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BOWTIE RISK ANALYSIS
FOR
EWT FACILITIES
STUDENT INDUSTRIAL PROJECT
Name : Nur Fatin Dariah binti Mohamad Daud
Course : Chemical Engineering
Dept : HSE Department
Supervisors : Dr. Bawadi Abdullah
En. Taram Satiraksa
Strictly Confidential 1
OUTLINE
OBJECTIVES
INTRODUCTION
WHAT IS BOWTIE?
HISTORY OF BOWTIE
PROJECT METHODOLOGY
CONSTRUCTING A BOWTIE
CONCLUSION
Strictly Confidential 2
OBJECTIVES
To determine the major hazard on EWT Facilities.
To identify the threats and consequences of the Top Event
To construct Bowtie Risk Analysis of EWT facilities.
To get better understanding of process and operation
in upstream operation.
Strictly Confidential 3
1. Extended well test (EWT) facilities was installed on the Floating
Storage Unit (FSU) Nautica Muar for KMSE & AJK field.
2. Applying bowtie risk analysis for FSU Nautica Muar.
(only focusing on EWT Facilities)
INTRODUCTION
Strictly Confidential 4
• Risk Evaluation method used to analyze and demonstrate causal relationships in
HIGH risk scenarios.
• Capture Easily in Visual
• Name from the shape of the diagram-looks like a men’s bowtie.
WHAT IS BOWTIE?
Strictly Confidential 5
HISTORY OF BOWTIE
Piper Alpha Incident 1988, 6 July
Cause by
explosion
167 men died,
61 survivors
Nov 1988,
Cullen Inquiry
set an
investigation
Lack of
understanding
of hazards &
risks
Urge rose as
lesson learn to
gain more
understanding
and insight
causality
Strictly Confidential 6
METHODOLOGICAL PARENTS OF BOWTIE
1) Fault Tree Analysis
logical structure displaying the
relationship between an undesired
potential event (top event) and all its
probable causes
2) Event Tree Analysis
identifies and quantifies the possible
outcomes following an initiating event
Strictly Confidential 7
COMBINATION OF FAULT TREE AND EVENT TREE
UE 1
UE 3
UE 4
UE 5
UE 7
IE
IE
IE
IE
IE
IE
TE
SCE
SCE
DP
DP
DP
ME
ME
ME
ME
ME
ME
Fault Tree Event Tree
Barriers
Prevention Mitigation
DPAnd
And
OR
OR
OR
OR
OR
UE 2
UE 6
UE 8
SCENARIO
Initiating events Major Events
Unwanted Events
Strictly Confidential 8
BARRIER THINKING - SWISS CHEESE MODEL
• Early 90’s, James Reason develop the Swiss Cheese Model.
• It is a metaphor that made barrier thinking popular for the past two decades.
• Hazards are contained by multiple protective barriers.
• Barriers are needed to prevent loss.
HAZARD
INCIDENT
Barriers
Strictly Confidential 9
• Barriers may have weaknesses.
• Holes represent the weaknesses.
HAZARD
INCIDENT
Barriers
BARRIER THINKING - SWISS CHEESE MODEL
Strictly Confidential 10
BARRIER THINKING - SWISS CHEESE MODEL
HAZARDS
INCIDENT
Barriers
• Once the holes (barrier’s flaws)are aligned, Hazard will pass through the holes
in all slices leading to incident to occur./ failure.
