Political administrative relations impact of and puzzles in aberbach, putnam, and rockman, 1981

Political-Administrative Relations: Impact of and
Puzzles in Aberbach, Putnam, and Rockman, 1981
KWANG-HOON LEE* and JOS C.N. RAADSCHELDERS*
Political-administrative relations became an issue once politicians and
administrators came to be considered as distinct actors in the public realm.
This happened in the late eighteenth century, and several authors since then
explored the nature of this relationship in normative and/or juridical terms.
But it took almost two centuries before it became an object of systematic
empirical study in a comparative perspective: Aberbach, Putnam, and
Rockman (APR 1981). The APR study was the first to use survey methods
and to advance empirically based theory. In this article we discuss the
intellectual attention for this topic since the early nineteenth century,
APR’s findings and impact and—given APR’s influence upon methods—
some intriguing problems with the framework that they developed. Finally
we list some potential new avenues of research.
Introduction
The interest in political-administrative relations and concern about bureau-
cratization dates back to the nineteenth century, but until the 1940s studies
were either normative by nature, advocating some degree of separation
between politics and administration (in the United States, e.g., Goodnow
1900; Wilson [1887] 2005) or discussed the growing influence of civil
servants on policymaking (Appleby 1949; Leys 1943; Weber 1985). After
the 1940s scholars increasingly argued that the politics-administration
dichotomy did not reflect the emerging reality of increasing civil service
discretion and influence (e.g., Mosher [1968] 1982; Svara 1985, 1998, 2001)
and that empirical research was needed to illuminate the dynamics of the
relation between politicians and bureaucrats.
Surprisingly, systematic data collection and analysis of the development
and status of political-administrative relations was not done until the
1970s. The research presented by Aberbach, Putnam and Rockman (here-
after APR, 1981) is the first comparative book-length manuscript.1
Since
the publication of Bureaucrats and Politicians in Western Democracies, the
study of political-administrative relations has blossomed and expanded.
This article demonstrates how the APR study fits in the intellectual devel-
opment of attention for this topic.
*University of Oklahoma
Governance: An International Journal of Policy, Administration, and Institutions, Vol. 21, No. 3,
July 2008 (pp. 419–438).
© 2008 The Authors
Journal compilation © 2008 Wiley Periodicals, Inc., 350 Main St., Malden, MA 02148, USA,
and 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford, OX4 2DQ, UK. ISSN 0952-1895

We will first briefly trace the study of political-administrative relations
to the intellectual tradition of Hegel’s political theory and to Weber’s
comparative-historical observations (first section). Next we discuss the
content and main theses of APR’s book and subsequent studies (second
section). Then we address APR’s impact on the substantive study of
political-administrative relations (third section) and examine some
intriguing problems in their theory and methodology (fourth section). The
latter is important because their approach has been quite influential and
often replicated. We will conclude with some observations about emerging
lines of research (fifth section).
The Intellectual Attention for Political-Administrative Relations
In light of history, the distinction between politicians and administrators is
very recent. For most of history, government offices were held by individu-
als belonging to the social-economic elite, while the population at large had
little to no influence. The distinction made between political and nonpo-
litical, that is, administrative, officeholders rests basically upon the need
for a less corrupt and more expert civil service that was separate from the
direct and personal influence of politics so that knowledgeable and meri-
torious candidates rather than friends or relatives would be appointed.
Such a nonpoliticized bureaucracy emerged in Europe between 1780–1830
(Church 1981, 129; Hattenhauer 1978, 182; Parris 1969, 33). Since the 1780s
the number of nonpolitical, civil service career positions started to become
significantly larger than that of political (elected or politically appointed)
positions in public organizations (Chester 1981, 286). For instance, the
percentage of civil servants (i.e., white collar, desk workers) in four Dutch
municipalities amounted from 5.4% in 1800 to 31.1% in 1980, while that of
political officeholders declined from a little more than 11% in 1800 to about
2.5% in 1980 (Raadschelders 1994, 417).
Hegel is the first scholar to consider the role and position of civil
servants in relation to the executive as part of a more encompassing
philosophy of right (Gale and Hummel 2003; Shaw 1992). He holds that
executive power depends upon civil servants (Hegel [1821] 1942, 189–190)
given their impartiality and their “knowledge and proof of ability” (190–
192). To Hegel a civil servant is more than a mere mechanical executor of
political will and brings moral consciousness to an otherwise technical
administrative activity. Civil servants are supposed to be recruited from
among a politically conscious and educated middle class that is the pillar
of the state (193, 291). He argues that contemporary civil servants are the
new Platonic guardians of the universal (i.e., state) will.2
In this sense,
Hegel’s perspective is normative and juridical.
It was Weber who developed a sociological perspective on political-
administrative relations without disregarding the normative and juridical
angles. He believed that civil servants should “remain outside the realm of
the [political] struggle of power” (Weber 1968, 1404).3
They were respon-
420 KWANG-HOON LEE AND JOS C.N. RAADSCHELDERS

