CyberThreat
Intelligence Matrix
Mapping your knowledge gaps.
Depth of knowledge:
Footprint | Arsenal |Tradecraft
Stages of attack:
Prep. | Intrusion | Execution
Presentation:
https://www.slideshare.net/Frod
eHommedal/the-cyber-threat-
intelligence-matrix
Essay:
https://www.mnemonic.no/secu
rity-report/making-your-move
Taking the Attacker Eviction Red Pill Frode Hommedal | Telenor | CM2017
The CyberThreat
Intelligence Matrix
Mapping your knowledge gaps.
Depth of knowledge:
Footprint | Arsenal |Tradecraft
Stages of attack:
Prep. | Intrusion | Execution
Presentation:
https://www.slideshare.net/Frod
eHommedal/the-cyber-threat-
intelligence-matrix
Essay:
https://www.mnemonic.no/secu
rity-report/making-your-move
Taking the Attacker Eviction Red Pill Frode Hommedal | Telenor | CM2017
Threat Metrics
to help you navigate
CTI Matric:
Identifying knowledge gaps.
ThreatType Matric:
Identifying type of threat.
RiskType Matric:
Identifying type of risk.
Intrusion Pattern:
Identifying type of infiltration.
DwellTime:
Identifying length of infiltration.
Taking the Attacker Eviction Red Pill Frode Hommedal | Telenor | CM2017
With these models in mind we will look at some
response patterns
Taking the Attacker Eviction Red Pill Frode Hommedal | Telenor | CM2017
Response Patterns
for your consideration
Ignore:
Ignorance or actively ignoring.
Disrupt:
Continuous remediation.
Engage:
A game of chess heavily reliant
on intelligence and a high
operational tempo.
Clean:
Scope, shut down and clean.
Migrate:
Build new and migrate.
Taking the Attacker Eviction Red Pill Frode Hommedal | Telenor | CM2017
Response Patterns
for your consideration
Ignore:
Ignorance or actively ignoring.
Disrupt:
Continuous remediation.
Engage:
A game of chess heavily reliant
on intelligence and a high
operational tempo.
Clean:
Scope, shut down and clean.
Migrate:
Build new and migrate.
Taking the Attacker Eviction Red Pill Frode Hommedal | Telenor | CM2017
Response Patterns
for your consideration
Ignore:
Ignorance or actively ignoring.
Disrupt:
Continuous remediation.
Engage:
A game of chess heavily reliant
on intelligence and a high
operational tempo.
Clean:
Scope, shut down and clean.
Migrate:
Build new and migrate.
Taking the Attacker Eviction Red Pill Frode Hommedal | Telenor | CM2017
Response Patterns
for your consideration
Ignore:
Ignorance or actively ignoring.
Disrupt:
Continuous remediation.
Engage:
A game of chess heavily reliant
on intelligence and a high
operational tempo.
Clean:
Scope, shut down and clean.
Migrate:
Build new and migrate.
Taking the Attacker Eviction Red Pill Frode Hommedal | Telenor | CM2017
Wrap up
Taking the Attacker Eviction Red Pill Frode Hommedal | Telenor | CM2017
So what truth is
THE RED PILL
of attacker eviction exposing?
A way more
complex and
adversarial
incident response reality than most
responders are ready to acknowledge
Taking the Attacker Eviction Red Pill Frode Hommedal | Telenor | CM2017
Yet the key takeaway is that if you
understand
your attacker you will be able to
improve
your response significantly
Taking the Attacker Eviction Red Pill Frode Hommedal | Telenor | CM2017
Then you can apply the right
response pattern
to the identified
intrusion pattern
and the identified
threat and risk types
Taking the Attacker Eviction Red Pill Frode Hommedal | Telenor | CM2017
Always outnumbered.
Never outgunned!
