Rachel A. Cone Thesis 2013 Introducing The Stability Theory in Alliance Poli...
Central Challenges of Current the Korean Conflict
1. Central Challenges of Current the Korean Conflict:
Ideological Imperatives, Defence Dependency, and Reunification
Name: Daniel Perritt
Date: December 10th
, 2015
Class: 7SSWM117 15-16
Instructor: Dr. Anglim
Word Count: 4024
2. Introduction
There are manyconflictsthatare currentlyongoingaroundthe world,fromthe warinAfghanistan,to
the civil war in Syria, yet few are as long lasting as the conflict between North and South Korea.1
In
answeringthe questionof “wartermination”itisthe stance of thisessaythatalthoughactive fighting
or open warfare is not currently occurring, it is still a conflict without an end and has thus not been
terminated, thus the possibilityfor warfare to occur is still actively present. For the purposes of this
discussion, there will not be a lengthy discussion on the ramifications of the Korean War from June
1950 to July 1953. This is not to dismiss it, but to stay focused on the central challenges of today.
Despite beingunderanarmistice agreementsinceJulyof 1953, Northand SouthKoreahave nottruly
had a lasting resolution to the separation that began prior to WWII and the violence that followed
thereafter. Identifying the central challenges herein seeks to assess the current issues that are
problematic in pursuing that resolution. However, first there must be an understanding that North
Korea is not a “crazy” regime without a rhyme or reason to its perceived madness and rather
unpredictable ways. As will be shown, it is a rational entity that pursues interests through a very
particularmethodof rationality whichmaybe foundthroughunderstandingthe complexityof North
Korean ideology. The main central challenge to resolving this conflict appears not to be about
beginningnegotiationsandbargaining,butrevolvesaroundthe entwinementof regime and ideology
that inhabits North Korean society as a whole. Around this central challenge there are other sub-
challenges onbothsides pertainingtoachievingaresolutiontothe ongoingconflict.The structure of
the paperwill be asfollows:First,there isgoingtobe abrief historicalcontextonthe developmentof
the divide betweenthe NorthandSouth.Second,the relationshipbetweenregime thenandideology
will be discussed, including an explanation of Juche, followed by the regime now,and challenges of
nuclear disarmament. Third will be an identificationof South Korean challenge regarding defence
dependency. Last but not least are the challenges associated with the concept of reunification.
1 "Global ConflictTracker."Council on Foreign Relations.
3. Historical Context and Establishment of Divide
The conflict betweenthe North and South can be traced back to before the end of WWII when the
U.S. andthe USSR were analysingthe region,lookingat the imminentchange withinboth the political
and economic spheres in the post WWII era following Japan’s ejection from the country. At first
neither country really had a vested interest in Korea, despite agreeing that it needed to be out of
Japanese control.Thiswasproblematicas Koreawas notseenas stable enoughtomanage itself,and
alsoin part due to Japanese control that had lastedforgenerations,inboththe economicandpublic
spheres of life. The significance behindthe 38th
parallel meant different thingsfor both the U.S. and
USSR butwouldhave drasticpolarizingeffectsduetothe initiativessetforthrespectively.Forthe U.S.,
Korea came to be seen as an area to project influence and contain soviet ideology in the region, as
they didn’t want the USSR to manage the region uncontested in the post war era. U.S. involvement
was also influenced by the inability to rely on China to assist in managing Korean affairs as social
divisionswithin the country didnot inspire confidence.For the USSR, Korea represented a potential
ideological andeconomicpartner,aswell ashadhistoricalrelevanceforwantingcontrol of the region
as Japanhad wona war earlierinthe 20th
century that limitedRussianinfluence inboth Korean and
Manchuria.2
Why thisisimportanthastodo withthe scope andaimsof Russiainseekingtocontrol Korea.