sible for sincerely executing orders of their political leaders. At the same
time, though, Weber found that no action or problem is so technical that it
is without political content, foreshadowing Waldo’s point of view some
decades later. In addition, Weber emphasized a legal, rational, and expert
bureaucracy as necessary, arguing that a “less competent administrative
staff might prove a more pliable instrument . . . in a political system based
on strongly-held beliefs” (Diamant 1962, 85). He also acknowledged the
emerging power of bureaucracy when observing that “[i]n a modern state
the actual ruler is necessarily and unavoidably the bureaucracy. . . . It is
[civil servants] who decide on all our everyday needs and problems”
(Weber 1968, 1393).
The distinction between Hegel and Weber is also visible in the works of
Goodnow and Wilson. Goodnow is closer to Hegel than to Weber for
advocating a (nonspecified) degree of administrative independence, that
is, that administration should mostly be separate from politics in order to
avoid corruption (Goodnow 1900, 45, 82). Wilson appears to separate the
politics and administration on a basis more comparable to Weber, regard-
ing administration as the application of technical principles. In practice as
in theory, the distinction between civil servants and politicians solidified
in Europe from the early nineteenth century. In the United States and at the
end of that century, advocates of scientific management focused on effi-
ciency while social reformers clamored for anticorruption measures. Both
groups asserted that efficiency and reform would be best served if admin-
istration were largely separated from politics. The role of administrators
continued to increase and even overshadowed that of political officehold-
ers (Leys 1943). In response to growing bureaucratic influence throughout
the twentieth century, increased political control over bureaucratic
power was advocated (Weber 1968, 1408, 1417). In the late nineteenth and
early twentieth century new political offices were created (Lee and
Raadschelders 2005; Light 1995) and (new) top civil service positions were
politicized (see Raadschelders and Van der Meer 1998, 28–33). Throughout
the twentieth century politicians have created agencies outside direct
bureaucratic (i.e., departmental) control, and in the latter part of the twen-
tieth century performance measures and benchmarking represent efforts
to make bureaucratic activity even more transparent.
Findings in APR and Changes since Then
The APR study was initiated by the University of Michigan’s Comparative
Elites Project, which aimed to collect data about attitudes and beliefs of top
political and administrative officeholders.4
The data for the study were
gathered mainly between 1970 and 1974 on the basis of “open-ended, yet
largely structured” interviews with top officials (APR 1981, 33).5
Bureau-
crats and Politicians in Western Democracies (1981) included material on
Britain, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Sweden, and the United
States, and was the capstone to a project that had led to 17 articles and
POLITICAL-ADMINISTRATIVE RELATIONS 421

several books up to 1981.6
The behavioral and attitudinal data was system-
atically presented throughout the book and interpreted in terms of a
framework of four images of political-administrative relations. Both the
data as well as the fourth of their images have attracted much attention.7
The four images of interaction between political and bureaucratic
officeholders (Table 1) have been subject to much discussion and misun-
derstanding and even confusion. The authors assumed Image I and II as
more descriptive of bureaucrats at lower levels, while considering Image
III and IV as more illustrative of the higher levels (APR 1981, 20). Inter-
preting their findings in light of the four images, APR concluded that the
civil servants’ role had evolved from Image I to II and even III. They
carefully voiced the potential for advancing toward Image IV (238–239).
APR presented the social, economic, educational, and political charac-
teristics of civil servants. Generally, civil servants came from more privi-
leged social origins than political officeholders and were not very
representative of the population, especially so in France and Italy (APR
1981, 51, 56, 61–64). They enjoyed a higher educational background with
an emphasis on law in France and Germany, on the humanities in Britain,
and on the hard sciences in the United States (50–51). In regard to political
ideology, politicians were more inclined to sympathize both with pluralist
politics and egalitarian or participatory populism (176–190), while bureau-
crats appeared to be low on populism (206–207). In regard to national
characteristics, the British were highest on pluralism, while the Italians
were lowest; egalitarianism was strongest in Sweden; and populism
surprisingly strong among German civil servants (180–181, 188).
Next, APR turned to the role of civil servants in policymaking and
expressed surprise when finding that bureaucrats were heavily involved
in mediating and reconciling interests (89–91). At the same time, political
officeholders were clearly more partisan and served more particularistic
purposes, while civil servants fulfilled more the roles of bureau technician
and broker, serving a collective purpose (109–111). In terms of the inter-
TABLE 1
Four Images of Interaction between Political Officeholders and Civil Servants
(APR 1981, 4–16)
Separation Pure Hybrid
Image I Image II Image III Image IV
Politicians Policy Interests (political
sensitivity)
Energy (passion,
idealism)
Civil
servants
Administration Facts (neutral
expertise)
Equilibrium
(pragmatism,
caution)
Authors Wilson,
Goodnow
Simon Rose

