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Russian Subversion of the USA Final Phase
This is a quick overview of Quick Leak
1. Russian Subversion of the USA Final Phase
2.
3. Dec 4 2014
4.
5.
6.
7. Toby posted the following to the forum
8. I believe that the medias' job should be to alert us to the things that are going on around us,
including clear and present dangers to our way of life as we know it.
9.
10. --> that is supposed to be the role of the press.
11.
12. But because the press failed so miserably in this respect, moreover the press assumed the role
not to inform us, but to disinform us so that we are so distracted from all the stuff that we
are bombarded with that we cannot even figure out what is happening on our own anymore, there
emerged a branch of the press, calling itself "alternative news", claiming to take over the role
of the press for those interested in knowing what is really going on in the world.
13.
14. Unfortunately this "alternative press" also got hijacked very quickly, or for every REAL source,
the conspirators inserted 30 disinfo agents into the "alternative media camp" in order to re-
establish that status quo: there simply being too much information for an average person to dig
himself through, not to mention sorting out all the B.S.
15.
16. I mean look at it: we are bombarded with a lot of stuff that is not really so extremely relevant
when put next to the REAL NEWS.
17.
18. REAL NEWS among other things, I consider:
19.
20. --> the communist long range strategy as published by Golitsyn and Sejna, and how far we have
progressed within the final phase (perestroika, "breakdown" of Warshaw Pact and USSR in order
for Europe to disarm and send US troops home to then land a full scale attack at Europe and the
US after an economic collapse will have strengthened the communist parties in all the target
countries)
21.
22. But unfortunately you hear nothing about this on the alternative media outlets.
23.
24. In my opinion, especially during these times now, the following should be published and
republished on a daily basis so that people get it:
25.
26. -Russia faked the breakdown of communism
27.
28. Golitsyn foretold in his book New lies for Old (1984) that is the soon to begin offensive "final
phase" of communism:
29.
30. - that the USSR would collapse,
31. - the Berlin wall would fall
32. - Germany reunified
33. - Warsaw Pact dissolved (hoping that NATO would dissolve)
34. - Balkan states split up (Sejna said this in hios 1982 book "we will bury u"
35. - US troops will withdraw from Europe
36. - economic collapse
37. - re-emerging Russia as a strong nation asserting itself on the world stage
38.
39. Further anticipated:
40.
41. - complete isolation of the USA so that it will withdraw into its fortress America unwilling to
defend Europe when attacked by Russia
Welcome
guest

42.
43. --> aha - here is probably the reason why why the US is so vilified 24/7.
44.
45. I mean what they are doing on the world stage is not good. I am not saying that. But we need to
keep in mind that they are "steered" by the same puppet masters that steer Russia: the high
finance.
46.
47. I invite everyone to check it out:
48.
49. Read the second last chapter (called "the final phase") of Golitsyns book "New Lies for Old"
(1984). You can find it on the internet here:
50.
51. a href="http://www.spiritoftruth.org/newlies4old.pdf"> New Lies for Old (Golitsyn, 1984 Then take
a look at his second book The Perestroika deception (1995) here:
52.
53. The Perestroika Deception
54.
55. THAT is in my opinion at least - the kind of stuff that is presently of uttermost
importance.[/b] All the other stuff that we read about Russia, the US, etc is in my opinion
right now rather secondary - with the exception of civil war issues in the US, maybe - and
probably published with the purpose to still blur the role of Russia and the USSR up the the
last moment.
56.
57. ok - I just wanted to put this as a bit food for thought. Everyone will have to agree with me
that considering the importance of this communist long range strategy, that there really is
relatively little (as compared to its importance) on the net about it and its consequences to
our way of life
58.
59. (btw. I am saying this from an European Perspective. Naturally all that is taking place in the
US currently is of outermost importance for all those living there. But even the emerging civil
war in the US can be seen very nicely in perspective through the communist long range plan.
60.
61. After all: The USA is the mortal enemy of the communist system.
62.
63. I strongly recommend the lecture by (genuine) KGB defector Yuri Bezmenow on the subversion of
the USA. It is on youtube, here:
64.
65. Yuri Bezmenow lecture on the subversion of the USA
66.
67. What is so nice there is also the way he explains how communist intelligence is not James Bond
stuff mostly, but mostly deals with disinformation. That is: most KGB agents are sitting at
newspapers, run media outlets, including "alternative media outlets" for sure, to try and
control what information we receive.
68.
69. --> with that in mind we can look at folks like Fulford from a totally different and new
perspective. I wish u all a good day,
70.
71. Toby
72.
73.
74.
75. My comment: I had a college professor who stated "Communism is the right idea, but it was tried
on the wrong people. America has the right people." They may have given up on Russia.
76.
77. The KGB could very well now be seated in the City of London financial district and colleges of
America. It was, after all, a Jewish outfit. Factor that into all of this.
78.
79.
80.
81. Discuss this on the forum
82. http://www.reactorbreach.com/showthread.php?tid=1989
83.
84. http://www.jimstonefreelance.com/
85.
86.
87.
88. RUSSIAN NUCLEAR WAR PREPARATIONS AND USA ATTACK PROPHECIES
89.
90. http://www.2shared.com/complete/p1jWX17B/RUSSIAN_NUCLEAR_WAR_PREPARATIO.html
91.

92. RUSSIA'S UNDENIABLE NUCLEAR WAR PREPARATIONS
93. by J. R. Nyquist AUG 27 2007
94. Since 1998 I have publicly warned of Russia’s war preparations.
95. The idea of preparing for nuclear war is absurd for most Americans, because the idea of nuclear
war makes no sense in a consumer society.
96. However that may be, Russia’s war preparations were as undeniable then as they are today. And
Russia is not a consumer society.
97. In the late 1990s Russia was refurbishing huge nuclear war bunkers and building underground
cities.
98. The only purpose such bunkers and cities could serve is in relation to a future nuclear war. For
a country that was supposedly broke to be spending its precious resources on something so
expensive, so far out of the way of “normal” expectations, seemed inexplicable.
99. “Oh well,” people would shrug.
100. “The Russians are used to doing this sort of thing. It gives them psychological comfort. Let
them do what they want. It needn’t trouble us.” The public missed the fact, however, that Russia
was continuing to violate arms control agreements.
101. It was not admitting to all the nuclear warheads it possessed, and was not reliably disposing of
them. It was developing new, deadly, biological and chemical weapons.
102.
103. Why in the midst of peace, a few short years after the end of the Cold War, were the Russians
adhering to this insane path? Were they anticipating a future war?
104.
105. The answer must be yes.
106. And the answer continues to be yes. In the 1990s Russia forged an alliance with China that
involved a growing series of joint military exercises.
107. Why would the Russians do this? Why would they seek to develop a joint military capability that
would link Russian missile power with Chinese manpower?
108. For over a decade the Russians have been providing the Chinese with technology and weapons.
109. This is not merely a commercial transaction, as some would insist. These transactions are
carefully considered strategic steps. Since the mid-1990s, Russia and China have initiated
joint-armaments programs that further solidified their military partnership.
110. It is obsolete thinking to suppose Russia and China are enemies. It must be understood, as a
practical matter, that Russia and China are underdog powers locked in a struggle for primacy
with the United States.
111. The only sensible strategy, if Russia and China expect to emerge on top, is to unite against the
Americans.
112. And that is what the two countries have been doing for the past decade.
113.
114. A week ago today, on August 17, the Russians and Chinese conducted joint military exercises on
Russian soil, in the southern Ural Mountains. These coincided with strategic air operations
involving Russian nuclear bombers.
115. The combination of ground exercises with nuclear bomber exercises is a characteristic of Soviet
nuclear war theory, which holds that troops must be used to follow up nuclear strikes.
116. President Putin and China’s President Hu Jintao watched the exercises while holding a summit in
Bishkek (the capital of former Soviet Kyrgyzstan).
117. While China and Russia insist that their preparations aren’t aimed at any specific power, only a
simpleton would believe them. (I am sad to acknowledge that many Americans, in this regard, are
simpletons.)
118.
119. Last week, in an obvious upgrading of nuclear war readiness, Russian President Vladimir Putin
announced the resumption of long-range nuclear bomber patrols that had previously been suspended
in 1992. “I made the decision to restore flights of Russian strategic bombers on a permanent
basis,” said Putin.
120. “Combat duty has begun.” For some reason, Americans cannot digest Putin’s statement or his
decision to resume bomber patrols. Why is this happening? Well, we say to ourselves, there is no
reason other than the peculiar psychology of the Russians.
121. President Bush has not put U.S. strategic bombers on patrol.
122. And why should he? Russia isn’t our enemy. We are all friends. We are all economic partners and
allies in the war against terror.
123.
124. In Washington the State Department spokesman, Sean McCormack, responded to the Russian
announcement of permanent strategic bomber patrols by saying, “It’s interesting.
125. We certainly are not in the kind of posture we were with what used to be the Soviet Union. It’s
a different era. If Russia feels as though they want to take some of these old aircraft out of
mothballs and get them flying again, that’s their decision.”
126.
127. It’s as if the Russian military had resumed stamp collecting or archery.
128. There is no strategic alarm, no threat, no difficulty and no discomfiture. Let them play with
their obsolete toys.
129. We are living in a new era, and these activities no longer trouble us.