The country wasn’t seen as stable or in any shape to actually govern itself. Both the U.S. and USSR
understood that the region neededto be monitored/governed, eventuallycausing the US to offer a
notion of “trusteeship” in a quasi-patriarchal and neo-imperialist way. What’s interesting is that the
USSR andU.S. respectivelyunderstoodthattheywere limitedintheirabilitytomanage the peninsula,
however, the U.S. thought the USSR wanted full control Korea, while the USSR thought the U.S.
wanted the same, neither knew the others true intention of keeping separate zones of control.3
2 Stueck, WilliamWhitney. Rethinking the Korean War: A New Diplomatic and Strategic History. Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press,2002. 15.
3 Stueck, 33.
4. “DivisionandCold War Came to KoreaFirst and Foremostbecause of the inabilityof outside power,
the United States and the Soviet Union, to devise a unification plan that would protect the interests
of both.”4
This is a summary of the complication experienced by both the U.S. and USSR in attempting
to come to an agreementof howto manage the future of Korea.What followedisasharp divisionin
the domestic political partiesand ideologythat solidified itself over time. Ideologicallyspeaking,the
separation of the 38th
truly represented the respective ideologies of those states overseeing the
region. The U.S. represented freedom and democracy while the USSR was that of socialism and
communism. During this time there were Korean domestic groups that aligned based on those
ideological positions, thus further causing cleavages within the Korean population. U.S. presence in
the regionwas largelytocontestthe sovietsfromimplementingandidentifyingacommunistregime
from the exiledpartiesthatsoughtrefuge inChinaduringJapanese occupation. In1946, polarization
really solidified itself in the domestic sphere as parties shifted from being pro trusteeship to against
it,inresponse tothe shift,sovietauthoritiesarrestedanddetainedthe leadingnon-communistfigure
in an attemptto trulygalvanize influence inthe North.5
Bydoingthis the sovietsassertedfull control
of the North and vetted the communist party as well as installed Kim Il-sung as the chairman of the
People’s Committee. It is with the rise of Kim Il-sung that set in motion the establishment of Juche
ideology and the fundamental divide of North and South Korea that has persisted until today.
The Regime – Then
It wasn’tuntil afterthe armistice agreementthatSungproposedthe implementationof JucheintoN.
Koreain Decemberof 1955. As the country soughtto rebuilditselfafterthe war,he usedit at firstto
motivate the populace and sought to re-establish N. Korean identity. During the 1960’s was when
Juche stated to become more integrated as a tool for political and social control. Implementation of
4 Stueck, 35.
5 Ibid.,32.
5. thisgoal wasdone throughpolitical educationprogramstoindoctrinate the populationintohisbrand
of political ideology.Sungalsosoughtfurthercontrol of the partyasinfightingandfactionshad begun
to arise. During this time the development of Sung’s image began to take on a “cult” like status as
sociallyengineerednarrativesidolizedhiminpopularculture.Thismovementpavedthe wayfor the
party to also begin a transformation of Juche into a theological element in order to cement its
importance throughtradition,as “religionwasdismissedaseitherpro-Americanormedieval”,there
was an imperative to create one for political purposes.6
Throughthe establishmentofJucheasanationalreligion,itsintegrationintoN.Koreansociety
wasabsolute,therebyprovidingthepopulationanimplicitlymoral objectiontooutsideinfluencesand
givingregime a sort of legendarystatusamongitspeople.Understandinghow Jucheoperateshasn’t
been easy for the international community, often leading to frustration in attempting to rationalize
the seeminglyirrational. So what exactly is it, and how does it work? Han S. Park gives a summary:
“Juche is quite unique amongcommunistideologies.Iargue that, infact, Juche has developedintoa
complex systemof ideaswithmultiple functions.WhileJuche isfirstandforemostapolitical ideology
that provides regime legitimacy, it has also developed into a mass belief system and a theology.”7
Understanding the ideological imperative of North Korea is essential in also understanding the
difficulty associated with changing the regime, both of which are central challenges to achieving a
lasting conflict resolution.