actions between politicians and bureaucrats, they distinguished three
types: cabinet bureaucrats insulated from politics (the United Kingdom,
the Netherlands, and Sweden), relatively frequent contacts (Germany and
Italy), and interdependency (the United States) (233–235).8
More interest-
ingly, the authors noticed clear differences between the United States and
Europe on the degree of intertwinement between political and adminis-
trative elites. U.S. civil servants played more political roles as advocates,
policy entrepreneurs, and even partisans than their European colleagues,
while American political officeholders were more active technicians
than their European counterparts (APR 1981, 94–98). APR argued that
American elites overlapped more than in Europe because of U.S. institu-
tional history (243). European civil servants were more situated at the
ideological center and slightly more conservative than Members of Parlia-
ment, while American bureaucrats were as scattered across the political
spectrum as members of Congress but lightly skewed to the left (119–125).
Has anything changed in political-administrative relations since the
publication of APR’s book? Generally, little change has been reported in
social-cultural background. For instance, despite intense struggles about
the role of the public sector through the three decades (1970s–1990s), the
American higher civil servants still remain a well-educated, experienced,
and highly motivated group, as they were in 1970 (Aberbach 2003b). In the
United Kingdom, the civil service is still ideologically located in the center
and appears to have moved away somewhat from Image III into the
direction of Image I (Wilson and Barker 2003). German civil servants are
still left of center (Derlien 2003). For Belgium, the civil service is ideologi-
cally moderate and right of center (Dierickx 2003).9
Bigger change has
been reported with regard to educational background. By and large, law
has become less and the social sciences more important as a preparation
for the civil service career.10
The same phenomenon has been observed
in other European countries (Page and Wright 1999, 2007) and in the
European Union (Page 1997).
With regard to politicization APR (1981) hypothesized that it would not
encroach much upon professionalism of bureaucracy, and this was indeed
confirmed. At the same time they assumed that partisan appointment
would influence administrative activities (260–261), but this was found to
be the case only to a limited extent. For instance, despite their partisanship
for career development, German civil servants are often critical of the
consequences of politicization (Mayntz and Derlien 1989, 399–400). The
degree of politicization depends more upon institutional factors as coun-
tries in the Westminster tradition show. For example, the ideological close-
ness between parties and the low number of political transitions keep
Canadian deputy ministers from being politicized (Bourgault and Dion
1989, 139–140). The Belgian bureaucracy is an interesting case. Belgian
senior civil servants are marginalized, since ministerial staffers assist min-
isters and act like a hub of contacts among parliamentarians, ministers,
and civil servants (Dierickx 2003, 328–329).

Neutrality and politicization of bureaucrats are also influenced by the
historical development of the political system. For instance, in Europe,
bureaucracy historically preceded democracy, whereas democracy in
the United States was followed by bureaucratization (Derlien 1996, 150;
Nelson 1982, 774–775). Consequently, U.S. political parties used the
emerging bureaucracy for their interests and spoils, while their European
counterparts, as more programmatic and disciplined, endeavored to
control the growing bureaucracy through, for example, enhanced controls
over top career appointments (Nelson 1982, 774–775). APR noted that
dissimilar attitudes between European and the U.S. elites were attributed
to differences in constitutional development, electoral and party systems,
and political institutions (21–23). In terms of recruitment for top bureau-
cratic positions, national differences have been found. The United States
appears to emphasize loyalty and political responsiveness to the govern-
ment in power; the British model stresses expertise of top-ranking civil
servants, while the German model combines loyalty and expertise (Derlien
1996, 156–157). In terms of party affiliation, while the United States and
Britain ban civil servant membership of political parties, Germany and the
Netherlands allow it (Derlien 1996, 153).
Perhaps the most noticeable difference between APR’s initial con-
clusions and research results since then regards the degree to which
Image IV became less rather than more the direction to which political-
administrative relations evolved. Initially, several examples of movement
toward Image IV were noticed. For instance, Image IV was considered
more possible in the United States than in any other country (Aberbach
and Rockman 1988, 23), and a higher civil service as “political careerists”
was in fact rising in the United States (Heclo 1984, 18–20, also cited in
Campbell and Peters 1988, 93; Light 1995). The blending of expert knowl-
edge and political commitment through intertwinement of the Special
Advisers to the Prime Minister and the politically partisan think tanks in
Britain during the 1970s and 1980s also suggested a movement toward
Image IV (Bulmer 1988, 30–40). Another example was that Swedish under-
secretaries mostly viewed themselves as hybrids between civil servants
and politicians in 1990, while they mainly saw themselves as civil servants
in 1971 (Ehn et al. 2003, 440). Notwithstanding this perceived increasing
intertwinement, political control was observed to have intensified since
the early 1980s (Aberbach 2003a; Aberbach and Rockman 1997; Bulmer
1988; Campbell and Wilson 1995; Derlien 2003; Ehn et al. 2003; Mayntz
and Derlien 1989). The intensification of political control over bureaucracy
may well be due to the influence of New Public Management (NPM).
While the impact of NPM in general varied from country to country, its
influence upon political-administrative relations seems to be quite uni-
form.11
These findings suggest that the development toward Image IV is
not fully formed in some political systems or vary over countries. Theo-
retical discussion of Image IV (next section) helps to explain the national
variances in the development.

