This document provides a literature review and theoretical framework for analyzing US foreign policy toward North Korea. It begins with an introduction outlining tensions between North Korea and other countries. The theoretical framework section explains that a constructivist approach will be used, incorporating notions of identity and nationhood. It discusses concepts like structuration and the mutual constitution of structures and agents. The analytical framework views the North Korean issue as one of nation- and state-building. The literature review section examines existing works on US policies of non-proliferation, economic sanctions, and their multilateral elements. It finds these policies have generally been unsuccessful and ignores regional dynamics. The document then provides comparative case analyses of the Palestinian and Iraqi situations

1. Christopher Jackson
31 March 2016
POLI 405: Dr. Liu
8638 Words
A Constructivist Review of US Foreign Policy Toward North Korea
Introduction: North Korea, The Middle East, and Identity
Tensions between North Korea and the rest of the world have continued to increase for
the better part of the last 60 years; moreover, in very recent history, tensions have escalated due
to continued nuclear testing carried out by the Kim regime along with the recent detention of an
American citizen who was traveling through the country. As such, revisiting US foreign policy
surrounding North Korea becomes an incredibly timely and relevant topic to investigate. A
relationship that has historically been characterized by outside condemnation of the North
Korean regime demonstrates habitual isolation and sanctions placed on the nation by outside
parties. Thus far, there has been little development in relations and tensions continue to rise.
Though analyzing North Korean identity, I believe that more substantial policies can be
developed by the United States, in cooperation with other East Asian partners, using experiences
in the Middle East as an example of failed policies, policies that have many similarities to those
being exercised against North Korea currently. Through engaging with a constructivist
framework, I will present the issue of North Korea as one of a crisis in nation and state building,
which I believe opens windows for new policy prescription on the basis of recognizing and
developing North Korea identity.
Theoretical & Analytical Framework
Theoretical Approach: Constructivist and Post-Structuralist Accounts
Drawing on constructivist theory allows for the scholar to incorporate notions of identity
and nationhood in a way that other foreign policy analysis techniques do not permit. Central to
my argument is the claim that North Korea has been deprived the chance to properly engage in
identity formation, both on the state and human level. As posited by constructivist theory,

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structuration suggests, “structures and agents are mutually constituted” (Flockhart, 2012, p. 86).
Following, Flockhart continues this framework by writing, “it is through practice that social facts
are externalized and habitualized, and thereby ensured an independent existence from the agents
who first constructed the social fact, and it is through practice that institutions such as self-help
or cooperation become embedded” (p. 86). With respect to North Korea, this conceptual
framework becomes highly valuable: identities and structures created by the North Korean
regime are externalized and reinforced by the outside community.
For example, the outward display of military might and willingness to attack by North
Korea is thus reciprocated as a reality back to North Korean decision makers by the actions and
platitudes offered by the international community. This will be further explored in case analysis.
Finally, an essential facet of constructivist theory posits that meaning of any object is derived by
the agent observing the object; in other words, in terms of international relations, North Korea
will respond to an enemy in a given way on the basis that the entity is perceived to be an enemy.
The opposite also holds true (p. 81). When one combines notions of structuration with the
foundational concept of subjective meaning, it becomes much simpler to distill reason and
rationale behind both the antics of the North Korean regime as well as the corresponding
responses from outside actors.
Moreover, in drawing from poststructuralist theory, notions of inside-outside dynamics
can be more fully explored, allowing for a richer, deeper analysis of North Korean behavior.
According to poststructuralist theories, the inside (the domestic) is understood as being a polar
inverse of the outside (the international), thus creating an understanding of foreign policy as a
tool that “keep[s] this distinction in place” (Hansen, 2012, p. 98). Furthermore, the notion of
discourse as a tool of power is iterated by poststructuralist understandings of international

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relations. If one returns to constructivist ideals, this inside-outside dynamic gains traction and
relevance with particular respect toward North Korea: the inside identity, or the identity of the
North Korean nation, will be seen by North Koreans as opposite of the identity of the outside
world. Noting that identity is based on subjective understanding of outside stimuli, it becomes
somewhat of a circular loop through which identities are created and reinforced: assuming
poststructuralist positions on inside-outside dynamics are correct, one can see a cycle in which
North Korea projects an image of identity based on the inverse of what outside identity is (i.e.
Western, liberal democracy), which is then filtered back into the North Korean regime through
structuration. Thus, engaging in a constructivist and poststructuralist framework allows for a
wider array of explanations regarding North Korean dynamics to emerge the opens the door for
new policy prescriptions, which will be explored in the cases below.
Analytical Conceptualization: Nation- and State-building
Through engaging with constructivist and poststructuralist theoretical frameworks,
traditional realist understandings of the North Korean issue can be departed from and replaced
with an entirely new framework based on identity formation. While typically understood as a
rogue state vying for power, I argue that North Korean behavior is inherently tied to a lack of
North Korean nation- and state- building. Evidence suggesting the lack of nation and state
building will be presented in the North Korean case analysis. Fukuyama (2014), without directly
stating so, continuously suggests the vitality of forming national identity in the process of
legitimizing state institutions, noting that national identity can be developed both by the state and
the populace via bottom-up action in the arts (p. 185). When analyzed one level further, one
could easily pull from Fukuyama’s argument the notion that national identity must be built from
within the state itself.