Juche Ideology “Self-Reliance” – An Explanation
Complete integrationof societyunderneaththe Juche ideologyisthe central goal of the DPRK as the
regime’s legitimacy and primacy is predicated off of this belief system in its entirety. There is no
dissentingopinionaseverymemberhasbeenintegratedintothisbeliefsystem.The reinforcementof
6 Gothel, Ingeborg. "Juche and the Issueof National Identity in the DPRK of the 1960's."In North Korea:
Ideology, Politics, Economy, 19-31. Englewood Cliffs,NJ: Prentice Hall,1996.28.
7 Park,Han S. "The Nature and Evolution of Juche Ideology." In North Korea: Ideology, Politics, Economy, 9-19.
Englewood Cliffs,NJ: Prentice Hall,1996.5.
6. Juche in its entirety causes issues when approaching regime change in that the wide majority of N.
Korean society is going to be resistant against change, as to change the regime is to challenge their
ideological, religiousand personal identification.8
Through understanding the complex relationship
with N. Korean society and this ideology there is also an identification of why regime change and
ideology are a central challenge for terminating the conflict with a long lasting resolution. If North
Koreanssee themselvesasthe representativesof all “oppressedpeoples”aswellasthe leadersof the
world in their conception of the worldview, it becomes clear that fostering peace would mean an
upheaval of N. Korean society. There would have to be a comprehensive and fundamental change
away from this ideological “socio-political” system.
The ideaof “self”withinthe contextof Juche ideologydoesn’tjustinclude the individual,it’s
of a national level,ahyperethnocentricand “uncompromising”wayof viewingthe world.However,
that is not to say that individualityisn’tpresent,as“man isthe masterof nature and societyandthe
mainfactor that decideseverything”. 9
Understandingthisisveryimportanttothe relationof howN.
Koreanssee theirplace inthe world,as the central “brain”,in theirrealm isthe “Great Leader”who
decides the parameters that society operates. Park gives a good analogy by identifying the “brain”
being the Great Leader, the nervous system being the party, and the people being a body.10
This
Clausewitzian viewpoint is furthered by the “creative” aspect of Juche where adopting outside ideas
and systemsmust “firststudy one’sownsocietyscientificallyandunderstandfullythe historical and
cultural condition”.The aimof doingthisiswastofurtherintegrate Marxist-LeninistideastoN.Korean
society, and by altering those “foreign” ideas through N. Korean culture, it would not “exhibit
irregularities”.11
“The eternal life proclaimed here is attained when a biological
(isolated)individualacquiresasocial life byovercominginnate desires
8 Park,10.
9 Ibid.,12.
10 Ibid.,13.
11 Ibid.,14.
7. and egoistic life style through integrating himself thoroughlyinto the
life system of the national community, thus, becoming part of the
immortal social life.”12
This quote very succinctly identifies how N. Koreans have integratedthe Juche ideologyinto
society as a theological principle on a societal level. This also is the methodology of the regime for
keepingJucherelevantinsideof society,asthe “brains”are indeedactuallypeopleand will die,thisis
what has allowedthe regime tostayinpowerdespite the deathsof bothKimIl-sungand KimJongIl.
Why thisideologyisproblematicbecomesclearonce it’sproperlyunderstood,andalsogivescontext
to the reasoning behind some of its seemingly “erratic” behaviours over time.
The Regime Now
In today’sNorth Korea,KimJong-Unis the “brain” and is no lessprone to makingirrational claimsor
threats than his predecessors.13
There are a lot of fundamental differences in comparison to his
predecessors,namelythathe widelywasn’tknowninN.Koreaprior to hisnamingas the heirto Kim
Jong-Il,nordidhe have a repertoire tobase a conceptionof how hispoliciesmayormay notchange.
