A Knowledge Concept Map Structured Concept Analysis From Systematic Literature Review

29
a Knowledge Concept Map: Structured
Concept analysis from Systemaic
literature review
Philip Sisson1
and Julie J.C.H. Ryan2
Abstract
The purpose of this aricle is to present a mental model of knowledge as a concept
map as an input to knowledge management (KM) invesigaions. This aricle’s
extended knowledge concept map can serve as a resource where the invesigaion,
development, or applicaion of knowledge would be served with a broad mental
model of knowledge. Previously unrelated concepts are related; knowledge
concepts can someimes be expressed as a range, i.e., certainty related states:
view, opinion, seniment, persuasion, belief, and convicion. Extrathesis is ideniied
as a potenial skill level higher than synthesis, and associated with the concepts:
discovery, insituion, insight (the event), revelaion, or illuminaion that precedes
innovaion. Qualitaive methods were used to gather and document concepts. System
engineering and object analysis methods were applied to deine and relate concepts.
However, the theoreical sampling and theoreical saturaion methods applied
do not guarantee all appropriate concepts have been ideniied. Given the breadth,
depth, and dimensionality of concepts of knowledge, later researchers may add
addiional concepts. This aricle provides evidence of addiional things people know, an
alternaive to psychology’s acquaintanceship, understanding and placement of newer
categorizaions of knowledge in relaion to older ones, and suggests that ranges for
knowledge terms exist. This aricle extends the 2015 paper on this topic by: 1) taking
a deeper look into epistemological terms and relaionships, 2) providing contextual
deiniions, 3) suggesing extrathesis as an idea beyond synthesis, 4) updaing the
concept map; and 5) providing new insight on the overloaded knows including adding
an eleventh know. It provides a much more solid basis for KM invesigaions than typical
presentaions, providing a broad understanding of knowledge that is beneicial.
Keywords: knowledge; concept map; knowledge concept map.
1 Philip Sisson, Ph.D. Candidate, The George Washington University, 5010 Larno Drive, Alexandria, VA, USA, 22310,
e-mail: sissonp@aol.com.
2 Julie J. C. H. Ryan, D.Sc., Naional Defense Insitute University, 300 5th Ave SW, Suite 183H, Washington, DC 20319,
e-mail: julieryan@julieryan.com.

30 / A Knowledge Concept Map:
Structured Concept Analysis from Systemaic Literature Review
Special issue: Knowledge Management - Current Trends and Challenges
Małgorzata Zięba (Ed.)
IntroduCtIon
Recurring themes that resonate in business, the media, and academia,
airm that we are in the “Age of Knowledge,” that knowledge management
(KM) is important, and that both individuals as well as organizaions need
to coninually learn to improve their knowledge base to remain relevant.
What tends to be glossed over in these discussions is the quesion of what
knowledge is, and furthermore how to acquire it.
There are whole discourses in philosophy on what is knowledge which
tend toward arcane arguments about jusiied true beliefs and how such
beliefs might be formed. Operaionalizing these philosophical concepts prove
to be diicult, primarily because the philosophical debates are less about
uility and more about theory. Thus, an increasing chasm between tradiional
philosophy and praciioners has developed.
Pariions of knowledge trace back to Aristotle’s ive virtues (techne,
episteme, phronesis, sophia, and nous) (Parry, 2008). How-we-know
breakdowns were explored in the 20th century (Stroll, 2013), although they
trace back to 1 BC (Lef, 1983). Nichols (2000) summarized a KM perspecive
(“explicit, implicit, [and] tacit” and “declaraive and procedural knowledge”)
(pp. 3-4). Holsapple and Joshi (2004) present a web of numerous knowledge
atributes. The authors’ developed knowledge concept map is important
because it unloads overloaded terms about what we know, and relates
the old and new “knows” to each other, as well as a wide list of previous
unrelated, or poorly related, concepts, in a single visual.
As Stroll (2013) suggests, the aricle irst “‘[studies] uses of “knowledge”
in everyday language;’” (the nature of knowledge, para. 3) - “by example,
‘who, what, when, where, why, and how’ (Pompper, 2005, p. 816)” (Sisson
& Ryan, 2015, p. 1028). This aricle then looks at the antecedents of these
forensic knows (Wilson & Ibrahim, 2011, p. 132) and moves on to the
epistemological basis of some of them, idenifying know-valid and know-basis
in the process. Other concepts are developed by discussing epistemological
beginnings,psychology’scontribuions,adeeperlookintothe“knows”of,and
knowledge management (KM) contribuions to knowledge categorizaion.
“The presented concept map relates diverse concepts such as mental
processes, reasoning, jusiicaion, Gardner’s muliple intelligences, Bloom’s
Taxonomies, scales and measures of proiciency, and certainty, as well as
other topics” (Sisson & Ryan, 2015, p. 1027). Puing management concepts
in perspecive to each other allows people to oten see separately addressed
subjects (such as validity and proposiional states, Bloom’s taxonomy, and
competency terms like journeyman) in relaion to each other, perhaps
opening new ideas on how to use them.

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Philip Sisson and Julie J.C.H. Ryan /
Journal of Entrepreneurship, Management and Innovaion (JEMI),
Volume 13, Issue 3, 2017: 29-69
Eleven “types of knowns ... plus subcategories for some of them are named”
(Sisson & Ryan, 2015, p. 1028) permiing their use without term-concept
overloading. Know-why now has the new tool Opion OutlinesTM
available
to document (Lewis, 2015b). Extrathesis is suggested as an idea beyond
synthesis. As postulated, extrathesis could have profound implicaions
in understanding knowledge creaion (intuiion), upon which signiicant
innovaion and subsequent entrepreneurship depends.
This aricle expands upon “What do we know – building a knowledge
concept map” (Sisson & Ryan, 2015) verbaim, in much of the presented
material with speciic material quoted and cited, in block quotes, and, in some
cases, new ideas are integrated with verbaim extracts. In the last case, the new
material will be set of with brackets or italics. Minor changes in punctuaion
and grammar are not noted. Also, the choice of paragraph style is someimes
based on reducing the complexity of citaion to improve readability.
MethodologY
To address exising and new ideas about what we know, muliple methods
were used following qualitaive research, concept analysis (systems
architecing), and systems thinking (Senge, Kleiner, Roberts, Ross & Smith,
1994) approaches. Qualitaive approaches to explicaing and categorizing
the components of knowledge were iteraively applied in idenifying and
examining diferent knowledge concepts. The goal of the invesigaion is
to create a mental model of knowledge that incorporates more knowledge
related concepts in a single visual. Knowledge analyzed as an object (object
analysis) (rather than as “a state of mind,” an access condiion, capability
(Alavi & Leidner, 2001, p. 109), social acion (Crane, 2013), or KM view of
knowledge as a process (Serenko & Dumay, 2015, p. 410)) was selected as the
dominant presentaion method, although enabling acion is shown.
The iniial words selected “represent knowledge [terms, their] atributes,
and related terms that were drawn from a list of over a thousand candidate
KM [domain] terms” (Sisson & Ryan, 2015, p. 1028). They were the basis
for further theoreical sampling. Ideniied concepts were informally coded,
relaionships were established, and then the concepts were distributed in the
evolving concept map. Five basic atributes for knowledge were ideniied
and subsequently extended to accommodate informaion technology
oriented atributes, such as those ideniied in Holsapple and Joshi’s (2004)
web of knowledge atributes. New concepts such as inluencers, and where
knowledge is located (embodied, embrained, etc.), were posiioned in the

map because the authors think ideas like these are important and needed to
be addressed.
Knowledge valuaion, knowledge as assets, and intellectual capital
topics, are not speciically included. Redeiniion and extension of the
locaion terms by personal KM (PKM) researcher Schmit (2015) were only
noted, similarly with Lewis’s (2015c) Symbioic Table of Knowledge™. Both
ideas merit menioning but further consideraion is not criical to this overall
visualizaion.
The theoreical sampling and theoreical saturaion methods applied
do not guarantee all appropriate concepts have been ideniied. Given
the breadth, depth, and dimensionality of concepts of knowledge, later
researchers may add addiional concepts.
lIterature reVIew
the old knows and epistemological beginnings
Knowledge [, understanding,] ... enables capability for acion
(Peter F. Drucker in The New Realiies, cited by Stankosky, 2003).
Enabling acion traces back to Aristotle’s téchné leading to poi-
esis and phrónésis leading to praxis – acion [(Marquardt, 2002;
Schwartz, 2011)]. ... It is represented in “facts (including generaliza-
ions) and concepts” (Gregory, 2004, knowledge) and in people is “the
psychological result of percepion and learning and remembering”
(Thinkmap, 2012-2017, knowledge) (Sisson & Ryan, 2015, p. 1028).
Knowledge as representaions of the knows resides in many arifacts. It
is fairly easy to see hunters shooing deer with arrows in the Lascaux Cave
Huning Paining – know-how. Observers can see a picture of Capistrano
with the swallows arriving, and as a result know that birds return annually,
but; we do not know what birds visualize (if it is visual) (know-where). The
picture could also represent know-when to people. Perhaps the Ankh is an
unremembered map to the Garden of Eden (Sisson, personal communicaion,
2014); see Figure 1. Whether the Lascaux Cave paining is meant to represent
know-what or know-how, if the picture of swallows generates a recogniion
of know-where, or if the Ankh was irst a map to the garden of Eden—not
a “sacred emblem symbolizing life” (Darvill, 2008, ankh; Merriam-Webster,
2013-2017, ankh), ferility (Ankh, 2016), or a key to “the gates of death onto
immortality” (Magalis, 2005, p. 5116)— is in the mind of the observer.

