The United States invasion of Iraq destabilized the country and created an environment conducive to violence and terrorism. Insurgents gained valuable combat experience fighting US forces, establishing Iraq as a training ground for terrorists. The US policy of targeted drone strikes against terrorists may have completed a self-reinforcing cycle of violence by creating new militants seeking retribution. Destroyed infrastructure and cultural sites in Iraq serve as constant reminders of fragility and death, strengthening support for violent ideologies. Experienced insurgents from Iraq have spread to other conflicts, and the cycle of US targeted killings and terrorist creation could continue indefinitely.

1. 1
Atmosphere of Destruction, Future of Violence:
Consequences of the United States Invasion of Iraq
Keith Cavalli
In recent times following the United States occupation, Iraq has swelled to become a
disturbingly violent place once again. In the months straddling the latest elections the
country has been a theatre of frequent attacks targeting security forces and civilians.
According to United Nations estimates, 8,868 people were killed in violence in 2013,
Iraq's highest annual death toll in five years (al Jazeera, 2014). The landscape is typical of
military conflict. Anbar province, with its scorched and crumbling buildings pockmarked
from gunfire, could be mistaken for Mogadishu during the Somali civil war of the 1990’s.
It was not surprising that at the 2014 White House Correspondents dinner, when the
congregation was asked if it was time for a ‘ten-year surprise party for Iraq’ (McHale,
Washington DC, 2014), the joke was not well received. The United States invasion of
was destabilising, and according to the Nuremberg Charter could be considered a
“supreme international crime” (Kramer & Michalowski 2005, p. 446). The consequences
of the invasion of Iraq could be indefinite, and remain to be completely defined.
This essay will explore the environment created in Iraq as a result of the United States
invasion, and demonstrate that a potential cycle of terrorist creation and assassination has
been created. Studies will be presented that reveal the conditions created can influence
and motivate people to subscribe to violent behaviour. Iraq was a theatre that could be
considered to have offered a valuable opportunity to insurgents through combat
experience. The United States, in adopting a practice of targeted killings similar to Israel,
may have completed a self-reinforcing cycle of violence. The goal of regime change
partially resided in creating a stable, legitimate state, friendly to the United States.
However, the invasion ironically resulted in what could be considered a failed state, with
a lingering insurgency (Hinnebusch 2007, p. 17), as well as a proving ground for the
insurgents. Iraq and the United States could be engaged in a future cycle of violence
through the creation of a psychological environment, insurgent war, and a continuing US
policy of terrorist assassination.
Transition to destruction
Defeating and disbanding the Iraqi army resulted in a weak Iraqi state, or possibly no
state at all, replacing the relatively stable country that existed under the regime of
Saddam Hussein (Feldman 2009, p. 13). It has been similarly postulated that many of the
munitions for constructing Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) were taken from large
Iraqi military ordnance deposits that were looted by insurgents, or from pre-war
stockpiles hidden throughout the country (Fischer 2008, p. 2). The invasion of Iraq
created a rare but valuable training ground for terrorists to gain experience and
effectiveness, as occurred in the Soviet war in Afghanistan (1979-1989). In addition to
the United States freeing qualified potential insurgents, it allowed access to the necessary

