Russo - Ukrainian War Updates III: Defcon 3

usso - krainian War Updates III:
DEFCON 3 Kan Yuenyong

[as of March 1, 2022, GMT+7; D-Day+5]
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Geopolitics.Λsia
Image: https://mobile.twitter.com/AkelaFreedom/status/1427890288622768131

–Herman Melville, ‘Moby Dick’
“…be it what it may”
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The Net Assessment
• Russia has made a stiﬀed test more than ever toward the strength of the recent rules-based global order. It remains
intact so far should the war end shortly. If it will be a protracted war, the new global order will emerge.

• The resent maneuver from the West aims to end the conflict in a very short period of time by sharply increasing
Russia’s cost of war (i.e. SWIFT sanction) and facilitate Ukraine (via supporting through equipments and funding) to
build its capability on resistance against Russia’s military

• UNAG’s Uniting for Peace (U4P) move to overrule the UNSC’s veto power is similar to the move during the
Afghanistan’s U4P move in 1980, but this time it’s with more united Western allies

• More alert and strengthening NATO allies, i.e. an announcement of German Chancellor to increase defense budget
to 2% of GDP, and to diversified its dependence on Russian energy.

• Russia tries to increase its bargaining via Nuclear threatening and mobilizing army from Belarus and Chechnya, but
it’s diﬃcult to achieve military objectives in the short run (i.e. to decapitate the Ukraine government and install the
new friendly regime). Alternative SWIFT has very low user (i.e. only 400 users)

• Over 500,000 Ukrainian refugees have fled after Russian invasion (Axios). It might generate further problems in
Europe.
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The Net Assessment (cont.)
• It doesn’t matter on how Putin aims to see “Kosovo (1998-1999)” or “Afghanistan (2021)” but
it will be unveiled as following scenarios:

• Finland (winter war, 30 November 1939 – 13 March 1940), short term conflict 6 - 12
months -> Ukraine will set aside and will meet terms with Russia for the disputed
territory and becoming neutral for at least 10 years treaty, possibly can still have a risk
for the future conflict with Putin’s “perpetual war-and-peace”. Possibility = 30%.

• Spanish civil war (17 July 1936 – 1 April 1939), average term conflict, 2 - 3 years or
more -> might contribute to global conflict, underlying global order adjustment had
emerged, the war was merely a symptom. Possibility = 25%.

• Soviet-Afghan war (24 December 1979 – 15 February 1989), a protracted war, i.e. 5-10
years or more -> might contribute to another Russia’s collapse, yet another kind of
global order will emerge. Possibility = 45%
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Besiege and encirclement
Converge to isolate

the eastern flank
Occupying the eastern flank
Ukrainian government
will choose to flee to
Lyiv, and then to secure
the western flank
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2022_Russian_invasion_of_Ukraine

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• Russia deployed additional heavy forces and artillery that it has so far failed to employ
in assaults on Kyiv to the city’s western approach on February 27-28. Russian forces
will likely launch a renewed assault on western Kyiv on March 1.

• Russian forces began using heavy artillery against central Kharkiv on February 28,
indicating a dangerous inflection in Russian operations as the Kremlin chooses to use
air and artillery assets it has held in reserve to date.

• Russian forces resumed limited advances in northeastern Ukraine on February 28 after
an operational pause on February 26-27.

• Russian and proxy forces resumed assaults on Ukrainian forces defending Mariupol
from the east and deployed additional artillery and anti-tank guided missile (ATGM)
assets to the Mariupol front line on February 28. Russian forces may attempt a
renewed assault on Mariupol in the coming days.

• Russian forces increasingly targeted Ukrainian airfields and logistics centers on
February 28, particularly in western Ukraine. Russia likely seeks to ground the
Ukrainian air force and interdict the ability of Western states to resupply the Ukrainian
military.

• Russian and Belarusian forces may be preparing for an additional line of advance from
Belarus into western Ukraine.

• Russian successes in southern Ukraine are the most dangerous and threaten to
unhinge Ukraine’s successful defenses and rearguard actions to the north and
northeast.