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Philip Sisson and Julie J.C.h. ryan /
Journal of entrepreneurship, Management and Innovaion (JeMI),
Volume 13, Issue 3, 2017: 29-69
(Ankh, 2016)
Photograph of a TV
screen during a PBS
program on ancient
rivers, circa 2012
(L. H. Sisson, per-
sonal communicaion,
2014).
The let graphic is one of many images of an Ankh. On the right, the photograph of a TV
screen shows a hypothesized locaion of Eden and the locaion of rivers at that ime. Noice
that the shape of the rivers is similar to the shape represented in the Ankh on the let (L. H.
Sisson, personal communicaion, 2014).
Note: sources as indicated.
Figure 1. The Ankh as a potenial map to the Garden of Eden
The earliest wriings of humankind also reveal an interest in
understanding how we know. One of the irst documented knowledge
managers was Imhotep, a famous intellectual and architect of Egypt, living
in the 27th century BCE. He was known for his organizaion and harnessing
of knowledge in areas as diverse as medicine, architecture, and agriculture
(Encyclopaedia Britannica academic, 2012-2016, Imhotep). One of the most
famous early philosophers, Sun Tzu, who lived in the 5th
(Li, 2012, p. 437) or
4th
century BCE, applied the lessons of knowledge management to warfare
(Bellamy, 2001, Sun-Tzu) and is widely quoted to this day (The Sonshi Group,
2015). The Greeks developed the concept of the Academy (Kidd, 2006, p.
171) to explore knowledge, in the fourth century BCE, producing scholars
such as Plato. It is from the later that we get many of the concepts upon
which the current philosophy of knowledge discourse is founded.
Aristotle presented “ive virtues of thought” (Téchné, Phróné-
sis, Noûs, Epistémé, and Sophía) which can be mapped to know-
how, experience, intuiion, truth (know-that) (Schwartz, 2011,
pp. 40, 42-45) and basic truths (theoreical wisdom) (Feldman &
Ferrari, 2005, p. 485). Acceping Plato’s deiniion of knowledge
as a “jusiied true belief,” (Blackburn, 2008 (2016), p. 270, Get-
ier examples; Conee & Feldman, 2006) reveals a need for validity
(know-valid as something one knows) and raises the idea of how
one knows it is jusiied (know-basis).
Over the millennium other philosophers have invesigated
knowledge resuling in suggesions of what [it] is and claims by

others [of what] it is not. “Much of epistemology has arisen ei-
ther in defense of, or in opposiion to, various forms of skepicism”
(Klein, 2014, Skepicism; Sisson & Ryan, 2015, pp. 1028-1029).
Table 1 summarizes the authors’ percepion of general relaionships
between some of these epistemological viewpoints, followed by Table 2 with
sipulated deiniions (as explanaions).
Know-that, who, when, where, why, and how “have been explored
in detail, especially since the beginning of the 20th century” (Stroll, 2013,
epistemology). Most of these terms match Hermagoras of Temnos’s (1 BC)
list of “a constellaion of circumstances” … “oten expressed in the form
of … quesions” (Lef, 1983, pp. 28-29). The terms are common to news
wriing (forensic or straight news) (Pompper, 2005, p. 816)) and in criminal
invesigaions as “situaional based explanaions” (Wilson & Ibrahim, 2011,
pp. 130-132; Sisson & Ryan, 2015, p. 1028).
Thus, in modern terms, we ind ourselves discussing the same issues
plaguing the ancients. Today, however, we are in the context of a technological
underpinning that has revoluionized the development, communicaion, and
archiving of that which feeds knowledge: informaion.
Psychology contribuions
Historiesofpsychologyandphilosophybegantodivergeinthemid-nineteenth
century, when “psychologists came to regard themselves as engaged in a fully
ledged science” (Heil, 2005, epistemology and psychology). “Psychology
acknowledges three categories of knowledge: declaraive knowledge,
procedural knowledge, and acquaintanceship knowledge. Declaraive and
procedural knowledge relate respecively to know-that and know-how
(Colman, 2009-2016, declaraive knowledge and procedural knowledge)”
(Sisson & Ryan, 2015, p. 1029).
Acquaintanceship knowledge is knowledge of “people, places, and
things.” and “This class of knowledge was discussed by the Welsh philosopher
Bertrand (Arthur William) Russell (1872–1970) in The Problems of Philosophy
(1912) and is poorly understood in psychology” (Colman, 2009-2016,
acquaintanceship knowledge). However, Thomas Nagel’s example of “a bat’s
knowing what it was like to experience its echo-locatory senses as an example
of consciousness” (Van Gulick, 2011, concepts of consciousness, secion 2,
para. 5) suggests another term: know-like. Dancers also know-like in how
they move (Sisson & Ryan, 2015, p. 1028). Those examples it in with Russell’s
“knowledge by acquaintance is ‘what we derive from sense’” (Russell per
Gregory, 2004, knowledge by acquaintance, and knowledge by descripion)
and may be a missed opportunity to understand acquaintanceship beter in
terms of know-like (Sisson & Ryan, 2015, p. 1032).

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Volume 13, Issue 3, 2017: 29-69
table 1. Summary of relaionships in selected epistemological viewpoints
Mental (Sensory Induced) Non-Mental (Observed in Acions)
Occurrent (Aware of) Disposiional (Shown in Behavior)
Basis
Perceived, Sense Experience Innate A Hypothesized
Empiricism Raionalism
A posteriori; Observaion (including introspecion,
feelings B
), experiments C
, or experience D
. Acquired
through sense-data E
.
a priori F
(incl./ intuiion G
)
Reasoning H
(Thinking,
relecion, etc.)
Creaion
Sources Inference
Revela-
ion
Intuiion Gener-
ate J
Inducion Deducion
Devine
disclosure
Raional
insight K
Cause to efect Efect to cause
From premises From observaions
(facts)
“paricular to
general” L
“paricularizing from
the general” M
Jusiicaion
Evidence (logical proposiions) Reliabilism
Certainty / Ceritude
Skepicism
Adapted based on the Indiana Philosophy Ontology Project (InPhOrmers, 2014)
A
(Brown, 2005, innate ideas). B
(Pike, 2005, p. 2778). C
(Colman, 2009-2016, empirical). D
(Colman,
2009-2016, a posteriori; Heery & Noon, 2008, empiricism). E
(Lacey, 2005a, empiricism). F
(Brown, 2005,
innate ideas). G
(Lacey, 2005b, raionalism). H
Lewis (2013) assets there are only 8 Degrees of ReasonTM
(p. 143). J
Including mash-ups, ariicial smartness (Foxwell, 2013; Kelly, 2014a, 3. Beter Algorithms,
para. 10; 2014b, When and Where ... , para. 7). K
(Markie, 2013 1.1 Raionalism, para. 2). L
(Cohen, 2005,
inducion). “Another name for this is ‘generalizaion from the paricular’” (Last, 2007, inducion; J. Tiles,
2004). M
(Last, 2007, deducive reasoning).
Psychologist’s broader interests include “behaviour and mental
experience” (Colman, 2009-2016, psychology). The elements of mental and
cogniive processes under review in the literature someimes list diferent
elements. For this aricle, mental processes mean cogniion (thinking)
processes, “afect (emoion)” states, “conaion or voliion (striving)” factors
(Scot & Marshall, 2009-2015, cogniion (cogniive)), and sensing processes
- “whether conscious or unconscious” (Chandler & Munday, 2011, cogniion
(cogniive processes)). Figure 2 shows these as inputs to understanding/
knowledge. They are posiioned in the upper let corner of the knowledge
concept map. Voliion factors and afecive states inluence knowledge
“creaion” as an enity’s knowledge inluences an individual’s percepion

