CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. Below are the top three takeaways from the week: 1. None of the parties to Yemen’s civil war are prepared to make concessions required to achieve a peace deal, or even a sustained ceasefire, in the near term. Fighting along key frontlines, as well as airstrikes and ballistic missile fire, resumed with the expiration of a three-day humanitarian ceasefire on October 22. UN Special Envoy for Yemen Ismail Ould Cheikh Ahmed reportedly proposed a peace plan that meets some al Houthi-Saleh demands, but President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi’s administration is unlikely to consider the proposal. The Saudi-led coalition, which backs the Hadi government, will continue to prioritize a military solution over a political deal that allows the al Houthis or former Yemeni president Ali Abdullah Saleh to retain influence in Yemen. The al Houthi-Saleh faction is not close to military defeat, despite coalition offensives on multiple fronts, and will continue to resist a peace framework that does not address its interests. 2. Al Shabaab is increasing its operational tempo in an effort to disrupt Somalia’s fragile parliamentary election process. The group conducted three geographically dispersed attacks within 24 hours, including a raid on a Kenyan border town and a suicide vehicle-borne improvised explosive device attack on an African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) military base in central Somalia. Al Shabaab is also benefitting from large-scale social unrest in Ethiopia, which has forced several Ethiopian AMISOM units to withdraw from Somalia. Al Shabaab will seek to compromise Somalia’s political transition by attacking state and security targets and consolidating control of territory in southern Somalia. 3. The Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) is setting conditions to wage a drawn-out guerrilla war in Libya. ISIS has dispersed attack teams throughout Sirte district in north central Libya. These teams are using hit-and-run tactics and tunnels to attack U.S.-backed forces attempting to seize ISIS’s final bastion in Sirte city. ISIS has also targeted supply lines west of Sirte city, demonstrating its capability to maneuver throughout the region. The use of guerrilla tactics will further prolong the U.S. airstrike mission in Libya. ISIS will continue to operate in Libya, exploiting the country’s ongoing civil war and governance failures, despite the loss of its former stronghold in Sirte.

1. AEI’s Critical Threats Project
Update and Assessment
October 25, 2016

2. 2
TOP THREE TAKEAWAYS
1. The combatants in Yemen’s civil war will not make necessary concessions for
a negotiated political resolution under current conditions.
2. Al Shabaab is increasing its operational tempo in an effort to disrupt Somalia’s
fragile parliamentary election process.
3. The Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) is setting conditions to wage a
drawn-out guerrilla war in Libya.
2
3
1

3. 3
| ASSESSMENTAL QAEDA
Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan, al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent, and al Qaeda associates
Political and military tensions remain high between the Indian and Pakistani governments. Indian Prime Minister Narendra
Modi stated that “Pakistan embraces and radiates the darkness of terrorism.” Jammu and Kashmir Chief Minister Mehbooba
Mufti called on Pakistan to cease cross-border firing in Kashmir. Pakistan submitted a complaint to a UN observatory body
alleging that India violated the ceasefire agreement along the Line of Control.
Outlook: The governments of India and Jammu and Kashmir will continue to pressure Pakistan to halt cross-border firing
and alleged support of Salafi-jihadi militants.
Salafi-jihadi groups continue to conduct high-casualty attacks targeting Pakistani security forces. Militants carried out a
suicide raid at the Balochistan Police College in Quetta, Balochistan province, killing at least 59 personnel and wounding
approximately 100 others. ISIS Wilayat Khorasan claimed responsibility for the attack, though Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ) or a
Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) splinter group, Jamatul Ahrar, may also be responsible. The presence of multiple Salafi-
jihadi groups in Pakistan may be triggering competition between the groups for support and influence.
Pakistan’s Counter Terrorism Department (CTD) continued operations targeting Salafi-jihadi militants following Pakistani
Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif’s call to crack down on militant groups. Most of the operations targeted TTP militants in the
Sindh and Punjab provinces. The CTD claimed to eliminate LeJ, a Pakistan-based Salafi-jihadi group known for sectarian
attacks, in Punjab on October 21.
Outlook: Multiple Salafi-jihadi groups will continue to target security forces, as well as state, judicial, and sectarian targets,
in the Balochistan region.