• Russian troops are facing growing morale and logistics issues, predictable
consequences of the poor planning, coordination, and execution of attacks along
Ukraine’s northern border.
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-
oﬀensive-campaign-assessment-february-28-2022

One of the new satellite images from Maxar showing the Russian military convoy that’s reached the
outskirts of Kyiv, longer than previously measured & now believed to be 40+ miles long. Maxar says
it’s made up of armored vehicles, tanks, towed artillery and other vehicles..

https://mobile.twitter.com/kaitlancollins/status/1498467692042461186
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Live Webcams From Around #Ukraine | #Kyiv

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lf-EEnsxZXo
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Dynamics of War
• In war, both sides are not at fixed state. After facing a strong resistance from Ukrainian army and facing problems on
logistics, but the northern flank of Russian invasion army will overcome the problems and it has adjusted its plan by
diverting to encircle Kyiv. With limited people and resources, Ukrainian army will be forced into defensive form. It is the
Russian army whom is the oﬀensive actor and thus to dictate the fate of war. We predict the phases of war as follows:

• Besiege & encirclement: Urban warfare will use oﬀensive-defensive ratio as much as 6:1 to 10:1, while it will use only
3:1 on open terrain. Russian military will rather shelling rather than to direct occupying the city to avoid losing the
servicemen, while encirclement the city. The Ukrainian army inside Kyiv, if being encircled, it will lack of enough food
and ammunition supply.

• Occupying eastern flank campaign: The rational choice for president Volodymyr Zelenskyy is to leave Kyiv and
establishing Lviv as the new capital and military base, the connected boundary of western flank of Ukraine with Poland,
Slovakia, Hungary and Romania will help building the safe rear for Ukrainian army. In the meantime, the Russian army
from the northern front and the southern front will march along the Dnieper river to converge each other and thus to
isolate Ukrainian army whom still remains in the eastern flank. If Lyiv will also fall, the Ukrainian government will
establish government in exile. The Russian military will establish the new Ukrainian puppet government.

• Continued invasion in the western flank and possible urban and insurgency warfare in occupied zone: Had the
two countries not met the negotiation terms, the protracted war will be expected. It will be a long and losing war for
both sides. Ukrainian force will be supported by the West. While the Russian military will endure its expensive cost of
war and waiting for the West to give up its economic sanction plan. g Geopolitics.Λsia
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Soviet Union vs Russia’s military doctrine
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Russia’s brand of hybrid warfare is a whole-of-government approach. It operates along a spectrum of conflict ranging from covert action to
overt combat, with the mobilization and employment of partisan forces that serve as the glue that binds each end of the spectrum of the
concept. All the while, Russian hybrid warfare makes use of information, cyber and electronic capabilities as tools of applied force. Russia
uses the construct of the “Russian Identity” to justify action and to enable covert and partisan action.

(Fox and Rosso, 2017) -> escalate - de-escalate / hybrid warfare / chaos strategy doctrine.
Soviet Union’s doctrine Russia’s doctrine

Uniting for Peace (U4P) Invoked by the Security Council
Uniting for Peace Invoked by the General Assembly
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U4P is very rare, happened only 12 times in the history.

Appointment of the members of the Credentials Committee 
Report of the Credentials Committee

• Adoption of the agenda (A/ES-11/2)

• Letter dated 28 February 2014 from the Permanent
Representative of Ukraine to the United Nations
addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/
2014/136) - Item 5

• https://media.un.org/en/asset/k1l/k1luiq96be
How to Overrule the Veto
Power with Style

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https://mobile.twitter.com/1hotstreet/status/1498313100143075330
• The negotiation terms oﬀered both on table and oﬀ table, we see stalemate
here

• Ukrainian side:
• Possible Terms: Russia needs to retreat without condition, and end
war

• Bargaining chip: [1] Building up potential protracted war; [2]
Supports by economic and symbolic sanction from the West and
allies; [3] Supports by financial and equipments from the West; [4]
Threatening to enter EU and NATO

• Advantage: Protracted war tends to weaken Russian army in the
long run, in its fullest potential, it might even make the regime
collapse from within.

• Russian side:
• Possible Terms: Cedes Crimea in an exchange of Donbas and end
war, see https://newsinfo.inquirer.net/1561513/putin-lays-out-
conditions-as-russians-shell-ukrainian-city

• Bargaining chip: [1] Controlling the territories of northern Ukraine,
Donbas, Mariupol, Crimea-Kherson; [2] Threatening to use nuclear
weapon; [3] Posses a stockpile of gas and energy

• Advantage: Holding gas and energy stockpile will force the West to
stop the sanction in the long term. Russian energy production is
accounting for over 12 percent of global crude oil production.
Washington’s order to release strategic stockpile of oil and gas
tends to be on a short term manners.