and mental processes (Bennet, Bennet & Avedisian, 2015, p. 1; Schwandt
& Marquardt, 2000, p. 734). Schwandt’s Organizaional Learning Systems
Model contains similar ideas (Schwandt & Marquardt, 2000); see upper right,
let of legend.
table 2. Explanaion of epistemologically related terms
term deiniion, example, Perspecive or historical Source
Acquired “All human knowledge is derived
from experience” (Quinton, Quin-
ton, & Fumerton, 2013).
Experience John Locke (1632-1704); B.F. Skin-
ner (1904–90)
A Priori A
“Independent of experience;” B
reasoned from axioms (Oxford
English Dicionary, 2011-2017,
a posteriori).
Innate; C
Intuited;
Logical
Albert Of Saxony (1316-1390);
Immanuel Kant (1724–1804); …
A Posteriori Reasoned “from efects to
causes, from experience and not
from axioms” (Oxford English Dic-
ionary, 2011-2017, a posteriori).
Observaion;
Experienial
(phrónésis)
Behavior “Behavior refers ... to easily observable aciviies” (Doorey, 2004, p. 3275). According to
Collins (1993), “behavior-speciic acion is decontextualizable. It is the only form of acion
which is not essenially situated” (p. 108).
Certainty Indubitability (Reed, 2011, 2.
Concepions of certainty, para.
2) “Knowledge is radically difer-
ent from ceritude and neither
concept entails the other” (Refer-
encing Witgenstein, Stroll, 2013,
Knowledge and Certainty, para. 4).
Ceritude Ludwig Witgenstein (1889-1951)
Certainty /
Ceritude
Certainty/ceritude “imply the absence of doubt about the truth of something”
- certainty with evidence; ceritude, convicion, perhaps purely on belief (Allen, 2008,
certainty, ceritude).
Construc-
ionism
Knowledge (meaning) is constructed (Bodner, 1986; Lowenthal & Muth, 2008).
Declaraive
Knowledge
“Awareness and understanding of factual informaion about the world—knowing that in
contrast to knowing how” (Colman, 2009-2016, declaraive knowledge).
Descripion “What kinds of mental content, if any, ought to count as knowl-
edge” (Husserl per Stroll, 2013, Descripion and Jusiicaion, para.
2). “Descripions focus on ‘a single thing’ (What is it?)” (Wheten &
Rodgers, 2013, p. 850)
1858-1989
Disposi-
ional
“Disposiional knowledge, as the term suggests, is a disposiion, or
a propensity, to behave in certain ways in certain condiions” (Stroll,
2013, Occasional ...).
Behavior

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Volume 13, Issue 3, 2017: 29-69
Empiricism
(knowledge
sources)
“All knowl-
edge is
based on
experience
derived from
the senses”
(Stevenson,
2010-2017,
empiricism).
Sensed; Percep-
ions
Hume, Locke, Mill (Buchanan, 2010-2016, empiri-
cism) (1632-1873)
A
“In strict philosophical usage, an a priori truth must be knowable independently of all experience” (J.
E. Tiles, 2004). B
Kant according to Casullo (2006). C
“By some metaphysicians used for: Prior to expe-
rience; innate in the mind” (Oxford English Dicionary, 2011-2017, a priori, 3.).
Empiricism In philosophy, “[empiricism is] the theory that all knowledge is based on experience de-
rived from the senses” (Stevenson, 2010-2017, empiricism); “direct observaion, experi-
ments, or experience” (Heery & Noon, 2008, empiricism). “Knowledge, or the materials
from which it is constructed, [is based] on experience through the tradiional ive senses”
(Lacey, 2005a, empiricism); through “experience, which involves two logical levels, sensa-
ion and relecion” (Darity, 2008, p. 578).
Evidence In this aricle, evidence is “something that furnishes or tends to furnish proof;” “an out-
ward sign: indicaion, token” (Merriam-Webster, 2013-2017, evidence, 1b & 1a).
Experience In this aricle, experience is “the sum total of the conscious events that make up an indi-
vidual life” (Merriam-Webster, 2013-2017, experience, 5. a) and “the events that make up
the conscious past of a community or naion or humankind generally” (Merriam-Webster,
2012-2016, experience, 3. b.).
Inference Inference can be seen as the process, “premises and conclusion that represent a process
of inferring or that form the determinants of a belief” (Merriam-Webster, 2013-2017,
inference, 3).
Innate “Present in the mind, in
some sense, from birth”
(Stroll, 2013, innate and
acquired knowledge).
Plato (428/427-348/347 BCE); Descartes (1596-1650); Noam
Chomsky (1928-)
Innate knowledge is “an idea that is inborn, rather than being learned through experi-
ence” (Colman, 2009-2016, innate idea) (Blackburn, 2008 (2016), innate ideas); “ideas
that exist in the mind without having been derived from previous experience” (Brown,
2005).
Intuiion “In philosophy, [intuiion is] the power of obtaining knowledge that cannot be acquired
either by inference or observaion, by reason or experience” (Encyclopaedia Britannica
Academic, 2012-2016, Intuiion).
Jusify In this aricle, to jusify is to “show to be reasonable or provide adequate ground for;”
“show to be right by providing jusiicaion or proof” (Thinkmap, 2012-2017, jusify).
Jusiica-
ion
“What kinds of belief (if any) can be raionally jusiied” ... “what one ought ideally to
believe” (Stroll, 2013. descripion and jusiicaion, para. 3).
Knowledge “Jusiied true belief” (Blackburn, 2008 (2016), Geier examples); “(1) if A knows that p,
then p is true, and (2) if A knows that p, then A cannot be mistaken; ...” (Stroll, 2013skepi-
cism, para. 3).

Mental
State and
Knowing
“Knowledge is a state of mind” (awareness).
“Knowing is a mental state akin to, but diferent
from, believing” (Stroll, 2013, Mental and Non-
mental ... , para. 1).
Awareness Plato (c. 427-c. 347 bc)
Perceived In psychology, percepion is “the process or product of organizing and interpreing sensa-
ions (sensory data from external objects or events) into meaningful paterns” (Chandler
& Munday, 2011, percepion (perceiving)). “Percepion depends upon the sense organs
possessed by the animal, and the interpretaion that is placed upon incoming sensaions
by the brain” (McFarland, 2006, percepion).
Procedural
Knowledge
“Informaion about how to carry out sequences of operaions—knowing how in contrast
to knowing that” (Colman, 2009-2016, procedural knowledge).
Mental
Processes
For this aricle, mental processes are cogniion (thinking) processes, voliion factors, and
afecive states (Scot & Marshall, 2009-2015, cogniion (cogniive)), and sensing pro-
cesses.
Nonmental
condiions
“Knowing is ied to the capacity
to behave in certain way” (Stroll,
2013, Mental and Nonmental,
para. 3).
As observed in acions
(behavior)
Witgenstein
(1889–1951)
Occurrent “Knowledge of which one is currently aware”
(Stroll, 2013, Occasional ...).
Awareness
Raional-
ism
“The ulimate
source of human
knowledge is the
faculty of reason”
(Stroll, 2013, Raio-
nalism and Empiri-
cism).
Reason (Thinking) Descartes, Spinoza, Von Leibniz (1596-1716)
In philosophy, raionalism is “the doctrine or theory that emphasizes the role of reason in
knowledge, or claims that reason rather than sense experience is the foundaion of
certainty in knowledge” (Oxford English Dicionary, 2011-2017, raionalism, 2. a.).
Reliabilism Reliabilism is, “in tradiional epistemology, what makes a belief jusiied, being a mater of
the believer’s raionality and responsibility, must lie within his ‘cogniive grasp’. That is, for
a belief to be jusiied the believer must be aware of what makes it jusiied” (Bach, 2005).
Revelaion Revelaion is “the divine or supernatural disclosure to humans of something relaing to
human existence” (Stevenson, 2010-2017, revelaion, 2.).
Skepicism “Skepicism in philosophy refers to the principle that all knowledge, whether sensory or
conceptual, is subject to the limitaions of the human mind and, thus, unreliable” (Reines,
2007, p. 657). “Scepicism is now the denial that knowledge or even raional belief is pos-
sible” (Blackburn, 2008 (2016), scepicism).
Voliional
(Conaion)
Conaion and voliion represent “intenional mental occurrence[s]”
(Ginet, 2006, p. 704) leading to a “conscious adopion by an indi-
vidual of a line of acion.” (Kent, 2007-2016, voliion)
Shown in Behavior
Historical annotaions based on Encyclopedia Britannica Academic epistemology aricles, primarily
(Stroll, 2013).