130. The Cold War ended and the animosity between the great powers is gone.
131. Say good-bye to it. Any evidence to the contrary is not evidence. We’re living in “a different
era.” Anyone who doesn’t know this, even if they are the president of the Russian Federation, is
out-of-step.
132. One might imagine Washington’s reaction to a Russian missile strike against U.S. targets. “It’s
interesting,” the State Department would purr. “This is not the sort of missile strike we would
have expected from the Soviet Union.
133. Of course, it’s a different era. If Russia feels that they want to launch some old, useless
missiles, that’s their decision.”
134.
135. Our lack of imagination, our inability to grasp our enemy’s thought process, leads us to dismiss
what is obvious. The Russians are getting ready. Why isn’t the American side responding?
136. Why aren’t the Americans getting ready?
137. We have been seduced by a series of comforting illusions. We are also absorbed in a struggle
against Islamic terrorism (only we are at pains to admit the “Islamic” aspect of it).
138. The American shopping mall regime produces stupefaction and complacency.
139. The regime is predicated on economic optimism and entertainment. This optimism is about to be
shattered. The Russians know this is going to happen, and they are preparing even as we fail to
prepare.
140.
141. Experts: U. S. unprepared for nuclear terror attack
142. "...attempting to evacuate could "put you on a crowded freeway where you'll be stuck in traffic
and get the maximum radiation exposure." Yet, "...the only choice for most people would be to
flee" because they are unprepared!
143. By Greg Gordon McClatchy Newspapers
144. http://www.realcities.com/mld/krwashington/16812686.htm
145. Thu, Mar. 01, 2007
146.
147. WASHINGTON - Although the Bush administration has warned repeatedly about the threat of a
terrorist nuclear attack and spent more than $300 billion to protect the homeland, the
government remains ill-prepared to respond to a nuclear catastrophe.
148.
149. Experts and government documents suggest that, absent a major preparedness push, the U. S.
response to a mushroom cloud could be worse than the debacle after Hurricane Katrina, possibly
contributing to civil disorder and costing thousands of lives.
150.
151. "The United States is unprepared to mitigate the consequences of a nuclear attack," Pentagon
analyst John Brinkerhoff concluded in a July 31, 2005, draft of a confidential memo to the Joint
Chiefs of Staff. "We were unable to find any group or office with a coherent approach to this
very important aspect of homeland security. ...
152. "This is a bad situation. The threat of a nuclear attack is real, and action is needed now to
learn how to deal with one."
153.
154. Col. Jill Morgenthaler, Illinois' director of homeland security, said there's a "disconnect"
between President Bush's and Vice President Dick Cheney's nuclear threat talk and the
administration's actions.
155.
156. "I don't see money being focused on actual response and mitigation to a nuclear threat," she
said.
157.
158. Interviews by McClatchy Newspapers with more than 15 radiation and emergency preparedness
experts and a review of internal documents revealed:
159.
160. The government has yet to launch an educational program, akin to the Cold War-era civil defense
campaign promoting fallout shelters, to teach Americans how to shield themselves from radiation,
especially from the fallout plume, which could deposit deadly particles up to 100 miles from
ground zero.
161.
162. Analysts estimate that as many as 300,000 emergency workers would be needed after a nuclear
attack, but predict that the radiation would scare many of them away from the disaster site.
163.
164. Hospital emergency rooms wouldn't be able to handle the surge of people who were irradiated or
the many more who feared they were.
165.
166. Medical teams would have to improvise to treat what could be tens of thousands of burn victims
because most cities have only one or two available burn-unit beds. Cham Dallas, director of the
University of Georgia's Center for Mass Destruction Defense, called the predicament "the worst
link in our health care wall."
167.
168. Several drugs are in development and one is especially promising, but the government hasn't

acquired any significant new medicine to counteract radiation's devastating effects on victims'
blood-forming bone marrow.
169.
170. Over the last three years, several federal agencies have taken some steps in nuclear disaster
planning. The Department of Health and Human Services has drawn up "playbooks" for a range of
attack scenarios and created a Web site to instruct emergency responders in treating radiation
victims.
171.
172. The Energy Department's Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory is geared to use real-time
weather data, within minutes of a bombing, to create a computer model that charts the likely
path of a radioactive fallout plume so that the government can warn affected people to take
shelter or evacuate. The government also has modeled likely effects in blast zones.
173.
174. Capt. Ann Knebel, the U. S. Public Health Service's deputy preparedness chief, said her agency
is using the models to understand how many people in different zones would suffer from blast
injuries, burns or radiation sickness "and to begin to match our resources to the types of
injuries."
175.
176. No matter how great the government's response, a nuclear bomb's toll would be staggering.
177.
178. The government's National Planning Scenario, which isn't public, projects that a relatively
small, improvised 10-kiloton bomb could kill hundreds of thousands of people in a medium-sized
city and cause hundreds of billions of dollars in economic losses.
179.
180. The document, last updated in April 2005, projects that a bomb denoted at ground level in
Washington, D. C., would kill as many as 204,600 people, including many government officials,
and would injure or sicken 90,800. Another 24,580 victims would die of radiation-related cancer
in ensuing years. Radioactive debris would contaminate a 3,000-square-mile area, requiring
years-long cleanup, it said.
181.
182. Brinkerhoff, author of the confidential memo for the Joint Chiefs, estimated that nearly 300,000
National Guardsmen, military reservists and civil emergency personnel would be needed to rescue,
decontaminate, process and manage the 1.5 million evacuees.
183.
184. The job would include cordoning off the blast zone and manning a 200-mile perimeter around the
fallout area to process and decontaminate victims, to turn others away from the danger and to
maintain order. Brinkerhoff estimated that the military would need to provide 140,000 of the
300,000 responders, but doubted that the Pentagon would have that many. And the Public Health
Service's Knebel cited studies suggesting that the "fear factor" would reduce civil emergency
responders by more than 30 percent.
185.
186. Planning for an attack seems to evoke a sense of resignation among some officials.
187.
188. "We are concerned about the catastrophic threats and are trying to improve our abilities for
disasters," said Gerald Parker, a deputy assistant secretary in Health and Human Services' new
Office of Preparedness and Response. "But you have to look at what's pragmatic as well."
189.
190. Dr. Andrew Garrett of Columbia University's National Center for Disaster Preparedness, put it
this way: "People are just very intimidated to take on the problem" because "there may not be
apparent solutions right now."
191.
192. The U. S. intelligence community considers it a "fairly remote" possibility that terrorists will
obtain weapons-grade plutonium or highly enriched uranium, which is more accessible, to build a
nuclear weapon, said a senior intelligence official who requested anonymity because of the
sensitive nature of the information. The official said intelligence agencies worry mainly about
a makeshift, radioactive "dirty bomb" that would kill at most a few hundred people, contaminate
part of a city and spread panic.
193.
194. But concerns about a larger nuclear attack are increasing at a time when North Korea is testing
atomic weapons and Iran is believed to be pursuing them. Al-Qaida's worldwide network of
terrorists also reportedly has been reconstituted.
195.
196. The 9/11 Commission's 2004 report rated a nuclear bombing as the most consequential threat
facing the nation.
197.
198. "We called for a maximum effort against the threat," Lee Hamilton, the panel's vice chairman,
told McClatchy Newspapers. "My impression is that we've got a long ways to go. ... I just think
it would overwhelm us."
199.
200. Dr. Ira Helfand, a Massachusetts emergency care doctor who co-authored a report on nuclear
preparedness last year by the Physicians for Social Responsibility, chided the administration

for trying "to create a climate of fear rather than to identify a problem and address it." The
doctors' group found the government "dangerously unprepared" for a nuclear attack.
201.
202. Government officials say they have drafted playbooks for every sort of radioactive attack, from
a "dirty bomb" to a large, sophisticated device.
203.
204. But radiation experts and government memos emphasize the chaos that a bigger bomb could create.
Emergency responders could face power outages, leaking gas lines, buckled bridges and tunnels,
disrupted communications from the blast's electromagnetic pulse and streets clogged by vehicle
crashes because motorists could be blinded by the bright flash accompanying detonation.
205.
206. No equipment exists to shield rescue teams from radiation, and survivors would face similar
risks if they tried to walk to safety.
207.
208. Defense analyst Brinkerhoff proposed having troops gradually tighten the ring around the blast
zone as the radiation diminished, but warned that the government lacks the hundreds of radiation
meters needed to ensure that they wouldn't endanger themselves. He said those making rescue
forays would need dosimeters to monitor their exposure.
209.
210. Emergency teams would have no quick test to determine the extent of survivors' radiation
exposure. They would have to rely on tests for white blood cell declines or quiz people about
their whereabouts during the blast and whether they had vomited.
211.
212. For those with potentially lethal acute radiation sickness, only limited medication is
available, said Richard Hatchett, who's overseeing nearly $100 million in research on radiation
countermeasures for the National Institute of Allergies and Infectious Diseases.
213.
214. The Department of Health and Human Services might commit to a limited purchase of one promising
drug as early as this month. But currently federal health officials plan to fly victims of acute
radiation sickness to hospitals across the country for bone marrow transplants.
215.
216. The National Planning Scenario expressed concern that uninformed survivors of an attack could be
lethally exposed to radiation because they failed to seek shelter, preferably in a sealed
basement, for three to four days while radioactive debris decayed. Another big problem: Only a
small percentage of Americans store bottled water, canned food and other essentials for an
ordeal in a shelter.
217.
218. Helfand said it would be too late to help most people near the blast, but that advance education
could save many people in the path of the fallout.
219.
220. Education is critical, he said, because attempting to evacuate could "put you on a crowded
freeway where you'll be stuck in traffic and get the maximum radiation exposure."
221.
222. California's emergency services chief, Henry Renteria, said it might be time "to re-establish an
urban area radiation shelter program."
223.
224. Brinkerhoff wrote that people could build their own radiation-proof shelters if the government
engaged in "large-scale civil defense planning" and gave them meters and dosimeters to monitor
the radiation.
225.
226. Since there hasn't been "any enthusiasm to address this kind of preparedness," Brinkerhoff
concluded, the only choice for most people would be to flee.
227.
228. much, much more at: http://www.2shared.com/complete/p1jWX17B/RUSSIAN_NUCLEAR_WAR_PREPARATIO.html
229.
230.
231. David Alan Rosenberg on: U.S. Planning for a Soviet Nuclear Attack
232.
233. In the fifties, it's a case that clearly, from all the data we have, Soviet nuclear readiness
was incredibly low; that the Russians were not really able to do anything to match the Strategic
Air Command in terms of its capabilities to keep its forces up and all. And the ability to
launch a surprise attack did not seem particularly great. But the problem was what we didn't
know. The intelligence revolution, as represented by satellites in particular (the recently
declassified photo satellites that used to drop their packages and get caught by airplanes, you
know), that doesn't come until the 1960s.
234.
235. The Soviet Union explodes an atomic bomb in August of 1949. It's disclosed to the world in
September. In the spring and summer of 1950, the Joint Chiefs of Staff do some consideration of
an additional targeting category. And in August of 1950, the Joint Chiefs lay on the Strategic
Air Command the requirement to in fact also to begin targeting Soviet capability to deliver

