This presentation was given by CIFOR scientist Sven Wunder at a COP20 side-event titled "Benefit and Burden Sharing in Forest Policies and REDD+" in Lima, Peru. The event addressed the benefits and costs associated with forest conservation initiatives across multiple countries, and their equity implications. It builds on results gathered from an ongoing multi-year European Commission-funded project aimed to provide policy options and guidance to improve the design, development, and implementation of REDD+ benefit sharing mechanisms.

1. REDD+ sticks and carrots combined:
simulating costs and equity effects
in Brazil and Peru
Jan Börner (University of Bonn, CIFOR)
Eduardo Marinho (CIFOR)
Sven Wunder (CIFOR)

2. Background
• Brazil has effectively reduced deforestation to
70-80% of pre-2004 levels
• Command-and-control (C&C) policies
(=“sticks”) are budget-wise cheap – yet costly
to land users (Börner et al., 2014)
• Effective C&C may require complementary
incentives to remain politically sustainable
(Nepstad et al., 2014)

3. Research questions
1. What tradeoffs between cost effectiveness
and land-user income may integration of
REDD+ sticks (C&C) and carrots (PES) trigger
(Brazil case)?
2. How can incentives be designed to make
conservation both cost-effective and
egalitarian (Peru case)?

4. Policy mix tradeoffs
REDD+ cost-effectiveness
Landholder
incomes
C&C
PES

5. PES design tradeoffs Cost-effectiveness
• Concentration of land ownership
• Historical deforestation patterns
• Spatially variable opportunity costs
• Targeting of payments
Equality

6. Study areas

7. Study areas
BRAZILIAN AMAZON
• High historical deforestation
• High concentration of land
ownership
• Commercial agriculture and
cattle operations at the
agricultural frontiers
• Relatively well developed
forest monitoring and law
enforcement infrastructure
• Large-scale PES planned
PERUVIAN AMAZON
• Historically low deforestation
• More homogeneous
distribution of land
• Predominantly subsistence
cattle production and small but
growing commercial sector
• Relatively weak forest
monitoring and law
enforcement infrastructure
• Large-scale PES implemented

8. Modelling decision making
Land user
• Deforestation is a function of
expected profits and policy
incentives
Envir. Protection Agency
• Enforcement is a budget
constrained optimization of
deterrence through in situ
inspections
df  d  pF PES  d max  ,  
f  ,d *  pF  PES 
d p
I
I

p i i
i
  
s t p TC nd TC B
i
i i i i


1
'
1
. .
max

9. Spatial analysis
• District-based opportunity cost
analysis
• Grid-based spatial simulation of:
– Avoided deforestation (Brazil, Peru)
– Land user income change (Brazil,
Peru)
– Command-and-control
implementation costs (Brazil)
– Sticks & carrot integration (Brazil)
– Alternative PES payment modalities
(Peru)
Spatial overlay
Threatened
forests
Community
boundaries
Population
Returns to
deforestation

10. PES design tradeoffs
UNEQUAL & INEFFICIENT
0 2000 4000 6000 8000 10000 12000
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
Cost-effectiveness: Peruvian Soles per hectare of conserved forest
Inequality: gini coefficient of HH income change
current PNCB scheme
av. p/ha opp. cost payment
compensation up to av. opp.cost
av. department p/ha opp. cost payment
av. province p/ha opp. cost payment
1 min. salary per year + pure compensation
1 min. salary per year + average opp. cost payment
EQUAL & EFFICIENT

11. Welfare effects of policy mixes

12. Key findings
• Mixing carrots with sticks can make REDD+ fairer,
but also more expensive (Brazil)
• If PES are intended to complement C&C (as is
common under REDD+) enforcement quality is
key to cost-effectiveness
• Designing PES requires knowledge about spatial
patterns of deforestation and opportunity costs
• Simple and feasible adjustments to the PNCB can
boost its cost-effectiveness and equity effects