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These ideas lead “to concepts of sensaion [(know-like)], percepion,
remember/retrieve/recogniion/recall (Marzano & Kendall, 2007, kindle 828-
839, Level 1: Retrieval), think, intuit, reason and know. Know-like is revealed
in terms of experienial consciousness (like a bat’s echo-locatory senses)
(Van Gulick, 2011 2.1)” (Sisson & Ryan, 2015, p. 1029). The concept map
difereniates know-that (descripion) from know-what (an understanding)
and displays nine knows (plus know-why (basis)) showing when, where,
why, who, like, and why can be clariiers of how. In the knowledge concept
map, the knows are posiioned let and below the knowledge box shown in
Figure 2.
Notes: a) (Marzano & Kendall, 2007). b) Adapted from (Lewis, 2013). c) (Bennet & Porter, 2003, p. 477).
d) (Bennet & Bennet, 2008, pp. 410-412). e) (Ryan, Dirienzo, Noteboom & Sisson, 2015). f) (Blackler,
1995, pp. 1040-1042). g) (Omotayo, 2015, p. 5). h) (Anonymous, 2017).
Figure 2. Locaion of mental processes and the eleven knows in the concept
map highlighted
Source: updated graphic from Sisson & Ryan (2015, p. 1030).

Epistemological experise is know-how – “knowledge of how to do some
paricular thing; skill, experise, esp. in regard to a pracical or technical
mater” (Oxford English Dicionary, 2011-2017, know-how). “More recently,
Bloom’s Taxonomy (Atherton, 2013; Krathwohl, 2002; [Krathwohl, Bloom
& Masia, 1964]) was developed to help with seing educaional objecives
that show [an individual’s] acquisiion of knowledge and skills. The levels
in Bloom’s three taxonomies can also be viewed as proiciency in cogniive,
kinestheic, and afecive capabiliies;” perhaps in another respect, kinds
of human knowledge that are respecively oten named (cogniive),
partly named (or macro speciied: throw a ball - psychomotor), or gross
categorizaions (feelings - afecive). “Marzano and Kendall (2007) and Fink
(2013) address adapions and extensions of Bloom with an educaing, rather
than educaional, objecives focus.” (Sisson & Ryan, 2015, pp. 1030-1031).
“The medieval guild terms apprenice, journeyman and master speak to
levels of competence (Dreyfus & Dreyfus, 2005).” Ubiquity staf (2005) states,
“we do think of experise as following along a coninuum from novice through
apprenice, and then journeyman and master.” (Sisson & Ryan, 2015, p.
1030) Dreyfus and Dreyfus (2005), however, list ive stages: novice, advanced
beginner, competence, proiciency, experise (expert) (pp. 782-788). Wiig’s
KM “model-degrees of internalizaion” (novice, beginner, competent, expert,
master) (Dalkir, 2011, kindle locaion 0933), reverses the order of Dreyfus’
labels of expert and master.
The Ryan Research Group suggests that there might be a competence
beyond master or expert and a competency level greater than Bloom’s
synthesis addressing going beyond, extrapolaing outside the expert’s
tradiional domain (J. Ryan, J.C.H., Thomas Dirienzo, Anna Noteboom, and
Philip Sisson. Ryan Research Group - discussion, spring semester, 2015).
Extrathesis is postulated. It results in enlightenment, which in this context
is “a state of greater knowledge, understanding, or insight” (Oxford English
Dicionary, 2011-2017, enlightenment, 1. a.), not wisdom. Extrathesis has
aspects of deep smarts (Brockmöller, 2008; Leonard & Swap, 2004, p. 55;
Ubiquity staf, 2005) (knowledge), deep raionality (Ryan, 2014, secion 5),
and extraordinary consciousness (Bennet & Bennet, 2011; Bennet, Bennet &
Avedisian, 2015) to see “the overarching patern” (Bennet & Bennet, 2011,
p. 12). However, these terms, collecively, are probably more loosely related
than truly descripive of extrathesis. Addiionally, the referenced aricles
atribute them to the domain of the expert and extrathesis, as envisioned,
is not limited by the need for high level experise. The second component
(“analyical, creaivity, and pracical”) of “Sternberg’s Successful Intelligence
Theory”, creaivity, needs to be looked at with respect to extrathesis as well
(Ruban & Cantu, 2005, pp. 866-867). Gardner’s ideas of a “broadly scanning

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mental searchlight” (Waterhouse, 2013, p. 542) is also interesing. Genius
(extraordinary, manifested creaive or original acivity (Merriam-Webster,
2013-2017, genius, 4b)) is a strawman word to express an individual’s
competency associated with this concept. In the concept map, genius is
shown with, but not as an extension of, the master, expert sequence. (Figure
3 shows where experise levels, Bloom’s Taxonomy, and Gardner’s muliple
intelligences are posiioned in the knowledge concept map.)
Gardner’s postulated muliple intelligences (“linguisic, musical, logical-
mathemaical, spaial, bodily-kinestheic, interpersonal, and intrapersonal,”
naturalist, and existenial intelligence (Nuzzi, 2010, p. 583) and spiritual
intelligence – the last rejected by Gardner (Gardner, 2000)). Spiritual
intelligence is “able … to make sense out of the ‘ulimate’ concerns of human
beings, such as the meaning of life and death, or the puzzle of the existence
of single individuals in a vast and empty universe” (Plucker & Esping, 2014,
p. 557). “Spiritual intelligence calls for muliple ways of knowing, and for the
integraion of the inner life of mind and spirit with the outer life of work in
the world” (Vaughan, 2002, summary).
Figure 3. Locaion of experise levels, Bloom’s Taxonomy of Educaional
objecives, and Gardner’s muliple intelligences in concept map
Source: updated extract (Sisson & Ryan, 2015, p. 1030).
However, “somewhat to [Gardner’s] surprise, ‘existenial intelligence’
qualiies well as an intelligence in light of the eight criteria that [he has] set
forth in [his] wriings (Gardner, 1993, chap. 4)” (Gardner, 2000, p. 29). For
Gardner, “intelligence permits an individual to solve problems and create

products that are of value within a cultural context” (Ruban & Cantu, 2005,
p. 866). “Neuroscience research has not validated [the idea of] muliple
intelligences. ... researchers ... have noted that no neuroscience research had
tested the theory of muliple intelligences and that neuroscience research
had disconirmed the existence of the putaive separate content processing
modules in the brain” (Waterhouse, 2013, p. 543). Regardless, Gardner’s
ideas are sill useful in thinking about knowledge. Österberg (2004) separates
Gardner’s intelligences as “abiliies that explain” “‘knowing that’ or ‘knowing
how’” (p. 147); notwithstanding, the authors believe that the general
relaionships shown in Figure 3 are beter from a knowledge mental model
perspecive. In the concept map, “muliple intelligences are shown as related
to the [eleven] knows in terms of what each of the intelligences can know
and to Bloom’s taxonomy as indicators of proiciency in the intelligences”
(Sisson & Ryan, 2015, p. 1031).
dISCuSSIon and FIndIngS
the Knows
“Know-that and know-how trace back to Epistémé and Téchné” (Sisson &
Ryan, 2015, p. 1029). Epistémé is know-that (Fantl, 2012), truth/reality. In
this context, truth is “the Greek noion of truth as ‘correspondence with
reality’” (Schwarzschild, 2007, p. 162). Sophía is basic truths/theoreical
wisdom. Both come from “Theoria - the producion of truth” (Calhoun,
2002, praxis). For this aricle, they are viewed as know-that in terms of the
knows. Ein-Dor (2011), in his “Taxonomies of Knowledge,” discusses know-
about (“what drug is appropriate for an illness”) as an example of declaraive
knowledge, but the term is not added as a separate row category in table 3,
since it is a statement of fact, know-that. He places “tacit-explicit, individual-
social, procedural-declaraive, commonsense-expert, and task-contextual” as
opposing dimensions (see his igure 1, p. 1497). In the discussion, he also
lists categories: “Procedural: Know-how,” “Causal: Know-why,” “Condiional:
Know-when,” and “Relaional: Know-with.” Ein-Dor excludes three “the
categories recognized in (Alavi & Leidner, 2001, p. 113) ... condiional,
relaional, and pragmaic” as “not generally recognized as basic dimensions
of knowledge.” (Ein-Dor, 2011, pp. 1491-1499).
Blackler (1995), however, in categorizing knowledge ies know-that
from Ryles (1949) and know-about from James (1950) together, but in terms
of “conceptual skills and cogniive abiliies.” Similarly, Blackler ascribes
embodied, acion oriented, partly explicit knowledge to Ryles (know-how)
and James (knowledge of acquaintance) (pp. 1035, 1023-1024). In looking at