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Considering his historical explanation of Western national-identity formation that
emphasizes the role of in-out dynamics (supported by poststructuralist theory, see above), it is
not outrageous to assume that this argument can be applied to the North Korean case; in other
words, by taking the conceptual jump from stating that Western states developed identities via
the process of realizing borders and in-group/out-group distinctions (p. 189-191) to synthesizing
the greater proposition that in-groups form identities, it becomes clear that in order to remain in
accordance with Fukuyama’s notions of nation/state-building, a national identity must be
developed from the inside out. Considering constructivist-based structuration, this notion is
complicated for North Korea: I will argue that North Korea has been deprived of an inwardly-
focused process of national identity formation that is thus exacerbated by the phenomenon of
structuration: in projecting a military regime into the greater world, North Korea traps itself
through processes of self-definition and external iteration.
The regime's tendency to deprive its citizens of any form of freedom then compounds the
issue as bottom-up identity formation is entirely reliant on structuration phenomenon occurring
within the state itself: citizens will iterate identities forced onto them by the regime, while the
regime will iterate identities forced onto it by the outside world. This cyclical phenomenon of
identity reiteration is the exact issue I hope to tackle in this research: by framing the North
Korean issue as one of nation- and state-building, policies can be geared toward aiding the
identity formation within North Korea. By drawing on lessons from Palestine and Iraq, I gain
evidence for my suggestions. This research will attempt to answer: Can the United States
reformulate relations with North Korea through constructivist inspired policies in conjunction
with South Korea, China, and Japan, utilizing lessons from Palestinian and Iraqi cases? I posit
that if the United States draws on lessons from conflicts in Palestine and Iraq, constructivist and

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poststructuralist theories can help to produce new policies toward North Korea that encourage
Japan, China, and South Korea to approach the conflict as an internal North Korean state- and
nation- building challenge, ultimately creating the potential for an easing of hostilities between
North Korea and the rest of the world.
Investigating Existing Literature & Methodology
In order to demonstrate the current flaws within US stances toward North Korea, three
cases will be analyzed with respect to current and past policy positions utilizing existing
literature. Namely, US policies of nonproliferation, condemnation, and economic sanction will
be explored with respect to North Korea. Immediately following the literature review, actions
taken within Palestine and Iraq will be analyzed in order to illustrate failing policies. With
respect to Palestine, I will investigate how the lack of acknowledgement by the international
community, ergo the denial of nation-building processes, has instigated continuous conflict and
anger within Palestine. Moreover, I will present similarities between the US-Israel-Palestine
dynamic and the US-South Korea-North Korea dynamic. Turning to Iraq, I will examine notions
of the nationless-state and the success of economic sanctions. Through comparing the cases of
North Korea, Palestine, and Iraq, I will illustrate the downfalls of current US stances toward
North Korea, opening the door for a new set of policies to be adopted by the US that incorporate
East Asian regional partners. Following this review, an analysis and synthesis of key ideals will
be provided before policy prescription is undertaken.
I. Non-Proliferation
Literature engaging with the nature and effectiveness of US-North Korean policies
consistently points toward nuclear nonproliferation, a keystone of Obama’s policies toward
North Korea during his presidency (Aleska, 2011, p. 44; Snyder, 2013, p.99). A long history of

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American attempts to deter North Korean nuclear aspirations is characterized by iterative failures
in which North Korea abandons American stipulations and reengages with nuclear development
(Aleska, p. 50). Moreover, the platitude of the US to require North Korea to give up nuclear
aspirations as a required criteria for even entering peace talks serves as a major hindrance to
development of relations: while the US refuses to speak until nuclear disarmament occurs, North
Korean postures refuse to disarm until talks have begun, creating a paradoxical, zero-sum
situation (Aleska, p. 52-53).
In attempting to address why North Korea continues to maintain its nuclear arsenal,
Aleska (2011) writes, “North Korea will not abandon nuclear weapons due to the deteriorating
conventional balance against the US after the Cold war” (p. 62). This argument helps to
contextualize the inside-outside identity formation process that will be explored in later analysis.
It is also noteworthy to mention that it is generally accepted that US military power is far
superior to North Korean military power (p. 54). This notion becomes vital to understand when
considering the North Korean perspective of the issue, which will be detailed later in this
analysis.
II. Sanctions-based Approach
Economic sanctions have been yet another tool frequently adopted by the US in order to
instill influence on the DPRK. As noted in Bahng’s (2010) analysis, however, the sanctions
based approach has been largely unsuccessful and likely will continue to be unsuccessful (p.
119). Furthermore, Bahng notes that economic sanctions imposed on North Korea after the
Cheonan crisis (North Korean sinking of South Korean ship) will require international
cooperation, testing the power of American diplomatic influence around the world (p. 121).
Moreover, in order for sanctions against North Korea to be fully effective, Bahng suggests that

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China must apply pressure to North Korea (p. 123). In the context of multilateral elements,
discussed below, sanctions become further complicated as they are by no means bilateral
techniques. In investigating the most contemporary instances of US policies toward North Korea,
one will find the very recently adopted “North Korea Sanctions and Policy Enhancement Act of
2016”, yet another piece of legislation aimed at financially strangling the DPRK from the outside
in (North Korea Sanctions and Policy Enhancement Act of 2016). The impacts of sanctions will
be more fully investigated in the following case analyses.
III. Multilateral Elements
The alliance between the United States and South Korea must be analyzed in order to
gain a full picture of influencing factors on North Korea behavior. When considering the highly
influential role the US has played on the Korean peninsula since the 1953 ceasefire, it is not
unreasonable to assume that US-South Korean dynamics have an influence on North Korean
behavior; moreover, US-North Korean dynamics, with particular respect to American deterrence
of North Korean nuclear development, certainly could impact North-South Korean relations
(Jong-Han, 2011, P. 256). In a statistical analysis carried out by Jong-Han (2011), these notions
are tested and find that North Korean behavior toward South Korea is in fact impacted by US-
North Korean dynamics at a statistically significant level (p. 273). This notion is expanded upon
as Jong-Han notes that US action toward North Korea, identified as the primary causal agent,
impacts the entire peninsula, manifested in North Korea-South Korea dynamics (p. 273).
Returning to notions of non-proliferation, it thus becomes important to consider the implications
of a South Korean-American alignment on the nonproliferation issue, which Snyder (2013)
posits has existed since Obama and Lee Myung-bak saw “eye-to-eye” on the issue (p. 99).