Strictly Confidential 11
BARRIER THINKING - SWISS CHEESE MODEL
HTTPS://WWW.YOUTUBE.COM/WATCH?V=EB2MKSWEDJ0
Strictly Confidential 12
METHODOLOGY
Hazard Identification
(HAZID)
Risk Assessment
(RA)
Major Accident Hazard
(MAH)
Bowtie
Analysis
Strictly Confidential 13
HAZARD IDENTIFICATION (HAZID) & RISK
ASSESSMENT (RA)
HAZARD ID Description
H1 Loss of Containment
H2 Ignited release; Fires
H3 Dropped / Swinging object
H4 Transport hazard
H5 Collision
H6 Natural Events
H6 Miscellaneous hazards
Strictly Confidential 14
LOSS OF CONTAINMENT
AT EWT FACILITIES
@FSU NAUTICA MUAR
Strictly Confidential 15
STEPS CONSTRUCTING BOWTIE
Identify Hazards
Identify Top Events
Identify Threats
Evaluate Consequences
Control Threats
Recovery Measures
Identify Escalation Factors
Controlling Escalation
Strictly Confidential 16
STEP 1: IDENTIFY HAZARDS
• Anything which is a source of potential loss or damage
HYDROCARBON
OIL UNDER
PRESSURE
Hazard
Strictly Confidential 17
STEP 2: IDENTIFY TOP EVENT
• A point in time which describes the release or loss of control over a Hazard
LOSS OF
CONTAINMENT
HYDROCARBON
OIL UNDER
PRESSURE
Hazard
Top Event
Strictly Confidential 18
Top Event
STEP 3: IDENTIFY THREATS
Threats
Human Error
Blockage of Piping due to
waxy crude resulting in
Piping Breakage
Corrosion
(Internal)
Corrosion
(External)
LOSS OF
CONTAINMENT
HYDROCARBON
OIL UNDER
PRESSURE
Hazard
Strictly Confidential 19
STEP 4: EVALUATE CONSEQUENCES
Human Error
Blockage of Piping due to
waxy crude resulting in
Piping Breakage
Corrosion
(Internal)
Corrosion
(External)
Fire without personnel
injury but Damage to
Facilities
Personnel injury
(HC release with fire)
Environmental Impact /
Hydrocarbon Spill
Fire (Multiple fatalities)
LOSS OF
CONTAINMENT
HYDROCARBON
OIL UNDER
PRESSURE
Threats
Consequences
Top Event
Hazard
Strictly Confidential 20
CONSTRUCTING THE BARRIERS
Function of barriers: to:
1. Control Threats
2. Determine the Recovery Measure
3. Controlling Escalation Factors
Strictly Confidential 21
CONSTRUCTING BARRIERS
Human Error
Blockage of Piping due to
waxy crude resulting in
Piping Breakage
Corrosion
(Internal)
Corrosion
(External)
Fire without personnel
injury but Damage to
Facilities
Personnel injury
(HC release with fire)
Environmental Impact /
Hydrocarbon Spill
Fire (Multiple fatalities)
LOSS OF
CONTAINMENT
HYDROCARBON
OIL UNDER
PRESSURE
Threats
Consequences
Top Event
Hazard
Threat Barriers Recovery Measure
Strictly Confidential 22
STEP 5: THREAT BARRIERS
Human Error
Blockage of Piping due to
waxy crude resulting in
Piping Breakage
Corrosion
(Internal)
Corrosion
(External)
LOSS OF
CONTAINMENT
HYDROCARBON
OIL UNDER
PRESSURE
Threats
Top Event
Threat Barriers
Strictly Confidential 23
Threats Barrier 1 Barrier 2 Barrier 3 Barrier 4 Barrier 5 Barrier 6 Barrier 7
Corrosion (internal) Piping (corrosion
allowance, corrosion
coupon in design)
(Piping system)
Anode in Tank
(design)
(Tanks)
Annual Class
Survey
(Inspection)
Crude & gas
sampling to
develop crude
assay and MSDS
(to ensure the
compatibility of
the crude)
(inspection)
Corrosion (Eternal) Painting & Coating Spec
for piping, corrosion
allowance
(Piping system)
Painting & Coating
Program
(Maintenance)
Annual Class
Survey
(Inspection)
Human Error Rest hour policy to
mitigate fatigue
(Procedural)
Competent personnel
(Administrative)
Correct tools
(Procedural)
Compliance to
PTW and
conducting tool
(Procedural)
Safety passport
requirement ,
Health declaration
form to be fill up
(Procedural)
Pre-joining medical
check and marine
medical check every 2
years.