nuclear weapons against the United States and its allies. And this is one of the great drivers
of any kind of nuclear competition between the United States and the Soviet Union, at least on
the America side. And that is the requirement to be able, under the right circumstances, to
launch a disarming first strike against the Soviet Union. A preemptive strike, not a preventive
war but a preemptive strike against Soviet nuclear capability.
236.
237.
238. And this, in turn, means that as more air fields are identified in the Soviet Union, as Soviet
military capability, aerial capability grows, that by the 1950s you're now talking about the
growth of so-called counter-force targets. That includes nuclear production facilities and major
air bases. And then starting in the mid-fifties, with dispersal air fields, where the Soviet air
force could disperse to and then launch strikes, that it causes this huge increase in potential
targets beyond the traditional city bombing requirement.
239.
240. And the fact is then, how are you going to be able to take out these targets? Are you going to
go in and just launch a strike against the air bases and the nuclear production facilities, and
then hold back your bombers from attacking cities? Well, the problem is that no one had told
LeMay that that was what he was supposed to do. And he felt he didn't have the resources that
could launch a series of strikes into the Soviet Union, because the likelihood of Soviet air
defenses (which were constantly working and improving at this time-- Soviets made great, great
progress in terms of both anti-aircraft artillery and in early warning, although none of it was-
-was, you know, so overwhelmingly proficient as to prevent the Americans from truly getting in),
but the fact that this could, in fact, slow a strike, take out enough of his bombers to prevent
a series of strikes. And so LeMay plans the equivalent of one big air strike that will take out
both nuclear capability and retardation targets (that which they can find), and also urban
industrial targets, in one big attack.
241.
242. And by the mid-fifties (`54, `55), you're talking about 750 airplanes, 750 targets that SAC is
contemplating attacking if it has, in fact, an adequate warning time, which under strategic
warning (based on the equivalent of various forms of signals, intelligence that the Russians
were in fact moving their forces to attack Western Europe as well as preparing their forces to
attack the United States), would mean that they could get perhaps 24 or 36 hours warning. And
whether the President of the United States would then act on that warning time to launch the
United States first is another question, although it's clear that Eisenhower understood that he
would, in fact, if given this kind of warning, be willing to use his forces to (as he says in
December 1954) "blunt the enemy offensives".
243.
244. And so you've got the dynamics of an arms competition at work here, that is being fueled by
increasing capability in aircraft, and bigger and bigger nuclear weapons, until by `54, `55, the
first hydrogen bombs, the first thermonuclear weapons are now entering the inventory that will
allow you to take out large air fields or significant portions of cities in ways that the
smaller fission weapons would not in fact do. And that begins to pile up even more and more
weaponry and capability.
245.
246. The other problem is that SAC has a series of analytical formulae that it puts together, that
relate to the question of what will be the damage that needs to be laid on against targets. And
that means that there needs to be a certain kind of redundancy that insures that enough weapons
will land on what is a designated ground zero. And so you will see a certain amount of
duplication from SAC alone, in terms of taking this on.
247.
248. And then the problem is that in the mid-fifties, you see the Navy developing its own nuclear
capability, charged under the various agreements governing roles and missions of the Armed
Forces. Navy carrier aircraft will be attacking targets of naval interest, as they're called,
within the Soviet Union. They could include air fields that could launch Soviet aircraft to
attack, with nuclear weapons, U.S. forces at sea, submarine bases. And in some cases, the Navy,
being somewhat paranoid about the Air Force during this period, the Air Force being somewhat
paranoid about the Navy during this period -- as one old friend who worked on this used to note,
"Well, we finally got to the point where we weren't trusting SAC to hit everything that we
needed, so we'd go against cities where battery factories were located, that made batteries for
submarines. And they were deep in central Russia. But we were always going against those with
much smaller yield weapons than SAC was" -- that you then had a lot of what SAC always decried
as endless duplication and needless duplication in nuclear targeting.
249.
250. And the other part of the problem was that then you would also have the problem of
deconfliction, which was a case that you had numbers of aircraft coming in, aircraft that were
launched from perhaps the European command, U.S. Air Force tactical aircraft that might be going
against targets that could affect the land battle in Western Europe, SAC aircraft coming in from
the continental United States or stationed overseas, and carrier aircraft coming in from the
Mediterranean or from the Norwegian Sea - and they might all simultaneously be going against a
series of targets that would mean that they could be passing each other and dropping weapons at
moments where one airplane could in fact either be flying into the blast of another, or in a

more benign sense, airplanes could in fact be flying close enough so that the pilots could in
fact get blinded and irradiated by the blast of a nuclear weapon going off nearby. And so there
was a serious need to try to find ways of deconflicting these incoming strikes, which led to the
creation of what were known as worldwide coordinating conferences that were held annually, in
which there were a lot of debates that went on about all of this.
251.
252. And so finally it was decided in the summer of 1960 to in fact not to create a single strategic
command, but to create a joint strategic target planning staff out in Omaha, at SAC
headquarters, that would attempt to put together two products: a national strategic target list
that would, in fact, serve as the basis for all national nuclear war planning for Strategic Air
Command and for Polaris submarines, and then put together a Single Integrated Operational Plan
that in fact would control the forces going against those targets. And that would include SAC
forces in the U.S. and overseas, theater forces, carrier aviation, and submarine forces.
253.
254. The problem was that SAC had developed its own approach to nuclear war planning. And so when
the Navy sent people out to Omaha, they were in effect forced to go along with the SAC approach,
both analytically in terms of weighting targets and in terms of their value in a war plan and
what was going to be attacked and serving as a priority, and also, given what the national
strategic target and attack policy laid out, what you were going to hit in terms of how much
damage was going to be expected, what your probability of damage was going to be in terms of--
against how much of industrial floor space, against how much of the counter-force capability
that you were going to be working against a Soviet means of delivering. And these were very,
very high levels of what's known as damage expectancy: what damage would be expected, assuming
the weapons; how many weapons would get to the target, and would both arrive and do their job.
255.
256. And as a result, you created what's been called by some people a doomsday machine that, if you
had 28-hour strategic warning, would launch over 3,000 weapons at 1,050 designated ground zeros
in the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China and in Eastern European states, that
would be destroyed all at once, and (it) has been estimated as resulting in 285 million prompt
deaths. And that was the American nuclear war plan that was created in 1960, that was briefed to
the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff in December 1960.
257.
258. And when Secretary Thomas Gates, the Secretary of Defense, and General Lyman Leominster, the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, called the President to say, well, we've got a first cut of this
war plan, and we're going to approve it, Eisenhower, who was not briefed on it, in this phone
call says, "Well, announce-- put my name on it too, saying that I've in fact reviewed this,"
when in fact there does not appear to have been any real indication that President Eisenhower
was ever fully briefed on this war plan, other than perhaps by his science advisor, the late
George Kistiakowsky, who in fact, at the instigation of Admiral Arlie Burke (the Chief of Naval
Operations who was so disturbed at so many of the abuses that went on in putting this plan
together) convinced Kistiakowsky to in fact go out to study the problems of this war plan. And
he produced a report. But that report, in effect, was what the Kennedy Administration inherited
instead.
259.
260. And this set up the foundation for nuclear war planning for, in many ways, for decades to come,
in that it established a joint pattern for planning that subsequent presidential administrations
and military services (the Army and the Air Force and the Navy) have been working to sort of
find ways of breaking this up into much more discrete and potentially militarily useful options,
rather than this kind of doomsday plan. And much of the debates over nuclear war planning in the
United States, in effect, have revolved around the question of just how flexible one's plan
should be.
261.
262. back to Interview Transcripts
263.
264. http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/amex/bomb/filmmore/reference/interview/rosenberg02.html
265.
266.
267.
268. RUSSIAN NUCLEAR MILITARY STRATEGY AND NUCLEAR ATTACK PROPHECIES.docx
269.
270. http://www.docstoc.com/docs/160350852/RU...PROPHECIES
271.
272.
273. RUSSIAN NUCLEAR MILITARY STRATEGY AND NUCLEAR ATTACK PROPHECIES
274.
275.
276. Why the Soviet Union Thinks it Could Fight and Win a Nuclear War
277. by Richard Pipes
278.
279. Baird Professor of History, Harvard University