@FrodeHommedal
no.linkedin.com/in/hommedal
frodehommedal.no

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Taking the Attacker Eviction Red Pill (v2.0)

  • 1. Taking the Attacker Eviction RED PILL
  • 2. Taking the Attacker Eviction RED PILL Taking the Attacker Eviction Red Pill Frode Hommedal | Telenor | CM2017
  • 3. Taking the Attacker Eviction Red Pill Frode Hommedal | Telenor | CM2017 Or how to structure your thinking when countering espionage and sabotage from “APT”
  • 4. Taking the Attacker Eviction Red Pill Frode Hommedal | Telenor | CM2017 In this talk we will look at the attempted eviction of a mission driven and well organized adversary
  • 5. Taking the Attacker Eviction Red Pill Frode Hommedal | Telenor | CM2017 Beware that this is work in progress and still a bit rough around the edges
  • 6. Taking the Attacker Eviction Red Pill Frode Hommedal | Telenor | CM2017 Incident Response PICERL: Prepare Identify Contain Eradicate Recover Lessons Learned NIST: Preparation Detect & Analyze Contain & Eradicate & Recover Post IncidentActivities Bottom Line: Eventually you will try to get the attacker off your network
  • 7. Taking the Attacker Eviction Red Pill Frode Hommedal | Telenor | CM2017 Incident Response PICERL: Prepare Identify Contain Eradicate Recover Lessons Learned NIST: Preparation Detect & Analyze Contain & Eradicate & Recover Post IncidentActivities Bottom Line: Eventually you will try to get the attacker off your network
  • 8. Taking the Attacker Eviction Red Pill Frode Hommedal | Telenor | CM2017 Turns out there’s a lot of uncertainty to deal with when responding to a targeted and advanced “APT breach”
  • 9. Taking the Attacker Eviction Red Pill Frode Hommedal | Telenor | CM2017 Incident Response when facing an APT threat Best Practice: Scope before you start responding. Common Misstep: Acting too soon, giving your adversary time to adapt.
  • 10. Taking the Attacker Eviction Red Pill Frode Hommedal | Telenor | CM2017 Incident Response when facing an APT threat Best Practice: Scope before you start responding. Common Misstep: Acting too soon, giving your adversary time to adapt.
  • 11. Taking the Attacker Eviction Red Pill Frode Hommedal | Telenor | CM2017 It turns out “acting too soon” is a thing when responding to an APT threat
  • 12. Taking the Attacker Eviction Red Pill Frode Hommedal | Telenor | CM2017 If you want to respond effectively you need to reduce the uncertainty and understand when it’s the right time to act
  • 13. Taking the Attacker Eviction Red Pill Frode Hommedal | Telenor | CM2017 Understanding common APT patterns
  • 14. Taking the Attacker Eviction Red Pill Frode Hommedal | Telenor | CM2017 Intrusion Patterns of “APT” threats Sting Operation: Also called “smash and grab”. A direct attack to get a specific piece of information. Persistent Infiltration: A long running campaign against you, where your adversary will gain and sustain unauthorized access to your infrastructure for a long period of time. Response: When responding, you should take into consideration what kind of pattern you are seeing.
  • 15. Taking the Attacker Eviction Red Pill Frode Hommedal | Telenor | CM2017 Intrusion Patterns of “APT” threats Sting Operation: Also called “smash and grab”. A direct attack to get a specific piece of information. Persistent Infiltration: A long running campaign against you, where your adversary will gain and sustain unauthorized access to your infrastructure for a long period of time. Response: When responding, you should take into consideration what kind of pattern you are seeing.
  • 16. Taking the Attacker Eviction Red Pill Frode Hommedal | Telenor | CM2017 The Structure of an APT infiltration Access: An APT infiltration is all about access.They work a lot to gain and sustain access. Extract: The purpose of gaining access is to find and extract useful information (or abuse your infrastructure). Deliver: All of this is done to deliver on goals set for the attacker’s mission.
  • 17. Taking the Attacker Eviction Red Pill Frode Hommedal | Telenor | CM2017 The Structure of an APT infiltration Access: An APT infiltration is all about access.They work a lot to gain and sustain access. Extract: The purpose of gaining access is to find and extract useful information (or abuse your infrastructure). Deliver: All of this is done to deliver on goals set for the attacker’s mission.
  • 18. Taking the Attacker Eviction Red Pill Frode Hommedal | Telenor | CM2017 The Structure of an APT infiltration Access: An APT infiltration is all about access.They work a lot to gain and sustain access. Extract: The purpose of gaining access is to find and extract useful information (or abuse your infrastructure). Deliver: All of this is done to deliver on goals set for the attacker’s mission.
  • 19. Taking the Attacker Eviction Red Pill Frode Hommedal | Telenor | CM2017 Why you are targeted by an APT attack team Adversarial Relationship: For you to ever be targeted by an APT attack team you must be relevant for some kind of adversarial relationship. Provide Access: And you must provide access to something that will help the offensive party gain an advantage in that relationship. Collection: What you are observing though is only the collection part of a much bigger process.