Impact of APR on the Study of Political-Administrative Relations
Until the late 1970s political-administrative relations were often studied
as part of a more general analysis of political-administrative systems
(Suleiman 1974, 1978, on France; Mayntz 1978, on Germany). The APR
study certainly helped in defining this as a research topic in its own right
and has had a large impact in terms of substantive focus and methodology.
First, the APR study initiated the investigation of the characteristics of
top-elected and administrative officeholders and the relations between
them on the basis of interviews rather than the hitherto customary inves-
tigation of departments and agencies in the United States. In addition, it
started to move comparative study of this phenomenon beyond the
United Kingdom and the United States. Second, the study is considered as
an example of the empirical inquiry fueled by the behavioral revolution
during which theory development was less important than a solid, data-
based account of various aspects of bureaucracy (Pierre 1995, 5–6). Much
of this empirical work involves national country studies (Derlien 1992,
295). Finally, and most importantly, judged by the number of replications
and further inquiry into national circumstances, APR’s work must be
regarded as a landmark, having enlarged and enriched the topic. In the
words of Campbell (1988) it represented “the most direct challenge to the
policy/administration dichotomy” (246), Derlien (1992) called it an out-
standing comparative study (295), and Peters and Pierre (2001, 1) wrote
that “the standard corpus of literature on the role perceptions and actions
of civil servants and politicians comes out of the work of [APR].”
It is not until the late 1980s that attention for this topic picks up steam.
Considering the year of publication and the years scholars needed to collect
and report data, this time lag is not surprising. Aberbach and Rockman
continued in this area of research, fueling interest through the symposium
dedicated to this topic in the inaugural issue of Governance (1988) that
contained, next to an introductory article by Aberbach and Rockman
(1988), country-specific pieces on the United Kingdom (Bulmer 1988)
and Germany (Derlien 1988) and a piece on the politics-administration
dichotomy (Campbell and Peters 1988). Aberbach and Rockman (1997,
2000) continued to publish and in 2003 another symposium appeared in
Governance (with Aberbach, Derlien, Dierickx, Ehn et al., and Wilson and
Barker).Authors in these two special issues, though, did not all focus on the
same categories of officials and focused on career civil servants’ relations
with political appointees at the top of departments rather than on relations
with members of parliament.12
Next to these two special issues, several
articles have been published since 1988 that explicitly revisit elements of the
APR study (Aberbach et al. 1990, comparing United States and Germany;
Bourgault and Dion 1989, 1993, on Canada; Campbell 1988, on Image IV in
various countries; Genieys 2005, on France; Gregory 1991, on Australia and
New Zealand; Hacek 2006, on Slovenia; Hart and Wille 2006, on the
Netherlands; Mayntz and Derlien 1989, on Germany).13

Scholars also expanded and/or refined the four images, specifically
Image IV. Campbell (1988), and Campbell and Peters (1988) elaborated
Image IV by distinguishing three subtypes: Image IV.1 represents the
reactive career bureaucrats; Image IV.2a the pro-active, permanent civil
servants who operate as policy professional and who exercise cross-cutting
gamesmanship; and, Image IV.2b the pro-active, party-political bureaucrat
with corner-fighting gamesmanship. Campbell (1988) presented examples
of each in various Western countries (including Japan) (250). Gregory (1991)
studied the degree to which civil servants were programmatically commit-
ted and tolerant of politics, while reminding us of APR’s typology of
bureaucrats and politicians in terms of populism and pluralism. He merged
Campbell’s three Image IV subtypes with APR’s four images (Table 2).
These theoretical elaborations reflect that the political-administrative rela-
tions in Image IV are not always the same across countries and across
governmental departments or agencies.
The literature referenced so far concerns political-administrative rela-
tions at the level of federal or national government, but APR has also
reinvigorated research into the relations between elected officials and
administrators at the local level both in America and Europe.14
As far as
the local level in the United States is concerned, the study on the council-
manager model indeed looked at the political-administrative relations in
American cities before APR but focused on suitable functions and divi-
sions between elected officials and administrators, that is, a juridical per-
spective. Many studies since the 1950s found that the roles and powers of
city managers had increased (Adrian 1958; Morgan and Kirkpatrick 1972;
Reynolds 1965; Saltzstein 1974; Stillman 1974).
In the middle of 1980s, Svara (1985) mapped four models of the council-
manager system (i.e., political-administrative relations) at the local
level on the basis of extensive literature review: a policy-administration
dichotomy, mixture in policy, mixture in administration, and co-equals in
policy. He observed, though, that none of these captured reality entirely.
TABLE 2
Roles of Administrators in Terms of Political Tolerance and Programmatic
Commitment (Gregory 1991, 326)
Programmatic
Commitment
Tolerance of Politics
High Low
High (Pro-active) Political bureaucrats
(IV2a, IV.2b)
Technocrats (II, IV2a)
Low (Reactive) Traditional bureaucrats
(IV.1, III)
Classical bureaucrats
(I, II, III)
Note: Close comparison of the original table in Gregory (1991, 326) and the accompanying
text (326–327) shows that the text is more nuanced than the table. We have adapted the table
in the spirit of the text.