280. Reprinted from Commentary, 1977
281. A Summary of the Argument by Bill Somers
282.
283. American and Soviet nuclear doctrines are diametrically opposed. They are products of totally
different historical experiences and political and socioeconomic systems. The apparent
contradictions in Soviet nuclear doctrine and the dangers of U. S. unilateral adherence to a
strategy of mutual deterrence are best understood when put in historical perspective.
284. The American view of war has been conditioned by the ideas characteristic of a Western
commercial society. Underlying it is the notion that human conflict results from
misunderstandings that can be resolved by negotiation. Marxism, on the other hand, holds
conflict to be normal (and military forces as a political tool and a part of grand strategy.
Americans generally regard war as an abnormal situation and want to end it rapidly through
technological superiority and with the least possible loss of friendly (but not necessarily
enemy) lives. Large peacetime forces are an unwelcome expense.
285. These contrary views of war were affected differently by the coming of nuclear weapons. In the
U. S., atomic and thermonuclear bombs were considered "absolute" weapons, capable of destroying
a society or even a civilization, and against which there was no defense. Thus, Clausewitz's
dictum that war is an extension of politics was considered dead. Since nuclear war could serve
no rational political purpose, the function of strategic forces should be to avert war. Because
of the vast destructiveness of nuclear weapons, a "sufficiency" of weapons to retaliate was
believed to be enough. Numerical superiority was thought to have little meaning. To ensure a
stable balance, in which conflicts could be resolved by negotiation, the USSR should even have
the ability to do unacceptable second-strike damage to the U. S. This concept of mutual
deterrence, or mutual assured destruction, became U. S. policy and as nuclear delivery
capabilities improved, remained the foundation of a somewhat more flexible policy.
286. These U. S. strategic theories were developed largely by civilian scientists and "accountants,"
with little contribution from military professionals. The theorists were guided significantly by
fiscal imperatives -- the desire to reduce the defense budget while retaining a capacity to
deter Soviet threats to U. S. interests. The theories were formulated without reference to their
Soviet counterparts, and in the belief that we can "educate" the Soviets to adopt our views.
287. In the USSR, where strategy is considered a science and the special province of the military,
nuclear weapons were not held to be "absolute," except perhaps briefly after Stalin's death. The
idea of mutual deterrence was never accepted. Soviet theorists rejected the idea that technology
determines strategy. They adapted nuclear weapons to their traditional Clausewitzian view of war
as an extension of politics.
288. The Communist revolution eliminated that segment of Russian society that was most Westernized,
and put the peasant class in power. History had taught the Russian peasant that cunning and
coercion assured survival; cunning when weak; cunning and coercion when strong. "Not to use
force when one had it indicated some inner weakness." That concept of the use of power and the
fact that, since 1914, the USSR has lost up to 60,000,000 citizens through war, famine, and
purges and survived has no doubt conditioned the development of Soviet nuclear strategy. Soviet
nuclear doctrine, expounded in a wide range of Russian defense literature, has five related
elements:
289. • Preemption (first strike).
290. • Quantitative superiority (a requisite for preemption and because the war may last for some
time, even though the initial hours are decisive).
291. • Counterforce targeting.
292. • Combined-arms operations to supplement nuclear strikes.
293. • Defense, which has been almost totally neglected by the U. S. under its concept of mutual
deterrence.
294. Soviet Doctrine is both a continuation and an extension of the Soviet belief that all military
forces -- nuclear and conventional -- serve a political purpose as guarantor of internal control
and an instrument for territorial expansion. Thus, large military forces are accepted in the
Soviet Union as a rational capital investment, regardless of their impact on social programs.
295. Soviet writing on nuclear strategy has been largely ignored, or has been ridiculed in this
country because if its jingoism and crudity, and the obscurity of Communist semantics. It is a
strategy of "compellance," in contrast to the U. S. doctrine of deterrence.
296. But "... the relationship of Soviet doctrine and Soviet deployments (is) sufficiently close to
suggest that ignoring or not taking seriously Soviet military doctrine may have very detrimental
effects on U. S. security."
297. Finally, "... as long as the Soviets persist in adhering to the Clausewitzian maxim on the
function of war, mutual deterrence does not really exist. And unilateral deterrence is feasible
only if we understand the Soviet war-winning strategy and make it impossible for them to
succeed."
298.
299.
300. Article Preview
301. Why the Soviet Union Thinks It Could Fight & Win a Nuclear War
302. Richard Pipes — July 1977
303. - Abstract
304. IN A RECENT interview with the New Republic, Paul Warnke, the newly appointed head of the Arms

Control and Disarmament Agency, responded as follows to the question of how the United States
ought to react to indications that the Soviet leadership thinks it possible to fight and win a
nuclear war. “In my view,” he replied, “this kind of thinking is on a level of abstraction which
is unrealistic. It seems to me that instead of talking in those terms, which would indulge what
I regard as the primitive aspects of Soviet nuclear doctrine, we ought to be trying to educate
them into the real world of strategic nuclear weapons, which is that nobody could possibly win.”
305. Even after allowance has been made for Mr. Warnke’s notoriously careless syntax, puzzling
questions remain. On what grounds does he, a Washington lawyer, presume to “educate” the Soviet
general staff composed of professional soldiers who thirty years ago defeated the Wehrmacht-and,
of all things, about the “real world of strategic nuclear weapons” of which they happen to
possess a considerably larger arsenal than we? Why does he consider them children who ought not
to be “indulged”? And why does he chastise for what he regards as a “primitive” and unrealistic
strategic doctrine not those who hold it, namely the Soviet military, but Americans who worry
about their holding it?
306. ________________________________________
307.
308. About the Author
309. Richard Pipes is professor of history emeritus at Harvard and the author most recently of
Russian Conservatism and Its Critics (Yale).
310.
311.
312.
313. The Public Mood: Nuclear Weapons and the U.S.S.R.
314. Foreign Affairs, Fall 1984
315. by Daniel Yankelovich and John Doble
316. Presidential campaigns do more than choose individuals for high office: our history shows
317. many instances where elections have moved the country closer to a decisive resolution of
longstanding
318. issues. The 1984 presidential campaign gives the candidates a historic opportunity to build
319. public support for reducing the risk of nuclear war. The American electorate is now
psychologically
320. prepared to take a giant step toward real arms reductions.
321. For several years now a great change, largely unnoted, has transformed the outlook of the
322. American electorate toward nuclear arms. There is a dawning realization among the majority of
323. voters that the growth in nuclear arsenals on both sides has made the old "rules of the game"
324. dangerously obsolete. The traditional response of nations to provocations and challenges to
their
325. interest has been the threat of force and, in the event of a breakdown of relations, resort to
war.
326. However much suffering war may have created in the past, the old rules permitted winners as well
as
327. losers.
328. But an all-out nuclear war, at present levels of weaponry, would wipe out the distinction
329. between winners and losers. All would be losers and the loss irredeemable. This grim truth is
now
330. vividly alive for the American electorate. Moreover, for the average voter the danger is real
and
331. immediate–far more so than among elites and experts. Americans are not clear about the policy
332. implications of this new reality. They do not know how it should be translated into day-to-day
333. transactions with the Soviet Union to reduce the danger. But there is an impatient awareness
that the
334. old responses are not good enough, and a sense of urgency about finding new responses.
335. –By an overwhelming 96 percent to 3 percent, Americans assert that "picking a fight with the
336. Soviet Union is too dangerous in a nuclear world...."
337. –By 89 percent to 9 percent, Americans subscribe to the view that "there can be no winner in
338. an all-out nuclear war; both the United States and the Soviet Union would be completely
339. destroyed."
340. —By 83 percent to 14 percent, Americans say that while in past wars we knew that no matter
341. what happened some life would continue, "we cannot be certain that life on earth will
342. continue after a nuclear war."
343. —And, by 68 percent to 20 percent, the majority rejects the concept that "if we had no
344. alternative we could fight and win a nuclear war against the Soviet Union."
345. These findings are from a new national study conducted by the Public Agenda Foundation to
346. probe attitudes toward nuclear arms. The picture of the electorate's state of mind that follows
has
347. been pieced together from a number of excellent national surveys of public attitudes conducted
over
348. the past several years by a variety of organizations. These include: Gallup, Harris, New York
Times/
349. CBS, Time Soundings (conducted by Yankelovich, Skelly and White), ABC News/Washington Post,

350. The Public Mood: Nuclear Weapons and the U.S.S.R. 2
351. NBC News/Associated Press, Los Angeles Times, Research and Forecasts, and the Public Agenda
352. study, the most recent.
353. The Public Agenda survey underscores what many others have discovered: Americans have
354. come to believe that nuclear war is unwinnable, unsurvivable.
355. II
356. In the postwar period, U.S. policies toward the Soviet Union have oscillated between policies
357. of containment (drawing lines against overt Soviet involvement), and policies of détente that
358. depended on "managing" a carrot/stick relationship between the superpowers. Our shifts from one
359. policy to the other have depended more on internal American politics than on Soviet actions. In
the
360. early 1970s, détente enjoyed immense popularity with the public. As the decade moved toward its
361. close, however, differing Soviet and American interpretations of détente had begun to create
362. tensions (for example, in Angola). The watershed event was the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan
in
363. December 1979 and the reaction of the Carter Administration. This event marked the public start
of
364. the present "down phase" of disillusionment in the United States with the policies of détente,
and of
365. deeply troubled relations with the Soviets.
366. President Carter characterized the Afghanistan invasion as "the worst threat to world peace
367. since World War II." The public, which had momentarily set aside its mistrust of the Soviet
Union in
368. the early and middle 1 970s, now responded with renewed mistrust and frustration over our
apparent
369. impotence to counter Soviet aggression. (The frustration was aggravated, coincidentally, by
this
370. country's inability to free the hostages in Iran.) This combination of events led to a steep
increase in
371. public support for strengthening our defenses, and a mood of deep disillusionment with détente
The
372. Public Agenda survey shows that two-thirds of the public (67 percent) endorse the view that the
373. "Soviet Union used détente as an opportunity to build up their armed forces while lulling us
into a
374. sense of false security."
375. In 1980 and 1981 the backlash against détente reached a high peak of intensity. The public
376. mood was characterized by injured national pride, unqualified support for increasing the
defense
377. budget, and a general desire to see American power become more assertive.
378. The public is now having second thoughts about the dangers of such an assertive posture at a
379. time when the United States is no longer seen to maintain nuclear supremacy. The electorate is
still
380. wary, still mistrustful, and still convinced that the Soviets will seize every possible
advantage they
381. can; yet, at the same time, Americans are determined to stop what they see as a drift toward
nuclear
382. confrontation which, in the electorate's view, neither we nor the Soviets desire. The stage is
being set
383. for a new phase in our relationship with the Soviets.
384. For the United States, "normal relations" between the two superpowers are clearly not the
385. "friendly relations" the American people associated with the 1970s policy of détente At the
same
386. time, Americans are skeptical about the kind of containment policy that prevailed so often in
the
387. past. From our Vietnam experience, voters draw the lesson that we must keep uppermost in mind
the
388. limits of American power. And from the present standoff on nuclear arms they draw the lesson
that
389. we must avoid being provocative and confrontational.
391. Large majorities now support a relatively nonideological, pragmatic live-and-let-live attitude
392. that potentially can provide the political support for a new approach to normalizing relations
393. between the two superpowers.
394. In shaping new policy proposals it will be useful for candidates to hold clearly in view two
395. major findings that emerge from the many studies of public attitudes toward nuclear arms. The
first
396. is that Americans have experienced a serious change of heart about the impact of nuclear
weapons
397. on our national security. The second is that voter perceptions of the Soviets are not as black-
andwhite