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knowing as an acivity state, Blackler (1995) brings out knowing as mediated
[constantly changing], situated [interpreted within contexts], provisional
[and developing], pragmaic [driven by concepions], and contested (pp.
1040-1042). This group of terms in the knowledge concept map resides in the
area from mental processes, leading to understanding, and supports the idea
that knowledge is constructed each ime it is used (Bodner, 1986; Lowenthal
& Muth, 2008).
Condiional is shown as a subcategory of know-when in this aricle’s
model because of its ime implicaion. Relaional is included in this aricle’s
model as connecivity (“cause-and-efect” – know-why (Fink & Disterer,
2011, p. 651). Pragmaic knowledge, menioned as “useful knowledge for an
organizaion,” (Alavi & Leidner, 2001, p. 113; Ein-Dor, 2011, table, p. 1492) is
relevance in Table 3. Know-with may be a category of know-how. It also has
connotaions of connecivity already included in know-why (Ein-Dor, 2011,
pp. 1492, 1496-1497). “Holsapple and Joshi (2004, pp. 597-598) use many of
the same words as Ein-Dor.” Their “web of knowledge atributes” are mode:
tact, explicit; type: reasoning, procedural, descripive; perishability: none,
rapid; accessibility: public, private; applicability: local, global; immediacy:
acionable, latent; orientaion: domain, relaional, self (p. 598, igure 596).
“Their perspecive seems more knowledge as represented in informaion
systems oriented and revealed no new knows;” although, the web of
knowledge and knowledge dimensions are alluded to in the knowledge
concept map as “other” difereniators of knowledge’s state atribute. (Sisson
& Ryan, 2015, p. 1029).
Like know-how, “know-what partly comes from Hermagoras (‘what
resources? (quibus adminculis)’) (Lef, 1983, pp. 28-29); on the other hand,
know-what is someimes used to mean ‘clear recogniion of the objecive
of a selected course of acion’ (Merriam-Webster, 2013-2017, know-what)
or ‘knowing which informaion is needed’ (Marquardt, 2002, pp. 141-142)”
(Sisson & Ryan, 2015, p. 1029). From an organizaional learning perspecive,
Marquardt (2002) also sipulates for organizaional learning: 1) “‘Know how:’
Knowing how informaion must be processed.” 2) “‘Know why:’ Knowing
why certain informaion is needed.” 3) “‘Know where:’ Knowing where to
ind certain speciic informaion.” 4) “‘Know when:’ Knowing when certain
informaion is needed” (pp. 141-142). “This [paper pictures] know-what as
being able to have a mental image of a situaion – an understanding” (Sisson
& Ryan, 2015, p. 1029).

table 3. What we know – the knows
type of
knowing
Sources deiniion, example, or source
Know-that Epistémé
Psychology
“Seems to denote the possession of speciic pieces of informaion, and
the person who has knowledge of this sort generally can convey it to
others” (Marinich & Stroll, 2013. The nature of knowledge, para. 3);
declaraive knowledge (Colman, 2009-2016, knowledge).
Know-what
Recitability
of facts
Resources
Objecive
Greeks Know-what is “structural knowledge, paterns” (Charles Savage per
Green, 2005, slide 16); “something imagined or pictured in the mind”
(Merriam-Webster, 2011-2016, concept, 2.).
Straight News Capability to mentally idenify supposed facts - “ive W’s and H (who,
what, when, where, why, and how)” (Pompper, 2005, p. 816).
Hermagoras “With what resources?” (Lef, 1983, pp. 28-29).
Dicionary “Of a selected course of acion” (Merriam-Webster, 2013-2017, know-
what); “knowing which informaion is needed” (Marquardt, 2002, pp.
141-142).
Know-who Greeks Know-who is knowledge about “a person, indeinitely or abstractly;
a ‘some one’” (Oxford English Dicionary, 2011-2017, who, III. 14. b.).
Know-where Greeks Know-where is “a sense of place;” do/did something (Charles Savage
per Green, 2005, slide 16); “where to ind” (Kazmer, 2002, p. 426; Mar-
quardt, 2002, pp. 141-142); “at this ime; now” (Thinkmap, 2012-2017,
where, adverbs) (present) extrapolated to include past and future.
Know-when
Condiional
Greeks Know-when is ime, “a sense of iming” (Altheide & Snow, 1979, p. 35;
Charles Savage per Green, 2005, slide 16) “the ime in which something
is done or comes about” (Merriam-Webster, 2012-2016, when, Main
Entry: when, 1616); is needed (Marquardt, 2002, pp. 141-142); occurs
or occurred.
Research “When to prescribe the drug” (Alavi & Leidner, 2001, p. 113; Ein-Dor,
2011, p. 1492).
Know-why
Moivaion
Relevance
Connecivity
Basis
Greeks Know-why provides raionale (D. Fink & Disterer, 2011, p. 651); “for
what reason” (Merriam-Webster, 2013-2017, wherefore) (Lewis, 2015c);
wider context (Charles Savage per Green, 2005, slide 16).
Voliion /
Connaion
Know-why (moivaion) is what triggered the acion or inacion.
Leadership /
KM /
Know—why (relevance) is external; pragmaic (Ein-Dor, 2011, p. 1492).
Research Know—why (connecivity): “cause-and-efect relaionships” (Fink &
Disterer, 2011, p. 651); “relaional: know-with” (Ein-Dor, 2011, p. 1492).
Jusiicaion
(Aristotle)
Know-why (basis) is the raionale used for jusiicaion; “within [one’s]
‘cogniive grasp’” (Blackburn, 2008 (2016), scepicism) by acceping
authority or using another one of Lewis’s 8 Degrees of ReasonTM
(Lewis,
2015a).
Know-how Téchné Know-how is “knowledge of how to do some paricular thing; skill,
experise” (Oxford English Dicionary, 2011-2017, know-how).
Know-com-
petent
Medieval
Guilds
Knowledge of personal and others (general) level of experise.

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type of
knowing
Sources deiniion, example, or source
Know-like
Familiarity
Sensaion
Feelings
Categoriza-
ion
Percepion
(potenial)
Sensaion
(Nagel)
Know-like is experienial awareness (acquaintanceship knowledge);
familiarity.
Acquain-
tanceship
“The state of being well known: the familiarity of the scene” (Australian
Oxford Dicionary, 2004, familiarity).
Conscious-
ness
From the senses.
Afecive
Domain
“A feeling can be almost any subjecive reacion or state” (Waite, Lind-
berg & Zimmer, 2008. emoion)
Gardner Naturalist Intelligence: discriminaing and classifying (Colman, 2009-
2016, muliple intelligences; Nuzzi, 2010, p. 585); (not just “found in
nature” per (Nuzzi, 2010).
Gardner,
Primal
From Gardner’s spiritual intelligence classiicaion (Colman, 2009-2016,
muliple intelligences), chakra (Maxwell, 2009), and paranormal (Gus-
tavsson, 2014, 7. Other Philosophical Work, para 4) feeling.
Know-valid Aristotle Know-valid is knowing that is “something that is true” (enough/verisi-
militude versus verity (Merriam-Webster, 2013-2017. veracity, truth));
the veracity (Bennet & Porter, 2003, p. 477) (or level of veracity).
Know-value Economic
Knowledge
Know-value is being able to assess at least a relaive value of the knowl-
edge. Derived from the idea of economic knowledge (Anonymous Re-
viewer, 2017)
Know-who, know-where and know-when also come from Her-
magoras. ... Know-where is more than just a sense of place, it can
be a sense of when something was done (the past) or might need
to be done (the future). Know-when is obviously ime, “a sense of
iming” (Altheide & Snow, 1979, p. 35; Charles Savage per Green,
2005, slide 16) or with regards to a condiional (Alavi & Leidner,
2001, p. 113; Ein-Dor, 2011, p. 1492).
Know-why, the last of the 5Ws in news reporing, overall ad-
dresses raional. From [a] professional knowledge [perspecive,] it
is “cause-and-efect relaionships” (Fink & Disterer, 2011, p. 651) or
relaional (Ein-Dor, 2011, p. 1492) (also connecivity). Ciing Quinn,
Anderson, and Finkelstein (1996), D. Fink and Disterer (2011) men-
ion care-why (in terms of creaivity) which includes “will, moiva-
ion, and adaptability for success” (p. 651 & 652). Dalkir (2011) lists
care-why along with “experise, know-how, [and] know-why” in the
third category of tacit properies (, kindle, locaion 234). L. D. Fink
(2013, pp. 3, 5, and 6) has caring as one of her six categories for
signiicant learning. For this aricle’s authors, care-why is more vo-
liional or aitudinal than a type of knowing. The authors view mo-
ivaional raionale ... as enity speciic with relevance more oten
insituional. Adaptability is something exhibited, not something
known. Knowing why-valid [and] know-basis, leads to [Lewis’s as-
serted, only] 8 Degrees of ReasonTM
. (Lewis, 2012, pp. 113-174; Sis-
son & Ryan, 2015, p. 1029).