(Procedural)
Stop work policy
(Procedural)
Blockage of Piping
due to waxy crude
resulting in Piping
Breakage
Steam System
(Fired Heaters)
Steam heating coil in
tank
(Tanks)
Chemical
Injection at FSU
(Chemical
Injection
Systems)
Threats Barriers (Left Side of Bowtie)
Strictly Confidential 24
STEP 6: RECOVERY MEASURES
Fire without personnel
injury but Damage to
Facilities
Personnel injury
(HC release with fire)
Environmental Impact /
Hydrocarbon Spill
Fire (Multiple fatalities)
LOSS OF
CONTAINMENT
HYDROCARBON
OIL UNDER
PRESSURE
Consequences
Top Event
Hazard
Recovery Measures
Strictly Confidential 25
Barrier 1 Barrier 2 Barrier 3 Barrier 4 Barrier 5 Barrier 6 Barrier 7 Barrier 8 Consequences
Routine operation
on main deck
(Operation and
maintenance)
Emergency Shutdown
System (ESD) for
pump
Process Emergency
Shutdown Valves
(ESDVs)
Oil Spill
Response Plan
(Oil Spill
Contingency)
Emergency
Response
Procedures
(ERP) and
Emergency
Control
Centre (ECC)
(Safety)
Communication
during spill
(Communication
system)
Alarm to be
activated during
oil spill
(Process control
& Alarms)
Safety Standby
Vessel
(Rescue
Facilities)
Environmental
Impact /
Hydrocarbon
Spill
Routine operation
on main deck
(Operation and
maintenance
Emergency Shutdown
System (ESD) for
pump
Oil Spill Response
Plan (Oil Spill
Contingency)
Safety Standby
Vessel
(Rescue
Facilities)
First Aid/
Medical
response
Manual Fire
Fighting Equipment
Fire water pump Hazardous Area
Ventilation
Personnel injury
(HC release with
fire)
Routine operation
on main deck
(Operation and
maintenance
Emergency Shutdown
System (ESD) for
pump
Oil Spill Response
Plan (Oil Spill
Contingency)
Safety Standby
Vessel
(Rescue
Facilities)
Personal
Survival
Equipment
(PSE),
lifejackets.
Fixed Foam system
for pump room,
engine room, main
deck, cargo area,
etc.
Hazardous Area
Ventilation
Emergency Stop
Button
(ventilation
system/quick
closing valve to
stop oxygen
from going into
engine room,
pump room
Fire without
personnel injury
but Damage to
Facilities
Routine operation
on main deck
(Operation and
maintenance
Emergency Shutdown
System (ESD) for
pump
Oil Spill Response
Plan (Oil Spill
Contingency)
Safety Standby
Vessel
(Rescue
Facilities)
First Aid/
Medical
response
Emergency/Escape
Lighting
Helicopter
Facilities
Manual Fire
Fighting
Equipment
Fire (Multiple
fatalities)
Recovery Measures (Right Side of Bowtie)
Strictly Confidential 26
STEP 7: IDENTIFY ESCALATION FACTORS
A condition that leads to increase risk by defeating or reducing the effectiveness
of controls
Human
Factors
Mechanical
Failures
Abnormal
Conditions
Loss of Critical
Services
Strictly Confidential 27
Not Familiar with
Facility’s ERP
Environmental Impact /
Hydrocarbon Spill
LOSS OF
CONTAINMENT
HYDROCARBON
OIL UNDER
PRESSURE
Consequences
Top Event
Hazard
Recovery Measures
Emergency Response
Procedures (ERP) and
Emergency Control
Centre (ECC)
(Safety)
Escalation Factor
STEP 7: IDENTIFY ESCALATION FACTORS
A condition that leads to increase risk by defeating or reducing the
effectiveness of controls
Strictly Confidential 28
STEP 8: CONTROLLING ESCALATION
A control that manages the conditions which reduce the effectiveness of other controls.
1. Controlling Human Factors
• Training and Induction
• Supervision and mentoring
• Qualification and Certifications
• Auditing and Verification
2. Controlling Mechanical Failures
• Maintenance and Repairs
• Inspection and Testing
• Redundancy and Spares
• Design and Specification
Strictly Confidential 29
Loss of Critical
Services
COMPLETE BOWTIE
Human Error
Blockage of Piping due to
waxy crude resulting in
Piping Breakage
Corrosion
(Internal)
Corrosion
(External)
Fire without personnel
injury but Damage to
Facilities
Personnel injury
(HC release with fire)
Environmental Impact /
Hydrocarbon Spill
Fire (Multiple fatalities)
LOSS OF
CONTAINMENT
HYDROCARBON
OIL UNDER
PRESSURE
Threats
Consequences
Top Event
Hazard
Threat Barriers Recovery Measures
Inspection and Testing
Mechanical Failures
Maintenance and Repairs
Strictly Confidential 30More examples
Strictly Confidential 31
BOWTIE ADVANTAGES
1. BARRIER EFFECTIVENESS - Barrier effectiveness gives instant visual insight into the
strength of Barriers.
2. BARRIER TYPE - Having different Barrier types will increase the strength of the
organization, by decreasing the likelihood of common mode failures.
3. BARRIER ACCOUNTABILITY - Making people responsible for Barriers, makes it
transparent what everybody is supposed to do to operate safely.