4. 4
| ASSESSMENT:
Political
The major players in Yemen’s civil war are not willing to make the concessions required for a peace deal under current
conditions. UN Special Envoy for Yemen Ismail Ould Cheikh Ahmed proposed a peace plan that addresses some demands
of the al Houthi-Saleh faction, but internationally recognized Yemeni President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi’s administration,
backed by the Saudi-led coalition, remains committed to a peace framework that requires the al Houthi-Saleh faction to
disarm and withdraw from seized territory before negotiations proceed.
Outlook: The parties to Yemen’s civil war will continue to pursue a military solution as the country’s humanitarian crisis
worsens.
Security
Hostilities resumed along the frontlines in Hajjah, Taiz, Lahij, Sa’ada, and Ma’rib governorates following a 72-hour
humanitarian ceasefire. The Saudi-led coalition escalated airstrikes targeting al Houthi-Saleh positions in al Hudaydah
governorate on Yemen’s Red Sea coast, possibly in response to a series of anti-ship missile attacks from al Houthi-Saleh-
held territory in mid-October. Al Houthi-Saleh forces continued cross-border attacks on Yemen’s northern border in
response to coalition-backed efforts to seize territory in Sa’ada governorate, the al Houthis’ historic stronghold.
Outlook: Hostilities will continue to escalate in the Saudi-Yemeni border region.
Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and ISIS in Yemen
AQAP is exploiting the civil war to build relationships with anti-al Houthi forces in central Yemen. AQAP-affiliated Ansar al
Sharia continues to fight on the al Bayda, Taiz, and Ibb frontlines, where it targeted al Houthi-Saleh field commanders
between October 18 and 23. AQAP maintains a support zone in Ma’rib governorate. A reported U.S. airstrike targeted
members of the AQAP affiliate Sons of Hadramawt in Ma’rib on October 21, indicating that Sons of Hadramawt members
may have relocated to Ma’rib after losing control of al Mukalla, Hadramawt in April 2016.
Outlook: AQAP will expand its area of operations throughout southern and central Yemen as the war continues.
GULF OF ADEN YEMEN

5. 5
| SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:GULF OF ADEN YEMEN
1) 18, 20 OCT:
Coalition air defenses
intercepted ballistic
missiles in Ma’rib.
2) 20-21 OCT: Hadi
government forces
advanced in Sa’ada.
3) 20, 24 OCT: Al
Houthi-Saleh forces
shelled Saudi
positions in Jazan
region, Saudi Arabia.
4) 17-23 OCT: AQAP
clashed with al Houthi-
Saleh forces in Ibb.
5) 19, 23 OCT: Al
Houthi-Saleh forces
launched ballistic
missiles towards
Najran, Saudi Arabia.
6) 21 OCT: A reported
U.S. airstrike targeted
AQAP in Ma’rib.
2
3
5
4
1 6

6. 6
| ASSESSMENT:
Political
Somali Upper House elections continue to produce mixed results. Approximately half the Somali state administrations
conducted elections that did not meet constitutional regulations, including the thirty percent requirement for female
representation. The administrations achieved varying success in preventing candidates with violent or controversial pasts
from winning seats. Lower House elections pose a more complex security and logistical challenge to the Somali federal
state. Lower House elections will involve significantly larger delegate lists and more polling locations. Officials insist Lower
House elections will take place between October 23 and November 10.
Outlook: Somali officials will likely delay the Lower House elections until early 2017.
Security
Al Shabaab is capitalizing on the absence of AMISOM forces to advance in Hiraan region. Al Shabaab seized El Ali and
Halgan after Ethiopian AMISOM troops withdrew on October 11 and October 22. Ethiopian forces are withdrawing from
Somalia to quell growing protests by the Oromo ethnic group in Ethiopia. Ethiopian forces have abandoned at least seven
other towns since August 2016. Al Shabaab likely exploited this security vacuum to launch a complex attack on a Djiboutian
AMISOM base in Beledweyne, Hiraan region on October 25.
Outlook: Al Shabaab will seize population centers abandoned by Ethiopian forces in the Hiraan region.
Al Shabaab
Al Shabaab continues to target Kenyan civilians along the northern Kenya-Somali border. Al Shabaab militants launched an
overnight attack on a lodge in Mandera town, Mandera County, Kenya on October 25 that killed 12 civilians. Al Shabaab
launched a similar attack in Mandera town on October 5. Kenyan officials announced plans to train a new border defense
group, but regional politicians are demanding more security support from the central government.
Outlook: The increase in attacks on the Kenya-Somalia border and the Ethiopian troop withdrawal may cause Kenya to
deploy additional forces inside Somalia.
GULF OF ADEN HORN OF AFRICA