Lewis deines “learning as ‘the gaining of knowing, saisied with some
degree of reason.’” For Lewis, reasoning is a conglomeraion of categories,
such as how or why it is done, i.e. “what is automaic,” “what should be
done,” or “what one thinks from.” (Lewis, 2015a) For this aricle’s knowledge
concept map, reason is why. These are several kinds of why – moivaion,
relevance, connecivity, and basis (see Table 3). Some of these map directly
to Lewis, others do not. “Lewis dives deep into why with a more exhausive
viewpoint” (Sisson & Ryan, 2015, p. 1029) (Lewis, 2013, pp. 143-208; 2015a;
2015b; 2015c)
“When talking about know-why it would be good to qualify it [unless
the usage is clear as] know-why (basis), know-why (moivaion), know-why
(relevance) or know-why (connecivity)” (Sisson & Ryan, 2015, p. 1029).
Know-like was recognized as a category related to [psycholo-
gy’s] acquaintanceship knowledge – “knowledge of people, places,
and things, and although [acquaintanceship knowledge] may in-
clude declaraive knowledge it need not necessarily do so, as when
one knows a colour, or a smell, or a face, but cannot state any facts
about it” (Colman, 2009-2016, acquaintanceship knowledge). (Sis-
son & Ryan, 2015, p. 1029).
The acquaintanceship disincion was made by Bertrand Rus-
sell. ... Knowledge by acquaintance is “what we derive from sense”,
which does not imply “even the smallest ‘knowledge about”’, i.e.
it does not imply knowledge of any proposiion concerning the
object with which we are acquainted. For Russell, knowledge is
primarily - and all knowledge depends upon - the “knowledge by
acquaintance of sensaions.” ... More recently, theories of percep-
ion have blurred Russell’s disincion by suggesing that there is
no direct knowledge by the senses, but that percepions are es-
senially descripions (though by brain states rather than language)
of the object world. This follows from the view that percepion is
knowledge based and depends upon (unconscious) inference, as
suggested in the 19th century by Hermann von Helmholtz and now
very generally, if not quite always, accepted. (Per Russell, 1914,
Gregory, 2004, knowledge by acquaintance, and knowledge by de-
scripion)
“Familiarity, sensaion, and feelings [ideas] resonate well with the
concept of [know-like]” (Sisson & Ryan, 2015, p. 1029), but are fundamentally
diferent. Thinking about Gardner’s naturalist intelligence as an object
related intelligence (Nuzzi, 2010, p. 584) brings out the idea of categorizaion
as a category of know-like. Also listed as a potenial know-like category,

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Volume 13, Issue 3, 2017: 29-69
is percepion from Gardner’s spiritual intelligence (Colman, 2009-2016,
muliple intelligences).
“Know-valid addresses the [level] of internal certainty or ceritude –
view, opinion, seniment, persuasion, belief, convicion (Merriam-Webster,
2013-2017, opinion, Synonym Discussion; Merriam-Webster, 2012-2016,
opinion)”3
(Sisson & Ryan, 2015, p. 1029). Stroll (2013) cites Plato in that
“knowing is one member of a group of mental states that,” according to
current theory, “can be arranged in a series according to increasing ceritude”
(Mental and Nonmental, para. 1). The authors’ preferences are relected in
the concept map by proposiional states such as feel, think, believe, and
know (Atkinson, 2015, para. 3). Perhaps religious scholars would reverse the
order of believe and know.
“Know-competent comes from the Medieval Guilds and Bloom’s
Taxonomies – [the irst] as indicators of competence and [the second
educaional objecives that can be interpreted] as levels of experise”
(Sisson & Ryan, 2015, p. 1030). In many cases, it is diicult as an individual to
assess true competency, but everyone makes competency assessments and
decisions regularly in daily life.
For the presented knowledge model, learning, per se, is not
a part of knowledge, rather the environment, or preparing to learn, creates
opportuniies to trigger patern recogniion and start cogniive processes
leading to retrieving (Marzano & Kendall, 2007, kindle 828-839), or creaing
knowledge. See Figure 4. From a KM systems model perspecive, recognize
(discover) was ideniied as a common concept to capture the ideas about an
event that includes recognize, discover, ind, intuit, illuminaion, epiphany,
revelaion, insight (the event), and learning - to a degree. The authors’ interim
restatement of the levels of Bloom’s Taxonomy shows the 1st level of each to
be either retrieve or perceive. In fact, considering other parts of the model,
each should start with percepion.
Figure 4. Preparing to learn
Source: Modiied Sisson & Ryan (2016a, p. 3, igure 1).
3 The order of these words difers depending which synonym source was consulted. (Merriam-Webster, 2013-2017
opinion. Synonym Discussion; Merriam-Webster, 2012-2016, opinion).

Organizaional learning knowledge creaion is similar. Sisson and Ryan’s
(2016c) poster shows three nominal learning models: for the individual
(mental processes), ariicial eniies (ariicial intelligence learning), and
organizaional learning as typiied by Schwandt’s Organizaional Systems
Learning Model (OLSM) (DR Schwandt & Gundlach, 1992; Schwandt, 1994;
David Schwandt & Marquardt, 2000). The arrows in the poster poining to all
three suggest a common viewpoint may be possible. Or, Schwandt’s OLSM
may be a general case enity learning model, where the simulus occurs in
the interface, and sense making is analogous to patern recogniion.
other knowledge management perspecives
TheirstKMperspecive,Nichols(2000)ideniies“explicit,implicit,4
[and] tacit” and “declaraive and procedural knowledge” (pp. 3-4) -
“dimensions of knowledge” (Nonaka, 1994, p. 16). “Explicit knowl-
edge is that which can be codiied or encoded and is represented in
certain arifacts” (Bennet & Tomblin, 2006, p. 293). Implicit “can be
ariculated but [has not]” (Nichols, 2000, p. 3). “’Tacit’ knowledge
has a personal quality, which makes it hard to formalize and com-
municate” (Nonaka, 1994, p. 16); “thoughts that cannot be pulled
up from memory and put into words” (Bennet & Bennet, 2011, slide
33). “Choo (2002), on the other hand, categorise[s] organisaional
knowledge into tacit, explicit and cultural” (Omotayo, 2015, p. 7).
Explicit, implicit, and tacit have aspects of a range (Chaharbaghi et
al., 2005, p. 109)[, coninuum (Blackler 2002, per Geisler & Wickra-
masinghe, 2015, p. 44)]. Cultural is in a diferent dimension and to
these authors its more with Holsapple and Joshi’s “web of knowl-
edge atributes” (2004, p. 598). Collecively, these viewpoints lead
to the idea of knowledge being expressible or inexpressible. These
concepts are in the center let and lower right corner in igure 5.
(Sisson & Ryan, 2015, p. 1031).
Omotayo (2015) extends Blackler (1995) and others to idenify the
dimensions of knowledge in terms of where it occurs versus knowledge
atributes. Omotayo begins with Blackler who “deines knowledge as taking
4 Omotayo (2015) picks Koenig to address the diferences, “Koenig (2012), however, describes this characterizaion of
knowledge into explicit and tacit as rather too simple. He suggests that knowledge is beter described as explicit, implicit,
and tacit. Explicit means informaion or knowledge that is set out in tangible form. Implicit is informaion or knowledge
that is not set out in tangible form but could be made explicit, while tacit is informaion or knowledge that one would
have extreme diiculty operaionally seing out in tangible form” (p. 7).

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Volume 13, Issue 3, 2017: 29-69
ive disinct forms: embodied, embedded, embrained, encultured, and
encoded.”5,6,7
Figure 5. Fanning out from the central concepts to other perspecives
Source: updated extract (Sisson & Ryan, 2015, p. 1030).
Per Omotayo, embodied is gained through bodily training (Bloom’s
PsychomotorDomain).Embeddedisin“rouinesandsystems,”(organizaional
memory in organizaions). Embrained is tacit or implicit; encultured is shared
knowledge; and encoded is explicit. “It can be said that organisaional
knowledge is embodied and embrained in the staf, embedded in rouines/
common tasks, encultured among the staf, and encoded in manuals,
guidelines and procedures” (p. 5). Hislop, Strai, Yakhef, Davenport and
Pusak, Badaracco, Nonaka, Takeuchi, Baloh, et al., Dufy, Polanyi, Koenig,
Hibbard, and Martensson are used in his ampliicaion of these ideas (pp.
5-7). Omotayo’s where-is-knowledge dimensions are incorporated into
the knowledge concept map, but not as knowledge atributes. Blackler’s
5 From Collins (1993), Blackler (1995) gets embodied, embrained, encultured (p. 99), the word embedded (p. 98), and
encoded, implied by “symbol-type knowledge- that is, knowledge that can be transferred without loss on loppy disks
and so forth” (p. 99).
6 Omiing embodied and adding encapsulated, Schmit (2015, p. 2) menions these in ive, growing to six, pairs
associated with “constraints overcome by ive co-evoluion” sequences: “embodied and embrained (1), encapsulated
and encultured (2), encoded and organizaional (3), digiized and networked (4), and enclouded and value-chained (5)
knowledge with PKM and the World Heritage of Memes Repository (WHOMER) - argued to become the sixth one (p. 2).
7 Green and Ryan’s (2005) categories: customer, compeitor, employee, informaion, partner, process, product/service,
and technology (p. 47), are all included in Blackler’s ive.