398. as they once were; there are many shades of gray—nuances and subtleties that have an
399. important bearing on policy. An inference follows from these findings: voters are
psychologically
400. prepared to consider much more dramatic and far-reaching arms-control policies than existing
ones,
401. because existing policies are rooted in the old rules of the game when there was a chance of
winning
402. if war broke out.
403. III
404. At the very start of the nuclear age in August 1945, a Gallup poll found that the
405. overwhelming majority of citizens approved the use of the atomic bomb on Hiroshima and
406. Nagasaki. America was war-weary, and the new weapon held the promise of ending the conflict and
407. saving American lives. Yet, when asked in the same survey whether the United States should use
408. poison gas against Japanese cities if it would shorten the war and save American lives, most
409. Americans answered no. In the summer of 1945, then, in spite of the suffering the war had
caused,
410. Americans clearly understood the ideas of deterrence and retaliation, and the need to weigh
concerns
411. other than that of simply ending the war.
412. In 1954, Gallup reported that 54 percent of the public felt that the invention of the hydrogen
413. bomb made another world war less likely. By 1982, however, the Gallup survey revealed that
414. American thinking had undergone a radical change. In that year, responding to the same question
415. posed a generation earlier, nearly two in three (65 percent) now said the development of the
bomb
416. was a bad thing.
417. The reasons for this change are clear-cut. Twenty-nine years ago, Gallup had found that only
418. 27 percent of the public agreed that "mankind would be destroyed in an all-out atomic or
hydrogen
419. bomb war." The Public Agenda asked those they interviewed in 1984 if they agreed or disagreed
420. with this statement: "There can be no winner in an all-out nuclear war; both the US and the
Soviet
421. Union would be completely destroyed." An overwhelming 89 percent concurred. This and other
422. responses reflect a dramatic shift in people's thinking about what nuclear war would be like.
Nuclear
423. war is no longer seen as a rational policy for the US government to consider.
424. In part, this extraordinary change reflects Americans' revised understanding of the relative
425. strengths of the United States and the Soviet Union. When the United States alone had the bomb,
426. most Americans had few doubts about our safety. Even after the Soviets achieved nuclear status,
and
427. even after the advent of the hydrogen bomb, American confidence in our nuclear superiority gave
428. most people a feeling of security. In 1955, for example, when only 27 percent said an all-out
nuclear
429. war would destroy mankind, Americans were nearly unanimous (78 percent) in believing that the
430. United States had more nuclear weapons than the Soviet Union. Today, only ten percent believe
we
432. have nuclear superiority; a majority now feels that the two sides are roughly equal in
destructive
433. capability, and at a level felt to be terrifying.
434. Concern about the issue has also increased, especially among the young. Only five percent of
435. the public says they find themselves thinking about the possibility of nuclear war less than
they did
436. five years ago. A majority—and nearly three in four young adults between the ages of 18 and 30—
437. says they think about the issue more often than they did five years ago. There is also majority
438. agreement, 68 percent (rising to 78 percent among adults under 30), that if both sides keep
building
439. missiles instead of negotiating to get rid of them, it is only a matter of time before they are
used. A
440. sizable number expects that day to come soon: 38 percent of the American people, and 50 percent
of
441. those under 30, say that all-out nuclear war is likely to occur within the next ten years. This
is a
442. vision of the future that is far different from that held in the mid-1950s when most people
said the
443. development of the bomb was a good thing, deserving of a central role in our military strategy.
444. Americans have also arrived at an astonishingly high level of agreement that we must adapt
445. our future policies to these "facts of life":
446. —That nuclear weapons are here to stay. They cannot simply be abolished, and because
447. mankind will maintain its knowledge of how to make them, there can be no turning back to a
448. less threatening time (85 percent).

449. —That both we and the Soviets now have an "overkill" capability, more destructive
450. capability than we could ever need, and the ability to blow each other up several times over
451. (90 percent).
452. —That there can be no such thing as a limited nuclear war: if either side were to use nuclear
453. weapons, the conflict would inevitably escalate into all-out war (83 percent).
454. —That the United States no longer has nuclear superiority (84 percent), and that we can
455. never hope to regain it; that the arms race can never be won, for if we did have a bigger
456. nuclear arsenal than the Soviets, they would simply keep building until they caught up (92
457. percent); and that building new weapons to use as "bargaining chips" doesn't work because
458. the Soviets would build similar weapons to match us (84 percent).
459. It is this fundamental sense that our own lives may be at risk that accounts for another
460. startling change in public opinion. A consensus level of 77 percent says that by the end of the
decade
461. it should be US policy not to use nuclear weapons to respond to a conventional Soviet attack.
Nearly
462. the same number (74 percent) say it should be current policy never to use small nuclear weapons
in a
463. battlefield situation.
464. IV
465. Public attitudes toward the Soviet Union are highly complex. Americans believe that the
466. Soviet Union is an aggressive nation, both militarily and ideologically, which presses every
467. advantage, probes constantly for vulnerabilities, interprets every gesture of conciliation and
468. friendship as weakness, fails to keep its promises, cheats on treaties, and, in general, gets
the better
469. of us in negotiations by hanging tough.
471. At the same time, however, there is less concern than in the past about communist subversion
472. from within or about the political appeal of communist ideology to our closest allies.
Americans hold
473. the Russian people in high esteem, believe that America is able to live in peace with a variety
of
474. communist countries, see the Russians caught in the same plight as ourselves in seeking to
avert a
475. suicidal nuclear arms race, credit the Soviets with legitimate security concerns, and believe
they are
476. genuinely interested in negotiation. Huge majorities feel that America has been less
forthcoming in
477. working things out with the Russians than it might be and that we have to share some of the
blame
478. for the deterioration in the relationship.
479. This ambivalent attitude represents a change in outlook from the last presidential election in
480. 1980 to the present one. In 1980, Americans were in an assertive anti-Communist, anti-Soviet
mood,
481. ready to support cold-war kinds of initiatives. But in politics, timing is all. Surveys show
that
482. Americans feel that the power imbalance that prevailed in 1980 has now been partly or wholly
483. corrected and that more constructive negotiations are possible.
484. Today, the majority of Americans have reached a conclusion about communism that can best
485. be described as pragmatic rejection. As they have in the past, Americans today firmly reject
the
486. social values of communism, and see them as opposed to all our fundamental beliefs. But there
is
487. little fear today that communist subversion threatens the United States, that communists will
engage
488. in sabotage, form a fifth column, or convert millions of Americans to their cause. Americans
today
489. are confident that communism holds little appeal in this country. They differentiate among
490. communist countries, too, and the threat they pose to our security. For example, in the Public
491. Agenda survey, people concur with near unanimity that "our experience with communist China
492. proves that our mortal enemies can quickly turn into countries we can get along with" (83
percent).
493. This sense that communism is something we can tolerate without accepting, something with which
494. we can coexist without endorsing, represents another and perhaps fundamental shift in the
public's
495. thinking since the beginning of the nuclear age.
496. Admittedly, public attitudes toward dealing with the threat of communism often seem
497. contradictory and confused. In recent years computer-based statistical methods have permitted
some
498. very subtle and powerful analyses which divide the public into like-minded subgroups. At the
Public