  • 20. Taking the Attacker Eviction Red Pill Frode Hommedal | Telenor | CM2017 Why you are targeted by an APT attack team Adversarial Relationship: For you to ever be targeted by an APT attack team you must be relevant for some kind of adversarial relationship. Provide Access: And you must provide access to something that will help the offensive party gain an advantage in that relationship. Collection: What you are observing though is only the collection part of a much bigger process.
  • 21. Taking the Attacker Eviction Red Pill Frode Hommedal | Telenor | CM2017 Why you are targeted by an APT attack team Adversarial Relationship: For you to ever be targeted by an APT attack team you must be relevant for some kind of adversarial relationship. Provide Access: And you must provide access to something that will help the offensive party gain an advantage in that relationship. Collection: What you are observing though is only the collection part of a much bigger process.
  • 22. Taking the Attacker Eviction Red Pill Frode Hommedal | Telenor | CM2017 Why you are targeted by an APT attack team Adversarial Relationship: For you to ever be targeted by an APT attack team you must be relevant for some kind of adversarial relationship. Provide Access: And you must provide access to something that will help the offensive party gain an advantage in that relationship. Collection: What you are observing though is only the collection part of a much bigger process.
  • 23. Taking the Attacker Eviction Red Pill Frode Hommedal | Telenor | CM2017 Why you are targeted by an APT attack team Adversarial Relationship: For you to ever be targeted by an APT attack team you must be relevant for some kind of adversarial relationship. Providing Access: And you must provide access to something that will help the offensive party gain an advantage in that relationship. Observing Collection: What you are observing though is only the collection part of a much bigger process.
  • 24. Taking the Attacker Eviction Red Pill Frode Hommedal | Telenor | CM2017 Intermission
  • 25. Taking the Attacker Eviction Red Pill Frode Hommedal | Telenor | CM2017 The IR and eviction process should not really be about evicting the attackers but rather keeping them out and preventing them from effortlessly re-entering
  • 26. Taking the Attacker Eviction Red Pill Frode Hommedal | Telenor | CM2017 It also shouldn’t be about cleaning networks but rather mitigating risk as effectively as possible
  • 27. Taking the Attacker Eviction Red Pill Frode Hommedal | Telenor | CM2017 And sometimes this actually means leaving your network compromised while covertly containing the most important risks by using what you learn from the attackers
  • 28. Taking the Attacker Eviction Red Pill Frode Hommedal | Telenor | CM2017 So how do we make that decision?
  • 29. Taking the Attacker Eviction Red Pill Frode Hommedal | Telenor | CM2017 By structured analytical thinking using analytical models
  • 30. Taking the Attacker Eviction Red Pill Frode Hommedal | Telenor | CM2017 DwellTime The time an attacker has stayed undetected in your network. Short: Hours to day. Good changes of catching up with the attacker. Medium: Days to weeks.You may catch up if you have a capable and enabled team. Long: Months to years. Depending on the attacker your chances are in all fairness pretty slim without a full purge or migration.
  • 31. Taking the Attacker Eviction Red Pill Frode Hommedal | Telenor | CM2017 DwellTime The time an attacker has stayed undetected in your network. Short: Hours to day. Good changes of catching up with the attacker. Medium: Days to weeks.You may catch up if you have a capable and enabled team. Long: Months to years. Depending on the attacker your chances are in all fairness pretty slim without a full purge or migration.
  • 32. Taking the Attacker Eviction Red Pill Frode Hommedal | Telenor | CM2017 Intrusion Patterns of APT threats Sting Operation: Also called “smash and grab”. A direct attack to get a specific piece of information. Persistent Infiltration: A long running campaign against you, where your adversary will gain and sustain unauthorized access to your infrastructure for a long period of time. Response: When responding, you should take into consideration what kind of pattern you are seeing.