7. 7
| SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:GULF OF ADEN HORN OF AFRICA
1) 22-23 OCT: Al
Shabaab occupied
Halgan area, Hiraan
region after Ethiopian
AMISOM forces
withdrew.
2) 24 OCT: Puntland
and Galmudug forces
clashed near Galkayo,
Mudug region.
3) 25 OCT: Al
Shabaab attacked
Kenyan civilians in
Mandera town, Kenya.
4) 25 OCT: Al
Shabaab attacked a
Djiboutian AMISOM
base in Beledweyne,
Hiraan region.
5) 25 OCT: Al
Shabaab gunmen
assassinated a SNA
general in Mogadishu.
4
2
3
1
5

8. 8
| ASSESSMENT:
Political
The political process in Libya is stalled as the UN-backed Government of National Accord (GNA) faces challenges to its
legitimacy from the east and west. GNA Prime Minister Fayez al Serraj is attempting to reassert the GNA’s authority in the
capital Tripoli, where unrest among anti-GNA militias remains a threat following an attempted coup by a rump parliament.
Serraj is also seeking negotiations with the Libyan National Army (LNA), which is consolidating its military and economic
power in eastern Libya. Serraj lacks the political capital to bring together competing factions in support of the GNA.
Outlook: Serraj’s efforts to ally with the LNA may spark backlash from the GNA’s current supporters.
Security
The Libyan National Army (LNA) may be preparing for a renewed offensive against the Benghazi Revolutionaries Shura
Council (BRSC), an Islamist militant group that includes al Qaeda associate Ansar al Sharia, with Egyptian military support.
Egyptian military sources claim that Egypt is providing military support for the LNA’s counterterrorism operations without
breaking the UN arms embargo. The LNA may be supplying oil to Egypt in exchange for military support.
Outlook: The LNA will resume offensive operations on the besieged Qanfouda neighborhood, where both the BRSC and
ISIS Wilayat Barqa are operating.
Ansar al Sharia and Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) in Libya
ISIS may be starting a guerrilla-style campaign against US-backed forces throughout central Libya’s Sirte district. ISIS
militants left in Sirte are adapting to U.S. airstrikes through increased hit-and-run tactics and tunnels recently discovered by
GNA-allied forces. ISIS has also positioned attack teams outside of Sirte city to ambush supply lines into the city.
Outlook: The diffusion of ISIS militants outside of Sirte city will likely result in a months-long guerilla war throughout Sirte
district.
WEST AFRICA LIBYA

9. 9
| SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:WEST AFRICA LIBYA
1) 18 OCT: ISIS
wounded 64 GNA-
allied militiamen in
Sirte.
2) 20 OCT: The Subol
al Salam Brigade, a
Salafi militia possibly
allied with the LNA,
killed 13 Sudanese
JEM militants in
Jaghbub.
3) 22 OCT: GNA-allied
militias seized the 600
complex in Sirte.
4) 22 OCT: The anti-
GNA Tripoli
Revolutionaries
Brigade demonstrated
in Tripoli.
5) 24 OCT: A car
bomb killed an LNA
soldier in al Sirati,
Benghazi.
31
4
5
2