Later Svara (1998) observed that a strict separation of the two spheres was
unproductive and that elected officials and administrators complemented
each other. Politicians should show respect for the administrator’s com-
petence and trust their commitment to accountability and responsiveness
(Svara 2001, 179). APR was not referenced in these articles. But, in an
extensive empirical and comparative study of political-administrative
relations at the top in local government, APR is referenced several times
but then to point to similarities and differences in characteristics of and
interactions between federal or national and local government elected
officeholders and civil servants (Mouritzen and Svara 2002).
Mouritzen and Svara (2002) distinguish four types of administrator
roles (Table 3). They insist that the case of separate roles is closest to APR’s
Image II and that the case of overlapping roles is closest to Image III. They
acknowledge the possibility of closer interdependency at the local level
but refer to APR and others to argue that “complementarity in relation-
ships is a general phenomenon at the apex of all governments” (287). Since
then several articles concerning local government elites have been pub-
lished (Dunn and Legge 2002; French and Folz 2004, on the United States;
Hansen and Ejersbo 2002, on Denmark; Jacobsen 2005, 2006a, 2006b, on
Norway). More study of local civil service systems at large is necessary (cf.
Kuhlmann and Bogumil 2007).
Even though it is found that the “gap” between politicians and bureau-
crats has been widening since the early 1980s, in particular in the United
States (Aberbach and Rockman 1997, 347–348), Image IV is nonetheless a
powerful image since it forces people to consider the desired nature of
interaction between the two groups of public sector actors. We will discuss
the features of Image IV in more detail next.
Intriguing Problems of the APR Study
While APR has greatly advanced and inspired empirical research into
political-administrative relations, the theoretical meaning of their work
TABLE 3
Models of Political-Administrative Relations Concerning Hierarchical
Relations and Relative Distinctness of Officeholders (Mouritzen and Svara
2002, 26–42)
Separation
of Roles
Supremacy of Political Norms
High Low
High Separation from political
involvement but not administrative
involvement in policy
Autonomous administrator
Low Responsive administrators Overlapping roles

has much less been scrutinized. In this section we will focus on three
intriguing problems of the APR study.15
The first problem concerns the
moment that the theoretical model of four images was constructed. The
content of the images is the second problem. The third is by far the most
intriguing: the coherence and consistency of the four images’ framework.
The first problem concerns the question when, exactly, the authors
developed their four images and their content. APR observed that the
Weberian distinction between the world of political officeholders and top
bureaucrats was supported by their data and fitting well with their Image
II (APR 1981, 84, 89). But they also observed the likelihood that both
groups of actors were involved in policymaking and thus in political
activity (85). They wrote: “Bureaucrats are more likely to focus on broker-
ing than legislators . . . because they are more deeply involved with the
concrete details of policy decisions than are the legislative politicians”
(90). And then they expressed that such a finding was “one of [their] most
striking and unexpected findings” (91, emphasis added; but see Aberbach
and Rockman 1977). If unexpected, the question is legitimate to ask
whether the framework of four images was developed prior to the inter-
views or an outcome of them. The language throughout APR suggests the
latter. If that is the case, one could argue that it should not have been
presented as a theory framing the interpretation of the study’s findings
but as an important theoretical contribution coming out of empirical
work. Subsequent authors seem to treat the images as a result (rather than
a start) that can be tested in other times and contexts (especially Images II,
III, and IV).
As far as the content of the four images is concerned, they include both
a normative and juridical and an empirical and sociological perspective.
In fact, APR’s images conflate a juridical interpretation of the politics-
administration interaction with a more sociological understanding
(Raadschelders and Van der Meer 1998, 32). The normative-juridical per-
spective is represented in Image I, while Images II, III, and IV concern
descriptive-empirical dimensions. The same mixture of perspectives is
noticeable in Peters’ (1985) five types of interaction between officeholders
at the summit. Peters’ formal-legal model compares well to APR’s Image
I, while the middle three models (i.e., village life, functional village life,
and adversarial) are based on a more sociological perspective (cf. Images
II, III, and IV). Peters’ last type, the administrative state, assumes almost
complete dominance of administrators (and implies absence of political
officeholders) and thus falls entirely outside APR’s four images. In their
1988 article in Governance, Aberbach and Rockman observed that the pure
hybrid of Image IV is a “marriage between technical skill and proximity to
political power” (10). Hence, Image IV is about overlapping roles of poli-
ticians and (we assume) political appointees on the one hand and top
bureaucrats on the other. If that is so, then there must be an Image V where
politicians are negligible or even absent, something that Peters’ type of the
“administrative state” considers at least theoretically possible.