2. 2
arms in a politically vacuous space. Countries with intermediate degrees of political
freedom are shown to be more subject to terrorism as opposed to countries with
expansive political freedom or strict authoritarian regimes (Abadie, 2004 p. 3). This
suggests that transition from an authoritarian regime to democracy may result in an
increase in terrorism (Abadie, 2004 p. 9). Recent violence might be considered to
substantiate this finding.
A team of American and Iraqi epidemiologists estimated that out of a total of 655,000
excess deaths in the US invasion of Iraq, 601,000 were caused by violence (Brown 2006,
p. 12). A logical and empathetic view would recognise that suffering indiscriminate
violence without immediate recourse may confer a lasting impression on survivors. These
victims may wish to seek similarly violent retribution. As the United States has not been
subjected to any legal recourse under the international system, the motivation for justice
through individual actions or a terrorist organisation may have been created.
The National Security Strategy of The United States (2010 p. 4) stated “in Iraq, we are
transitioning to full Iraqi sovereignty and responsibility - a process that includes the
removal of our troops, the strengthening of our civilian capacity, and a long-term
partnership to the Iraqi Government and people”. It has been presented that there were
some successes early in the invasion through the Coalition Provisional Government
(CPA) such as a nation-wide food rationing program, health and education, and currency
stabilization. These accomplishments by the CPA were overshadowed by unfulfilled
promises (Looney 2008, p. 27). The United States could be considered to have invaded,
destroyed and left unrepaired lives and property, and departed Iraq. The resulting
environment has been littered with physical and psychological reminders serving to
motivate future generations of terrorists.
Psychological atmosphere: the silent recruiter
Reminders of atrocities are not confined to personal memories of death. Remaining
scenes of demolition and the absence of adequate reconstruction affect the victim’s
psyche. Such environments have been determined to be a substantial element in
formulating militaristic or radical approaches in the wake of an invasion and occupation
(Ziv, Kruglanski, & Shulman 1974). In a study of Israeli settlements eighteen months
after the end of artillery shelling in the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, it was found that people
living in shelled areas expressed more patriotism, covert aggression, and signs of courage
than did those living in non-shelled areas. This determination was further seen as a
significant factor in the development of the attitudes of children. Terror Management
Theory (TMT) evolved out of such studies, presenting that human awareness of the
inevitability of death creates the potential for existential terror that would undermine
adaptive behavior unless effectively managed (Vail, Arndt, Motyl, & Pyszczynski 2012,
p. 1070). From this perspective the destroyed civilised human infrastructure in Iraq serves
as a ‘broken window’, a constant reminder of the fragility of human life (Vail, Arndt,
Motyl, & Pyszczynski 2012, p. 1070).

3. 3
Buildings constructed by the Americans that fell into disrepair might also be added to this
category. It has been determined that the sight of destroyed buildings leads to increased
“death thought accessibility” which strengthens the religious certainty of victims and the
support for violent military aggression against people who might threaten their way of
life (Vail, Arndt, Motyl & Pyszczynski 2012, p. 1079). Osama bin Laden depicted such
findings in advance of the study, warning the American people “just as you lay waste to
our nation, so shall we lay waste to yours” (Osama bin Laden, 2004), keeping the fear
that is integral to terrorism in the fore.
Central to the destruction resulting from United States invasion was the failure to secure
Iraq’s cultural heritage. That the world’s largest military power did not plan for the
security of Iraq’s identity is bewildering, and could be considered a violation of Article
4(3) of the 1954 Hague Convention which calls for the prevention or intervention, to stop
“to any form of theft, pillage or misappropriation of, and any acts of vandalism directed
against, cultural property” (Hague Convention 1954, cited in Gerstenblith 2006, p. 7). As
the Coalition forces gained control of various cities, notably Baghdad, looting of
government buildings by the local populace was tacitly permitted by forces reluctant to
intervene. The Iraq Museum, National Library, National Archives, and Religious Library
(Awqaf Library) in Baghdad were all subjected to theft. Save for the museum, all
buildings were burned (Gerstenblith 2006, p. 7). For the Iraqis the scene must have been
surreal; American soldiers armed to the hilt and watching as the country’s history went
up in flames. Not only did war create the environment that Ziv, Kruglanski, and Shulman
studied which led to the findings of TMT, the lack of engagement by US Forces in the
invasion ensured that the ‘broken window’ effect extended into the nucleus of Iraq’s
cultural heritage. It is a background that could be deemed suited to the production of
terrorists.
Training, cards, and targets
George Bush’s ‘deck of cards’ approach, which depicted Saddam Hussein and 51 other
terrorists, became tradition under the Obama Administration through a series of ‘baseball
cards’ that presented terrorists to be considered for elimination by drone strike (Becker &
Shane 2012). An American citisen was targeted and killed in this approach, raising
constitutional concerns with respect to the right of due process under the Fifth
Amendment of the United States Constitution. The list could possibly exceed that of the
Bush Administration. The Chief of Staff William Daley pointed out that the president and
his advisers were aware that a continuous cycle of names could not be added to the ‘kill
list’ from consistently lower on the list of al Qaeda members. No answer however, has
been forthcoming as to the limits of the activity of targeted killing through drone strikes
(Becker & Shane 2012).
In the absence of a cap on this cycle, the creation of a potential hive for generations of
terrorists in Iraq may result in a pool of qualified operators that continue to come into the
sights of the US. Despite a lean toward peace and functionality in Iraq in the US National
Defense Strategy (2010), there may be a compounding violent cycle of engagement
through terrorist creation and assassination. The possible spillover of trained combatants