Economic Statecraft: Economics as Weapons
David Allen Baldwin (2020), “Economic Statecraft” (new edition), pp. 40-41
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SWIFT Sanction
• The Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT), legally
S.W.I.F.T. SC, is a Belgian cooperative society providing services related to the
execution of financial transactions and payments between banks worldwide, the
global de facto financial settlement hub.

• Considered to be the nuclear options in economic sanction arsenal. Now the US,
EU, Canada, Japan, South Korea, Singapore, etc. adopt the SWIFT sanction.

• No real alternative, Since 2014, the Bank of Russia has run its own financial
messaging system for Russian and foreign banks. But it has only about 400 users.

• Aims to increase cost of war and inflicts the most economic pain in the shortest
period, i.e. economic shock or devalue of currency. The Bank of Russia raised the
interest rate from 9.5% to 20% after the rouble sank 30% after new Western
sanctions. The currency then eased back to stand 20% down.

• The most rigorous aspect is at the compliance certified body, i.e. “J.P. Morgan
(JPMS) has introduced a framework that is designed to comply with U.S. money
laundering laws and regulations by restricting certain activities in the securities of
U.S. Marijuana Related Businesses”

• Might impact on shortage of gas and energy, triggers commodity price and inflation

• See sanction list: https://www.ft.com/content/6f3ce193-ab7d-4449-
ac1b-751d49b1aaf8
Absolutely brutal collapse in the ruble tonight - down more than 40%. This exceeds the
loss suﬀered on August 26, 1998 during the height of the Russian Financial Crisis.

https://twitter.com/vsualst/status/1498120083679363072
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DEFCON 3
• Putin places Russian nuclear deterrent on highest alert,
https://www.rt.com/russia/550767-putin-nuclear-
deterrent-forces-order/

• Pentagon wants Moscow back channels to prevent
nuclear escalation: As the U.S. and NATO rush weapons
into Ukraine, DoD oﬃcials want more military channels to
Putin’s top leaders. But Russia’s not picking up the
phone. https://www.politico.com/news/2022/02/27/
pentagon-moscow-backchannel-escalation-00012107

• Normally, DEFCON status is not available to public, but it
has been communicated only among the security oﬃcers

• It has changed from: normal condition, to DEFCON 5, 4,
3, 2, 1 (maximum readiness)

• The recent level, DEFCON 3, “Round House”, was
assessed by the public intelligence organization,
DEFCON Warning System (DWS), for civilians, not
military, https://mobile.twitter.com/DEFCONWSALERTS/
status/1497954094807351296
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Nuclear Warfare Concept
• Nuclear Triad is a capability to deliver nuclear missiles from Land-sea-air based (ICBMs, SLBMs, Strategic Bombers), only four countries
control nuclear triad.

• The possession of second-strike capabilities, the possible remaining nuclear arsenal that can endure the adversaries’ first-strike,
counters a first-strike nuclear threat and can support a no first use nuclear strategy. the submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) is
the second-strike capability by nature.

• Reciprocal second-strike capabilities usually cause a mutual assured destruction (MAD) defence strategy, though one side may have a
lower level minimal deterrence response. Thus MAD is the genuine “helm” of hegemony of “hard power” to “govern” the recent global
order. MAD mades total war or world war among superpowers unlikely, but a limited conventional warfare.

• Anti-ballistic Missile (ABM) is a system designed to intercept and destroy any type of ballistic threat especially ICBM. The ABM capability
is not a public knowledge, but a military classified information. Full ABM capability is like Israeli “Iron Dome”. Normally, the intelligence
service will provide specific location of ICBM (and may be also airbase) for automatic intercept, but it’s difficult to detect & intercept SLBM,
because it has stealthily movably operated undersea. The recent nuclear deterrence debate argues on a topic to limit ABM capability more
than to restrict amount of nuclear possession, i.e. China has employed “minimum deterrence”. Because ABM constitutes a “hidden”
leverage over second-strike capability, thus off-balance in MAD. It’s expected that the US has possessed the most excel ABM on earth.