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Moreover, there has been a noted lack of cooperation between parties with respect to
North Korea: oftentimes, the North Korean is viewed as an isolated problem separate from US-
Chinese dynamics, for example. Notions of the US as being the primary power holder in the
region are echoed by several scholars (Bracken, 2012; Christensen, 2015), helping to bolster
claims that US actions toward any actor in the region could have unintended and far reaching
consequences. Bracken (2016) notes that this tendency fails to recognize overarching
connections between dynamics; in other words, Bracken would insinuate that US-Chinese
relations have a direct effect on what unravels in North Korea (p. 3), thus complicating the nature
of causal agents described in Jong-Han’s (2011) analysis.
Yet, Jong-Han does test the impact of US-Chinese dynamics on North Korean behavior
toward the US, finding a statistically significant, positive relationship: this indicates, in other
words, that positive relations between the US and China lead to more positive actions from North
Korea toward the United States (p. 277). Additionally, the strength of Chinese influence over
North Korea is described as follows: “Given China’s competitive relations with other major
powers, we conclude that the Xi leadership will not abandon the DPRK; indeed it will reinforce
the policy of strengthening China’s influence over it. Nonetheless one aspect of doing so will
involve China opening up to other – cooperative, multilateral – approaches to reinforcing
stability on the Korean Peninsula and in Northeast Asia” (Daewon and Richey, 2015, p. 483),
offering contemporary insight into the ever evolving dynamics. Evidence suggesting that
multilateral cooperation may be a necessary component to solving the nuclear issue can be seen
in Snyder’s (2013) analysis that highlights the failure of US-North Korean bilateral talks in 2012
(p. 101). If one returns to Bahng’s (2010) notion that even sanctions require international support

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(p. 121), ideals of multilateral cooperation, support, and involvement become unavoidable when
dealing with North Korean policy.
Comparative Case Study Analysis: Palestine and Iraq
Considering the above literature’s claims with respect to nonproliferation, sanctions, and
multilateral elements, a case study analysis, found below, will help to illustrate why current US
postures toward North Korea may be entirely ineffective. By investigating similar postures and
phenomenon in the Palestinian and Iraqi cases, one can draw comparative conclusions based in
constructivist and poststructuralist theories of international relations that suggest that a lack of
nation- and state- building lie and the heart of challenges surrounding US-North Korean
dynamics and North Korean relations with the region at large. Following the two cases, I will
provide a synthesized analysis of how one could potentially connect the Iraqi, Palestinian, and
North Korean cases to support the notion that North Korea has been deprived of nation building
opportunities.
I. The Palestinian Case: Existing Literature and Policy Relevance
Lessons can certainly be drawn from analyzing Palestinian-Israeli dynamics when
considering policies applied to North Korea. From the Palestinian case, several elements will be
focused on in order to draw connections to the North Korean case: ideological considerations,
notions of stalemate as a foreign policy and relevant notions of recognition, civilian immobility,
and alliance dynamics.
Turning first to ideological considerations, similarities can be derived between the
Palestinian and North Korean cases. Ideology, an element of foreign policy that would be
entirely ignored by realist schools of thought, is arguably an incredibly strong influencing agent
on actor behavior on the international stage (Haas, 2012). In discussing challenges to Israeli-

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Palestinian peace, Smith (2013) notes that ideological drivers prevent successful territorial
agreements between Israel and Palestine: with specific respect to the West Bank, Smith writes,
“abandoning this region would violate the Likud party’s platform, which insists on its retention.
Ideology linked to national identity thus requires keeping the West Bank, even if this means that
peace agreements with Arabs states or with the Palestinians are unlikely” (p. 247). Thus, in
attempting to apply this notion to the North Korean case, a constructivist view would suggest
that the Kim regime’s inward-looking ideology could be a driving factor in preventing further
peace and agreement between North and South Korea. The principal lesson to be drawn here is
not one that leads to specific policy advice; rather, in accepting that ideology could be playing a
role, actions of North Korea can be analyzed outside of a zero-sum realist framework. Accepting
the Kim regime’s divine status, and thus ideology, combined with the ideological battle between
communism and capitalism that led to the partition of Korea, offers insight for new policy in that
the US can begin to approach the issue as an ideological one rather than a power-struggle
conflict.
Yet another similarity between the two cases lies in the “stalemate” nature of the
respective borders between Palestine-Israel and North-South Korea. In both cases, international
actors have accepted the notion that a divided and tense border is the best solution; however,
little indicates in either case that such a solution has been successful. In both cases, there have
been detrimental effects as a result of such a set-up: in the Israeli-Palestine issue, disputes over
the West Bank force a gridlock in relations. Smith (2013) notes that an Israeli effort to remove
settlements from the West Bank could result in a civil war, yet in preserving the territory, there is
little if no room for negotiations to take place between Israel and Palestine (p. 248). Such a
situation can be seen along the DMZ, or South-North Korean border. In simply accepting a