Since 2012, his consolidationof powerhas beencomplete throughthe furtheruse of the monolithic
hierarchy and Juche ideology. Coupledwith multiple military parades, putting emphasis on earlier
initiativesduringmeetings,andbreakingofnuclearproliferationagreementwiththeU.S.indicate that
the policies established by his forefathers are there to stay.14
Mark FitzpatrickpointsoutthatUnis a real probleminhisattempttocreate anissue withthe
U.S. He sees this as a sign of weakness,in that a xenophobic agenda or a “threat from the outside”
may seekto bring the party and countrytogetherundertighterparty control.This most likelyhasto
dowiththe issuesathandthatthe regime isfacing,suchasa lackof domesticmarketcontrol,arising
12 Park,“The Nature and Evolution of Juche Ideology”, 15.
13 Freeman, Colin."Kim Jong-un Threatens War with "US Imperialists"as North Korea Celebrates 70th
Anniversary of RulingParty."The Telegraph. October 10, 2015.
14 Park,Yong Soo. "Policies and Ideologies of the KimJong-un Regime in North Korea: Theoretical
Implications." Asian Studies Review 38, no. 1 (2013): 8-11.
8. blackmarket,andapopulationthatisfinallybeingabletosee the disparitytheyinhabitincomparison
to the restof the world.15
Whythisisimportantisbasedonthe understandingthatthe partyiswilling
to hold power at any cost. It is the imperative of the state to retain legitimacy and authority.
Nuclear Disarmament
Nucleardisarmamentisa central challenge asthe regime seesarmamentasits methodfor retaining
powerandauthorityinthe region. Overtime therehave beennumerousinstancesanddevelopments
since the original pursuitof thisobjectivebyKimIl-sung.Thusfarthe recordistatteredwithshattered
agreements,brokenpromisesandattemptsto furtherthislong lastingobjective.16
Thisalsotiesinto
how the Juche ideology has been integrated into society, as those who are involved are also
contributing to the greater good of N. Korea and thereby earning themselves admittance into
immortal life through developing a way of defence against aggression. It is morally right to pursue
nuclear weapons as self-defence is an inherent right. Within the context of N. Korean society, by
denyingthemthe abilitytodefendthemselves, theyare justifiedon moral grounds through Juche.17
Froma strategicstandpoint,the developmentof nuclearweaponsisseenasadvantageousas
theywouldallowforthe use ineitheranoffensive ordefensivecapability.Acquiringanucleararsenal
wouldalsogive the regimefurtherbargaining powerinthe international spectrumbymakingitavery
real threat in the region, depending on whether or not they could actually deliver such warheads.
Expandinguponthis,N.Koreawouldpotentiallybe able toinvestmore ineconomicdevelopmentand
less on conventional military means.18
If its intentionsare truly for defence purposes,then the need
for conventional forces may not be as heavily invested into. Contrasting that, it may also cause an
offensive. In either scenario the issue is problematic for a number of reasons.
15 Fitzpatrick,Mark."North Korea: Is Regime Change the Answer?" Survival 55, no. 3 (2013): 12.
16 "North Korea Profile- Timeline." BBC News. December 9, 2015.
17 Park,Han S. "The Conundrum of the Nuclear Program." In North Korea: Ideology, Politics, Economy, 221-233.
Englewood Cliffs,NJ: Prentice Hall,1996. 223.
18 Park,“The Conundrum of the Nuclear Program”, 226.
9. South Korean Challenges
For SouthKorea,there are alsochallengesassociatedwithcomingtoaresolution,the mainchallenge
being the potential loss of U.S. protection and the deferment that it enjoys from the result of their
securitytreatythatwassignedin1954.To bestillustratethe clearandstarkcontrastbetweenthe two
nations,currently,S.Koreahas a GDP of 1.6 trillion,40.5 timesthat of N. Korea’sestimated40Bn. As
of 2008 S. Korea also spent approximately 2.8% of that GDP on defence spending compared to N.
Korea’s 22.3%, which even despite that large different in percentage S. Korea’s yearly fiscal
expenditure is a reported 26.1Bn, at that time it little over 3 times the size of N. Korea’s. As of this
year S. Korea has decided to further increase spending by a massive increase to total approximately
214 Bn by 2020, nearly matching the U.S. yearly investment.19
Quite clearly it is no longer in the
incapacitated state that it was at the time of the armistice agreement.20
These figures show that S.