  • 33. Taking the Attacker Eviction Red Pill Frode Hommedal | Telenor | CM2017 TheThreatType Matrix ThreatType: Strategic |Tactical | Operational Capability: Low | Medium | High Strategic: You are a high priority and long term target for your adversary Tactical: You are a short/medium term target for a specific reason Operational: You are a target because the attacker wants infrastructure
  • 34. Taking the Attacker Eviction Red Pill Frode Hommedal | Telenor | CM2017 TheThreatType Matrix ThreatType: Strategic |Tactical | Operational Capability: Low | Medium | High Strategic: You are a high priority and long term target for your adversary Tactical: You are a short/medium term target for a specific reason Operational: You are a target because the attacker wants infrastructure
  • 35. Taking the Attacker Eviction Red Pill Frode Hommedal | Telenor | CM2017 TheThreatType Matrix ThreatType: Strategic |Tactical | Operational Capability: Low | Medium | High Strategic: You are a high priority and long term target for your adversary Tactical: You are a short/medium term target for a specific reason Operational: You are a target because the attacker wants infrastructure
  • 36. Taking the Attacker Eviction Red Pill Frode Hommedal | Telenor | CM2017 The RiskType Matrix RiskType: Strategic |Tactical | Operational Impact: Low | Medium | High Strategic: Affects your org’s long term strategic goals Tactical: Affects your org’s current and near future execution Operational: Affects your org’s (IT) operation
  • 37. Taking the Attacker Eviction Red Pill Frode Hommedal | Telenor | CM2017 The RiskType Matrix RiskType: Strategic |Tactical | Operational Impact: Low | Medium | High Strategic: Affects your org’s long term strategic goals Tactical: Affects your org’s current and near future execution Operational: Affects your org’s (IT) operation
  • 38. Taking the Attacker Eviction Red Pill Frode Hommedal | Telenor | CM2017 The RiskType Matrix RiskType: Strategic |Tactical | Operational Impact: Low | Medium | High Strategic: Affects your org’s long term strategic goals Tactical: Affects your org’s current and near future execution Operational: Affects your org’s (IT) operation
  • 39. Taking the Attacker Eviction Red Pill Frode Hommedal | Telenor | CM2017 The CyberThreat Intelligence Matrix Mapping your knowledge gaps. Depth of knowledge: Footprint | Arsenal |Tradecraft Stages of attack: Prep. | Intrusion | Execution Presentation: https://www.slideshare.net/Frod eHommedal/the-cyber-threat- intelligence-matrix Essay: https://www.mnemonic.no/secu rity-report/making-your-move
  • 40. Taking the Attacker Eviction Red Pill Frode Hommedal | Telenor | CM2017 The CyberThreat Intelligence Matrix Mapping your knowledge gaps. Depth of knowledge: Footprint | Arsenal |Tradecraft Stages of attack: Prep. | Intrusion | Execution Presentation: https://www.slideshare.net/Frod eHommedal/the-cyber-threat- intelligence-matrix Essay: https://www.mnemonic.no/secu rity-report/making-your-move
  • 41. Taking the Attacker Eviction Red Pill Frode Hommedal | Telenor | CM2017 The CyberThreat Intelligence Matrix Mapping your knowledge gaps. Depth of knowledge: Footprint | Arsenal |Tradecraft Stages of attack: Prep. | Intrusion | Execution Presentation: https://www.slideshare.net/Frod eHommedal/the-cyber-threat- intelligence-matrix Essay: https://www.mnemonic.no/secu rity-report/making-your-move
  • 42. Taking the Attacker Eviction Red Pill Frode Hommedal | Telenor | CM2017 The CyberThreat Intelligence Matrix Mapping your knowledge gaps. Depth of knowledge: Footprint | Arsenal |Tradecraft Stages of attack: Prep. | Intrusion | Execution Presentation: https://www.slideshare.net/Frod eHommedal/the-cyber-threat- intelligence-matrix Essay: https://www.mnemonic.no/secu rity-report/making-your-move
  • 43. Taking the Attacker Eviction Red Pill Frode Hommedal | Telenor | CM2017 The CyberThreat Intelligence Matrix Mapping your knowledge gaps. Depth of knowledge: Footprint | Arsenal |Tradecraft Stages of attack: Prep. | Intrusion | Execution Presentation: https://www.slideshare.net/Frod eHommedal/the-cyber-threat- intelligence-matrix Essay: https://www.mnemonic.no/secu rity-report/making-your-move
  • 44. Taking the Attacker Eviction Red Pill Frode Hommedal | Telenor | CM2017 The CyberThreat Intelligence Matrix Mapping your knowledge gaps. Depth of knowledge: Footprint | Arsenal |Tradecraft Stages of attack: Prep. | Intrusion | Execution Presentation: https://www.slideshare.net/Frod eHommedal/the-cyber-threat- intelligence-matrix Essay: https://www.mnemonic.no/secu rity-report/making-your-move
  • 45. Taking the Attacker Eviction Red Pill Frode Hommedal | Telenor | CM2017 The CyberThreat Intelligence Matrix Mapping your knowledge gaps. Depth of knowledge: Footprint | Arsenal |Tradecraft Stages of attack: Prep. | Intrusion | Execution Presentation: https://www.slideshare.net/Frod eHommedal/the-cyber-threat- intelligence-matrix Essay: https://www.mnemonic.no/secu rity-report/making-your-move
  • 46. Taking the Attacker Eviction Red Pill Frode Hommedal | Telenor | CM2017 Threat Metrics to help you navigate CTI Matric: Identifying knowledge gaps. ThreatType Matric: Identifying type of threat. RiskType Matric: Identifying type of risk. Intrusion Pattern: Identifying type of infiltration. DwellTime: Identifying length of infiltration.