The second problem is what the content of Image IV represents. The
image can be defined as either a complete intertwinement of elected
officeholders and civil servants at one moment in time or, as various pas-
sages seem to suggest, a reference to top officials who move in their career
from administrative or private sector positions to political positions (and
sometimes back again).16
For instance, APR mention the phenomenon of
pantouflage in France and Japan as well as the advance of “technocratically
trained” individuals into political office. They mention Giscard d’Estaing
and Raymond Barre in France, Helmut Schmidt in Germany, and Jimmy
Carter in the United States as examples (APR 1981, 17, 85). Next to indi-
vidual career patterns, Image IV can also be seen as a new type of elite
convergence and this seems to be the most often used interpretation of
Image IV. Aberbach and Rockman clarified Image IV as an executive
creature based on “motivational construct,” which combines the control
over bureaucracy by the political leadership with the bureaucratic sympa-
thetic attitudes toward political decision (1988, 9–10).
Could it be that modeling of reality is very much dependent upon
Zeitgeist? As we mentioned above, after the Second World War, authors
noted that the dichotomy was no reflection of reality and even an aberra-
tion. Indeed, empirical research showed more shades of gray than could be
conceived of through the juridical lens of the prewar decades. Could it be
that the lens through which we look at political-administrative relations has
changed while reality has not? The dominant perspective before the Second
World War, that of a dichotomy, is today the submerged perspective simply
because there is so much empirical research testifying to degrees of overlap.
We suggest that the framework of four images is inconsistent, because
it lumps two rather different (normative and juridical as well as sociologi-
cal) perspectives together. First, the images represent a development over
time. APR suggested that political-administrative relations evolved over
time from Image I to II and even III. Most recent developments, they held,
appeared to point toward an Image IV (APR 1981, 238–239). Page pounced
that such an observation could not be made on the basis of “single-point
data” and that historical analysis was needed (Page 1985, 134; 1995, 136).
Indeed, the dispersed historical analyses show that administrators and
politicians have been pretty much intertwined at the top in the course of
the nineteenth and twentieth centuries because they belonged to the same
social-economic-cultural elite (Raadschelders and Van der Meer 1998).
What is more, there are clear cases where administrators have had sub-
stantial, even decisive, influence over policy (Carpenter 2001; Van der
Meer and Raadschelders 2008). But how often this occurred and whether
there was variation between countries in this regard is unclear for lack of
documentation (see next section). There is another reason why APR’s
suggestion of an evolutionary model is puzzling. They indicate that
Images I and II are more characteristic of the lower levels in the hierarchy,
while Images III and IV are more representative of the top. If that is so,
however, two questions emerge:

1. Do the images represent an evolutionary framework that only per-
tains to the higher-level officials?
2. Do the images adequately capture different levels of responsibility in
government?
The third problem with the four images is that the framework contains
elements of both a typology and a taxonomy: Two images are elements of
a typology, while two others are elements of taxonomy. A typology
defines theoretical concepts with dimensions based on a notion of ideal
type. It serves as a useful heuristic for comparison (chapeau Weber). At the
same time, though, boundaries between identified categories are often not
very clear. A taxonomy, instead, classifies and measures characteristics on
the basis of empirical observations. Taxonomies are mostly associated with
the natural sciences, while typologies thrive in political science and public
administration (Smith 2002). We suggest that APR’s Images I and IV are
elements of a typology. Image I has been part of the literature since at least
Bonnin’s 1812 study,17
while Image IV originated with APR. We state that
Images I and IV are ideal types. Images II and III are more elements of a
taxonomy, since they are based on carefully documented interviews and
surveys about characteristics and behaviors of top-level public officials.
One can quibble over the shortcomings in theory and methodology of
the APR study, but the authors were very clear about their intention: the
images were not to be regarded as theory but as “searchlights” (i.e., quite
like the hermeneutic function of an ideal type), and their methodology
was not a quantitative-statistical and rigorous test of variables (APR 1981,
20). The lack of clarity about the survey instrument is an issue not men-
tioned by APR. However, the critiques do not diminish the most impor-
tant fact about the APR study: there is little doubt that it prompted a
vigorous study about characteristics and behaviors of elected officials and
top civil servants and interactions between the two groups. More specifi-
cally, they pulled the research done hitherto in individual countries (e.g.,
Van Braam 1957, on the Netherlands) into a comparative perspective. We
suspect that APR’s impact will continue both directly, in the replication,
updating, and even collection of data (as in the case of local government),
and indirectly, in studies probing day-to-day activities of top-, middle- and
lower-level administrators.
Emerging Avenues of Research
We conclude this article with suggestions for four avenues of further
research. First, much more work also needs to be done on the role and
influence of junior, mid-level civil servants at both the federal or national
and subnational levels. To be sure, APR did mention that officials of lower
rank (but, still quite senior) had extensive contact with members of Par-
liament, citizens, clientele group representatives, and departmental peers