• Russian Death Hand (Система) can automatically initiate the launch of the Russian intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) by sending a
pre-entered highest-authority order from the General Staff of the Armed Forces, Strategic Missile Force Management to command posts
and individual silos if a nuclear strike is detected by seismic, light, radioactivity, and pressure sensors even with the commanding elements
fully destroyed.
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https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_states_with_nuclear_weapons

https://sgp.fas.org/crs/nuke/R45861.pdf
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Russia’s nuclear warheads

https://sgp.fas.org/crs/nuke/R45861.pdf
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Russia’s nuclear warheads (cont.)

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Long-range Hypersonic Weapon (LRHW)
• The Long-Range Hypersonic Weapon (LRHW) is
a surface-to-surface hypersonic missile planned
for use by the United States Army. The United
States Navy intends to procure a ship/
submarine-launched variant of the missile as
part of the service's Intermediate-Range
Conventional Prompt Strike (IRCPS) program.

• LRHW is diﬃcult to intercept, but it’s also
diﬃcult to maneuver, both due to its high speed.

• Apart of the US, China and Russia also conduct
the test, but only the US has already made it in
production, and also a military space program
(i.e. Space Delta 9 in US Space Force, orbital
warfare) to counter this kind of weapon.
https://mobile.twitter.com/ussfspoc/status/1460998677019906056
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The Evolution of Geopolitical Theories
• Classic dialectic between Sir Halford John Mackinder (heartland theory) vs Nicholas John Spykman (rimland theory), realism plus geography.

• George Friedman (RAND/Stratfor/Geopolitical Futures) has enhanced the classic dialectic to infuse it into each country’s “geopolitical implication” and
then each country will project its “hard power” along its distinguish geopolitical implication. World system has happened according to the interaction
among those geopolitical implications around the world. The US is the maintenance of global order because of its implication to preserve the largest
sea power on earth. Under this theory, geopolitical implication will dictate state’s behavior, not man itself. Putin has to enact his political maneuver
according to Russian geopolitical implication in order to maintain his power, not the other way round. If he fails to do so, he will be replaced by
someone else who can do better than him in this regards. There is more “maneuver of power” rather than “balance of power” in this aspect.

• John Joseph Mearsheimer’s offensive realism maintains “regional hegemony” (to avoid bug passing flaw) and trying to suppress other regional
candidates by collaborate with regional actors (via offshore balancer) more than just to wait for natural geopolitical balance of power (thus offensive not
defensive). There is no true global order in this system, but global typology of power, the unipolarity (single regional hegemon) and bipolarity (two
regional hegemons) are safer than multipolarity (multiple regional hegemons) because minimum miscalculation from limited “bug passing” possibility.
The premise of realism has been built upon the nature of man, i.e. anarchy and power politics.

• Neoliberalism maintains “global institution” to preserve “global governance”, i.e. UN and its sister subsidiaries. Under this system, economic power
will be enshrined over hard power. Thus Joseph Nye has invented the concept of “soft power” and “smart power” to combine different power
altogether. The premise on neoliberalism has been built upon the economic concept such as game theory. This school believes in international law. It
fails to explain why sometimes human sacrifice their life instead of economic benefit (considered from the actor’s point of view, should they fail to exist,
i.e. suicidal terrorist or die in war, the game in “game theory” will be no more, gambling can’t explain over all driving factor.)

• The discourse of institutions is the outcome of “constructed idea” by human interactions, thus constructivist school

• Another model is Marko Papic’s constrain model (2021: 40) g Geopolitics.Λsia
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• It has to control strategic gravity center around Moscow and
major industrial zone and preserve its influence over its core in
the central Russian plain

• It has to build buﬀer state over buﬀer state in Eastern Europe,
to prolong invasion from northern European plain which has
very minimum natural barrier (i.e. mountain, river or sea), and
waiting for the winter to use the climate to inflict the invading
adversaries.

• It has to maintain its influence over several natural barriers to
protect its core, i.e. Balkan Mountains, Black Sea, Crimean
Mountains, Caucasus, The Caspian Sea, Ural Mountains, etc.

• It doesn’t matter whether Putin is either a rational actor or a
madness, a democratic leader or an authoritarian, believes in
communist ideology or believes in Russian Orthodox identity,
but what’s matter is he has to implement the geostrategy
according to Russian geopolitical implication.

