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Public Lecture Series (2019.2.21) Assessing Reconciliation on the Korean Peninsula, Part 2


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“Clausewitz on His Head – A Paradigm Shift for Durable Peace on the Korean Peninsula,” presented by Dr. David H. Satterwhite on February 21, 2019.

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Public Lecture Series (2019.2.21) Assessing Reconciliation on the Korean Peninsula, Part 2

  1. 1. Assessing Reconciliation on The Korean Peninsula – Contentious History, Summits, Denuclearization, & Prospects for a Paradigm Shift Part One – Mark Caprio "From Collective Responsibility to Collective Solution: The Shared History Korean Peninsula Crises" Part Two – David Satterwhite "Clausewitz on His Head – A Paradigm Shift for Durable Peace on the Korean Peninsula" ICAS Public Lecture Series 21 February 2019 @ TUJ 1
  2. 2. "Clausewitz on His Head – A Paradigm Shift for Durable Peace on the Korean Peninsula" Outline  An intense, 47-yr encounter with Korea – self-introduction  China’s “Century of Humiliation” – Korea’s 125 yrs of incessant war  Decisions w/out Korean input – colonial rule & “blameless” division  Cold War’s 1st Hot War – enduring legacies of perpetual war-footing  A broken “security-first” paradigm – How is “Clausewitz on his head”?  Nuclear-Korea reminder – “Operation Hudson Harbor”, ROK, DPRK pgrms  Stepping-stones towards a Paradigm Shift – key steps to denuclearization  Pomp & Circumstance – but forecasting surprises out of the Hanoi Summit 2
  3. 3. China’s “Century of Humiliation” – Korea’s 125 yrs of incessant war, 1894 to 2019  70 yrs after the “Century of Humiliation” – legacy lingers  Korea’s less-publicized but potent ”Century+ of War”, cont.  1894-1895 – Sino-Japanese War – fought over Korea, Japan wins  1904-1905 – Russo-Japanese War – fought over Korea, Japan wins  1910-1945 – Japan’s Colonial Cultural War – Japan wins, Korea suffers  1945-1950 – Internal warfare, Guerrilla warfare, prelude to a Civil War  1950-1953 – The “Almost Nuclear” but devastating int’l Korean War  1953-present – Armistice, “DMZ”, hair-trigger “Cold War hangover war”  Who wins a war with no end in sight? Who & what are the victims?  How does perpetual war “secure the peace” – or prolong the war?  Might the Hanoi Summit surprise us with the path to a Peace Treaty? 3
  4. 4. Korean Politics 101 – Who, what, when & why was the Korean Peninsula divided?  “We all know who divided the Korean Peninsula” said a seasoned State Dept Japan-hand… but evidently he didn’t!  Reminders of historical context & the Cold War’s 1st step in Asia  WWII in Europe ends in April 1945, E. Europe under Soviet control  Soviet troops transported to Far East, ready to enter war vs. Japan  At Potsdam, Truman learns of the successful test of the Atomic Bomb  Aug 6 Hiroshima, Aug 8 USSR War, Aug 9 Nagasaki, Aug 15 Surrender  Aug 8, Soviet troops enter Korean Peninsula, advance south past 38th  Aug 10-11, U.S. proposes 38th to Stalin – accept Jpn’s surrender, N & S  Stalin agrees, Peninsula is “temporarily” divided, formal states in 1948 [Historical puzzle: did Stalin expect to receive half of defeated Japan?] 4
  5. 5. A broken “security-first” paradigm since the Korean War – How is “Clausewitz on his head”? 5 ”War is but an extension of politics [diplomacy] by other means” – Carl von Clausewitz (1780 - 1831) “War is not merely a political act, but also a real political instrument, a continuation of political commerce, a carrying out of the same by other means” (On War, Book 1, Chap. 1, 24, J.J. Graham 1873 translation) Karl Wilhelm Wach painting
  6. 6. A Security Paradigm in which diplomacy is an afterthought, an extension of war What Korea has witnessed since the Armistice was signed in 1953 is perpetual war – a readiness & calculated capability to engage in active hostilities at any moment, with virtually any means at the security forces’ disposal, including nuclear weapons. “Extension of diplomacy by other means” has been a continuous war, in the almost total absence of diplomacy. In other words, when diplomacy has been attempted, it has been the opposite of what Clausewitz articulated – it has been an “extension of war” rather than “war as the extension of diplomacy...” War has been “in the driver’s seat”; war has been the dominant paradigm; diplomacy has been an afterthought as a part-time endeavor merely as an extension of war by other means. (Satterwhite 2018) 6
  7. 7. As with any dominant paradigm, in Korea, too, there are key assumptions…  An “enemy image” of implicit distrust, doubting any non- belligerent intent;  A portrayal of the DPRK as “unpredictable”, a ”rogue state”;  A sense that “preservation of the regime” is paramount & pathological for the DPRK, ignoring reality that any regime views regime preservation as a natural national priority;  A readiness to engage in warfare, including nuclear weapons deployed in the U.S. arsenal pre-targeted on the DPRK;  A non-negotiable posture of sanctions (“Maximum Pressure”) to force unilateral denuclearization by the DPRK, with no reciprocal security guarantee or U.S. denuclearization steps. 7
  8. 8. Nuclear-Korea & Denuclearization in Context – “Operation Hudson Harbor”, ROK, the DPRK The DPRK can be understood to have embarked on a nuclear weapons’ program in response to the existential threat of nuclear attack it has faced since early in its existence, beginning with “Operation Hudson Harbor” during the Korean War. 8  Oct 1950 – Dummy bombs dropped over Pyongyang by sole B-29s just 5 yrs after the bombing of Hiroshima.  “Davy Crockett” portable atomic canon developed for & deployed in Korea for battlefield use in resumed war.  1958-1993 – only atomic weapons in Korea were U.S.  U.S. strategic forces targeting DPRK are deployed 24/7.
  9. 9. Crafting a paradigm that enables practical steps towards a durable, sustainable peace 1. Timely steps towards a Peace Treaty to replace the Armistice. 2. Full, reciprocal diplomatic relations among DPRK, U.S., Japan. 3. Confidence-building measures in military, cultural, political arenas. 4. Timely lifting of economic sanctions, combined with promotion of a rebuilding of the economic infrastructure to alleviate poverty and build foundations for eventual ROK & DPRK economic integration. 5. Reciprocal reduction in DPRK & ROK offensive military capabilities, combining verifiable denuclearization of DPRK & a verifiable “No First-Use” pledge by the U.S. as key security guarantee to the DPRK. 6. Build jointly-administered institutions fostering systemic trust. 9
  10. 10. Assessing the 2nd U.S.-DPRK Summit – Deliverables, Mging Expectations, Surprises?  Applause for the quiet statesman-like role played by President Moon Jae-In to ensure dialogue stays on track.  Recognition for the bold initiatives taken by Pres. Trump to conduct unprecedented senior-level dialogue with the DPRK.  Exploring reciprocity – what is the U.S. willing to “deliver” in order to begin the long process of verifiable denuclearization?  How will the interests of the Korean people be ensured and reflected by a narcissistic President not nuanced in diplomacy?  Willing to be surprised – steps towards a Peace Treaty? 10