4. 4
into other theatres is thus a concern. David Kilcullen (2010, pp. 166-167) reveals through
complex system analysis that the principle strength in a global insurgency is the ties
between organisations. However if the links to a global Islamist insurgency can be
severed, then such ‘disaggregation’, could dismantle the risk of conflation of these
combatants in other theatres (Kilcullen 2010, p. 167).
Kilcullen’s approach is a thoughtful alternative to the violent targeted strikes abroad.
However, as Tan (2009, p. 173) presents, the US lacks the imagination to adapt to a
clever and nimble adversary, questioning whether the United States has the ability to
overcome its “ingrained cultural habit of using force as an easy option”. While targeted
killings may be effective, they are fraught with moral consequences. A case in the actions
of Israel is worth consideration. In 2002 Israel dropped a 2000 pound bomb to kill Salah
Shehada, a distressingly violent Hamas operator (Byman 2006, p. 95). He was killed,
along with his daughter and eight other children. The Hamas rhetoric in the reply was
gruesome, saying it would fight until “Jews see their own body parts in every restaurant,
every park, every bus and every street” (Byman 2006, p. 95). The bombing would have
been a potent event for the creation of martyrs. Though Hamas attacks increased rapidly
the following year, their effectiveness decreased. It was suggested that despite the
possible creation of terrorists and the increase in attacks as a result of a targeted killing,
the number of skilled terrorists was found to be quite limited, and that targeted killings
are effective in the elimination of experienced operators (Byman 2006, p. 103). However,
it is possible that if an environment contains the motivation for retribution, and a theatre
for practice exists, then militants over time will become effective to a degree that they too
are targeted.
Shutgart (2006, p. 29) demonstrates in the case of Afghanistan that battle hardened
Afghans, through defeating the Soviets, became an exceptional force for terrorism and
posits this could happen post Iraq. Indeed this appears to have occurred to a sophisticated
level. In Afghanistan the Soviet Army consisted of demoralized conscripts. In Iraq
insurgents tested themselves against arguably the most qualified army in history (Bergen
& Reynolds 2005, p. 4). In a report to the US Congress, Iraq was shown to be an active
battleground with a seemingly invisible enemy. In 2007 IEDs, roadside bombs, and
suicide car bombs caused over 60% of all American combat casualties in both killed and
wounded (Wilson, CRS Report for Congress, 2006). Examination of the 2008 Operation
Iraqi Freedom military casualty data shows the total number of hostile deaths of
Americans to be 3,178, and the number wounded in action to be 30,568 (Fischer, CRS
Report for Congress, 2008). The volume of incidents demonstrates an active arena with
militants gaining the skills required to become effective terrorists through immersion in
combat. Such skills can travel with the individual. It has been reported that under a new
overarching group, the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, Syrians are merging with fighters
from al Qaeda in Iraq, the same Sunni insurgent group that climbed to prominence
through fighting the Americans (Barnard & Schmitt 2013).
Conclusion

5. 5
The images associated with the invasion of Iraq have become infamous, but nowhere
would the reminders of the invasion generate more severe repercussions than from within
Iraq itself. Iraq is a country containing the origins for terrorism, and a war with the
United States provided practice for insurgents. It seems that the result of the invasion of
Iraq could be a cycle of martyr creation and targeted assassinations. While a successful
attack has not occurred on US soil by an Iraqi national, the pool of experienced operators
is likely deep and active. Experienced and motivated militants have engaged in other
theatres as they have done in Afghanistan. The United States may well be expected to
continue to target combatants. These individuals though may not have existed save for
the activities of the United States in Iraq. The invasion of Iraq could be seen to have
resulted in a cycle of militant development and targeted killing. This is a phenomenon
that is seeping into surrounding countries, along with the potential for continued
engagement abroad by the United States. The embers from the invasion of Iraq may be
scattered around the globe, and continue to burn.
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6. 6
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