• See https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/geopolitics-russia-
permanent-struggle
Russia’s Geopolitical Implication

SIU’s Meta-Geopolitical Concept
• Offensive realism tends to overlook possible emerging global institution from the changing global typology. Geopolitical implication fails to recognize
other kinds of power, i.e. economic power and other soft powers. Neoliberalism tends to take its global order (global governance) for grant, and believes
too much on economic principle/power especially in passive form, (tends to omit its offensive form, i.e. sanction).

• Meta-geopolitical framework tries to eliminate those flaws and weaknesses, and blending all kind of school of thought into the universal analytical
framework.

• It has relied on Alvin Toffler’s “powershift” concept, based on The Three Sacred Treasures (三種の神器), the imperial regalia of Japan consists of the
sword Kusanagi no Tsurugi (草薙劍), the mirror Yata no Kagami (⼋咫鏡), and the jewel Yasakani no Magatama (⼋尺瓊勾⽟). They represent the three
primary virtues: valour (the sword) or “hard power”, wisdom (the mirror) or “noopolitik”, and benevolence (the jewel) or “economic power” in this
regards.

• Each power can be transformed back and forth into different kind of power, i.e. money can buy gun, gun can rob money. Each power will glitter
according to the changing global typology (i.e. hard power in multipolarity, and economic power in unipolarity, mixed in bipolarity).

• Each power has its dominant in distinguish domain, i.e. hard power based on terrestrial domain (land and sea, controlled with air supremacy) it will
generate specific geopolitical implication, noopolitik can shine in “noosphere / cyberspace domain”, thus powershift because of information
technological revolution. The demarcation among domains to project the power to related actors is sometimes blur and intermingled. Thus in space
(astropolitik) domain, the nation-state actor will behave differently from terrestrial (geopolitics) power projection typology.

• It allows (or enable to plug in) different school of thought, i.e. mainstream economics in realm of economic/financial sphere, but this realm can transform
into offensive form such as “economic statecraft” using economic power as of weapon, albeit a soft one, i.e. sanction.

• The underlying foundation has been built based on dynamic statecraft of nation-state, i.e. “positive governance”, an ongoing research.

• It’s on development and it has to be tested more. It aims to build a geopolitical framework for all seasons, all purpose. g Geopolitics.Λsia
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SIU’s comprehensive “Meta-Geopolitics” Framework
https://www.geopolitics.asia/white-paper
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See “Katechon and Cognitive Revolution: An Emergence of the 21st
Century Global Politics”, https://www.academia.edu/45408259/
Katechon_and_Cognitive_Revolution_An_Emergence_of_the_21st_
Century_Global_Politics, to be revised and presented at CMU
School of Public Policy, “Public Policy for Inclusivity and
Sustainability, 2022”
See “Positive Governance”, such as (1) Francis Fukuyama’s The
Origins of Political Order, (2) https://www.academia.edu/62322497/
The_Public_Administration_s_Cybernetic_Governance_Paradigm_in
_Digital_Era (already presented at the annual conference of PAAT,
2021), and (3) https://www.academia.edu/44766849/
Reinstitutionalism_and_Governance.
To be analyzed with “Computational Social Science” model such as
Agent-based Modeling (ABMs), with opensouce intelligence based
on meta-geopolitics framework, and to be polished by machine-
learning technology in the future
The global order and typology helmed
and governed by “MAD” of nuclear triad
Modeling at (1) micro-scale, i.e. corporate and association, (2)
mesoscale such as nation-state, and (3) macro-scale such as
intergovernmental organization.

Recommendation to Thailand and ASEAN
• Objection a violation of international law, thus to preserve the recent
rules-based global order. This is the most vital principle to be
insisted for future resolution regarding possible conflict in Asia. This
kind of global order is the most peaceful one, compared to the
revision one oﬀered by Russia.

• Encourage to resolve the conflict by the peaceful means, not by
using force, and providing humanitarian aids to the people whom
have been impacted from the conflict.

• Voice out the concerns concretely and unitedly with ASEAN
platform

• Consider to facilitate the coming APEC meeting as a stage to help
resolving the conflict. Russia might be banned from the
corresponding members. Thus it has to be prepared as a platform
beforehand.

• The world should set its priority into global issues such as the
pandemic, the climate change, inequality among the north and the
south, terrorism, etc. Thus ending the conflict is a must. g Geopolitics.Λsia
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