other categorizaions (“mediated, situated, provisional, pragmaic,” and
contested (pp. 1040-1042)) are shown as descriptors inluencing knowledge
construcion (Bodner, 1986; Lowenthal & Muth, 2008). These concepts are
to the right and slightly behind the knowledge atributes in the center of the
concept map.
Next, the subject of validity is a dominant theme in epistemol-
ogy. [Veriicaion and validaion]8
are used in system engineering to
check requirements have been met [(veriicaion – “proof of com-
pliance” (NASA SEH, 2007))] and that a system is suitable for its
intended purpose (validaion9
) (Armstrong, 2011; Krueger, Walden,
& Hamelin, 2011, p. 363). Bennet and Porter (2003, p. 477) ofered
up another term (vericate) that its with jusiicaion and knowing
valid. Vericate means “grounding ... through implicit data and in-
formaion” (Bennet & Porter, 2003, p. 477); “to determine the rea-
sonableness or soundness;” (as opposed to verify (“grounded by
the explicit)” (Bennet & Bennet, 2011, slide 4) – partly like validate
per systems engineering above. It is acceping a source with “rea-
son to know.” That can be “informaion that requires only an ordi-
nary level of intelligence to infer from it that a certain fact exists, or
that there are reasonable and suicient grounds for its existence.
Reason to know implies that a reasonable person may accordingly
proceed, relying on the fact’s likely existence” (BusinessDirectory.
com, 2012-2016, reason to know). Vericate is more known acquain-
tance - implying checking with someone else (A. Bennet, Bennet,
& Lewis, 2015). Vericate [is somewhat] like Lewis’ 8th
degree of
reasoning – quesioning in “ask, and expect an answer” (Lewis,
2015a); however, a hypotheical range of vericate, validate, and
verify puts vericate at the beginning. These concepts are shown
near the lower let above one legend of the concept map. (Sisson &
Ryan, 2015, p. 1031)
Lewis’s (2015c) Symbioic Table of Knowledge™ poses two quesions…
that expand into three quesion operaions, six quesion types, and
twenty base quesions about knowledge with descripive and prescripive
variaions. It then categorizes the quesions in terms of concise, contextual,
consequenial, and conceptual answer/knowledge. The concept is placed on
the knowledge concept map, posiioned between the 8 Degrees of ReasonTM
8 Ater review, the order of these two words is reversed from the order used in (Sisson & Ryan, 2015).
9 “The Validaion Process answers the quesion of ‘Is it the right soluion to the problem?’” (Defense Acquisiion
Guidebook, 2013, secion 4.3.16). In a semanic view of theories, “good models of the phenomena” (Gimbel, 2011l. 3370)
are accurate and representaive. Denzin and Lincoln (2011), in their Handbook of Qualitaive Research, explore many
context speciic validaion (methods) without deining the term generically; however, validity is about correspondence
with reality.

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Volume 13, Issue 3, 2017: 29-69
and the eleven knows, with links to jusiicaion, certainty, and validity states.
Jusiicaion in relaion to reasoning, KM, and the scieniic method is an area
for further invesigaion (Sisson & Mazzuchi, 2017).
From their work with the US Navy, the Bennets also developed
“a knowledge taxonomy for grouping types of knowledge from the
viewpoint of what knowledge is needed to do a paricular type of
work or take a paricular acion” (Bennet & Bennet, 2011, slide 22;
Bennet, Bennet & Avedisian, 2015) – “categories of knowledge”.
The Bennets’ categories do not map cleanly to the [eleven] knows.
By example, kDescripion, descripive informaion (know-that),
maps to “what, when, where and who” (Bennet & Bennet, 2011,
slide 22; Bennet & Bennet, 2008, pp. 408, 410). In the concept
map, Bennets’ categories are shown related to acion as enablers.
See, Bennet and Bennet (2008, pp. 409-411) for a discussion of
their terms. In terms of the knows, kPraxis and kResearch also point
to knowing condiions or causaion – know-when (condiional) and
know-why (connecivity) but are not shown as explicitly connected
in the concept map. These concepts are at the top center.
Rumsfeld is widely credited with the term unknown unknowns
[(Ayto & Croton, 2011, Unknown unknowns)]. Know-knowns to
unknown-unknowns are used in NASA for risk management and
project management. The Johari window (1955) (Chandler & Mun-
day, 2011, Johari window (JW method)) uses similar labels with re-
gards to people. The principle author remembers the terms from,
he thinks, a 1967 NASA Summer insitute at the University of South-
ern California concerning project management and development.
Two other paries report recalling the terms earlier than Rumsfeld:
1) The Jet Propulsion Lab CKO. 2) A NASA consultant menioned
a Lockheed Marin paper that he is unable to resurrect. Regardless,
the terms can be viewed as measures of [comprehensibility] and
raise the idea of incomprehensibility as an opposite. These con-
cepts are at near the botom-right (Sisson & Ryan, 2015, p. 1031).
Table 4 deines concepts selected from these sources that have been
included in this aricle’s model of knowledge.

table 4. Addiional terms
aspect Source deiniion or example
Expressible /
Inexpressible
Psychology Declaraive or explicit knowledge (words, etc. and sharable) versus
tacit knowledge (“unable to express” (Bennet & Bennet, 2011, slide
33; Mathews, 2007-2014, tacit knowledge))
Comprehendi-
ble 10
versus
Incomprehen-
sible
Psychology “An ability to understand the meaning or importance of something
(or the knowledge acquired as a result)” (Thinkmap, 2012-2017,
comprehension) - know-what (Lewis, 2012, p. 10) versus cannot
igure out
Deduced Incomprehensible is something “that cannot be understood” (Aus-
tralian Oxford Dicionary, 2004, incomprehensible)
Vericate Bennets Vericate is “to determine the reasonableness or soundness” (Bennet
& Bennet, 2011, slide 4); “reason to know” (BusinessDirectory.com,
2012-2016, reason to know) – can be determined by consultaion;
(Bennet & Porter, 2003, p. 477)
Verify
System
Engineering
Verify is “to ascertain or test the accuracy or correctness of (some-
thing), esp. by examinaion or by comparison with known data, an
original, or some standard; to check or correct in this way” (Oxford
English Dicionary, 2011-2017, verify, para, 4a)
Validate Validate is to “provide objecive evidence that the [soluion meets]
its intended use” (Krueger et al., 2011, p. 133); show corresponden-
ce with reality (Gimbel, 2011 l. 3370)
• Known
-Known
• Known-
Unknown
• Unknown-
Unknown
• Unknown-
Known
Johari Win-
dow (1955)
(Chandler
& Munday,
2011, Johari
window (JW
method))
NASA
Knowns
“Things we know that we know.”
(Rumsfeld, 2002) per
(O’Connor, 2003, slide 2)
“Events that are
likely to occur based
on historical data”
(Bilbro, 2012, p. 2)
“Something that
you know you
don’t know”
(2105. known
unknown)
“Events that cannot
be predicted” (Bil-
bro, 2012, p. 2)
“Things we
don’t know we
don’t know.”
“That which is hidden and known to
me alone.” (Johari Window) (Chandler
& Munday, 2011, Johari window. (JW
method))
“Things we don’t know
we know” (O’Connor,
2003, slide 2)
Mental model of knowledge – a concept map
Figure 6 presents a picture of how the authors see relaionships between
these diferent viewpoints.10
10 In the meanings in which they overlap, [the words apprehend and comprehend] denote slightly diferent aspects
of understanding. Apprehend means to grasp or perceive a general idea or concept, whereas comprehend means to
understand an argument or statement” (Allen, 2008, apprehend, comprehend).

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Volume 13, Issue 3, 2017: 29-69
The environment produces triggers that kick of mental pro-
cesses that recall, remember, or discover new knowledge – rec-
ognizing a patern that results in some level of understanding
(knowledge). Mental, (and cogniive) and sensing processes, and
voliion factors and afecive states are inluenced by and inluence
previously constructed knowledge. Knowledge atributes can be
expressed in many dimensions, someimes as a range within a cat-
egory. [By example,] opinions and beliefs in the certainty/ceritude
area could be on a scale from “I feel, I think, I believe to I know”
(Atkinson, 2015, para. 3). Certainty with regards to the states can
vary from view, opinion, seniment, persuasion, and belief to con-
vicion (Sisson & Ryan, 2015, p. 1031).
Notes: a) (Marzano & Kendall, 2007). b) Adapted from (Lewis, 2013). c) (Bennet & Porter, 2003, p. 477).
d) (Bennet & Bennet, 2008, pp. 410-412). e) (Ryan, Dirienzo, Noteboom & Sisson, Ryan Research Group,
personal communicaion, spring semester, 2015). f) (Blackler, 1995, pp. 1040-1042). g) (Omotayo, 2015,
p. 5). h) (Anonymous, 2017).
Figure 6. Knowledge concept map
Source: updated graphic from Sisson & Ryan (2015, p. 1030).