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ceasefire, both sides of the border feel entitled to the land they are on and believe that the
opposing country is violating territorial claims. In both cases, border disputes characterize part of
the issue, thus inspiring new policy proposals to tackle the issue, which will be discussed at
further length in the following sections. Moreover, in both cases, civilian mobility is severely
limited. Palestinians have been restrained to their territorial bounds in the past ten years, and
outside nations do not welcome Palestinian refugees and even at times allow the Israeli army to
slaughter Palestinians who have crossed international borders (Smith, 2013, p. 258). A similar
trend is experienced by North Korean refugees, who run the risk of being repatriated to North
Korea if found in China. The inability for civilians to flee their respective situations adds yet
another level of complexity to the challenge of developing sound national identities.
Following a similar line of thought, notions of recognition can be explored. Recognition
of a state’s identity by outside actors is arguably the most stable form of state legitimacy in the
current international system; thus, in lacking recognition, a country will need to assert itself on
the global stage, perhaps violently. Shlaim (2013) notes that in peace attempts between Palestine
and Israel, a policy of recognition was encouraged by the international community on the PLO: if
the PLO could recognize Israel’s right to be a state, tensions would decrease (p. 274). Yet, this
ultimately was unsuccessful as peace agreements failed, oftentimes pinned on the uncooperative
nature of Palestinian leader Arafat (p. 275). Placing blame on Arafat is a practice that while
commonplace is widely disputed within academia: it is arguable that Arafat was pushed into a
corner in which he essentially had to reject peace offers. Similarly, the international community,
viewing the Kim regime in North Korea as an aggressor, looks for the North Korean state to
recognize the validity of the capitalist, “non-North-Korean” identity. Looking at the Palestinian

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case, forcing recognition of the outside world by the state, which is being deprived of legitimacy,
does not work. This argument will become vital in my analysis sections below.
Finally, the role of multilateral relational ties must be considered for both cases. As the
literature review noted, there is a proven relationship between US actions and North Korean
responses. While this in and of itself is substantial, I suggest one can add to the literature by
drawing conclusions on the value and intrinsic nature of US alliances surrounding the situation.
There is much speculation surrounding the role of the Israeli-US alliance for Israel: Migdal
(2014) notes that Israel is more of a liability for the US than anything else, suggesting that the
Israeli army is really only good for defending itself (p. 81). One could pose a similar argument
for the US-South Korean alliance. With the DMZ heavily patrolled by joint US-South Korean
operations, one could easily make the conceptual jump provided by Migdal to the North Korean
case. In other words, I am inclined to ask what value the South Korean army has for the US
army. In the eyes of North Koreans, I posit that such a dynamic could appear disingenuous:
North Korea very well may harbor anger toward South Korea for relying on a US military
presence to preserve the security of the border. This is somewhat speculative and would need
further research, but for the purposes of this research, the question posed is useful enough.
Moreover, Migdal emphasizes this point by investigating Cold War era implications:
“Israel’s utility as a strategic partner lay on the side of the equation in which the United States
sought gains in a zero-sum relationship with the USSR; if the United States instead aimed for
compromises and deals with the Soviets, the tie to Israel was far less valuable and possibly even
counterproductive” (p. 90). Such a position begs the question of South Korea’s intrinsic value to
the US and moreover the effect the relationship has in the overarching dynamic: in a sense, it can
be argued that the US-South Korean alliance would lose value if the North-South Korean issue

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were resolved. The US-South Korean venture is somewhat reliant on a mutual adversary: North
Korea. Moreover, it is easy to speculate that US troop presence in South Korea is a strong asset
to greater US defense in the Asia-Pacific region. In short, alliances between the US and Israel
and the US and South Korea both seem to lack intrinsic value, and in fact, could be exacerbating
the issue the alliance is trying to solve in both respective cases.
II. The Iraqi Case: Existing Literature and Policy Relevance
In drawing from the Iraqi case, I will compare elements between Iraq and North Korea
focusing on the following elements: notions of a nationless state, the impacts of condemning
international rhetoric, and the impacts of a sanctions based approach to interest propagation.
Through this analysis, I hope to illuminate the dangers of engaging in any of the above listed
techniques as tools of international maneuvering, all the while linking back to the central idea
that North Korea must be given a chance to properly nation build before relations can improve.
First, the notion of a nationless state must be explored. Robins (2013) analyses the
situation the evolved in Iraq over the course of the latter quarter of the twentieth century as a
process in which Iraq became meaningless, in a sense: “Just as there is no sense of what ‘Iraq’
means, so no conception of national interest can be elaborated. External relations are therefore a
diverse extension of the short-run, tactical maneuverings of the various branches of its factional
government” (p. 315). This position becomes incredibly relevant for both constructivists and
poststructuralists: without a proper national identity, the importance of which elaborated by
Fukuyama, a constructivist would likely posit that there is high volatility within the state.
Moreover, considering constructivist structuration that would suggest Iraqi identity is shaped by
external pressures, it becomes even more difficult to pin an identity as the international
community iterates the lack of identity. The discourse, thus, becomes one of hostility, as

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described in the following analysis of hostile rhetoric. Like Iraq, North Korea lacks a national
identity for the outside world aside from its categorization as a hostile and erratic state: the
implications of assigning such an identity are arguably very dangerous. Turning to Iraq’s
invasion of Kuwait and the respective motivations, connections between nationless states,
authoritarian regimes, and oppressive rhetoric can be drawn.
Similar to what many would understand as North Korean fear of being excluded from the
international system, Gause (2010) notes that “Iraqi leadership steadfastly maintained (prior to
the invasion of Kuwait) that there was an international conspiracy against it, meant to weaken
Iraq internationally and destabilize it domestically” (p. 92). If one returns to literature
surrounding US-North Korean policy, it becomes clear that there are parallels in the two
dynamics: the central goal of US sanctions based policy is to strangle North Korea out of the
international economy. Dangers of such a policy are illuminated by Gause: “there is every
indication that the decision to invade Kuwait was made relatively shortly before the invasion,
with the regime feeling intense pressure to act” (p. 92). Considering contemporary North Korean
postures of aggression, including the detention of an American tourist and threats to attack Japan
in 2016, it is arguable that similar motivations may lie behind North Korean actions. Such a
hypothesis is supported in Legrenzi and Calculli’s (2013) analysis of Middle East security: the
scholars posit that authoritarian regimes (such as North Korea) become completely obsessed with
preserving regime security rather than national security (p. 207). Without a national identity
outside of the regime, what else would there be to protect? Common sense supports such
conjecture.
Incorporating Fukuyama’s claims surrounding nation building and constructivist based
structuration, it could be argued that fears of losing legitimacy led to hostile actions, which could