(APR 1981, 226). Indeed, one of the reviewers noticed that this observation
was very intriguing but had been left unexplored (Lehman 1984, 1450).
The studies by Page and Jenkins (2005) and Page (2007) may become as
important a start to this line of inquiry as APR was to comparative char-
acteristics of politicians and bureaucrats and political-administrative rela-
tions. We expect that in-depth mapping of the role of junior, mid-level
civil servants will significantly increase the understanding of the role of
specialists in policymaking.
A second line of profitable research is the administrator biography, a
“method” only recently coming in vogue and—as far as we can tell—
especially in the United Kingdom (e.g., Denman 2002; Fry 2000; Roper 2001;
Theakston 1997), Canada (e.g., Granatstein 1981), and the United States
(e.g., Riccucci 1995; Stillman 1998). While there are plenty biographies of
political officeholders, the dearth of biographies of top civil service is
perhaps less striking than it seems. After all, according to the formal-legal
juridical model, they play a service role and thus de-emphasize their
leadership. Civil servants may not be inclined to trumpet their own impor-
tance and involvement in policymaking. Yet, as limited administrative
biographies are in numbers, those that are available clearly show how
important civil servants have become to the functioning of government and
its services at large. Riccucci (1995, 4–12) believes that the biographical
profile allows scholars to see how senior civil servants can exercise entre-
preneurialism without alienating the elected officeholders and their politi-
cal environment, while Rhodes and Weller (2001, 7–8) observe that
“biography enables us to explore how an institution is created, sustained,
and modified through the beliefs and actions of individuals.”
The third promising line of emerging research, related to biography, is
an ethnographic (also interpretative and narrative) account based upon
the study of writings, lectures, interview transcripts, and actions of civil
servants and elected officeholders (Rhodes 2005, 5–6). Both a biographic
and an ethnographic approach register and generate qualitative data about
the daily activities of officeholders, exploring the beliefs and desires
that—at least partially—influence policy and decision making (Bevir,
Rhodes, and Weller 2003, 3–4). We do not think that these emerging
avenues of research take us farther away from the intent of the APR study.
Combined, quantitative, and qualitative approaches provide a much richer
understanding of the interplay between social, economic, and educational
characteristics of officeholders and their role fulfillment in the interaction
with one another. Perhaps the biographic and ethnographic approaches
provide a better understanding of the beliefs of individual acts that are
partly influenced by institutional history.
Finally, on an altogether different note, it is important that any research
into theories about the politics-administration dichotomy and investiga-
tions of political-administrative relations is embedded in the intellectual
debate about this since the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century.
Our attempt in the first section is admittedly brief, befitting a review