499. Agenda, analyst Harvey Lauer performed such an analysis on their survey findings, with some
500. revealing and important results.
501. Lauer's "cluster analysis" showed that public attitudes are most sharply divided by four
502. variables: (1) the presence or absence of ideological animosity toward the Soviet Union; (2)
the
503. inclination to see the conflict between the United States and the USSR in religious terms or
504. pragmatic terms; (3) the tendency to minimize or to stress the threat of nuclear war; and (4)
the
505. favoring of an assertive or a conciliatory policy toward the Soviets.
506. The four groups that Lauer's cluster analysis reveals can be characterized as follows. One
507. group he calls the "threat minimizers." They constitute 23 percent of the Public Agenda's
national
508. cross-section. Like virtually everyone else, they believe that nuclear war is unwinnable. But
unlike
509. most other Americans, they do not think there is any real chance that it will happen.
Consequently
510. they are prepared to take far greater risks than the rest of the public. They are less
interested in
511. negotiation than in building up our military strength. They reject conciliatory gestures in
favor of
512. weakening the Soviet Union in every way possible. Demographically, this group is predominantly
514. male (69 percent), older than other groups, and fairly well educated, with good incomes.
Politically,
515. they tend to be conservative and Republican.
516. At the opposite extreme is to be found the youngest and best educated of the four groups.
517. Constituting 21 percent of the sample this group believes the possibility of nuclear disaster
is real
518. and urgent, they have faith in conciliation over confrontation, they want to see the United
States take
519. the initiative in reducing our nuclear arms, and most strikingly, they are almost totally free
of the
520. ideological hostility that the majority of Americans feel toward the Soviet Union. They see the
521. Soviet threat almost completely in military terms. Like the first group, it, too, is more male
than
522. female (56 percent to 44 percent), but unlike the first group it tends to be liberal rather
than
523. conservative.
524. What about the two middle groups where the majority of Americans are to be found? The
525. single largest of the four groups—31 percent—is made up of Americans who are ideologically
526. opposed to communism and the Soviets but are peaceful and nonassertive in their strategic
thinking
527. about how to deal with the Soviet threat. They see communism as an ideological threat, but they
also
528. think a lot about the possibility of nuclear war. They believe the Soviet Union takes advantage
of us
529. and cheats on our treaties with it, but they also believe that the United States has not done
enough to
530. reach serious arms control agreements with the Soviets. They urge that we reach an
accommodation
531. with the Soviets on a peaceful coexistence, "live-and-let-live" basis, and not attempt to
reform or
532. change them. Demographically, this is the most female of the four groups (60 percent); they are
533. fairly young, of average education, and middle-of-the-road in their political orientation.
534. The fourth group, representing one quarter of the population (25 percent) tends to see the
535. conflict between us and the Soviets in religious terms. They see the Soviet Union as an "evil
empire"
536. threatening our moral and religious values. A majority of them believe that in the event of a
nuclear
537. holocaust their faith in God would ensure their survival. Unlike all the other groups, they
believe that
538. some day the United States is going to have to fight the Russians to stop communism.
539. In many respects, the religious anti-communism of this group predisposes it to endorse the
540. utmost in nuclear military strength for the United States. But, paradoxically, it is the most
541. apprehensive about the imminent threat of a nuclear holocaust. Consequently, it sees great
danger to
542. the United States in efforts to weaken the Soviets too much, lest they respond "like cornered
rats." A
543. majority among them believes the United States has not done enough in negotiations with the
544. Soviets, and a large minority would even opt for unilateral reductions in our nuclear

stockpile.
545. Most of the contradictions in public responses are concentrated in this subgroup. There is,
546. however, an emotional logic underlying their seeming inconsistency: they fear communism as an
547. ideology and would smite it with the sword—but they fear the threat of nuclear war more than
they
548. fear communism and therefore they are more willing than most Americans to sheathe the sword.
549. They want the United States to be as strong militarily as possible, but they also fear the
550. consequences of our using our military strength aggressively. Their activism derives from the
fact
551. that the likelihood of nuclear war is a living reality for them. They are concerned to do
everything
552. they can to avert catastrophe. Of all the four groups, they most yearn for strong leadership
and
553. authority to set down a policy that will allay their anxieties. They are the only one of the
four groups
554. where a majority believes that the subject of nuclear weapons is too complex for them to think
about
556. and should therefore be left "to the President and to the experts." Demographically, they are
the least
557. well educated of the four groups, disproportionately Democratic but not liberal.
558. A profile of ambivalent American attitudes toward the Soviet Union can be seen graphically
559. in the following table. It summarizes both the positive and negative attitudes toward the
Soviet
560. Union and toward communism as an ideology.
561. AMBIVALENT ATTITUDES TOWARD THE SOVIET UNION AND COMMUNISM*
562. Negative Views % Agree % Disagree
563. "During the 1970s, when we were trying to
564. improve relations, the Soviets secretly built up
565. their military strength"**
566. 90 6
567. "The Soviets are constantly testing us, probing for weaknesses, and
568. they're quick to take advantage whenever they find any"**
569. 82 14
570. "The Soviets treat our friendly gestures as weaknesses" ** 73 23
571. "The Soviets used détente as an opportunity to build up their armed
572. forces while lulling us into a false sense of security"***
573. 67 20
574. "If we are weak, the Soviet Union, at the right moment, will attack
575. us or our allies in Europe and Japan" * * *
576. 65 27
577. "The Soviets only respond to military strength"*** 61 34
578. "The Soviets lie, cheat and steal—do anything to further the cause
579. of communism"***
580. 61 28
581. "The Soviets have cheated on just about every treaty and
582. agreement they've ever signed"***
583. 61 24
584. "In past agreements between the US and the Soviet Union, the
585. Soviets almost always got the better part of the bargain"***
586. 58 31
587. "Whenever there's trouble in the world—in the Middle East,
588. Central America, or anywhere else—chances are the Soviets are
589. behind it"***
590. 56 38
592. More Accepting Views %
593. Agree
594. %
595. Disagree
596. "The Russian people are not nearly as hostile to the US as their
597. leaders are and, in fact, the Russians could be our friends if their
598. leaders had a different attitude"**
599. 88 6
600. "The US has to accept some of the blame for the tension that has
601. plagued U.S.-Soviet relations in recent years"***
602. 76 16
603. "You can't understand how the Russians behave without realizing
604. that their homeland has been invaded many, many times. They are
605. obsessed with their own military security"***

606. 75 19
607. "The idea that the Soviets are the cause of all the world's troubles is
608. a dangerous oversimplification " * * *
609. 70 26
610. "The US often blames the Soviets for troubles in other countries
611. that are really caused by poverty, hunger, political corruption and
612. repression" * * *
613. 68 26
614. "Just 40 years ago, the Germans invaded the Soviet Union and
615. killed millions of Russian citizens. It's perfectly understandable
616. why they oppose our putting nuclear missiles on German soil"***
617. 58 35
618. "The Soviet leaders believe that President Reagan is trying to
619. humiliate them, and this is not a good climate for negotiating on
620. matters of life and death"***
621. 51 40
622. "The degree to which the Soviets cheat on arms control is
623. overstated by Americans who oppose negotiating with them in the
624. first place"***
625. 44 41
626. # Totals do not add to 100% because "Not Sure" responses are omitted
627. ** Time/Yankelovich, Skelly and White, 1983
628. *** Public Agenda, 1984
629. There is somewhat of a generation gap on attitudes toward the Soviets, with older Americans
630. expressing more suspicion of and hostility toward Soviet motives and actions than younger
631. Americans. For example, 76 percent of those over 60 agree that the Soviets lie, cheat and steal
—do
632. anything to further the cause of communism—compared to 52 percent among those under 30. More
634. older than younger Americans also believe that the Soviets cheat on treaties and agreements (76
635. percent to 49 percent). On the other hand, young Americans, perhaps more skeptical of authority
to
636. begin with, believe the degree of Soviet cheating is overstated by those who oppose negotiating
with
637. them in the first place. (Fifty-nine percent of those under 30 express such a view, compared to
only
638. 32 percent among those over 60.)
639. V
640. Such is the nature of public ambivalence toward the Soviet Union that it dooms to failure any
641. one-dimensional policy that appeals exclusively to one side of public attitudes. A policy of
undiluted
642. anti-communism that emphasizes only the negatives cannot hope to win solid majority support.
The
643. time is past when successful candidates can simply run against the Politburo. Similarly, a
onedimensional
644. policy of détente—if détente is interpreted as it was in the 1970s, as "making friends"
645. with the Russians—cannot win solid majority support either.
646. No amount of public opinion analysis can fashion the correct policy. What opinion polls can
647. reveal, however, and what we propose to describe are the boundaries or constraints which the
648. public's thinking imposes on policy. To sustain a complex and difficult policy, one that may
call for
649. public sacrifice, restraint and understanding, it is prudent to seek to win solid and lasting
support
650. from the electorate. Our analysis of opinion data suggests that to achieve such support in
today's
651. climate, such a policy would have to be conceived within the following guidelines:
652. 1. The United States must not adopt any policy that the majority of Americans will
653. perceive as "losing the arms race."
654. Most Americans believe that the United States cannot regain nuclear superiority, that the
655. arms race cannot be won, and that we can never return to a time when our nuclear monopoly gave
us
656. a sense of nearly total security. People are nearly unanimous in the view that if we had a
bigger
657. nuclear arsenal than the Soviets, they would simply keep building until they caught up (92
percent).
658. By nearly eight to one (84 percent), the public opposes the idea of building new weapons to use
as
659. "bargaining chips" to get concessions in negotiations.
660. But, in spite of the feeling that we can never "win" the arms race, Americans are afraid we
661. could "lose" it. Nearly six in ten (57 percent) say we must continue to develop new and better