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be interpreted as backlashes against a system that does not allow for a nation's identity (in this
case, Iraq and North Korea) to be recognized, ergo a denial of nation- and state-building
processes. As mentioned in the theoretical framework section of this paper, discourse is
considered a powerful aspect of foreign policy within poststructuralist thought. Gause notes that
the pressure felt by Hussein described above led to a change in rhetoric and “tone” (p. 94);
witnessing changes in tone among North Korean elites is thus less of a mystery when analyzed
through a poststructuralist lens. If my claims that US policies aimed at strangling the North
Korean regime (see Legrenzi and Calculli, above) evoke desperation within the North Korean
decision maker circle, it is no surprise that rhetoric coming out of the DPRK can oftentimes be
brash and seemingly irrational; rather than irrational, the rhetoric can be seen as a sign of failed
nation building. In other words, already lacking a national identity due to an oppressive regime
that restricts civilian life, North Korea is further pushed into the category of oppressor, causing
restrictive policies from the external world, iterating an identity that North Korea arguably must
“adopt”.
Finally, in analyzing the effectiveness of sanctions against Iraq, notions of identity,
desperation, and regime security can be coalesced. Gause (2010) illuminates the post-1990
situation in Iraq as one being under the constraints of “the most onerous regime of international
economic sanctions in the modern era” (p. 114); however, despite this battering of economic
strangulation, Gause posits that Saddam managed to cling to power, preserving the security of
the regime, echoing back to notions developed by Legrenzi and Calculli (p. 114). Moreover, “as
the 1990s progressed, Saddam seemed more and more secure domestically, even as his people
suffered under economic sanctions” (Gause, 2010, p. 123). A starkly similar phenomenon can be
seen in North Korea: while the Kim regime has survived without breaking since 1953, the human

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rights situation in the DPRK continues to deteriorate. Thus, the population suffers, struggling to
survive as a result, entirely undercutting the potential for civilian life to create bottom-up nation
building that Fukuyama identifies as being vital.
In connecting these concepts, a startling link can be seen: oppressive rhetoric by the
international community (power of discourse, poststructuralist theory) forces a desperation
among actors who act as authoritarian rulers, creating a positive feedback cycle in which the
regime both propagates and adopts an identity of “rogue state” as a result of a void in national
identity (structuration); meanwhile, sanctions placed on these countries as a result of actions that
could be argued are motivated by such desperation entirely strangle the potential for the populace
to nation build or formulate a new, more agreeable identity. The cycle thus perpetuates.
Constructivist and Poststructuralist Conclusions on US Policy toward North Korea
I. Theoretical and Conceptual Analysis
Applying constructivist and poststructuralist theories of international relations to the
evidence outlined in the existing literature surrounding North Korea, Palestine, and Iraq, allows
for the reframing of the North Korean issue to be one of a deprivation of nation- and state-
building. In the following analysis, I will synthesize the above evidence to make the claim that
framing the issue as one of nation/state-building is not only relevant, but also useful in
formulating new policies toward the DPRK. A series of factors will be analyzed within the
context of nation building to build my case.
Let us begin with an overarching assumption that will help to thread the conceptual links
discussed: North Korea is an autocratic regime that propagates a divine status of the Kim regime;
moreover, the regime is highly oppressive, stripping citizens of basic human rights and engaging
in a wide variety of human rights abuses. The next assumption made in this research is found in

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notions of an “ideal” North Korea, which I will conceptualize as one that has undergone real
nation building processes and allows for civic engagement in life. First, Fukuyama (2014) notes
that autocratic regimes are not conducive to healthy nation building (p. 211); this is echoed by
Norton (2013), who writes with respect to Iraq, “If a democracy is to be durable, then an
essential ingredient is a vibrant civil society, which certainly requires much more time than the
few months anticipate initially by the US architects of the invasion” (p. 133). Thus, at the most
fundamental and simplistic level, it is apparent that North Korea has not undergone proper nation
building processes, nor has it granted access to its citizens any right to democratic process within
the country. Accepting this claim, I will now investigate the implications of viewing the issue
through the lens of nation building.
Returning to the concept of structuration, the above evidence creates a theoretical loop:
with an autocratic regime responsible for the creation of national identity in entirety, the
international community will only be able to feasibly respond to the actions of said regime. The
generally condemning platitudes received by the regime will thus bolster regime ideological
claims to superiority: in the North Korean case, international condemnation does little other than
reinforce to the Kim regime that it must continue its aggression in order to assert its recognition
on the global stage. Support for this hypothesis is derived from analyses on Saddam’s behavior
during the invasion of Kuwait. Finally, the nature of the ceasefire agreement along the DMZ
further complicates national identity, as the North Korean stance will be one of hostility toward
South Korea, interpreting the very presence of the country as an insult and impediment to North
Korean territorial sovereignty, starkly similar to PLO/Palestinian actions toward Israel.
Thus, nation and state building become essential facets to consider in the North Korean
case: both the North Korean populace and the regime are deprived of identity formation, which