Koreacouldeasily andtotally outspendN.Koreashouldittrulyhave the incentive todoso,however,
since itspendsnearly40Bnon militaryaide forS.Korea,itbecomesapparentthatfromthe S. Korean
perspective it isn’t advantageous to do so despite massive increases.21
Reasons for this other than
economic considerations may be the added security of having U.S. ground troops and bases on S.
Koreansoil.Shouldthe Northactuallyattack,itwouldhave anautomatic allyinthe regionthatwould
be able to assist in defending against aggression. Along those lines, should the U.S. incur casualties
due to aggression, it most likely would result in a combined war effort, furthermore, by staying the
U.S.’sprotectorate,itisalsolikelythatshouldN.Koreause nuclearweapons,the U.S.mayretaliate in
kind.
19 Panda,Ankit. "South Korea Is Planninga Huge Increasein Defense Spending." The Diplomat.April 20,2015
20 Sedghi, Ami, and Simon Rogers. "South v North Korea: How Do the Two Countries Compare? Visualised."The
Guardian.April 8,2013.
21 Shell,Elizabeth, and Matt Stiles."Where Does U.S. Military Aid Go?" PBS. August 30, 2012.
10. Reunification Challenges
Discussing reunification is essential in considering the central challenges of the ongoing Korean
conflictas it’s a solutionthathas beensuggestedandsought afterby both sidesfor nearly60 years.
Reaching reunification is a subject fraught with challenges that have to be accounted for, without
addressingtheseconcernsthelikelihoodof resolutionbecomeslesspossible throughpeacefulmeans.
As early as 1960, Kim Il-sung actually proposed the idea of having a federal system of reunification
withthe South,where bothNorthand Southwouldretaintheirindependenteconomicspheres,thus
concluding in a “Korea-wide election”.22
In 2000, on June 12th
North and South Korea held a summit
to begin working towards reunifying the two nations. The goals of the summit were to:
“…establish peaceful relations; begin allowing meetings between
some separatedfamiliesfromAugust15 and resolve the issue of long
term prisoners; and promote balanced development of their
economies and build mutual confidence through cultural, athletic,
medical and environmental cooperation and exchange.”23
Identifyingthe historical pretextprovidesjustificationtowardscontinuingtoestablishitas a primary
solutiontothe conflict.Tobring the subjectevenmore upto date,the new Presidentof SouthKorea
has begunpushingforreunificationaspublicsupportwasshowntobe waningdue,mostlikelydueto
a newergenerationthathasneverknownaunitedKorea.24
Timingforanegotiationisn’tjustessential
whenattemptingtostopviolence,overtime withaconflictsuchasthis,resolutionisgoingtohave to
be approachedsoonerthanlater before youngerS. Koreans become toodisillusionedorapathetic.25
22Hong, Philip."Reunification of Korea: A Social Development Approach to Resolvingthe Korean
Conflict."Journal of Comparative Social Welfare 24, no. 1 (2008):69.
23 Hong, 70.
24 Williamson,Lucy."Why Is South Korea Plugging Unification?"BBC News. January 28, 2014.
25 Williamson,Lucy."Why Is South Korea PluggingUnification?”.
11. Unlike waiting for an enemy to become willing to negotiate through attrition and war, proactive
conflict resolution within this context towards reunification may be mandatory.26
In orderto move the N. Koreanregime towardsreunificationFitzpatrickgivesthe suggestion
of targetingthe economicelementsandalsothe emplacementof sanctions.Impactingthe economy
of the DPRK would have a few different implications. First, it would negatively impact its ability to
advance itsnuclearprograms.A secondaryeffectisthatthe lossof income effectsthe legitimacyand
fostersdisunitywithinthe party.If the DPRK cannotfinanciallysupportmembers,norearna place in
the ideologicallydefined“immortal”realmofsociety,thenindigenouschange maybemore possible.27
There are manychallengesthatwill be associatedwithunificationshouldithappen.Firstand
foremostisactuallygettingittohappen.Giventhe ideological perspectiveandsocio-political system,
merging the two countries with separate ideas on what civic government looks like or is would be
fundamentally challenging for a number of reasons. N. Koreans may reject the new order as it’s not
only a foreign concept, but may be seen as a western invention, and therefore morally repugnant.