10. 10
| ASSESSMENT:
Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and ISIS in the Maghreb
Tunisian authorities disrupted an ISIS attack that may have been ordered by ISIS leadership in Libya or Iraq and Syria. The
plan reportedly included two attack teams that would infiltrate Tunisia from Libya to assassinate the Tunisian interior
minister and conduct an explosive attack on the Tunisian parliament building.
Outlook: ISIS will attempt to plan another spectacular attack on Tunisia using Libya as a support zone.
Uqba ibn Nafa’a (Tunisia)
Tunisia achieved an important milestone in its democratic transition. The country held its first elections for its High Judicial
Council, replacing the direct appointment of Judicial Council members by government officials.
Outlook: The Tunisian government will continue efforts to reform the country’s political and economic systems. Difficult
economic reforms and high unemployment are most likely to spark popular backlash.
Associated Movements in the Sahel (Ansar al Din, al Murabitoun, Boko Haram)
A self-declared pro-ISIS group may be increasing the pace and size of its attacks in the Sahel region. The group’s leader,
who has ties to the AQIM network, claimed responsibility for two attacks in Burkina Faso and Niger. AQIM remains the
dominant militant group in the Sahel region.
Nigerian security forces are struggling to make battlefield gains against Boko Haram despite the government’s claims that
the group is essentially defeated. Military commanders contradicted the official reports by leaking to the press that most
casualties from a clash between Nigerian forces and pro-ISIS Boko Haram militants in mid-October occurred when soldiers
abandoned their posts. The militants captured as many as 85 Nigerian soldiers, who chose to surrender rather than fight.
Outlook: Salafi-jihadi groups will attempt to expand recruitment in Burkina Faso. Corruption within the Nigerian government
and military will continue to undermine operations against Boko Haram.
WEST AFRICA MAGHREB AND SAHEL

11. 11
| SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:WEST AFRICA MAGHREB
1) 17-21 OCT:
Tunisian security
forces arrested ISIS
militants in Sousse,
Monastir and Tunis for
allegedly planning to
assassinate the
interior minister and
bomb the parliament
building.
2) 25 OCT: Tunisian
police arrested two
American brothers
from Michigan in
Jendouba
Governorate on
terrorism charges.
3) 24 OCT: Tunisian
police arrested four
suspected militants in
Tajerouine, Kef
Governorate.
1
3
2

12. 12
| SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:WEST AFRICA SAHEL
1) 24 OCT: Burkinabe
police pursued
suspected Salafi-jihadi
recruiters in
Ouagadougou and
killed one suspected
militant.
2) 19 OCT: Militants
killed a Malian nurse
on a roadway in
Gossi, Gao Region.
3) 24 OCT: The
Civilian Joint Task
Force killed seven
Boko Haram militants
in Hansta, Adamawa
State, Nigeria.
2
3
1

13. 13
ACRONYMS
African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)
al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)
al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS)
Coordination for the Movement of the Azawad (CMA)
Imghad Tuareg and Allies Self-Defense Group (GATIA)
Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham (ISIS)
Libyan National Army (LNA)
Arab Movement of Azawad (MAA)
United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA)
Mujahideen Shura Council in Derna (MSCD)
National Movement for the Liberation of the Azawad (MNLA)
The Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO)
Pakistani Military (PakMil)
Possible military dimensions (PMD)
Somalia National Army (SNA)
Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)

14. 14
Katherine Zimmerman
research manager
katherine.zimmerman@aei.org
(202) 888-6576
Paul Bucala
Iran analyst
paul.bucala@aei.org
(202) 888-6573
Marie Donovan
Iran analyst
marie.donovan@aei.org
(202) 888-6572
Heather Malacaria
program manager
heather.malacaria@aei.org
(202) 888-6575
Emily Estelle
al Qaeda analyst
emily.estelle@aei.org
(202) 888-6570
Caitlin Pendleton
Iran analyst
caitlin.pendleton@aei.org
(202) 888-6577
For more information about AEI’s Critical Threats Project, visit www.criticalthreats.org.
Frederick W. Kagan
director
fkagan@aei.org
(202) 888-6569