662. nuclear weapons so as not to lose the arms race. A particular concern fueling this sentiment is
the
663. fear that "technological breakthroughs" could make the weapons we now have obsolete (71
percent).
664. 2. Americans are convinced that it is time for negotiations, not confrontations, with the
665. Soviets.
666. Following from the view that nuclear weapons can never be abolished and that the arms race
667. cannot be won, Americans see only one way to reduce the risk of nuclear war—through
668. negotiations. Americans overwhelmingly concur that "picking a fight" with the Soviet Union is
too
669. dangerous in a nuclear world, that we should be thinking of peaceful solutions (96 percent).
670. Americans feel that the Soviets are as afraid of nuclear war as we are (94 percent) and that it
is in
671. our mutual interest to find ways to negotiate to reduce the risk of war.
673. Some people see a most ominous trend: that we and the Soviets are drifting toward
674. catastrophe. Sixty-eight percent of Americans feel that if we and the Soviets keep building
nuclear
675. weapons instead of negotiating to get rid of them, "it's only a matter of time before they are
used."
676. This concern is especially pronounced among women (75 percent) and those under 30 (78 percent).
677. By 50 percent to 22 percent, people say the United States would be safer if we spent less time
and
678. effort building up our military forces and more on negotiating with the Soviets. Again, women
and
679. younger Americans agree even more strongly. The idea of building more dangerous nuclear weapons
680. to get the Soviets to make concessions on arms control is rejected by a margin of 62 percent to
31
681. percent. Half the public fears that President Reagan is playing nuclear "chicken" with the
Soviets (50
682. percent).
683. 3. The dominant attitude of Americans is that of "live-and-let-live" pragmatism, not an
684. anti-Communist crusade, nor a strong desire to reform the Russians.
685. Americans say that peacefully coexisting with communist countries is something we do all
686. the time (71 percent). And by a margin of 67 percent to 28 percent, people agree that we should
let
687. the communists have their system while we have ours, that "there's room in the world for both."
688. A solid majority also feels no strong desire to involve the United States in reforming the
689. Soviet Union. Nearly six in ten (58 percent) agree that we've been trying to change Soviet
behavior
690. for 60 years, and that it is time we stopped trying to do so. By a margin of 59 percent to 19
percent,
691. Americans also say we would be better off if we stopped treating the Soviets as enemies and
tried to
692. hammer out our differences in a live-and-let-live spirit. And, by a margin of 53 percent to 22
693. percent, Americans feel that the United States would be safer if we stopped trying to prevent
the
694. spread of communism to other countries, and learned to live with them the way we live with
China
695. and Yugoslavia.
696. 4. A national reconsideration of the strategic role for nuclear weapons is badly needed.
697. Our present policies are almost universally misunderstood. More than eight out of ten
698. Americans (81 percent) believe it is our current policy to use nuclear weapons "if and only if"
our
699. adversaries use them against us first. Almost the same massive majority believes that this is
what our
700. national policy should be. Only 18 percent agree that we should use nuclear weapons against a
701. conventional Soviet attack in Europe or Japan; and more than three out of four (76 percent)
agree
702. that we should use nuclear weapons if, and only if, the Soviets use them against our allies
first.
703. At the same time, however, the public holds many other attitudes that are actually or
704. potentially in conflict with this majority position. Only a third of all Americans (33 percent)
know
705. that nuclear weapons are less expensive than conventional forces. At the same time, substantial
706. majorities (66 percent) say that they would be willing to pay higher taxes for defense if we
and the
707. Soviets reduced our nuclear weapons and replaced them with non-nuclear forces.
708. More important than economic arguments is the concern of the majority, summarized above,
709. that we not "lose" the arms race by falling behind the Soviets in technology or weapons. There

is
710. also great reluctance to appear "weak" in Soviet eyes, since the public is persuaded that the
Soviets
711. interpret conciliatory gestures on our part as signs of weakness.
713. In brief, Americans fear that the danger of nuclear war has seriously weakened our security.
714. They also realize that the present standoff between us and the Soviets excludes the use of
nuclear
715. weapons as an option for achieving policy goals. But they have not yet thought through the
strategic
716. and policy implications of this awesome change in the rules. Their present preferences are
clear: to
717. move toward less rather than greater reliance on nuclear weapons.
718. 5. Finally, Americans are prepared—somewhat nervously—to take certain risks for
719. peace.
720. So dangerous is the present situation, and so gravely does it threaten our security, that the
721. public feels it is time to change course and, in doing so, to take some initiatives in the
cause of
722. peace.
723. The idea of a bilateral and verifiable nuclear freeze has been supported by upwards of 75
724. percent of the public for several years. But beyond a freeze, majorities also endorse other
strategies
725. containing an explicit element of risk. For example, a 61-percent majority favors the idea of
726. declaring a unilateral six-month freeze on nuclear weapons development to see if the Soviets
will
727. follow suit, even if they might take advantage of it; 56 percent favor signing an arms control
728. agreement with the Soviets, even if foolproof verification cannot be guaranteed. Finally, 55
percent
729. favor expanding trade with the Soviets and making other cooperative gestures, even if that
makes
730. them stronger and more secure.
731. In sum, a fair conclusion from the variety of surveys and interviews is that the American
732. electorate wants to reverse the present trend toward relying ever more heavily on nuclear
weapons to
733. achieve the nation's military and political objectives. The public finds the long-term risks of
734. continuing the way we are going to be simply unacceptable.
735.
736.
737. much, much more at:
738. http://www.docstoc.com/docs/160350852/RU...PROPHECIES
739. http://www.reactorbreach.com/showthread.php?tid=1989&pid=8044#pid8044
740.
741.
742.
743. New Lies for Old by Anatoliy Golitsyn, 1984
744.
745. http://www.spiritoftruth.org/newlies4old.pdf
746.
747. Nuclear War Survival Skills NP
748.
749. http://www.nukepills.com/nuclear-war-survival-skills-pdf-download/
750.
751. WE WILL BURY YOU
752.
753. http://www.spiritoftruth.org/We_Will_Bury_You.pdf
754.
755. The Perestroika Deception
756.
757. http://www.spiritoftruth.org/The_Perestroika_Deception.pdf
758.
759.
760.
761. The Spirit Of Truth Blog- An Historical Epiphany- Russia's Lying To This World
762. Jesus said to them, "If God were your Father, you would love me, for I have come here from God.
I have not come on my own; God sent me. Why is my language not clear to you? Because you are
unable to hear what I say. You belong to your father, the devil, and you want to carry out your
father’s desires. He was a murderer from the beginning, not holding to the truth, for there is
no truth in him. When he lies, he speaks his native language, for he is a liar and the father of
lies. Yet because I tell the truth, you do not believe me!" [John 8:42-45]
763.

764. The site of Jesus’ baptism by John the Baptist opened to the public after 42 years this week:
765.
766.
767. After 42 years as a closed military zone, the site where John baptized Jesus along the shores of
the Jordan River will permanently open to the public with a special ceremony on January 18.
768.
769. Guess who showed up to be baptized at the historic site by the waters of the Jordan River?
770.
771. Why...Russian President Dmitry Medvedev, of course!
772.
773.
774.
775.
776. The Russian media says President Dmitry Medvedev has taken a dip in the Jordan River in
commemoration of Jesus' baptism.
777.
778. RIA Novosti and ITAR-Tass say Medvedev was dunked three times - in line with Orthodox tradition
- at a site in western Jordan where Jesus is said to have been baptized by John the Baptist.
[Yahoo News]
779.
780. What was the occasion?
781.
782. The Orthodox Epiphany that commemorates when Jesus was baptized in those very same waters some
2000 years ago:
783.
784.
785. Russian President Dmitry Medvedev took an Epiphany dip in the holy waters of the Jordan River on
Wednesday.
786.
787. Epiphany, also know as Theophany, is one of the Great Christian Feasts. The Russian Orthodox
Church celebrates it on January 19 in line with the Julian calendar.
788.
789. The Russian leader visited a Russian Orthodox center for pilgrims, currently being built near
the area where Jesus Christ is believed to have been baptized by John the Baptist.
790.
791. "Visiting the Jordan River on Epiphany Day is a great joy for any Orthodox believer. I'm
convinced that the hotel will soon take in its first pilgrims. Happy holiday," Medvedev wrote in
the guest book. [Ria Novosti]
792.
793.
794. On January 19th, the Russian Orthodox Church celebrates Epiphany.
795.
796. Epiphany is one of the main Christian holidays, one of twelve, which is celebrated and has been
since the first ages of Christianity. On this day, Our Lord Jesus Christ was baptized in the
River Jordan.
797.
798. The Gospels say that St. John the Baptist, also known as John the Forerunner, who started the
practice of baptizing people, received a revelation that the Savior of mankind would come to him
to be baptized. Several days later, Jesus Christ came to him. When Jesus was baptized, the Holy
Spirit in the image of a dove descended on Him, and John heard the voice of God the Father:
“This is My beloved Son, in Whom I am well pleased”.
799.
800. “Christ’s mission was to deify man’s nature – and to sanctify the whole world. By receiving
baptism in the River Jordan, He sanctified the water element – and thus the whole of nature,”
said Archbishop of Egoryevsk Marc. [Voice Of Russia]
801.
802. Why is it that the formerly atheistic, KGB Kremlin elite are "finding God"?
803.
804. How about because THEY THINK THEY EFFECTIVELY ARE GOD and believe themselves to be the ultimate
AUTHORity in human HIStory!
805.
806.
807. "History is a capricious creature. It depends on who writes it." - Mikhail Gorbachev
808.
809. Notably, the Wikipedia entry for "epiphany" states:
810.
811.
812. An epiphany (from the ancient Greek epiphaneia, "manifestation, striking appearance") is the
sudden realization or comprehension of the (larger) essence or meaning of something. The term is
used in either a philosophical or literal sense to signify that the claimant has "found the last