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in turn lessens the legitimacy of the institutions in place already within North Korea, all the
while exacerbating issues perceived by the international community. In accepting the frame of a
nation- and state-building “deficit”, North Korean actions are far less irrational and can be
analyzed outside of a realist, zero-sum game. With these theoretical and conceptual definitions in
mind, I can now turn to a review of current policies and their direct relevance to nation- and
state-building. For the sake of simplicity, I will simply draw from the evidence presented in the
literature review and case analyses: for reference to sources, please refer to the corresponding
sections above. The incorporation of very recent developments with respect to DPRK missile
testing will serve to provide real-time evidence for my arguments.
II. Policy Implications on Nation- and State-building with Contemporary Developments
A. Military Policy and Presence: Implications on DPRK Psyche
The first real dynamic to be addressed is the simple military dominance of the US over
North Korea. While not a direct policy, US troops along the DMZ and the general large presence
of US military in the region certainly has implications for identity crises in North Korea. As
discussed in the literature review, it can be argued that North Korean actions can be interpreted
as desperate attempts to gain legitimacy. When the world’s largest military power is also your
primary military and symbolic adversary, this will surely create panic within the DPRK circle of
elites. Thus, the dominance of the US military does little to deter North Korea in my analysis.
While I do suggest that American military may in fact deter the Kim regime from carrying out
direct military attacks, I simultaneously posit that such military presence by the US will only
work to increase North Korean fears of losing recognition and legitimacy. Moreover, Ri Jong
Ryul, the deputy-director general at Pyongyang’s Institute of International Studies, commented
on North Korean postures toward the upcoming election that illuminate such de-legitimization:

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“‘Whether Republicans or Democrats take power, it has nothing to do with us. American
politicians have always had a hostile policy against (North) Korea”’ (Ri in Ripley and Schwartz,
2016). As a result, North Korea will see itself as a perpetual enemy to the world, which, in effect,
compounds and reinforces the North Korean regime’s international identity as being one of a
rogue, aggressive, and irrational state.
Moreover, considering the ceasefire status between North and South Korea, the two
nations are still technically at war! As such, there is very little by means of deterring agents with
respect to North Korean military build up. Without an aggressive posture, the DPRK will lose
what little identity it has managed to build for itself. Considering the Iraqi and Palestinian cases,
support for my position grows: both Iraq and Palestine have engaged/continue to engage in
hostile antics that have been labeled as irrational and terrorist in nature. Both the Iraqi and
Palestinian cases have resulted in great bloodshed, which I suggest should serve as a warning for
North Korea. The lack of an agreed upon border between North-South Korea and Israel-Palestine
causes, in my analysis, both of the “underdog” actors in their respective dynamics to adopt even
more hostile platitudes to defend the land that much of the international community denies to
them, either in real terms or symbolically. This dynamic thus directly connects to notions of
North Korean nuclear armament.
B. Nonproliferation Stance: An Agent of Isolation
In addition to the US military presence having an arguable influence on DPRK identity
formation, I posit that US stances regarding North Korean nuclear proliferation further hinder the
ability for North Korea to nation build. First, the refusal for the US to meet with North Korea in
any capacity unless nuclear proliferation is abandoned causes North Korea to be pushed into a
corner in which they must cede to Western demands before receiving any form of legitimization.

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Returning to the Palestinian case, I believe the US nonproliferation stance is similar in nature to
the forced recognition of Israel by the PLO. Moreover, the DPRK is being met with such
demands by the world’s largest nuclear power and North Korea’s main foe. As a result,
nuclearization becomes even more central to the regime’s identity via structuration, as suggested
by constructivist theory.
Very recent developments on the Korean Peninsula support such a notion. US Presidential
candidate Donald Trump has called for a pullout of the US military from the peninsula and has
suggested that South Korea and Japan develop their own nuclear programs (Ripley and
Schwartz, 2016). Ri (mentioned above) responded, ‘“The U.S. tells us to give up our nuclear
program, is preparing a nuclear attack against us, and on the other hand would tell its allies to
have nuclear weapons. Isn't this (a) double standard?”’ (Ri in Ripley and Schwartz, 2016). Ri
goes on to suggest that such policies exacerbate North Korean nuclear ambitions as a result of
this cornering double-standard, suggesting that non-proliferation not only fails as a policy in that
it achieves the opposite of its goal, but also works to solidify North Korea’s identity as an
isolated as a rogue nuclear state. I suggest this highly dangerous for the development of North
Korean-US developments, and it seems that scholars such as Ri would agree. Alternative routes
to peace agreements can be made, which I will discuss in the policy prescription section.
C. Sanctions-based Approach: Strangling the Populace
Considering evidence presented by the Iraqi case, it seems that sanctions are entirely
ineffective. Sanctions have not curbed DPRK ambitions to achieve nuclear armament, which is
seemingly the main goal of economic sanctions placed on the regime. In response to North
Korea’s most recent nuclear tests in April 2016, the BBC speculates that a potential fifth test
“would be further defiance of tougher sanctions imposed by the UN last month” (“New nuclear

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test”, 2016). Such speculation directly confirms the notions that sanctions fail to deter
proliferation and in fact may only serve to further motivate hostility on the peninsula. Moreover
and perhaps more importantly, economic sanctions have the strongest impact on the populations
of the countries undergoing sanction. Harden’s (2007) article certainly suggests a need for
funding to help provide sustenance to North Korean citizens.
Returning to notions developed by Fukuyama with respect to nation building, sanctions
conceivably undermine entirely the possibility for bottom-up identity creation, thus further
solidifying the power of the autocratic regime. Once again, I posit that current policies toward
North Korea, in this case with particular respect to sanctions, ultimately undermine the goals of
the policies: sanctions, designed to deter North Korean nuclear proliferation, have failed to
achieve this goal and in effect continue to inhibit nation building endeavors by the populace that
I suggest would ultimately ease tensions between North Korea and the outside world. Finally, it
should be noted that sanctions also add to the “rogue state” identity that the regime both
promotes and is forced to adopt, once again touching on structuration theory.
D. Multilateral Elements: Unforeseen Effects and US Regional Hegemony
Finally, I will examine the influence of multilateral elements: as noted in the literature,
there is statistically observable influence that US actions have on North Korean behavior;
moreover, it is arguable that if it holds true the US action toward China affects North Korean
responses, then behavior of China toward the US will provoke US responses, that are then
responded to by North Korea. The same sort of dynamic is demonstrated to occur with respect to
US-South Korean interactions. In short, it is clear that North Korean actions are being motivated
by a plethora of international dynamics that may have nothing to do with the North Korean state.
Accepting these dynamics, responses of the US to North Korean behavior are thus ultimately a