Furthermore, the theological aspect that permeates the whole of North Korean society would be
problematicinthatremoving Jucheisinawaygoingtobe strippingthemof theirsense of personand
self-identity. The migrationof impoverishedandmalnourishedN.Koreansintothe southernregionof
the peninsula may cause issues with crime, culture shock, or evensecurityrisks. Insurgency is a real
possibilitygiventhe ideological differencesbetweenthe twopopulations.Coupled withthe potential
lossof identity,some N.Koreansmaytake toterrorismasa methodto show political discontentwith
the loss of their way of life.
PhilipHongidentifiesthree different“models”thatreunificationmayhappenunder.The first,
is unificationbywar,where the Northperceivesitself aseithercollapsingornearcollapse.The move
toward war thereafter would be seen as a solution for the regime, first through ideological
26 Pillar,Paul R."The Opening of Negotiations." In Negotiating Peace: War Termination as a Bargaining
Process. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press,1983.49.
27 Fitzpatrick,Mark."North Korea: Is Regime Change the Answer?", 13-15.
12. justification,andsecond,byensuringinternal partystabilitywithacommon,eminentenemy.Averting
thisscenariomaybe done byutilizingthe internationalcommunityaswellasthirdpartyintervention
tactics to provide the potential belligerents with an alternative for violence.28
The second model is the absorption of the Northfrom the South. As addressed above, from
the N. Korean perspective this has challenges associated with integration into a different society.S.
Koreans would also have to cope with thischange, as well as pay for the bulk of the reunification as
the N. Korean economy isn’t capable of contributing nearly as much as S. Korea can. The cost of
buildinginfrastructure orindustrial capabilitiesalone wouldcostanestimated140 Bn. Arguablyit’sa
cheaperalternative thanmilitaryexpenditure,howevershouldreunificationhappen,S.Koreawould
be paying for both. That drain on the economy in turn may impact the social welfare of all Koreans.
For South Korea, unification also has challenges associated with reunification other than the loss of
U.S. military assistance or defence cost deference.
The last recommended model is that of gradualism, a slow integration initiative enacted to
mitigate the issues associated with rapid absorption. Hong describes this method aptly:
“Gradualism, by offering a buffer zone for unexpected consequences
– whether it be financial, political, or social – to come into play at a
slower pace, will allow for the two Koreas and their neighbouring
countries to react appropriately to each situation.”
Conclusion
In conclusion, there are clearly numerous challenges pertaining to the ongoing Korean conflict. In
attempting to identify areas of issue, the contention of this paper is that the main challenge for
resolving this conflict is that of the N. Korean regime and ideological imperative. Also, as shown
throughout the length of this paper there are challenges for ending S. Korean deference and
28 Cochrane, Feargal."Third Party Intervention." In Ending Wars. Cambridge: Polity,2008. 61.
13. dependency on U.S. military aid, as well as numerous challenges in regards to reunification as a
solution. Althoughthereare different scenariosuponwhichreunificationandresolutionmayoccur,it
is in the best interest of the world that it be done so without causing further strife or escalation of
force.
14. Bibliography
Books:
1. Cochrane,Feargal."ThirdPartyIntervention."In Ending Wars.Cambridge:Polity,2008.
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Prentice Hall, 1996.
3. Park, Han S. "The Nature and Evolution of Juche Ideology." In North Korea:
Ideology, Politics, Economy, 9-19. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1996.
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(2013): 7-20.
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the Korean Conflict." Journal of Comparative Social Welfare 24, no. 1 (2008): 65-81.
4. Park, Yong Soo. "Policies and Ideologies of the Kim Jong-un Regime in North Korea:
Theoretical Implications." Asian Studies Review 38, no. 1 (2013): 1-14.
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