piece of the puzzle and now sees the whole picture," or has new information or experience, often
insignificant by itself, that illuminates a deeper or numinous foundational frame of reference.
813.
814. Here's an historical 'epiphany' for you.
815.
816. I've been trying to warn this world for almost 20 years now about the evil intentions of the
"Old Enemy".
817.
818.
819.
820. Russia's ruling elite did away with their false and failing ideological front of Communism to
replace it with a 'new lie for old':
821.
822.
823. CHRISTIANITY!
824.
825.
826. The Kremlin, deluded by its historical messianic complex, is implementing a multi-year
apocalyptic plan, in concert with common allies, to "save" the world from the sinful,
materialistic West and evil, "Zionist" Jews via historically unprecedented mass deceit and
murder.
827.
828. I'm here trying to save you from this absurd historical lie. Hence, the "Apocalypse":
829.
830.
831. An Apocalypse (Greek: apokálypsis; "lifting of the veil" or "revelation") is a disclosure of
something hidden from the majority of mankind in an era dominated by falsehood and
misconception, i.e. the veil to be lifted.
832.
833. The term also can refer to the eschatological final battle, the Armageddon, and the idea of an
end of the world. In Christianity The Apocalypse of John is the Book of Revelation, the last
book of the Christian Bible.
834.
835.
836. The Man of Lawlessness
837.
838. Concerning the coming of our Lord Jesus Christ and our being gathered to him, we ask you,
brothers, not to become easily unsettled or alarmed by some prophecy, report or letter supposed
to have come from us, saying that the day of the Lord has already come. Don’t let anyone deceive
you in any way, for [that day will not come] until the rebellion occurs and the man of
lawlessness is revealed, the man doomed to destruction. He will oppose and will exalt himself
over everything that is called God or is worshiped, so that he sets himself up in God’s temple,
proclaiming himself to be God.
839.
840. Don’t you remember that when I was with you I used to tell you these things? And now you know
what is holding him back, so that he may be revealed at the proper time. For the secret power of
lawlessness is already at work; but the one who now holds it back will continue to do so till he
is taken out of the way. And then the lawless one will be revealed, whom the Lord Jesus will
overthrow with the breath of his mouth and destroy by the splendor of his coming. The coming of
the lawless one will be in accordance with the work of Satan displayed in all kinds of
counterfeit miracles, signs and wonders, and in every sort of evil that deceives those who are
perishing. They perish because they refused to love the truth and so be saved. For this reason
God sends them a powerful delusion so that they will believe the lie and so that all will be
condemned who have not believed the truth but have delighted in wickedness. [2 Thessalonians 2]
841.
842. http://thespiritoftruth.blogspot.com/2011/01/historical-epiphany-russias-lying-to.html
843.
844.
845.
846. Russia's Secret War Plans
847.
848.
849. "America will be totally destroyed." - Col. Stanislav Lunev
850.
851.
852. Westerners, for the most part, continue to take news regarding Russia, China, North Korea,
Georgia, Iran, Syria, Hezbollah, Hamas, etc. at face value. This self-deluding needs to stop if
the free world is to have any chance of survival.
853.
854. Defectors from Russia and former Soviet states have long been warning the West that it is being

duped into defeat:
855.
856.
857. One of the most remarkable defectors in this regard is Colonel Stanislav Lunev, the highest-
ranking defector from Russia's military intelligence services, the GRU. In 2001, Lunev was
interviewed by NewsMax.com and HERE IS A CRITICAL EXCERPT THAT EVERYONE SHOULD LISTEN TO VERY
CLOSELY (full interview). Russia is pursuing an all-out third world war against the West in a
necessarily secretive way, and it appears Moscow's plans are nearing a violent phase. (READ
ABOUT RUSSIA'S SECRET NUCLEAR WAR-FIGHTING BUNKER.)
858.
859.
860. At the current juncture, multiple critical flashpoints are heating up to a potentially explosive
level: North Korea vs. South Korea, Israel vs. Iran, Georgia vs. Russia, etc.
861.
862. Regarding North Korea's recent provocations, just keep in mind the following key facts:
863.
864.
865. Today, China supplies about 90% of North Korea's oil, 80% of its consumer goods and 45% of its
food. Beijing is Pyongyang's only formal military ally and its primary backer in the United
Nations Security Council and other diplomatic forums. If it weren't for the Chinese, there would
be no North Korean missile program, no North Korean nuclear program and no North Korea. (Forbes)
866.
867. Pyongyang would not be testing nukes and/or otherwise provoking a confrontation with the West
unless it has at least tacit approval from Beijing. The threat of China applying what would
effectively be strangling economic sanctions means that North Korea's behavior is shaped by
Chinese policy toward its Stalinist neighbor. So the real question here is not what the supposed
madman, Kim Jong Il, is up to....but rather what is China up to?
868.
869.
870. "U.S. policy for dealing with the North Korean situation is inadequate because it focuses on
North Korea in isolation as a rogue state, and naively seeks help from the Russians and Chinese
to solve the problem. The North Korea situation and any future nuclear incident, wherever it
occurs, must be seen against the background of Sino-Soviet 'convergence' strategy: the
interaction of Russian and Chinese policy and the moves they make to derive strategic gains from
critical situations should be closely studied."
871.
872. - Anatoliy Golitsyn, the highest ranking KGB defector to the West, The Perestroika Deception,
1990, p.46
873.
874. China operates in concert with Russia (especially with regard to the North Korean puppet state
that was originally established by Russia after World War Two), and Russia shapes history
according to astrology similar to the occult practices of Hitler's Germany in waging World War
Two.
875.
876.
877. "Astrology is a quite serious science. It helps us launch spacecraft, missiles; we use it
broadly to forestall suicides among the personnel. Experience shows it is unreasonable to reject
it. Our estimates and forecasts are usually corroborated up to 70-75 percent." - Viktor
Yakovlev, Commander of the Russian Strategic Rocket Forces
878.
879.
880. "Believe it or not, every three months a summary of astrological prognoses predicting the place
and date of future extraordinary occurrences is sent from the St. Petersburg Naval Scientific
Research Institute to the Russian Defense Ministry's General Staff." - Komsomolskaya Pravda;
January 21, 1998
881.
882. Note that the first of a triple conjunction between Jupiter and Neptune just occurred. This is
more rare than I had thought, last occurring in 1971. The last time a triple conjunction
occurred involving outer planets was 1993. With the third Saturn-Neptune conjunction in 1989,
the Berlin Wall came down as the staged "Velvet Revolutions" took place in Eastern Europe.
883.
884. Notably, when the Berlin Wall came down, a major phase of "peaceful" convergence between East
and West, Communism and Capitalism, got underway.
885.
886. Korea's DMZ constitutes the final Cold War "battleline" between world Communism and Capitalism,
East and West.
887.
888. With this week's conjunction of Jupiter and Neptune, North Korea carried out an underground test
of an atomic bomb the size of the ones dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki and test launched
medium range ballistic missiles stirring regional tensions.
889.

890. Should North Korea go back to war with South Korea, a major phase of "violent" convergence
between East and West will be underway. That a new Korean conflict, potentially involving
nuclear weapons, may be in the works is suggested by concerns of Russian officials:
891.
892.
893. In Moscow, news agencies quoted an official as saying that Russia is taking precautionary
security measures because it fears tensions over the test could lead to nuclear war. (Reuters)
894.
895.
896. Russian intelligence agencies received task to thoroughly monitor developments in Korean
peninsula
897.
898. Russia has revealed an unprecedented level of concern over Pyongyang's increasing belligerence
and is taking security measures as a precaution against the possibility that tension over North
Korea could escalate into nuclear war, The Moscow Times reports, referring to unidentified
officials. Sensitive political decisions taken by Moscow are traditionally revealed by anonymous
officials through Russian news agencies.
899.
900. A security source told news agency Interfax that the standoff triggered by Pyongyang's recent
nuclear test could affect the security of Russia's far eastern regions, which border North
Korea. "The need has emerged for an appropriate package of precautionary measures," the paper
cites the unidentified source. "We are not talking about stepping up military efforts but rather
about measures in case a military conflict, perhaps with the use of nuclear weapons, flares up
on the Korean peninsula." The official did not elaborate further, The Moscow Times notes.
901.
902. Radio Ekho Moskvy reported earlier this week that Russian intelligence agencies had received
task to thoroughly monitor developments in the Korean peninsula and to report immediately on
changes of situation. (Axis News)
903.
904. All said and done, the megolamaniacal totalitarian regimes in Moscow and Beijing continue to
tailor world history toward an apocalyptic world war with great success because the West is
wholly deluded and unaware of the secret war plan unfolding.
905.
906. As long as people fail to think for themselves and no one calls these evildoers to account for
their occultic machinations against humanity, then the free world ultimately will be subject to
the fate of the North Korean people:
907.
908.
909.
910.
911.
912. When will people make a stand against 'The Old Enemy'?
913.
914.
915. The Soviets never start a war. By definition, the United States or, more generally speaking,
"imperialism is the source of all antagonistic conflicts of the present day world, the source of
war danger." [General Major A.S. Milovidov, quoted in Soviet Strategy For Nuclear War, p.98]
916.
917.
918. Speaking of the surprise unleashing of a nuclear war, the following should be noted. Recently
the command element of the U.S. army, evidently, does not exclude the possibility of opening
military operations even in the main theaters with the use of just conventional means of
destruction. Such a beginning of war can create favorable conditions for the movement of all
nuclear forces to the regions of combat operations, bringing them into the highest level of
combat readiness, and subsequently inflicting the first nuclear strike with the employment in it
of the maximum number of missile launch sites, submarines and aircraft at the most favorable
moment.
919.
920. One of the advantages the Soviets see of the conventional phase is the possibility that it
provides cover to operations to initiate a nuclear attack, preparations that might otherwise be
detected and provide warning. The notion of striking at "the most favorable moment" included in
this quote is often encountered in Soviet military literature, especially in regard to surprise
attack. [From Soviet Strategy For Nuclear War, p.103]
921.
922.
923. "We believe that the main determinant in the attack is the most decisive operation possible,
having for its purpose the total destruction of the enemy's armed forces, and particularly the
destruction of his nuclear weapons; that is, the achievement of results such that he would no
longer be capable of offering further resistance within the limits of missions being carried
out, or which would be needed for general capitulation. In the past this aim was possible of

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