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response, indirectly, to the original US behaviors motivating North Korean action; yet, North
Korea will consistently be punished for its actions. It becomes overwhelmingly clear that such
dynamics severely undermine North Korean attempts to form independently based identity. This
will naturally affect both the DPRK regime and populace, destroying chances of productive
nation or state building.
Multilateral elements can also be seen in an often ignored dynamic occurring on the
North Korean border: human smuggling. As a result of the DPRK’s restriction on North Korean
civilian mobility, the only way out of North Korea is via illegal smuggling routes. While there
are a large number of routes and respective smuggling organizations, Harden’s (2007)
description of the smuggling situation in 2007 is indicative of the multilateral nature of North
Korean emigration out of North Korea: “A low-budget escape through China via Thailand to
Seoul, which requires treacherous river crossings, arduous travel on foot and several miserable
weeks in a Thai immigration jail, can cost less than $2,000, according to four brokers here.” In
my analysis, this highly dangerous route out of North Korea only reinforces to the people of the
DPRK that they are forced to assume the identity of the autocratic regime. International actors
tend to punish the citizens attempting to flee rather than apply pressure on the regime, thus
forcing the people of North Korea to bear the burden of the regime’s identity, an identity I argue
is in part created by international actors. It is then clear that North Korean citizens have little to
no chance of receiving individual legitimacy, completely dashing any chance of bottom-up
nation building.
It should also be noted that the powerful influence of the US on these dynamics could
certainly impact North Korean fears of US hegemony, further informing and inspiring North
Korean actions. Turning to recent policy history, one can easily see how US hegemony becomes

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a real fear for the DPRK: it was not until 2005 that President Bush changed his stance toward
North Korean negotiation policy to one that permitted levels of negotiation. Previously, Bush
had taken a “no-negotiation” stance (Migdal, 2014, p. 256). Such a stance was adopted out of the
Bush administration’s sentiment that any form of negotiation with a regime like North Korea
would be a sign of “weakness” and a “concession to evil” (p. 287). Naturally, thus, North Korea
will understand its position on the international stage as evil and de-legitimized. A blunt refusal
to speak with North Korea certainly plays into structuration theories: the DPRK will see itself as
lacking agency to affect any change in the world, symbolized in the power of US refusal to come
to the negotiation table. The US’ influence on the peninsula, as seen in Jong-Han’s work, is
substantial; thus, a refusal to speak will create a substantial response from North Korea, and
likely one of apathy when Ri’s interview is considered. While apathy toward US domestic
politics may exist within the DPRK, the US’ ability to unilaterally refuse to speak certainly
suggests hegemony to the DPRK. Unaware of its own influence on the psyche and actions of
North Korea, US policies and stances have continued to exacerbate tensions. It was not until
Bush’s second term, Migdal (2014) writes, “with a sense of resignation that his slipping approval
rate and the straits in which the United States found itself internationally forced him into these
unsavory policy shifts” (p. 287). Such a policy shift was a step in the right direction, but perhaps
a step too late. With these conclusions in mind, I will now turn to policy prescription, drawing
upon the latest developments on the peninsula to formulate my suggestions.
Conclusion: Policy Prescription
I. April 2016: Indication of North Korean Legitimization Attempts
In the past several months, North Korea has continued to carry out nuclear tests in spite
of international disdain. Moreover, in the month of April 2016, despite upped UN sanctions,

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North Korea has attempted a launch of a missile that the DPRK suggested could reach the US
mainland. On 18 April 2016, the South Korean president indicated that North Korea is
attempting to conduct yet another nuclear test, news that has not been met kindly by the
international community (“New nuclear test”, 2016). In analyzing the international response and
internal DPRK motivations, my overarching arguments surrounding nation- and state-building
truly come to light and will position me to offer policy prescriptions for this highly timely
international issue.
In response to such speculation, US Deputy Secretary of State Blinken claimed that if
another round of tests are run by the DPRK, the US will respond strongly. Blinken, while
meeting with Japanese officials in Tokyo, “told reporters North Korea would be digging itself
deeper into a hole if it pursued further provocations” (Funakoshi, 2016). In my analysis, such
discourse is simply a replication of the discourse always utilized by the US toward the DPRK, a
notion echoed by Ri in his interview (2016) with CNN (Ripley and Schwartz). As detailed
extensively in this report, such a posture is dangerous and will likely only serve to increase
tensions. North Korea also received criticism from its northern neighbor China, who warned that
further proliferation would only serve to strangle the North Korean economy even more (“China
chides North Korea”, 2016).
However, in my analysis, it seems clear that North Korea is not concerned with economic
sanctions as nothing has prevented the tests. When one turns to speculations surrounding the
Worker’s’ Party Congress, constructivist notions of identity can help to explain this: “Observers
believe Kim is trying to project strength ahead of the crucial Worker's' Party Congress next
month -- where the young leader could gain even more power” (Ripley and Schwartz, 2016). If
one applies constructivist frameworks and structuralist theories, it seems evident that the DPRK