Iniially, the authors viewed understanding and knowledge as nearly
equivalent. This point of view evolved from deiniions of the two, paricularly
as synonyms. More recently, understanding and knowledge are considered
from another viewpoint, as two faces of the same thing (perhaps a yin and
yang relaionship). At this point, knowledge is beginning to be viewed from
the more abstract Epistémé and Sophia perspecive, while understanding is
being viewed from an outcome of learning perspecive.
Thoughts about jusiied, true beliefs (two atributes in Figure 7), for most
people, are not regular, formal occurrences in daily life; yet, people act on
knowledge based on internal, oten unconscious, assessments (proposiional
states) of its apperceived value (know-value (Anonymous, 2017)), such as
useless (trivial), only news, basic, logical, or fundamental. Perhaps saying
“‘useless’ knowledge [is] such as which is the third, or the thirteenth, longest
river in the world,” (Gregory, 2004, knowledge) is a bit harsh, and trivial is
a beter categorizaion. News contains knowledge and is beter on a scale of
acionable value than trivial facts. Logical and fundamental are two measures
tracing back to Aristotle’s Epistémé and Sophía.
While originally the levels of Bloom’s Taxonomy were considered
progressions that need to take place in learning, later aricles (possibly partly
in response to Marzano and Kendall’s (2007) and Fink’s (2013)) implicaions)
state the opposite (Krathwohl, 2002, p. 218; Seaman, 2011, p. 37). While
extrathesis is placed in the knowledge concept map above all three parts
of the taxonomy, it may not be really diferent from synthesis as in some
perspecives, as in this aricle where the authors suggest wisdom is not
diferent from knowledge – it is merely insighful knowledge.
Discussions about the KM data, informaion, knowledge, and wisdom
(DIKW)hierarchyappropriatenessconinue.11
Wisdomasinsighfulknowledge
may be a good model for extrathesis as a special kind of synthesis. In that case,
would synthesis need to be in each of the taxonomies? Or, does adaping for
the Psychomotor Domain and actualizing for the Afecive Domain, capture
the synthezising idea?
The knowledge concept map shows ... new ideas [developed
in this aricle] such as comprehensible/ incomprehensible, know-
like and know-valid, and vericate. [Figure 6 (the concept map)]
presents a picture of how the authors see relaionships between
11 “Wisdom is the combinaion of knowledge and experience, but it is more than just the sum of these parts” (Bennet
& Bennet, 2014, p. 27). In the same book, Williams (2014) provides a graphic that shows wisdom is at the top-right
of Devon, Horme, and Cronenweth’s (1988) knowledge spectrum (event -> ... wisdom); however, he coninues, “there
are more criics of the DIKW hierarchy than there are exponents of it” (p. 83 & 85) (as part of an introducion to other
alternaives and his “beter” suggesion). Lewis, (2013) eschewing wisdom, takes the posiion that informaion is a signal
that contain both data and knowledge and that data plus knowledge is needed for decision-making.

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Volume 13, Issue 3, 2017: 29-69
[these diferent viewpoints]. By example, it provides visibility to
the 8 Degrees of ReasonTM
(Lewis, 2015a) and places the Bennets’
knowledge categories in relaion to other concepts. (Sisson & Ryan,
2015, p. 1031).
Knowledge
Principal knowledge at
Knowing
Truth
Justified
States
Expertise
Figure 7. Principal knowledge atributes
Source: extract from Sisson & Ryan (2015, p. 1030).
ConCluSIon
The knowledge concept map conirms “knowledge is a mulifaceted concept
with mulilayered meanings” (Nonaka, 1994, p. 15) with many knowledge
concepts using the eleven knows and knowledge principal atributes (Figure
7) as focusing points. It substaniates that from epistemology, broadly,
knowledge exists in the minds of people, may exist internally from birth, can
be displayed in behavior, derives from experience perceived from the senses,
is created by reasoning, may be a logically true proposiion, may represent
truth/reality, and “jusiied” knowledge can have degrees of certainty. It
clariies that “knowledge in people has been [shown] (Bloom) to be related
to thoughts, as well as the kineic nature of physical skills or feelings.” The
map shows that “philosophical opposing views about whether knowledge
is innate or experienial” (Sisson & Ryan, 2015, p. 1031) is a knowledge sub
state (innate and experienced). Truth (certain or with ceritude) is discussed
(both validity and proposiional states).
The paper brings forth and extends the idea that knowledge atributes
can be expressed in many dimensions, someimes as a range within
a category. By example, opinions and beliefs in the certainty/ceritude area
could be on a scale from “‘I’ feel; ‘I’ think; ‘I’ believe; [to] ‘I’ know” (Atkinson,
2015, para. 3) (hopefully indicaing that the transiion from belief to knowing
is based on some assessment of truth). The knowledge concept map shows
ideas developed in this aricle: comprehensible / incomprehensible, know-
like, know-valid, know-competent, know-value, and vericate have a place
in a general understanding about knowledge. It integrates the 8 Degrees
of ReasonTM
(Lewis, 2015a) and places the Bennets’ knowledge categories

in relaion to other relevant concepts. It implies (Figure 7) that while many
knowledge atribute suggesions can be found (Alavi & Leidner, 2001;
Holsapple & Joshi, 2004), the principal knowledge atributes are knowing,
truth, jusiied, states, and experise.
The theoreical sampling and theoreical saturaion methods applied
do not guarantee all appropriate concepts have been ideniied. Given
the breadth, depth, and dimensionality of concepts of knowledge, later
researchers may add addiional concepts.
One area for addiional invesigaion could be revelaion in regards to
recogniion-discovery. “All knowledge comes from God” (Buts, 1958, p. 117;
Heck, 2013, p. 301). Or as, another Islamic thinker, “Syed Muhammad Naquib
AI-Atas” “asserts that as far as the sources and methods of knowledge are
concerned, all knowledge comes from God and is acquired through the
channels of the sounds senses, true reports based on authority, sound reason
and intuiion” (Yousif, 2001, p. 87). So, does knowledge from God through
revelaion mean that while revelaion its within as a percepion concept, the
recogniion-discovery common concept needs to be unbundled (recogniion
and discover versus recogniion-discover) – recogniion (remember, recall,
etc.) and discovery (ind, intuit, illuminaion, epiphany, revelaion, insight
(the event)?
“Other areas to consider include know-like. Does thinking of know-like
as familiarity help with psychology’s diiculty explaining acquaintanceship?
Would changing the acquaintanceship to know-like or familiarity help?”
(Sisson & Ryan, 2015, p. 1032). Do Gardner’s existenial and spiritual
intelligence ideas indicate knowing other than like or being distributed
across the other knows? Is know-like (percepion) a way to address Gardner’s
(rejected) spiritual intelligence? Are know-who and know-where as generic
as displayed in Table 3?
If one postulates a proposiional awareness sequence of feel, think,
believe, know; how does the idea of faith12
afect the sequence? Does the
order of religious proposiional states difer – perhaps, feel, think, know,
and believe? Do two such proposiional statement sequences indicate
a fundamental diference between mundane and religious validity (the order
of believe and know)?
Expanding the the list of knowledge locaions (such as enclouded,
etc.) (Schmit, 2015) brought up in the methodology secion, Lewis’s
(2015c) Symbioic Table of Knowledge™, organizaional knowledge speciic
atributes, and how knowledge is created, are also ideas for potenial further
invesigaions to see if they ofer new insights that merit integraion into the
12 “Faith almost always implies ceritude even where there is no evidence or proof” (Merriam-Webster, 2012-2016,
belief).

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Volume 13, Issue 3, 2017: 29-69
concept map as a general mental model of knowledge. Opion OutlinesTM
to
document decisions (Lewis, 2015b) merits further invesigaion as a separate
topic. Extrathesis’s implicaions in understanding knowledge creaion
(intuiion) also merit further invesigaion. In addiion, Sisson and Mazzuchi
(2017) suggest that jusiicaion, in addiion to “validaion, vericaion, and
veriicaion” could include “methodiicaion (qualitaive research approaches
validaion), or provisionalizaion (staisics)” (p. 4.), which would be another,
minor addiion to the concept map.
For invesigators into KM, or knowledge in management, innovaion, or
entrepreneurship, the knowledge concept map reveals the broad scope of
knowledge that needs addressing, a truly common descripion of KM, and
facets that can be important in other venues.
Seeing relaionships of these concepts (Figure 6) helps relate
many viewpoints on and about knowledge as an explicit, shareable
image. The concept map provides a staring point for other inves-
igators to use [and] explore diferent relaionships or add other
concepts (Sisson & Ryan, 2015, p. 1032).
acknowledgements
We thank Dr. Thomas A. Mazzuchi for his contribuion of both the planning
for, and compleion of requested revisions.
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