  • 47. Taking the Attacker Eviction Red Pill Frode Hommedal | Telenor | CM2017 With these models in mind we will look at some response patterns
  • 48. Taking the Attacker Eviction Red Pill Frode Hommedal | Telenor | CM2017 Response Patterns for your consideration Ignore: Ignorance or actively ignoring. Disrupt: Continuous remediation. Engage: A game of chess heavily reliant on intelligence and a high operational tempo. Clean: Scope, shut down and clean. Migrate: Build new and migrate.
  • 49. Taking the Attacker Eviction Red Pill Frode Hommedal | Telenor | CM2017 Response Patterns for your consideration Ignore: Ignorance or actively ignoring. Disrupt: Continuous remediation. Engage: A game of chess heavily reliant on intelligence and a high operational tempo. Clean: Scope, shut down and clean. Migrate: Build new and migrate.
  • 50. Taking the Attacker Eviction Red Pill Frode Hommedal | Telenor | CM2017 Response Patterns for your consideration Ignore: Ignorance or actively ignoring. Disrupt: Continuous remediation. Engage: A game of chess heavily reliant on intelligence and a high operational tempo. Clean: Scope, shut down and clean. Migrate: Build new and migrate.
  • 51. Taking the Attacker Eviction Red Pill Frode Hommedal | Telenor | CM2017 Response Patterns for your consideration Ignore: Ignorance or actively ignoring. Disrupt: Continuous remediation. Engage: A game of chess heavily reliant on intelligence and a high operational tempo. Clean: Scope, shut down and clean. Migrate: Build new and migrate.
  • 52. Taking the Attacker Eviction Red Pill Frode Hommedal | Telenor | CM2017 Wrap up
  • 53. Taking the Attacker Eviction Red Pill Frode Hommedal | Telenor | CM2017 So what truth is THE RED PILL of attacker eviction exposing? A way more complex and adversarial incident response reality than most responders are ready to acknowledge
  • 54. Taking the Attacker Eviction Red Pill Frode Hommedal | Telenor | CM2017 Yet the key takeaway is that if you understand your attacker you will be able to improve your response significantly
  • 55. Taking the Attacker Eviction Red Pill Frode Hommedal | Telenor | CM2017 Then you can apply the right response pattern to the identified intrusion pattern and the identified threat and risk types
  • 56. Taking the Attacker Eviction Red Pill Frode Hommedal | Telenor | CM2017 Always outnumbered. Never outgunned! @FrodeHommedal no.linkedin.com/in/hommedal frodehommedal.no

Editor's Notes

  1. This talk is about models. Models to help you structure your thinking when you plan your response to an APT breach.
  2. More specifically it will focus on models to structure your thinking regarding the eviction of your attacker from your infrastructure.
  3. More specifically it will focus on models to structure your thinking regarding the eviction of your attacker from your infrastructure.
  4. You’re not cleaning up garbage. You’re (literally) chasing rats. Highly intelligent and organized rodents with malicious intent. This makes it all very fluid and unpredictable.
  5. Compromised assets might actually not be your biggest risks. And sometimes ”cleaning up” your compromised assets will leave you worse off containing the biggest risks.
  6. ”Purge” is sometimes called “nuke and pave”. Or maybe it’s “scorched earth”?
  7. This is military forces used against civilians, in peace time. This is being a fire fighter, and every fire you fight is lit by an arsonist. This is the absence of rule of law. This is being constantly outnumbered and outgunned.