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will continue to test despite sanctions in order to bolster its own internal legitimacy. Evidence
detailed in this research supports this suggestion strongly.
Moreover, the most recent test coincided with Kim Jun Un’s grandfather’s birthday, the
father of the DPRK. (“China chides North Korea”, 2016). Yet again, this indicates some form of
top-down nation-building. The celebration of the regime is central to DPRK identity and it is
widely accepted that the test was in commemoration of the original leader’s birthday. When one
draws from Fukuyama and constructivist ideas of identity, it seems clear that nuclear weapons
are intimately linked with North Korean attempts to form a legitimized identity. Thus, by altering
the discourse surrounding the DPRK internationally and reshaping the focus of policy
approaches, top-down nation-building could perhaps occur with an emphasis on something other
than proliferation. These recent developments serve to educate the following policy prescription.
II. Nuclear Appeasement & Humanitarian Pressure: A New Approach to North Korea
The final portion of this research will attempt to present alternative policies in hopes of
fostering better relations between North Korea and the outside world in such a way that allows
the DPRK to gain legitimacy from the international community while also encouraging new
routes to identity formation. Policy prescription will be brief; as such, it is vital that a firm
understanding of the above claims surrounding identity, structuration, and nation/state-building
has been developed in order to fully understand the reasoning behind the following prescriptions.
This research has presented a large number of issues surrounding current policies toward North
Korea. To review what I have determined as flawed aspects of US and international policies
toward North Korea, I will briefly list concepts discussed in earlier portions of this analysis: US
military dominance, isolating and condemning rhetoric, the ceasefire status between North and
South Korea, lack of North Korean civilian mobility, emphasis on nonproliferation, suggestions

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for Japanese and South Korean proliferation, economic sanctions, and US influence in the
region. It would be impossible to adequately propose policies for each of these concepts, thus
this research will seek to provide alternative policies to address the following: (1) emphasis on
nonproliferation, (2) sanctions based approach, (3) US regional influence, and (4) civilian
immobility.
The policy I propose manages to neatly coalesce the above four facets of the current US
approach in a simplistic paradigm flip; in other words, through utilizing its powerful influence,
the US could feasibly alter its current approach from a “punish first-reward later” (PFRL) model
to a “incentivize first-punish later” (IFPL) model that opens the door to alternative routes for
DPRK national identity formation while simultaneously allowing the US to leverage its own
power in a way that is justifiable. For the sake of simplicity, I will delineate my policy
suggestion in a linear manner, with each step following the previous in a logical and calculated
way. I call my North Korea policy “Nuclear Appeasement & Humanitarian Pressure.”
Nuclear Appeasement & Humanitarian Pressure Policy Prescription
1. US/International Concessions to North Korea (Incentivize First/IF)
a. US will cease condemning rhetoric toward North Korean proliferation and
temporarily allow the DPRK to continue its nuclear program (Nuclear Appeasement)
b. US will encourage UN to drop all economic sanctions against the DPRK (IF)
c. US and UN will work together to develop comprehensive aid package to be given to
North Korea for humanitarian purposes (Humanitarian Pressure)
2. North Korean concessions to US/International Community (Humanitarian Pressure)
a. In order for US/International Community to accept the nuclear program, the North
Korean regime must first immediately shut down all work camps in the country and

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release citizens currently being held: this will occur in a pre-determined period of
time, overseen solely by the DPRK regime. Regime will not be tried for crimes
against humanity in return for closing the camps. Following the closure of camps:
b. The DPRK must accept the aid package under certain stipulations (IF/Humanitarian
Pressure)
c. DPRK must utilize US-UN agreed upon percent of funding in the following two
sectors, which will be a process overseen by a DPRK, Chinese, South Korean, US
joint authority:
i. Infrastructure in rural North Korea
ii. Development of agriculture and food supply to meet demands of Korean
people
d. DPRK must utilize US-UN agree upon percent of funding to develop educational
opportunities for all North Koreans, including the re-integration of all North Korean
citizens currently in concentration camps. This process will initially be overseen by
the DPRK exclusively, allowing the country to adopt its own identity.
e. DPRK must ease border restrictions. This will be a cooperative effort between China
and the DPRK in which North Korean citizens are allowed temporary visits to UN
healthcare facilities in China near the DPRK-Chinese border. Further border
restrictions will be lifted in time; however, this is the proposed starting point.
3. Conditions (Punish Later/PL)
a. In proposing this plan, it is evident that the US, UN, and international community
have worked together diligently to offer a generous aid package to the DPRK

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b. This policy also legitimizes North Korean nuclear program and identity in its
allowance of DPRK oversight of educational program
c. The simple proposal of this policy has dual purpose: if DPRK refuses to accept plan
after reasonable time and rounds of negotiations, international community can and
should use overwhelming force to overthrow the regime quickly and efficiently. All
members of the DPRK regime will be tried for crimes against humanity and lose all
legitimacy.
III. Concluding Remarks
While this policy is certainly not perfect, I strongly believe that through negotiations, the
IFPL model can seek to provide the DPRK with legitimacy while simultaneously justifying
forceful regime change in the face of DPRK refusal. In a sense, the choice becomes obvious for
the DPRK. In accepting the plan, the regime is permitted to stay in power while avoiding losing
face, maintains its nuclear program, and is given the opportunity to be seen as a heroic actor both
domestically and internationally. Over time, the regime and populace no longer will feel such a
need to preserve itself internally, allowing alternative routes to identity formation. Moreover,
without the pressure of being a “rogue state,” the DPRK will have much less incentive to act
aggressively. In refusing the plan, the DPRK has given up all hopes of receiving international
legitimacy and certainly digs its own grave. This policy is open to critique and suggestion: I truly
hope that these suggestions can help to reframe the North Korean issue in a way that serves all
parties’ interests.

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