4. Suggest Bowtie to be applied seriously for Risk Analysis.
5. Mitigation strategies can be identified easily – So the concept *ALARP can be
achieved.
*As Low As Responsible Practicable
Strictly Confidential 32
CONCLUSION
Major hazard can
be identified
Threats can be
determined.
Consequences of
The Top Event can
be evaluated
Barriers and
mitigation strategies
can be measured.
Strictly Confidential 33
Q & A

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Internship Project - Bowtie

  • 1. © 2015 VESTIGO PETROLEUM SDN BHD (a wholly owned subsidiary of PCSB) All rights reserved. No part of this document may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means (electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise) without the BOWTIE RISK ANALYSIS FOR EWT FACILITIES STUDENT INDUSTRIAL PROJECT Name : Nur Fatin Dariah binti Mohamad Daud Course : Chemical Engineering Dept : HSE Department Supervisors : Dr. Bawadi Abdullah En. Taram Satiraksa
  • 2. Strictly Confidential 1 OUTLINE OBJECTIVES INTRODUCTION WHAT IS BOWTIE? HISTORY OF BOWTIE PROJECT METHODOLOGY CONSTRUCTING A BOWTIE CONCLUSION
  • 3. Strictly Confidential 2 OBJECTIVES To determine the major hazard on EWT Facilities. To identify the threats and consequences of the Top Event To construct Bowtie Risk Analysis of EWT facilities. To get better understanding of process and operation in upstream operation.
  • 4. Strictly Confidential 3 1. Extended well test (EWT) facilities was installed on the Floating Storage Unit (FSU) Nautica Muar for KMSE & AJK field. 2. Applying bowtie risk analysis for FSU Nautica Muar. (only focusing on EWT Facilities) INTRODUCTION
  • 5. Strictly Confidential 4 • Risk Evaluation method used to analyze and demonstrate causal relationships in HIGH risk scenarios. • Capture Easily in Visual • Name from the shape of the diagram-looks like a men’s bowtie. WHAT IS BOWTIE?
  • 6. Strictly Confidential 5 HISTORY OF BOWTIE Piper Alpha Incident 1988, 6 July Cause by explosion 167 men died, 61 survivors Nov 1988, Cullen Inquiry set an investigation Lack of understanding of hazards & risks Urge rose as lesson learn to gain more understanding and insight causality
  • 7. Strictly Confidential 6 METHODOLOGICAL PARENTS OF BOWTIE 1) Fault Tree Analysis logical structure displaying the relationship between an undesired potential event (top event) and all its probable causes 2) Event Tree Analysis identifies and quantifies the possible outcomes following an initiating event
  • 8. Strictly Confidential 7 COMBINATION OF FAULT TREE AND EVENT TREE UE 1 UE 3 UE 4 UE 5 UE 7 IE IE IE IE IE IE TE SCE SCE DP DP DP ME ME ME ME ME ME Fault Tree Event Tree Barriers Prevention Mitigation DPAnd And OR OR OR OR OR UE 2 UE 6 UE 8 SCENARIO Initiating events Major Events Unwanted Events
  • 9. Strictly Confidential 8 BARRIER THINKING - SWISS CHEESE MODEL • Early 90’s, James Reason develop the Swiss Cheese Model. • It is a metaphor that made barrier thinking popular for the past two decades. • Hazards are contained by multiple protective barriers. • Barriers are needed to prevent loss. HAZARD INCIDENT Barriers
  • 10. Strictly Confidential 9 • Barriers may have weaknesses. • Holes represent the weaknesses. HAZARD INCIDENT Barriers BARRIER THINKING - SWISS CHEESE MODEL
  • 11. Strictly Confidential 10 BARRIER THINKING - SWISS CHEESE MODEL HAZARDS INCIDENT Barriers • Once the holes (barrier’s flaws)are aligned, Hazard will pass through the holes in all slices leading to incident to occur./ failure.