article. We believe that the historical perspective is necessary to compre-
hend the development of political-administrative relations over time and
explicitly include analysis of the changes of lenses or perspectives through
which contemporaries judged their own environment. A good theory of
(organizational) political-administrative relations in reality requires such
historical analysis.
APR was instrumental in developing an empirical approach to this
topic and this continues to inspire scholars. They also strengthened a
sociological perspective, but we should not forget the normative and the
juridical or legalist perspectives that, in practice, are as relevant at the top
as actual organizational behavior.
Notes
1. Dogan’s (1975) study contains contributions from various authors (includ-
ing a reprinted article by Putnam and a chapter by Eldersveld, Hubée-
Boonzaaijer, and Kooiman, both on the APR project) and is thus not consid-
ered a (co-)authored book-length manuscript.
2. Hegel used the term, “universal,” in a broad way using terms like subject,
object, abstract, individual, particular, etc. For a reference, see Knapp (1986).
3. In this article we cited from Weber’s (1968) essay “Parliament and Govern-
ment in a Reconstructed Germany: A Contribution of the Political Critique
of Officialdom and Party Politics,” originally published in 1918, reprinted in
Roth and Wittich (1968, Appendix II in Volume 2). This piece addresses the
same concerns as Weber’s more often quoted “Politics as a Vocation,” which
was originally published in 1919. See a reprint of the latter in Hans H. Gerth
and C. Wright Mills, eds., 1946. From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology. New
York: Oxford University Press, 77–128.
4. For a reference of the sample and data collection, see chapter 2 of APR’s
book.
5. The interviews with French officials in fact took place in the fall of 1969 (APR
1981, 39).
6. For a reference, see APR (1981, viii–xi, 299–300).
7. Reviewers on the APR study generally appreciated the richness of the data
on beliefs and attitudes of top officeholders and were somewhat critical of
the lack of attention for the link between national characteristics of office-
holders (as dependent variable) and their institutional environment (the
independent variable) and the poor information about the data collection
(Edinger 1982; Hodgetts 1983; Issac 1983; Legg 1983; Lehman 1984; Rains
1983; Sloan 1983). Hodgetts 1983 and Lehman 1984 specifically discussed the
possible shift toward Image IV, mentioning trends in that direction in
Canada and Germany as reported in APR.
8. APR did not have data on the interaction among elites in France.
9. Belgium was not surveyed in APR’s (1981) research.
10. In Germany, law as the best career preparation was not as prevalent as before,
whereas social sciences like economics were emerging (Derlien 1988, 72;
2003). Similarly in Sweden, law for civil service training gradually decreased
(from 61% in 1917 to 29 % in 1971 and 21% in 1990); instead, social science
(15%), economics (15%), and engineering (21%) increased in 1990 (Ehn et al.
2003, 437). In Belgium, in 1989–1990, law is not as dominant a background
(32%). Civil servants are also reported to have degrees in engineering (21%),
social science (21%), and economics (14%) (Dierickx 2003, 345, fn. 9).

11. For the details of the impact of NPM on the political-administrative rela-
tions, see Aberbach (2003) on the United States, Gregory (1991) on Australia
and New Zealand, Bulmer (1988) and Wilson and Barker (2003) on the
United Kingdom, Ehn et al. (2003) on Sweden, Rouban (2007) on European
states, and Campbell (2007) and Halligan (2007) on Anglo-American states.
12. Dierickx (2003) and Ehn et al. (2003) interviewed top bureaucrats and
members of Parliament; Aberbach (2003) and Derlien (1988) compared civil
servants with political appointees including (in the German case) parliamen-
tary secretaries; Bulmer (1988) and Wilson and Barker (2003) focused on
Whitehall; Bourgault and Dion (1989) studied Canada’s deputy ministers,
the country’s top bureaucrats; and Gregory (1991) compared top bureaucrats
of Australia and New Zealand.
13. Hacek’s article presents not only a comparison between Slovenia and the
countries in the APR study but also the differences in social and educational
backgrounds of administrative and political elites between national and
local levels.
14. As far as the supranational level is concerned, Page (1997, 138) found that the
social, economic, and educational characteristics of senior-level officials in
the European Union were comparable to what APR had collected more than
two decades earlier. For instance, the average age of top EU officials in the
early 1990s was close to APR’s average age for the senior civil servant in the
early 1970s, which was 53 (Page 1997, 70–73).
15. Beside the three intriguing problems, Weber’s (1981, 5) ideal type of bureau-
cracy is somewhat ambiguously used in APR’s book. They write: “Weber
himself thought that what we have termed Image I was the ideal relationship
between politicians and administrators, but he recognized that it was an
improbable one” (emphasis added). This is a puzzling observation since
Weber was very clear about the use of ideal types as an analytical instrument
for studying reality (Weber 1985, 146–214). It is never an ideal to strive for.
Various authors had observed this misunderstanding of the nature of an
ideal type in the 1960s (Diamant 1962, 62–65; Lipset 1963, 58–59; Mayntz
1965; Mouzelis 1967, 43–46), and what is puzzling is that APR could have
known this since they referenced Diamant in their first chapter. In fact, APR
consciously chose to speak of “images” rather than models. The concept of
“model” implies a hypothetical and theoretical frame, while “image” may
include both normative and empirical conceptions. To them the images are
“searchlights for illuminating empirical patterns in [the] data” (20). Also,
they used the Gerth and Mills translation of Weber’s “Politics as a Vocation,”
which is hardly sufficient considering that Weber wrote so much more about
bureaucracy and politics in his monumental Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft. See
the full translation by Roth and Wittich (1968). How Weber is treated in the
literature is representative of a shortcoming in various individual studies.
Ultimately, though, the stereotypical treatment of Weber and the misunder-
standing of his methodology start with the cursory treatment of his schol-
arship in textbooks.
16. For a reference, see Bezes and Lodge (2007).
17. Thus is quite a bit earlier than Vivien’s (1844) study of which Mouritzen and
Svara (2002, 3) claim that it introduced the dichotomy. Also see Rutgers
(2004, 66–67, 152).
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