  • 12. Strictly Confidential 11 BARRIER THINKING - SWISS CHEESE MODEL HTTPS://WWW.YOUTUBE.COM/WATCH?V=EB2MKSWEDJ0
  • 13. Strictly Confidential 12 METHODOLOGY Hazard Identification (HAZID) Risk Assessment (RA) Major Accident Hazard (MAH) Bowtie Analysis
  • 14. Strictly Confidential 13 HAZARD IDENTIFICATION (HAZID) & RISK ASSESSMENT (RA) HAZARD ID Description H1 Loss of Containment H2 Ignited release; Fires H3 Dropped / Swinging object H4 Transport hazard H5 Collision H6 Natural Events H6 Miscellaneous hazards
  • 15. Strictly Confidential 14 LOSS OF CONTAINMENT AT EWT FACILITIES @FSU NAUTICA MUAR
  • 16. Strictly Confidential 15 STEPS CONSTRUCTING BOWTIE Identify Hazards Identify Top Events Identify Threats Evaluate Consequences Control Threats Recovery Measures Identify Escalation Factors Controlling Escalation
  • 17. Strictly Confidential 16 STEP 1: IDENTIFY HAZARDS • Anything which is a source of potential loss or damage HYDROCARBON OIL UNDER PRESSURE Hazard
  • 18. Strictly Confidential 17 STEP 2: IDENTIFY TOP EVENT • A point in time which describes the release or loss of control over a Hazard LOSS OF CONTAINMENT HYDROCARBON OIL UNDER PRESSURE Hazard Top Event
  • 19. Strictly Confidential 18 Top Event STEP 3: IDENTIFY THREATS Threats Human Error Blockage of Piping due to waxy crude resulting in Piping Breakage Corrosion (Internal) Corrosion (External) LOSS OF CONTAINMENT HYDROCARBON OIL UNDER PRESSURE Hazard
  • 20. Strictly Confidential 19 STEP 4: EVALUATE CONSEQUENCES Human Error Blockage of Piping due to waxy crude resulting in Piping Breakage Corrosion (Internal) Corrosion (External) Fire without personnel injury but Damage to Facilities Personnel injury (HC release with fire) Environmental Impact / Hydrocarbon Spill Fire (Multiple fatalities) LOSS OF CONTAINMENT HYDROCARBON OIL UNDER PRESSURE Threats Consequences Top Event Hazard
  • 21. Strictly Confidential 20 CONSTRUCTING THE BARRIERS Function of barriers: to: 1. Control Threats 2. Determine the Recovery Measure 3. Controlling Escalation Factors
  • 22. Strictly Confidential 21 CONSTRUCTING BARRIERS Human Error Blockage of Piping due to waxy crude resulting in Piping Breakage Corrosion (Internal) Corrosion (External) Fire without personnel injury but Damage to Facilities Personnel injury (HC release with fire) Environmental Impact / Hydrocarbon Spill Fire (Multiple fatalities) LOSS OF CONTAINMENT HYDROCARBON OIL UNDER PRESSURE Threats Consequences Top Event Hazard Threat Barriers Recovery Measure
  • 23. Strictly Confidential 22 STEP 5: THREAT BARRIERS Human Error Blockage of Piping due to waxy crude resulting in Piping Breakage Corrosion (Internal) Corrosion (External) LOSS OF CONTAINMENT HYDROCARBON OIL UNDER PRESSURE Threats Top Event Threat Barriers
  • 24. Strictly Confidential 23 Threats Barrier 1 Barrier 2 Barrier 3 Barrier 4 Barrier 5 Barrier 6 Barrier 7 Corrosion (internal) Piping (corrosion allowance, corrosion coupon in design) (Piping system) Anode in Tank (design) (Tanks) Annual Class Survey (Inspection) Crude & gas sampling to develop crude assay and MSDS (to ensure the compatibility of the crude) (inspection) Corrosion (Eternal) Painting & Coating Spec for piping, corrosion allowance (Piping system) Painting & Coating Program (Maintenance) Annual Class Survey (Inspection) Human Error Rest hour policy to mitigate fatigue (Procedural) Competent personnel (Administrative) Correct tools (Procedural) Compliance to PTW and conducting tool (Procedural) Safety passport requirement , Health declaration form to be fill up (Procedural) Pre-joining medical check and marine medical check every 2 years. (Procedural) Stop work policy (Procedural) Blockage of Piping due to waxy crude resulting in Piping Breakage Steam System (Fired Heaters) Steam heating coil in tank (Tanks) Chemical Injection at FSU (Chemical Injection Systems) Threats Barriers (Left Side of Bowtie)
  • 25. Strictly Confidential 24 STEP 6: RECOVERY MEASURES Fire without personnel injury but Damage to Facilities Personnel injury (HC release with fire) Environmental Impact / Hydrocarbon Spill Fire (Multiple fatalities) LOSS OF CONTAINMENT HYDROCARBON OIL UNDER PRESSURE Consequences Top Event Hazard Recovery Measures
  • 26. Strictly Confidential 25 Barrier 1 Barrier 2 Barrier 3 Barrier 4 Barrier 5 Barrier 6 Barrier 7 Barrier 8 Consequences Routine operation on main deck (Operation and maintenance) Emergency Shutdown System (ESD) for pump Process Emergency Shutdown Valves (ESDVs) Oil Spill Response Plan (Oil Spill Contingency) Emergency Response Procedures (ERP) and Emergency Control Centre (ECC) (Safety) Communication during spill (Communication system) Alarm to be activated during oil spill (Process control & Alarms) Safety Standby Vessel (Rescue Facilities) Environmental Impact / Hydrocarbon Spill Routine operation on main deck (Operation and maintenance Emergency Shutdown System (ESD) for pump Oil Spill Response Plan (Oil Spill Contingency) Safety Standby Vessel (Rescue Facilities) First Aid/ Medical response Manual Fire Fighting Equipment Fire water pump Hazardous Area Ventilation Personnel injury (HC release with fire) Routine operation on main deck (Operation and maintenance Emergency Shutdown System (ESD) for pump Oil Spill Response Plan (Oil Spill Contingency) Safety Standby Vessel (Rescue Facilities) Personal Survival Equipment (PSE), lifejackets. Fixed Foam system for pump room, engine room, main deck, cargo area, etc. Hazardous Area Ventilation Emergency Stop Button (ventilation system/quick closing valve to stop oxygen from going into engine room, pump room Fire without personnel injury but Damage to Facilities Routine operation on main deck (Operation and maintenance Emergency Shutdown System (ESD) for pump Oil Spill Response Plan (Oil Spill Contingency) Safety Standby Vessel (Rescue Facilities) First Aid/ Medical response Emergency/Escape Lighting Helicopter Facilities Manual Fire Fighting Equipment Fire (Multiple fatalities) Recovery Measures (Right Side of Bowtie)
  • 27. Strictly Confidential 26 STEP 7: IDENTIFY ESCALATION FACTORS A condition that leads to increase risk by defeating or reducing the effectiveness of controls Human Factors Mechanical Failures Abnormal Conditions Loss of Critical Services
  • 28. Strictly Confidential 27 Not Familiar with Facility’s ERP Environmental Impact / Hydrocarbon Spill LOSS OF CONTAINMENT HYDROCARBON OIL UNDER PRESSURE Consequences Top Event Hazard Recovery Measures Emergency Response Procedures (ERP) and Emergency Control Centre (ECC) (Safety) Escalation Factor STEP 7: IDENTIFY ESCALATION FACTORS A condition that leads to increase risk by defeating or reducing the effectiveness of controls
  • 29. Strictly Confidential 28 STEP 8: CONTROLLING ESCALATION A control that manages the conditions which reduce the effectiveness of other controls. 1. Controlling Human Factors • Training and Induction • Supervision and mentoring • Qualification and Certifications • Auditing and Verification 2. Controlling Mechanical Failures • Maintenance and Repairs • Inspection and Testing • Redundancy and Spares • Design and Specification
  • 30. Strictly Confidential 29 Loss of Critical Services COMPLETE BOWTIE Human Error Blockage of Piping due to waxy crude resulting in Piping Breakage Corrosion (Internal) Corrosion (External) Fire without personnel injury but Damage to Facilities Personnel injury (HC release with fire) Environmental Impact / Hydrocarbon Spill Fire (Multiple fatalities) LOSS OF CONTAINMENT HYDROCARBON OIL UNDER PRESSURE Threats Consequences Top Event Hazard Threat Barriers Recovery Measures Inspection and Testing Mechanical Failures Maintenance and Repairs
  • 32. Strictly Confidential 31 BOWTIE ADVANTAGES 1. BARRIER EFFECTIVENESS - Barrier effectiveness gives instant visual insight into the strength of Barriers. 2. BARRIER TYPE - Having different Barrier types will increase the strength of the organization, by decreasing the likelihood of common mode failures. 3. BARRIER ACCOUNTABILITY - Making people responsible for Barriers, makes it transparent what everybody is supposed to do to operate safely. 4. Suggest Bowtie to be applied seriously for Risk Analysis. 5. Mitigation strategies can be identified easily – So the concept *ALARP can be achieved. *As Low As Responsible Practicable
  • 33. Strictly Confidential 32 CONCLUSION Major hazard can be identified Threats can be determined. Consequences of The Top Event can be evaluated Barriers and mitigation strategies can be measured.